Central Asia in Asia: Charting growing trans-regional linkages

Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 3–13

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Journal of Eurasian Studies j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s e v i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / e u r a s

Central Asia in Asia: Charting growing trans-regional linkages Nicola P. Contessi Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nazarbayev University

A R T I C L E

I N F O

Article history: Received 14 September 2015 Accepted 15 October 2015 Available online 2 December 2015 Keywords: Balance of power Concert Governance Multilateralism Infrastructures Trade

A B S T R A C T

As the so-called ‘Asian Century’ unfolds, Central Asian countries are increasingly directing their foreign relations eastward. Meanwhile, Asian states are equally turning to Central Asia in their search for energy resources and new markets. This dual dynamic is giving rise to closer and deeper ties in three key areas. As far as infrastructures are concerned, various Asian powers have adopted Silk Road policies that see Central Asia as a fundamental transit route for their long-haul connectivity projects. In the field of trade, Central Asia’s exchanges with other Asian countries have been growing steadily since the 1990s, in some cases even coming to rival, in comparative terms, exchanges with the West. Lastly, in terms of multilateralism, Central Asia is increasingly enmeshed in a web of overlapping institutions with a strong Asian identity, coexisting with the region’s Western institutional references. The article then problematizes this emerging pattern by sketching out some of the possible ramifications that could stem from the sustainment and consolidation of these trends for the international order and the global balance of power. Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University.

Prevailing narratives of Central Asian international politics typically refer to a looming power struggle along an East–West divide. Today, however, we also see accelerating trans-regional ties linking it to diverse Asian sub-regions (East, West, North, South, and Central), much of them bypassing the West altogether. Countries in these sub-regions are gradually taking an increasingly large place in the foreign relations of Central Asian states, across a variety of sectors. In a way, this is a sign of the times: if we speak of an Asian century today, it is because of the demographic weight and economic dynamism of this part of the world. With Asia emerging as an important pole of global economic and political power,1 it is inevitable for it to gradually draw countries

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nazarbayev University, 53 Kabanbay Batyr Avenue, 010000 Astana, Kazakhstan. E-mail address: [email protected]. 1 In 2010, the IMF projected that over 40 percent of global GDP will be generated in Asia by 2030.

from adjacent (sub)regions as it consolidates this role. At the same time, a number of pull factors are present. Just like for countries in the West, Central Asia’s natural resources are an attractive bounty for countries in the East, equally hungry for energy resources. Moreover, for the rising powers and emerging economies of East, South and West Asia, Central Asia represents an obvious hinterland to engage, as they seek to refashion the environment around them or reach out to new markets. India (Das Gupta, 2010; Kavalski, 2009; Moore, 2007; Peyrouse, 2010; Sachdeva, 2006), Iran (Pahlavi & Hojati, 2009), Japan (Dadabaev, 2013, 2014; Hickok, 2000; Rakhimov, 2014), and South Korea (Fumagalli, 2006, 2012) have all displayed similar efforts in this direction, though it is China that has undoubtedly developed the largest footprint, factor that some regard as the main spur for other major Asian players like Japan (Walton, 2009) and India (Kavalski, 2010a, 2010b). More recently, ASEAN countries have also begun to explore ways to connect South-East Asia to Central Asia in a single economic corridor (Jakarta Globe, 2013).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2015.11.001 1879-3665/Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University.

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On the other hand, Central Asian states have developed a tradition of foreign and security policy diversification (Contessi, 2015). At a time when Russia, under strain in the Post-Soviet space, has been tightening its grip on its “near abroad”, Asian countries represent a further and previously under-explored vector to mitigate these new pressures. Meanwhile, this vector can also represent a way to offset the negative externalities that the economic crisis in Russia has inevitably generated for the region. Significantly, the search for these connections has ticked up since 2014. Engaging their broader continent has thus come to represent an opportunity for Central Asian countries, and one that comes with little strings attached. However, these growing interactions have deep roots. As this paper illustrates, they also have a multidimensional character, encompassing trade, infrastructure connectivity and multilateralism. Together, these ties are gradually re-enmeshing Central Asia with parts of Asia from which it had been isolated for most of its modern history, and this is itself a noteworthy development. But what is the broader picture that the sustainment of this trend could compose in the long run? Even though their true magnitude will be discernible only “once the dust has settled to the ground”, the transformations these tendencies portend – which are taking place against the backdrop of the rapid and more profound changes the international system is experiencing – are potentially far-reaching. Authors have noted that rivalries between Asian rising powers were adding an Eastern dimension to the so-called New Great Game in Central Asia (Contessi, 2013, 237; Cooley, 2014). Calder (2012) argued that complementarities between the advanced industrial and the extractive economies of Eurasia are driving the emergence of a new form of continentalism. Lastly, though more recent opinions have nuanced the realism of such a proposition (Umland, 2015), Trenin (2015) has argued that an expanding Sino-Russian axis would bring about the emergence of a "Greater Asia" that will challenge the international order. If the trends portrayed in this special issue stay the course and further deepen in the future, they could come to offer a corollary to some of those early assessments. To be sure, the latter are still largely embryonic and open-ended, and anticipating their future evolution presents undisputable difficulties. Yet, this does not mean the exercise should not be attempted, as they pose real challenges for analysts and policymakers alike.2 Therefore, the exercise pursued herein, if still tentative (and with due caveats), has both scholarly and policy relevance. This article begins by canvassing the broad trends that are giving rise to this pattern, and successively debates various scenarios in a first cut endeavor to anticipate implications. Sections one, two and three survey such deepening interactions in the areas of trade, infrastructure connectivity and multilateralism respectively (and by

2 At various times, R scholars have observed the need to devote more efforts to anticipating international change (for instance, see: Gaddis, 1992; Holsti, 1998; Vincent, 1983; see also: Deutsch, 1966).

way of the latter, security and finance). Section four then takes a step further and considers the possible ramifications of these trends. It develops a four-pronged definition of international regions and contemplates the possibility that the long-term sustainment of trans-regional ties around Central Asia may foreshadow regional consolidation along continental lines. Acknowledging certain caveats to which I return in the conclusion – the still nascent nature of these ties, Central Asia’s continued links to the West, and Asia’s overall heterogeneity – three different scenarios are put forward based on different forms of governance that may emerge in this hypothetical macro-region.

1. Trade Statistics highlight a pattern of growth in commercial exchanges between countries of Central Asia and those of other subregions of Asia, even amidst diminishing trends between individual dyads. Unsurprisingly, the lion’s share goes to ‘usual suspects’ like China, Japan, and South Korea which, in 2013, ranked among the top ten trading partners for several Central Asian states. China was the first trading partner for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and the second for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; Japan was Kyrgyzstan’s fifth, Tajikistan’s third and Uzbekistan’s tenth trading partner; South Korea was Uzbekistan’s fourth, and Turkey was the ninth partner for Kazakhstan, the fifth for Kyrgyzstan, the third for Tajikistan, the second for Turkmenistan and the fifth for Uzbekistan (International Trade Center, 2014). However, the interesting and less recognized part of the story is that countries of West, South and – though volumes remain negligible – even Southeast Asia are taking increasingly prominent positions among Central Asian states’ trading partners. East Asian countries are clearly the leading Asian partners for Central Asian states (see: Peyrouse and Fumagalli, this issue, for analyses on China and South Korea respectively). In 2013, China had total trade of $22.5 billion with Kazakhstan, about $1.5 with Kyrgyzstan, about $2.1 with Tajikistan, $9.3 with Turkmenistan, and $4.5 with Uzbekistan. In the same year, Japan’s total trade with Kazakhstan amounted to some $1.7 billion ($ 2.051 in 2012), $258 million with Kyrgyzstan, some $2.5 million with Tajikistan, $61.6 with Turkmenistan and $225.12 with Uzbekistan. South Korea’s trade with Kazakhstan amounted to some $1.4 billion, $114 million with Kyrgyzstan, $44.5 with Tajikistan, $155.4 million with Turkmenistan, and $2.2 billion with Uzbekistan. In the South and West Asian context, the leading trading partner is Turkey, with close to $3 billion traded with Kazakhstan in 2013, $290 million with Kyrgyzstan, $655 million with Tajikistan, $2.75 billion with Turkmenistan, and $1.360 with Uzbekistan. The same year, Iran’s exchanges with Kazakhstan reached $620.6 million, $22 with Kyrgyzstan, $283 with Tajikistan, $535 with Turkmenistan and 136 with Uzbekistan, while India’s trade with Kazakhstan amounted to $677 million, with Kyrgyzstan to $26.7 million, with Tajikistan $48 million,

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with Turkmenistan 69.3 million and with Uzbekistan $156. But out of the various relationships between Asian and Central Asian countries, the ones with Southeast Asia are mostly under the radar. Though overall turnover remains modest, and largely limited to selected countries, these ties – encompassing tourism, investment and energy – begun to grow in the 2013–2014 biennium. In 2013, Indonesia’s trade with Kazakhstan amounted to $170,452 million, $1.946 million with Kyrgyzstan, to $5 million with Tajikistan, $5.1 million with Turkmenistan and $32 with Uzbekistan. The same year, Malaysia traded with Kazakhstan for $122 million, $11.483 with Kyrgyzstan, $5.5 million with Tajikistan, $36.6 with Turkmenistan and $87 with Uzbekistan; Thailand’s traded $163 million with Kazakhstan, $6 with Kyrgyzstan, $3 million with Tajikistan, and $9.2 with Turkmenistan; lastly, Vietnam’s trade with Kazakhstan reached $234 million, $3.133 with Kyrgyzstan, $9.2 with Turkmenistan and $139 with Thailand.

100

CA5 share of trade by region

80

Africa

60

Latin American

40

Eastern Europe WEOG

20 0

Asia 2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

What all of this suggests is that Asian countries have an increasingly important place in the balance of trade and overall economic well-being of Central Asian states. The chart above captures the weight of the five Central Asian countries’ trade with Asia relative to trade with other regions. On aggregate, between 2009 and 2013, Asian countries absorbed about one third of Central Asian trade, with a growth from 29.2 percent in 2009 to 36.8 in 2013. In the face of it, countries of Western Europe and North America have maintained a relatively stable position, peaking at 41.8 percent in 2010 to gradually dwindle down to 36.5 percent in 2013. This is not to say that Asia has eclipsed the West, and indeed if we sum Eastern Europe to the latter, its portion remains much larger, but Asia has nonetheless taken a greater position. A breakdown by country (see Fig. 1 below) reveals a more varied picture, with only a moderate share of Kazakhstan’s trade involving Asia, and figures exceeding 50 per cent for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; Turkmenistan coming close to 70 per cent in the second half of the sampled period. Kazakhstan’s situation is not surprising as the country benefits from greater integration with the global economy and exports large amounts of hydrocarbons to the West, from which it imports consumer goods in return. For its part, Kyrgyzstan has traditionally been the point of entry for Chinese bazaar goods and shows considerable volumes of trade with Asia. However, this country has actually experienced a moderate growth in exchanges with Eastern Europe in the same period, a group that in UN nomenclature includes Russia, Kyrgyzstan traditional patron. Tajikistan displays a comparable pattern.

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2. Infrastructures The numerous initiatives to connect Asia through transport and energy corridors that have sprung over the years are another important development. Some date back several decades, as in the case of the Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID), launched under the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the AsiaPacific (UNESCAP) in 1992.3 Other projects are much more recent and are being spearheaded by a handful of Asian powers. For all its ostensible limitations (Cooley, 2015), the most notable of these is China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR), unveiled by President Xi Jinping in September 2013, and which some already dub Beijing’s Marshall Plan for Asia. Also known as the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, it comprises a land-based corridor stretching from Xi’an (i.e. the Chang’an of the ancient silk road) to Lanzhou (Gansu) to Urumqi (Xinjiang) and Khorgos (Xinjiang) through Central Asia to Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic and Germany, and a maritime route from Guangzhou (Guangdong province) all the way to Venice through the Suez Canal.4 The Chinese government estimates the initiatives can generate a total economic turnover of $21.1 trillion (Tiezzi, 2014a, 2014b; Want China Times, 2014). To accelerate investments into infrastructure modernization, the Chinese government has created a $40 billion Silk Road fund and adopted a domestic policy framework to encourage Chinese banks to lend money to other countries investing in infrastructure along the planned route (Chu, 2013; RT, 2014a). This adds to $25 billion earmarked for the Maritime Silk Road and investments in the amount of $50 billion Beijing already pledged to Central Asia in 2013. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), officially launched at the end of June 2015, will provide additional financial muscle for these initiatives. The AIIB is due to start lending in 2016, with a target of $15 bn a year (Bermingham 2015). Needless to say, all this raises critical questions about the viability (in China) and transparency (in beneficiary countries) of such a large scale investment. In the energy field, two major projects already link Central Asia with China. The first is the 2,228 km Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline that was completed between 2001 and 2009, with a current capacity of 20 million tons of oil per year. The second is the China– Central Asia Pipeline, which pumps natural gas from Turkmenistan (lines A, B and C), as well as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (line C). Line D – the fourth section, scheduled to be ready by 2016/17 – will deliver gas from another field in Turkmenistan. The four lines of the China–Central Asia

3 ALTID combined under a single banner the preexisting Asian Highway and Trans-Asian Railway projects, themselves originally launched in the 1960s. ALTID intersects with other trans-continental transit initiatives like TRACECA and especially CAREC. In 2001, UNESCAP and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe have partnered in a joint project known as the Euro–Asia Transport Linkages to build transport corridors between the two continents. 4 Some of these corridors like the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (notwithstanding a volatile security situation) and the Bangladesh–China– India–Myanmar Economic Corridor, as well as various Western routes through Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are already being implemented. See Mu (2014).

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N.P. Contessi / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 3–13

Kyrgyzstan

60

Share of trade (%)

Share of trade (%)

Kazakhstan 40 20 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

80 60 40 20 0 2009

2013

100 50 0 2009

2010

2011

2011

2012

2013

Turkmenistan

2012

2013

Share of trade (%)

Share of trade (%)

Tajikistan

2010

80 60 40 20 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Share of trade (%)

Uzbekistan 60 40 20 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Data: ITC 2014 Regions are based on UN Regional Groups (http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml). N.B. West is short for the Western Europe and Others group; East are countries from the Eastern Europe group, which includes Russia.

Fig. 1. Percentage of trade by region.

Pipeline are destined to supply more than 40 percent of Beijing’s gas requirements by 2020 – the equivalent of 80 billion cubic meters per year (Contessi, 2014a). Another project is South Korea’s Eurasia Initiative launched in October 2013, on occasion of the International Conference on Global Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia held in Seoul, just shortly after China unveiled its Belt initiative. Its stated goal is to build “a single continent connected by logistics and energy networks” with the prospective goal of setting up a single market from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The energy component is centered on electric grids, oil and gas pipelines; while the transit component hinges on a web of transcontinental road and rail links, destined, in the latter case, to enable a Silk Road Express (SRX) train from Busan to Europe (Park, 2013). Central to this initiative is the Russian Far East as the geographical connector in a terrestrial network spanning South Korea, North Korea, Russia and China to Central Asia and from there reaching further to Europe. This South Korea–North Korea–Russia triangulation could, in the hopes of the South Korean leadership, contribute to the amelioration of inter-Korean relations. The construction of a 54 km cross-border freight rail line between the

North Korean port of Rajin and the Russian city of Khasan is under way,5 and a Trans Eurasia Information Network should be completed by the first half of 2016. The integration of Korean and Russian electricity grids is also being studied. Prior to this, Seoul partnered with Uzbekistan in the construction of the Navoyi Transport Hub, the largest logistical center in Central Asia with annual capacity of 100,000 tons, inaugurated in August 2010 and operated by Korean Air Cargo (see Fumagalli, this issue). Like its counterparts, India’s Connect Central Asia policy aims to rekindle ancient ties, notwithstanding its dependence on the volatile Af-Pak region. Delhi has proposed the long-term integration of land routes linking it to Central Asia as spurs of the planned international North–South corridor. Likewise, in the energy field, another goal is that of creating stable energy supply links to India for hydroelectricity from Tajikistan or hydrocarbons from the Caspian

5 The South Korean government is nudging private investors to purchase a 34 percent stake in the RasonKonTrans Russian–North Korean joint venture that is developing the corridor.

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Sea, with the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) pipeline as a key plank of this strategy. Iran has also been working with Central Asian countries towards the restoration of ancient transport ties in a similar Silk Road logic, though its policy is more limited in breadth and reach. The Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran north–south railway opened in December 2014, gives the two Central Asian countries a direct link to the open seas (Daly, 2014; Iran Daily, 2014). But, Iran is also poised to take an important place in China’s Silk Road belts itself, both maritime and land based, with potential to become an interchange between overland and maritime routes. The possible lifting of sanctions, following the ratification of the 2015 nuclear agreement, could unlock even greater potential for Tehran. Due to its insular nature, Japan has not played a major role in the development of pan-Asian connectivity. Tokyo has been mainly a donor for ongoing multilateral initiatives and feasibility studies, consistent with its foreign policy of assistance (see Dadabayev, this issue). However, in May 2015, Prime Minister Abe used the floor of the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia to announce the creation of a five-year plan for infrastructure investments in Asia funded to the tune of $110 bln (Kihara & Sieg, 2015). During his October 2015 tour of Central Asia, he announced $25 bln in infrastructure and other projects (Japan Times, 2015). 3. Multilateralism A further sign of Central Asia’s eastward tilt is its growing involvement in a variety of pan-Asian multilateral frameworks that have emerged over the years.6 These range from the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the area of security, and, most recently, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and, to an extent, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in the economic sphere. Three main factors combine to give these institutions a continental breadth. First are the strategies of their respective prime movers (China and Russia above all). Having taken a wider Asian outlook in their foreign policy orientations – China with its March West policy and Russia with its Look East policy – both powers are bound to imbue, in one way or another, their multilateral creations with that rationale. Second, the membership of these groupings – whether current or projected – comprises countries from different parts of Asia. CICA and AIIB have a clearly pancontinental roster of members (the latter also including non-regional members), while the SCO is set to expand its membership presently limited to Central Asian countries.7 Through its push for free trade agreements (FTAs) with countries in various parts of Asia, the EEU has taken a similar route. A third and last factor is represented by ‘institutional tie-ups’, a term here used to describe the variety 6

These obviously do not include the variety of Post-Soviet groupings that have also emerged since the end of the Cold War, which are outside the scope of this article. 7 The SCO has engaged non-local countries through observer and dialogue partner arrangements since 2004. Also positing the SCO as a transregional organization is Jackson (2014).

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of cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding (MoU) reached between Secretariats of different multilateral organizations. While these have often little substance, they do carry a political significance that is worth taking note of. Founded in 1992, CICA, a little known organization promoting dialogue, confidence building, and counter-terrorism, only held its first Summit in 2002. With 26 member states spanning the Asian continent, CICA is the most comprehensive multilateral body on Asian security despite significant gaps.8 It is also at the center of a web of institutional tie-ups with various other regional organizations, including MoU’s with ASEAN and the SCO, concluded in 2014. As its name and membership lineup indicate, CICA had a clear pan-continental aspiration from the beginning. Under China’s two-year chairmanship, CICA may in the future turn into the cornerstone for a new security governance framework for the whole of Asia. At the 2014 Summit, Beijing laid out plans to strengthen its institutional architecture, including the functions of the permanent secretariat; intensify high-level meetings; and establish a mechanism for defense consultations (CICA, 2014). Having developed since its establishment into what is probably the most consequential regional grouping in Central Asia, the SCO already connects the latter region to East and North Asia by way of China and Russia. The 2015 Ufa Summit boosted the organization’s trans-regional breadth with the addition of India and Pakistan, previously observer states, as full members. But the SCO’s Observer and Dialogue Partners further underscore its continental breadth: the former include Iran and Mongolia, and the latter Sri Lanka and Turkey. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia and Nepal were also given dialogue partner status at the Ufa summit. The SCO has likewise been pursuing institutional tie-ups with various Asia-Pacific multilaterals. Between 2005 and 2014, it reached MoUs with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2005), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2007), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for the Asia-Pacific (UNESCAP) (2008), and CICA itself (2014). Though concrete results remain to be seen, these ties exemplify, at least symbolically, a distinct political orientation. Nonetheless, cooperation with UNESCAP has supported the conclusion of the SCO Intergovernmental Agreement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States on the Facilitation of International Road Transport that was signed in Dushanbe in September 2014, and will also assist in its implementation. Launched in 2015, with a clearly continental membership roster and mandate, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is poised to become a catalyst of continental integration. With initial capital of $100 billion, the AIIB will help fill a shortfall in infrastructure investment in Asia that the Asian Development Bank estimated to stand at $8 trillion

8 The current membership includes the five Central Asian countries; Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East; Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Turkey in West and South Asia; Cambodia, China, Mongolia, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam in East and Southeast Asia. Russia and Egypt are also members, while Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, and the US have observer status.

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for the period 2010–2020 (The Straits Times, 2015). All Central Asian countries but Turkmenistan are among its founding members as well as more than 30 other Asian countries and twenty non-Asian ones. Finally, the EEU may also end up playing a role in promoting closer trans-regional ties between Central Asia and Asia, though from a revisited Russia-centric logic, and this notwithstanding the economic crises afflicting its key members. Although membership is currently limited to only five former soviet countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia), the EEU is increasingly leaning toward Asia in two main ways. On one hand, by negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with various Asian countries. Negotiations with Vietnam were completed in December 2014 and if the agreement enters into force by the end of 2015 (Small, 2014), as a Russian high-ranking official contended, this could then provide a blueprint for similar agreements with other ASEAN countries, and eventually even the future ASEAN Economic Community (Kamalakaran, 2015; Korablinov, 2015; Standartnews, 2014). A similar document was reportedly reached with Egypt (Ghazanchyan, 2015), and discussions with India began during the 2013 Saint Petersburg Economic Forum (Debidatta, 2014; ITAR-TASS, 2014). Iran, Israel, Thailand and Turkey have also expressed their interest in a FTA with the EEU (Asbarez.com, 2015; ITAR-TASS, 2015b; Panfilova, 2014; RT, 2014b; Tehran Times, 2015; Times of Central Asia, 2015). Another kind of linkage is the prospective integration between the EEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt, which Russia and China agreed in May 2015 (ITAR-TASS 2015a). 4. Gauging the impact of a more Asian Eurasia Authors have underscored the profoundly transformative effect that the consolidation of international regions could have on the configuration of world politics (Acharya, 2007; Hurrell, 2007). The redrawing of regional boundaries could be equally significant. Deeper ties between different parts of Asia imply not only consolidation, but also a redefinition of these boundaries, and, conceivably, the translation of regionalism to a larger, continental, scale. Therefore, addressing the question of what could be some of the repercussions of denser trans-Asian ties on the international system, albeit still in a hypothetical form requires taking a broader perspective and partially shifting our focus from the immediate Central Asian neighborhood. This, in turn, requires thinking critically about regionalism. Attention must be devoted to the deep features that undergird regions, in order to subsequently understand how emerging trajectories could modify those very same features. Definitions of international regions have traditionally emphasized a mix of physical proximity and shared cultural, political, and economic ties. More recent conceptualizations have laid emphasis on their socially constructed nature as well (Acharya, 2007, 634; Hurrell, 2007; Katzenstein, 2005). Implicit in the evolution of such definitions is a growing understanding that, together with their geographical and behavioral features, it is the substantive content of regional interactions and their associated practices that make these constellations politically salient (Ayoob, 1999; Lemke, 2002; Nye, 1968; Paul, 2012).

Building on this rich debate, a definition highlighting shared rules of the game, whether formal or informal, whose validity is recognized by states within a bounded geographical space, has the merit of subsuming various aspects of these existing definitions, while also contributing to an understanding that is more sensitive to power.9 From this perspective, regions can be distinguished on the basis of four main pillars: an ideological status quo (Lemke, 2002; see also Katzenstein, 2005); a degree of institutionalization (Katzenstein, 2005);10 norms of intervention by outside actors (Hurrell, 2007, 132), namely the conditions and the manners in which outside states are permitted to wield influence; lastly, the practices for accessing territory – especially understood in terms of the markets and the natural resources contained within it, the allocation of contracts for extracting them, and the ways of trading them (Lemke, 2002, 55–6). Another merit of this definition is to help clarify how power can travel between regional and global levels. Because regions can be conceived of as an ‘intermediate [and, one may add, relatively autonomous] form of community’ between the nation – state and international society (Whiting, 1993, 20), the connotation of such rules can bear on the nature of the international order and of the global distribution of power. Hence, such a definition can also help us gauging the implications that deeper trans-regional ties could have on the nature of regionalism in Asia. However, the specific connotation (and ensuing global impact) of the rules of the game of continental regionalism in Asia would be determined by the type of governance such space came to adhere to. In turn, this hinges on how the discrete agencies of different categories of actors combine with one another, and on the degree of collaboration the more powerful players will be able to elicit from smaller Asian and Central Asian states. The latter, in fact, hold the keys to the type of governance that could ultimately prevail.11 Unfolding evidence is currently consistent with three distinct scenarios, each embodying a different form of governance: hegemony, concert, or a more diffuse balance of power. Underwriting these scenarios is an implicit dialectic between two sets of parallel logics: on one hand, integration on a continental scale through growing interaction and consolidation and fragmentation at the system level, due to the geographically based differentiation of interstate practices, consistent with the hegemonic and concert scenarios; on the other hand, fragmentation (at least political) on a continental scale and integration at the system

9 This resonates with Alagappa’s (2003: 34) emphasis on “rule governed interaction”. 10 To the extent that multilateralism represents the primary vehicle for the allocation of values in the international system (Contessi, 2014b), the ideological aspect goes hand in hand with the institutions that embed it. 11 Actors in different categories can be expected to hold different outlooks on the future evolution of the Asian space. For the unipole, regions are an important connector permitting the local articulation of influence through the integration into globalization and extends its security guarantees (Hurrell, 2007; Katzenstein, 2005). For regional rising powers and would-be regional (or global) hegemons, regions represent a springboard for organizing and propelling their affirmation on the world stage. For smaller Asian states, the region represents a more proximate, accessible and familiar international level.

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Thanks to unmatched capabilities and a geographic location as the ideal seam between Asia’s disparate cores, Beijing can play a catalyzing role in joining up these various parts, and has the ambition to do so. One possibility, therefore, is a Sino-centric hegemonic scenario. China already is the largest trading partner for most countries of Asia and is positioned to become the main public goods provider for the emerging continental region, a role that can give it sway over the connotation of rules of the game. In ideological terms, starting from Central Asia, China has been promoting a New Security Concept for over a decade. Premised on the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, it stresses Westphalian statehood as well as mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. Though similar principles are generally quite widely upheld throughout Asia independent of China’s preference, Xi’s statement at the 2014 CICA Summit indicates Beijing will be pushing to extend them on a continental scale. As a result, it is therefore possible that the former principles could emerge as the ideological status quo for an Asian continental region. In turn, this could cement a body of localized values diluting perhaps the cultural homogeneity of the liberal international order, which some consider a key requirement for effective global governance (Hurrell, 2007, 128). In institutional terms, Beijing has become, over the years, the foremost institutional entrepreneur in Asia both in the economic sphere, presiding over the 2015 launch of the AIIB, and in security, with its role in founding the SCO in 2001, which it still leads with Russia. These venues are key platforms for shaping regional governance. Xi’s proposal for revamping CICA goes in a simlar direction, though its results remain uncertain. If Chinese ambitions are successful, CICA could eventually become an overarching institutional framework with a continental breadth. As developments within the SCO suggest (see Ambrosio, 2008; Al-Qahtani, 2006; Human Rights in China, 2011), the gradual process of

legalization (Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal, 2000) within the various continental institutions could reinforce such a non-western ideological status quo by translating its values into hard and, more often, soft law. If the membership enlargement goes forward, the SCO could further contribute to this outcome by increasing the number of Asian states abiding by principles of interaction that China played a primary role in shaping. The AIIB will likely further contribute to the codification of rules and practices in the financial sector that can rival the ones embodied in both the IFIs and the Japan-led Asian Development Bank. Leveraging its economic prowess, China is becoming a key beneficiary of rules of territorial access, tying to itself many regional countries, for which natural resources represent the main economic activity. Chinese companies have already acquired the rights to much of the region’s resources, and oil and gas pipelines already flow to China from Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Moreover, in 2014, Beijing also agreed to build a pipeline from Russia’s fields in Eastern Siberia and also is a major importer of other minerals and raw materials from the region. As a component of China’s broader March West strategy to boost its presence in and engagement of Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, OBOR can further contribute to reorienting rules of access towards Beijing. Building on over 20 years of engagement of Central Asia, OBOR is the most articulated, well financed, and promising of the various connectivity projects.13 Lastly, China is spearheading the search for a new security architecture for the whole of Asia that would transform norms of intervention, in what Acharya (2007, 644) argued could represent an Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine. Its Asian Security Concept was proposed as a “code of conduct” in the political and security spheres with the unconcealed intent of locking the US out of Asia. In the words of President Xi Jinping, this would transcend the “Cold War thinking” of what he labeled as efforts to “beef up a military alliance targeting a third party [i.e. China]” (Xi Jinping, 2014). Beijing plans to use its two-year CICA chairmanship to advance these purposes (Gov.cn, 2014). The gradual consolidation of a continental region could foster a more cloistered regional space, if not an actual “zone of autarky” (Calder, 2012, 284), relatively insulated from offshore balancing, as the effect of the “stopping power of water” (Mearsheimer, 2001, 114) is reversed. In sum, in a Sino-centric hegemonic scenario, rules of the game could enshrine a self-referential ordering, with different subregions hierarchically organized internally and closed off to outsiders externally. Or at least, one in which Beijing has primacy over the terms under which these outsiders may engage and how subregions interact. However,

12 Changes in the foreign policy priorities of one or more of the key players; domestic instability and/or regime change in one or more of the regional players; alteration in the distribution of power in Asia; the countervailing efforts of external powers and a major shift in technology are some factors that could alter, disrupt or weaken the trajectory of international change in one direction or another.

13 Unlike other plans, it is integrated within a national economic development strategy and a variety of collateral domestic and foreign policy tools, while also being poised to benefit regional economies locally. Moreover, it appears Chinese leaders also see the Silk Road as a space for capital and currency integration based on the internationalization of the Renmimbi (Tiezzi, 2014a).

level, referring to the assimilation of the continent’s disparate regional realities into global logics and the minimization of continental coherence, consistent with the balance of power scenario. Which scenario will occur could depend on a plethora of intervening variables.12 Having emerged, in its 25 years of independent existence, as a strategic crossroad for connectivity projects, and as a political laboratory for original governance solutions, Central Asia is uniquely positioned to play a pivotal role in this regard. 4.1. Hegemony

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Beijing has been coy about assuming wide ranging international responsibilities. Moreover, mistrust is widespread given China’s sheer size and the potency of China-threat narratives that could undermine Beijing’s prospects, including in Central Asia, as Peyrouse argues in this issue. Other eligible powers in Asia may also put a brake on Beijing’s ambitions. 4.2. Multipolarity A second scenario is that of a polycentric Asia propelled by multiple engines: from the deepening SinoRussian partnership, to the multiple other pivotal states in various sub-regions: first and foremost, India (and Pakistan) – bound to join the SCO as full members – but also Iran, Japan, South Korea and Turkey. Thanks to the alliances that the three latter countries have with them, Western powers are equally involved in this process. All these states can further facilitate trans-regional connections, while smaller states are likewise nurturing closer ties not only with these pivotal players, but also directly with their peers. Depending on how these multiple agencies stack up, the resulting multipolarity could take one of two possible configurations. First, Asia’s various pivotal states rank considerably on various measures of national power, and their élites can be said to share a similar worldview and role identities favoring strong foreign policy independence. As a result, if they were able to reach a grand bargain in which the payoff from mutual accommodation was bigger than what they could obtain through cooperation with outside powers, one possible configuration could then be some variant of a concert system. As born out of the European experience, a concert implies a pact among key powers, underwritten by a logic of collusion in the name of both mutual assistance and mutual control. While a 21st Century, Asian concert would presumably differ somewhat from that historical ideal type; the region’s pivotal states have been developing modes of interaction that presently seem to observe similar conventions.14 As observers put it, the Sino-Russian relationship is premised on various forms of accommodation and compensation (Gabuev, 2015; Yan, 2014). Russia– South Korea, Russia–Iran, Russia–India and China–Iran are other dyads that have developed a grammar for constructive engagement with one another. The Russia–India– China trilateral is a further arrangement that has allowed its members to reach agreement on key principles of relations (Trenin, 2015), and this notwithstanding India’s substantial ambivalence, or the longstanding Sino-Indian historical rivalry. It is possible that the logic underpinning these formats may eventually find a broader application. In this case, collusion among members of the pact and observance of the respective spheres of interest would inspire regional rules of the game. 14 Key features of a concert system include: great power tutelage on the international system; the inviolability of the territorial status quo without great power consent; the protection and defense of key members of the state system; and great power refrain from challenging one another in their vital interests or in their prestige and honor (Elrod, 1976, 160; Väyrynen, 2003, 29).

Rules of territorial access and outside intervention would both likely hinge on the final say of a handful of powers within their respective spheres of influence likely organized along existing sub-regions. In the case of Central Asia, this would remain Russia for the foreseeable future, notwithstanding China’s inroads (Peyrouse, this issue). For example, the closing of American military bases in Uzbekistan (2005) and in Kyrgyzstan (2014), which were widely attributed to Russian diplomatic efforts, is indicative of emerging norms of intervention in the sub-region. China’s efforts in the South China Sea are not very different. As seen above, virtually all of Asia’s pivotal states are also pursuing Silk Road policies aimed at building connectivity and accessing territory and markets in the larger region. Tellingly, while American and European energy and mining companies still benefit from concessions obtained in the early 1990s, Asian states are increasingly obtaining access to the continent’s natural resources – primarily Central Asian ones. Together with denser infrastructure connectivity, this could give shape to a self-sufficient continental space capable of sustaining itself through intramural trade and supply chains. It thus seems plausible that other members of the pact would receive a favorable treatment relative to outsiders in their attempt to access other subregions, and, from a politico-military perspective, could be involved in interventions through joint operations. Concurrently, the ability of outsiders to access that same territory may result diminished, though some of these Asian customers, like Japan, South Korea, and to some extent, India, are also Western allies or partners. It thus seems plausible that other members of the pact would receive a favorable treatment relative to outsiders in their attempt to access other sub-regions, and could participate in intervention through joint operations. The institutional shape of the continent would probably still see multiple institutional structures coexisting side by side, typically under the leadership of one key power, like for example, the AIIB and possibly CICA, or acting as compensation chambers where their respective interests can be reconciled like the SCO- notably thanks to its twoheaded leadership. If the membership enlargement decided at the 2015 Ufa Summit goes forward, the SCO could then become one of the chief venues for an Asian concert. Conversely, the ideological status quo in an Asian concert would plausibly uphold principles inspired by the Bandung legacy which already form common ground among the various Asian powers, as well as other consensual elements favored by these key members within their respective spheres. These values would provide the fundamental glue holding together the great power bargain. Currently, the qualitative nature of multilateralism that is emerging from the institutional overlap in the wider Asia – whether in the form of tie-ups, mutual observer relationships, or direct membership – seems to increasingly embody similar core values. For instance, as President of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang noted: ‘ASEAN and SCO share similar approaches and also emphasize the importance of maintaining peace, stability and general welfare of the region’. Underwritten by the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ and its constituent Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the SCO, is, like ASEAN and its underlying ‘ASEAN Way’, a distant descendant of Bandung and the

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nonaligned tradition, while other institutions share, in one way or another, a similar inclination. Nonetheless, as far as ASEAN is concerned, while expressing a vision for an Asian regional order, it also seeks conciliation with the Westernled international order. In sum, a concert would be consistent with the logic of continental consolidation, although one hinging on an oligarchic rather than hegemonic governance revolving around the ordering role of the main regional powers, and more or less hierarchical relations between the former and the smaller states in the respective subregions, which would tendentially be organized as spheres of influence. Though they may be consulted sporadically, smaller states in the subregions would likely have reduced opportunities to interact autonomously with other subregions. And powers yet, the egalitarian principles of the Bandung ethos could temper this. Externally, a concert-based Asia would be relatively closed off to outside players, as members of the pact seek to perpetuate their prerogatives. Renewed multivectoral diplomacy in Central Asia suggests attempts to prevent such scenario. A second variant of multipolarity is the one built on a balance of power system where the major players adhere to the more competitive logic of a dynamic confrontation and search for preponderance (Elrod, 1976, 160). The major poles in such a system typically struggle with one another to maintain equilibrium by preventing or redressing imbalances in the distribution of power between them (Lobell, 2014), polarity being a function of the way technology, resource endowments, economic and military capabilities are distributed, such logic is associated with a pluralistic governance where political and economic forces are profoundly intertwined, due to the intensification of ties across Asia of the kind that this issue has surveyed. However it’s been objected that some Asian states are too far apart to develop regional rivalries (Lemke, 2002), Washington’s Pivot to Asia and New Silk Road Initiative, Beijing’s March West policy, Moscow’s New Eastern Policy, as well as Delhi’s, Seoul’s, and Tokyo’s overhauled Asia and Central Asia policies may all conspire to bringing about this type of outcome. The smaller states’ strategies to resist domination by stronger regional powers would be instrumental to such an outcome. From an institutional point of view, this could entail the affirmation of a multilayered system of overlapping great power-led institutions with the cohabitation of Eastern and Western templates. Such institutions would presumably have limited effectiveness in terms of outputs, and serve mainly as power multipliers. Meanwhile, a certain bifurcation can be highlighted within the wider Asian institutional overlap, between more ‘continental’ projects, and both ‘trans-Pacific’ and ‘Euro-Atlantic’ initiatives like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), or the East Asia Summit, and the OSCE respectively. This would probably mirror a degree of normative competition from an ideological point of view, with Bandung principles defying efforts to uphold the liberal international order through alternate institutional frameworks. Territorial access in such a scenario would likely correlate with alignment patterns, though contractual obligations may occasionally be reviewed as the former are reconsidered, and pivotal states make efforts to undermine one another. The various Silk Road policies that disparate players are spearheading can contribute to maintaining the region

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accessible to other states as well. Moreover, a new round of official visits to Central Asia by Heads of State and Government of virtually all Asian powers between 2013 and 2015 (Xi, Park, Modi, Putin, Abe), capped by US Secretary of State John Kerry’s, suggest the prolongation of a degree of geopolitical pluralism. Lastly, the continued demand for offshore balancing could preserve a certain openness as far as norms of intervention are concerned, with regional states seeking outside allies to balance local rivals. Countries like Japan or South Korea are linked to the US through a system of formal alliances, but it is uncertain whether this could eventually elicit an opposite formal alliance, though a China–Russia strategic partnership and even a China-Russia-Iran triangle have been developing in response. In absence of a formal countervailing coalition, we could see limited hard balancing perhaps with US allies favoring catching the buck, as well as a revival of surrogate balancing through institutions or norms (Contessi, 2009; He, 2012; Paul, 2005). In this regard, India’s attempt to combine ties in Asia with a strategic partnership with the US is emblematic. In sum, a balance of power scenario would prevent the consolidation of a coherent continental region, sustaining instead a degree of openness for outside powers and a greater assimilation into the wider international order. As a result, we may see the different sub-regions of Asia to be more dispersed politically, propelling higher degrees of interaction than in alternative configurations and acting as entry points from which the kind of ties described herein could exert multiple centrifugal pulls sustaining an Asian New Great Game. 5. Conclusion This special issue has grappled with developments that are contributing to bringing together parts of Asia that are fundamentally distinct, with Central Asia positioned to play an unprecedented pivotal role. The individual papers by Sébastien Peyrouse, Timur Dadabaev and Matteo Fumagalli zoomed in on the nature of Central Asia’s ties with China, Japan and South Korea respectively examining these evolving relations in the economic and political realms. Taking stock, this article speculated on what may be some of the larger ramifications these developments could have, suggesting three distinct scenarios: a hegemonic governance centered around China, and two alternative multipolar configurations distinguished by the underlying principle of interaction, whether collusion or competition. Of these, the former two adhere to a logic characterized by continental consolidation. Regardless of intensity and degree, this could result in a more fragmented of the international system as continental fault lines become more pronounced. The latter, on the other hand, depicts a trajectory driven by the opposite logic of assimilation of the continent into the global order and a more fragmented continental region. As a result the outcome of this dialectic, therefore, could have far reaching implications for the international system. However, already wildly contested today, the type of governance that may eventually emerge on a more closely knit Asian continent is unlikely to be a perfect embodiment of one

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model or another, in light of the obvious continuities between the three forms. Even if a concert does prevail, this may eventually turn into a balance of power if the grand bargain underwriting collusion is altered; likewise, a balance of power may solidify into collusion if a viable equilibrium is achieved that can lead to the development of cooperative norms. Conversely, should a preponderant power like China be able to stem the formation of balancing coalitions, this imbalance may eventually consolidate into hegemony. Likewise, a concert system may eventually decay as other players weaken vis-à-vis China, and the latter becomes the ultimate guarantor of the rules initially embodied in the concert. Viceversa, it could give way to a more competitive environment in the absence of a single preponderant actor. In closing, a few cautionary points are in order if we want to avoid over-interpreting the reach of these transformations. First, the nature of these ties remains very much at the level of incipient tendencies, whose direction, strength and pace could change in future years. Even though infrastructures are sprawling, Asia’s sub-regional components remain distant. From a trade perspective, even though the overall portion of Central Asia–Asia trade has been growing steadily, the volumes of exchanges remain relatively small even with some of the larger countries like Japan or India – though recent trips by state leaders may change this. Second, as far as Central Asia is concerned, these trends have not developed at the expense of the region’s westward strategic links,15 even though, as far as trade is concerned, this has been the case for individual Central Asian countries. As such, this might just be a stage in an ongoing process whereby the Eastern and Western orientations of the Central Asian region eventually merge to give rise to a transcontinental Eurasia. Likewise, the balance between the two orientations may further tilt in one direction or another. Either way, Central Asian countries have an unprecedented pivotal role to play as the catalysts of international change. Third, Asia is a heterogeneous geo-cultural, geo-economic and geopolitical space with nations separated by distances or natural obstacles of various sorts; using very different languages (some with entirely different roots); and practicing different religions. Each nation also has different priorities and faces unique security situations that often preclude agreement on regional issues (Wuthnow, 2014). Moreover, as Peyrouse (this issue) has shown with regard to China, deep mistrust still dampens higher levels of cooperation.16

15 Consider, for instance, Kazakhstan’s revamped strategic partnership with the United States (2014) and conclusion of an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2015; or Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s efforts to renew security partnerships with the United States. 16 Nonetheless, there also is a degree of shared history – embodied primarily in the experiences of the Silk Road and of colonialism – comparable institutional forms and non-western identities. Moreover, at least at élite level, Asian nations tend to share a keenness for being masters of their own destiny and a commonality of views on international issues. Hence, though spread over a much larger geography, one could also argue that Asia is not overly different from Europe: itself a riddle of languages, cleavages and schisms for much of its history, which, however, has not stopped it from integrating around a body of shared values and rules of the game and from developing a common continental identity.

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