- Email: [email protected]
Concepts and approaches in evolutionary epistemology. Towards an evolutionary theory of knowledge
Book Reviews
395
to the rejection of Hobhouse’s and McDougall’s systems metaphors for animal thought. One might wonder whether the strict interpretation of parsimony fueled the movement towards behaviorism or whether the movement, driven by other sources, dictated the interpretation. The reader for whom comparative psychology is a new field will remain unaware that such issues exist. Paul S. Silverman Department of Psychology University of Montana Missoula,
Montana
59812 USA
References Griffin, D. R. (1981). The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. New York: Rockefeller University Press. Griffin, D. R. (1984). Animal Thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hulse, S. H., Fowler, H., & Honig, W. K. (eds.) (1978). Cognitive Processes in Animal Behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Humphrey, N. (1983). Consciousness Regained: Chapters in the Development of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mellgrin, R. L. (ed.) Animal Cognition and Behavior. New York: North-Holland. Mitchell, R. & Thompson, N. S. (eds) (in press). Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit. New York: SUNY Press. Spear, N. E. & Miller, R. R. (eds) (1981). Information Processing in Animals: Memory Mechanisms. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Walker, S. (1983). Animal Thought. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology. Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge, edited by Franz M. Wuketits. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984. The Austrian biologist Franz M. Wuketits has edited a reader containing eleven papers on fundamental concepts, approaches and findings of evolutionary epistemology (EE). Ten contributions were written by representatives of EE, while in one of the papers a firm critic gets a chance to speak. In his preface, Wuketits argues that the book will be of interest to scholars from various disciplines such as philosophy, philosophy of science, sociology of knowledge, biology, and psychology. While this is certainly true, I should suggest that social scientists, whatever their discipline, should also be put on this list. In the first chapter on ‘Evolutionary epistemology - A challenge to science and philosophy’, Wuketits presents the central propositions of EE, each of them in their historical context. The following contributions by Rupert Riedl (‘Evolution and evolutionary knowledge - On the correspondence between cognitive order and nature’) and Robert Kaspar (‘A short introduction to the biological principles of evolutionary epistemology’) briefly present the most important components of EE. The best-known German representative of EE, the philosopher Gerhard Vollmer, points out in his contribution (‘Mesocosm and objective knowledge - On problems solved by evolutionary epistemology’) what EE really tries to achieve (or has already achieved) and what is outside the scope of EE. Vollmer presents a list of several philosophical problems that have been solved by EE or the solution of which now seems to be within reach due to the advances of EE.
396
Book
Reviews
Vollmer gives his opinion on the relationship between mind and body (or better between mind and brain) and comments on the controversy between dualistic and monistic opinions (p. 114). As is well-known, the dualistic position in its dominant version of interactionism starts from the assumption that mind and brain are different substances which interact actively (compare among others Eccles and Popper), while identity theory (Bunge et al.) as the most prominant monistic position regards the mind as a function of the central nervous system which emerges only on a certain evolutionary level. Mind is regarded as an emergent function. According to Vollmer EE unambiguously supports an evolutionary identity theory based on systems theory (p. 115). I find his arguments so convincing within the framework of EE that I should really be interested to hear Karl R. Popper’s comment on this criticism, provided that he goes beyond what he has already said on this issue together with Eccles. ‘Neurobiological aspects of intelligence’ are presented by the neurologist Franz Seitelberger. He deals specifically with the relationships between the brain, its organic structure, and intelligence. He points out that the function of the brain system is informationprocessing in order to control behavior. Seitelberger understands consciousness as a quality emerging on a specific level of brain functioning, i.e. he regards it as a pattern of dispositional properties, not as a separate entity. As a consequence he criticises the substantial dualism of mind and body as fictitious. In this contribution ‘The evolution of scientific method’ the Viennese philosopher and epistemologist Erhard Oeser shows how the development of science and of the scientific method can be interpreted from the point of view of evolutionary theory and of the evolutionary theory of human knowledge in particular. He explains the development of science as the result of a self-controlling and self-correcting cognitive process. The philosopher Werner Leinfellner discusses in his article ‘Evolutionary causality, theory of games, and evolution of intelligence’ contributions of game-theoretic and decision-theoretic models towards EE. He interprets evolution as a sequence of alternating competitive and cooperative games. It seems that when competitive phases are exhausted and come to an end, a sequence of cooperative games suddenly begins. The cooperation of nucleotids and proteins for example in hypercycles, according to Eigen and Schuster, can be regarded as a suddenly beginning cooperative phase. The formation of cells and of multicellular organisms, the symbiotic amalgamation of animals, the formation of bands, clans and nations in societal evolution are, according to Leinfellner, examples for syntheses, for the integration of formerly separate and competing single systems into a larger unit. This is tied to the concept of synergism as it has recently been investigated by Peter A. Corning (The Synergism Hypothesis: A Theory of Progressive Evolution, New York, McGraw Hill, 1983) though there are considerable differences in the reasoning behind both approaches that cannot be outlined here in greater detail. However, as far as Leinfellner regards Darwin’s conception as limited to a competitive struggle for survival excluding all forms of cooperation, the question arises whether his interpretation of Darwin’s ideas is not too narrow. Giinter P. Wagner discusses ‘The logical basis of evolutionary epistemology’, and in his contribution ‘The ethics of science: compatible with the concept of evolutionary epistemology?’ the German biologist Hans Mohr focuses on the ethical relevance of EE. In contrast to Gerhard Volhner and many other representatives of EE Mohr attributes ethical relevance to EE, at least as far as the scientific ethos is concerned. This ethos, namely the binding inner value-system of science, he argues, is not only compatible with the theses of EE; its validity can convincingly be demonstrated with the help of EE. The
Book Reviews
397
scientific ethos is, he writes, normatively valid, because it does exist, because it is laid down in our genes. Scientific work has, according to Mohr, a fundamental interest in objectivity. If objective knowledge increases fitness to a considerable degree, a genetic codification of those behaviors that guaranteed ‘objective knowledge’ must have occurred during human evolution. For an evolutionary biologist, he goes on to argue, the answer is clear: Objective knowledge about the real world increases (inclusive) fitness, thus knowledge is useful, functional and appropriate in terms of Darwinian evolution. Due to this conviction it is understandable why scientists firmly believe in certain basic assumptions (there is a real world, the real world can be understood, logic is a valid means in enquiries about and descriptions of the real world, etc.). Our intuitive, unreflected ‘knowledge’ about the modus procedendi with which one has to comply in order to gain objective knowledge (norms like honesty, precision, fairness, unbiasedness etc.) are, according to Mohr, also programmed into our genes. Of course, Mohr knows that scientists often deviate more or less from these norms, but he explains this by arguing that while our quest for knowledge is innate its function is not basic, but secondary, and that is why it can (at least temporarily) be suppressed or pushed into the background. If this qualification is not meant to immunize his thesis against criticism, Mohr has to specify in greater detail the impact of these two kinds of functions. Mohr’s thesis of the genetic encoding of the scientific ethos is quite interesting, but he seems to neglect some possible objections. His argument that the scientific ethos and the quest for knowledge are the consequences of the fitness-increasing effects of knowlecdge seems to be empirically questionable. With Reinhard Low, a firm critic of EE gets a chance to speak. In his contribution he intends to demonstrate ‘The metaphysical limits of evolutionary epistemology’ (as the title of his article indicates). Low criticizes, among other things, the concept of ‘knowledge’ as it is usually employed in EE, in the sense of acquisition of information which in primitive organisms leads to a fit between structures, in more highly evolved animals to simulation and registration of the outside world, and in humans finally includes trial and error based on mental representation of actions and their consequences. He argues that this definition of knowledge neglects a decisive aspect of knowledge, namely subjectivity. However, whether this is regarded as a shortcoming could depend on whether one regards EE as a philosophic approach, as Low does, or as a biological enterprise. Nevertheless, it has to be added that the representatives of EE are far from united on this issue. Apart from his introductory chapter Wuketits has contributed another article with the title: ‘Evolutionary epistemology - A new Copernican revolution?’ It is his view that EE is not a ‘third Copernican revolution’, but rather a change in the paradigm of the theory of knowledge (p. 283). The concentration on the debate with philosophers who adhere to traditional epistemological positions has led many a representative of EE to neglect the question as to how EE relates to other disciplines. It is true that in his own contribution Wuketits presents EE as a new challenge and asks - similar to Vollmer - whether other disciplines also contribute towards EE. He names a few disciplines that in his view support the main theses of EE with their findings. As a matter of fact, several points of view within these disciplines (developmental psychology, anthropology, linguistics) seem to be compatible with EE, but the matrix put together by Wuketits looks too much like a collection of confirming evidence that is impressive enough for our ratiomorphic apparatus to find EE plausible. But the matrix presented by Wuketits is useful and can be extended if it is interpreted in a slightly different way. The main ideas of EE can be derived from
398
Book Reviews
evolutionary theory. From these basic ideas, hypotheses, or at least general assumptions, can be derived which are relevant for different areas of human existence and thus would have to be answered by different sciences dealing with humans. These answers would then constitute a test of the hypotheses derived from EE and thus in the last resort a test of EE itself. Of course, such a task could be tackled by the disciplines and subdisciplines mentioned by Vollmer and now also by Wuketits, for in these disciplines scientists have already discussed the question of innate elements of human cognition within the context of their own work. The developmental psychologist Piaget could be mentioned in this connection as well as Chomsky for linguistics and Levi-Strauss for (structural) anthropology. It is understandable that when turning to these disciplines the representatives of EE are pleased to take up positions which are in agreement with their own assumptions. But they should try to broaden the scope of their comparison more than they have done up to now in order to avoid the criticism that they concentrate too much on confirming evidence. This, however, presupposes that one is sufficiently familiar with other disciplines. Since most representatives of EE are biologists, a few are psychologists and philosophers and since social scientists are, as far as I know, completely absent among the followers of EE, new personnel has to be recruited into the ranks of EE if this task is to be solved. It would be urgently desirable if a number of social scientists from quite different disciplines would start to argue with the representatives of EE. Practically all areas of human behavior which are the subjects of the social sciences are influenced by our cognitions. Therefore it must be of interest what can be found out empirically about the peculiarities, the potentials and the limitations of human cognition. There is a great deal of research on this problem in the social sciences themselves. But EE can stimulate further research, and, besides that, quite a few of the findings of the social sciences can be better interpreted in the light of EE. EE contributes to a framework into which independently collected and seemingly unrelated evidence of the social sciences could be integrated. This could be clarified by an example: Political scientists are aware of the strong impact that prejudice has on political behavior. Sociologists interpret this in a wider context and demonstrate the enormous impact of prejudice in human societies in general. Social psychologists contribute to these findings by showing that individuals develop affective ties with particular groups. This leads to the acceptance of group norms including the collective rejection of other groups as different. In this connection stereotypes are discussed as the cognitive element of prejudice. Cognitive psychologists can show how stereotypes can come about, namely by demonstrating different biases in our intuitive judgements. These biases correspond to a large degree to what one would expect of a ‘ratiomorphic apparatus’ that is less than perfectly rational. Thus we have already reached the biology of epistemology which has plausibly demonstrated on the basis of evolutionary theory that our ‘ratiomorphic apparatus’ has a large impact on our cognitions. How this apparatus functions neurophysiologically is a question which has to be answered by the brain sciences. If the relationships mentioned above do exist to some degree, this can serve as proof for the relevance of EE - mediated by several ‘junctions’ (disciplines) - for political science and sociology. This is just one example for the desirable linking of the life sciences (in a broad sense) which can lead to explanations of particular phenomena on different levels by the respective disciplines. However that may be: Knowledge about the potentials and limitations of our cognitions is fundamentally important for all social sciences for the very simple reason that
Book Reviews
399
cognition is an important (if not the most important) element of human behavior. Those social scientists will have few difficulties in accepting the relevance of EE for their own work who start from the cognitive basis of social phenomena, i.e. who hold the opinion that social behavior and cultural achievements follow from particular cognitive properties or basic cognitive components. One can expect much less enthusiasm for EE from adherents of the other (and much stronger) research tradition in the social sciences according to which cognitive processes are determined by social organization (Marx, Durkheim, G.H. Mead etc.). But even from this position the rejection of EE cannot be justified, for EE does not attempt to do more than explain the evolution of particular cognitive structures. The influence of social interaction on the evolution of the human ability to gain knowledge remains open to discussion, and thus the impact that social living has had during our phylogeny on the basic cognitive equipment of present-day humans is still an unsettled issue. This does not deny that during ontogeny the social environment has a considerable impact on the cognitive styles adopted by individual human beings (cf. developmental psychology). But from the perspective of EE one can nevertheless assume that despite the influences during individual life histories some properties of our ratiomorphic equipment can still be discerned in the way we think and (partly influenced by our thinking) in the way we act. Interactions in everyday-life seldom occur according to the rules of a rational search for knowledge and decisionmaking, as we all know and as, among others, ethno-methodology (Garfinkel et al.) has demonstrated. Perfect rationality does not occur first because of the structural constraints of the macro-system, for example the organization of power and the distribution of authority, and second because of the influence of affect on social interaction, and third because social interaction consists to a considerable extent of routines. The last point is particularly important since the abilities we owe to our ratiomorphic apparatus play an important role in the formulation of routines. This is exactly the point where explanations derived from EE can set in, and as we are dealing here with the most basic properties of our cognitive orientation, there is still enough room left for social influences on our thinking and acting. In any case, EE can help us to understand that and why it is unrealistic to expect specific degrees of rationality in normal human conduct. This expectation still predominates in the social sciences which generally put the blame for this state of affairs on evil social influences rather than trying to understand our cognitive peculiarities and shortcomings as a result of our biological evolution.
Heiner Flohr Universittit Diisseldorf, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut, Politikwissenschaft , Universitiitsstr. I, D-4000 Dusseldorf F.R.G.
395
to the rejection of Hobhouse’s and McDougall’s systems metaphors for animal thought. One might wonder whether the strict interpretation of parsimony fueled the movement towards behaviorism or whether the movement, driven by other sources, dictated the interpretation. The reader for whom comparative psychology is a new field will remain unaware that such issues exist. Paul S. Silverman Department of Psychology University of Montana Missoula,
Montana
59812 USA
References Griffin, D. R. (1981). The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. New York: Rockefeller University Press. Griffin, D. R. (1984). Animal Thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hulse, S. H., Fowler, H., & Honig, W. K. (eds.) (1978). Cognitive Processes in Animal Behavior. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Humphrey, N. (1983). Consciousness Regained: Chapters in the Development of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mellgrin, R. L. (ed.) Animal Cognition and Behavior. New York: North-Holland. Mitchell, R. & Thompson, N. S. (eds) (in press). Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit. New York: SUNY Press. Spear, N. E. & Miller, R. R. (eds) (1981). Information Processing in Animals: Memory Mechanisms. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Walker, S. (1983). Animal Thought. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology. Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge, edited by Franz M. Wuketits. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984. The Austrian biologist Franz M. Wuketits has edited a reader containing eleven papers on fundamental concepts, approaches and findings of evolutionary epistemology (EE). Ten contributions were written by representatives of EE, while in one of the papers a firm critic gets a chance to speak. In his preface, Wuketits argues that the book will be of interest to scholars from various disciplines such as philosophy, philosophy of science, sociology of knowledge, biology, and psychology. While this is certainly true, I should suggest that social scientists, whatever their discipline, should also be put on this list. In the first chapter on ‘Evolutionary epistemology - A challenge to science and philosophy’, Wuketits presents the central propositions of EE, each of them in their historical context. The following contributions by Rupert Riedl (‘Evolution and evolutionary knowledge - On the correspondence between cognitive order and nature’) and Robert Kaspar (‘A short introduction to the biological principles of evolutionary epistemology’) briefly present the most important components of EE. The best-known German representative of EE, the philosopher Gerhard Vollmer, points out in his contribution (‘Mesocosm and objective knowledge - On problems solved by evolutionary epistemology’) what EE really tries to achieve (or has already achieved) and what is outside the scope of EE. Vollmer presents a list of several philosophical problems that have been solved by EE or the solution of which now seems to be within reach due to the advances of EE.
396
Book
Reviews
Vollmer gives his opinion on the relationship between mind and body (or better between mind and brain) and comments on the controversy between dualistic and monistic opinions (p. 114). As is well-known, the dualistic position in its dominant version of interactionism starts from the assumption that mind and brain are different substances which interact actively (compare among others Eccles and Popper), while identity theory (Bunge et al.) as the most prominant monistic position regards the mind as a function of the central nervous system which emerges only on a certain evolutionary level. Mind is regarded as an emergent function. According to Vollmer EE unambiguously supports an evolutionary identity theory based on systems theory (p. 115). I find his arguments so convincing within the framework of EE that I should really be interested to hear Karl R. Popper’s comment on this criticism, provided that he goes beyond what he has already said on this issue together with Eccles. ‘Neurobiological aspects of intelligence’ are presented by the neurologist Franz Seitelberger. He deals specifically with the relationships between the brain, its organic structure, and intelligence. He points out that the function of the brain system is informationprocessing in order to control behavior. Seitelberger understands consciousness as a quality emerging on a specific level of brain functioning, i.e. he regards it as a pattern of dispositional properties, not as a separate entity. As a consequence he criticises the substantial dualism of mind and body as fictitious. In this contribution ‘The evolution of scientific method’ the Viennese philosopher and epistemologist Erhard Oeser shows how the development of science and of the scientific method can be interpreted from the point of view of evolutionary theory and of the evolutionary theory of human knowledge in particular. He explains the development of science as the result of a self-controlling and self-correcting cognitive process. The philosopher Werner Leinfellner discusses in his article ‘Evolutionary causality, theory of games, and evolution of intelligence’ contributions of game-theoretic and decision-theoretic models towards EE. He interprets evolution as a sequence of alternating competitive and cooperative games. It seems that when competitive phases are exhausted and come to an end, a sequence of cooperative games suddenly begins. The cooperation of nucleotids and proteins for example in hypercycles, according to Eigen and Schuster, can be regarded as a suddenly beginning cooperative phase. The formation of cells and of multicellular organisms, the symbiotic amalgamation of animals, the formation of bands, clans and nations in societal evolution are, according to Leinfellner, examples for syntheses, for the integration of formerly separate and competing single systems into a larger unit. This is tied to the concept of synergism as it has recently been investigated by Peter A. Corning (The Synergism Hypothesis: A Theory of Progressive Evolution, New York, McGraw Hill, 1983) though there are considerable differences in the reasoning behind both approaches that cannot be outlined here in greater detail. However, as far as Leinfellner regards Darwin’s conception as limited to a competitive struggle for survival excluding all forms of cooperation, the question arises whether his interpretation of Darwin’s ideas is not too narrow. Giinter P. Wagner discusses ‘The logical basis of evolutionary epistemology’, and in his contribution ‘The ethics of science: compatible with the concept of evolutionary epistemology?’ the German biologist Hans Mohr focuses on the ethical relevance of EE. In contrast to Gerhard Volhner and many other representatives of EE Mohr attributes ethical relevance to EE, at least as far as the scientific ethos is concerned. This ethos, namely the binding inner value-system of science, he argues, is not only compatible with the theses of EE; its validity can convincingly be demonstrated with the help of EE. The
Book Reviews
397
scientific ethos is, he writes, normatively valid, because it does exist, because it is laid down in our genes. Scientific work has, according to Mohr, a fundamental interest in objectivity. If objective knowledge increases fitness to a considerable degree, a genetic codification of those behaviors that guaranteed ‘objective knowledge’ must have occurred during human evolution. For an evolutionary biologist, he goes on to argue, the answer is clear: Objective knowledge about the real world increases (inclusive) fitness, thus knowledge is useful, functional and appropriate in terms of Darwinian evolution. Due to this conviction it is understandable why scientists firmly believe in certain basic assumptions (there is a real world, the real world can be understood, logic is a valid means in enquiries about and descriptions of the real world, etc.). Our intuitive, unreflected ‘knowledge’ about the modus procedendi with which one has to comply in order to gain objective knowledge (norms like honesty, precision, fairness, unbiasedness etc.) are, according to Mohr, also programmed into our genes. Of course, Mohr knows that scientists often deviate more or less from these norms, but he explains this by arguing that while our quest for knowledge is innate its function is not basic, but secondary, and that is why it can (at least temporarily) be suppressed or pushed into the background. If this qualification is not meant to immunize his thesis against criticism, Mohr has to specify in greater detail the impact of these two kinds of functions. Mohr’s thesis of the genetic encoding of the scientific ethos is quite interesting, but he seems to neglect some possible objections. His argument that the scientific ethos and the quest for knowledge are the consequences of the fitness-increasing effects of knowlecdge seems to be empirically questionable. With Reinhard Low, a firm critic of EE gets a chance to speak. In his contribution he intends to demonstrate ‘The metaphysical limits of evolutionary epistemology’ (as the title of his article indicates). Low criticizes, among other things, the concept of ‘knowledge’ as it is usually employed in EE, in the sense of acquisition of information which in primitive organisms leads to a fit between structures, in more highly evolved animals to simulation and registration of the outside world, and in humans finally includes trial and error based on mental representation of actions and their consequences. He argues that this definition of knowledge neglects a decisive aspect of knowledge, namely subjectivity. However, whether this is regarded as a shortcoming could depend on whether one regards EE as a philosophic approach, as Low does, or as a biological enterprise. Nevertheless, it has to be added that the representatives of EE are far from united on this issue. Apart from his introductory chapter Wuketits has contributed another article with the title: ‘Evolutionary epistemology - A new Copernican revolution?’ It is his view that EE is not a ‘third Copernican revolution’, but rather a change in the paradigm of the theory of knowledge (p. 283). The concentration on the debate with philosophers who adhere to traditional epistemological positions has led many a representative of EE to neglect the question as to how EE relates to other disciplines. It is true that in his own contribution Wuketits presents EE as a new challenge and asks - similar to Vollmer - whether other disciplines also contribute towards EE. He names a few disciplines that in his view support the main theses of EE with their findings. As a matter of fact, several points of view within these disciplines (developmental psychology, anthropology, linguistics) seem to be compatible with EE, but the matrix put together by Wuketits looks too much like a collection of confirming evidence that is impressive enough for our ratiomorphic apparatus to find EE plausible. But the matrix presented by Wuketits is useful and can be extended if it is interpreted in a slightly different way. The main ideas of EE can be derived from
398
Book Reviews
evolutionary theory. From these basic ideas, hypotheses, or at least general assumptions, can be derived which are relevant for different areas of human existence and thus would have to be answered by different sciences dealing with humans. These answers would then constitute a test of the hypotheses derived from EE and thus in the last resort a test of EE itself. Of course, such a task could be tackled by the disciplines and subdisciplines mentioned by Vollmer and now also by Wuketits, for in these disciplines scientists have already discussed the question of innate elements of human cognition within the context of their own work. The developmental psychologist Piaget could be mentioned in this connection as well as Chomsky for linguistics and Levi-Strauss for (structural) anthropology. It is understandable that when turning to these disciplines the representatives of EE are pleased to take up positions which are in agreement with their own assumptions. But they should try to broaden the scope of their comparison more than they have done up to now in order to avoid the criticism that they concentrate too much on confirming evidence. This, however, presupposes that one is sufficiently familiar with other disciplines. Since most representatives of EE are biologists, a few are psychologists and philosophers and since social scientists are, as far as I know, completely absent among the followers of EE, new personnel has to be recruited into the ranks of EE if this task is to be solved. It would be urgently desirable if a number of social scientists from quite different disciplines would start to argue with the representatives of EE. Practically all areas of human behavior which are the subjects of the social sciences are influenced by our cognitions. Therefore it must be of interest what can be found out empirically about the peculiarities, the potentials and the limitations of human cognition. There is a great deal of research on this problem in the social sciences themselves. But EE can stimulate further research, and, besides that, quite a few of the findings of the social sciences can be better interpreted in the light of EE. EE contributes to a framework into which independently collected and seemingly unrelated evidence of the social sciences could be integrated. This could be clarified by an example: Political scientists are aware of the strong impact that prejudice has on political behavior. Sociologists interpret this in a wider context and demonstrate the enormous impact of prejudice in human societies in general. Social psychologists contribute to these findings by showing that individuals develop affective ties with particular groups. This leads to the acceptance of group norms including the collective rejection of other groups as different. In this connection stereotypes are discussed as the cognitive element of prejudice. Cognitive psychologists can show how stereotypes can come about, namely by demonstrating different biases in our intuitive judgements. These biases correspond to a large degree to what one would expect of a ‘ratiomorphic apparatus’ that is less than perfectly rational. Thus we have already reached the biology of epistemology which has plausibly demonstrated on the basis of evolutionary theory that our ‘ratiomorphic apparatus’ has a large impact on our cognitions. How this apparatus functions neurophysiologically is a question which has to be answered by the brain sciences. If the relationships mentioned above do exist to some degree, this can serve as proof for the relevance of EE - mediated by several ‘junctions’ (disciplines) - for political science and sociology. This is just one example for the desirable linking of the life sciences (in a broad sense) which can lead to explanations of particular phenomena on different levels by the respective disciplines. However that may be: Knowledge about the potentials and limitations of our cognitions is fundamentally important for all social sciences for the very simple reason that
Book Reviews
399
cognition is an important (if not the most important) element of human behavior. Those social scientists will have few difficulties in accepting the relevance of EE for their own work who start from the cognitive basis of social phenomena, i.e. who hold the opinion that social behavior and cultural achievements follow from particular cognitive properties or basic cognitive components. One can expect much less enthusiasm for EE from adherents of the other (and much stronger) research tradition in the social sciences according to which cognitive processes are determined by social organization (Marx, Durkheim, G.H. Mead etc.). But even from this position the rejection of EE cannot be justified, for EE does not attempt to do more than explain the evolution of particular cognitive structures. The influence of social interaction on the evolution of the human ability to gain knowledge remains open to discussion, and thus the impact that social living has had during our phylogeny on the basic cognitive equipment of present-day humans is still an unsettled issue. This does not deny that during ontogeny the social environment has a considerable impact on the cognitive styles adopted by individual human beings (cf. developmental psychology). But from the perspective of EE one can nevertheless assume that despite the influences during individual life histories some properties of our ratiomorphic equipment can still be discerned in the way we think and (partly influenced by our thinking) in the way we act. Interactions in everyday-life seldom occur according to the rules of a rational search for knowledge and decisionmaking, as we all know and as, among others, ethno-methodology (Garfinkel et al.) has demonstrated. Perfect rationality does not occur first because of the structural constraints of the macro-system, for example the organization of power and the distribution of authority, and second because of the influence of affect on social interaction, and third because social interaction consists to a considerable extent of routines. The last point is particularly important since the abilities we owe to our ratiomorphic apparatus play an important role in the formulation of routines. This is exactly the point where explanations derived from EE can set in, and as we are dealing here with the most basic properties of our cognitive orientation, there is still enough room left for social influences on our thinking and acting. In any case, EE can help us to understand that and why it is unrealistic to expect specific degrees of rationality in normal human conduct. This expectation still predominates in the social sciences which generally put the blame for this state of affairs on evil social influences rather than trying to understand our cognitive peculiarities and shortcomings as a result of our biological evolution.
Heiner Flohr Universittit Diisseldorf, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut, Politikwissenschaft , Universitiitsstr. I, D-4000 Dusseldorf F.R.G.