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Marxism and anti-marxism
RICHARD
T. DE GEORGE
Marxism and Anti-Marxism
The 1920s in the Soviet Union were a time of debate-Marxist debate, of course, with the Mechanists and the Deborinists making up the dominant camps. The existence, extent, and nature of dialectics held center stage, with consequent disagreements on the nature of economic, historical, and social development. In 1929 Stalin condemned the Mechanist position as a right deviation, and on January 25, 1931, the Central Committee of the CPSU linked Deborinism with “left” deviationism. The position of V.V. Adoratsky, M.B. Mitin, and P.F. Judin emerged as the approved, orthodox, “middle” position. The Stalinist exercise in comparative Marxist theory had, of course, a political point. Henceforth there was an official interpreter of orthodoxy which could decide what was approved Marxist theory, and what was not. Stalin and other leaders of the CPSU have frequently exercised their prerogative of deciding what was or was not acceptable Marxist or Marxist-Leninist theory. In more recent years leaders of other Communist countries have similarly assumed the prerogative of deciding what is orthodox and what unorthodox in the writings both of their own theoreticians and of those of other countries. As a result, what may be considered orthodox in Poland may not be so considered by the leaders
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STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
of the CPSU; and what may be considered creative Marxism in Yugoslavia may be attacked as revisionist, non-Marxist, or anti-Marxist in the U.S.S.R. The resultant proliferation of Marxist theories has given rise to attempts to devise methods by which to (1) decide who is a Marxist; (2) compare the various emerging doctrines with respect to their agreements and disagreements; and (3) determine which of the various doctrines are more true, useful, consistent, etc. The purposes of such comparisons vary. One purpose might be to test the dominance of the Soviet Union’s theoretical views vis-A-vis those of other Communist countries; another might be to judge the amount of divergence allowed by a particular government; a third might be to ascertain whether philosophers of a particular country are permitted to work out difficulties within the Marxist framework independently of governmental or Party interference; a fourth might be to learn possible solutions to common problems from present-day thinkers who identify themselves with Marxism; and so on. In his paper “Open Marxism and Its Consequences,” Professor Skolimowski presents a scheme for the comparison of Marxisms, suggeststhat the scheme may be used as a means of deciding who is a Marxist, and draws certain conclusions about “open Marxism” and the New Left. Comparing the views of various Marxist thinkers on such concepts as history, dialectics, praxis, alienation, and so on, is a possible-and possibly enlightening-endeavor. Skolimowski is certainly correct in pointing out that some Marxists have been more deterministic in their interpretations of history than others. How many different interpretations are there? Little matter. In the paper we are presented with three broad classifications; others are possible, and we could extend our discriminations down as far as we like. Whether we stop with three or four or five or more depends on our purpose. And if we take the proposed model simply as a sample of what we can do, there is no ground here for objection. Similarly, whether a scheme includes interpretations of only history, dialectics, and praxis, or whether it includes indefinitely many more depends once again on one’s purpose. The scheme we have been presented may have many uses. Can it, however, be used, as the author suggests, to decide who is a Marxist? I think not. In principle, no matter how far it is developed and no matter how many categories and subdivisions are added, the scheme is incapable of this use. Consider first how the scheme was generated.
MARXISM AND ANTI-MARXISM
39
We are told, “We shall assume that every conception of Marxism... includes as its components the conception of history,...” etc. This means either that there must first be some prior decision or agreement as to who is and who is not a Marxist, and that as a result of analyzing and comparing their works we isolate a certain number of similar topics which are treated in certain ways and classifiable into a scheme; or that by some other means we know that someone cannot be a Marxist unless he deals with certain topics in certain ways as presented in the scheme. But in the first case, since we already know or decide who is a Marxist independently of the scheme,the schemeis superfluous for this purpose, and any attempt to use it to identify Marxists is circular. If we opt for the second procedure, unless and until we can justify the completeness of the scheme, it cannot be used to identify someone as a Marxist. Even then, the number of components of the schemeone must hold to be a Marxist certainly remains a moot point. Confusion arises in the paper precisely as a result of attempting to use the schemeas a means of identifying someone as a Marxist. For though we are told, on the one hand, that the “C” positions are versions of Marxism (i.e., that they are the views on history, etc., held by persons who had previously been in the group of Marxists chosen to set up the various interpretations), we are told, on the other hand, that “some left-wing versions of Marxism have nothing distinctively Marxist in their formulation of history, praxis, alienation or dialectics.” But then either someone can be a Marxist and not have anything specifically Marxist in his views, or, if he has nothing specifically Marxist in his views, he should be denied the label of “Marxist.” In the former case it becomes unclear why view “C” was used in the first place as a type of Marxist interpretation; in the latter case, since holding view “C” does not make one a Marxist, we are left wondering just what-if not the conceptual components of the scheme, no matter how far developedis necessary to make one a Marxist. There are perhaps ways out of this difficulty. One way would be to take Marx’s writings as a touchstone for determining who is a Marxist. Presumably the A, the B, and the C interpretations all have some basis in the Marxian corpus. Does the corpus allow of other interpretations? I seeno way of setting a limit to the number of possible interpretations, nor any but arbitrary ways of deciding how much overlap with Marx’s views another view must have to be called “Marxist.” It would be interesting and enlightening to break down the Marxian corpus into its smallest declarative components, and then run an analysis of his views
40
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
on a given topic. Development, changes, and contradictions could all be noted. By similar analyses the Leninist corpus or the Soviet, Maoist, or other versions of Marxism could be compared with respect to their varying interpretations on praxis, history, etc., along lines similar to those which Skolimowski suggests. A large variety of comparisons could be generated, and even a topology of Marxism developed. If one were to similarly break down the Hegelian corpus or that of the New Left or of Thomas Jefferson, other comparisons (e.g., is the New Left closer to Jefferson or to Marx?) would undoubtedly emerge which might be enlightening. But (1) in every case the basic model of comparison should be clearly identified; and (2) except for polemical or political purposes there is little point in laying down dogmatic criteria of what constitutes Marxism. Skolimowski’s use of “right” and “left” does not of course coincide with the political, historical use of the terms by the CPSU referred to earlier, and the labels can easily be changed to read simply “A,” “B,” and “C” (adding more letters if more interpretations are added). But his use of the terms “right,” “moderate,” and “left” tends to give the scheme an interpretation, and in the paper leads to conclusions which I do not find justified. Thus we are told that some “left” (or C) Marxists are not Marxists at all, but “anti-Marxists.” Yet why a radical “left” position precludes one’s being a Marxist, while a radical “right” position does not, is never explained. Is the B (or possibly the A?) position to be the touchstone of Marxism, and, if so, why? Was Marx an “A” Marxist, or a “B” Marxist, or neither? To the extent that Marx was a “C” Marxist, was he a Marxist at all? Surely those self-proclaimed Marxists who defend the “C” positions can point to Marxian texts to support their stand. Furthermore, underlying Skolimowski’s interpretation seems to be a static view of Marxism which a priori precludes its being applied to an analysis of social problems in the second half of the twentieth century. To characterize the New Left from this point of view consequently precludes an objective examination of the relation between the New Left and the Marxism of Marx. The new Marxism which we find developing in the countries of Eastern Europe is varied and in some instances remarkably open in its criticism of Stalin, Lenin, Engels, and even Marx. To an outside observer it is indeed sometimes difficult to understand in what sensethe writings of some self-proclaimed Marxists are Marxist, for it seemsthey could have been written by non-Marxists just as well. If this is true of all the writings of a particular person, we may well wonder in what
MARXISM
AND
ANTI-MARXISM
41
sensehe is a Marxist, and whether his avowal to be one is to be taken as a political expedient, a caseof self-deception, a statement of a former commitment, etc. Philosophers do not usually worry terribly much whether philosopher X, who claims he is an Aristotelian or a Thomist or a Hegelian or a positivist or a phenomenologist, really is one. That the caseis different with Marxists is because political and other similar considerations are at stake. Skolimowski’s conclusion that “The more recent suppression of Soviet writers and intellectuals is a further sign that the left will have to become anti-Marxist in order to develop a social ideology adequate for our times” seemsto me to be a political or ideological conclusion based on the quite arbitrary and counterintuitive way he has chosen to define “anti-Marxist.” He is, of course, free to define his terms as he wishes; but the arbitrariness of his definition necessarily infects his conclusion, and to that extent renders it less enlightening than polemical. Living, thinking Marxists need not be anti-Marxists (in the more usual senseof being opposed to or of explicitly denying the validity of Marx’s methods of analysis, his procedure, or certain of his doctrines). The “creative” Marxists of Yugoslavia are proof of this. To be sure, they go beyond what Marx said, develop his insights, apply his methods to contemporary problems, enter areas he left untouched. But this is what it means for a philosophy to be alive. Hence, to my mind, it is only because many East European thinkers are not anti-Marxists that a comparative study of Marxisms is interesting, timely, and worth pursuing.
T. DE GEORGE
Marxism and Anti-Marxism
The 1920s in the Soviet Union were a time of debate-Marxist debate, of course, with the Mechanists and the Deborinists making up the dominant camps. The existence, extent, and nature of dialectics held center stage, with consequent disagreements on the nature of economic, historical, and social development. In 1929 Stalin condemned the Mechanist position as a right deviation, and on January 25, 1931, the Central Committee of the CPSU linked Deborinism with “left” deviationism. The position of V.V. Adoratsky, M.B. Mitin, and P.F. Judin emerged as the approved, orthodox, “middle” position. The Stalinist exercise in comparative Marxist theory had, of course, a political point. Henceforth there was an official interpreter of orthodoxy which could decide what was approved Marxist theory, and what was not. Stalin and other leaders of the CPSU have frequently exercised their prerogative of deciding what was or was not acceptable Marxist or Marxist-Leninist theory. In more recent years leaders of other Communist countries have similarly assumed the prerogative of deciding what is orthodox and what unorthodox in the writings both of their own theoreticians and of those of other countries. As a result, what may be considered orthodox in Poland may not be so considered by the leaders
38
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM
of the CPSU; and what may be considered creative Marxism in Yugoslavia may be attacked as revisionist, non-Marxist, or anti-Marxist in the U.S.S.R. The resultant proliferation of Marxist theories has given rise to attempts to devise methods by which to (1) decide who is a Marxist; (2) compare the various emerging doctrines with respect to their agreements and disagreements; and (3) determine which of the various doctrines are more true, useful, consistent, etc. The purposes of such comparisons vary. One purpose might be to test the dominance of the Soviet Union’s theoretical views vis-A-vis those of other Communist countries; another might be to judge the amount of divergence allowed by a particular government; a third might be to ascertain whether philosophers of a particular country are permitted to work out difficulties within the Marxist framework independently of governmental or Party interference; a fourth might be to learn possible solutions to common problems from present-day thinkers who identify themselves with Marxism; and so on. In his paper “Open Marxism and Its Consequences,” Professor Skolimowski presents a scheme for the comparison of Marxisms, suggeststhat the scheme may be used as a means of deciding who is a Marxist, and draws certain conclusions about “open Marxism” and the New Left. Comparing the views of various Marxist thinkers on such concepts as history, dialectics, praxis, alienation, and so on, is a possible-and possibly enlightening-endeavor. Skolimowski is certainly correct in pointing out that some Marxists have been more deterministic in their interpretations of history than others. How many different interpretations are there? Little matter. In the paper we are presented with three broad classifications; others are possible, and we could extend our discriminations down as far as we like. Whether we stop with three or four or five or more depends on our purpose. And if we take the proposed model simply as a sample of what we can do, there is no ground here for objection. Similarly, whether a scheme includes interpretations of only history, dialectics, and praxis, or whether it includes indefinitely many more depends once again on one’s purpose. The scheme we have been presented may have many uses. Can it, however, be used, as the author suggests, to decide who is a Marxist? I think not. In principle, no matter how far it is developed and no matter how many categories and subdivisions are added, the scheme is incapable of this use. Consider first how the scheme was generated.
MARXISM AND ANTI-MARXISM
39
We are told, “We shall assume that every conception of Marxism... includes as its components the conception of history,...” etc. This means either that there must first be some prior decision or agreement as to who is and who is not a Marxist, and that as a result of analyzing and comparing their works we isolate a certain number of similar topics which are treated in certain ways and classifiable into a scheme; or that by some other means we know that someone cannot be a Marxist unless he deals with certain topics in certain ways as presented in the scheme. But in the first case, since we already know or decide who is a Marxist independently of the scheme,the schemeis superfluous for this purpose, and any attempt to use it to identify Marxists is circular. If we opt for the second procedure, unless and until we can justify the completeness of the scheme, it cannot be used to identify someone as a Marxist. Even then, the number of components of the schemeone must hold to be a Marxist certainly remains a moot point. Confusion arises in the paper precisely as a result of attempting to use the schemeas a means of identifying someone as a Marxist. For though we are told, on the one hand, that the “C” positions are versions of Marxism (i.e., that they are the views on history, etc., held by persons who had previously been in the group of Marxists chosen to set up the various interpretations), we are told, on the other hand, that “some left-wing versions of Marxism have nothing distinctively Marxist in their formulation of history, praxis, alienation or dialectics.” But then either someone can be a Marxist and not have anything specifically Marxist in his views, or, if he has nothing specifically Marxist in his views, he should be denied the label of “Marxist.” In the former case it becomes unclear why view “C” was used in the first place as a type of Marxist interpretation; in the latter case, since holding view “C” does not make one a Marxist, we are left wondering just what-if not the conceptual components of the scheme, no matter how far developedis necessary to make one a Marxist. There are perhaps ways out of this difficulty. One way would be to take Marx’s writings as a touchstone for determining who is a Marxist. Presumably the A, the B, and the C interpretations all have some basis in the Marxian corpus. Does the corpus allow of other interpretations? I seeno way of setting a limit to the number of possible interpretations, nor any but arbitrary ways of deciding how much overlap with Marx’s views another view must have to be called “Marxist.” It would be interesting and enlightening to break down the Marxian corpus into its smallest declarative components, and then run an analysis of his views
40
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE
COMMUNISM
on a given topic. Development, changes, and contradictions could all be noted. By similar analyses the Leninist corpus or the Soviet, Maoist, or other versions of Marxism could be compared with respect to their varying interpretations on praxis, history, etc., along lines similar to those which Skolimowski suggests. A large variety of comparisons could be generated, and even a topology of Marxism developed. If one were to similarly break down the Hegelian corpus or that of the New Left or of Thomas Jefferson, other comparisons (e.g., is the New Left closer to Jefferson or to Marx?) would undoubtedly emerge which might be enlightening. But (1) in every case the basic model of comparison should be clearly identified; and (2) except for polemical or political purposes there is little point in laying down dogmatic criteria of what constitutes Marxism. Skolimowski’s use of “right” and “left” does not of course coincide with the political, historical use of the terms by the CPSU referred to earlier, and the labels can easily be changed to read simply “A,” “B,” and “C” (adding more letters if more interpretations are added). But his use of the terms “right,” “moderate,” and “left” tends to give the scheme an interpretation, and in the paper leads to conclusions which I do not find justified. Thus we are told that some “left” (or C) Marxists are not Marxists at all, but “anti-Marxists.” Yet why a radical “left” position precludes one’s being a Marxist, while a radical “right” position does not, is never explained. Is the B (or possibly the A?) position to be the touchstone of Marxism, and, if so, why? Was Marx an “A” Marxist, or a “B” Marxist, or neither? To the extent that Marx was a “C” Marxist, was he a Marxist at all? Surely those self-proclaimed Marxists who defend the “C” positions can point to Marxian texts to support their stand. Furthermore, underlying Skolimowski’s interpretation seems to be a static view of Marxism which a priori precludes its being applied to an analysis of social problems in the second half of the twentieth century. To characterize the New Left from this point of view consequently precludes an objective examination of the relation between the New Left and the Marxism of Marx. The new Marxism which we find developing in the countries of Eastern Europe is varied and in some instances remarkably open in its criticism of Stalin, Lenin, Engels, and even Marx. To an outside observer it is indeed sometimes difficult to understand in what sensethe writings of some self-proclaimed Marxists are Marxist, for it seemsthey could have been written by non-Marxists just as well. If this is true of all the writings of a particular person, we may well wonder in what
MARXISM
AND
ANTI-MARXISM
41
sensehe is a Marxist, and whether his avowal to be one is to be taken as a political expedient, a caseof self-deception, a statement of a former commitment, etc. Philosophers do not usually worry terribly much whether philosopher X, who claims he is an Aristotelian or a Thomist or a Hegelian or a positivist or a phenomenologist, really is one. That the caseis different with Marxists is because political and other similar considerations are at stake. Skolimowski’s conclusion that “The more recent suppression of Soviet writers and intellectuals is a further sign that the left will have to become anti-Marxist in order to develop a social ideology adequate for our times” seemsto me to be a political or ideological conclusion based on the quite arbitrary and counterintuitive way he has chosen to define “anti-Marxist.” He is, of course, free to define his terms as he wishes; but the arbitrariness of his definition necessarily infects his conclusion, and to that extent renders it less enlightening than polemical. Living, thinking Marxists need not be anti-Marxists (in the more usual senseof being opposed to or of explicitly denying the validity of Marx’s methods of analysis, his procedure, or certain of his doctrines). The “creative” Marxists of Yugoslavia are proof of this. To be sure, they go beyond what Marx said, develop his insights, apply his methods to contemporary problems, enter areas he left untouched. But this is what it means for a philosophy to be alive. Hence, to my mind, it is only because many East European thinkers are not anti-Marxists that a comparative study of Marxisms is interesting, timely, and worth pursuing.