Misunderstanding: The standard case

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Journal of Pragmatics 31 (1999) 763-785

Misunderstanding: The standard case Edda Weigand Universittit Miinster, Fachbereich H, Sprachwissenschaft, Bispinghof 2B, D-48143 Miinster, Germany

Abstract Starting from an overview of the multiple cases of misunderstanding dealt with in the literature, the question arises whether there is a type of misunderstanding which can be called the standard case. Referring to a model of dialogic action games the standard case can be defined by some constitutive features. On the basis of an explanation of understanding, the standard case of misunderstanding is investigated in more detail by distinguishing two subtypes: misunderstanding the means and misunderstanding the purposes. From such an analysis of the standard case important consequences can be drawn for the general principles of language use. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

I. The problem Our problem in analysing misunderstanding refers to the question of how a model which tries to explain the functioning of language use can account for misunderstanding. The state of the art in the field of misunderstanding is characterized by a variety of different cases. For our purposes, however, we have to define misunderstanding in a standard form. Analysing authentic examples will give us some insights on how misunderstanding works. These insights will modify our model in some decisive ways.

2. Varieties of misunderstanding First of all, let us try to describe how misunderstanding is dealt with in the literature. In the last decade misunderstanding has become a favourite topic in sociolinguistic and discourse analyses. It is addressed not only under the term 'misunderstanding' but also under such terms as 'miscommunication', 'misfit' or 'pragmatic failure'. These terms are applied to a variety of different cases and perspectives within varying methodological frameworks. Four main types of cases can be distinguished.

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2.1. The cross-cultural case

Let us begin with the broad area of cross-cultural communication. Since communication is a culture dependent activity, we can easily find various cases of misunderstanding because differences in language and culture quite naturally lead to communication difficulties (cf. e.g. Pride, 1985; Tylor and Davies, 1990; Meyer-Kalkus, 1990; Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz, 1982; Blum-Kulka and Olshtain, 1986; Thomas, 1983). As to this type of misunderstanding which arises in inter-ethnic communication, Gumperz points out that "socio-cultural conventions affect all levels of speech production and interpretation" and that "we must abandon the existing views of communication which draw a basic distinction between cultural or social knowledge on the one hand and linguistic signalling processes on the other" (1982a: 186). Cross-cultural communication problems can be observed not only between speakers of different languages or in conversations between native and non-native speakers. Even within the same language we find different cultural frames belonging to different varieties, as e.g. Chick (1989) demonstrated for the use of English in South Africa. Varieties may be considered not only on a horizontal level. We may also distinguish varieties vertically, e.g. in conversations between experts and laymen, who show different knowledge frames or different cultural levels (cf. Ringle and Bruce, 1982; West, 1984). Communicative problems may also result from different cultural roles within one community. From this perspective male-female communication can result in miscommunication due to cultural differences (cf. e.g. Maltz and Borker, 1982). You just don't understand and That's not what 1 meant, two books by Tannen (1991, 1992), describe the difficult understanding problems in this field. However, when reserving to different cultural frames (either in cross-ethnic or in cross-gender communication), we are not talking about the standard form of language use. As Schegloff (1987: 202f.) has pointed out, our languages are built for effortless understanding. Therefore, we have to presume that the standard case of language use presupposes co-membership, and deals with communication between members of the same community and the same cultural world. 2.2. Deviant or side aspects

Without having clarified the phenomenon 'misunderstanding' as a whole, some authors turn to specific features which cannot always be considered constitutive of misunderstanding. Rather, they are deviant aspects in the cases of planned and unresolved misunderstanding, or side aspects in the case of preventing misunderstanding. In general, misunderstanding occurs without having been intended by the speaker. Nevertheless, someone who knows how misunderstanding works may deliberately select utterances which can be believed to lead to misunderstanding (cf. Souza Filho, 1985: 424f.). In this case however, he is deceiving his interlocutor by planning misunderstanding and wanting to profit from it. Although we have to include deceiving speech acts within the range of everyday communication, the feature of being planned cannot be considered part of the standard case of misunderstanding.

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Planned misunderstanding is necessarily deviant in another respect, namely that it must not be detected by the interlocutor. This feature of remaining unresolved is discussed in the literature as another feature of misunderstanding mainly in connection with indirect speech acts (cf. e.g. Blum-Kulka and Weizman, 1988; Tannen, 1992: 6ff.), Indirect speech acts, however, in my opinion cannot be analysed as cases of inherent misunderstanding based on ambiguity of the directly and the indirectly expressed action function. Indirect speech acts are not at all ambiguous, they are deliberately open to more than one understanding simultaneously. For example, the response in (1) A: Do you think Doris can change schools in mid-term? B: In Germany, schools are better. can be considered as a statement and at the same time as indirectly expressing a directive function, viz. to change schools and go to Germany. This might have been intentional; but it is essential to indirectness that no choice has been made. Undirectness allows different possibilities to remain open (cf. Weigand, 1989: 234ff.). This leaves the case of another side aspect of misunderstanding, the case of preventing misunderstanding. In contrast to the speaker who plans misunderstanding there is the cautious and honest speaker who tries to prevent misunderstanding, since he considers it to be a disturbing phenomenon. How can he anticipate and exclude misunderstanding thus securing understanding in advance? Many studies deal with difficulties of understanding especially in institutional communication (e.g. Selting, 1987) and with problems that lead to clarification requests or to other attempts at establishing understanding (e.g. Clark and Schaefer, 1989: 265; Meng and Nitsche, 1989). Dascal (1985a: 452f.) characterizes processes of securing understanding as 'processes of preventing misunderstanding'. He introduces a rule, 'Check for misunderstanding', which guides the hearer especially in his task of understanding implicatures. Again, we are not on the right track if we want to find what might be called the standard case of misunderstanding. Difficulties of understanding, non-understanding and misunderstanding have to be kept separate. 2.3. C o m m u n i c a t i o n as m i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n

Another group of studies confronts us with the central methodological question of the relation between understanding and misunderstanding, between communication and miscommunication. Usually, we assume that we intend to come to an understanding in communication and, therefore, regard cases of misunderstanding or miscommunication as deviant. But there is the opposite view which considers language use as inherently problematic, and miscommunication not as a failure but as part and parcel of the act of communication. In this sense, Coupland et al. (1991) have tried to deconstruct "conventional assumptions about communicative adequacy" by avoiding "the risk of idealizing communication", which leads to a relativist perspective (1991 : 7-11 ). Taylor (1992) suggests "anti-dogmatic strategies" (253) with

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which the question "whether communicators ordinarily understand each other" (1992: 20) should be addressed. Sperber and Wilson's inference model (1986) appears to be based on similar premises. For them "the assumption of mutual knowledge may always be mistaken" (1986: 19) because "the context actually used by the hearer" cannot be considered "identical to the one envisaged by the speaker". Similarly Tannen (1991, 1992) talks about inherent difficulties in understanding due to the fact that it is different persons who communicate. For Ringle and Bruce "conversation failure, in fact, appears to be the rule rather than the exception" (1982: 204). The question what can be called communicative success, and what has to be called miscommunication depends heavily on the model used for the description of language use. Types of miscommunication are derived by Reilly (1987) from a form of information-processing analysis. Other varieties of communicative non-success are distinguished by Grimshaw (1989: 301ff.) on the basis of Labov and Fanshel's sociological model (1977). Also Dua (1990) following Goffman (1981), tries to set up a systematic framework in terms of which, once again, differing types of miscommunication can be distinguished. Airenti et al. (1993) appear to restrict the notion of successful communication to responses of acceptance and agreement only. The central question whether pragmatic failures and breakdowns are a pervasive phenomenon present in every act of communication cannot be clarified by putting assumption against assumption. A methodological discussion is needed that clarifies the object and interest of our approach. If the object is language performance, and if we are interested in the documentation of authentic conversations, it will not come as a surprise that well-formed structures and mis-structures cannot be clearly separated. If our interest goes beyond the documentation of performance and aims at explaining the functioning of language use, we have to look for a central analytic key. This key we might find in the notion of 'coming to an understanding'. Assuming a general superordinate purpose of coming to an understanding does not imply, as we shall see, that we have to exclude cases of misunderstanding totally. However, if we abandon the central term of 'understanding', we will be caught by methodological fallacy and confusion. Misunderstanding and miscommunication then will not only resist a simple definition, as Coupland et al. (1991: 16) assume, but will resist any analytic treatment. 2.4. Misunderstanding in a harmonious model

The counterposition to such a view of communication as miscommunication can be seen in the view that communication is designed to work, i.e. to bring about understanding. Any difference in the communicative worlds of the interlocutors may lead to divergent understandings and increase the risk of misunderstanding. Therefore, communication will function all the easier, the less differences there are. According to Schegloff (1987: 202f.), communication is supposed to bring about effortless understanding. Therefore, to begin with, the functioning of language use is analyzed in a harmonious model, where the interlocutors belong to the same community.

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Schegloff distinguishes two types of trouble that occur in communication: externally and internally caused trouble. The first type is caused by social, cultural, and linguistic differentiation, the second occurs even within a harmonious model. But what sort of trouble will arise even when there are no external differences? Schegloff distinguishes two types: problematic reference and problematic sequential implicativeness. Thus it may be unclear whether an utterance has' to be taken seriously or nonseriously or the action function might not be expressed unequivocally. At this point we are very close to what might be called the standard case of misunderstanding, i.e. misunderstanding in the framework of a harmonious functioning model not disturbed by extemal factors. The model of understanding used by Zaefferer (1977) is, in contrast to Schegloff's, a very simple and restricted, idealized one, in which interlocutors share the same grammar. In such a model, ideal understanding is always presupposed, and misunderstanding can only occur by way of the interlocutors' different assessments of contexts. Unfortunately, Zaefferer doesn't elaborate on the relationship between the Montague type of grammar favoured by him (1977: 335) and a 'theory of context'. Also Dascal's approach, which refers mainly to the notion of understanding, might be included in this group. In Dascal and Berenstein (1987) two modes of understanding are distinguished, comprehending and grasping. To either of them, different types of misunderstandings correspond. Comprehending refers to rules, grasping to the determining of what the rules are. In Dascal and Berenstein's example of the speech of a black leader taken from Gumperz (1982a), the rules change from standard English to black English. At this point the interlocutors would have to determine what the rules are. In my opinion, however, there is nothing to be determined by the interlocutors. They simply have to recognize that the variety has changed (see 5.1.3 below). In a more general way, Dascal (1985a) distinguishes types of misunderstanding starting with a model of understanding which I will discuss below (cf. section 4). One might distinguish two other types of communication problems which I will only mention briefly because in my opinion they are not related directly to our phenomenon of misunderstanding. First, according to Dascal (1977, 1985a: 441) misunderstanding plays a key role in the framework of Grice's model (1975). However, I think that nearly all Gricean examples can be reduced to the same type: understanding these utterances on the level of the literal meaning is communicatively not satisfactory. There remain difficulties, which can be overcome by conversational implicatures. There is no central point of misunderstanding. At most, the difficulties could be considered as sources of potential misunderstanding, which however is not elaborated in detail. Second, there is a well-established field in the literature dealing with errors in communication. Insofar as the concept of error is related to the speaker producing the utterance, especially with the phenomenon of slips of the tongue (cf. Bierwisch, 1970; Fromkin, 1973), it is not of interest to the phenomenon of misunderstanding as studied by us. Even so-called pragmatic errors of the speaker, understood as errors in applying the Gricean maxims, are discussed (Kreuz and Roberts, 1993). Recently,

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however, errors of the hearer, e.g. slips of the ear (Fromkin, 1980; Ferber, 1991), have been analysed as well and these might be considered as some sort of misunderstanding. There are, however, conceptual differences between errors and misunderstandings. In general, the concept of error does not reflect the essential distinction between the speaker and the hearer, whereas misunderstanding is exclusively related to the hearer. Errors, in the last analysis, occur on the basis of casualness; for misunderstanding, however, we might suppose some sort of pattern. Additionally, errors might be noticed by the speaker or hearer, whereas misunderstandings have to be pointed out to the hearer. Therefore, I do not use the term 'error' for cases of misunderstanding, since we are invested in finding types, patterns, or principles of misunderstanding.

3. Defining misunderstanding: The standard case As we have seen, the concept of misunderstanding is discussed in the literature in a variety of cases and with a multqglicity of methods. There is no clear-cut general phenomenon; instead we find either very specific, or marginal and deviant, cases on the one hand, and on the other there are general principles like 'differences lead to trouble' or 'communication is inherently miscommunication'. In order to understand a phenomenon, we should not start with marginal, somehow unsatisfactory examples. But there are attempts to deal with misunderstanding in a more systematic way relating it to the key notion of understanding, as in Schegloff (1987) and Dascal (1985a). This is where we should start trying to grasp the phenomenon of misunderstanding in a generalizable standard form. Defining misunderstanding is not possible without a clear concept of understanding in language use. Such a concept depends on our model of language use. In contrast to other models which focus on single aspects, e.g. on information processing (Reilly, 1987: 3), or which are based on metaphorical expressions such as that of language as a 'picture of the world' or a 'mirror of the mind' (Dascal, 1983: 52), we should try to develop a natural and comprehensive model. In my opinion the use of language has to be considered as a complex human ability with which we may clarify and regulate our mutual communicative, i.e. dialogic purposes. Humans in general are guided by purposes: material, emotional, cognitive and communicative ones. Pursuing communicative purposes with communicative means constitutes communicative action. The general purpose of all our communicative actions, the purpose of coming to an understanding in dialogic action games, is determined by the necessity of living and working together. At the centre of these dialogic action games there are human beings using all their abilities for specific communicative purposes. It is strange to think that we should use only our ability to speak. In the same way, we naturally employ other abilities, above all that to see and that to think. All these abilities provide us with the communicative means that we have at our disposal for achieving our communicative purposes. These communicative means are used conventionally and rationally; otherwise it would be impossible to secure intersubjective understanding. Even indirect ways of expressing our purposes are conventional tech-

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niques, even if they sometimes only lead to suggestions and presumptions about what is meant. Dialogic action games are always interactive action games, which, on an interactive level, serve the general purpose of coming to an understanding. In contrast, understanding is not an interactive social, but a cognitive notion which is the inverse uttering. Now we have arrived at the crucial point: if we want to stick' to a harmonious model, does understanding always have to be fully presupposed? Reflecting on cases of misunderstanding has modified my view of dialogic action games. Referring to a harmonious model cannot mean that the side of the speaker and the hearer have to be considered as being totally equal, that complete understanding always has to be presupposed. Such a view is simply inadequate; in every action game different worlds meet, simply because speaker and hearer are different persons. As long as we consider linguistic means only, we might not be troubled by this assumption: the conventions of standard language use are valid for both interlocutors on the basis of their communicative competence. But as soon as we consider communication as a set of action games with human beings at the centre, linguistic means are always combined with perceptual and cognitive means. Thus we cannot escape the view of different worlds coming together in an action game. In this respect I agree with Sperber and Wilson as well as Tannen (see 2.3 above), but my view of different worlds does not necessarily lead to a relativist position, where understanding becomes misunderstanding and vice versa. Nevertheless, I want to maintain that in language use we can come to an understanding. Thus it is manifest that the key notion is not understanding, but coming to an understanding on an interactive level. Our model of coming to an understanding in dialogic action games, therefore, has to accept or tolerate to a certain degree cases of misunderstanding which are somehow inherent in the systematics of language use. They are distinguished from those cases of misunderstanding which are caused by errors or apparent cross-cultural differences. Our central question refers to the 'standard case' of misunderstanding inherent in the conditions of action games on the level of communicative competence. From the very beginning, our communicative competence accounts for some points where misunderstanding may come in. These points have to be identified. They constitute subtypes of the standard case of misunderstanding which should be described even in a model of well-formed dialogue structures. Therefore, let us try to define some constitutive features of what might be called the standard case of misunderstanding: • Misunderstanding is a form of understanding which is partially or totally deviant from what the speaker intended to communicate. • As a form of understanding, it refers to the reverse side of meaning or to the reverse side of the utterance, and represents a cognitive phenomenon belonging to the interlocutor. • The interlocutor who misunderstands is not aware of it. Remember Goethe in Die Wahlverwandtschaften: "Niemand wiirde viel in Gesellschaften sprechen, wenn er sich bewuBt w/ire, wie oft er die anderen miBversteht".

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Misunderstanding cannot be considered as a cognitive act because the hearer is not aware of it; instead, it represents an ability or inability of the hearer or, as Baker and Hacker (1980: 617) would prefer to say, it "is akin to an ability". Misunderstanding will normally be corrected in the course of the ongoing dialogic action game. We may be confident that we will arrive at an understanding in the dialogic action game as a whole even if an utterance has been misunderstood. Meaning and understanding or misunderstanding an utterance is not an autonomous unit by itself but a part of the dialogic interaction. It is because of the general Dialogic Principle that language use can tolerate cases of misunderstanding. These five points, in my opinion, define misunderstanding in its standard form. In contrast to misunderstanding there is the phenomenon of non-understanding which differs in two decisive points: Non-understanding cannot be regarded as a form of understanding; it is not understanding or refers to difficulties in understanding. Only formally (in a way that does not take us anywhere) can the negation of understanding be considered an extreme variant of understanding. • Someone who is subject to non-understanding, i.e. who does not understand or has difficulties in understanding, is aware of it, as in the following example: (2) A: John comes back tomorrow. B: What did you say? I don't understand, the television is too loud. •

We may distinguish two cases of non-understanding: the first, when you know that you are not understanding and you want to be enlightened; the second, when you know that you are not understanding and you want to conceal it. In both cases, a non-understanding of which you are aware is something different from misunderstanding. Therefore, we will exclude it from our considerations here. In contrast to misunderstanding which is a cognitive ability of the hearer, the term miscommunication refers to an interactive phenomenon of both the speaker and the hearer. Thus it belongs to the action level of coming to an understanding. The term 'miscommunication' can be useful in cases where misunderstanding is not corrected. Communication continues without the interlocutors being aware of the fact that they are no longer addressing each other, the hearer without knowing that he has misunderstood, the speaker not identifying the misunderstanding clearly. In contrast to misunderstanding, miscommunication cannot serve the purpose of coming to an understanding. Having recognized 'coming to an understanding' as the central feature constituting dialogic action games, we may now distinguish three different types of action games. In the first type, the interlocutors understand the meaning of the utterances of each other on the basis of their communicative competence. In this case, we may presume quasi-identity of the worlds of the speaker and the hearer. The model of dialogue grammar as has been developed so far is restricted to this case of a totally harmonious model of well-formed structures in which understanding is presupposed

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and harmony already pre-established (cf. Hundsnurscher, 1980; Weigand, 1989; Adamzik, 1995). The second type is misunderstanding. Here we have to distinguish two sub-types, one based on errors and aspects of performance, the other caused by the conventions and principles of communicative competence themselves. As competent interlocutors we have to be able to cope with general performance conditions of action games. Our standard case, whose principles we intend to make explicit, comprises at the level of communicative competence - cases of both sub-types. Even in a harmonious model with interlocutors of the same community we cannot always assume that understanding is processed automatically. The communicative world of our action games is so complex that understanding is not fully pre-determined and secured. Therefore - as we will see below - misunderstanding is tolerated in a harmonious model of communicative competence, if the notions of harmony and convention are modified. Such a model relies on the probability that understanding will be worked out in dialogue. The third type is that of non-understanding. Even non-understanding is allowed in dialogic action games, as far as it is signalled by the interlocutor, and clarified dialogically. In contrast to misunderstanding, where the identification and clarification in general has to be done by the speaker, the hearer himself has to signal his problems and thus initiate the process of clarification. By considering not only the first type of presupposed understanding but all three types of coming to an understanding, we arrive at an enlarged model of our dialogic action games which is no longer based on total harmony only but recognizes harmony as a concept which has to be reached at least in part by dialogue: Dialogic action games coming to an understanding

by way of understanding only

misunderstanding

non-understanding

included

included

the standard case

harmony pre-established

harmony dialogically achieved Fig. 1. Dialogic action games.

By the fact that misunderstanding and non-understanding may be cleared up and still lead to a coming to an understanding, these cases are distinguished from cases of miscommunication; miscommunication, in my opinion, is characterized as communication not achieving its purpose of coming to an understanding. Having thus clarified the interrelations between understanding, misunderstanding and non-understanding in a model of dialogic action games, we will now concentrate on the standard case of misunderstanding in dialogic sequences. First of all, we will try to understand in more detail what is going on in understanding. What happens in

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misunderstanding will then be analysed following the lines established in the analysis of understanding.

4. Analysing understanding In an action-theoretic model, understanding an utterance means to understand what the utterance is used for, i.e. to understand its communicative purpose and the state of affairs it is related to. As Dascal and Berenstein (1987: 140) have pointed out, understanding is always pragmatic understanding. What is going on in action games cannot be divided into language and communication. Such a traditional methodological view still sticks to an abstract notion of language as a sign system which is merely embedded in a communicative situation. Rather, when considering language use in action games - which is a quite different object of study - we refer to language as a natural phenomenon, i.e. as an ability of human beings which works together with other abilities like the perceptual and cognitive ones. In action games, we use all our abilities as communicative means in order to come to an understanding about our respective purposes. Even in a pragmatic model, language use can be considered as a system of correlating meaning and expression, but now in the wider sense of communicative purposes related to states of affairs and communicative means. An element may be a means only if it is used for some purpose, and a purpose needs means to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, we have to give priority to the functional side, i.e. to the purposes and the related states of affairs, because they determine what may be considered a means. Therefore, let us begin with asking in more detail what structure we can assign to the functional side of any speech act. We started with the general purpose of communication, i.e. with the purpose of coming to an understanding. This interactive purpose, based on actions and reactions, requires us to overcome Searle's monologic speech act taxonomy (1975). Specific dialogic purposes have to be derived that define all types of speech acts which - according to our general Dialogic Principle - are all dialogically oriented speech acts, i.e. either initiative or reactive ones. In the final analysis, all specific dialogic purposes are based on pragmatic claims to truth and volition (Weigand, 1989, 1991). For instance, a pragmatic claim to truth defines representative speech acts and a pragmatic claim to volition directive speech acts. The corresponding reactive speech acts of ACCEPTING and CONSENT are speech acts that fulfil the claims to truth and volition respectively. These pragmatic claims to truth and volition are related to the mental states of belief and desire of human beings. Thus we have reached a cognitively based dialogic taxonomy of speech acts. Communicative purposes refer to specific states of affairs which are dependent on them, as is represented in the formula F(p). States of affairs or the propositional meaning of speech acts consist of the two propositional functions of reference and predication which again can be traced back to a cognitive base. It is the cognitive and physical abilities of human beings that determine how the world is perceived and predicated, or referred to, in language use. Thus we find underlying action func-

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tion and propositional function, i.e. underlying social and representational concepts, a cognitive base given by mental states and abilities of human beings (cf. Weigand, 1996). Cognition plays a role in language action not only as a cognitive base of the functional side, it is included in the means, too. That is, in communicating we rely on certain assumptions and knowledge, and we use cognitive abilities in inferencing processes in order to arrive at specific meanings which are not explicitly expressed, i.e. we use our knowledge of the world and our inferencing ability as a means for our purposes. Therefore, we assume a model of a speech act like the following: communicative purpose action function

(state of affairs) (propositional function)

pragm, claims to truth and volition

referential

mental states of belief and desire

~-----~ communicativemeans (linguistic, perceptual, cognitive)

predicative

cognitive and physical abilities

~ cognitive J base

Fig. 2. A speech act. We have defined understanding as related to the inverse of utterance meaning. A pre-condition is that we 'understand' the means, i.e. that we are able to identify the means. Understanding the purposes and identifying the means are separable only heuristically. Identifying the means requires us to know what purposes they are used for. Therefore, in my view, analysing misunderstanding has to refer to the whole correlation of means and purposes. In contrast, Dascal (1985a), in describing 'the relevance of misunderstanding' focuses on the meaning side using an onion-like model of what he calls the significance of an utterance. Following Fillmore (1976), he distinguishes four layers of significance which are indicated by four questions: (I) (II) (III) (IV)

What did he say? What was he talking about? Why did he bother to say it? Why did he say it in the way he said it?

These four layers of significance serve "as a guide for identifying various forms of misunderstanding" (Dascal, 1985a: 443). In part, these layers can be correlated with our types of meaning. Layer III, I think, refers to the level of action function; layer I and II to the levels of predicative and referential function respectively. With layer IV rhetorical-psychological aspects are included which in my opinion either belong to subtle distinctions of the functional structure F(p) or go beyond a linguistic theory of language use (cf. Weigand, 1994: 464f.).

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Our model is different insofar as we do not only list types of meaning but also indicate how they interact, i.e. according to the structure indicated in Fig. 2. The main component of the utterance, the communicative purpose, is not satisfactorily expressed by layer III. Moreover, analysing understanding or misunderstanding cannot be reduced to the functional side only.

5. Analysing misunderstanding Using the model of a speech act as represented in Fig. 2 as the basis of our concept of understanding, let us now see what we may derive from it for the issue of analysing misunderstanding. We may assume that there are some subtypes of our standard case of misunderstanding which result from problems in identifying the means, and other subtypes which result from problems in understanding what is meant. We begin by analysing examples in which misunderstanding arises on the level of means. Here we may distinguish different cases according to the different types of communicative means. We nearly always use authentic examples of our own everyday language use which are well-embedded in the dialogic process and clearly manifest the main points where misunderstanding comes in. The background of these authentic examples, however, is sometimes difficult to explain and this hints at the almost infinitely faceted world of action games. 5.1. Misunderstanding the means 5.1.1. Linguistic means

(3) A: Harry is a competent chess-player. B: You are a competent chess-player? A: No, I said Harry is a competent chess-player. In this simple example misunderstanding arises because B is unable to identify the phonological sequence or the linguistic means of the utterance by A. The reason is that our dialogue is part of a multi-person dialogue, several interlocutors speaking at the same time. In another situation, there might be other reasons as well, for instance, dialect differences which make identifying the means more difficult (cf. Celce-Murcia, 1980: 204). In contrast to our example (2), a case of non-understanding, the interlocutor B in example (3) who is subject to misunderstanding is not aware of it and is corrected by the other interlocutor. Contrastive stress is clearly used as a dialogical expression of correction (cf. Carlson, 1984). B's question, realized by intonation only, might not merely be a sign of surprise as in our authentic example. It can also be the type of question which is used when the speaker wants confirmation. In this case the speaker might not be certain whether he was able to identify the phonological sequence correctly. Example (3) demonstrates that Zaefferer (1977" 332) is mistaken in his claim, that at the phonological level we find only non-understanding, not misunderstanding.

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Even in cases where we cannot identify the phonological sequence we nevertheless try to understand and may thus come to a false identification. Ringle and Bruce (1982: 209) discuss another example of this type in which misunderstanding is not immediately corrected. One might object that (3) has to be considered as an example of a performance problem. This is partly right but as an example of performance it refers to the case of an unrepeatable concrete misunderstanding of exactly the same form. These unrepeatable features of performance are without interest for us. We consider (3) as an example of a possible type of misunderstanding on the level of communicative competence which is due to the fact that identification of the oral means never occurs in a vacuum. We are always faced with the possibility of disturbing noises in the environment and are interested only in this general condition of action games. A partly similar, partly different example of misunderstanding might result because of another performance reason, namely because we as interlocutors are sometimes absent-minded and understand a word differently from the one which is uttered, for instance, as in the following dialogue between professors at the university:

(4) A: Do you think that I could give my inaugural lecture by the end of June? B: It should be a date in mid-semester. A: But there are still two weeks left of the semester in July. B: Oh yes, I thought of July, but you said June. Absent-mindedness can be considered as a possible general performance condition of action games like disturbing noises which we have to come to terms with as competent interlocutors by dialogically correcting misunderstandings which might occur. Misunderstanding the means refers not only to the phonological sequence as with example (3), It may also be caused by differences in syntactical processing as in the following dialogue between a student and her professor:

(5) A: I have to indicate two topics for the exam. B: Which ones did you choose? A: Dialogue grammar and communication disturbances. B: You should see me once again and tell me about your preparation. Did you attend the lecture on communication disturbances? A: Yes, naturally. B: O.K. And what is your second topic? A: Communication disturbances. B: Oh, now I understand. These are two topics. I thought it was one but the relation between dialogue grammar and communication failures sounded strange to me and therefore I asked you to show me your work for the exam. This example is interesting in another respect insofar as it is the interlocutor B himself who has misunderstood and who initiates the correcting sequence by his question And what is your second topic? He believes he understood even though his understanding resulted in difficulties, instead of recognizing that there was a misun-

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derstanding. Another example dealing in part with the syntactic structure of the utterance is analysed by Schegloff (1987: 210ff.) 5.1.2. Perceptual means

In example (3) we have dealt with a case where the phonological sequence is not correctly identified because of acoustic reasons. In the same way perceptual means, like gestures, are sometimes not precisely perceived because they are not accurately performed: (6) A: Give me the bucket, please! (with gesture) B: (brings a bucket) A: Not this one, I mean the little one to the left. A's gesture was not precise enough to permit the hearer to identify the intended object. Thus its exact referential function was not understood. Here again we can distinguish cases of misunderstanding and from those of nonunderstanding. Non-understanding would be recognized by an interlocutor who addresses the first speaker with a clarifying question, such as: (7) B: Which bucket do you mean? 5.1.3. Cognitive means

The assumption that we use cognitive means in dialogic action games is partly based on the observation of a human ability to draw inferences (Lehnert and Ringle, 1982: xiv). Cases of misunderstanding can be used as evidence that inferences are cognitive means helping to understand what is meant. An example are indirect speech acts where inferences are used to determine the indirectly expressed action function. Indirectness implies greater risk of misunderstanding compared with direct acts. This risk is acceptable since indirectness is a matter of probability. Indirect speech acts are well dealt with in the literature. I have myself addressed them in Weigand (1989). Therefore, I will concentrate here on another example where misunderstanding is due to the improper identification of cognitive means. In this case it is our knowledge of habits that potentially causes misunderstanding. Much the same as we rely on what we see in the communicative situation, we rely on shared or common knowledge about objects and processes in the world, especially knowledge about habitual activities of our interlocutors. Since the world continually changes, and habits may be followed in general, but not in every case, the question what cognitive means are employed in the actual case is never totally settled. From this follows the risk of misunderstanding, especially when we take account of another principle of communication: not everything is said, perhaps not everything can be said for reasons of economy. The following is an example where reliance on knowledge of habitual activities is used as a cognitive means: (8) (A is preparing a meal in the kitchen. B is in the living room next to it. Both rooms are connected by a door.)

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(8.1) A: I want to hear the news. Keep the door open. (8.2) B: That's not possible. Our neighbour is at home. (8.3) A: Keep the door open. I am coming. Here two habits are in conflict: News is listened to in the living room because the television is there. Sometimes, when A is preparing a meal in the kitchen, he listens to the news from the kitchen through the open door as long as the television is turned very loud. B's misunderstanding arises because A does not say what cognitive means he is relying on, i.e. what habit he is referring to in the actual situation. B infers that A wants the door to be open because he wants to hear the news from the kitchen, which would require the television set to be turned very loud. This inference is wrong; A meant the door to be open so that he could carry the meal into the living room. Moreover, A already knew that the neighbour (who might have been upset by the noise from the TV set) is at home. A risk of misunderstanding is inevitable because of the two reasons already mentioned: When relying on their knowledge of habits, interlocutors may rely on different cognitive means and therefore draw false inferences. Our actions are not totally pre-determined, neither are they ambiguous. There is simply more than one way to connect the variables in order to understand what is meant. Not everything is explicitly said in communication. Therefore, we nearly always make inferences. That means we have to account not only for conventions but also for suggestions and presumptions (for a proposal in this direction cf. Dascal, 1994). Not everything can be expressed because of time-economical reasons and because we are not always aware of every piece of information that would be necessary for clear understanding. In our case, A does not tell B from where he wants to hear the news. If there is a possibility of understanding by connecting and closing the variables in a certain way, this particular connection might turn out to be wrong and we have a case of misunderstanding. On the other hand, if there is no such possibility, i.e. if our understanding is blocked, we are either confronted with a case of non-understanding, or with the kind of problems of understanding that Grice (1975) tries to overcome with the help of conversational implicatures. Since the concept of habits and the principle that not everything can be expressed explicitly are general conditions of communication, there will always be the risk not to be able to identify the right cognitive means, i.e. the risk of misunderstanding. This leads us to a modification of the notion of convention. In contrast to language as a sign system where conventions are fixed, in language use we need a notion of convention which permits choice in order to describe e.g. the conventional sequence of actions (cf. Lewis, 1969: 68; Weigand, 1986:118). But conventional choice is not enough. We must account for the possibility that conventions depend on habits

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whose validity cannot be totally predicted. At this point we are confronted with the problem of deciding what conventions are valid. Perhaps this is the point where Dascal and Berenstein's 'grasping' is required (see 2.4 above), but it would be a point of a free decision of the speaker and not conventionally pre-determined as in Dascal and Berenstein's example. Even if we consider rational possibilities only, there will be no solution for this issue other than the one which is employed in our dialogic action games: accepting the risk of misunderstanding. It is precisely this risk of misunderstanding which makes communication so efficient since it permits us to cope with an unlimited, ever changing world. This throws light on an activity many linguists are engaged in: namely, trying to represent the total knowledge of our world, which we now recognize as an absurd activity, an endeavor which is neither asked for nor even possible. Human beings do not communicate on such a basis. Our communicative world is not a pre-established harmony in the sense that the speaker and the hearer sides would be equal. But we may nevertheless trust in it because problems are managed and solved dialogically. Regarding this point we may join with Ringle and Bruce even if we use different methodological frameworks: "'The reason that dialogue is such an effective means of communication is not because the thoughts of the participants are in such perfect harmony, but rather because the lack of harmony can be discovered and addressed when it is necessary." (Ringle and Bruce, 1982: 204) 5.1.4. Combination of means In general, in communication different types of means interact. Consider the following example:

(9) A t o C: Doris does not feel well. She is not coming today. (Gesture: A strokes her (own) hair) B t o A : You are not well? Do you have a headache? In this authentic example which is comparable to example (1), the reason for B's misunderstanding is that we are dealing with a multi-person conversation. The interlocutors form a circle and everyone is speaking simultaneously. In contrast to example (1), the gesture plays a role in the process of (mis)understanding. Because A in making the utterance strokes her own hair, B thinks that A has a headache. We have discussed some examples of misunderstanding which resulted from the fact that the means had not been identified precisely. As authentic examples they belong to the level of performance. What we were interested in, is not the individual case of performance which as such may not be repeated. It is the type of misunderstanding that is exemplified by authentic cases, the ways of correcting it dialogicaUy, and the type of reasons why misunderstanding may arise on the level of communicative means. 5.2. Misunderstanding the purposes

From being unable to identify the means, naturally, consequences arise for understanding what is meant. But there are examples, too, where what is meant is misun-

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derstood even if there is no obvious trouble in identifying the means. This suggests that we should deal with an ambiguity of the means. Let us see how misunderstanding happens in such cases. As we did with misunderstanding on the level of the means, we can also on the side of the purposes identify subtypes of our standard case, according to the components on the functional side (cf. Fig. 2). 5.2.1. Action function A is on a walk with B, a child. A carries both the ball the child wanted to take along and the flower the child picked up during the walk. After a while, A asks the child to hold the ball: (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4)

A: B: A: B:

Can you hold the ball? (A gives B the ball) And you keep the flower. Do you want it? No, you keep it.

The response by the child (10.2) is understood by A as a reproach because A knows that the child likes flowers and could be envious if the other is allowed to carry them. Therefore, she wants to invalidate the presumed reproach and offers the flower to the child (10.3). The child clarifies in the last utterance that her first utterance was not a reproach but only a statement. She agrees without envy that the other should keep the flower. The source of misunderstanding is utterance (10.2) because A thinks that it is based on a specific preference of B; this, however, in this case, is not correct. Example (10) exhibits features similar to example (8) but nevertheless it seems different from (8). The following points are similar: Not everything is said explicitly. We have to take account of concepts that are not always valid, i.e. that are not conventionally determined, such as habits in example (8) and preferences or emotions in example (10). However, in example (8) utterance (8.1) is not at all ambiguous, if it is taken as such. Misunderstanding comes in because of false inferences. In contrast, utterance (10.2) is in itself, at least for the hearer, ambiguous insofar as in our case intonation is not realized in a distinctive manner. The two possible action functions - STATEMENT versus REPROACH - differ only in their pragmatic claim what does not always have to be marked explicitly by linguistic illocutionary devices. A statement is issued with a pragmatic claim to truth whereby truth is almost evident. A reproach is issued with the pragmatic claim 'it should not be this way', this is what I characterized in my dialogic speech act taxonomy as a subtype of a representative speech act (cf. Weigand, 1989). The reason why 'it should not be this way' can be related to preferences and emotions as in our case, it could also be group-specific social norms. The action type that is intended by the speaker will often be recognized only dialogically. Insofar as preferences and emotions are not always apparent they carry

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the risk of misunderstanding if there are no clear linguistic or perceptual markers (like intonation and facial expression). Therefore, utterance (10.2) can be considered ambiguous as it may express different action types. A similar example of this common case of taking statements as reproaches is the following: (11.1) A: How will we manage it next week? I hope it will not be like this week. (11.2) B: I am really fed up with this story. The reaction by B demonstrates that he took the preceding utterance as a reproach. A recognizes dialogically that she has been misunderstood because the preceding utterance was intended only as a statement. Other examples of misunderstanding the action function are discussed e.g. by Schegloff (1987: 208f.) and Thomas (1983: 93). 5.2.2. Referential function Communicative purposes refer to specific states of affairs which are described by the propositional functions of referring and predicating. The referential function, in particular, can be the source of manifold misunderstandings. For instance, deictic expressions like here and now refer to different speech situations or different scopes (cf. Dascal, 1985a: 445) or the referential function is not clearly enough expressed (cf. Schegloff, 1987: 204; Reilly, 1987b: 123ff.; Hess-Ltittich, 1984:32 with a literary dialogue). There is a famous example of different ways of referring to the same person which became the source of a grave misunderstanding, the example of Oedipus. The dictum of the sphinx was:

(12) Punish the murderers of Laios. With the murderers of Laios the sphinx is referring to Oedipus himself who in his turn, does not know that he has murdered Laios. Characteristically, a sphinx deliberately does not tell decisive details. So here again the principle 'not everything is explicitly expressed' combined with the complexity of our world and human life causes misunderstanding. 5.2.3. Predicative function The predicative function, in my opinion, can be assigned to lexical expressions (cf. Weigand, 1993a, 1995). There are mainly two possible types of reasons for misunderstanding here, on the one hand differences in competence even within the range of standard language use, and on the other hand possible ambiguities in the way lexical expressions are used. It would not be difficult to find examples where differences in competence are caused by different levels of education or by culturespecific aspects. It is well-known that you have to know what Italians mean by punctuality or by the concept of family when you hear:

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(13) Sarb puntuale. (14) La mia famiglia mi aspetta. According to Wierzbicka (1990: 352) and Gumperz (1982a: 186) you cannot add culture to the meaning of the word. Instead, the meaning of the word is culture-specific and it depends on use. These cases where misunderstanding the predicative function is based on cultural differences are not of central interest for us because they do not belong to our standard case. However, it would need some labour and patience to find authentic examples which demonstrate differences in competence within the standard language use of the same community. Problems could arise, for instance, in the use of foreign words. Nor is it easy to find authentic examples of the other type of reason, i.e. the type of possible ambiguities. Schegloff (1987: 205) analyses an authentic example where preparing anything is differently understood b y the interlocutors. Hess-Liittich (1984: 35) refers to a similar literary example with the German zu weir gehen. Another example can be found with Thomas (1983: 94) concerning see. However, this only refers to a single utterance. If we stick to the view that the unit of lexical description is not the word but the way lexical items are used, many potential ambiguities of single words vanish. In the light of dialogic action games artificial examples like He went to the bank are without relevance. For our problem of the standard case of misunderstanding which is corrected in the dialogic sequence, the task of checking more authentic material remains.

6.

Consequences

As we have seen in the examples discussed, the rules and principles of coming to an understanding in dialogic action games are not at all like mathematical rules. We cannot start from a model of understanding an utterance as an ideal construction in which all points are fixed (as in Chomsky's ideal grammar) or in which understanding is presupposed (as in a certain type of dialogue grammar). In a model of dialogic action games we do not find total understanding nor identity of the speaker's and the hearer's worlds. Instead, the risk of misunderstanding is inherent in the system from the very beginning because of general conditions and specific points which we can indicate precisely: • In the centre of the action game there are human beings with their physical and cognitive abilities; these cannot be exhaustively listed or completely described on a causal or conventional basis. There will always remain differences from one interlocutor to another that may have an effect on the actual course of an action game, even if we restrict ourselves to standard language use and standard communicative competence (Weigand, 1993b: 144). In particular, if we include cognitive and emotional structures, we will be confronted with the risk of misunderstanding. • There is the complexity of the worM, of the facts and relationships which are meant and should be understood. We have to accept the principle that variables can be closed in different ways.

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From these two pre-conditions another fundamental point results: Not everything is said; perhaps not everything can be said for reasons of economy in language use. We have to rely on our ability to draw inferences which are only in part conventionally determined, and in part based on rational suggestions and presumptions. On the basis of these general conditions of dialogic action games, we can be more specific in indicating the points which might cause misunderstanding. These points refer to the components of the means and of the purposes: • The linguistic means used by the speaker are not always correctly identified by the interlocutor. Speaking is bound to situational, i.e. acoustic and perceptual, conditions. There might be some noise in the environment which disturbs the identification of the phonological sequence, and perceptual means like gestures are not always performed precisely. Our communicative competence has to face this problem of performance. • The other point on the level of the means which is exposed to misunderstanding is the cognitive means like our knowledge of habits and similar inferences. Habits are not valid for every case. Inferences are not always conventional but represent presumptions which are dependent on all the differences that might exist between the world of the speaker and that of the hearer. • Even if the means are precisely performed we may be unable to understand the action function. The means may be ambiguous, the functions are linguistically not always explicitly expressed. Action types may depend on preferences and emotions which - like habits - are not always valid. • Understanding the referential function may be tied to a piece of knowledge which cannot automatically be presupposed because of the infinity of world knowledge. • There may be differences in what we call standard competence that cause differences in understanding what is predicated. Because of general conditions and specific reasons of this type we have to abandon the view of pre-established harmony and equality of the speaker and the hearer sides. On the other hand, we will find a new dialogic harmony in the systematics of action games which is a balanced equilibrium of near-infinite parameters, Such a system is capable of tolerating that some points are not fixed, not pre-determined, that there are variables which can be closed in different ways. The risk of a failure is accepted because normally it will be overcome by the participants in their attempt to arrive at an understanding. We agree, that in principle we always face the risk of misunderstanding, which does not mean that understanding coincides with misunderstanding. We were able to identify some major points which are subject to possible misunderstanding. Thus it is justifiable to keep understanding and misunderstanding separate in a model of action games that attempts to explain how we can come to an understanding. An ideal system where understanding is presupposed could not take account of components which are only in part regulated conventionally, like habits, preferences, emo-

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tions, and inferences, n o r could it cope with the i m m e n s i t y of what has to be said and the time available in such an effective and e c o n o m i c way. Thus we agree with Dascal (1985a: 442): " A significant part of u n d e r s t a n d i n g speech has to do with m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g " . C o m m u n i c a t i o n functions so well because it allows the risk of m i s u n derstanding and trusts in the fact that it will be corrected by the o n g o i n g dialogue itself. Once more, the Dialogic Principle is c o n f i r m e d as a constitutive feature of language.

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Edda Weigand is Professor of Linguistics at the University of Miinster/Germany after having been Professor of German in Italy. She is working mainly on two fields, the field of dialogue analysis and the field of comparative lexical research. On the basis of a general dialogic notion of language ('Sprache als Dialog', 1989) she has written many articles and authored or edited several books on pragmatics, speech act theory, dialogue theory, lexical semantics and other topics. Besides her tasks as Vice-president of the International Association for Dialogue Analysis (IADA, Bologna), she is currently engaged in research projects on lexical semantics of different languages emphasising that lexical semantics also has to be revised in the framework of a model of language use.