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Comparative functionalism: An essay in anthropological theory
BOOK REVIEWS
123
C O M P A R A T I V E FUNCTIONALISM: AN ESSAY IN A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L THEORY. WALTER GOLDSCHMIOT. University of Chicago Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966. 149+xii pp THIS is a little book about a big subject. It addresses itself not only to the question "Why Anthropology ~"-but also offers some suggestions about "How". It deserves a wide readership, and should be of particular interest to readers of this inter-disciplinary Journal. The author is a social anthropologist and is Chairman of the Department o f Anthropology at the Umversity o f California at Los Angeles. He has had a wealth of field researcb experience both in North America and in Africa and is the author o f a number of ~orks on technical matters as well as on broader aspects o f anthropology and sociology. The mood of this latest book is set in the preface: "The anarchic state of anthropological mqmry is troubling an increasing number of its practitioners. Anthropology holds a monopoly on a body of data which is of prime importance to the understanding of every discipline treating with the nature of man and the character o f his behavior. It has a responsibihty therefore to the behavioral sciences as a whole, which it cannot neglect but which, in fact, it has not fulfilled." In this essay the author urges his colleagues to readdress themselves to the "big questions" of social science, among which he lists: What is the nature o f man, and what are the limits of his adaptability to situations and of his malleabdlty to cultural demands ? What are the recurrent problems consequent upon human interaction, and what are the tenable and most efficient solutions to these problems ? The author also recommends a reconsideration of more specific questions, such as. Is sexual jealousy "natural" among mankind? Are males "naturally" more dominant than females ~ is man fundamentally a "loving" creature? Do humans everywhere seek "symbolic" eternity for themselves ? Is war inevitable ~ The author's view o f cultural restitutions is basic to his thesis. According to him, institutions are mstrumentalmes for performing two kinds o f " f u n c t i o n " : 1 The satisfactaon of individuals' needs, both physical and "mental". 2 The maintenance of a society's stability in terms of the size of its population, the amount and quaht.~ o f goods consumed, and its "strength" vis-~-vis other societies. The author believes it possible and desirable to evaluate institutions in terms of their effectiveness in carrying out such functions. (Indeed, the normative flavour of this essay comes through very clearly.) Anthropology is important m reaching these objectaves because, according to the author, "it holds a monopoly on the body of data"--l.e, cross-cultural data--which other disciphnes need in order to understand and evaluate human institutions. But hasn't anthropology been doing these things in the past ? The author believes that the discipline may have started off in this direction but has been sidetracked into enterprises which by their very nature cannot help answer the "big questions". These sidetracks are o f two kinds: "explanations" based on a single case, and cross-cultural comparison of specific institutions. Case studies o f individual societies are, of course, necessary; they provide the raw materials for generalizations about mankind at large. Indeed, there ts need for many more such studies. But universally valid explanations can only come about through comparison of the whole range of societies. Such comparisons are of course a major part o f anthropological inquiry, but accord)ng to the author the wrong things are being compared. For example, efforts to compare the socalled institution o f "marriage" from society to socmty are doomed to failure because of the Impossibility of specifying what practices should be included under this term. Some o f the features of what we in the West call "'marriage" are m other societies included in different kinds of institutional frameworks, or may not be present at all. What all human societies do however have in common are problems consequent upon the nature of the human animal and the contexts of human social life; and every social-cultural system that we know about has developed more or less efficient practices for solving these problems. Hence, what anthropologists intent on generahzation should be concerned with is the comparison of social-cultural systems in terms o f the restitutions they have developed for solving these problems--or, in the author's language, for performing these functions. This is what the author means by "comparative functionalism". The author conmders that all comparative-functionalist studies must take into account the psychobiological character of man, each society's physical and social environment (i.e. the "ecosystem"), and its history Among the psychobiological characteristics of man are included not only man's "'animal needs", his distlnctive physical skills, and his unique capacity for symbolization, hut also his basic need for human interaction, his desire for physical sell-perpetuation, and his desire for symbolic self-aggrandmement. The ecosystem in which any society is found includes both opportunities to exploit and circumstances to be coped with. In this connection, the author points out that the physical environment is alterable onlyup to a point ; Le. every human society is forced to adjust to the environment to some degree. As for history (or what
124
BOOK REVIEWS
the author calls the "temporal dxmension") he points out that no society can be "understood" without knowledge of its past and its members' expectations. (This viewpoint zs presumably intended as a corrective to the synchronistic bmses of many social anthropologists.) Finally, the author provides examples of some of the "'functional reqmmtes" around which he urges fellow anthropologists to organize their inquiries. One such necessity faced by every society (given man's psychobiological nature, etc.) is to distribute its goods. This is done in numbers of ways: by sharing; by direct exchanges of various types--reciprocal gift-giving, bartering, etc.; by elaborate market systems; and so on. But it is always done somehow, and with different degrees of efficiency (in terms of individuals' needs and the avoidance o f waste). Another set o f functions that must be performed by some institutions in every society is the placing of restraints upon sexual drives and the regularization of procreation. The jobs involved In performing these functions include rules delimiting rights o f sexual access, provision for the nurturance and socialization o f infants and for their social identities, prowsion of an identification object for parents (wherewith to project themselves, symbolically, into the future), etc. In Western societies most of these functions are performed by marriage and the family, but this is by means the case m all societies, in some of which, m fact, the family as we know it simply does not exist, and where analogies to our contract o f "marriage" are at best only partial. It is easy to criticize this little book on a number of points. It is in places rather loosely argued, and marred by such vague expressions as "implications o f a social order" (p. 67). It will undoubtedly come under fire from anthropologists as being, "warmed-over MahnowskI" (i.e. the concern with institutions as instrumentalities for satisfying individuals' needs), or "dead-end Radcliffe-Brownism" 0.e., the concern with "societal maintenance"), or "negative Leachxsm" (i.e., the disavowal of such alleged universals as "marriage"). Others will critlcme the author for making unsupportable assumptions about man's need for social lnteracuon with other humans, or about "the fundamental desire for symbolic self-aggrandizement". Indeed, anyone tackling such a large subject as this will inevitably arouse criticisms, just and unjust. The important thing, however, is that the subject is being tackled: for doing this, Professor Goldschmidt deserves commendation for courage and h~gh marks for intellectual resourcefulness. DOUGLAS OLIVER Harvard Um versity
123
C O M P A R A T I V E FUNCTIONALISM: AN ESSAY IN A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L THEORY. WALTER GOLDSCHMIOT. University of Chicago Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966. 149+xii pp THIS is a little book about a big subject. It addresses itself not only to the question "Why Anthropology ~"-but also offers some suggestions about "How". It deserves a wide readership, and should be of particular interest to readers of this inter-disciplinary Journal. The author is a social anthropologist and is Chairman of the Department o f Anthropology at the Umversity o f California at Los Angeles. He has had a wealth of field researcb experience both in North America and in Africa and is the author o f a number of ~orks on technical matters as well as on broader aspects o f anthropology and sociology. The mood of this latest book is set in the preface: "The anarchic state of anthropological mqmry is troubling an increasing number of its practitioners. Anthropology holds a monopoly on a body of data which is of prime importance to the understanding of every discipline treating with the nature of man and the character o f his behavior. It has a responsibihty therefore to the behavioral sciences as a whole, which it cannot neglect but which, in fact, it has not fulfilled." In this essay the author urges his colleagues to readdress themselves to the "big questions" of social science, among which he lists: What is the nature o f man, and what are the limits of his adaptability to situations and of his malleabdlty to cultural demands ? What are the recurrent problems consequent upon human interaction, and what are the tenable and most efficient solutions to these problems ? The author also recommends a reconsideration of more specific questions, such as. Is sexual jealousy "natural" among mankind? Are males "naturally" more dominant than females ~ is man fundamentally a "loving" creature? Do humans everywhere seek "symbolic" eternity for themselves ? Is war inevitable ~ The author's view o f cultural restitutions is basic to his thesis. According to him, institutions are mstrumentalmes for performing two kinds o f " f u n c t i o n " : 1 The satisfactaon of individuals' needs, both physical and "mental". 2 The maintenance of a society's stability in terms of the size of its population, the amount and quaht.~ o f goods consumed, and its "strength" vis-~-vis other societies. The author believes it possible and desirable to evaluate institutions in terms of their effectiveness in carrying out such functions. (Indeed, the normative flavour of this essay comes through very clearly.) Anthropology is important m reaching these objectaves because, according to the author, "it holds a monopoly on the body of data"--l.e, cross-cultural data--which other disciphnes need in order to understand and evaluate human institutions. But hasn't anthropology been doing these things in the past ? The author believes that the discipline may have started off in this direction but has been sidetracked into enterprises which by their very nature cannot help answer the "big questions". These sidetracks are o f two kinds: "explanations" based on a single case, and cross-cultural comparison of specific institutions. Case studies o f individual societies are, of course, necessary; they provide the raw materials for generalizations about mankind at large. Indeed, there ts need for many more such studies. But universally valid explanations can only come about through comparison of the whole range of societies. Such comparisons are of course a major part o f anthropological inquiry, but accord)ng to the author the wrong things are being compared. For example, efforts to compare the socalled institution o f "marriage" from society to socmty are doomed to failure because of the Impossibility of specifying what practices should be included under this term. Some o f the features of what we in the West call "'marriage" are m other societies included in different kinds of institutional frameworks, or may not be present at all. What all human societies do however have in common are problems consequent upon the nature of the human animal and the contexts of human social life; and every social-cultural system that we know about has developed more or less efficient practices for solving these problems. Hence, what anthropologists intent on generahzation should be concerned with is the comparison of social-cultural systems in terms o f the restitutions they have developed for solving these problems--or, in the author's language, for performing these functions. This is what the author means by "comparative functionalism". The author conmders that all comparative-functionalist studies must take into account the psychobiological character of man, each society's physical and social environment (i.e. the "ecosystem"), and its history Among the psychobiological characteristics of man are included not only man's "'animal needs", his distlnctive physical skills, and his unique capacity for symbolization, hut also his basic need for human interaction, his desire for physical sell-perpetuation, and his desire for symbolic self-aggrandmement. The ecosystem in which any society is found includes both opportunities to exploit and circumstances to be coped with. In this connection, the author points out that the physical environment is alterable onlyup to a point ; Le. every human society is forced to adjust to the environment to some degree. As for history (or what
124
BOOK REVIEWS
the author calls the "temporal dxmension") he points out that no society can be "understood" without knowledge of its past and its members' expectations. (This viewpoint zs presumably intended as a corrective to the synchronistic bmses of many social anthropologists.) Finally, the author provides examples of some of the "'functional reqmmtes" around which he urges fellow anthropologists to organize their inquiries. One such necessity faced by every society (given man's psychobiological nature, etc.) is to distribute its goods. This is done in numbers of ways: by sharing; by direct exchanges of various types--reciprocal gift-giving, bartering, etc.; by elaborate market systems; and so on. But it is always done somehow, and with different degrees of efficiency (in terms of individuals' needs and the avoidance o f waste). Another set o f functions that must be performed by some institutions in every society is the placing of restraints upon sexual drives and the regularization of procreation. The jobs involved In performing these functions include rules delimiting rights o f sexual access, provision for the nurturance and socialization o f infants and for their social identities, prowsion of an identification object for parents (wherewith to project themselves, symbolically, into the future), etc. In Western societies most of these functions are performed by marriage and the family, but this is by means the case m all societies, in some of which, m fact, the family as we know it simply does not exist, and where analogies to our contract o f "marriage" are at best only partial. It is easy to criticize this little book on a number of points. It is in places rather loosely argued, and marred by such vague expressions as "implications o f a social order" (p. 67). It will undoubtedly come under fire from anthropologists as being, "warmed-over MahnowskI" (i.e. the concern with institutions as instrumentalities for satisfying individuals' needs), or "dead-end Radcliffe-Brownism" 0.e., the concern with "societal maintenance"), or "negative Leachxsm" (i.e., the disavowal of such alleged universals as "marriage"). Others will critlcme the author for making unsupportable assumptions about man's need for social lnteracuon with other humans, or about "the fundamental desire for symbolic self-aggrandizement". Indeed, anyone tackling such a large subject as this will inevitably arouse criticisms, just and unjust. The important thing, however, is that the subject is being tackled: for doing this, Professor Goldschmidt deserves commendation for courage and h~gh marks for intellectual resourcefulness. DOUGLAS OLIVER Harvard Um versity