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Animal welfare and human welfare
Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 22 (1989) 95-103
95
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam - - Printed in The Netherlands
Animal Welfare and H u m a n Welfare M.J. LANGFORD
The MemorialUnive~i~New[oundland, St. John~,New~undlandAIB3V6~anad~
ABSTRACT Langford, M., 1989. Animal welfare and human welfare. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 22: 95-103. In the first part of this paper, we examine the two kinds of positive reply that can be given to the question "why does animal welfare matter?" The first reply attempts to show that animal welfare matters because it contributes to human welfare; the second attempts to show that animal welfare matters "in itself". Some of the implications of these different replies are explored through the examination of two examples, one concerning the protection of animals in the wild, the other from the field of animal husbandry. In both cases, the arguments that are consistent with the two kinds of reply are examined. In the second part of the paper, we explore the possibility that there may be rational grounds for a person to adopt one kind of reply, along with the arguments that are appropriate to it, rather than the other. The grounds identified are: ( 1 ) the intellectual need to be consistent with the way that we draw the distinction between humans and other animals (assuming that we do make such a distinction); (2) the need to be consistent with our position with respect to religion, and whatever consequences this may have for our view of human and animal nature; (3) the need to be consistent with the stand that we adopt in other areas of morality. In conclusion, we show that an awareness of the basis for arguments concerning animal welfare and of possible disagreements about this basis, can assist rational and open discussion of controversial issues relating to animal welfare. When participants in a debate proceed with such an awareness and with an appreciation of the basic principles adopted by other participants, then some common ground may often be found and, along with this, a mutual agreement that some answers are definitely wrong.
INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF ARGUMENT THAT ARE USED TO SUPPORT ANIMAL WELFARE T o all, o r a l m o s t all, r e a d e r s o f t h i s c o l l e c t i o n o f articles, t h e c l a i m t h a t we o u g h t t o be c o n c e r n e d w i t h a n i m a l w e l f a r e will b e a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n . W e k n o w , h o w e v e r , t h a t in t h e p a s t m a n y e d u c a t e d p e o p l e w o u l d h a v e b e e n surprised by the contemporary concern with animal welfare. In the light of this c h a n g e in a t t i t u d e , I p r o p o s e t o b e g i n t h i s p a p e r b y r a i s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n " W h y does animal welfare matter?" on the grounds that reflective persons need, from time to time, to question their basic assumptions. As s o o n as t h e q u e s t i o n " W h y d o e s a n i m a l w e l f a r e m a t t e r ? " is p u t , it a p p e a r s
0168-1591/89/$03.50
© 1989 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
96 that there are two distinct kinds of answer that try to give a positive response; correspondingly, there are two kinds of argument that are used to support animal welfare. The first kind of positive answer attempts to show that animal welfare matters because it contributes to human welfare, the second kind of positive answer attempts to show that animal welfare is morally important in itself, or "intrinsically", quite apart from any consequences that animal welfare may have for human welfare. There are other possible kinds of answer including one that denies that animal welfare does matter and which therefore responds to the question by saying "question mal posde", on the grounds that the very asking of the question assumes that a positive answer of some kind should be given. I shall not pursue responses of this sort in this paper. Some people will certainly try to use both of the above kinds of argument, but even for these people it is important to raise the issue of which kind of argument is primary because our decision on this matter radically affects the way in which practical problems should be approached. If we rely primarily on the first kind of answer, practical problems that arise in the field, say, of animal husbandry will need to be handled in one way, while if we rely primarily on the second kind of answer, I shall show that they need to be handled in another, less straightforward way. Furthermore, it may well be that many misunderstandings arise because the participants in a debate on animal welfare do not realize that they are arguing from different standpoints. Let us consider two illustrations that bring out the difference between the two kinds of answer, one from the protection of animals in the wild, the other from the field of animal husbandry. First, let us suppose that a serious debate develops about whether or not to preserve polar bears in the Canadian Arctic following a large increase in the human population of the region. Those in Group A are in favour of allowing the species to die out because of the nuisance and danger that the bears cause to humans, while those in Group B are in favour of preserving the bears. Members of Group B, however, are divided into two camps. Those in B ( 1 ), reflecting the first kind of answer described above, argue that in the long term there will be more human suffering if the bears are not preserved, and that the nuisance and danger caused by the bears are more than compensated by the avoidance of this suffering. In particular, it is claimed that if the bears are not preserved: (1) the ecology will suffer and as a result humans will have the expensive task of taking on the important role that bears have played as predators in the delicate balance of the North; (2) humans will not have the pleasure of being able to watch polar bears in their natural environment. Those in Group B (2), reflecting the second kind of answer described above, while accepting that the arguments given under B (1) may add some persuasive power to their side (especially to certain politicians who, in their view, are not likely to be moved by purely moral argument), are unhappy about relying on this kind of apology for the bears. Somehow, they say, this kind of argument misses the point. A polar bear, they argue, has an intrinsic "right" to be in the Arctic, unless perhaps it poses an immediate threat to a particular human.
97 If we are trying to resolve this dispute, perhaps in the capacity of an independent arbitrator, then in the case of the debate between A and B (1) we know, more or less, how to proceed. We may still have difficulty in actually determining a correct answer, but essentially, we know what the criteria for a correct answer are. The welfare of bears is an "instrumental" good, that is good in so far as it contributes to h u m a n welfare. There will still be difficulties because it is hard to make accurate predictions about things such as the magnitude of the dangers that bears pose and because of the ambiguity of determining what counts as h u m a n welfare. However, we do not have the additional difficulty of trying to balance two independent schemes of welfare, animal and human. This additional difficulty arises as soon as we examine the debate between A and B (2). According to the latter, even if we presume that polar bears will present a p e r m a n e n t danger if preserved and that as a result each year some humans will die and others will have increased fear, this still leaves open the question of whether the bears should be preserved. We have to try and balance animal and h u m a n welfare, and if one is not instrumental to the other there may not even be the theoretical possibility of a correct answer. In the last sentence, I deliberately used the word "may", because whether or not the desired balance between animal and h u m a n welfare can, in theory, be reached by a rational process depends upon the kind of overall moral philosophy that we hold. For example, if we are Benthamite utilitarians, then although we will belong in Group B(2), because of Bentham's important and, for the time, unusual claim t h a t the happiness of all sentient beings has to be taken into account (in Singer, 1979 ) there does exist, nevertheless, a universal criterion in term of which the balance between animal and human welfare can, in principle be made, namely the long-term overall balance between pleasure and pain. However, m a n y non-utilitarians will insist that there are several independent values and that there is no "primal" value, such as pleasure or happiness, to which they can all be reduced. An arbitrator who is sympathetic to this view clearly has a m o n u m e n t a l and, in a sense, impossible task. However, in saying this I do not mean to imply that this view is wrong just because it generates an impossible task. Perhaps decision making just has to take place in such a context! For our second illustration, let us take the debate over the raising of chickens in batteries. Most of the arguments are familiar. Those in Group A defend the present practice, stressing the economic benefits of mass production, while those in Group B are against it, arguing in favour of a greater concern for animal welfare. Once again, however, those in group B are divided in a crucial way. Those in B (1) point to the loss of flavour compared to home-range products, reduced longevity in close confinement, the bad effects of the antibiotics that have to be used as a result of this intense system, and so on. T h e y may also point to the painful concern that some h u m a n s feel as a result of knowing that chickens suffer and it is important to see that, stated in this way, the
98 argument still falls under B(1) and not B(2), since it is an argument about human suffering that results from viewing animal suffering! In contrast, those in Group B (2), while they will probably experience personal suffering at the contemplation of animal suffering, will insist that animal suffering in itself is cause for disquiet and, moreover, that this suffering cannot be justified simply by pointing to a corresponding human good or lessening of human suffering, for example, as a result of cheaper meat. The arguments used by those in Group B(1) may assist a good cause, but, so those in B(2) insist, they are not the essential arguments. Once again it is clear that if we accept the validity of the arguments used by Group B {2) we have a much greater theoretical problem than if we confine ourselves to the arguments of B (1). It will also quickly become apparent that members of group B (2) differ widely among themselves. Some will regard the prevention of animal suffering as a kind of "deontological" principle, so that no amount of human good can compensate for a violation of this principle. In a similar way, they might also refuse to kill even a single polar bear that threatens a human. Others will be more flexible and will take the notion of a "balance" much more literally, allowing some preventable suffering to animals but only if there is no "realistic" alternative. Then, of course, the debate centres on what counts as "realistic", or "necessary", or "possible" and so on. Those who follow this approach will probably allow limited animal exploitation when no alternative is "possible" and, likewise, would condone the killing of individual bears in order to protect life, but would not condone the killing of species for human convenience. Given the distinction between two kinds of argument for taking animal welfare seriously [represented by B(1) and B(2)], can we give reasons for preferring one approach rather than the other, or is it the case, as many claim who are generally sceptical about the value of reasoning within the domain of practical ethics, that no reasons can be given? Those who support this position might add the claim that we all have our particular prejudices, at least when it comes to fundamental positions and while we may be able to argue rationally from these fundamental positions, we cannot argue rationally about them. In other words (so the sceptical argument continues), given our premises, we can be rational in the sense of being consistent with these premises, but the premises themselves are chosen on non-rational grounds. In the next part of this paper, I propose to argue that this sceptical position oversimplifies the situation and that there are, in fact, rational considerations that can lead a reflective person to belong either to Group B (1) or to Group B (2) rather than the other, and perhaps to some more specific position within one of these very broad groups. Finally, in the third part of this paper I shall discuss, very briefly, the problem that arises when there is a perceived conflict between animal and human welfare.
99 RATIONAL GROUNDS FOR ADOPTING ONE POSITION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANIMAL WELFARE RATHER THAN ANOTHER
There are at least three areas of reflection that can lead a person to adopt a position within B (1) as opposed to B (2), or vice versa. (1) There is the way in which we draw the distinction between humans and animals, or more strictly between humans and other animals. Clearly this distinction, however it is drawn, has implications for moral issues relating to animals. One reason for this is that accounts that claim to be descriptions, especially of complex concepts such as h u m a n nature are nearly always, and perhaps always, evaluative as well as descriptive. The way in which this distinction is drawn has often been non-rational and merely the result, say, of a religious prejudice. However, there is no need for the distinction to be nonrational and when it is not then the consequences that are drawn for moral issues that relate to animals can be the result of rational reflection. Let me illustrate; in the past, a number of philosophers confidently asserted that animals differed from humans because the former lacked any inkling of "selfconsciousness" or, more specifically, of symbolic or propositional language. For example, the eminent philosopher E r n s t Cassirer wrote "In all the literature of the subject there does not seem to be a single conclusive proof of the fact that any animal ever made the decisive step from subjective to objective, from affective to propositional language", and he goes on to claim that only in man do we find "a symbolic imagination and intelligence" (Cassirer, 1944). Therefore, it was often asserted that humans have a unique kind of value because they alone reach a level of being which makes them self-conscious, selfdirecting agents. In the light of recent work with primates, and in particular their use of sign language, it is doubtful whether this way of marking a clear distinction between humans and all other animals can still be sustained and, indeed, those who argued that a difference of this kind was the crucial factor in the awarding of a special moral status are now committed (if they are consistent) to awarding this status to at least some non-human animals. I do not mean to imply from the foregoing paragraph that the issue of the distinction between h u m a n and other animals is now closed; far from it. Indeed the issue is not (in my view) whether or not there is a distinction, but how accurately and fairly to describe the distinction. In addition to problems about the precise meaning of concepts such as "self-consciousness", it may well be that the distinction cannot properly be made by looking for a single factor, like "self-consciousness", which divides this species from that, but from the possession of a cluster of factors, no one of which is unique to any species, but which together mark off this species from that. However, a distinction along these lines does not sit happily with an absolute moral distinction between the
100 human species and all others, and would be much more congruous with a position within what I described as B(2). This is one indication of how there could be a rational argument for one overall position rather than another. In other words, a perfectly rational decision about the way in which humans differ from other species could lead one to adopt a moral stand within B (2) rather t h a n B ( 1 ). (2) There is the implication of one's overall position with respect to religion. It might be claimed that this in turn is basically a non-rational matter, but for some at least, this will be hotly contested. Without entering into this particular debate, let us assume the following situation. Professor X, a woman brought up as an atheist, has come to adopt some version of Christianity on grounds that, according to her honest opinion, are at least in part rational. My point is that the change in Professor X's position may have (rational) implications for her view of the moral status of animals. Moreover, paradoxically, it may well be the case t h a t she will have much stronger grounds for adopting a position that falls under B (2) t h a n will m a n y traditional humanists! Many humanists have adopted the claim of Protagoras: " M a n is the measure of all things", as a s u m m a r y statement of their philosophy and as a short way of indicating their rejection of divine beings or divine standards. However, if this statement is taken at face value, then the moral implications put the humanist immediately into Group B (1), i.e., animal welfare must be measured, along with all other things, in terms of h u m a n welfare. However, for Christians, or for members of other faiths that can consistently deny that man is the measure of all things, there is no reason why animals cannot have an independent importance within the overall scheme of creation. I used the word "paradoxically" in the above paragraph when I referred to this matter, because as a matter of historical fact, Christians have often tended to treat animals as if man were the measure of all things, while it has often been humanists (in a broad sense of the term) like B e n t h a m and Mill who have stressed the moral status of animals. One reason for this odd situation has been a traditional and in m y view, mistaken, interpretation of Genesis, where Adam was given dominion over the animals, a dominion symbolized by his right to name them. {Genesis 1, 28 and 2, 19-20) However, as a matter of sheer consistency and putting aside the history of how religious people have often used or misused animals, a creationist view allows for, and perhaps even suggests, the possibility that animals have a moral status that depends on the Creator's purpose, a purpose t h a t does not necessarily reduce animals to creatures that exist for the sake of humans and that is, therefore, independent of h u m a n welfare. This could be true even if we accept the view of Genesis that humans have "dominion" over the animal kingdom. The issue is the nature and purpose of this dominion. By a "creationist" view I do not mean one that denies evolution, despite the frequent association of belief in creation with rejections of evolution. I simply mean a view that accepts the idea of a creative
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power behind whatever process there is that leads to the existence of animals and humans, whether this process be evolutionary or not. Once again, therefore, there may be rational grounds for adopting one kind of moral philosophy rather than another; grounds that depend upon the need for some consistency or congruence with our other beliefs. (3) There is the relationship of one's view of the moral status of animals to one's overall moral philosophy, a philosophy that for some at least, is the result of deep reflection upon the different possible philosophies plus a preference for the one that seems the most coherent or most consistent with experience. I have already hinted at one illustration of this. If we are utilitarians, then the demands of consistency should lead us to belong to Group B (2). I shall give just one other illustration. If we believe that the human sense of moral obligation is to be explained purely in terms of human psychology and does not reflect some kind of discovery about universal obligations binding on all rational creatures (as, for example, in Kant), then the very notion of a "correct" answer to any moral issue will seem odd. In the light of this, some thinkers claim that the only way in which one moral answer can be "better" than another is in terms of its ability to reconcile conflicting human interests. An interesting example of such a view, worked out in terms of the laws that are appropriate to a society that contains competing interests, can be found in the writings of Roscoe Pound. A philosophy of this kind logically commits one to a position within B (1). One of the things which I personally find odd is that many of those who vigorously defend animal welfare from arguments that belong to the B (2) type, when challenged about their overall philosophy, tend to uphold a version of the last-named moral philosophy, that is to say, one that explains perceived moral conflicts purely in terms of conflicts between different human interests. Kant would have argued that if people wish seriously to maintain the convictions that they hold, they should develop a moral philosophy that is adequate for their position! To put this in another way: there are certain prerequisites, or "postulates", that should lie behind one's moral claims. THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN ANIMAL AND HUMAN WELFARE
So far, I have argued that as soon as we ask how animal and human welfare are related we come up against a crucial conflict between the two positions that I have classed as B(1) and B(2). Moreover, when a practical issue is under discussion, such as the treatment of chickens in food production, it soon becomes apparent that failures to reach agreement are often the result of fundamental disagreements at this theoretical level and not only of disagreements about empirical matters, such as the estimated cost of different methods of rearing chickens. In the light of the foregoing discussion, how can we handle situations in
102 which animal and human welfare appear to be in conflict? If we regard animal welfare as "instrumental" to human welfare then, as I have pointed out, we know, at least in theory, how to proceed, but what do we do if (1) we are not "instrumentalists", but belong somewhere within the group that I have labeled B (2), and also (2) we are not Benthamite utilitarians and do not believe that there is a single value in terms of which conflicts between animal and human welfare can be resolved? As I have already indicated, it follows that there will be no "correct" answer to many problems, but it does not follow that all answers are therefore on the same level and that we are simply forced to make a non-rational decision. What should happen, I suggest, is something like this. Firstly, the participants in a debate should try to find what common ground they share with respect to the empirical description of the problem they face. For example, if we stay with the issue of battery chickens, we need to know what are the probable costs of alternate ways of keeping chickens and what are the behavioural differences between chickens reared in different ways. Secondly, the participants should try to find general principles they agree about, even if these principles do not give precise answers to ethical problems. For example, in the case of animal experimentation, debaters may well accept a principle to the effect that if we have to use animals, we must use as few animals as possible and use them in the most economical way. Some of these principles may assist the debate even if they immediately raise problems of interpretation. Take, for example, a principle that runs: "When there are alternative ways of raising animals we should use the one that causes least pain and distress whenever possible". It might be objected that acceptance of this principle gets us nowhere because the word "possible" is too vague. "Of course", someone may say, "it is possible to abandon all battery raising of chickens but the cost would be unrealistic". However, it seems to me that to debate the issue in the context of this principle is already to move forward from the verbal exchanges that typify many debates about animal welfare. Although there may still be eventual disagreement, the participants are now actively exploring together what the alternatives are and are trying to weigh, in the context of a shared concern with a principle, the relative weights of a certain value and a certain disvalue. Moreover, when participants proceed in this way, even when no single "correct" answer emerges, it may well be the case that several definitely wrong answers emerge. In other words, a rational debate may not be able to identify A as the correct answer, but it may be able to show that given the agreement that exists about the empirical facts and about principles that are shared, answers X, Y and Z are wrong, while what should be done lies within the range of answers represented by A, B and C. It is certain that this will not satisfy everyone, but it is sufficient to give point to the debate and to allow reason an important role. After all, ethics is not the only intellectual discipline in which we may have to be satisfied with saying that whatever the best answer is, we
103 know that it lies within this range of answers rather than that range of answers. Furthermore, as the debate proceeds, there may be a role for a certain kind of "sensitivity" that enables those who agree (at first, superficially) about certain principles to develop a common mind about what these principles really mean and where they lead. A high level discussion between scientists who disagree about which hypothesis to use may have much in common here with a properly conducted ethical debate. For the scientists, there are some totally unreasonable hypotheses (X, Y and Z) and others (A, B and C) which can be entertained by a reflective intelligence. Between A, B and C, if a growing sensitivity does not give us accord, it may well be that in ethics, as in science, there is room for several different creative choices, all of which can be rationally justified.
REFERENCES Cassirer, E., 1944. An Essay on Man. Chapter 3, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1962,pp. 30, 33. Singer, P., 1979. Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 49-50.
95
Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam - - Printed in The Netherlands
Animal Welfare and H u m a n Welfare M.J. LANGFORD
The MemorialUnive~i~New[oundland, St. John~,New~undlandAIB3V6~anad~
ABSTRACT Langford, M., 1989. Animal welfare and human welfare. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 22: 95-103. In the first part of this paper, we examine the two kinds of positive reply that can be given to the question "why does animal welfare matter?" The first reply attempts to show that animal welfare matters because it contributes to human welfare; the second attempts to show that animal welfare matters "in itself". Some of the implications of these different replies are explored through the examination of two examples, one concerning the protection of animals in the wild, the other from the field of animal husbandry. In both cases, the arguments that are consistent with the two kinds of reply are examined. In the second part of the paper, we explore the possibility that there may be rational grounds for a person to adopt one kind of reply, along with the arguments that are appropriate to it, rather than the other. The grounds identified are: ( 1 ) the intellectual need to be consistent with the way that we draw the distinction between humans and other animals (assuming that we do make such a distinction); (2) the need to be consistent with our position with respect to religion, and whatever consequences this may have for our view of human and animal nature; (3) the need to be consistent with the stand that we adopt in other areas of morality. In conclusion, we show that an awareness of the basis for arguments concerning animal welfare and of possible disagreements about this basis, can assist rational and open discussion of controversial issues relating to animal welfare. When participants in a debate proceed with such an awareness and with an appreciation of the basic principles adopted by other participants, then some common ground may often be found and, along with this, a mutual agreement that some answers are definitely wrong.
INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF ARGUMENT THAT ARE USED TO SUPPORT ANIMAL WELFARE T o all, o r a l m o s t all, r e a d e r s o f t h i s c o l l e c t i o n o f articles, t h e c l a i m t h a t we o u g h t t o be c o n c e r n e d w i t h a n i m a l w e l f a r e will b e a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n . W e k n o w , h o w e v e r , t h a t in t h e p a s t m a n y e d u c a t e d p e o p l e w o u l d h a v e b e e n surprised by the contemporary concern with animal welfare. In the light of this c h a n g e in a t t i t u d e , I p r o p o s e t o b e g i n t h i s p a p e r b y r a i s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n " W h y does animal welfare matter?" on the grounds that reflective persons need, from time to time, to question their basic assumptions. As s o o n as t h e q u e s t i o n " W h y d o e s a n i m a l w e l f a r e m a t t e r ? " is p u t , it a p p e a r s
0168-1591/89/$03.50
© 1989 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
96 that there are two distinct kinds of answer that try to give a positive response; correspondingly, there are two kinds of argument that are used to support animal welfare. The first kind of positive answer attempts to show that animal welfare matters because it contributes to human welfare, the second kind of positive answer attempts to show that animal welfare is morally important in itself, or "intrinsically", quite apart from any consequences that animal welfare may have for human welfare. There are other possible kinds of answer including one that denies that animal welfare does matter and which therefore responds to the question by saying "question mal posde", on the grounds that the very asking of the question assumes that a positive answer of some kind should be given. I shall not pursue responses of this sort in this paper. Some people will certainly try to use both of the above kinds of argument, but even for these people it is important to raise the issue of which kind of argument is primary because our decision on this matter radically affects the way in which practical problems should be approached. If we rely primarily on the first kind of answer, practical problems that arise in the field, say, of animal husbandry will need to be handled in one way, while if we rely primarily on the second kind of answer, I shall show that they need to be handled in another, less straightforward way. Furthermore, it may well be that many misunderstandings arise because the participants in a debate on animal welfare do not realize that they are arguing from different standpoints. Let us consider two illustrations that bring out the difference between the two kinds of answer, one from the protection of animals in the wild, the other from the field of animal husbandry. First, let us suppose that a serious debate develops about whether or not to preserve polar bears in the Canadian Arctic following a large increase in the human population of the region. Those in Group A are in favour of allowing the species to die out because of the nuisance and danger that the bears cause to humans, while those in Group B are in favour of preserving the bears. Members of Group B, however, are divided into two camps. Those in B ( 1 ), reflecting the first kind of answer described above, argue that in the long term there will be more human suffering if the bears are not preserved, and that the nuisance and danger caused by the bears are more than compensated by the avoidance of this suffering. In particular, it is claimed that if the bears are not preserved: (1) the ecology will suffer and as a result humans will have the expensive task of taking on the important role that bears have played as predators in the delicate balance of the North; (2) humans will not have the pleasure of being able to watch polar bears in their natural environment. Those in Group B (2), reflecting the second kind of answer described above, while accepting that the arguments given under B (1) may add some persuasive power to their side (especially to certain politicians who, in their view, are not likely to be moved by purely moral argument), are unhappy about relying on this kind of apology for the bears. Somehow, they say, this kind of argument misses the point. A polar bear, they argue, has an intrinsic "right" to be in the Arctic, unless perhaps it poses an immediate threat to a particular human.
97 If we are trying to resolve this dispute, perhaps in the capacity of an independent arbitrator, then in the case of the debate between A and B (1) we know, more or less, how to proceed. We may still have difficulty in actually determining a correct answer, but essentially, we know what the criteria for a correct answer are. The welfare of bears is an "instrumental" good, that is good in so far as it contributes to h u m a n welfare. There will still be difficulties because it is hard to make accurate predictions about things such as the magnitude of the dangers that bears pose and because of the ambiguity of determining what counts as h u m a n welfare. However, we do not have the additional difficulty of trying to balance two independent schemes of welfare, animal and human. This additional difficulty arises as soon as we examine the debate between A and B (2). According to the latter, even if we presume that polar bears will present a p e r m a n e n t danger if preserved and that as a result each year some humans will die and others will have increased fear, this still leaves open the question of whether the bears should be preserved. We have to try and balance animal and h u m a n welfare, and if one is not instrumental to the other there may not even be the theoretical possibility of a correct answer. In the last sentence, I deliberately used the word "may", because whether or not the desired balance between animal and h u m a n welfare can, in theory, be reached by a rational process depends upon the kind of overall moral philosophy that we hold. For example, if we are Benthamite utilitarians, then although we will belong in Group B(2), because of Bentham's important and, for the time, unusual claim t h a t the happiness of all sentient beings has to be taken into account (in Singer, 1979 ) there does exist, nevertheless, a universal criterion in term of which the balance between animal and human welfare can, in principle be made, namely the long-term overall balance between pleasure and pain. However, m a n y non-utilitarians will insist that there are several independent values and that there is no "primal" value, such as pleasure or happiness, to which they can all be reduced. An arbitrator who is sympathetic to this view clearly has a m o n u m e n t a l and, in a sense, impossible task. However, in saying this I do not mean to imply that this view is wrong just because it generates an impossible task. Perhaps decision making just has to take place in such a context! For our second illustration, let us take the debate over the raising of chickens in batteries. Most of the arguments are familiar. Those in Group A defend the present practice, stressing the economic benefits of mass production, while those in Group B are against it, arguing in favour of a greater concern for animal welfare. Once again, however, those in group B are divided in a crucial way. Those in B (1) point to the loss of flavour compared to home-range products, reduced longevity in close confinement, the bad effects of the antibiotics that have to be used as a result of this intense system, and so on. T h e y may also point to the painful concern that some h u m a n s feel as a result of knowing that chickens suffer and it is important to see that, stated in this way, the
98 argument still falls under B(1) and not B(2), since it is an argument about human suffering that results from viewing animal suffering! In contrast, those in Group B (2), while they will probably experience personal suffering at the contemplation of animal suffering, will insist that animal suffering in itself is cause for disquiet and, moreover, that this suffering cannot be justified simply by pointing to a corresponding human good or lessening of human suffering, for example, as a result of cheaper meat. The arguments used by those in Group B(1) may assist a good cause, but, so those in B(2) insist, they are not the essential arguments. Once again it is clear that if we accept the validity of the arguments used by Group B {2) we have a much greater theoretical problem than if we confine ourselves to the arguments of B (1). It will also quickly become apparent that members of group B (2) differ widely among themselves. Some will regard the prevention of animal suffering as a kind of "deontological" principle, so that no amount of human good can compensate for a violation of this principle. In a similar way, they might also refuse to kill even a single polar bear that threatens a human. Others will be more flexible and will take the notion of a "balance" much more literally, allowing some preventable suffering to animals but only if there is no "realistic" alternative. Then, of course, the debate centres on what counts as "realistic", or "necessary", or "possible" and so on. Those who follow this approach will probably allow limited animal exploitation when no alternative is "possible" and, likewise, would condone the killing of individual bears in order to protect life, but would not condone the killing of species for human convenience. Given the distinction between two kinds of argument for taking animal welfare seriously [represented by B(1) and B(2)], can we give reasons for preferring one approach rather than the other, or is it the case, as many claim who are generally sceptical about the value of reasoning within the domain of practical ethics, that no reasons can be given? Those who support this position might add the claim that we all have our particular prejudices, at least when it comes to fundamental positions and while we may be able to argue rationally from these fundamental positions, we cannot argue rationally about them. In other words (so the sceptical argument continues), given our premises, we can be rational in the sense of being consistent with these premises, but the premises themselves are chosen on non-rational grounds. In the next part of this paper, I propose to argue that this sceptical position oversimplifies the situation and that there are, in fact, rational considerations that can lead a reflective person to belong either to Group B (1) or to Group B (2) rather than the other, and perhaps to some more specific position within one of these very broad groups. Finally, in the third part of this paper I shall discuss, very briefly, the problem that arises when there is a perceived conflict between animal and human welfare.
99 RATIONAL GROUNDS FOR ADOPTING ONE POSITION ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANIMAL WELFARE RATHER THAN ANOTHER
There are at least three areas of reflection that can lead a person to adopt a position within B (1) as opposed to B (2), or vice versa. (1) There is the way in which we draw the distinction between humans and animals, or more strictly between humans and other animals. Clearly this distinction, however it is drawn, has implications for moral issues relating to animals. One reason for this is that accounts that claim to be descriptions, especially of complex concepts such as h u m a n nature are nearly always, and perhaps always, evaluative as well as descriptive. The way in which this distinction is drawn has often been non-rational and merely the result, say, of a religious prejudice. However, there is no need for the distinction to be nonrational and when it is not then the consequences that are drawn for moral issues that relate to animals can be the result of rational reflection. Let me illustrate; in the past, a number of philosophers confidently asserted that animals differed from humans because the former lacked any inkling of "selfconsciousness" or, more specifically, of symbolic or propositional language. For example, the eminent philosopher E r n s t Cassirer wrote "In all the literature of the subject there does not seem to be a single conclusive proof of the fact that any animal ever made the decisive step from subjective to objective, from affective to propositional language", and he goes on to claim that only in man do we find "a symbolic imagination and intelligence" (Cassirer, 1944). Therefore, it was often asserted that humans have a unique kind of value because they alone reach a level of being which makes them self-conscious, selfdirecting agents. In the light of recent work with primates, and in particular their use of sign language, it is doubtful whether this way of marking a clear distinction between humans and all other animals can still be sustained and, indeed, those who argued that a difference of this kind was the crucial factor in the awarding of a special moral status are now committed (if they are consistent) to awarding this status to at least some non-human animals. I do not mean to imply from the foregoing paragraph that the issue of the distinction between h u m a n and other animals is now closed; far from it. Indeed the issue is not (in my view) whether or not there is a distinction, but how accurately and fairly to describe the distinction. In addition to problems about the precise meaning of concepts such as "self-consciousness", it may well be that the distinction cannot properly be made by looking for a single factor, like "self-consciousness", which divides this species from that, but from the possession of a cluster of factors, no one of which is unique to any species, but which together mark off this species from that. However, a distinction along these lines does not sit happily with an absolute moral distinction between the
100 human species and all others, and would be much more congruous with a position within what I described as B(2). This is one indication of how there could be a rational argument for one overall position rather than another. In other words, a perfectly rational decision about the way in which humans differ from other species could lead one to adopt a moral stand within B (2) rather t h a n B ( 1 ). (2) There is the implication of one's overall position with respect to religion. It might be claimed that this in turn is basically a non-rational matter, but for some at least, this will be hotly contested. Without entering into this particular debate, let us assume the following situation. Professor X, a woman brought up as an atheist, has come to adopt some version of Christianity on grounds that, according to her honest opinion, are at least in part rational. My point is that the change in Professor X's position may have (rational) implications for her view of the moral status of animals. Moreover, paradoxically, it may well be the case t h a t she will have much stronger grounds for adopting a position that falls under B (2) t h a n will m a n y traditional humanists! Many humanists have adopted the claim of Protagoras: " M a n is the measure of all things", as a s u m m a r y statement of their philosophy and as a short way of indicating their rejection of divine beings or divine standards. However, if this statement is taken at face value, then the moral implications put the humanist immediately into Group B (1), i.e., animal welfare must be measured, along with all other things, in terms of h u m a n welfare. However, for Christians, or for members of other faiths that can consistently deny that man is the measure of all things, there is no reason why animals cannot have an independent importance within the overall scheme of creation. I used the word "paradoxically" in the above paragraph when I referred to this matter, because as a matter of historical fact, Christians have often tended to treat animals as if man were the measure of all things, while it has often been humanists (in a broad sense of the term) like B e n t h a m and Mill who have stressed the moral status of animals. One reason for this odd situation has been a traditional and in m y view, mistaken, interpretation of Genesis, where Adam was given dominion over the animals, a dominion symbolized by his right to name them. {Genesis 1, 28 and 2, 19-20) However, as a matter of sheer consistency and putting aside the history of how religious people have often used or misused animals, a creationist view allows for, and perhaps even suggests, the possibility that animals have a moral status that depends on the Creator's purpose, a purpose t h a t does not necessarily reduce animals to creatures that exist for the sake of humans and that is, therefore, independent of h u m a n welfare. This could be true even if we accept the view of Genesis that humans have "dominion" over the animal kingdom. The issue is the nature and purpose of this dominion. By a "creationist" view I do not mean one that denies evolution, despite the frequent association of belief in creation with rejections of evolution. I simply mean a view that accepts the idea of a creative
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power behind whatever process there is that leads to the existence of animals and humans, whether this process be evolutionary or not. Once again, therefore, there may be rational grounds for adopting one kind of moral philosophy rather than another; grounds that depend upon the need for some consistency or congruence with our other beliefs. (3) There is the relationship of one's view of the moral status of animals to one's overall moral philosophy, a philosophy that for some at least, is the result of deep reflection upon the different possible philosophies plus a preference for the one that seems the most coherent or most consistent with experience. I have already hinted at one illustration of this. If we are utilitarians, then the demands of consistency should lead us to belong to Group B (2). I shall give just one other illustration. If we believe that the human sense of moral obligation is to be explained purely in terms of human psychology and does not reflect some kind of discovery about universal obligations binding on all rational creatures (as, for example, in Kant), then the very notion of a "correct" answer to any moral issue will seem odd. In the light of this, some thinkers claim that the only way in which one moral answer can be "better" than another is in terms of its ability to reconcile conflicting human interests. An interesting example of such a view, worked out in terms of the laws that are appropriate to a society that contains competing interests, can be found in the writings of Roscoe Pound. A philosophy of this kind logically commits one to a position within B (1). One of the things which I personally find odd is that many of those who vigorously defend animal welfare from arguments that belong to the B (2) type, when challenged about their overall philosophy, tend to uphold a version of the last-named moral philosophy, that is to say, one that explains perceived moral conflicts purely in terms of conflicts between different human interests. Kant would have argued that if people wish seriously to maintain the convictions that they hold, they should develop a moral philosophy that is adequate for their position! To put this in another way: there are certain prerequisites, or "postulates", that should lie behind one's moral claims. THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN ANIMAL AND HUMAN WELFARE
So far, I have argued that as soon as we ask how animal and human welfare are related we come up against a crucial conflict between the two positions that I have classed as B(1) and B(2). Moreover, when a practical issue is under discussion, such as the treatment of chickens in food production, it soon becomes apparent that failures to reach agreement are often the result of fundamental disagreements at this theoretical level and not only of disagreements about empirical matters, such as the estimated cost of different methods of rearing chickens. In the light of the foregoing discussion, how can we handle situations in
102 which animal and human welfare appear to be in conflict? If we regard animal welfare as "instrumental" to human welfare then, as I have pointed out, we know, at least in theory, how to proceed, but what do we do if (1) we are not "instrumentalists", but belong somewhere within the group that I have labeled B (2), and also (2) we are not Benthamite utilitarians and do not believe that there is a single value in terms of which conflicts between animal and human welfare can be resolved? As I have already indicated, it follows that there will be no "correct" answer to many problems, but it does not follow that all answers are therefore on the same level and that we are simply forced to make a non-rational decision. What should happen, I suggest, is something like this. Firstly, the participants in a debate should try to find what common ground they share with respect to the empirical description of the problem they face. For example, if we stay with the issue of battery chickens, we need to know what are the probable costs of alternate ways of keeping chickens and what are the behavioural differences between chickens reared in different ways. Secondly, the participants should try to find general principles they agree about, even if these principles do not give precise answers to ethical problems. For example, in the case of animal experimentation, debaters may well accept a principle to the effect that if we have to use animals, we must use as few animals as possible and use them in the most economical way. Some of these principles may assist the debate even if they immediately raise problems of interpretation. Take, for example, a principle that runs: "When there are alternative ways of raising animals we should use the one that causes least pain and distress whenever possible". It might be objected that acceptance of this principle gets us nowhere because the word "possible" is too vague. "Of course", someone may say, "it is possible to abandon all battery raising of chickens but the cost would be unrealistic". However, it seems to me that to debate the issue in the context of this principle is already to move forward from the verbal exchanges that typify many debates about animal welfare. Although there may still be eventual disagreement, the participants are now actively exploring together what the alternatives are and are trying to weigh, in the context of a shared concern with a principle, the relative weights of a certain value and a certain disvalue. Moreover, when participants proceed in this way, even when no single "correct" answer emerges, it may well be the case that several definitely wrong answers emerge. In other words, a rational debate may not be able to identify A as the correct answer, but it may be able to show that given the agreement that exists about the empirical facts and about principles that are shared, answers X, Y and Z are wrong, while what should be done lies within the range of answers represented by A, B and C. It is certain that this will not satisfy everyone, but it is sufficient to give point to the debate and to allow reason an important role. After all, ethics is not the only intellectual discipline in which we may have to be satisfied with saying that whatever the best answer is, we
103 know that it lies within this range of answers rather than that range of answers. Furthermore, as the debate proceeds, there may be a role for a certain kind of "sensitivity" that enables those who agree (at first, superficially) about certain principles to develop a common mind about what these principles really mean and where they lead. A high level discussion between scientists who disagree about which hypothesis to use may have much in common here with a properly conducted ethical debate. For the scientists, there are some totally unreasonable hypotheses (X, Y and Z) and others (A, B and C) which can be entertained by a reflective intelligence. Between A, B and C, if a growing sensitivity does not give us accord, it may well be that in ethics, as in science, there is room for several different creative choices, all of which can be rationally justified.
REFERENCES Cassirer, E., 1944. An Essay on Man. Chapter 3, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT 1962,pp. 30, 33. Singer, P., 1979. Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 49-50.