Foreign fishing fleets in the subSaharan West African EEZ

Foreign fishing fleets in the subSaharan West African EEZ

Foreign fishing fleets in the subsaharan West African EEZ The coastal state perspective Wad M. Kaczynski This article analyses fishery resource use...

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Foreign fishing fleets in the subsaharan West African EEZ The coastal state perspective

Wad M. Kaczynski

This article analyses fishery resource

use trends In waters adjacent to the West Africa and coastal states’ capabilities to control distant water fishing fleets. Serious difficulties in resource management are compounded by unsatisfactory performance of local administrations in regulatlng licence fishing and joint venture activities. Although not the only remedy, the civilian, scientific resource monitoring and surveillante systems can greatly reduce these problems and increase coastal countries’ share in rents generated by their fishery resources. The author concludes that the whole concept of existing controls of the 200-mile EEZ should ba re-designed and new measures undertaken by the local governments with increased support of international donor community. Specific improvements and changes are recommended in the final part of the study. Vlad M. Kaczynskiis Research Associate, Institutefor Marine Studies and School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA This article was prepared under the aegis of the Management of World Fisheries Under Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction Research Project, lead by Professor Edward Miles and Professor William Burkeat the Institutefor Marine Studies, University of Washington, DC, USA.

2

Marine living resources distributed along the coasts of the subsaharan West African countries have been the focus of a great deal of attention among coastal states, the distant water fishing fleet operators, international fisheries management bodies as well as the donor community and organizations funding natural resource development in this region. These resources have both high biological potential and great economic significance for all their users. At the same time their exploitation patterns are subject to growing concern due to widespread depletion, subsequent urgent need of conservation and persisting high share in their use by the foreign, non-African countries. These problems are additionally exacerbated by growing expectations of the coastal states in these resources potential as a source of hard currency, food and employment. All countries of the region are also increasingly aware of this potential as an important factor stimulating the national economic development and as a bargaining tool in negotiating cooperation agreements with foreign governments interested in distant water fishing along the coasts of the subsaharan West Africa. Implementation of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in this region late in the 1970s and early 198Os, did not substantially change the ways these resources are used and managed. They are even more heavily exploited and depleted now than before and foreign fleets continue to extract the lion’s share in economic value of the commercially important stocks. The coastal countries’ capabilities to control the exploitation process of these resources and use them directly for their own benefit are still very low and will remain this way many years ahead. On other hand the protein deficit, unemployment for foreign debt continue to grow in these countries with no clear promise for their elimination or substantial reduction in the near future. Among multiple reasons for these problems one can cite coastal state

0308-597X/89/010002-13$03.00

0

1989 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd

Foreign

‘Any discussion of the distant water fishing effort should be preceded by a definition of which fisheries are included. There is a significant number of countries involved in the distant water fisheries along the subSaharan West African coasts. They operate a great variety of vessel types and sizes range from small catcher boats fishing with support of auxilary ships or overseas port facilities and land processing plants, up to the super-factory trawlers and motherships capable of operating anywhere in the world ocean. For purposes of this study the distant water fishing effort includes all activities carried out by the non-African fleets operating in the ZOO-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the subsaharan West African coastal countries. This would mean that the catches of Ghanian or Senegalese vessels operating in jurisdictional waters of other African states are not counted here as of distant water origin. At the same time the large catches taken in the EEZs off subsaharan West Africa by the Spanish ships - even if they are based in the Canary Islands or activities of the Portuguese vessels registered for example in Madeira - would be considered as a distant water fishing. It is also useful to distinguish a separate category of foreign fishing vessels brought by the overseas partners to the joint ventures established with the coastal West African countries. This would include non-African fishing vessels registered in and flying the flag of the host West African countries as well as ships brought by the overseas partners to the joint ventures established in these states. Included are also vessels leased or chartered by these ventures. Such ships may operate with full support of the land facili-

ties in the host country or cooperate with the floating processors or transports. In this category of vessels the size and types may also vary from small tuna long-liners or shrimper-trawlers to freezer-trawlers or super-factory trawlers. These joint venture

fkhing

fleets

in the sub~ahara~z

West African

EEZ

institutional weakness, absence of data and information on the status of the coastal fisheries resources, lack of trained personnel and reduced or non-existent capabilities to use the marine living resources to the extent that will reflect these countries legitimate needs and best interests.

There is also continued demand for these resources in the world market. This results in strong pressures (both economic and political) from the foreign countries whose fishing fleet operators are often more interested in immediate benefits from resource exploitation than in long-term solutions addressing regional environmental concerns and coastal state systemic difficulties.

Major trends in benefit sharing When characterizing the most significant trends in the use of the marine living resources in the Western African region, the readily available data in FAO Yearbooks of Fisheries Statistics are commonly used although they traditionally address the whole CECAF (Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic Fisheries) area with no reference to the specific sub-zones, for example the coastal waters adjacent to subsaharan West African countries. Although the CECAF Statistical Bulletins published roughly every two years provide more detailed information on catches by sub-areas along the Western African coasts, this data - in absence of comprehensive statistical monitoring by coastal states - is based principally on reports produced by foreign fishing fleet operators. This, of course, does not help much in understanding the real situation where important marine living resources are located and where distant water fishing effort’ is particularly intensive. Table 1 based on this material indicates that in the mid-1980s foreign fishing fleets contributed at least 50% to the total catch of marine species in the whole CECAF area which includes waters from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Congo River. The table suggests that during 197&1985, there were the following shifts in the exploitation patterns of the marine living resources in the CECAF region: 0

fleet activities can give rise to somewhat similar international perceptions to those caused by the non-African distant water continued on page 4

Major changes in the resource sharing between distant water fleets and coastal countries had taken place at the time when nations of the region introduced the 200-mile EEZ, ie between 1976-1979. At that time coastal countries were able to increase their share in resources harvested from 35% to approximately 52%. Later, however, this share stagnated at the 50% level. The long-term gains

Table 1. Changes in catch of the non-African distant water fishing fleets and the coastal nations in the whole CECAF area during 1976-1985.

Year

Distant water fleets

Coastal states

1976 %

2 350 65

1 276 35

1977 %

2 302 62

1976 %

1 682

Distant water fleets

Coastal states

1981 %

1 854 57

1 377 43

1 439 38

1982 %

1 796 56

1 403 44

48

1 522 52

1983 %

1 682 53

1 482 48

1979 %

1 323 48

1 429 52

1984 %

1 246 48

1 350 52

1980 %

2152 63

1 276 37

1 387 50

1375

Year (thousand million tons)

Sources: Review of the State of World Fisheries Resources, FAO, 1987; and FAO Yearbook of fisheries Statistics, Vol 54, 1982, and Vol60, 1985.

MARINE

POLICY January 1989

50

3

Foreign fishing fleers in the .~ubS~hararz West Afrkan

EEZ

of these states were rather symbolic: their total catch in 1985 was only IOO,OOOmetric tons larger than that in 1976 - 8% growth. There was a substantial drop in reported total harvest level from 3.626 thousand metric tons in 1976 to 2,762 thousand metric tons in 1985, ie nearly 25%. This decline was due partly to the lower catch of the distant water fishing fleets, increased cost of access to the resources of the region and over-exploitation of several commercially valuable stocks. From 1983 the foreign fleets’ share in the total resource use has stabilized at the level of nearly 50% and this is attributed to increased cooperation undertaken by the long-range fishing countries (multilateral and bilaterial fishery agreements, licenced fishing, and other arrangements with the coastal states) seeking continued access to the CECAF fishery resources.

continued from page 3 fishing vessels operating within the licence fishing regime but with some important differences. Their catches are sometimes considered as a domestic landings of the host country and their impact on the local country’s economy may be much more pronounced. At the same time their interaction with the local fishing industry may be much greater. ‘FAO Review of the Status of World Fisheries Resources, FAO, Rome, Italy, 1987. 3J. Gonzalez, Projecto: Barcos Arrastreros para Camaron Fact/b/es de Emplear en Guinea-Bissau, Secretaria de Estado des Pescas, Bissau, October 1985, p 24.

4

It should, however, be noted that the CECAF area includes 20 independent developing coastal countries with nearly 10,000 km of coastline and that the marine living resources are distributed unevenly in the region. The richest grounds are located mainly in the subsaharan portion of the Northern Zone, in particular along the coasts of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry. According to FAO the known harvesting potential of most commercial species (except tuna) in the whole Northern Zone (between the Strait of Gibraltar and Freetown - Sierra Leone) fluctuates at the level of 2.5 million metric tones (MMT) a year.” This compares to approximately 150-200 thousand MMT a year of the resources available in the Southern Zone including coastal waters between Sierra Leone and Zaire. Because of this large resource potential, foreign fishing fleet activity concentrates mainly in the Northern Zone (CECAF sub-areas 34.1.2. and 34.3.1. - see Figure 1) adjacent to Western African low-populated coastal areas (Western Sahara, Mauritania) and economically weak countries (Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry), unable, as yet, to exploit these resources entirely by their national fleets. Table 2 indicates that in this specific sub-region the disparity in landings between coastal and distant water fishing countries is much higher than that suggested in Table 1 for the whole CECAF region. Table 2 demonstrates that distant water fishing fleets are taking more than 80% of all reported landings in the subSaharan portion of the Northern Zone although this share tends to gradually decline. This can be attributed mainly to the higher licence fees and continued depletion of fishery resources exploited by the long-range fleets. There are also other important factors contributing to this decline: since in some coastal countries of the northern CECAF zone licence fees are assessed on the basis of final production value, foreign fishing owners would not report their by-catch which can be retained or discarded. In the case of shrimp or squid fishery, accidental catch can be five times larger than the catch of the target species3 In this case only the shrimp or squid harvest will be reported, while the catch of non-target species would not be registered at all. Illegal fishing and under reporting of landings could also affect the volumes and composition of the officially reported catch although real harvest may be the same or even larger than that taking place before extension of national jurisdiction. A closer look into the resources use and benefit sharing patterns MARINE

POLICY January

1989

Foreign fishing fleets in the subSuharun West African EEZ NE El Cabino

270 26O 250

Morro-Carnot 240 23O 220 210 2oc lsobaths

19c

20 m _____I..

Poriendic-Nouakcholt 18C

100 m _._._.I

17c

1000 m ...i...*...

16" 15C

CECAF

sub-areas

140 River

Gambia

estuary

13c 12c 11"

Figure 1

East Central atlantic FAO management areas adjacent to the subsaharan West African coasts Northern Zone).

1~0 9’ 21°

20"

19O

18“

17O

16O

15O

14O

13O

12'= ll"

10'

9'

8'

the non-African distant water fishing fleets and the subsaharan West African coastal states may shed additional light on this problem.

between

Country case studies Mauritania

4Everett et al, Recent Trends in CECAF Fisheries, FAO, Dakar, 1985.

MARINE

POLICY January 1989

In Mauritanian waters, foreign fishing vessels are allowed to operate under two regimes: licenced and chartered fishing. Licenced fishing ships are expected to pay the license fee calculated according to the vessel’s GRT. For example, in 1983 there were 188 foreign ships (licenced or chartered) operating in the Mauritanian EEZ. This fleet represented the total of 325.812 GRT.J Licence fee revenues in 1983 were equal to US$4.8 million. Vessels chartered by the international joint ventures established in ~a~lritania (such as those with Soviet, Rumanian or Iraqui partners and national fishing companies) do not pay any licence fee. There is no available data on composition of licenced and chartered ships operating in Mauritanian coastal waters in 1983 although more recent information summarized in the Table 3 provides an insight into detailed breakdown of these ships during 1986. This data suggests that the licence fee is paid by less than 50% of the total number of permitted 5

Foreign Jishing fleets in the s~bSu~u~~n West African EEZ Tabte 2. Distri~tion of landings between coastal countries of the subSaharan Western (CECAF Northern Zone) and the non-African distant water fishing Beets in 1977-1985.

aNot included are landings of the African distant water fishing vessels from Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria and Senegal and operating in the CECAF Northern Zone. blncludes EEC member states, East European countries, South Korea, and other nations. Sources: G. Everett, et al, Recent Trends in CECAF Fisheries, FAO, Dakar, 1985; M. Robinson, T. Brainerd, An Overview of Current Trends in the Fisheries of the CECAF Area, CECAFI TECH/87/81, FAO, Dakar, 1987; and FAO Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics, Vol 60, Rome, 1986.

5Crown Agents, Fisheries Sector, 5.1, pp 71, 74.

Study of Mauritanian December 1986, Tabte

Country

1977

1980

1983

1985

Coastal states: Mauritania Senegal Gambia Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Conakry

27.1 201.7 15.4 3.8 8.1

10.1 217.8 10.5 3.8 18.9

42.8 248.2 9.0 2.6 24.4

45.0 229.0

Sub-total

256.1

261.1

327.0

313.6

10

12

16

19

% of grand total

1 134.0 440.4 675.8

942.3 448.9 647.5

935.0 386.9 360. i

708.1 395.4 270.1

Sub-total

2 250.2

1 938.7

1 682.0

1 373.6

% of grand total Grand total

90

88

2 506.3

2 199.8

2 009.0

81 1 687.2

ships authorized to operate in the ~aur~tanian

Fishing Ice-fish vessels: Lobster fishing ship Shrimper trawlers Hake trawlers Tuna trollers Tuna long-liners Tuna seiners Groundfish trawlers Others

regime

Lioence

Charter

13 6 14 IO

1

6 1 21 1

Sub-total

43

Freezers: Lobster fishing ship Shrimper trawlers Groundfish trawlers

22 3

Factory trawlers: Pelagic fish trawlers

of Fisheries and Maritime Eco-

84

ships and by 33% of the foreign fleet according to its estimated total GRT size. According to Crown Agents’ the ice-fish vessels and freezer trawlers fishing within the licencing arrangement average about 350 GRT each. The per vessel fee in 1986 was US$263-IGRT, ie US$92 000 per ship. This generated the revenue of approximately US$6.25 million. If the same fee would be collected from chartered 43 factory trawlers (their total tonnage is approximately 107.000 GRT) it would generate for the Mauritanian Government about US$28 million. This foregone fee appears to be several times bigger than the revenue produced by the group of ice-fish ships and freezer-trawlers and other smaller vessels. The most important source of revenue generated by the foreign fleet is the fish exports tax. It is assessed on the basis of the commercial value of processed products taken (‘exported’) by all ships to foreign markets.

Type of ship

nomy, 1987.

8.0 3.6 28.0

Distant water fleets:” USSR Spain Dthe?

Table 3. Estimated number and types of foreign 2WGmile EEZ during 1986.

Source: Ministry

Africa

Total 14 6 14 10 6 1 21

30

73

1 6

1 22 9

2

41

43

Sub-total

27

48

75

Grand total

70

78

148

MARINE

POLICY January

1989

Foreign fishing fleets in the subsaharan

West African EEZ

Joint fishing ventures and national fishing companies would also pay the ‘export’ tax for this portion of their production which is sold overseas. The tax is determined on the basis of company declarations and customs inspections carried out off Nouadhibou. The exports tax varies from 6.5% to 17% of the final production value according to species harvested and processed. This value is established yearly following international fishfood market prices mainly for whole, frozen fish, cephalopods or shellfish. Table 4 shows that with the 1983 harvesting potential for major species or groups of species equal to 515 700 tons, the total market value of fish was to be US$344.5 million FOB Nouadhibou. Expected revenue for the Mauritanian Government was estimated at the level of approximately US$40.8 million. When planning this revenue the Government assumed that the whole authorized quota for foreign fishing would be used and final productioin would be fully declared by the foreign licensed fishing ships or joint venture companies. However, according to later estimate@ the total value of the Mauritanian fish exports (including foreign sales of the national fishing companies) in 1983 was approximately US$132 089 500 and the resulting export tax was equal to US$15 836 000 only. These numbers indicate that the government was able to collect scarcerly 38% of expected fish export revenues for that year. One can therefore raise a serious question if it is more beneficial for the country to charge foreign ships with the tax based on exported fish products or to use the licence fee according to GRT and/or volume and composition of the fish raw material. This dilemma is more evident when considering the fishing of pelagic species carried out by foreign fishing ships: according to the Mauritanian Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy (Communication au Counseil des Ministres, 1986), in 1985 declared volume of exports of the pelagics attained the level of 276 000 tons, while the total harvest and corresponding volume of exports of these species should be 500-600 000 tons of frozen round fish. This would mean that the underestimate catch was twice as large as this officially reported by the fishing owners or assessed by the local port inspectors. Guinea-Bissau Agents, Study of the Mauritanian Fisheries Sector, A Strategy for the Future, 1986, p 51, Table G.

eCrown

According to recent assessments, the potential annual catch of the marine living resources in the Guinea-Bissau 200-mile EEZ is approximately 280 000 tons. This includes 100 000 tons of practically unusable

Table 4. Mauritania: expected export tax revenues from foreign licence fishing or chartered vessels in 1963 based on yearly catch potential.

MARINE

POLICY January 1989

Export tax (W

revenue (mln USS)

350

140.0

11 .oo

15 400

1 750 1 000 1000 4 000 10 000

157.5 10.0 10.0 20.0 7.0

12.16 9.80 6.48 17.00 17.00

19 152 0.980 0.648 3.400 1.190

Market price (US$/ton)

Pelagics Groundfish and cephalopods Tuna Hake Shrimp Lobster

400 000 90 000 IO 000 10000 5 000 700

Total

515 700

Species Group

Source: Department Proposal of the Fisheries Policy and Sector Strategy, 1985/88. Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy, Nouakchott, 1985.

Total product value (mln USS)

Yearly catch potential (tons)

344.5

40 770

7

Foreign fishing fleers in the subSaharan West African

EEZ

Table 5. Estimated volume and value of the available commercial fisheries resources in Guinaa-Bissau 200-mile EEZ.

Species group ‘Estimates

of cephalopod

and tuna resource

potential bPrices are arecalculated tentative. on the basis of raw fish (before pKxXS$ing) Bissau’s EEL’. Source: State Virkir, 1986.

SX-VeSSef.

Secretariat

FOB Guinea-

for Fisheries

1987,

Pelagics

Yearly fishing potential (tons)a 70 000

Tuna

100 000 5 000 10 000 1 000

Total

189 000

Demersals Shrimp Cephalopods

Estimated unit price (US$/ton)b

Total value (US)

250 350 4 000 1 200 1 000

17 500 000 35 000 000 20 000 000 12000000 1 000 000 85 500 000

triggerfish representing species of low market vaiue. The commercially exploitable resources estimated at the levef of 180-190 000 tons/year represent a value of at least US$85.5 million (Table 5). If the licence fee is equal to 15% of the above mentioned value, the revenue for Guinea-Bissau could be at the level of US$12.8 million per year. In 1985, the total direct revenues generated by the ficence fees were only US$2.1 milfion.7 This indicates that the direct benefit from foreign users of the resources was at that time approximately six times less than potentially available. In 1986, the Government issued over 200-licences for distant water ships totalfing 30 270 GRT. According to the State Secretariat for Fisheries, during the same 1986, this fleet has reported the harvest of 14 300 tons only, ie 72 tons per licence. Since most licences were sold for periods of six or 12 months, the estimated daily catch based on this data-would be 0.2-0.4 ton per vessel! Two significant conclusions can be made from this state of affairs in the Guinea-Bissauan 200-mile EEZ: 0

l

the reported catch relates only to the main target species of most of the foreign ships: principally shrimp. In this case the potential harvest assessed at the level of 5 000 tons/year would be surpassed nearly three times, and if the daily catch rate of an average licensed ship is assumed to be about 7.5 tons/day of shrimp and by-catch species and there were 180 days fishing, the total harvest of the whofe foreign fleet would reach 270 000 tons per year, 43% more than estimated potential catch of all commercially valuable species.

This over-exploitation and under-reporting of catch in the GuineaBissau’s EEZ affects both economic interests of the coastal country, severefy disrupts any stock conservation measures and neutralizes resources management efforts of the Government. Consulting Group, Development Strategy of the Guinea-Bissau s Fisheries, Reykjavik, Iceland, 1986. ‘Moustapha Cisse, ‘Quelques informaSons sur la peche maritime, les rendements de chalutage dans les eaux guineennes et les statistiques de peche collectees, FAO Fisheries Report 245, 1980; G. Zouev and A. Bonder, Les Ressources de Poisson de la Zone Economique Quineenne et /es Perspectives de teur ~p~oi~a~ion, Centre de recherche scientifique de Conakry, Conak~-R~bane, 1984; and op cif, Ref 4. ‘Virkir

8

Guinea-Conakry

Taking into account the results of different scientific expeditions and a number of studies of these resources* an attempt has been made in Table 6 to estimate the yearfy harvest potential of five major species groups available in the 200-mife EEZ of Guinea for the industriaf fisheries sector. They represent yearly catch potential of 135 000 tons. Due to very limited country’s industrial fishing capability to harvest these resources, they are traditionally sold to the foreign fishing fleets through ficensing arrangements. In order to attach an economic value to these resources, ex-vessel MARINE

POLICY January 1989

Foreign

fishing

fleets

in the sub~a~~ra~

Wesf African

EEZ

Table 6. Estimated potential and economic value of the fishery resources available for industrial fishing in Gufnean 2OPmile EEZ.’ Yearly fishing

potential (tons)

Species group Pelagics ‘Harvesting potential for artisanal fisheries sector is estimated at the level of 50-70 thousand metric tons/year. It is not included in the Table. bTuna potential is tentative and subject to changes. Source: Developmenf Strategy of the Guinean industrial Fisheries Sector, Seattle-Conakry, 1987.

Demersals: fin fish cephalopods Crustaceans (including lobsters) Tuna

Estimated unit price (US$/ton)

65 000

250

55 000

350 1 200

19 250 000 12 000 000

4.500

18 000 000 1000000

10 000

4 000 1 OOOb

1 OOOb

1635#~00

66 600 000

135 000

Total

Total value (UW

prices for non-processed fish FOB Guinean 200-mile EEZ were considered for all groups of commercial species. In the absence of current information on the status of the resources and patterns of their exploitation by the foreign fishing fleets, the licensing system adopted by the Guinean authorities generates extremely low revenues. It also results in excessive fishing effort measured here in number and type of licensed vessels and in time of their fishing operations” and in over-exploitation of the most important commercial species. As Table 7 shows, in 1985 Guinea received less than US$2 million for licences sold against cash payment or fish delivered for local consumption by the foreign fishing ships operating in the 200-mile zone. If this revenue is compared with the total estimated value of the resources available for the foreign fleets (135 000 tons/year worth US$66.6 million) and licence fees equal to 15% of this value is assessed, Guinea would receive a revenue equal to approximately US$lO 000 000 per year. However simple, assessment of the foreign fleet performance (based I)TL^-*.-II*- rr,z-L-r -6 Cereignvessels on an average number of vessels operating yearly in Guinean EEZ, ._.._- ._ -r-.---- .-- - Guinean EEZ equal to 100 vessels, 240 days lo fishing at the rate of approximately 10 Jring 1984-1986 fluctuated between 99 and 116 per year. On average, these tons/day) leads to the conclusion that its estimated yearly catch is at vessels spent approximately eight months least 200 000 tons. This would mean that the catch is 48% higher than fishing in Guinean EEZ. Foreign fleets the estimated potential as in Table 6. operating in the zone are composed mostIi of sh;imper and bottom fish trawlers. Comparison-of expected or potential direct revenues from the foreign Their average size is 425 GRT per ves;sel. r. , . pI . risning neets in ’ Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry made loMost licences issued for foreign operin Table 8 sugglests that in the mid-1980s: ators are valid for 360 days.

Table 7. Foreign licence fishing revenues in Guinea during 1985. Amount

Type of payment

aFollowing the Bilateral Fishery Agreement EEC pays approximately US$2 100 000 every three years as a partial compensation of licence fees paid by fishing owners of the member countries willing to fish in Guinean 200-mile EEZ. Source: Stfategie du ~vel~~ment en Fe&e Industrfeltepourf’ARnee 1986, Secretariat d’Etat a la Peche, Conakry 1986.

GAMINE

POLICY

January

1989

In cash: Licence fees Pro-rata yearly payment by EEC’IECU

USS

In kind: Fish delivered in lieu of licence fee tons Total

Unit value

Total

in US$/ton

(US%

812000

812 597

700 000

700 000

1120

412

461 440 1 974 037

Foreign fishing fleets in the ~~bSubaran West African EEZ Table 8. Estimated potential and real revenues of the coastal West African countries generated by the foreign fishing fleets. Effective payment received

Potential hence revenue Country

(a)

W

a/b

20 636 2 100 1 974

45 16 20

(US$‘000) Mauritania Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Conakry

45 570 12 800 IO 000

Source: Tables 4,5 and 6.

0

0

a

Mauritania was receiving less than 50% of the potential revenues produced by exports tax and licence fees. This percentage will be higher if the effective catch would be estimated on the basis of the fish raw material extracted rather than according to the final production brought for port inspection by the foreign fishing/ processing ships. In the Republic of Guinea the revenues were five times lower than those potentially available considering the total allowable catch level is taken yearly by foreign fishing ships. The Guinea-Bissauan Government received only 16% of the direct yearly fees which could be due if foreign fleets would be requested to report their total catch in the EEZ.

The estimated value of coastal country revenue includes both cash payments and fish deliveries in lieu of the licence fee. Not considered are potential indirect benefits and contributions received from the distant water fishing countries. These include training of local fisheries specialists, technical assistance, support of fisheries sector development projects, fisheries research, employment of coastal countries’ nationals on board foreign fishing ships, etc. These benefits are usually obtained as a result of bilateral fishery agreements, joint venture arrangements or other forms of cooperation with foreign, developed fishing countries. Although all these assessments are based on roughly estimated harvesting potentials and on simplified price calculations, they help to understand the future economic significance of the fishery resources for the subsaharan West African nations if proper conservation and management measures are introduced and adequate foreign fleet monitoring and control systems are set up in that area.

Improved control and management

of distant water fisheries

Facing these problems, coastal states of subsaharan West Africa such as Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau or Guinea-Conakry with support of international donor organizations have already started to strengthen their institutional capabilities to improve management addressing their 200-mile EEZs and to increase the beneficial effects the fishery resources can generate for the local populations and national economies. They have also defined national objectives addressing their coastal resources and maritime sectors in recently adopted development strategies. The evidence of these goals - as related to international aspects of their marine resource use and management, is confirmed in the short-, medium- and long-term foreign fleet management policies announced by several Western African governments during 1987. For example: 10

MARINE POLICY January

1989

In Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry: there is a strong commitment to establish more effective surveillance systems (including monitoring, control and enforcement capabilities) in their 200-mile EEZs. It is expected that these improvements will, in the short term, help to eliminate or reduce illegal fishing and underreporting of the catch, and in the long term, will increase licence revenues from the foreign fleets (Declaration de politique de developpement du secteur de la peche, 1987). In Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry: both Governments are increasingly aware of the importance of the conservation measures to be introduced initially through re-designing and rationalizing their resource allocation policy vis-a-vis foreign users. These objectives could be attained through more intensive resource research and data collection on foreign fleet exploitation patterns and values extracted by overseas fleet operators. In Guinea-Bissau the Government is currently starting implementation of the Data Processing and Foreign Fleet Management Center financed by the World Bank. Similar efforts to obtain the donor support are also made in Guinea-Conakry . ’ ’ In Guinea-Conakry: the development strategy of the industrial fisheries sector recently adopted by the Guinean Government calls for quick expansion of the national private fisheries sector through private investment effort, international joint ventures, promotion of private foreign investment and through re-orientation of the foreign aid from short term narrowly defined to long term, package type projects with particular emphasis on management, institutional reforms and human resource development. ‘* Although the need to establish effective fisheries management system, including monitoring, control and law enforcement is realized by all West African governments, their achievements in this field are still minimal. In no coastal country of the region are the management of foreign fisheries interests and surveillance systems working satisfactorily. It also seems that the foreign economic aid effort is not pe~orming well due to the absence of specific long-term fisheries management support policies, lack of coordination between donors and reluctance to engage in financing marine fisheries surveillance projects frequently considered as a responsibility of the military sector.

Problems of the fisheries surveillance systems

“J. Dancose, et al, Projef de Profecti~ et SurveHance des Pecbes. Faisabi/ife et Plan d’o~rafioff, L’Agence canadienne de developpement international (ACDI), Ottawa, Canada, February 1988. ‘?I. Kaczynski, Development Strategy of the Guinean Industrial Fisheries Sector, Part I: Sector Analysis and Management, Seattle-Conakry, 1987. 13For the purpose of this study the term ‘surveillance’ includes all aspects of fisheries monitoring, control and law enforcement (coast-guard duties) through physical inspection necessary for putting national fisheries policies into effect.

Gaulle

POLICY January 1989

In Western Africa the task to carry out foreign fleet management is left to the national fisheries agencies (Ministries or Secretariats for Fisheries) while the surveillance functions are usually shared between the civilian and military sectors. The civilian sector is in charge of licensing, monitoring and legal-administrative control of the foreign fishing effort while the navy and air force are involved in the law enforcement. However, there is growing dissatisfaction of the existing surveillance systems13 in the region, since they do not generate expected benefits for the coastal countries and require both high initial capital investment and prohibitive operation costs. In all countries, however, it is frequently assumed that the primary objective of fisheries surveillance is the reduction of illegal activities rather than the acquisition of adequate information on the exploited stocks, foreign fleet activities, production it

Foreign ~shing

fleets

in the

subSaharan

West African

EEZ

outputs and to help the government to introduce rational resource management policies. Although this approach could be attractive particularly during the first years of the 200-mile EEZ, it has, unfortunately, led to the generalized belief among decision makers that any investment in surveillance should principally address the enforcement components, hardware purchase and its operation with much less attention given to other crucial components of the system. In Mauritania, for example, the initial capital investment needed to start combined military-civilian surveillance system designed in 1987 with support of a foreign donor organization is to be about US$7.5 million with yearly operating costs during a ten to 15 year period of US$1.8 million.14 It may become difficult if not impossible for that country to pay for such a costly system or to maintain it on continued basis. West African countries are now facing a deterioration of existing hardware, severe maintenance problems, non-existent or poor communications systems, widespread lack of both trained observers and medium- and high-level surveillance management personnel. There is also the absence of coordination between paramilitary (customs, maritime brigades), military (navy, air force) and civilian administrations involved in management monitoring and control of the foreign fleets. Existing vested interests in some coastal countries’ administrations to keep unchanged international fisheries arrangements, licence allocation systems and control of fishing activities in the 200-mile EEZ is an additional but potent constraint which must also be taken into account. The build-up of enforcement capability in Western Africa was initially started with the foreign, principally bilateral aid. In Mauritania there was French involvement while in Senegal a major contribution is made by the Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA. In Guinea-Bissau several attempts to start a law enforcement system were made by the USSR, People’s Republic of China and French Governments. Guinea-Conakry has also used USSR hardware. Now there are two small and two larger surveillance ships delivered by the US Government to this country. Continued training of the navy personnel in surveillance and hardware servicing is also supported by foreign bilateral aid.

Unequal

14P.J . Derham, The Surveillance and Control of Mauritanian Fisheries, London, July 1986.

12

treatment

In all these countries international donors have emphasized enforcement of national fisheries regulations in the 200-mile EEZ while paying much less attention to the civilian monitoring, control, management and policy functions. They also have underestimated the need for accompanying legal/institutional improvements in the recipient country, as a condition of the system’s long-term survival, low cost and beneficiai effects to the coastal resources and national economies. This unequal treatment of all surveillance components and functions, and the near complete absence of structural adjustment measures reflecting increased coastal state’s responsibilities vis-a-vis their 200mile EEZs are the principal reasons for the present difficulties affecting the West African marine fisheries surveillance systems. Currently, all governments of the region show growing interest in re-designing their marine fisheries surveillance systems, although no MARINE POLICY January

1989

Foreign fishing fleets in the subsaharan

West African EEZ

West African country seems to be able to cope quickly with these challenges without foreign support. They request financing from the international multilateral donor community and through bilateral arrangements. Fortunately, during most recent years (1986-1987) there were several positive responses particularly by the World Bank which is currently financing a new important surveillance-related aid project in GuineaBissau. Although enforcement and hardware are important concerns of this project there is a much greater attention given to such a crucial ingredients of the surveillance system as scientific data collection, fishing quota allocation, licensing policy, and development of long-term institutional and domestic financial capabilities to secure continued financing of the system. There is also a strong emphasis on the structural adjustment in the recipent country’s supporting administration, on technical assistance and training. In other subsaharan West African coastal states such as Mauritania or Guinea-Conakry, governmental efforts to improve their surveillance systems are still under a review process. However, some proposals submitted by international donors seem to give insufficient weight to necessary institutional adjustment, comprehensive observer programmes or the at-sea data collection and its land processing capabilities. There is also insufficient attention paid to the technical assistance and training of observers, civilian surveillance and resource management personnel.

What could be done in the near future? It is frequently argued that a strong enforcement capability not only guarantees full compliance with national fishing regulations but also helps the coastal country to derive highest economic benefits from the resources allocated for the foreign fleets. However, it is increasingly obvious, that enforcement alone is not able to cope with all long-term challenges governments are facing when trying to manage the marine living resources and to control overseas fleet activities in their 200-mile EEZs. To address this problem, it seems advisable to reconsider the existing approach to the West African fisheries surveillance problem, first, by adopting the principle that the system can be effective and economically sound only if it is designed and functions as an integral part of the national marine resource policy and the 200-mile EEZ management effort. Emphasis therefore should be given to the surveillance system’s capability to collect information on status of exploited resources, fishing effort and operation patterns of the foreign fleets. This is because the ultimate objective of the monitoring and control function is to generate scientifically based information for the government so it can undertake proper policy measures related to the resource conservation, licence allocation, fee determination and collection, fishing effort regulation, negotiation of international fisheries agreements and joint venture activities. It is furthermore proposed that the surveillance systems in the countries of this sub-region are designed considering the integrated approach with emphasis on package measures and solutions addressing environmental concerns and national economic objectives. The surveill-

MARINE

POLICY January 1989

Foreign fishing fleets in the s~bS~~arffn

Wesf African

EEZ

ante systems should be considered an important instrument of sustained resource development policy of the coastal country rather than a purely military or paramilitary exercise. In practical terms, any foreign aid projects addressing surveillance programmes should not only include security elements (hardware for surface and air patrolling functions, and other related needs) but also administrative, legal, financial and other improvements in the governmental infrastructure to operate these programmes and use available data for resource conservation, management and policy purposes. This includes also necessary equipment and material such as observer instruments, civilian radio-communication equipment, transportation means, data processing equipment, etc. Secondly, it is necessary to emphasize the role of the surveitlance systems as a data and information gathering tools, Their capability in this field should be significantly upgraded. In West Africa (and in many other developing coastal states) this approach creates a good opportunity to use the national surveillance systems as a principal data source for thk governments on the status of the coastal fish stocks and their exploitation patterns. Unfortunately, resource assessment efforts undertaken by FAO or through bilateral arrangements with foreign governments, although of great value, are frequently fragmentary and not necessarily the most effective source of data helping governments, on the daily basis, to shape flexible resource management policies. If well designed and executed, the national surveillance systems have full potential to fill this gap substantially. The third, perhaps most important prerequisite for the success of the surveillance effort in Africa is the consistent and well-designed training programme for personnel involved in these activities (observers, radio-communications operators, surveillance officers, data processing specialists, system managers, administrators and fishery economists), What is needed are training programmes designed separately for each country but compatible on regional basis and addressing both monitoring/control an enforcement related needs in this field. In many aspects of the fisheries surveillance both civilian and military officers should receive identical training. This may lead to badly needed harmonization of the civilian and military functions of existing and future national surveillance systems. This approach and recognition of the regional nature of the problem by the donor organizations and foreign governments can help to establish presently absent regional cooperation between coastal states in the area of the foreign fleet control and marine resources management in Western Africa. Fourth, the international donor organizations are urged to coordinate their concepts and objectives when designing the surveillance programmes for the region so they will be simple, inexpensive, compatible with each other and serve as an instrument of cooperation between countries of the region rather than as a factor promoting the present isolated nature of surveillance efforts, confusion and continued absence of coordinated management of the regional 200-mile EEZs. Since no West African country is presently capable of sustaining the surveillance programmes because of existing economic difficulties, it is proposed that the reasonably inexpensive fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance systems should be financed by the foreign fisheries resources users rather than the coastal states of the region. This concept will not be totally new in West Africa since foreign

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MARINE

POLICY January

1989

Foreign fishing fleets in fhe subSaharun

West African EEZ

vessel owners are already paying the salaries of fisheries observers on their ships. They also cover some other costs related to their work at sea. The logic is that coastal state surveillance effort should not be economically (and politically) dependant on foreign fishing interests. A reasonable surveillance fee may help coastal states to maintain their control system on a continual basis. At the same time the new surveillance projects should avoid the mixing of national fishery management, monitoring and control responsibilities and country’s coast-guard duties since - as experience in West Africa indicates - the intended joint control and enforcement of the 200-mile EEZ tends to erode by conflicts of interest and sectorial priorities. The coast-guard concerns should preferably be the subject of separate treatment and independent foreign aid programmes.

MARINE

POLICY January 1989

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