Local participation and large marine protected areas: Lessons from a U.S. Marine National Monument

Journal of Environmental Management 252 (2019) 109624

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Journal of Environmental Management journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvman

Research article

Local participation and large marine protected areas: Lessons from a U.S. Marine National Monument Laurie Richmond a, *, Rebecca L. Gruby b, Dawn Kotowicz c, Robert Dumouchel a a

Humboldt State University, United States Colorado State University, United States c University of Rhode Island, United States b

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Ocean Marine protected areas Community engagement Governance Western Pacific Fisheries

This paper addresses the question: to what extent do insights from smaller, nearshore marine protected areas (MPAs) regarding the importance of participatory processes apply to large and remote MPAs (LMPAs)? To date there has been little empirical research about stakeholder participation in LMPA designation processes outside of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park context. Through an analysis of documents and 90 interviews collected by two independent research projects, this paper examines the designation process of a U.S. LMPA, the Marianas Trench Marine National Monument (MTMNM), which was established in the waters of the U.S. territories of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and Guam through a presidential proclamation under the U.S. Antiquities Act in 2009. Results indicate that overall the designation process for the Monument did not cohere with recommendations from nearshore MPA research about the importance of participation and trans­ parency. Despite widespread support for conservation in that space, the proposed Monument was highly con­ troverial. Stakeholders on all sides of the issue – advocates and opponents alike – expressed criticisms of the designation process. Concerns were related to the speed and perceived top-down nature of the process, the involvement of external entities, and the appropriateness of the process design for the local CNMI context. Data collected showed that much of the opposition to the Monument stemmed from how the process was conducted, rather than opposition to conservation. These findings suggest that a more participatory, collaborative, trans­ parent, and culturally appropriate designation process might have achieved a similar conservation outcome while reducing conflict and enduring resentment. We derive six lessons learned from the MTMNM designation process that may be useful for LMPAs globally. Results suggest that key lessons from conventional MPAs about effective consultation and participation processes can apply to LMPAs, but also that new guidance is needed to account for the unique features of LMPAs.

1. Introduction Large marine protected areas (LMPAs) have emerged as a significant trend in ocean conservation. LMPAs have been defined as MPAs that span an area greater than 100,000 km2. Typically, they have been designated in more remote and offshore portions of the ocean where less human activity is believed to occur (Devillers et al., 2015). Between 2006 and 2016, 18 LMPAs were established worldwide and additional sites are under development (Christie et al., 2017). LMPAs have played an important role in meeting the spatial element of global targets for ocean protection, with the largest 20 MPAs in the world by some esti­ mates accounting for 70% of the global MPA coverage (Christie et al.,

2017; Spalding et al., 2013). In the wake of the expansion of LMPAs worldwide, a growing community of practitioners and scholars have called for increased research and attention to the human dimensions of LMPAs (Christie et al., 2017; Gray et al., 2017; Gruby et al., 2017, 2016; Lewis et al., 2017). Several of these scholars highlight the importance of understanding the ways in which the human dimensions of LMPAs may be similar to as well as differ from those of smaller, nearshore MPAs (hereafter: conventional MPAs) (Gruby et al., 2017). Research related to the governance and success of conventional MPAs consistently highlights the importance of incorporating stake­ holder engagement and/or public participation into MPA planning processes (Dalton et al., 2012; Fox et al., 2013; Sayce et al., 2013; Scholz

* Corresponding author. Department of Environmental Science & Management, Humboldt State University, 1 Harpst Street, Arcata, CA, 95521, United States. E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Richmond). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109624 Received 3 April 2019; Received in revised form 21 September 2019; Accepted 21 September 2019 Available online 11 October 2019 0301-4797/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Journal of Environmental Management 252 (2019) 109624

et al., 2004). Researchers have found that incorporating stakeholder participation in conventional MPA planning can increase both the ecological and social success of MPA networks (Dalton et al., 2012; Jentoft et al., 2007; Lundquist and Granek, 2005; Pollnac et al., 2001). Alternatively, attempting to implement conventional MPAs through top-down processes with little stakeholder involvement can contribute to equity concerns, negative local perceptions of MPAs, derailed plan­ ning processes, and in some cases lower ecological effectiveness result­ ing from lack of compliance (Campbell et al., 2012; Christie, 2004; McClanahan et al., 2006; Murray, 2005; Suman et al., 1999). As a result of these findings, many recent guidelines related to the implementation and management of conventional MPAs recommend incorporating public and stakeholder input throughout the designation and manage­ ment processes (Christie and White, 2007; IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas, 2008; Pomeroy et al., 2005). The designation processes for some LMPAs, however, appear to have gone in a different direction. In contrast to the extensive public partic­ ipation processes used for the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (Day, 2017), the Chagos Marine Protected Area, Phoenix Islands Protected Area, and Motu Motiro Hiva Marine Park, as examples, were all desig­ nated through top-down processes, with limited local and stakeholder engagement (De Santo, 2013; De Santo et al., 2011; Gaymer et al., 2014; Gruby et al., 2016; Mitchell, 2017). Some early proponents of LMPAs argued that public participation may not be as important in LMPA designation processes because LMPAs are so remote with few human uses (Balmford et al., 2004; McCrea-Strub et al., 2011). More recently, management guidelines for LMPAs have emphasized the importance of stakeholder engagement and participation (Lewis et al., 2017), while recognizing that sustained stakeholder engagement may be more diffi­ cult for large sites because of their complexity and remoteness from human populations (Wilhelm et al., 2014). With the exception of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (Day, 2017), however, there are very few in-depth studies that have empirically documented designation pro­ cesses for LMPAs and explored local perceptions thereof. This is particularly problematic in the context of U.S. Marine National Monu­ ments, where questions around public engagement and participation have been at the center of national debate and scrutiny (Zinke, 2017). Rigorous, empirical research is needed to better inform contemporary debates and to better understand the extent to which insights from conventional MPAs regarding the importance of participatory processes do or do not apply to large and remote MPAs. This manuscript provides an assessment of the designation process for the Marianas Trench Marine National Monument (MTMNM or the Monument), a LMPA offshore of the United States territories of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and Guam (Fig. 1). The LMPA was established by George W. Bush in 2009 through U.S. presidential proclamation 8335. It encompasses 95,216 square miles1 (246,610 km2) of submerged lands and waters (U.S. Fish and­ Wildlife Service, 2017). This is a high-profile LMPA that has been dis­ cussed in several publications (Gruby et al., 2017; Kotowicz et al., 2017; Richmond and Kotowicz, 2015); however, there has not yet been a study of the process through which the Monument was designated. This paper brings together data from two separate studies spanning the years 2011–2016, including 90 interviews with individuals connected to the designation process. The authors draw from the collected data to address two key question about the MTMNM:

Combining data gathered in two separate studies has allowed for the generation of a more comprehensive portrait of how the designation process unfolded and how the local community has reacted and responded to the designation over time. Findings from this research can help inform future designation and management of LMPAs in the U.S. and around the world. 2. Methods This manuscript brings together data collected from two indepen­ dent social science studies conducted 2–7 years after the MTMNM was designated. First, a team led by co-authors Kotowicz & Richmond collected qualitative data in the CNMI and Guam between 2011 and 2012 (Study A). Second, a team led by co-author Gruby collected qualitative data in the CNMI and Guam in 2015, and in Honolulu, Hawai’i in 2016 (Study B). While the research projects were conceptu­ alized and conducted independently, the designation process was a focal point for both. Both these studies used an interpretive qualitative case study approach focused on in-depth understanding of the ways in which the MTMNM was experienced and perceived by key stakeholders, particularly in the CNMI. Both teams focused data collection most heavily in the CNMI because the large majority of the Monument is located within the CNMI waters and it was there that lobbying and opposition activities were most intensively focused. The project teams conducted data analysis separately and report results collectively. 2.1. Semi-structured interviews Combined, the research teams conducted 90 semi-structured in­ terviews with stakeholders connected to the designation of the Monu­ ment. Details on study methodologies, sampling approach, interview questions, and analysis methods can be found in Kotowicz and Rich­ mond (2013), Richmond and Kotowicz (2015), Gruby et al. (2017), and in the Supplemental Materials. Table 1 shows a breakdown of the types of individuals interviewed in each study. In combination, the two datasets capture the knowledge and per­ spectives of people who were closely connected to the processes that led to Monument designation, people who were closely connected to the Monument waters, and people who had the potential to be directly affected by Monument regulations or restrictions. The two teams dis­ cussed the Monument designation process with individuals who strongly supported the Monument designation, with individuals who strongly opposed it, and with a large number of individuals whose opinion fell somewhere in between. Interviewees sometimes gave conflicting ac­ counts about aspects of the designation process and the authors did their best to triangulate against multiple sources (e.g. multiple interviewees and/or documents) to describe the timeline and process as accurately as possible. 2.2. Document analysis In addition to interviews, both teams collected an extensive and diverse array of documents to gain insight into the events, representa­ tions, and perceptions of the initiation and designation of the Monu­ ment. For this paper, the project teams analyzed federal and CNMI government documents and letters, local and national news media coverage of the Monument, and websites and blog posts from actors involved in the Monument designation. The Supplemental Materials (SM) section contains a more detailed description of the interview and document analysis methods along with many of the original documents used in the analysis.

(1) What was the process through which the Monument was desig­ nated and how were local governments, local communities, and stakeholders involved? (2) What were local (CNMI) perceptions of and responses to the designation process?

2.3. Case study background In 2009, U.S. President George W. Bush issued a presidential proc­ lamation that established the Marianas Trench Marine National

1 In this manuscript, miles (mi) are U.S. miles, unless they are nautical miles in which case they are marked nmi.

2

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Fig. 1. Map of the final Monument boundaries. The black line represents the Economic Exclusive Zones of Guam and the CNMI combined; Islands Unit (in yellow) is about 16,405 mi2. The Trench Unit is in red and the Volcanic Units are represented with stars; size of the Monument in total is 95,216 mi2. Source: MTMNM map (Gibbons, 2009); inset maps (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2017). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)

Monument. The Monument includes three distinct spatial areas referred to as ‘units’ – the Islands Unit which includes the submerged lands and water column 20–30 nautical miles offshore of the three northern Islands in the Marianas chain; the Trench Unit which provides pro­ tections only to the submerged lands (ocean floor) surrounding the deep water trench that parallels the island chain; and the Volcanic Unit which provides protections to submerged lands surrounding underwater vol­ canoes in the Marianas chain (Fig. 1). The Islands Unit is the only portion of the Monument that includes the water column and has fishing restrictions. The proclamation stated that the “Secretary of Commerce shall prohibit commercial fishing” in the Islands Unit but that “suste­ nance, recreational, and traditional indigenous fishing shall be managed as a sustainable activity” (Bush, 2009). Because the other two units were not introduced to the public until after the Monument designation, the Islands Unit was the most controversial and discussed portion of the designation, and most of the discussion around designation took place in the CNMI. The Islands Unit portion of the Monument is more than 200 nmi from Saipan, the nearest currently inhabited island in the Marianas chain (Fig. 1). However, in recent history populations from the CNMI have resided on more northern islands in the chain, including on

Asuncion, an island within the Islands Unit, and residents continue to travel to the Islands Unit waters for commercial, cultural, and research purposes (Kotowicz and Richmond, 2013). 3. Results 3.1. Process of monument designation 3.1.1. Historical and political context The CNMI is spread across 14 islands and covers 183.5 mi2 of dry land of which a significant portion is under the control of the U.S. Mil­ itary (Allen and Amesbury, 2012; Blades, 2016). It has officially been a part of the United States since 1976 through an agreement called The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, which is referred to by locals as “the Covenant” (U.S. Congress, 1976). Commonwealth status grants the CNMI more autonomy than that of U.S. territories. In practice, however, the territorial status of the CNMI and Guam limits their ability to influence U.S. decisions. In 1977, the CNMI adopted their own constitution, which included specific pro­ visions related to conservation: article XIV stated that four islands in the 3

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an ocean or “blue legacy” before leaving office on January 20, 2009 (New York Times, 2008). Many interviewees believed this influenced the timeline of the process. Ultimately, prior to leaving office, President Bush had designated four LMPAs in the U.S. waters of the Western Pacific. Campaign materials reveal that Pew’s vision was for a much larger and more restricted protected area for the Islands Unit. In Monument discussions, Pew advocated for a “no take” LMPA in an area comprising the entire EEZ from a point between Agrihan and Asuncion islands and reaching up to the EEZ’s northern limits – a space estimated to be 115,000 mi2 (Iverson, 2008). Originally, Pew had considered advo­ cating for a no-take LMPA that encompassed the waters in the CNMI EEZ surrounding all of the islands north of Saipan, but this idea was aban­ doned due to lack of political feasibility; even the most ardent local advocates for the Monument concept pushed against that design (Friends of the Mariana Trench Monument, 2010).

Table 1 Number and types of individuals interviewed in the two qualitative studies. Primary roles

Description of roles

Interviewees Study A

Interviewees Study B

Local government [-LGOV] Federal government [-FGOV] NGO [-NGO]

Elected officials, government agency staff, advisors US federal agency staff and managers

12

22

2

14

Local and global environmental NGO staff Fishers, tourism operators University researchers and consultants

3

6

17

3

1

3

Leaders, staff of local orgs. (non-environment) Local individuals involved with MTMNM

0

1

5

1

40

50

Private sector [-PS] Researchers, contractors [-RC] Community orgs. [-CO] Informed citizens [-IC] Total

3.1.3. CNMI government response After Governor Fitial received the letter from Pew about the Monu­ ment concept, several officials within the CNMI government publicly expressed opposition to or concerns about the Monument concept. In March of 2008, Governor Fitial asked for Pew to remove the CNMI from any plans they had for a marine monument (Fitial, 2008). Shortly thereafter in April 2008, the Senate of the CNMI passed Senate Joint Resolution No. 16-04 “To respectfully request that the President of the United States refrain from unilaterally creating a Northern Islands Na­ tional Monument and imposing the regulatory burdens appurtenant thereto upon the People of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands without the consent of the government” (SM: Doc 11). During the summer and fall of 2008, the Governor of the CNMI, every island mayor, both the CNMI Senate and House of Representatives, and several gov­ ernment representatives from Guam wrote communications to Bush or his Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) that either opposed the Monument designation or expressed concerns about the designation process (SM: Docs 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 22, 24, 25, 26). Two members of the House of Representatives who voted against the Senate Joint Reso­ lution, wrote a letter to Bush in May 14, 2008 asking the Bush admin­ istration to “send more detailed and accurate information” about the Monument proposal; they expressed concerns that “misinformation and confusion have begun to cloud the local discourse” (Salas and Sablan, 2008). One high-level CNMI official reflected that the CNMI government opposition was part of a strategy to bring the U.S. federal government to the table for a negotiation so that the CNMI could have some influence on the decision: “the [CNMI] administration’s strategy was really to bring the federal government to the table and that’s when we went out, we meaning the [CNMI] administration, were out there voicing our opposition to this idea specifically to bring the federal government to the table, instead of just unilaterally just signing the proclamation” (LGOV B12; 2015). While the dominant public position of the CNMI government was opposition, there were supporters within the government as well. One of the most vocal advocates of the MTMNM was Cinta Kaipat who was a legislator in the CNMI House of Representatives at the time, but she was in the minority amongst her colleagues. Several interviewees who were working within CNMI government agencies during these discussions suggested that while some government employees personally supported the idea, there was a fear of publicly expressing this perspective in op­ position to the CNMI administration’s position on the issue (NGO - B27; 2015).

chain including Maug, Uracas, and Asuncion (which later became sur­ rounded by the waters of the Islands Unit) “shall be maintained as un­ inhabited places and used only for the preservation and protection of natural resources” (Northern Marianas Constitutional Convention, 1976). Ownership of the submerged lands and waters in the exclusive eco­ nomic zone (EEZ) surrounding the CNMI has been long contested. At the time of designation, the U.S. asserted authority over all the waters in the EEZ surrounding the CNMI including waters 0–3 nautical miles off the coast, which are typically under state or territory jurisdiction in the U.S. (Gruby et al., 2017). Since the designation the U.S. government has conveyed submerged lands in the three-mile zone to the CNMI through two transfers in 2013 and 2016 (Gruby et al., 2017). Several other controversial federal actions took place in the years before the Monu­ ment was proposed including the U.S. Congress passing a law that required the CNMI to raise its minimum wage to federal levels (a deci­ sion that decimated the CNMI’s textile-dependent economy), a shift in immigration policy that replaced the CNMI’s immigration policies with federal ones, and a substantial U.S. military build-up in the region (Allen and Amesbury, 2012). This history affected local CNMI perceptions of interactions with the federal government’s Monument initiative. 3.1.2. Initial plans According to interview accounts and document records, the idea for a Marine National Monument near the CNMI came from an international non-governmental organization (NGO), the Pew Charitable Trusts (Pew), as a part of their Global Ocean Legacy Project. Pew first communicated their vision for a federal marine monument in the waters surrounding the CNMI to Benigno Fitial, the CNMI governor at the time, in a letter dated December 20, 2007 (SM: Doc 1). In the letter, Jay Nelson, then-director of Pew’s Global Ocean Legacy Project, presents the case for the establishment of a Monument in “the Economic Exclusive Zone around the northernmost three of the Northern Mariana Islands” (Nelson, 2007, p.2). He highlights potential benefits the Monument could bring and seeks local government support for the idea, stating, “to be clear, our concept of a monument surrounding the constitutionally protected CNMI Nature Reserve is a private initiative. We will be suc­ cessful only if local residents and their elected leaders are supportive. We also need the support of the federal government” (Nelson, 2007, p.2). The letter describes Pew’s prior outreach efforts in the CNMI beginning in January 2007, where Pew visited three times to meet with local people (Nelson, 2007, p.4). Pew’s vision and the concept of a Monument in the Marianas aligned with the George W. Bush administration’s documented effort to create

3.1.4. Organizing support and opposition In the year and a half leading up to the designation of the Monument, Pew began working with groups to help organize local support for the Monument. Pew helped to organize and finance a CNMI-based advocacy group called Friends of the Monument (FOM) which later became 4

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Friends of the Mariana Trench Monument (FOM). In written testimony to Congress in 2010, FOM describe their efforts as a “campaign,” stating: “with the Governor taking the position he did, it fell to the supporters of the Monument to show the level of support the idea had in the com­ munity and in order to do so, we had to wage a ‘campaign’ educating the public on the Antiquities Act, the science behind marine protected areas, and the economic, social, and environmental benefits a monument would bring.” (Friends of the Mariana Trench Monument, 2010). As a part of their campaign, FOM organized presentations at schools and local organizations, held open houses, placed advertisements on the radio and in newspapers, spearheaded a student letter-writing campaign, distributed promotional materials, and organized various petitions in support of the Monument. According to representatives of FOM, approximately 6000 residents of CNMI signed the petition in support of the Monument (SM: Doc 17) and 206 business owners and managers signed a separate business petition (SM: Doc 18) and “over 100 current and former community leaders sent letters to then-President Bush in support of the Monument” (Micronesians in Island Conserva­ tion, 2009). Pew was also involved in the local campaign directly. Pew repre­ sentatives met with CNMI legislators individually and also gave at least one presentation to a group of them (LGOV - B47; 2015). In June of 2008, Pew sponsored two reports outlining economic and scientific ar­ guments for establishing the monument (Iverson, 2008; Kelsey, 2008). While Pew helped to organize support for the Monument concept, local and non-local entities mobilized opposition to the Monument in the CNMI. The proposed Monument was resisted by the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council (commonly referred to as Wes­ pac), the Federal body charged with developing fishing regulations in the Western Pacific region. The 13-member Council has strong local and Indigenous representation with at least two representatives appointed from Guam and CNMI respectively. Wespac publicly opposed the crea­ tion of the Monument (Martin, 2008); individuals connected to Wespac wrote op-eds in local CNMI newspapers expressing opposition to the Monument (e.g. (Gourley, 2009)), sent a letter and comments to G.W. Bush (SM: Doc 27), and helped organize a counter petition in opposition to the Monument which is said to have received approximately 300 signatures (SM: Doc 19). An interviewee who was part of the effort to oppose the Monument described the operation thusly, “we did the banners, I had banners made up, had buttons made up. And then we started becoming … We got on TV, I even paid for that. We started becoming more vocal, probably around maybe June or July. We kept up the letters to the editor. So, we kept pressure on them [Pew and the Monument advocates], but they were far more experienced than we were, far more savvy” (RC-B20; 2015). Monument proponents did not think Wespac should have been involved in CNMI politics while oppo­ nents saw them as critical support. Wespac’s opposition stirred contro­ versy with the organization being accused of breaking federal lobbying laws in the media (Saipan Tribune, 2008a) and others questioning the motivations for Wespac’s involvement in the issue (Kramer, 2008).

public input on the proposed MTMNM. This was the only public meeting about the Monument hosted by the federal government. While we do not have a formal record of participants, the Saipan Tribune reports there were about 350 “community members” in attendance (Saipan Tribune, 2008b), and interviewees recalled a large and diverse group including both anti-monument demonstrators and pro-monument advocates, and representatives from NOAA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Na­ tional Marine Sanctuary Program, and the CNMI local government. There was a consensus among interviewees on all sides of the issue that the White House wanted approval from the CNMI government even if they did not require it to move forward with the designation under the Antiquities Act. One respondent stated: “He [Connaughton] has to come home with community support. That’s what they were waiting for. They didn’t want this to be controversial.” (LGOV - B2; 2015). In the weeks leading up to the designation, there was a private negotiation between Connaughton and a small number of the CNMI’s top government officials to determine the final form of the Monument. Interviews with those involved indicate that during these negotiations the final boundaries of the Monument were decided – the size of the Islands Unit was reduced (final Islands Unit was 16,405 mi2 compared to the 115,000 mi2 proposed by Pew) and the Trench and Volcano Units were added – and that provisions for the allowance of recreational, sustenance, and traditional indigenous fishing in the Islands Unit were added to the proposal. An interviewee involved said that the CNMI of­ ficials successfully lobbied to ensure the Volcanic and Trench units did not include fishing restrictions (LGOV - B2; 2015). Referring to the ne­ gotiations as a “gentlemen’s agreement,” one interviewee reflected “I think they [the CNMI officials] felt like enough concessions had been made, so that they could be more comfortable endorsing this thing” (LGOV - B47; 2015). The content of the negotiations was not made public. One interviewee recounted that “general community” was not able to “see the understanding, the communication between the CEQ and the governor” (FGOV - B41; 2015). The final text of the declaration was not publicized before it was released by the media. As one inter­ viewee recalled, “We hadn’t read the declaration before the media came out. You know, they didn’t release it, and we didn’t get to peruse it” (NGO - B4; 2015). Another interviewee described the reaction to the Volcanic and Trench units being included in Proclamation 8335 as such: “We didn’t know anything about it. [. . . ] That was as much a shock to us as it was to anybody” (NGO - B27; 2015). CNMI officials and interviewees who were involved in the negotia­ tions stated that during these private discussions, the U.S. government made a series of promises to CNMI in exchange for local government support, including: co-management authority, a visitor center on the CNMI, conveyance of submerged lands to the CNMI, and federal support for enforcement and monitoring. However, some interviewees expressed doubt as to whether Connaughton actually promised to meet these conditions, or just stated that he would communicate them to President Bush. There is no written record of these conditions. After the negotia­ tions, key CNMI government officials, including Governor Fitial, switched to a position of support for the Monument. Governor Fitial then attended the proclamation signing ceremony in Washington D.C. (LGOV-B2; 2015). On January 6, 2009 President Bush invoked his powers under the Antiquities Act to make a proclamation creating the Marianas Trench Marine National Monument (Bush, 2009).

3.1.5. Federal involvement and final negotiations In August of 2008, President Bush sent a memorandum to the Sec­ retary of Defense, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Com­ merce, and the Chairman of the CEQ asking them to assess the viability of potential marine conservation management areas in the western Pa­ cific (Bush, 2008). James Connaughton, the Chairman of Bush’s CEQ, made one visit to CNMI during the designation process. The visit was a four-day trip in October 2008 (about three months before the procla­ mation was signed) during which he met with government officials and hosted a public meeting. Of his visit, Connaughton said: “It is our first time to visit Saipan. It’s a beautiful place. This is the first time that we stayed for a longer time, four days, which is unusual for us. Usually it would take only a day for us to stay in a place. The President told us to make sure we talk to all the people here” (Saipan Tribune, 2008b). During this visit, the CEQ hosted one formal public meeting to seek

3.2. Local perceptions of the designation process 3.2.1. Level of public involvement and speed of designation Interviewees on all sides of the issue expressed criticisms of the designation process, although the nature of the criticisms tended to differ depending on whether they supported or opposed the Monument. A common concern related to perceptions of top-down and noninclusive elements of the designation process. Many respondents felt that using a Presidential Proclamation, through the U.S. Antiquities Act, did not allow for proper consultation with the local government and the 5

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local people. One stakeholder said, “there’s no consultation and public education, no negotiation” (LGOV-A9; 2011); and another that the process was “not transparent” (RC-A1; 2011). One stakeholder expressed incredulity that the Monument could be designated even though the local governments were against it, “The majority of us says no, but blue legacy has to be done. George Bush just went ahead and signed it – with municipal government, the legislature, and the [CNMI] administration saying no” (IC-A6; 2011). Another said, “they just come down here and they just say, ‘okay, we’re gonna do this’ instead of have us a voice – hearing about our concern” (PS-A9; 2011). Other in­ terviewees expressed concerns that the local CNMI government also did not do enough to encourage public engagement and debate about the Monument concept – particularly given the grassroots support leveraged through local advocacy campaigns – before they took actions in the form of legislation and letters expressing CNMI opposition to the Monument. One interviewee reported, “the sad fact of it is that we really tried to get a public dialogue going. [. . . ] so part of that was trying to get our of­ ficials to at least sit down and in good faith have the dialogue with Pew about this” (NGO-B27; 2015). Advocates in support of the Monument felt that the CNMI government was “purposely trying to prevent dis­ cussion within the community” (LGOV-B25; 2015). Many respondents worried that the relatively fast pace of the designation did not allow for proper consultation with the local people and government and did not provide the federal government enough time to explain their reasoning for developing the protected area. One former government official said, “I think that the United States betrayed the people here by not giving the people an opportunity to fully un­ derstand, the concept of why they’re establishing the Monument” (LGOV-A9; 2011). Many of the letters from CNMI government officials to Bush and the CEQ included concerns about the fast pace of the timeline and what they perceived as top-down or unilateral elements of the process (SM Docs: 4, 10, 14, 15, 22, 24, 25, 26). Not everyone shared the view that the timeline for the implementation of the Monument was too fast. One supporter of the Monument said,

Several interviewees on both sides of the issue suggested that designating the LMPA through NOAA’s Marine Sanctuary Act would have been preferable, as the Sanctuary processes moves more slowly and requires more public engagement. As one vocal monument opponent stated, “The sanctuaries process is much more fair. It’s still – it would still be controversial, but the fact of the matter is, is that it allows opposing parties to come to the table [. . . ] the sanctuaries process takes several years” (RC-B20; 2015). Several respondents expressed a belief that the Bush administration used the Antiquities Act specifically so they could avoid the public participation and environmental review required in the Sanctuary process, “Why else would you designate something by executive order under your tenuous, in my opinion, use of the Antiq­ uities Act? If not to get around all of those pesky public engagement comments and review processes both biophysically, socially, and economically? Why else would you do it?” (FGOV-B7; 2016). 3.2.2. Involvement of external actors Both those supportive and opposed to the Monument concept expressed concerns about the way in which external actors became involved in the debate about whether to designate the Monument. Some were concerned about the prominent role they saw Pew, an interna­ tional NGO, taking in the designation process – as an advocate for the Monument. One stakeholder said, “It was just the thought that the dis­ cussion really didn’t come from our federal government initially. It was a non-government organization that brought this up [. . . ] Pew was a very, very powerful organization” (LGOV – B2; 2015). Another inter­ viewee said, “the [CNMI] administration back then sort of felt like something was going on that they weren’t even sort of consulted. [. . . ] Had the federal government come in and asked the local government I’m sure that things would be a little more smooth. But no it went the other way through Pew” (LGOV-B12; 2015). Another said, “the involvement of the Pew environment group just completely went overboard and irritated everybody” (RC-A1; 2011). Interviewees did note that despite the strong role they felt Pew played in the process, the final composition of the Monument differed in important ways from Pew’s original proposal. One stakeholder said, “What we got was something that was more in line with the culture and traditions of the Marianas. Pew wanted no take. [. . . ] The Presidential Proclamation incorporated the concerns of the local indigenous com­ munity by allowing them to continue taking seafood and resources in a sustainable manner. It did not follow the extreme ideological views of Pew environment group. What we got I thought was pretty good. End product better than what Pew proposed” (RC A1-2011). Interviewees also expressed concerns surrounding their perceptions that Wespac played a strong role in organizing opposition to the Mon­ ument. In 2015, one interviewee stated, “Wespac also funded the opposite side, and they continue to. [. . . ] That’s actually hilarious to think about all the money that Wespac has given to advocate against it. I mean, they’ve run anti-Monument PSAs for years” (NGO-B4; 2015). In their testimony to Congress in 2010, representatives from FOM said that Wespac, in their “campaign against the monument [. . . ] used every­ thing in their arsenal to make the monument seem controversial” (Friends of the Mariana Trench Monument, 2010). One respondent expressed a belief that individuals connected to Wespac “misled the Governor that we [Monument supporters from the CNMI] were the agents of the Feds and Pew” (NGO - B8; 2015). Others minimized the role of Wespac in fomenting opposition within the CNMI: “They [mon­ ument advocates] hate Wespac. [. . . ] Wespac didn’t have to stoke any fires, those fires were stoked here” (RC-B20; 2015). Some who were involved expressed a belief that the strong involvement of external entities combined with the limited involvement of the federal government may have fueled confusion and controversy surrounding the issue. In their letter of support for the Monument to Connaughton, the Saipan Chamber of Commerce wrote, “We believe that so much debate has occurred because until recently, information [. . . ] was disseminated primarily through private sources and not through

I would say that what I saw was a window of opportunity [. . . ] to take advantage of a situation that might provide something benefi­ cial. And so was it rushed? In that sense it’s possible that I could see how people would see that, depending on what kind of view you’re looking at. But to me ‘rushed’ would have been two months, not eighteen months, and rushed would have been nobody sitting down at a table trying to explain some of these things and instead cram­ ming it down somebody’s throat.” (NGO-B27; 2015). It is important to note that the meetings referred to in this quote were those sponsored by advocacy groups in support of the Monument rather than the CNMI or Federal government. This is a distinction – and a limitation – members of the groups recognized: “When you say ‘public consultations’, please keep in mind that we were an uncharted, loose association of like-minded people, who had no obligation to any kind of rules, other than we were trying to do our best to give the public a chance to participate, right?” (NGO-B27; 2015). Interviews indicated that much of the opposition to the Monument stemmed from how the process was conducted, not from opposition to conservation. One CNMI government official stated, “We were never against conservation. That has to be understood. And opposition was not to the Monument, it’s to the process.” (LGOV-B22; 2015). A represen­ tative from a local environmental NGO said, “I was certainly part of the opposition to the designation of the marine monument. No one is per se against conservation but it really is about how you go about it, yeah?” (NGO-B24; 2015). A local charter boat captain said, “I was kind of heartbroken about the way they took the Monument area. I think that the people should have been advised longer and gotten involved in it. They weren’t, it was shoved down their throat. [. . . ] there’s so many people for that [marine conservation in the Northern Islands] and I’m for that too but I was against it, the way they did it” (PS-A8, 2011). 6

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comply with consultation, participation, and transparency recommen­ dations had important implications. For example, negative perceptions of the process for being top-down or rushed played a role in triggering strong local opposition to the Monument among key stakeholders, many of whom said they opposed the process rather than conservation. Additionally, there is evidence that the fall-out from this process could have implications for future marine conservation work in the region. Pacific Islands’ leaders including the governor of the CNMI and other CNMI stakeholders sent letters to President Obama expressing opposi­ tion to his proposed expansion of the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument in 2014, in part based on their experiences with designation of the MTMNM. One letter said, “What you may not know is that there is a growing resentment in island communities throughout the Western Pacific with the Antiquities Act and the unilateral approach used by a sitting president in designating [Marine National Monu­ ments]” (Agpoon-Cabang, 2014). Ultimately, the final design of the MTMNM represented a negotiated compromise between the visions of advocates and opponents that was arguably more contextually appropriate than the initial proposal. The Islands Unit was reduced in size and allowed for certain local and “Indigenous” types of fishing to take place. Surveys of residents (Koto­ wicz et al., 2017) and language within the CNMI constitution all show that the CNMI community and government had and continues to have a strong orientation towards conservation, particularly in the Northern Islands, suggesting that a better designation process could have pro­ duced less controversy and engendered more local support. We specu­ late that had the designation process been approached as an open and creative dialogue from the beginning – between the CNMI government, the U.S. federal government, Pew, FOM, and the local public and stakeholders – a similar outcome could have been achieved while reducing the conflict which has left lasting divisions and resentment in the CNMI community, and which has had a legacy effect on imple­ mentation (Wilson, 2018). This is echoed in the words of a CNMI gov­ ernment official who said, “if it was going through the right process, I think it wouldn’t have been as turbulent” (LGOV-B12; 2015). This analysis also revealed something about the ingenuity of the different actors involved. President Bush had unilateral authority to designate the MTMNM, a commitment to his blue legacy, and the sup­ port of Pew, a well-funded international NGO. Through an outpouring of opposition shown in the letters and comments highlighted in this paper, and through bilateral negotiations, the CNMI government, with support from Wespac, was able to bring the White House to the table and to convince the Bush administration to make changes to the Monument proposal to be more in line with CNMI culture and interests. In this sense, the CNMI government forced the federal government to engage with alternative visions on the issue. The same can be said for the MTMNN advocates. The local CNMI government appeared set in its ef­ forts to show unilateral CNMI opposition to the Monument and through advocacy work and campaigning, Pew and local advocates from FOM were able to show the federal government that there was local support for the initiative even if the local government came out against it. Table 2 outlines key lessons that can be gleaned from this case. Lessons 1–3 are insights that are well supported in scholarship and reporting surrounding the designation of conventional MPAs. This case suggests that conventional MPA lessons about process design, partici­ pation, and transparency can also be applicable to LMPAs. Lessons 4–6 may be more relevant to LMPA processes specifically. These lessons align with the work of scholars who have highlighted unique features of LMPAs, including the heavy involvement of external actors in LMPA designation processes (Leenhardt et al., 2013), the importance of the territorial context for many LMPAs (De Santo, 2013; De Santo et al., 2011), and the tendency to overlook human dimensions in LMPAs due to their remoteness (Gruby et al., 2016). While key lessons from conven­ tional MPAs about effective consultation and participation processes can apply to LMPAs, the MTMNM case also suggests that new guidance is also needed to account for the unique features of LMPAs.

the federal government” (Arenovski, 2008). Several letters from local government officials to Bush and the CEQ explicitly asked the federal government to provide more information and become more involved (SM: Docs 4, 6, 11, 15, 23). 3.2.3. CNMI political context and federalization Stakeholder concerns about the process were embedded within a context of perceived federalization within the CNMI. For many Monu­ ment opponents, perceptions of the Monument designation process were connected to more long-standing concerns about the role that the U.S. government has played in the CNMI – a general sense that the U.S. government has overreached on many occasions and failed to meet historical commitments. In interviews, many opponents brought up the Covenant, evoking a sentiment that the Covenant includes a commit­ ment from the U.S. not to act unilaterally in the CNMI and instead to consult properly with the CNMI government on key decisions. They felt that the decision to designate the Monument through presidential proclamation and without proper consultation with the CNMI govern­ ment was a “betrayal” of the spirit of that fundamental agreement. One stakeholder said of the Monument: It was never negotiated under the Covenant. The Covenant is very clearly stated that anything that has to do with acquiring properties and so forth, has to be done through consultation. [. . . ] That doesn’t mean that you have to use the executive authority against the Covenant. The Covenant is the bible – [it] establishes the relation­ ship between the United States and the people here so that is a total betrayal of the U.S. exercising their rights under the Covenant (LGOV-A9; 2011). At the same time, interviewees highlighted the lack of political power in the Pacific Islands as a key reason why so many LMPAs had been designated there instead of other parts of the country: “the con­ centration is in the Pacific islands because we didn’t really have a lot of political clout push back” (LGOV-B2; 2015). Some stakeholders describe the federal government actions in designating the Monument around the three northern most islands of their territory using strong language such as “robbed” (IC-A3; 2011), “criminal” (LGOV-B22; 2015), “takeover” (IC-A6; 2011), “an insult” (PSA3; 2011) or “take the islands away from the people” (PS-A2; 2011). As one interviewee put it, the “take” was more than territorial, it was personal: “it was not only a taking of our property, but a rejecting of who we are, our person … It keeps coming out like this … the little brown people don’t know, so let’s manage it this way.” (LGOV-B22; 2015). Others expressed a sentiment that they believed the CNMI was capable of establishing and managing such an LMPA on their own (PS-A7; 2011). Suspicions about the designation were heightened because of other recent federal activities in CNMI. As one stakeholder said, “And at the time also there was a lot of consternation about federalization of immigration. So there was this general feeling of suspicion and resent­ ment that I remember being a factor. [. . . ] And that contributed to the resistance that people had early on” (LGOV-B47; 2015). Some expressed more conspiratorial concerns that the Federal government may be using the Monument designation as a screen to gain control for other activities such as military activity or mineral extraction (PS-A8, 2011). 4. Discussion and conclusion A vast literature on the governance of conventional MPAs (Christie and White, 2007; IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas, 2008; Pomeroy et al., 2005) as well as emerging research and guidance on LMPAs (Day, 2017; Lewis et al., 2017) emphasize the importance of public participation and transparency in designation, design, and man­ agement processes. Our findings suggests that the MTMNM designation process did not conform to these recommendations (see discussion in Table 2). Conducting the designation process in a way that did not 7

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Table 2 Key lessons to take away from the MTMNM designation process. Lessons Learned

Detailed Explanation

1. Incorporate genuine avenues for local participation, collaboration, and control in designation processes.

Many involved in the MTMNM designation process expressed concerns that not enough was done by the Federal or CNMI governments to understand and incorporate diverse views of local people from the CNMI in the designation decision. The lack of a structured process for incorporating local participation appeared to sour would-be supporters and fuel controversy surrounding the proposal. Many stakeholders commented that using the sanctuaries process through NOAA – which includes protocols for public engagement, environmental review, and management structure following implementation – would have led to better results. Even within the framework of the Antiquities Act, it would have been possible to design a better process with participation. Nothing in the Act itself requires this – but it also does not prevent it. Many perceived the designation process as rushed. Only 13 months elapsed between Pew sending the CNMI governor a letter proposing the Monument concept and the Monument being designated. In contrast, processes to designate conventional MPAs in the U.S. states of Oregon and California both took over 10 years and the designation of the most recent Marine Sanctuary in the U.S. – Greater Farallones – took over two years and three months. Many expressed concerns that the quick timeline for MTMNM designation did not give the CNMI community enough time to consider the issue and it did not allow the federal government enough time to educate the public about their proposal. While fast processes help to achieve conservation outcomes quickly, they may not be conducive to building trust and gaining stakeholder input, both of which could be crucial to the long-term success of marine conservation initiatives ( Dalton et al., 2012). Many of the key decisions about the Monument, including its location, size, and types of fishing restrictions, were finalized in private conversations among a few representatives of the CNMI government and the Bush administration not captured in the public record. Throughout the process, locals from the CNMI asked the federal government to provide more details about the LMPA proposal. Most stakeholders involved in the process said they were completely surprised by aspects of the Proclamation, including the addition of two Units. The lack of transparency fueled resentment and gave rise to perceptions among some residents that there was a hidden agenda behind the LMPA initiative. Representatives from the White House only visited the CNMI once late in the designation process and held one public workshop. Meanwhile, two external entities, Pew and Wespac, launched campaigns in support of or opposition to the Monument respectively. Their efforts appeared to affect public and government sentiments on the issue, confuse some

2.Do not rush the designation process.

3. Ensure transparent decision-making.

4. Responsible government entity should take control of public engagement process and be aware of the potential power of external actors in framing narratives of support and opposition.

Table 2 (continued ) Lessons Learned

5. Designation process should consider and adapt to the local context; special consideration needed in the case of designation in waters of overseas territories.

6. Recognize that there will be stakeholders with strongly held views regarding LMPA designation and management, even in areas with limited direct use.

Detailed Explanation local residents, and lead to concerns that external agendas were driving the process. This case highlights the importance of the responsible, implementing entity(s) taking visible control of the designation process to diminish perceptions of undue outside influence. Advocacy groups hosting informational meetings cannot replace a government-led consultation process where diverse perspectives are considered. In this case, U.S. federal officials should have conducted a more extensive formal public consultation process in partnership with the CNMI government. In the CNMI there is strong belief in the importance of the Covenant agreement with the U.S. and that the U.S. should not act unilaterally in the region. The Monument designation occurred on the heels of several federal actions that the region did not view favorably. Establishing the LMPA through a topdown, federal process using the Antiquities Act played into existing concerns about federal overreach. A more bottom-up approach to designation that included the CNMI government as a driver in the process may have been better received given the Commonwealth’s historical and political context and the strong local orientation towards conservation. Many recent LMPAs have been designated in the waters of overseas territories which often have reduced geopolitical power; process design should consider this history and incorporate bottom-up or collaborative elements so as not to reproduce power inequalities or perpetuate colonial practices. Like other LMPAs, the waters for the Monument were remote and rarely used for human activity. One study documented an average of just four trips per year to the Monument waters ( Richmond and Kotowicz, 2015). However, the relatively low levels of use did not minimize stakeholder interest or passionate involvement in the designation process. Designation of the Monument became a high-profile, contentious, and well-publicized issue in the CNMI community.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the numerous individuals from the CNMI, Guam, and beyond who donated their time to share their per­ spectives over the course of several years of research across the two studies. Study A: Funding for Study A came from the National Marine Fish­ eries Service (NMFS) Pacific Islands Fisheries Science Center (PIFSC) and NMFS Pacific Islands Regional Office. Co-authors Richmond and Kotowicz collected interviews while contractors with PIFCS; however, the views and analysis expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of NMFS. We would like to thank the staff of the CNMI Department of Lands and Natural Resources and Jack Ogumoro for providing assistance in specifically identifying individuals from the CNMI who had traveled to the Islands Unit waters. Judy Amesbury, Risa Oram, and Stewart Allen assisted with interview 8

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collection and data analysis. Human subjects research activities were approved under University of Hawaii Committee on Human Studies #18268. Study B: Robbie Greene assisted with data collection for Study B, and Katie Wilson assisted with data analysis for Study B. The Oak Founda­ tion (Grant number: ORIO-14-045), the Waitt Foundation, The Tiffany & Co. Foundation (Grant number: 11927), Lyda Hill Philanthropies, and Colorado State University provided funding for this work. The funders played no role in the study design; collection, analysis and interpretation of data; writing of the manuscript; or decision to submit the article for publication. The authors assume sole responsibility for all aspects of the research. This research has been approved by the Colorado State Uni­ versity Institutional Review Board for the protection of human subjects (protocol number: 14–55508 H).

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