China, Nuclear Security and Terrorism: Implications for the United States

China, Nuclear Security and Terrorism: Implications for the United States by Steven Grogan Steven Grogan works for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This article builds on a paper delivered at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. in 2007, when the author was a Mahan Scholar. The views expressed here are his own and do not purport to represent the DIA or the Department of the Navy.

Abstract: This article outlines Chinese strategic nuclear forces and the Chinese philosophical approach to nuclear security. It then focuses on the domestic conditions in China which could precipitate vulnerabilities to its nuclear forces. From information about internal security conditions in China, specific internal threats to Chinese nuclear security will be derived. Based on these threats, several outsider and insider scenarios will be outlined involving a variety of terrorist or terrorist related behaviors. These notional scenarios will include everything from overrun or attack, to diversion, to cyber terrorism, to sabotage. The article will then cover what these scenarios and the possible Chinese reaction to them may mean for the security, military and diplomatic strategies of the United States.

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he shift of Chinese strategic nuclear forces from a highly immobile force vulnerable to preemptive strike1 to a force that is mobile and possibly more survivable may actually result in a less secure force, one vulnerable to terrorism2 or related criminal activity. This raises two concerns: (1) whether a mobile Chinese nuclear force3 could be physically overrun, 1

Since little is known about Chinese nuclear security, this article is more conceptual than empirical and abides by what the 9/11 Commission might expect: prudent use of ‘‘imagination.’’ See ch. 11, ‘‘Foresight—and Hindsight,’’ The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 339. 2 In this article, ‘‘terrorism’’ will include any state or non-state act which seeks to overrun, attack, steal, divert, sabotage, or undermine any Chinese nuclear warhead, missile transport erector launcher (TEL), or convoy delivering the same. Included in terrorism is any criminal activity related to such plans. 3 This paper is about people and how they can affect nuclear security and less about the role of institutions or organizations which fight terrorism. While it covers Chinese strategic missiles including the DF-15, DF-21, DF-31, JL-1 and JL-2 and how these weapons are changing from being silo-based to road mobile, it is less about the order of battle, capabilities, or equipment of these forces. For further information see Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, pp. 18–19 and p. 41. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/ 070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf. # 2009 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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GROGAN attacked or made less safe by terrorists inside China and (2) whether personnel assigned to these forces could become less reliable based on China’s emerging de-emphasis on political control of its population and its flirtation with Westernization, namely increased economic liberalization. Increased ‘‘Westernization’’ does not automatically yield a propensity for decreased reliability. However, when Westernization is allowed to seep into a previously authoritarian or closed society, it is unknown how that society may fall victim to certain negative aspects of Westernization like embezzlement, bribery, and conspiracy to unlawfully acquire wealth and capital. Nonetheless, such an unknown remains interesting to ponder and forms a basis for the subject of this paper. Any vulnerability of Chinese nuclear weapons, regardless of origin, could pose a significant security concern for China.4 These Chinese security concerns, real or imagined, have implications for the security, military and diplomatic strategies of the United States. Background Overview of Force Composition Changes. This article does not cover the role played by the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government in the intricacies of Chinese decisionmaking about possible nuclear terrorism. This information is largely unknown because of the closed nature of Chinese society. Suffice it to state, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 2nd Artillery maintains operational control of all Chinese nuclear weapons. The PLA is ‘‘controlled and deployed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission.’’5 From the PLA’s main headquarters north of Beijing, the 2nd Artillery reportedly oversees eight missile bases located in Liaoning, Anhui, Yunnan, Hunan, Henan, Qinghai, Shanxi and Hebei provinces.6 At each of these bases, the Chinese generally possess an array of strategic nuclear weapons referred to as DF-3, DF-21, DF-15, DF-11, DF-18, DF-4 and DF-5 and possibly the DF-31. Taken together, this amounts to about twenty brigades.7 It is unknown whether these bases also hold the JL-1 and soon the JL-2 (Table 1). Throughout the 1980s, Chinese strategic nuclear forces became increasingly vulnerable to U.S. strategic nuclear forces. In the 1990s, the 4 The author wishes to thank John P. Franklin, Jane Eisenberg and George Kominiak and Robert Follis of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico for their insights into nuclear security, terrorism and China. Thanks, too, to Philip Saunders and Martin Wayne of National Defense University for their perspectives on Chinese security and political-military issues. 5 Open Source Center (OSC), HK Daily: ‘‘Second Artillery Corps Elevates China’s International Strategic Status’’ CPP20060823715017 Hong Kong Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal) in Chinese (11 August 2006), p. 14. 6 Indicates the approximate location of these Chinese missile bases and not the number of strategic nuclear weapons located at each. 7 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 193.

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China’s Nuclear Security Table 1. Names of Chinese Strategic Missile Bases and the Types of Missiles Deployed There8 Base in below provinces Liaoning Anhui (i.e., Wannan) Yunnan Henan Hunan Qinghai Shanxi Hebei

Missile system DF-3/DF-21 DF-3/DF-21/DF-15/DF-11/DF-18 DF-3/DF-21 DF-4/DF-5 DF-4/DF-5 DF-3/DF-4 DF-3/DF-4 DF-4/DF-5/possibly DF-31

2nd Artillery began a huge relocation effort to make these nuclear weapons less vulnerable using ‘‘advanced tunneling and construction methods’’ over rugged, mountainous terrain.9 In the course of this effort, the Chinese have worked to enhance the mobility of their strategic weapons to avoid strategic attack. But this force posture is allegedly undermined because the country is ‘‘suffering deeply from terrorism,’’ according to one Chinese writer. In refuting a pro-Taiwanese article in 2002, Liu Hong claims: For more than ten years, with the support of the anti-China forces in the West, ‘Taiwan independence,’ ‘Tibet independence,’ and ‘East Turkistan’ separatists forces have [been] . . . creating territorial activities, to sabotage state security . . . seriously endangering . . . territorial and sovereign integrity.10

It is unclear whether Hong seeks to draw a distinct connection between independence movements in China and nuclear terrorism. Clearly, however, Hong wants to align separatism with outside threats that may grow into something more dangerous. Examining the Operational Changes. In remote regions of China launch organizations are spread out over many miles. Command center crews handle communications for the missile batteries and face potential telecommunications and equipment challenges.11 These challenges are of great concern now because some Chinese strategic missiles may be fully mated with warheads. Such challenges could play into the hands of terrorist or criminal elements in China by leaving missiles, warhead storage facilities and transporter erector launchers (TELs) vulnerable to overrun/attack, diversion, cyberterrorism or sabotage. That is why perimeter or base security in China may be undergoing greater scrutiny at the strategic nuclear weapons sites shown in Figure 1. For instance, the Wannan Base in the mountains of Anhui and Shanxi provinces has extremely tight security, restricted areas to which 8

Ibid, p. 192. Ibid, p. 193. 10 OSC, Liu Hong, ‘‘Taiwan Strait Observation: Who is Engaged in Military Terrorism?— Further Criticism of Chen Shui-Bian’s Recent Crazy Remarks,’’ CPP20020918000028 Beijing Renmin Wang WWW-Text in Chinese (18 September 2002) from FBIS Translated Text. 11 Lewis and Litai, p. 197. 9

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GROGAN Figure 1. China Map: Country View

even the base commander cannot go. Yet the base’s engineers ‘‘are allowed to provide TV and electronic repair services’’ to local residents thus creating a potential security problem.12 This exemplifies a condition that is incongruent with greater security measures intended to safeguard the operational changes associated with greater mobility of Chinese strategic nuclear weapons. Towards Imperatives about Physical and Personnel Security. Before describing the physical and personnel security of Chinese nuclear forces, it is important to mention organizations that oversee China’s approach to the terrorism problem. To start with, China’s stance toward nuclear security appears to complement its anti-terror strategy developed after 9/11. Shortly after that date, Beijing set up a National Anti-terrorism Coordination Group led by Hu Jintao, the president of China since 2003. China’s National Ministry of Public Security began an antiterrorism bureau to carry out ‘‘research, planning [and] guidance’’ on a national antiterrorism agenda and combat what the Chinese call ‘‘a Terrorist Arc,’’13 which they say originates in the East Turkistan area. 12

Ibid., p. 195. Pan Guang, ‘‘East Turkistan Terrorism and the Terrorist Arc: China’s Post-9/11 AntiTerrorist Strategy,’’ China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 2 (2006), pp. 21–22. 13

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China’s Nuclear Security China has looked to the former Soviet Union to determine and enhance its approach to security, to include antiterrorism. It would be quite natural for China to look to Russia on such matters. There is a history there. At the end of World War II Russia worked to expel Japanese forces from Manchuria. More recently, China and Russia have collaborated on counterterrorism for the 2008 Olympics14 and other security matters, like internal conflict scenarios. The Beijing Review in September 2005 reported on SinoSoviet Joint Military exercises aimed at security, for example. That year the Russians and the Chinese participated in military exercises over an eight day period in the Russian city of Vladivostok which is near China’s Shandong Peninsula. This was ‘‘the first ever large-scale wargame’’ between the two countries focused on ‘‘new challenges and threats.’’15 The exercises involved nearly 10,000 troops of the two countries and one which involved ‘‘a neighboring country . . . in need of help due to internal conflict.’’ These exercises could be designed to gain information about what China sees as a terrorist’s ability to ‘‘establish headquarters in remote areas.’’ Chinese writings about nuclear security incorporate the basic thrust of the Russian approach to this subject, namely the three ‘‘Gs’’: guards, guns and gates.16 But the ‘‘Gs’’ mainly pertain to the Russian way of physically securing fissile material as opposed to nuclear weapons, as defined in this article. However, it is reasonable to assume the security of Russian and, by extension, Chinese nuclear weapons likely involve preventing unauthorized access to nuclear weapons; detecting unauthorized actions quickly; foiling unauthorized actions; inhibiting the perpetrator’s penetration; and using deadly force against persons or terrorist groups attacking the nuclear arsenal.17 Additionally, physical security elements at Chinese nuclear security installations reportedly include facility surveillance equipment, closed-circuit television equipment, access control and management equipment, technical warning mechanisms, ‘‘equipment, for detecting carried and vehicle-borne nuclear materials, explosives and metallic objects, fire alarms and automatic fire extinguishers, special communications equipment and supply equipment.’’ Fences, ‘‘anti-ramming barricades, hardened storage facilities and protective containers’’18 may also be prevalent. The 2nd Artillery Corps may 14 OSC, ‘‘Russia to help China fight terrorism, ensure security at Olympic Games CEP 20020626000337 Moscow ITAR-TASS in Russian (26 June 2002) from FBIS translated excerpt. 15 OSC, ‘‘Beijing Review on Sino-Soviet Russian Joint Military Exercises Aimed at Security.’’ CPP20050906000115 Beijing Review (Internet Version-WWW) in English (1 Sept. 2005). 16 Nathan Busch, ‘‘China’s Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting: The Case for Renewed Collaboration,’’ The Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2002, p. 96. 17 OSC, ‘‘Russian Nuclear Arsenal Safety, Security a Top Priority,’’ CEP 20050110000204 Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian (15 Nov. 2004) (Article by Yevgeniy Maslin, ‘‘The Safety of the Russian Federation’s Nuclear Arsenals’’). 18 OSC, ‘‘China: Nuclear Forces Enhance Base, Weapons Security’’ CPF 20070327534001 China—OSC Analysis in English (27 March 2007).

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GROGAN be using more sophisticated technology ‘‘and rapid reaction forces for security’’ to prevent what it describes as ‘‘enemy agents, criminals, and terrorists’’ from attacking and seizing missile facilities.19 Remote sensing equipment was installed in tunnels in and around one base. This was in response to China finding ‘‘foreigners’’ holding ‘‘GPS [Global Positioning Satellites] and electronic maps.’’20 Ultimately, it will be important to confirm whether security procedures for fissile materials migrate to security procedures for the handling of nuclear weapons. What is curious about the Chinese approach to the physical security is how much they appear not to know. In meetings U.S. engineers held with the Chinese Institute for Atomic Energy, for example, absent was Chinese use of multi-purpose sensors, the two person rule and multi-beam infrared security mechanisms. Overall, the Chinese may have feigned an apparent lack of knowledge about sensors. True or not, this kind of shortsightedness in perimeter security could be exacerbated by terrorist access to commercially available oxygen cutting torches which can cut through gates. This could give terrorists access to not only mobile missile convoys but allow them to employ chemical/biological agents against facility security personnel. What remains uncertain here is whether there is a genuine Chinese ignorance regarding physical security and possible countermeasures or a fatalistic approach to the subject, the latter reflecting a resigned attitude of ambivalence towards something which one can do little to effect. The physical side of Chinese nuclear security involves membership in international fora. China is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) whose membership also includes Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The SCO, founded in 2001, provides a so-called legal basis for holding joint exercises combating terrorism and separatism. China held ‘‘a joint anti-terrorism drill’’ code named ‘‘Tianshan (2006)’’ in the eastern region of Kazakhstan, Almaty involving unspecified law enforcement elements of two countries.21 Aside from reaching out to the Russians and members of the SCO on certain security matters, China has looked to other nations, as well.22 On fighting terrorism, the Chinese navy worked with Pakistan’s navy in October 2003 and with the Indian navy later that year.23 19 OSC, OSC Report: PRC Second Arty Enhances Missile Sites’ Convoys’ Physical Security’’ CPP 20060928318001 China OSC Report in English (28 Sept. 2006). 20 Ibid. 21 OSC, ‘‘China, Kazakhstan Launch Joint Anti-Terrorism Drill’’ CPP200608241150001 Beijing Xinhua in English (25 August 2006) from OSC Transcribed Text. 22 OSC, ‘‘India, China agree to impart ‘vigorous direction’ to bilateral relationship SAP 20020331000038 New Delhi The Indian Express (Internet Version-www/English 31 March 2002 from FBIS Transcribed Text) from FBIS Transcribed Text. All India Radio Home News Service in English (23 Apr 2002). 23 OSC, India, China to begin talks on means of combating terrorism in New Delhi, 23 April SAP 20020423000009 New Delhi All India Radio Home News Service in English (23 April 2002).

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China’s Nuclear Security Additionally, the Chinese navy ‘‘conducted joint military drills’’ with the French and British navies in 2004 and in 2006 met with the United States, Russia and nine other countries in Rabat to inaugurate ‘‘The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.’’ The initiative seeks to provide guidelines for nuclear substance accounting, nuclear facilities safety and ‘‘combating’’ terrorist efforts to obtain nuclear materials.24 There is another side to nuclear security in China: the human or personnel side. Apparently, the political inclination and indoctrination of those who guard Chinese nuclear weapons remains key. However, a decrease in overt political control of the Chinese population could result in greater personal freedom or yield some of the same consequences that the Russian military has experienced: indebtedness, greed and self-indulgence. Some Russian personnel associated with protecting nuclear material have had security difficulties or challenges, aspects of which could be linked to how these personnel handle less overt political control of their lives. As Yevgeniy Maslin observes, The selection of new recruits to serve at nuclear arsenals is becoming increasingly difficult. They are selected from among young people who are faultless in every respect, possessing the appropriate education and nervous-psychological stability. When selecting personnel who will be directly involved in work associated with the storage of nuclear weapons, technical resources are used to reveal any propensity in the candidates to use alcohol, drugs or to commit legal offenses.25

While Maslin offers no concrete explanation for ‘‘legal offenses,’’ one could assume these are associated with diminished obedience to authority which could give rise to questioning or not following the understood rules of a society. These factors could possibly provide an environment for making Chinese military personnel less reliable. Any lessening of political control of the Chinese population could yield subtle changes in psycho-social or cultural mores which might become ‘‘legal offenses.’’ Related could be China’s increasing look into ‘‘unstable soldiers’’ who’s ‘‘nervousness, ennui and lack of focus’’ have caused ‘‘most missile test failures.’’26 A less authoritarian Chinese culture could herald increased demands for more open communication between Beijing and its citizens. China’s inept explanations of the HIV-tainted blood scandal, the SARS outbreak and why it conducted its 2006 anti-satellite test are several examples of how miscommunication could alienate or stir a population to protest and, in some cases, cause a degree of unreliability among those who are thought to be the most trustworthy. 24

OSC, ‘‘PRC Arms Control Official Seeks Urgent Action on Nuclear Terrorism’’ CPP20061101054015 Beijing China Daily (Internet Version-WWW) in English (1 Nov. 2006) from OSC Transcribed Text. 25 Maslin, p. 10. 26 Lewis and Litai, p. 198.

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GROGAN Origins of Nuclear Security Threats The Threat Constellation: Catalysts for security challenges inside China include repression and exclusion of certain ethnic groups, less political control of the Chinese population, in general, the changing nature of the Chinese military and ‘‘non-traditional threats.’’27 Whether these catalysts contribute to breaches in physical or personnel security pertaining to nuclear weapons is uncertain. This uncertainty is reflected in Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle which states that it is impossible to know both the exact position and the exact velocity of an object at the same time. The same can be said about the effects of less overt political control on a previously authoritarian society. After all, given the closed nature of the Chinese society, it is impossible to discern exactly where the country is in its governing evolution. Thus, it is important to surmise how the Chinese view the underpinnings of instability and whether these conditions could lead dissident, increasingly isolated groups to consider dangerous actions against China’s nuclear weapons. For all its moves toward democratization and economic liberalism, China is still a closed, authoritarian society. And within this country, there are many ethnic minorities and religious groups who feel persecuted and seek a democratic China or, in some cases, a way to live separately or autonomously within China. Separatist movements reside in the western Chinese province of Xingjian and in Tibet and could become a greater source of instability in China. As seen this past summer, separatist activities can be fueled by perceptions of inequities. The Han Chinese—the country’s ethnic majority—enjoy a disproportionate amount of economic opportunity in Xinjiang and Tibet. Changes to societal norms in China may play a critical role concerning the country’s future stability. With the withering of the political commissar, for example, challenges to stability may increase. People are not as monitored as they once were. Specifically, the danwei, or work unit system is transforming. Keeping track of where a person lives, their health care, and with whom they associate is breaking down. Plus, the State and the Communist Party may be seen increasingly by the Chinese as separate entities—detached from society writ large—thus yielding a tendency toward a less cohesive population. These changes may produce a propensity among some to be less risk averse and given to behavior the Chinese military and security establishment may find objectionable. Another societal norm that is changing in China concerns the military. Not all those seeking a military commission must attend one of the Chinese military academies. Hence, there are more ROTC-like commissions now being granted to Chinese military officers. This would surely result in a less politically 27

Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), p.vii.

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China’s Nuclear Security homogeneous group. In the 2nd Artillery, for example, this diversity could be perceived by graduates of Chinese military academies as affecting the military professionalism and reliability of this newer cadre of military officer. By extension, if a Chinese military officer is living off base, this person might be more vulnerable to be recruited by foreign agents. All this may translate into a new Chinese officer corps which is perceived in China as potentially less reliable. Such a development could concern the personnel reliability plans of the PLA 2nd Artillery. As political control changes in Chinese society, so may generational and ethnic change occur within the civil-military arena. There are more civilian leaders who have not served in the military than ever before. This could create schisms between civilian and military officials concerning how to plan, develop and monitor security programs dealing with personnel reliability, for example. As the Chinese military becomes more ethnically diverse, China may use its concerns about ethnic separatism and religious extremism to justify scrutinizing the reliability of those groups for positions of major responsibility. Plus, hyper-materialism, corruption, interest in religious cults and personal indiscretions may warrant a closer look at new recruits or those bound for sensitive military assignments. Although China is a Communist State with an enormous internal security apparatus, it believes it is vulnerable to terrorism.28 As Susan Craig has pointed out, China faces a host of non-traditional threats.29 It is the Chinese who portray separatism, extremism and terrorism as complementary actions which build upon the other to yield an instability that could undermine state power.30 Take Beijing’s concerns about access to energy, for instance. As Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson note, if the Chinese were unable to access their ‘‘sea-based energy supply, ...[l]and-accessible land energy resources’’ of Central Asia would be an all-important alternative.31 If Central Asia became a cauldron of instability and a breeding ground for terrorism, China’s energy supply fears could become very real. Look, too, at China’s concerns about electronic communications within its borders. China’s security officials point to ‘‘flash’’32 messaging among demonstrators and ‘‘a cottage industry of itinerant lawyers and petition specialists.’’ For instability to become effective it must be organized and have momentum. Thus, to Beijing, the seeds of such instability may reside in an organized and state-of-the-art use of electronics and information operations. 28 For a discussion of China’s interest in counterterrorism, see Christopher Yeaw’s book review in Naval War College Review, Autumn 2006, p. 139. 29 Craig, pp. 101–105. 30 Pankaj Mishra, ‘‘The Train to Tibet,’’ The New Yorker, April 16, 2007, p. 82. 31 Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, ‘‘China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,’’ Naval War College Review, (Autumn 2006), Vol. 59, No. 4, p. 29. 32 Murray Scott Tanner, ‘‘Challenges to China’s Internal Security Strategy,’’ RAND Corporation Testimony, CT-254 (February 2006), p. 7.

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GROGAN Types of Threats Specific kinds of threats and scenarios involving criminal activity that could result in nuclear terrorism can be broken down into two categories, outsider and insider threats.33 Outsider threats are potential threats to Chinese nuclear security which could come from outside the confines of the Chinese military establishment. Insider threats could emanate from the trusted confines of this establishment. Outsider Threats: According to Susan Craig, there is an increase in the number of ‘‘mass disturbances’’ throughout China because, in general, the Chinese population lacks an acceptable outlet ‘‘to express their grievances.’’34 China’s Ministry of Public Security reported that in 2005 there were 87,000 group incidents, increasing from 74,000 the previous year. This is not necessarily an isolated statistic. As Craig cites, the number of people involved increased five-fold, from 730,000 in 1994 to 3.76 million in 2004.’’35 Granted, China is the most populated country in the world but ‘‘the rate of increase’’ in these incidents and the fact that Beijing feels it is a serious problem, heightens Chinese awareness of such unrest. Instability can result not only from organization or mass disturbances but also from attacks on law enforcement officials. Nearly 3,500 Chinese police officers were reportedly wounded or slain between 2001 and 2003 apparently stemming from ‘‘being attacked by crowds or gangs.’’36 While it may be a reach to assume those who attack police could all become terrorists, such behavior can show disdain for authority, namely those who represent the state or the government itself. Further, such violence can point to desperation and could form the basis for larger protest movements which may ultimately work out their frustration in ways anathema to Chinese nuclear security. Outsider threats are also seen in remote areas of China. Evidently in early January 2007 in the Xinjiang region of China, an area about the size of Alaska in northwest China, ‘‘18 terrorists were killed and 17 captured, along with 22 IEDs and materials for thousands more.’’37 These terrorists may have been Uiyhgur, ‘‘a Turkic ethnic group’’ which is mainly Muslim. This may have been part of a larger effort by Al Qaeda to train insurgents bent on terrorism. 33 For an interesting discussion of ‘‘Insider and Outsider Threats,’’ see J.P. Franklin, ‘‘Characterization of the Security Environment at Fissile Material Sites (U),’’ (Version B-Working Draft), Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (25 October 2005), p. 10. 34 Craig, pp. 109–10. 35 Ibid, p. 110. 36 Tanner, p. 7. This may be an anomaly and possibly a reaction to the corruption, repression and other manifestations of living in a totalitarian state. However, it may also be symptomatic of an emerging instability that could foment further and cause certain individuals to commit acts of terrorism. 37 Martin I. Wayne, ‘‘Al Qaeda’s China Problem,’’ Asia Times Online, 27 February 2007.

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China’s Nuclear Security Apparently, Al Qaeda has trained over 1,000 Uiyhgur in Afghanistan.38 Ultimately, terrorist threats may cause Beijing to place mobile missiles in hidden or more secure areas, like canyons. While this could enhance missile survivability it could also provide greater shelter within which terrorists might operate should they purloin such weapons. Insider Threats: Insider threats to Chinese nuclear security could involve untrustworthy military and civilian personnel. Given the high value China places on political reliability it is important to consider how such untrustworthy personnel could emerge. To start, look at cultural issues in China. Hierarchies of relationships connecting family, schools and businesses are crucial. This is how trust is built. Such connectedness in China may even be more important than the rule of law. As described earlier, if repression and exclusion affect one’s culture, family or religion, it is possible these conditions could produce resentment towards the state, possibly resulting in unreliability within that persecuted group. Whether that unreliability can be shrouded enough to gain access to a position of trust may be another matter.39 To understand further how personnel unreliability in China may lead to an ‘‘insider threat’’ facing Chinese nuclear security, it is useful to look at how the Chinese may see rules and mores of society. Generally speaking, the United States is a nation of implicit rules. Americans usually stop at stop signs, do not smoke on airplanes or other public places and rarely, if ever, cut in line. Following society’s rules involves acculturation, respect for authority and fear of consequences. This notion of consequences may resonate differently in the Middle Kingdom. As outlined earlier, with the example of a Chinese base perimeter being bereft of multi-layered beam security, such a situation may portray a lack of knowledge by those in the security field. It also could portray a degree of malevolence or a resigned sense of fatalism. In other words, a ‘‘what will be, will be’’ attitude. If such behavior is extant, it could explain this lack of consequences mindset, a mindset noticeable when examining a PRC 2nd Artillery Unit’s anti-terror training and winter logistics mission. In the face of several months of competition among winter supply transport vehicles, ‘‘officers and soldiers suggested that the brigade’s leaders contract the use of civilian [vice military] vehicles to transport goods and materials [because] that would protect the safety record of the unit’s military personnel and vehicles.’’40 The mere thought of avoiding training to establish an apparently blemish-free safety record would be anathema to most U.S. military personnel. This begs a question as to why this unnamed Chinese Guard Battalion apparently performed below standards while training in urban anti-terrorism and riot control 38

Ibid. Charles Ferguson, ‘‘The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism,’’ The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), p. 128. Note his view on how difficult it is to carry out an insider threat. 40 OSC, ‘‘PRC Second Artillery Units Anti-terror Training, Winter Logistic Mission’’ CPP 20070110318007Beijing Huojianbing Bao in Chinese (29 Nov. 2006), p. 2. 39

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GROGAN methods. Was it because they never simulated training or used substitutes or improper training methods? It is one thing to be unreliable because of a lack of knowledge and expertise but it may be another to be unreliable based on obfuscation. Insider threats and unreliability can be exacerbated by an overall dissatisfaction with living conditions. Take the Russian military, for example. Lack of regular pay, poor or non-existent housing, sub-standard food, lack of training, cut off of base utilities due to non-payment of bills and hazing have contributed to dissatisfaction the Russian military.41 Any military force which is not paid regularly or who live in squalor may be subject to degradation in spirit or likely in some ways to become unreliable. The Scenarios Plausible scenarios are needed to stimulate discussion about what insider or outsider threats42 mean for China and for the United States. For example, what specific steps would dissident or isolated groups have to take to execute terrorism? What level of violence is contemplated to carry out the terrorism? How do the terrorists actually acquire the nuclear weapons? How would they bypass the safety features that are presumably in place which are meant to preclude unauthorized use? How does the terrorist group transport the weapon? And finally, what would terrorists do with the missile or warhead once they obtained it? There can be motivations, catalysts and plans but scenarios are needed which can posit realistic threats to Chinese nuclear security. Any greater level of fidelity on causation cannot be covered here. Hence, this next section depicts threats and scenarios involving nuclear terrorism each grounded in rational thought. Outsider Scenario: The Overrun/Attack. Chinese ICBM convoys could be vulnerable to terrorism by an overrun or attack.43 These attacks might originate as ostensibly mass disturbances, terrorist elements of which take possession of a nuclear weapon to initiate an unauthorized launch or purloin the weapon to transport it out of China for presumably hostile purposes. From the mass disturbance, a terrorist first might lob a hand-grenade at a missile convoy or utilize a man-portable air defense system against a TEL so as to divert the procession within or outside the secure area. This action could be followed by attackers swarming the convoy and taking its contents hostage. Related to the overall attack, terrorists could ignite a dirty bomb near a strategic military installation causing havoc which might delay rescue of the originally overrun missile convoy. Terrorists could couple the attack with suicide tactics against nuclear security installations, further inhibiting rescue. 41

Non-attribution source, conversation with the author, 25 April 2007. Ferguson, p. 53. 43 This is derived from a similar notional concern potentially facing another nuclear power. 42

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China’s Nuclear Security As much as this scenario posits outsiders, the security of the weapons convoy could be undermined by either the quality of the security force guarding it or the logistics and transportation elements supporting it. It is unknown whether such logistics and transportation specialists in the convoy would be conscript or career Chinese military. This could make a difference in convoy security because it is possible that career Chinese military might have a greater commitment to training and mission accomplishment than transcripts. Combine this with the poor food and drinking water problems in much of the Chinese military conscript force and this could breed a very dissatisfied group of military personnel. Yet without knowing the overall security architecture for these weapons, it is unknown how such a takeover, as described in Scenario #1, could endanger launch authority, for example. This could be especially true if the attackers were suicidal44 and they detonated explosives which destroyed command and control elements of the missile. Indeed, this could heighten launch uncertainties. To show that China takes the overrun/attack scenario seriously, the PLA 2nd Artillery may have made enhancements to nuclear weapons security in 2007.45 PLA 2nd Artillery strategic missile units may have put in place a range of new procedures and new equipment designed to undermine threats to its nuclear weapons facilities. This is apparently in response to ‘‘dozens of incidents where foreigners . . . hav[e] come close to [2nd Artillery] facilities . . ..’’ Various other missile bases have caught foreigners claiming to be tourists holding ‘‘global positioning devices and electronic maps outside its restricted area,’’ in 2003, for instance. Outsider Scenario: The Rogue Element Police Force. Regardless of which Chinese military base a strategic nuclear weapon is located, the weapon could malfunction, need to be moved to enhance survivability or be awaiting dismantlement.46 This might involve moving the weapon over remote areas of China. In this instance, another overrun situation is plausible. But unlike the previous scenario, it would not necessarily envision a mass disturbance. The scenario could contain a rogue Uiyhgur element existing within the People’s Armed Police in Central Asia, perhaps responsible for various aspects of the convoy movement outside the military installation. To be effective, this police element would need access to heavy weapons and plan an attack on the convoy movement to ferry a nuclear weapon out of China. Insider Scenario: The Disgruntled Workers. Seizure of nuclear weapons could also take place based on actions taken by an insider. For example, in the Central Asia Republic a terrorist group notionally colludes with religious extremists and conspires to seize the transport of a nuclear warhead from a secure bunker to its mating facility near a Chinese submarine base. On the 44

Ferguson, p. 141. See OSC, ‘‘China: Nuclear Forces Enhance Base, Weapons Security,’’ 27 March 07. 46 Ferguson, p. 48. 45

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GROGAN submarine base, there is a cook whose pay is in arrears and whose relatives are part of an oppressed Central Asian minority.47 This cook conspires with an employee of the base—perhaps one of the moonlighting TV repair personnel described earlier—to gain financial rewards from members of a terrorist group in exchange for disclosing that a lack of multi-beam infrared security exists on part of the missile base, a gap in physical security, also described earlier. It may be a matter of time before the terrorist group is able to gain covert access to a Chinese SSBN base without timely detection or reporting. Insider Scenario: The Diversion. Transporting weapons, especially nuclear weapons, by rail or truck does not protect those weapons from theft or diversion by unreliable personnel or their cohorts. A diversion scenario could emanate from terrorists setting off a radiation incident along the convoy route or by targeting nuclear ammunition. This could happen based on the transport of nuclear weapons under a variety of less than optimal security and living conditions. Here, again, security, logistical and transportation cadre may hold the keys to optimized security. For example, it is unknown how frequently Chinese guards at nuclear facilities are required to requalify in the training of heavy weapons like assault rifles and machine guns. Relatedly, special motor vehicles which provide protection to the transport of weapons need to be secure from bullets, fragments, fire and rollovers. While these trucks may be in the inventory, it is important to know the percentage of trucks actually ready and available to military units. Trucks available may actually need regular overhauls because of the amount of use over time. Plus, as discussed in the overrun/attack scenario, if those who currently and formerly maintained nuclear weapons live in squalor or in crime-laden or environmentally unsafe areas, these conditions could affect the quality of life of these personnel and possibly impede their reliability. Insider Scenario: Cyberterrorism. Terrorist use of the Internet to attack Chinese nuclear security could be from the outside or inside. The Internet could allow terrorist groups to communicate covertly to solidify plans. Cyberterrorists are difficult to locate because they are skilled at ‘‘moving their web sites from host to host.’’48 This could present a challenge for Chinese officials intent upon shutting these web sites down or ensuring the terrorist group is not actually taking on the cover of a legitimate business. Terrorists, either insiders or outsiders could use the Internet to ‘‘market themselves, recruit followers, obtain capital, identify partners,’’ and even 47

Franklin. See the section on ‘‘Proximity to Known or Foreign Immigrant Presence (U),’’ p.

20. 48

Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson, ‘‘Terrorist Use of the Internet: The Real Story,’’ Joint Forces Quarterly, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C, Issue 45, (2d quarter 2007).

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China’s Nuclear Security create and identify insiders.49 For one, if a terrorist element gained an insider within a secure Chinese missile battery that person could distribute Internet browsers which may be configured to screen out critical Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) information from nuclear security procedures. Such SOP information, for example, could involve how to detect an unauthorized account holder or communicator. This level of intrusion using browsers could also lead to the creation of unauthorized SOP information which could establish bogus calls for the diversion of a nuclear weapons convoy or disclose its movements. This might allow for a potential compromise or seizure of a nuclear weapon. Terrorists could target Chinese critical infrastructure—energy and resource assets—that provide communications redundancy or back-up power supplies for Chinese nuclear weapons security. In the case of cyberterrorism and the earlier overrun scenario, any planned overrun could make sophisticated use of GPS in order to thwart Chinese countermeasures against possible terrorist actions. The West really does not know how China might handle a nuclear terrorism crisis. There are some scholars who believe Chinese decisionmaking is purposely vague. In fact, the Chinese may have no plans for crisis management. For example, it is not clear to this writer whether the Chinese believe a nuclear terrorism incident would be a law enforcement or a military problem. True, that kind of concern mirrors a Western way of thinking. And it is possible in a tightly controlled society, like China’s, there may be little time or inclination for any bureaucratic or turf battles about such a matter.50 Insider Scenario: The Ideologue and Sabotage. Born in Beijing, the son of a Chinese diplomat who served in Pakistan, marries a Chinese female. His wife appears to be an intense Maoist but is a study in deception. Her father was a Chinese naval officer—a submariner—who lost command of his boat because he visited a church in China. As a result, the family lost the perquisites associated with Communist Party life. She has become further embittered learning of the euthanasia which has often prevented the birth of Chinese girls. Most recently, she found out about repressive actions taken against those who exceed the one birth quota. She has decided to do anything she can to undermine the state. Her naval officer husband becomes a weapons officer on board a Chinese strategic submarine. After several years of marriage and through the power of suggestion, over time, she convinces her husband to 49

Ibid, p. 102. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that a nuclear terrorism incident in China might actually come under something called ‘‘Sudden Incidents,’’ for which there may be detailed plans. See OSC, ‘‘China: QRC Report on Use of Law in Handling Sudden Incidents’’ CPP20070306476001 Department of Defense in English 05 March 2007. (Article selected from Vol. 6-2006, China Military Science Journal by Senior Colonel Cong Wensheng: ‘‘The Use of Law in Handling of Sudden Incidents.’’) 50

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GROGAN exhibit an oblique, subtle form of passive resistance to the expert accomplishment of general quarters drills aboard the submarine. He unwittingly begins to inculcate this passive resistance to his subordinates who are entrusted with nuclear weapons. The naval officer’s wife is comforted knowing her husband and his crew might face remedial training and possibly disciplinary action because they continue to fail or barely pass general quarters drills. Failing a general quarters drill has implications for crew readiness and possibly its proficiency in the handling of nuclear weapons. Granted, this is far-fetched in terms of how much a Chinese naval officer, especially a submariner, might confide in his spouse about naval operations. But in an era of increased openness it is not inconceivable Chinese military culture may become more communicative within families. There may be a potpourri of other threats or scenarios facing Chinese nuclear weapons. Terrorists or criminal elements could:  Attack nuclear installations with trucks they obtain using forged ID cards. The trucks force military convoys on base to divert from their intended routes;  Divert parts of fire-fighting and rescue crews from an attacked convoy which had sustained an explosion by staging another explosion at or near other areas. This could be related to the diversion scenario;  Gain access to a mobile missile convoy by using the threat against the family members of convoy security personnel; or  Take advantage of extreme weather conditions which could arise during the transport of nuclear weapons or set a fire along a convoy route increasing the vulnerability to a mobile missile convoy. Implications for the United States An old Chinese proverb: ‘‘An Army burning with indignation is bound to win.’’ These nuclear security scenarios—and what the Chinese might do about each—have implications for U.S. security, military, and diplomacy strategies. Obviously, all the scenarios raise questions about how the Chinese could allow these situations to unfold and how each could affect Chinese command and control and consequence management procedures. For the outsider police scenario, for example, although it is unknown the level of security screening Chinese police undergo in Central Asia, it is worrisome to think these plotters could navigate the intricacies of communication, timing and dissimulation to possibly overrun a weapons convoy. Questions arise about a) the degree of reliability throughout all Chinese security elements providing perimeter and physical security for missile convoys; b) what the overrun scenarios mean for the security of the weapons themselves; c) whether the Chinese believe the United States is behind terrorist plots to 700

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China’s Nuclear Security de-stabilize their nuclear security or command and control; and d) lessons learned pertaining to the United States. What can the United States glean from these scenarios and apply to the security of American nuclear weapons? Security Strategy: U.S. nuclear weapons are operational—ready to launch. But these weapons have Permissive Action Links (PALs) or locks with codes preventing the unauthorized detonation of nuclear weapons.51 While there is no firm information on whether Chinese nuclear weapons have PALs, it is possible Beijing has sought and obtained Russian assistance regarding nuclear security. If Chinese nuclear weapons do not have PALs, the overrun/ attack scenarios could be internationally worrisome regarding an unauthorized launch. This scenario and the one about diversion could affect how the Chinese see their vulnerability to nuclear attack. After all, if the 2nd Artillery believes it is one nuclear weapon short because of a terrorist incident, their targeting and readiness calculations may be affected. If the United States learned of this situation, it is conceivable its own readiness or defense condition could change. On the insider scenarios, the U.S. Navy should be concerned about the origin of personnel unreliability. In the case of the unreliability of the Chinese submariner’s spouse, can she become an asset to the United States or is she pathological? If not exploitable, what is the role of passive resistance in military environments? How could it affect military readiness? Military Strategy: As the proverb mentioned earlier about indignation may indicate, China seeks to right how it was supposedly wronged, to catch up, to learn from its mistakes and to be triumphant, to win. This has implications for U.S. military strategy, especially in psychological operations (PSYOPS), generally described as methods used by military and police forces to shape a target audience’s emotions, motives, objective reasoning and behavior. MAJ GEN Xu Hezhen, Director of Shijiazhuang Army Command College, writes that while members of Chinese society ‘‘receive education in dialectical materialism,’’ which denies the viability of capitalism, they lack an ability to consider ‘‘a psychological angle’’ to issues. Xu Hezhen claims this ‘‘lack of a psychological angle’’ is a ‘‘weak link’’ among the Chinese people and asserts that ‘‘excellent psychological attainments’’ should improve ‘‘the quality of talent in our nation and military. . . .’’52 Since Hezhen injects military equities into the discussion, perhaps the ‘‘psychological angle’’ to which he refers is an effort by China to conduct PSYOPS against U.S. military forces as opposed to simply obtaining PSYOPS expertise. A Chinese call to obtain ‘‘psychological attainments’’ or PSYOPS could encompass a host of adversarial actions against U.S. military strategy. These could include: information operations, deception and denial, and conducting 51

Ibid., p. 60. OSC, ‘‘PRC Military Journal Examines Psychological Warfare in Context of Grand Strategy CPP20011121000214 Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue in Chinese (30 September 2001), pp. 94–100. 52

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GROGAN what Chinese Military Science calls ‘‘high-intensity psychological deterrence,’’53 the latter possibly related to what the Chinese call ‘‘’assassin’s maces’ or asymmetric silver bullet-type weapons.’’54 It would appear this mace weapon is an array of sophisticated, preemptive actions which, like an assassin, catch the adversary off guard and allow for the delivery of a lethal blow, perhaps via hi-tech warfare. While there is a natural tendency among U.S. war planners to assume PSYOPS pertains to China’s preoccupation with Taiwan, it is possible the Chinese could use PSYOPS as part of a larger psychological effort to: a) convince terrorists in China that Beijing has the will and determination to deter and defeat any form of terrorism; b) convince the United States and its allies that China takes terrorism seriously; or c) use both ‘‘a’’ and ‘‘b’’ as a smoke screen to build up Chinese counterterrorism forces and protect themselves from what they perceive as attack plans by special operations forces of the West. If Chinese efforts to build a viable counterterrorism enterprise are largely intended to deter the United States or the West and not terrorists, this is a potentially disturbing development for U.S. military strategy because it could call into question the veracity of any counterterrorism agreements or initiatives Washington may have made with Beijing. It could raise questions as to how distracted China wishes the United States to be over the terrorism problem. If China’s aim is to keep Washington preoccupied with terrorism and less focused on China’s near-peer competitive aims, U.S. military strategy will have to gauge how the war on terror may be eroding its indications and warning on Chinese military issues. China may seek to apply PSYOPS to a real or an imagined terrorist threat in order to influence how the U.S. military perceives China’s information operations capabilities. The article by Hezhen talks about the power of U.S. PSYOPS. He describes a ‘‘soft warfare’’ threat against China which could be construed as concern about outside influences seeking to foment conditions which could imperil stability in China. But the very writing of Hezhen’s article belies his claim about China’s lack of PSYOPS expertise. PSYOPS involves influencing a target audience’s emotions, motives, objective reasoning and behavior. Chinese writers are trying to do that all the time. Hezhen’s writing about a ‘‘soft warfare’’ or Western plot to influence China may evince a sophisticated Chinese desire to uncover something perfidious by the West and act upon it through writings, coercive action or diplomacy. Thus, it may be Hezhen who is conducting PSYOPS by questioning what China would do in the event of ‘‘soft warfare’’ or falling victim to terrorism. If Hezhen’s call to arms for the use of PSYOPS is a real effort to thwart a so-called terrorist threat in China, it still has other implications for U.S. military 53 Department of the Army, National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), ‘‘(U) Developing the Theory of Strategic Deterrence with Chinese Characteristics,’’ Translation of Zhonggsuo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science, 2004). NGIC-2005-00115-HT (14 August 2005), p. 4. 54 See Erickson and Wilson, p. 14.

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China’s Nuclear Security strategy, specifically defense acquisition plans. Hezhen refers to the security risks of ‘‘propaganda materials’’ and the need for a ‘‘complete security monitoring mechanism.’’ Perhaps this involves planning for hi-tech or informationized warfare, the origins of which may find the Chinese acquiring more sophisticated computer network attack (CNA) and computer network operations (CNO) equipment. This may have implications for defense acquisition in the United States because if the Chinese are investing in enhanced CNA and CNO equipment to defeat cyberterrorists, Beijing could also aim this equipment at the United States, prompting enhancements to its cyber capabilities. Finally, if the Chinese are creating terrorism concerns in their country to bolster their cyber capabilities against the United States, this has implications for U.S. technology transfer. Sharing technology with China may provide it unnecessary access to how the U.S. would conduct cyberwarfare against terrorists. The scenarios pose another question for U.S. military strategy: how to assess Chinese nuclear security, command and control and consequence management procedures in the face of terrorism. Although Lewis and Litai address crisis management, they do not completely outline who or what specific Chinese organization would be in charge during a nuclear security crisis in that country and what mechanisms are in place in China to uncover the perpetrators of the incident. As discussed earlier, would the Chinese see nuclear terrorism as a defense or a law enforcement problem? Diplomatic Strategy: Depending on how China handles the aftermath of the riots in the Xinjiang region this past summer, clever diplomacy could lessen global perceptions that China is a closed society or reduce the din of pro-democratic voices on Taiwan claiming that China practices cruel and unrelenting persecution of those expressing religious and democratic freedom. For all the concern China may show about nuclear terrorism, it has acted on its internal stability challenges, the effects of which could aid the country diplomatically. Murray Scot Tanner notes that China’s ‘‘internal security strategy’’ is comprised of a) efforts to minimize challenges to the leadership of the Communist Party; b) measures to contain any ‘‘seething popular anger’’ toward Chinese government at all levels, and c) actions to ‘‘isolate and repress’’ opposition especially in remote and distant areas which Beijing believes is organized and backed by a foreign influence or rooted in ethno-religious causes.55 In the absence of Western or open media coverage of China’s separatist and extremist groups, it is hard to gauge whether the threat to Chinese nuclear security is real. Diplomatically, this gives latitude to portray and handle the terrorism subject as China sees fit with little international oversight. 55

Tanner, p. 2.

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GROGAN Conclusion Showing how Chinese strategic nuclear forces, some of which are now road mobile and more survivable, could become more vulnerable to the potential of nuclear terrorism has been a challenge. Why? Because of the dearth of open source evidence showing a) the exact nature of the terrorist threats facing China, b) how terrorists could carry out such threats against China’s strategic nuclear weapons and c) what China intends to do about the threats while concomitantly reassuring the West that any anti-terrorism plans it has should not be seen as veiled threats against the United States or its allies. There are other challenges. For one, it would be useful to know how the command and control of Chinese nuclear weapons could be affected by overrun, attack, theft, diversion or sabotage. This could provide international assurance should China ever confront such situations. Second, it is possible with the mobile missile situation emerging in China that its nuclear weapons may be softer targets than those of the United States or Russia. Finally, are there tactical nuclear weapons in China: could these weapons be vulnerable to the notional terrorist attacks described in this article or to other attacks not covered? The challenge of deciding whether China has a real terrorism problem could be mitigated through confidence building measures. To start, China could be more forthcoming about whether there are any physical security gaps pertaining to its nuclear weapons and explore with the international community how less political control over its population and increased Westernization could foster reliability challenges in its nuclear forces personnel. Make no mistake. On the latter point, the United States would be hardpressed to gain any long-term strategic advantage knowing this kind of information. Unstable or unreliable individuals are of limited utility to even the archest of enemies. The main concern here is transparency and securing trust about nuclear weapons security. Confidence building measures could be fortified if China pledged that it would a) inform the United States, Russia and other nuclear powers through diplomatic means in the event terrorists steal a Chinese nuclear weapon and attempt to move it out of China; and b) commit to increasing the amount of information sharing with the United States on terrorist related subjects, especially regarding terrorist or criminal plans, intentions and motivations. In exchange, the United States may wish to bring the Chinese into the Proliferation Security Initiative, a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of delivery systems and related materials. Gaining greater insight into Chinese nuclear security might also warrant their membership in emerging global maritime partnerships which promote international cooperation among navies that have common maritime interests. Both venues might benefit the United States and could augment overall cooperation concerning the global war on terrorism.

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