- Email: [email protected]
Innovative governance from public policy unities
JBR-08703; No of Pages 5 Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Business Research
Innovative governance from public policy unities☆ Do Phu Hai a,⁎, Salvador Roig-Dobón b, José Luis Sánchez-García c a b c
Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (GASS/VASS), Hanoi, Vietnam IUDESCOOP, Universitat de València, Av. Los Naranjos s/n, 46022, València, Spain Catholic University of Valencia San Vicente Mártir, Valencia, Spain
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 1 February 2015 Accepted 1 September 2015 Available online xxxx
a b s t r a c t This study examines which configurations explain the public policy for innovative governance through comparative qualitative analysis (QCA). The research analyzes the sub-system conditions through a case of Vietnam. The results show the minimum configurations of key variable conditions to achieve the outcome. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Public policy Innovative governance Climate change policy QCA method
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical framework
The notion of governance connects with two developments that culminate in political and social sciences (March & Olsen, 1989; Voß, 2007; Williamson, 1999). Political sciences increasingly see governance as a reduction of the states' governing capabilities and the loss of legitimacy of state interventions. However, political sciences do not consider the multi-causality of policy conditions and innovative governance. The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is helpful to select in the modeling. Three principles guide this research: (1) evidence-based research, (2) academic rigor and independence of analysis, and (3) social legitimacy and a participatory process. These principles involve a substantive research approach with a rigorous and systematic identification of policy conditions on the reform progress in the case of Vietnam. Another way is to move away from obvious case boundaries— from obvious administrative or political–institutional boundaries (e.g. municipalities, districts, states, countries) to boundaries that are more directly relevant in the policy studies (Do, 2008). To examine the policy process of Vietnam, the study draws on data from the Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI). Following this introductory section, Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 offers the research method, including the description of case selection and model specification. Section 4 offers the results. Section 5 presents conclusions.
To the question of how institutions and mechanisms of governance come into being, the assumption is that overarching organizations of power (the state, the market) put them in place. Governance then includes the creation, maintenance, and transformation of social forms of organization through interventions in and modulation of existing patterns of interaction. These rule-shaping processes (e.g. public policy or organizational management) are institutionally structured themselves. The interest in such ‘institutionalized forms of shaping institutions’ is great in political science perspectives on governance where the focus is on the organization of policy processes. Further, political scientists differentiate levels within governance structures, acknowledging its nested character. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) distinguish between the “operational level,” the “collective level,” and a “constitutional level,” each with particular interactions and rules in their framework of analysis. In addition, Weale et al. (2003) distinguish between “primary rules” as “policies that are decided,” and “secondary rules,” which are “rules about rules; they define how the primary rules are made and how they may be changed” (p. 5) Thus, governance demarcates a departure from a narrow understanding of societal steering as unilateral, hierarchical control of the state. In contrast to pure hierarchy or pure anarchy, governance acknowledges a diversity of interaction patterns, rule systems, and rule-making processes that reproduce social order within various policy domains (see Voß, 2007). Eising and Kohler-Koch (1999) stress this open analytical understanding in which governance deals with the structured ways and means in which the divergent preferences of interdependent actors translate into policy choices to allocate values. Mayntz (1997) contributes to a rising perception of government failure in the 1970s and early 1980s. The widening perspective brings new forms of cooperative steering
☆ The authors thank Alicia Mas, University of Valencia, for her careful reading and suggestions on revising this essay. ⁎ Corresponding author at: Graduate Academy of Social Sciences, 477 Nguyen Trai, Thanh Xuan, Hanoi, Vietnam. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D.P. Hai), [email protected] (S. Roig-Dobón), [email protected] (J.L. Sánchez-García).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135 0148-2963/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
2
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
between public and private actors and self-regulation of private actors into view. The measurement of governance is complex and manifold and involves many conditions (Guzmán-Cuevas, Cáceres-Carrasco, & Soriano, 2009; Ribeiro-Soriano & Urbano, 2010). Many scholars in Vietnam consider that governance relies on six dimensions including transparency, vertical accountability, participation at local level, control of corruption, public administration procedures, and public service deliveries. In addition, innovative governance is important in its own right but even more for its contribution to the formation of a more fair and equal society (Hellström, 1996, 1998, 2001). The conditions that this study selects for the outcome of innovative governance come from discussions on governance and the concept of policy capacity. The first condition is the quality of systemwide data collection and data sharing. Information is very critical for policy analysis; thus, evidence-based public policy processes rely on the quality of system-data collection and data sharing. Information, by itself, does not put pressure on policymakers to make changes nor pressures the public to ask for changes. The cutting-edge issues in modern evidence-based policy debates focus on problemframing, methods for gathering and assessing reliable evidence, communicating and transferring knowledge into decision-making, and evaluating the effectiveness of implementation and program delivery in complex policy areas (Head, 2009). The rational choice agents argue that better data practice leads to more effective policy decisions (Weitzman, Silver, & Brazill, 2006). Therefore, this condition is the efficient sharing of data among data owners and inter- and intra-governmental agencies. The second condition is the accessibility of data or information to non-state actors. The participation and collaboration of non-state actors into the public policy process depend on their access to data. In Vietnam, non-state actors include mass organization, professional organizations and umbrella organizations, VNGOs, and community-based organizations (Do, 2008, 2009; Norlund, 2007). The third condition is the institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation. Policymaking follows rules and procedures, and less formal sanctions constrain policymaking (John & Johnson, 2008). For public policy process, rules are necessary (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Thus, the rules and procedures of public policy process going along with standards for the policy analysis and evaluation are the key for the governance outcome. The fourth condition is the policy learning capability. Two separate endogenous and exogenous aspects of subjective and objective policy learning exist (Bennett & Howlett, 1992), thus actors participating in policy evaluation are often also participating in a larger process of policy learning, which seeks to improve policymaking drawing on the assessment of past experience. Other variable exists which may enhance the learning process; for example, when actors learn to trust each other and exchange policy ideas, there is a potential for policy innovation (John, 2012). In Vietnam, the state actors participating in the policy process may increase the capability. The fifth condition is the inter-government and inter-agency coordination. The notion of policy sub-system is a powerful concept in policy analysis (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). The coordination of state actors in the sub-system, both at national and sub-national level, is important. The coordination of inter-government refers to different state actors in executive, legislative, and judiciary power branches, as well as within the executive system such as line ministries. However, the coordination of inter-agencies plays a key role for the policy process because of the location in different ministries or localities of functional departments in the Vietnam context. From the PAPI data, this study selects the specific cases that relate to the sub-national policy process. The sixth condition is the effectiveness of policy network and policy community. According to Howlett and Ramesh (2003), policy network is “being essentially interest-based” (p.151). The policy community consists of tight groups of policy actors or tight-knit sets of policy actors
who share a common idea set (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Richardson & Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1984). Group or network interactions correspond to the fluid and changeable reality of policymaking much more than the institutional approach (John, 2012). In Vietnam, the effectiveness of network and community policies depends on the sharing of policy process, which leads to innovative governance. The seventh condition is the clarity in roles and responsibilities of different organizations in policy process. Institutions divide roles and responsibilities between organizations; institutions constrain the choices open to decision makers and play a role in shaping the preferences of those actors (John, 2012). The eighth condition is the political accountability for policy process. The concept of accountability is complex. Keohane (2003, p. 3) also argues, “Accountability refers to relationships in which principals have the ability to demand answers from agents to questions about their proposed or past behavior, to discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in the event that they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.” Political accountability refers to the responsibility or obligation of government officials to act in the best interests of society or face consequences. Public officials should be responsible for their actions. Accountability ensures that the actions and decisions of public officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government initiatives meet their objectives and respond to the needs of the community, thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2010a, 2010b). In Vietnam, parliament and people council are key actors in the “chain of accountability” because they are, along with the judiciary branch, the key institution of horizontal accountability, not only in their own right but also as the institution to which many autonomous accountability institutions report. Civil society organizations and the mass media are also important institutions in vertical accountability. The ninth condition is the levels of participation of non-state actors in the policy process. Individual and group actors are key explanatory variables (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003) that relate to their levels of participation into the policy process. When engaging transparently with a wide range of state, non-state, and societal actors, participation and inclusiveness in the policy process improve (see DFID & GTZ, 2005; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; World Bank, 2007). The non-state actors possible are business actors, NGOs, social-political organizations such as unions, mass media, and research think-tanks. However, this research only deals with business actors and NGOs. One important function of civil society organizations (CSOs) is the mobilization of “volunteerism,” which can be for all kinds of social activities and human services. Through the mobilization of constituents and resources, those organizations can influence national policies and their implementation (Ribeiro-Soriano & Castrogiovanni, 2012; Sole Parellada, Ribeiro-Soriano, & Huarng, 2011). In Vietnam, the participation of NGOs and community-based organizations, research institutions, and associations could help in public policy process. Thus, the participation of non-state actors in policy process is a key condition that could produce the positive governance outcome. 3. Method This study uses QCA as method for the analysis because it is a common method in governance studies. Johnson (2005) explained how patterns of institutions and actors operated to produce a change in the municipal charter of USA. Kilburn (2004) worked on the influence of city context on urban regimes across 14 cities. Scouvart et al. (2008) measured the multiple causal interactions in deforestation process in Brazil. Oestreicher et al. (2009) strived to identify core conditions that shape the success or failure of a reduced deforestation scheme. Aubin and Varone (2011) analyzed rivalries between competing users of water resources. Rihoux, Rezsöhazy, and Bol (2011) worked successfully in an empirical study of 11 cases of local water rivalries in Belgium and Switzerland. Huntjens et al. (2011) analyzed policy
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
learning and its structural constraints regarding river basin management. In Vietnam, QCA analysis was useful to examine the grassroots of democracy and the condition variables relating to electoral systems, division of power, executive–legislative relations, and relation of state–civil society (Do, 2008). QCA allows identifying key combinations of causal conditions; in contrast, other methods such as statistical and economic tools mainly concentrate on establishing the “net effect” of each separate independent variable (Ragin, 2006). QCA also allows the identification of more than one unique path to an outcome—different participatory mechanisms, corresponding to more than one combination of conditions, may account for a result (Do, 2008; Ragin, 2009; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). This study uses the TOSMANA (Cronqvist, 2011) software to perform the csQCA (multi-value QCA) analysis. TOSMANA is a tool for Small-N analysis that is useful to perform social-science research on data sets with a small or intermediate number of cases.
3
Table 2 Balance of a change in PAPI score of 2011–2013 period. Province of Vietnam
Change of PAPI score from 2011 to 2013
Son La Dong Thap Ca Mau Bac Giang Ba Ria Vung Tau Ha Tinh Bac Ninh Cao Bang Vinh Long Binh Thuan Hung Yen Tra Vinh
−3.380 −2.221 −1.485 −1.416 −0.894 −0.606 3.611 3.894 3.959 4.042 4.893 5.944
QCA value 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.2. Model specification 3.1. Case selection Over two decades of reform, Vietnam has achieved significant economic development and poverty reduction. Recently, Vietnam has become a low–middle income country and aims to move towards improvement of quality, efficiency, and competitiveness of the economy in 2014–2020. Vietnam's reform dates back to 1986. Vietnam has implemented many effective measures to increase accountability in public life and citizen involvement in decision making. Democratic governance and citizen's participation also contribute to political stability, an essential building block of economic development. Democratic governance is important in its own right but even more so for its contribution to the formation of a more fair and equal society, in which power rests with the people. In short, democratic governance is necessary to create a society of the people, by the people, and for the people (Do & Nandy, 2006). This study uses the term of innovative governance to improve governance for Vietnam's context. The internal conditions are all important to examine for the innovative governance, thus this studies the sub-system conditions. The data for the analysis comes from the PAPI for years 2011, 2012, and 2013. This study also uses date from direct observation and perceptions of the leaders, policymakers, representatives of mass organizations, civil society groups, NGOs, and particularly local leaders who took part in and were responsible for the policy process.
Table 1 Specification of model.
Outcome variable Condition variables
Variables
Coded
Innovative governance The quality of system-wide data collection and data sharing Accessibility of data or information to non-state actors Institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation Policy learning capability Inter-government and inter-agency coordination Effectiveness of policy network and policy community Clarity in roles and responsibilities of different organizations in policy process Political accountability for process Levels of participation of non-state actors in policy process
(InG) Qdata Adata InSpolicy PLearn InCord Enetwork Crole PolAccou PartNGO
The study framed the system with some key conditions that relate to the innovative governance (see Table 1). See Table 2. During the analysis, the study rejected some conditions not relevant for the context (i.e., availability and competition of policy advisory services, levels of public trust in government, and the presence of policy entrepreneur(s)). Thus, the study selected the variables drawing on case knowledge and on the specificities of the Vietnam's governance. PAPI has become the time series governance- and policy-monitoring tool in Vietnam, and exclusively draws on citizens' perception. PAPI annually provides “real-time” data and information about governance processes in provincial level (PAPI, 2010–2014). 4. Results 4.1. Models analysis TOSMANA is useful to analyze cross-case regularities in small-N analysis. By means of Boolean algebra, the study can process dichotomized variables, which results in a formula explaining the outcome as a combination of condition variables. The study translates the variables into Boolean variables with multiple conjuncture of causality. In the analysis, with 9 causal conditions, theoretically, 29 (2k) = 512 possible combinations of conditions exist. The study groups together and shows as one configuration those cases that show the same configuration. The csQCA produces the minimal configurations of conditions necessary for the outcomes using Boolean algebra. The study minimizes the cases using Boolean algebra and further simplifies the combined patterns. The study also includes in the minimization those configurations that are theoretically possible but do not appear in the 12 cases (“logical cases”). In principle, the inclusion of logical cases generalizes the explanatory patterns that the observed cases suggest. 4.2. Minimization of “innovative governance” outcome (InG) TOSMANA processes the raw data to produce the truth table with 10 Boolean configurations: 5 configurations with [1] outcome corresponding to 6 cases; 5 configuration with [0] outcome with 6 cases. TOSMANA minimizes the configurations by using the Boolean minimization algorithms. Do (2009), Rihoux and De Meur (2009), and Rihoux et al. (2011) recommend running the minimization procedure twice, first for the [1] configurations, and then for the [0] configurations. 4.3. Minimizing value: The [1] configurations (without logical remainders) Firstly, the software minimizes the [1] configurations without including non-observed cases (i.e., without logical remainders). In the
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
4
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
Boolean minimization, the reduction of configurations reveals a clear pattern of the outcome for the InG outcome. The study obtains the following minimal formula; the reduction of the formula is as follows: PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1} […] ➔ innovative governance (formula 1). The PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1} are key conditions for [1], innovative governance. These formulas, we show the importance of a conditional configuration of PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1}, which is a combination of political accountability for policy process and inter-government and inter-agency coordination exiting in all minimal configurations in 12 provinces.
effectiveness of policy network, and policy community (InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0}). Inter-government and inter-agency coordination is the important condition for the governance, which brings tautological effect on the outcome governance. The level of effectiveness of the network or group and the high degree of participation of policy actors in the sub-system are key conditions for the innovative outcome, whereas weak condition of political accountability leads to the non-innovative governance.
4.4. Minimizing value: The [0] configurations (without logical remainders)
4.8. Findings
The study minimizes the [0] configurations without logical remainders. All descriptive minimal formulas are quite complex; the reduction of the formula (formula 2) is as follows: InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0} […] ➔ non-innovative governance (formula 2), so the InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0} represent the key conditions for [0], negative governance. These formulas show the importance of a conditional combination of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, inter-government and inter-agency coordination, effectiveness of policy network and policy community for non-innovation of governance in 12 provinces.
The results show that inter-government and inter-agency coordination is the important condition for the governance. On the one hand, QCA results also show that the high effectiveness of the network or group of can produce the outcome. On the other hand, results show that low degree of political accountability explains the non-innovative governance outcome. QCA helps identify the condition variable and causal combinations to produce the innovative governance (InG). The [1] outcome results from the combination (PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1}). QCA also shows that the [0] outcome results from the causal combination of weak conditions (InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0}), that is, of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, intergovernment and inter-agency coordination, and effectiveness of policy network and policy community. On the other hand, the only weak condition of political accountability for policy process leads to the non-innovative governance. This result means that the lack of political accountability may lead to non-innovative governance, which constrains the reform in Vietnam. In 12 cases, the favorable combination (InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0}) may actually be harmful for the governance.
4.5. Minimizing value: The [1] configurations (with logical remainders) To achieve more parsimony, running the TOSMANA to include nonobserved cases (i.e., logical remainders) is necessary. Thus, these logical remainders constitute a pool of potential cases that TOSMANA can use to produce a more parsimonious minimal formula. To include the non-observed cases is to express those 12 cases in a simpler way (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009). This study obtains the minimal formula 3: InCord{1} ➔ innovative governance. Thus, for all provinces, the condition of inter-government and inter-agency coordination plays the key role for the innovative governance. The study eliminates the InCord condition in TOSMANA and obtains this formula: Enetwork{1} + Adata{0}PolAccou{1} ➔ innovative governance. On the cases knowledge, the first path is better: Enetwork{1} ➔ innovative governance (formula 4). 4.6. Minimizing value: The [0] configurations (with logical remainders) The minimization of the [0] configurations, this time including the logical remainders, gives the following formula: InCord{0} ➔ noninnovative governance. Eliminating the configuration InCord results in PolAccou{0} + Adata{1}Enetwork{0}➔ non-innovative governance. Thus, for all these provinces, weak condition of political accountability for policy process or low level of effectiveness of policy network and policy community, even with existing high levels of the quality of system-wide data collection and data sharing led to the noninnovative governance outcome. On the cases knowledge, the study concludes that the first path is better to choose: PolAccou{0}➔ non-innovative governance (formula 5). Therefore, the weak condition of political accountability for policy process leads to non-innovative governance. 4.7. Synthesis In Vietnam context, the combination of political accountability for policy process and inter-government and inter-agency coordination results in innovative governance in all minimal configurations in 12 provinces (PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1}). Non-innovative governance in the 12 provinces is the result of the combination of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, inter-government and inter-agency coordination,
4.9. Methods of comparative public policies QCA helps in sharpening the focus on interaction patterns of innovative governance at sub-system of public policy processes. Making precise descriptions and definitions of the condition variables and possible outcomes is necessary for a highly systematic approach to the cases. QCA allows combining some qualities of the case-oriented approach with some qualities of the variableoriented approach (synthetic approach). This combination makes the case analysis transparent and contestable, meeting two fundamental conditions of scientific analysis (Do, 2009). For comparative configurational research (Ragin, 2006; Ragin, 2009), the combination of causal conditions lacking cases is the most powerful feature of QCA; from counterfactual analysis and establishment of explicit connections, QCA helps to reduce the challenges of research works in comparative of public policy at operational- and collective-choice level. QCA is extremely helpful not only for operating in the public policy sub-system (macro) from the comparative perspective of the country policies but also for the exploitation of contextual features linking to micro at operational level within one country. Finally, QCA offers valuable support with systematic case description and generalization in terms of theoretical proposals. The method makes precision mandatory. However, the results from QCA approach are difficult to interpret and require researchers with experience; thus, QCA results (and their interpretations) could tend to be somewhat arbitrary, whereas statistical methods are rather easier for junior researchers. Rihoux and Lobe (2009) are right to point out that QCA is most valuable if the method is part of an iterative process moving back and forth between actual cases and the results of analysis.
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
5. Conclusions Inter-coordination of inter-government and inter-agency coordination is a key condition for the outcome of innovative governance (Ribeiro-Soriano & Roig-Dobón, 2009). The causal combinations to produce the innovative governance result from the combination of the positive condition of political accountability, which comes from innovation of the Communist Party, and positive condition of intergovernment and inter-agency coordination, which is a result of the implementation of public administration reforms in Vietnam. QCA results show that the high level of effectiveness of policy network and policy community is essentially interest-based. Conversely, the non-innovative governance results from the causal combinations of weak conditions of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, and effectiveness of policy network and policy community. To sum up, the single weak condition of political accountability for policy process will lead to the non-innovative governance. Finally, QCA is helpful not only for the comparative analysis of public policy of countries but also for the comparative analysis at a local level. References Aubin, D., & Varone, F. (2011). Successful access of new user to water resource: A qualitative comparative analysis. Environment and Planning COMPASSS. Bennett, C.J., & Howlett, M. (1992). The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change. Policy Sciences, 25(3), 275–294. Cronqvist, L. (2011). Tosmana: Tool for Small-N Analysis [computer programme], version 1.3. 2.0. Trier: University of Trier. DFID, & GTZ (2005). Principles for PSIA Process in Policy Cycles and Stakeholder Participation. Available at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002344/PSIA_GTZ_ DFID_Mar2006.pdf Do, H.P. (2008). Grassroots political institutions in Vietnam. Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Vietnam (10/2007). Do, H.P. (2009). Institutional framework of participatory mechanism. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing. Do, H.N., & Nandy, S. (2006). Deepening democracy and increasing popular participation in Vietnam (Vietnam policy dialogue paper, 2006/1). Ha Noi, Vietnam: UNDP. Eising, R., & Kohler-Koch, B. (1999). Introduction: network governance in the European Union. In R. Eising, & B. Kohler-Koch (Eds.), The transformation of governance in the European Union (pp. 3–13). London: Routledge. Guzmán-Cuevas, J., Cáceres-Carrasco, R., & Soriano, D.R. (2009). Functional dependence and productive dependence of SMEs. Small Business Economics, 32(3), 317–330. Head, B.W. (2009). Three lenses of evidence-based policy. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67(1), 1–11. Hellström, E. (1996). Environmental forestry conflicts, forest policies and the use of forest resources—recent developments in USA, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland and Norway. Working Paper No. 7. Joensuu, Finland: European Forest Institute. Hellström, E. (1998). Qualitative comparative analysis: A useful tool for research into forest policy and forestry conflicts. Forest Science, 44(2), 254–265. Hellström, E. (2001). Conflict cultures. Qualitative Comparative Analysis of environmental conflicts in forestry (Silva Fennica Monographs No. 2). Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Forest Science/The Finnish Forest Research Institute. Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (2003). Studying public policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huntjens, P., Pahl-Wostl, C., Rihoux, B., Schlueter, M., Flachner, Z., Neto, S., ... Nabide Kiti, I. (2011). Adaptative water management and policy learning in a changing climate. A formal comparative analysis of eight water management regimes in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Environmental Policy and Governance, 21(3), 145–163. John, P. (2012). Analyzing public policy. Abingdon: Routledge. John, P., & Johnson, M. (2008). Is there still a public service ethos? In A. Park, J. Curtice, K. Thomson, M. Phillips, M. Johnson, & E. Clery (Eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 24th Report (pp. 105–125). London: Sage (eScholarID:46693). Johnson, L.S. (2005). Constitutional change in local governance: An exploration of institutional entrepreneurs, procedural safeguards, and selective incentives. (Retrieved from) Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations Paper No. 3557. Florida: Florida State University.
5
Keohane, R.O. (2003). Global governance and democratic accountability. In D. Held, & M. Koening-Archibugi (Eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (pp. 130–159). Oxford: Oxford Polity Press. Kilburn, H.W. (2004). Explaining U.S. urban regimes. A qualitative comparative analysis. Urban Affairs Review, 39(5), 633–651. March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of Politics. New York, NY: Free Press. Mayntz, R. (1997). The conditions of effective public policy. In R.,. Mayntz (Ed.), Soziale Dynamik und politische Steuerung: Theoretische und methodologische Überlegungen (pp. 143–167). Frankfurt, New York: Campus (first published 1983). Norlund, I. (2007). Filling the gap: The emerging civil society in Vietnam. Ha Noi,Vietnam: UNDP. Oestreicher, J.S., Benessaiah, K., Ruiz-Jaen, M.C., Sloan, S., Turner, K., Pelletier, J., et al. (2009l). Avoiding deforestation in Panamanian protected areas: An analysis of protection effectiveness and implications for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 279–291. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Ragin, C. C. (2006). The limitations of net-effects thinking. In B. Rihoux, & H. Grimm (Eds.), Innovative comparative methods for policy analysis (pp. 13–41). New York, NY: Springer. Ragin, C.C. (2009). Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA). In B. Rihoux, & C.C. Ragin (Eds.), Configurational comparative methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 87–122). Thousand Oaks and London: Sage. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1984). Power-dependence, policy communities and inter-governmental networks. Public Administration Bullentin, 49, 4–31. Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Castrogiovanni, G.J. (2012). The impact of education, experience and inner circle advisors on SME performance: Insights from a study of public development centers. Small Business Economics, 38(3), 333–349. Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Roig-Dobón, S. (2009). Linking globalization of entrepreneurship in small business organizations. Small Business Economics, 32(3), 233–239. Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Urbano, D. (2010). Employee–organization relationship in collective entrepreneurship: an overview. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 23(4), 349–359. Richardson, J.J., & Jordan, A.G. (1979). Governing under pressure: The policy process under a post parliamentary democracy. Oxford: Martin Robertson. Rihoux, B., & De Meur, G. (2009). Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA). In B. Rihoux, & C.C. Ragin (Eds.), Configurational comparative methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 33–68). Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage. Rihoux, B., & Lobe, B. (2009). The case for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): Adding leverage for thick cross-case comparison. In D. Byrne, & C.C. Ragin (Eds.), The Sage handbook of case-based methods (pp. 222–242). London: Sage. Rihoux, B., Rezsöhazy, I., & Bol, D. (2011). Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in public policy analysis: An extensive review. German Policy Studies, 7(3), 9–82. Scouvart, M., Adams, R.T., Caldas, M., Dale, V., Mertens, B., Nédélec, V., ... Lambin, E.F. (2008). Causes of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: A qualitative comparative analysis. Journal of Land Use Science, 2(4), 257–282. Sole Parellada, F., Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Huarng, K.H. (2011). An overview of the service industries' future (priorities: linking past and future). Service Industries Journal, 31(1), 1–6. Voß, J.P. (2007). Designs on governance: Development of policy instruments and dynamics in governance. doctoral dissertation San Francisco, CA: Vancouver's queen Elizabeth plaza, by courtesy of the ILWU library (ISBN 978–90-365-2585-5). Weale, A., Pridham, G., Cini, M., Konstadakopulos, D., Porter, M., & Flynn, B. (2003). Environmental governance in Europe. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Weitzman, B.C., Silver, D., & Brazill, C. (2006). Efforts to improve public policy and programs through data practice: experiences in 15 distressed American cities. Public Administration Review, 66(3), 386–399. Williamson, O.E. (1999). The mechanisms of governance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. World Bank (2007). Tools for institutional, political, and social analysis of policy reform. (ISBN10: 0–8213-6891-5 (electronic)). World Bank (2010a). Vietnam Development Report 2010: Modern Institutions. http:// www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/03/ 19/000333037_20100319004055/Rendered/PDF/ 535730WP0P11221ng0reduced0file0size.pdf (Joint donor report on Vietnam consultative group meeting, 2009) World Bank (2010b). Reforming Governance Systems under Real-World Conditions. www.worldbank.org/commgap (BLOG: publicsphere.worldbank.org).
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Business Research
Innovative governance from public policy unities☆ Do Phu Hai a,⁎, Salvador Roig-Dobón b, José Luis Sánchez-García c a b c
Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (GASS/VASS), Hanoi, Vietnam IUDESCOOP, Universitat de València, Av. Los Naranjos s/n, 46022, València, Spain Catholic University of Valencia San Vicente Mártir, Valencia, Spain
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 1 February 2015 Accepted 1 September 2015 Available online xxxx
a b s t r a c t This study examines which configurations explain the public policy for innovative governance through comparative qualitative analysis (QCA). The research analyzes the sub-system conditions through a case of Vietnam. The results show the minimum configurations of key variable conditions to achieve the outcome. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Public policy Innovative governance Climate change policy QCA method
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical framework
The notion of governance connects with two developments that culminate in political and social sciences (March & Olsen, 1989; Voß, 2007; Williamson, 1999). Political sciences increasingly see governance as a reduction of the states' governing capabilities and the loss of legitimacy of state interventions. However, political sciences do not consider the multi-causality of policy conditions and innovative governance. The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is helpful to select in the modeling. Three principles guide this research: (1) evidence-based research, (2) academic rigor and independence of analysis, and (3) social legitimacy and a participatory process. These principles involve a substantive research approach with a rigorous and systematic identification of policy conditions on the reform progress in the case of Vietnam. Another way is to move away from obvious case boundaries— from obvious administrative or political–institutional boundaries (e.g. municipalities, districts, states, countries) to boundaries that are more directly relevant in the policy studies (Do, 2008). To examine the policy process of Vietnam, the study draws on data from the Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI). Following this introductory section, Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 offers the research method, including the description of case selection and model specification. Section 4 offers the results. Section 5 presents conclusions.
To the question of how institutions and mechanisms of governance come into being, the assumption is that overarching organizations of power (the state, the market) put them in place. Governance then includes the creation, maintenance, and transformation of social forms of organization through interventions in and modulation of existing patterns of interaction. These rule-shaping processes (e.g. public policy or organizational management) are institutionally structured themselves. The interest in such ‘institutionalized forms of shaping institutions’ is great in political science perspectives on governance where the focus is on the organization of policy processes. Further, political scientists differentiate levels within governance structures, acknowledging its nested character. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) distinguish between the “operational level,” the “collective level,” and a “constitutional level,” each with particular interactions and rules in their framework of analysis. In addition, Weale et al. (2003) distinguish between “primary rules” as “policies that are decided,” and “secondary rules,” which are “rules about rules; they define how the primary rules are made and how they may be changed” (p. 5) Thus, governance demarcates a departure from a narrow understanding of societal steering as unilateral, hierarchical control of the state. In contrast to pure hierarchy or pure anarchy, governance acknowledges a diversity of interaction patterns, rule systems, and rule-making processes that reproduce social order within various policy domains (see Voß, 2007). Eising and Kohler-Koch (1999) stress this open analytical understanding in which governance deals with the structured ways and means in which the divergent preferences of interdependent actors translate into policy choices to allocate values. Mayntz (1997) contributes to a rising perception of government failure in the 1970s and early 1980s. The widening perspective brings new forms of cooperative steering
☆ The authors thank Alicia Mas, University of Valencia, for her careful reading and suggestions on revising this essay. ⁎ Corresponding author at: Graduate Academy of Social Sciences, 477 Nguyen Trai, Thanh Xuan, Hanoi, Vietnam. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (D.P. Hai), [email protected] (S. Roig-Dobón), [email protected] (J.L. Sánchez-García).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135 0148-2963/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
2
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
between public and private actors and self-regulation of private actors into view. The measurement of governance is complex and manifold and involves many conditions (Guzmán-Cuevas, Cáceres-Carrasco, & Soriano, 2009; Ribeiro-Soriano & Urbano, 2010). Many scholars in Vietnam consider that governance relies on six dimensions including transparency, vertical accountability, participation at local level, control of corruption, public administration procedures, and public service deliveries. In addition, innovative governance is important in its own right but even more for its contribution to the formation of a more fair and equal society (Hellström, 1996, 1998, 2001). The conditions that this study selects for the outcome of innovative governance come from discussions on governance and the concept of policy capacity. The first condition is the quality of systemwide data collection and data sharing. Information is very critical for policy analysis; thus, evidence-based public policy processes rely on the quality of system-data collection and data sharing. Information, by itself, does not put pressure on policymakers to make changes nor pressures the public to ask for changes. The cutting-edge issues in modern evidence-based policy debates focus on problemframing, methods for gathering and assessing reliable evidence, communicating and transferring knowledge into decision-making, and evaluating the effectiveness of implementation and program delivery in complex policy areas (Head, 2009). The rational choice agents argue that better data practice leads to more effective policy decisions (Weitzman, Silver, & Brazill, 2006). Therefore, this condition is the efficient sharing of data among data owners and inter- and intra-governmental agencies. The second condition is the accessibility of data or information to non-state actors. The participation and collaboration of non-state actors into the public policy process depend on their access to data. In Vietnam, non-state actors include mass organization, professional organizations and umbrella organizations, VNGOs, and community-based organizations (Do, 2008, 2009; Norlund, 2007). The third condition is the institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation. Policymaking follows rules and procedures, and less formal sanctions constrain policymaking (John & Johnson, 2008). For public policy process, rules are necessary (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Thus, the rules and procedures of public policy process going along with standards for the policy analysis and evaluation are the key for the governance outcome. The fourth condition is the policy learning capability. Two separate endogenous and exogenous aspects of subjective and objective policy learning exist (Bennett & Howlett, 1992), thus actors participating in policy evaluation are often also participating in a larger process of policy learning, which seeks to improve policymaking drawing on the assessment of past experience. Other variable exists which may enhance the learning process; for example, when actors learn to trust each other and exchange policy ideas, there is a potential for policy innovation (John, 2012). In Vietnam, the state actors participating in the policy process may increase the capability. The fifth condition is the inter-government and inter-agency coordination. The notion of policy sub-system is a powerful concept in policy analysis (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). The coordination of state actors in the sub-system, both at national and sub-national level, is important. The coordination of inter-government refers to different state actors in executive, legislative, and judiciary power branches, as well as within the executive system such as line ministries. However, the coordination of inter-agencies plays a key role for the policy process because of the location in different ministries or localities of functional departments in the Vietnam context. From the PAPI data, this study selects the specific cases that relate to the sub-national policy process. The sixth condition is the effectiveness of policy network and policy community. According to Howlett and Ramesh (2003), policy network is “being essentially interest-based” (p.151). The policy community consists of tight groups of policy actors or tight-knit sets of policy actors
who share a common idea set (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Richardson & Jordan, 1979; Rhodes, 1984). Group or network interactions correspond to the fluid and changeable reality of policymaking much more than the institutional approach (John, 2012). In Vietnam, the effectiveness of network and community policies depends on the sharing of policy process, which leads to innovative governance. The seventh condition is the clarity in roles and responsibilities of different organizations in policy process. Institutions divide roles and responsibilities between organizations; institutions constrain the choices open to decision makers and play a role in shaping the preferences of those actors (John, 2012). The eighth condition is the political accountability for policy process. The concept of accountability is complex. Keohane (2003, p. 3) also argues, “Accountability refers to relationships in which principals have the ability to demand answers from agents to questions about their proposed or past behavior, to discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in the event that they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.” Political accountability refers to the responsibility or obligation of government officials to act in the best interests of society or face consequences. Public officials should be responsible for their actions. Accountability ensures that the actions and decisions of public officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government initiatives meet their objectives and respond to the needs of the community, thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2010a, 2010b). In Vietnam, parliament and people council are key actors in the “chain of accountability” because they are, along with the judiciary branch, the key institution of horizontal accountability, not only in their own right but also as the institution to which many autonomous accountability institutions report. Civil society organizations and the mass media are also important institutions in vertical accountability. The ninth condition is the levels of participation of non-state actors in the policy process. Individual and group actors are key explanatory variables (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003) that relate to their levels of participation into the policy process. When engaging transparently with a wide range of state, non-state, and societal actors, participation and inclusiveness in the policy process improve (see DFID & GTZ, 2005; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; World Bank, 2007). The non-state actors possible are business actors, NGOs, social-political organizations such as unions, mass media, and research think-tanks. However, this research only deals with business actors and NGOs. One important function of civil society organizations (CSOs) is the mobilization of “volunteerism,” which can be for all kinds of social activities and human services. Through the mobilization of constituents and resources, those organizations can influence national policies and their implementation (Ribeiro-Soriano & Castrogiovanni, 2012; Sole Parellada, Ribeiro-Soriano, & Huarng, 2011). In Vietnam, the participation of NGOs and community-based organizations, research institutions, and associations could help in public policy process. Thus, the participation of non-state actors in policy process is a key condition that could produce the positive governance outcome. 3. Method This study uses QCA as method for the analysis because it is a common method in governance studies. Johnson (2005) explained how patterns of institutions and actors operated to produce a change in the municipal charter of USA. Kilburn (2004) worked on the influence of city context on urban regimes across 14 cities. Scouvart et al. (2008) measured the multiple causal interactions in deforestation process in Brazil. Oestreicher et al. (2009) strived to identify core conditions that shape the success or failure of a reduced deforestation scheme. Aubin and Varone (2011) analyzed rivalries between competing users of water resources. Rihoux, Rezsöhazy, and Bol (2011) worked successfully in an empirical study of 11 cases of local water rivalries in Belgium and Switzerland. Huntjens et al. (2011) analyzed policy
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
learning and its structural constraints regarding river basin management. In Vietnam, QCA analysis was useful to examine the grassroots of democracy and the condition variables relating to electoral systems, division of power, executive–legislative relations, and relation of state–civil society (Do, 2008). QCA allows identifying key combinations of causal conditions; in contrast, other methods such as statistical and economic tools mainly concentrate on establishing the “net effect” of each separate independent variable (Ragin, 2006). QCA also allows the identification of more than one unique path to an outcome—different participatory mechanisms, corresponding to more than one combination of conditions, may account for a result (Do, 2008; Ragin, 2009; Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). This study uses the TOSMANA (Cronqvist, 2011) software to perform the csQCA (multi-value QCA) analysis. TOSMANA is a tool for Small-N analysis that is useful to perform social-science research on data sets with a small or intermediate number of cases.
3
Table 2 Balance of a change in PAPI score of 2011–2013 period. Province of Vietnam
Change of PAPI score from 2011 to 2013
Son La Dong Thap Ca Mau Bac Giang Ba Ria Vung Tau Ha Tinh Bac Ninh Cao Bang Vinh Long Binh Thuan Hung Yen Tra Vinh
−3.380 −2.221 −1.485 −1.416 −0.894 −0.606 3.611 3.894 3.959 4.042 4.893 5.944
QCA value 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
3.2. Model specification 3.1. Case selection Over two decades of reform, Vietnam has achieved significant economic development and poverty reduction. Recently, Vietnam has become a low–middle income country and aims to move towards improvement of quality, efficiency, and competitiveness of the economy in 2014–2020. Vietnam's reform dates back to 1986. Vietnam has implemented many effective measures to increase accountability in public life and citizen involvement in decision making. Democratic governance and citizen's participation also contribute to political stability, an essential building block of economic development. Democratic governance is important in its own right but even more so for its contribution to the formation of a more fair and equal society, in which power rests with the people. In short, democratic governance is necessary to create a society of the people, by the people, and for the people (Do & Nandy, 2006). This study uses the term of innovative governance to improve governance for Vietnam's context. The internal conditions are all important to examine for the innovative governance, thus this studies the sub-system conditions. The data for the analysis comes from the PAPI for years 2011, 2012, and 2013. This study also uses date from direct observation and perceptions of the leaders, policymakers, representatives of mass organizations, civil society groups, NGOs, and particularly local leaders who took part in and were responsible for the policy process.
Table 1 Specification of model.
Outcome variable Condition variables
Variables
Coded
Innovative governance The quality of system-wide data collection and data sharing Accessibility of data or information to non-state actors Institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation Policy learning capability Inter-government and inter-agency coordination Effectiveness of policy network and policy community Clarity in roles and responsibilities of different organizations in policy process Political accountability for process Levels of participation of non-state actors in policy process
(InG) Qdata Adata InSpolicy PLearn InCord Enetwork Crole PolAccou PartNGO
The study framed the system with some key conditions that relate to the innovative governance (see Table 1). See Table 2. During the analysis, the study rejected some conditions not relevant for the context (i.e., availability and competition of policy advisory services, levels of public trust in government, and the presence of policy entrepreneur(s)). Thus, the study selected the variables drawing on case knowledge and on the specificities of the Vietnam's governance. PAPI has become the time series governance- and policy-monitoring tool in Vietnam, and exclusively draws on citizens' perception. PAPI annually provides “real-time” data and information about governance processes in provincial level (PAPI, 2010–2014). 4. Results 4.1. Models analysis TOSMANA is useful to analyze cross-case regularities in small-N analysis. By means of Boolean algebra, the study can process dichotomized variables, which results in a formula explaining the outcome as a combination of condition variables. The study translates the variables into Boolean variables with multiple conjuncture of causality. In the analysis, with 9 causal conditions, theoretically, 29 (2k) = 512 possible combinations of conditions exist. The study groups together and shows as one configuration those cases that show the same configuration. The csQCA produces the minimal configurations of conditions necessary for the outcomes using Boolean algebra. The study minimizes the cases using Boolean algebra and further simplifies the combined patterns. The study also includes in the minimization those configurations that are theoretically possible but do not appear in the 12 cases (“logical cases”). In principle, the inclusion of logical cases generalizes the explanatory patterns that the observed cases suggest. 4.2. Minimization of “innovative governance” outcome (InG) TOSMANA processes the raw data to produce the truth table with 10 Boolean configurations: 5 configurations with [1] outcome corresponding to 6 cases; 5 configuration with [0] outcome with 6 cases. TOSMANA minimizes the configurations by using the Boolean minimization algorithms. Do (2009), Rihoux and De Meur (2009), and Rihoux et al. (2011) recommend running the minimization procedure twice, first for the [1] configurations, and then for the [0] configurations. 4.3. Minimizing value: The [1] configurations (without logical remainders) Firstly, the software minimizes the [1] configurations without including non-observed cases (i.e., without logical remainders). In the
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
4
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
Boolean minimization, the reduction of configurations reveals a clear pattern of the outcome for the InG outcome. The study obtains the following minimal formula; the reduction of the formula is as follows: PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1} […] ➔ innovative governance (formula 1). The PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1} are key conditions for [1], innovative governance. These formulas, we show the importance of a conditional configuration of PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1}, which is a combination of political accountability for policy process and inter-government and inter-agency coordination exiting in all minimal configurations in 12 provinces.
effectiveness of policy network, and policy community (InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0}). Inter-government and inter-agency coordination is the important condition for the governance, which brings tautological effect on the outcome governance. The level of effectiveness of the network or group and the high degree of participation of policy actors in the sub-system are key conditions for the innovative outcome, whereas weak condition of political accountability leads to the non-innovative governance.
4.4. Minimizing value: The [0] configurations (without logical remainders)
4.8. Findings
The study minimizes the [0] configurations without logical remainders. All descriptive minimal formulas are quite complex; the reduction of the formula (formula 2) is as follows: InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0} […] ➔ non-innovative governance (formula 2), so the InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0} represent the key conditions for [0], negative governance. These formulas show the importance of a conditional combination of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, inter-government and inter-agency coordination, effectiveness of policy network and policy community for non-innovation of governance in 12 provinces.
The results show that inter-government and inter-agency coordination is the important condition for the governance. On the one hand, QCA results also show that the high effectiveness of the network or group of can produce the outcome. On the other hand, results show that low degree of political accountability explains the non-innovative governance outcome. QCA helps identify the condition variable and causal combinations to produce the innovative governance (InG). The [1] outcome results from the combination (PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1}). QCA also shows that the [0] outcome results from the causal combination of weak conditions (InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0}), that is, of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, intergovernment and inter-agency coordination, and effectiveness of policy network and policy community. On the other hand, the only weak condition of political accountability for policy process leads to the non-innovative governance. This result means that the lack of political accountability may lead to non-innovative governance, which constrains the reform in Vietnam. In 12 cases, the favorable combination (InSpolicy{0}* Plearn{0} * InCord{0}* Enetwork{0}) may actually be harmful for the governance.
4.5. Minimizing value: The [1] configurations (with logical remainders) To achieve more parsimony, running the TOSMANA to include nonobserved cases (i.e., logical remainders) is necessary. Thus, these logical remainders constitute a pool of potential cases that TOSMANA can use to produce a more parsimonious minimal formula. To include the non-observed cases is to express those 12 cases in a simpler way (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009). This study obtains the minimal formula 3: InCord{1} ➔ innovative governance. Thus, for all provinces, the condition of inter-government and inter-agency coordination plays the key role for the innovative governance. The study eliminates the InCord condition in TOSMANA and obtains this formula: Enetwork{1} + Adata{0}PolAccou{1} ➔ innovative governance. On the cases knowledge, the first path is better: Enetwork{1} ➔ innovative governance (formula 4). 4.6. Minimizing value: The [0] configurations (with logical remainders) The minimization of the [0] configurations, this time including the logical remainders, gives the following formula: InCord{0} ➔ noninnovative governance. Eliminating the configuration InCord results in PolAccou{0} + Adata{1}Enetwork{0}➔ non-innovative governance. Thus, for all these provinces, weak condition of political accountability for policy process or low level of effectiveness of policy network and policy community, even with existing high levels of the quality of system-wide data collection and data sharing led to the noninnovative governance outcome. On the cases knowledge, the study concludes that the first path is better to choose: PolAccou{0}➔ non-innovative governance (formula 5). Therefore, the weak condition of political accountability for policy process leads to non-innovative governance. 4.7. Synthesis In Vietnam context, the combination of political accountability for policy process and inter-government and inter-agency coordination results in innovative governance in all minimal configurations in 12 provinces (PolAccou{1}} * InCord{1}). Non-innovative governance in the 12 provinces is the result of the combination of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, inter-government and inter-agency coordination,
4.9. Methods of comparative public policies QCA helps in sharpening the focus on interaction patterns of innovative governance at sub-system of public policy processes. Making precise descriptions and definitions of the condition variables and possible outcomes is necessary for a highly systematic approach to the cases. QCA allows combining some qualities of the case-oriented approach with some qualities of the variableoriented approach (synthetic approach). This combination makes the case analysis transparent and contestable, meeting two fundamental conditions of scientific analysis (Do, 2009). For comparative configurational research (Ragin, 2006; Ragin, 2009), the combination of causal conditions lacking cases is the most powerful feature of QCA; from counterfactual analysis and establishment of explicit connections, QCA helps to reduce the challenges of research works in comparative of public policy at operational- and collective-choice level. QCA is extremely helpful not only for operating in the public policy sub-system (macro) from the comparative perspective of the country policies but also for the exploitation of contextual features linking to micro at operational level within one country. Finally, QCA offers valuable support with systematic case description and generalization in terms of theoretical proposals. The method makes precision mandatory. However, the results from QCA approach are difficult to interpret and require researchers with experience; thus, QCA results (and their interpretations) could tend to be somewhat arbitrary, whereas statistical methods are rather easier for junior researchers. Rihoux and Lobe (2009) are right to point out that QCA is most valuable if the method is part of an iterative process moving back and forth between actual cases and the results of analysis.
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135
D.P. Hai et al. / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
5. Conclusions Inter-coordination of inter-government and inter-agency coordination is a key condition for the outcome of innovative governance (Ribeiro-Soriano & Roig-Dobón, 2009). The causal combinations to produce the innovative governance result from the combination of the positive condition of political accountability, which comes from innovation of the Communist Party, and positive condition of intergovernment and inter-agency coordination, which is a result of the implementation of public administration reforms in Vietnam. QCA results show that the high level of effectiveness of policy network and policy community is essentially interest-based. Conversely, the non-innovative governance results from the causal combinations of weak conditions of institutional requirements and standards for policy analysis and evaluation, policy learning capability, and effectiveness of policy network and policy community. To sum up, the single weak condition of political accountability for policy process will lead to the non-innovative governance. Finally, QCA is helpful not only for the comparative analysis of public policy of countries but also for the comparative analysis at a local level. References Aubin, D., & Varone, F. (2011). Successful access of new user to water resource: A qualitative comparative analysis. Environment and Planning COMPASSS. Bennett, C.J., & Howlett, M. (1992). The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change. Policy Sciences, 25(3), 275–294. Cronqvist, L. (2011). Tosmana: Tool for Small-N Analysis [computer programme], version 1.3. 2.0. Trier: University of Trier. DFID, & GTZ (2005). Principles for PSIA Process in Policy Cycles and Stakeholder Participation. Available at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002344/PSIA_GTZ_ DFID_Mar2006.pdf Do, H.P. (2008). Grassroots political institutions in Vietnam. Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Vietnam (10/2007). Do, H.P. (2009). Institutional framework of participatory mechanism. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing. Do, H.N., & Nandy, S. (2006). Deepening democracy and increasing popular participation in Vietnam (Vietnam policy dialogue paper, 2006/1). Ha Noi, Vietnam: UNDP. Eising, R., & Kohler-Koch, B. (1999). Introduction: network governance in the European Union. In R. Eising, & B. Kohler-Koch (Eds.), The transformation of governance in the European Union (pp. 3–13). London: Routledge. Guzmán-Cuevas, J., Cáceres-Carrasco, R., & Soriano, D.R. (2009). Functional dependence and productive dependence of SMEs. Small Business Economics, 32(3), 317–330. Head, B.W. (2009). Three lenses of evidence-based policy. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67(1), 1–11. Hellström, E. (1996). Environmental forestry conflicts, forest policies and the use of forest resources—recent developments in USA, Germany, France, Sweden, Finland and Norway. Working Paper No. 7. Joensuu, Finland: European Forest Institute. Hellström, E. (1998). Qualitative comparative analysis: A useful tool for research into forest policy and forestry conflicts. Forest Science, 44(2), 254–265. Hellström, E. (2001). Conflict cultures. Qualitative Comparative Analysis of environmental conflicts in forestry (Silva Fennica Monographs No. 2). Helsinki: The Finnish Society of Forest Science/The Finnish Forest Research Institute. Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (2003). Studying public policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huntjens, P., Pahl-Wostl, C., Rihoux, B., Schlueter, M., Flachner, Z., Neto, S., ... Nabide Kiti, I. (2011). Adaptative water management and policy learning in a changing climate. A formal comparative analysis of eight water management regimes in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Environmental Policy and Governance, 21(3), 145–163. John, P. (2012). Analyzing public policy. Abingdon: Routledge. John, P., & Johnson, M. (2008). Is there still a public service ethos? In A. Park, J. Curtice, K. Thomson, M. Phillips, M. Johnson, & E. Clery (Eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 24th Report (pp. 105–125). London: Sage (eScholarID:46693). Johnson, L.S. (2005). Constitutional change in local governance: An exploration of institutional entrepreneurs, procedural safeguards, and selective incentives. (Retrieved from) Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations Paper No. 3557. Florida: Florida State University.
5
Keohane, R.O. (2003). Global governance and democratic accountability. In D. Held, & M. Koening-Archibugi (Eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (pp. 130–159). Oxford: Oxford Polity Press. Kilburn, H.W. (2004). Explaining U.S. urban regimes. A qualitative comparative analysis. Urban Affairs Review, 39(5), 633–651. March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P. (1989). Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of Politics. New York, NY: Free Press. Mayntz, R. (1997). The conditions of effective public policy. In R.,. Mayntz (Ed.), Soziale Dynamik und politische Steuerung: Theoretische und methodologische Überlegungen (pp. 143–167). Frankfurt, New York: Campus (first published 1983). Norlund, I. (2007). Filling the gap: The emerging civil society in Vietnam. Ha Noi,Vietnam: UNDP. Oestreicher, J.S., Benessaiah, K., Ruiz-Jaen, M.C., Sloan, S., Turner, K., Pelletier, J., et al. (2009l). Avoiding deforestation in Panamanian protected areas: An analysis of protection effectiveness and implications for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 279–291. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Ragin, C. C. (2006). The limitations of net-effects thinking. In B. Rihoux, & H. Grimm (Eds.), Innovative comparative methods for policy analysis (pp. 13–41). New York, NY: Springer. Ragin, C.C. (2009). Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA). In B. Rihoux, & C.C. Ragin (Eds.), Configurational comparative methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 87–122). Thousand Oaks and London: Sage. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1984). Power-dependence, policy communities and inter-governmental networks. Public Administration Bullentin, 49, 4–31. Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Castrogiovanni, G.J. (2012). The impact of education, experience and inner circle advisors on SME performance: Insights from a study of public development centers. Small Business Economics, 38(3), 333–349. Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Roig-Dobón, S. (2009). Linking globalization of entrepreneurship in small business organizations. Small Business Economics, 32(3), 233–239. Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Urbano, D. (2010). Employee–organization relationship in collective entrepreneurship: an overview. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 23(4), 349–359. Richardson, J.J., & Jordan, A.G. (1979). Governing under pressure: The policy process under a post parliamentary democracy. Oxford: Martin Robertson. Rihoux, B., & De Meur, G. (2009). Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA). In B. Rihoux, & C.C. Ragin (Eds.), Configurational comparative methods. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related techniques (pp. 33–68). Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage. Rihoux, B., & Lobe, B. (2009). The case for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): Adding leverage for thick cross-case comparison. In D. Byrne, & C.C. Ragin (Eds.), The Sage handbook of case-based methods (pp. 222–242). London: Sage. Rihoux, B., Rezsöhazy, I., & Bol, D. (2011). Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in public policy analysis: An extensive review. German Policy Studies, 7(3), 9–82. Scouvart, M., Adams, R.T., Caldas, M., Dale, V., Mertens, B., Nédélec, V., ... Lambin, E.F. (2008). Causes of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: A qualitative comparative analysis. Journal of Land Use Science, 2(4), 257–282. Sole Parellada, F., Ribeiro-Soriano, D., & Huarng, K.H. (2011). An overview of the service industries' future (priorities: linking past and future). Service Industries Journal, 31(1), 1–6. Voß, J.P. (2007). Designs on governance: Development of policy instruments and dynamics in governance. doctoral dissertation San Francisco, CA: Vancouver's queen Elizabeth plaza, by courtesy of the ILWU library (ISBN 978–90-365-2585-5). Weale, A., Pridham, G., Cini, M., Konstadakopulos, D., Porter, M., & Flynn, B. (2003). Environmental governance in Europe. Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Weitzman, B.C., Silver, D., & Brazill, C. (2006). Efforts to improve public policy and programs through data practice: experiences in 15 distressed American cities. Public Administration Review, 66(3), 386–399. Williamson, O.E. (1999). The mechanisms of governance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. World Bank (2007). Tools for institutional, political, and social analysis of policy reform. (ISBN10: 0–8213-6891-5 (electronic)). World Bank (2010a). Vietnam Development Report 2010: Modern Institutions. http:// www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/03/ 19/000333037_20100319004055/Rendered/PDF/ 535730WP0P11221ng0reduced0file0size.pdf (Joint donor report on Vietnam consultative group meeting, 2009) World Bank (2010b). Reforming Governance Systems under Real-World Conditions. www.worldbank.org/commgap (BLOG: publicsphere.worldbank.org).
Please cite this article as: Hai, D.P., et al., Innovative governance from public policy unities, Journal of Business Research (2015), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.10.135