- Email: [email protected]
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia August 3, 2015
By June Teufel Dreyer June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. This article is a slightly revised version of a text delivered as part of FPRI's Stanley and Arlene Ginsburg Family Foundation Lecture Series, hosted and cosponsored by the National Liberty Museum in Philadelphia, PA, May 12, 2015.
Abstract: The assertive actions China has taken to press its claims in the East China and South China seas since 2010 indicate that its leadership has decided that the time has come to end Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide [the country’s capabilities] and bide [its time].” Beijing has combined economic incentives and sanctions with small but incrementally meaningful military pressures. Efforts by neighboring states to form a countervailing coalition have thus far proved ineffective. Beijing’s tactics have been stunningly successful, though there are financial, structural, and resource weaknesses within China that indicate that the effort to assert control over the area will remain unrealized.
T
wenty-five years ago, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping advised his countrymen to hide their capabilities and bide their time. By 2010, the increasingly assertive behavior of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) indicated that its leadership felt that the time had come to move beyond Deng’s advice. The rise of China has by now become a standard phrase. How long it can continue to rise and what this implies for the geopolitics of Asia and, for that matter, the rest of the world are major unanswered questions. It is not certain that the Chinese leadership is sure about either one, but they do seem to have ambitious plans. Publicly, these plans generally are stated in the most benign terms possible: x
China wants nothing but to improve living standards for its people, and for people elsewhere as well
x
the best way to achieve this is through cooperation for mutual benefit
© 2015 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.
© 2015 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.
Fall 2015 | 1 doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2015.08.001
TEUFEL DREYER
x
China is a “friendly elephant”—although it dwarfs its neighbors, China means no harm
x
a rising tide lifts all boats
President George H. W. Bush meets with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, February 26, 1989.
Sometimes, however, the rhetoric seems less benign, as in September 2010, when the then-foreign minister Yang Jiechi told the assembled delegates at an ASEAN meeting in Hanoi that small countries would just have to realize that they are small countries while China is a big country.1 A short while later, Yang, who has since been promoted to the rank of state councillor, stormed out of the meeting when then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that the numerous territorial disputes in the area should be settled through peaceful negotiation. Beijing often likes to admonish other countries that their actions speak louder than words. However, its own actions are frequently at odds with its words. These actions are not reassuring—at such times, the elephant no longer seems so friendly. The PRC claims jurisdiction over 80 percent of the South China and East China Seas on the basis of a self-generated nine (sometimes ten) dashed line that has no foundation in international law. To complaints from those who fear that shipping through these busy areas may be adversely affected, Beijing pledges freedom of navigation. Yet, as illustrated by separate incidents involving the Indian navy, these promises may not be honored. In the first episode, in 2011, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warned an Indian naval ship leaving Vietnam, in what Vietnam ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprises ten states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
1
2 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
considers its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that it was in Chinese waters.2 In the second incident, a year later, PLAN “escorted” Indian naval ships on their scheduled trip from Manila to Seoul, in international waters.3 In 2014, after protracted negotiations, China signed a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) with 20 other nations, but indicated that it would not necessarily observe the code.4 In 2010, a Chinese fishing boat in waters administered by Japan but claimed by China, rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels who had ordered it to leave. The coast guard arrested the captain, with the government announcing that he would stand trial for the damage he had caused. In 2012, there was a stand-off with Manila over Scarborough Shoal, previously considered part of the Philippines but within Beijing’s nine-dashed line. Not all disputes involve Asia, or even freedom of navigation: in 2012 also, Argentina filed an anti-dumping case against China in the World Trade Organization. What these three cases have in common is that China used its economic strength to get the solution it wanted. In the first case, Beijing argued that, since the islands belonged to the PRC, it was the Japanese coast guard, not the fishermen, who had been trespassing. It demanded the immediate release of the captain. When this did not happen, the Chinese government threatened to embargo rare earth shipments to Japan, subjected Japanese imports to excruciatingly slow customs procedures, discouraged Chinese travel agents from booking trips to Japan, and arrested several Japanese nationals for alleged spying. The captain was released, and returned home to a hero’s welcome. As for the Philippines, Beijing discovered insect pests on bananas and stopped importing them. In addition, it announced that, for safety reasons, it would have to begin scrutinizing mangoes, papayas, and other Filipino agricultural products. Fruit exports to the PRC are a multi-million dollar source of income to the impoverished Philippines. Manila backed off. In the case of Argentina, Beijing stopped importing its soya beans, transferring the orders to Brazil. President Cristina Kirchner withdrew the complaint. Economic Incentives Beijing has economic carrots to offer as well as sticks. Its growing prosperity makes the PRC an attractive market for other countries’ products, despite frequent trade deficits on the part of the latter. Moreover, China has been willing to commit large sums of money to infrastructure enhancement in developing countries. Beijing began to formally claim the role of world financial leader with the founding of the Bo’ao Forum in 2001. The forum held its first meeting at Bo’ao in Hainan, an islandhttp://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-warship-confronts-indian-navy-vessel-in-southchina-sea-2011-9. 3 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-south-china-sea-a-surprise-chinese-escort-forindian-ships/article3524965.ece?css=print. 4 The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014252702304788404579519303809875852?KE YWORDS=China&mg=reno64-wsj.. 2
Fall 2015 | 3
TEUFEL DREYER
province just to the south of the main Chinese landmass, in February 2002. Technically, the forum’s name is the Bo’ao Forum for Asia (BFA), but representatives of many non-Asian states attend, attracted by the promise of the Chinese market and, since the forum meets in mid-winter, possibly by the location’s Hawaii-like climate as well. The establishment of Bo’ao was a conscious effort to parallel the World Economic Forum that has been held annually in Davos, Switzerland, since 1971 and is attended by 2,500 top business leaders, international political leaders, selected intellectuals, and journalists. Since the twenty-first century is predicted to be the century of Asia, the existence of an alternate structure to Davos seems appropriate. For Beijing, it was also a way to signal that Japan was no longer the engine of Asian development. Previously, the metaphor had been of Japan as lead bird in a vformation of geese flying toward industrialization and prosperity. Since the two nations are historic rivals, displacing Japan was especially pleasing to Beijing, as was the revelation in 2010-2011 that the Chinese economy had surpassed that of Japan to become the largest in Asia and, after the United States, second-largest in the world. The 2015 Bo’ao meeting concentrated on Chinese president Xi Jinping’s “one belt, one road” development plan, modelled on a fanciful reinterpretation of an ancient trading route that stretched from China through Central Asia to Europe. The land segment of this new “silk road”5 will retrace that path, while a maritime silk road, will connect China with Southeast Asian countries, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Neither belt nor road follows any clear geographic line, but are better envisioned as a web, centered on Beijing and a roadmap for Chinese plans to further integrate the PRC into the world economy, while strengthening its influence in these regions. Xi Jinping has pledged large financial contributions to further the infrastructure needed to implement these plans. Having already founded a BRICS Bank 6 and a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Bank,7 Beijing will contribute $50 billion toward the establishment of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). All three are headquartered in Beijing. If successful, these infrastructure plans will tie the economies of those states along the belt and road more closely to Beijing—and profoundly change the geopolitics of the area in China’s favor. They are nothing if not ambitious, having an estimated cost upwards of $8 trillion. One plan involves tunneling through the Himalayas to connect Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, with Kathmandu in Nepal. Skeptics pointed out that construction would destroy a fragile ecosystem that is one A term actually coined in the 19th century by German geographer/geologist Ferdinand von Richthofen, uncle of the more famous Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron of World War I aviation fame. There were actually several routes, with silk but one of many commodities that were traded. 6 The BRICS comprise Brazil, Russia, India, China and, according to some, South Africa. The collectivity was at one point thought to be on a steep development trajectory. In past years, apart from China, their performances have been disappointing. 7 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established in 1996 to counter the closer U.S.Japan relationship occasioned by Beijing’s saber-rattling in the Taiwan Strait, includes China, Russia, and four Central Asian states. 5
4 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
of the last pristine areas on earth, in order to build a line that could not possibly be commercially profitable. Moreover, in addition to the formidable engineering problems posed by construction on what is often referred to as the roof of the world, the terrain is prone to earthquakes. This last concern proved prophetic: scarcely a week after the plans were announced, a devastating earthquake, measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale, hit Nepal. The confirmed death toll exceeded 8,000, with twice that many injuries. Avalanches triggered by the quake buried the Mount Everest base camp, killing eighteen climbers. Shortly after cleanup operations began, a second strong quake struck. Presumably this will cause a reconsideration of the plan. Another major project, this one financed by a Chinese company,8 involves a canal through Nicaragua which, if completed, will rival that of Panama. Three times as long as the Panama Canal, it can accommodate larger ships and will connect Punta Gorda on the Caribbean with Brito on the Pacific, from whence goods can be transported to China. While some see benefits to the economy of the second poorest country in the Americas, others see a looming ecological catastrophe. The proposed route goes through Lake Nicaragua, which is the nation’s major source of drinking water as well as of the fish that are an important part of the livelihood of the people around it. An oil spill could be devastating. As in the Himalayas, the area is earthquake prone and has several active volcanoes.9 There have been off-again on-again discussions between China and Thailand about a canal through the Kra Isthmus, the narrowest part of the Malay peninsula. Again, the costs are staggering: an estimated $28 billion and ten years to complete. If completed, the distance between the Pacific and Indian Ocean/Andaman Sea would be cut by 1200 kilometers and eliminate the need to pass through the Straits of Malacca. Such a canal would fit in well with Xi Jinping’s one belt-one road plan.10 Military Enhancements Economic pressure, or the threat of economic pressure, has been successful but is only one part of the strategy, the other being military action or the threat of it. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has since 1989 benefitted from double-digit budget increases every year but one,11 2010, and even in that year it was a winner in the PRC’s budget wars, rendered more acute by the impact of the global financial crash on the country’s finances. The increases are notable in that they began as the Cold
While there is speculation that the developer Wang Jing is backed by the Chinese government, there is no definitive proof of its direct involvement. 9 The Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/can-a-chinese-billionaire-build-acanal-across-nicaragua/2015/02/03/e9cf3482-9aa5-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6_story.html. 10 Want China Times, June 1, 2015. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-printcnt.aspx?id=20150601000001&cid=1501. 11 While the initially announced increment for 2003 was up 9.6% to 185. 3 billion yuan ($22.3 billion), expenditures were over budget, for an actual increase of 11.72%. 8
Fall 2015 | 5
TEUFEL DREYER
War was ending and most other countries were reducing drastically their defense expenditures. Moreover, the PRC faces no external enemies. As in other sectors of the PRC, there is a great deal of corruption in the military. While a recent campaign against corruption has revealed that billions of dollars meant for military modernization were diverted into luxury homes and cars for the officer corps, there can be no doubt that China has been able to acquire impressive military capabilities. The bulk of newly developed weapons have gone to the navy and the air force, indicating that that is where the leadership thinks it will have to fight. In April 2015, the U.S. Navy issued a report, the first unclassified version since 2009, describing the PLA’s expanded capabilities. These included the launch of China’s first aircraft carrier; development of longer-range and more accurate missiles; significant improvements in the nuclear submarine force; and deployment of the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) designed specifically for attacking aircraft carriers So far, these assets have been used for intimidation and harassment. American analysts believe that the Chinese intend to exert pressure by keeping the military at a distance. The intent is to use paramilitary forces such as the coast guard, local militias, and fishing boats in a coordinated effort. In one scenario that worries Japanese policymakers, hundreds of fishing boats arrive in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which although under Japanese jurisdiction, are claimed by China. Their numbers are too large for the Japanese coast guard to handle, and moreover the Japanese coast guard has been skittish since the ramming incident in September 2010. The fishermen carry arms. Backing them up are provincial sea patrol boats manned by maritime militia—described by Japanese intelligence as young men raised on propaganda about the need to “recoup” China’s sacred territory and armed with machine guns. At least some can be presumed to have itchy trigger fingers. The dilemma for Japanese policymakers is how to respond if one or more of these young men fires on their ships. It is widely believed that the Chinese leadership is trying to get the Japanese side to fire the first shot, allowing Beijing to declare that it has been provoked and therefore has no alternative but to respond; the situation could escalate from there. Yet if they do not respond, the islands will be slowly absorbed. Turning from the East China Sea to the South China Sea, in May 2014, a Chinese state-owned oil company moved an oil rig into an area near the Paracel Islands, claimed by both China and Vietnam. For several days, clashes took place between Chinese coast guard vessels and Vietnamese boats that tried to enter the approximately 12-mile perimeter the Chinese ships had established around it. Several Vietnamese vessels were rammed, and one sank. The Chinese also trained water cannon at the ships, as their air force jets flew over the rig and PLAN hovered in the background. These actions set off anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam that resulted in two deaths and significant property damage. In July 2014, the rig was withdrawn, earlier than originally scheduled, with the explanation that weather factors
6 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
were involved.12 A year later, it was reinstated, just prior to the visit of the head of the Vietnamese communist party to Washington.13 Shortly thereafter, Chinese ships accelerated the pace of a project begun in 2013, building islands from reefs and shoals in several areas of the South China Sea and adding landing strips for planes. According to Beijing, these are for civilian purposes: search-and-rescue operations, marine meteorological forecasting, and the like. However, U.S. intelligence discovered two Chinese motorized artillery pieces on one of the artificial islands. The airfields will eliminate the PLA’s need for in-flight refueling to maintain air control of the South China Sea.14 Beijing has maintained that this island construction is within its sovereign rights, and has warned off U.S. reconnaissance planes conducting surveillance near them.15 It has also reserved the right to declare an ADIZ over the South China Sea. If built, the Kra Isthmus canal would have military significance as well. Singapore allows American warships to use its naval facilities, meaning that, in time of hostilities with China, the U.S. Navy could quickly interdict the pivotal Straits of Malacca. The Kra canal would provide the PRC with a critical alternative.16 Hybrid Warfare Beijing’s strategy, which entails coordinating various component parts that include economic carrots and stick, civilian and semi-civilian fishermen, provincial coastal patrols, and the regular Chinese coast guard, while the navy remains in the background is called “hybrid warfare.” Since only the Japanese military and the Indian military are even remotely a match for the PLA, this leaves other states with two unpalatable choices: either they can withdraw or risk provoking a kinetic confrontation they cannot hope to win. The Philippines, while withdrawing, has filed a complaint against the legality of the nine-dashed line with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Hague, but the PRC has rejected jurisdiction. Even an ITLOS ruling in Manila’s favor, though perhaps enabling it to score a point in the court of world public opinion, is unlikely to change the PRC’s stance.
The New York Times, July 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/asia/chinese-oil-rig-near-vietnam-to-bemoved.html?_r=0. 13 Reuters, June 16, 2015.,http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/26/us-southchinaseachina-vietnam-idUSKBN0P60X320150626 14 Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R43894, Jan. 28, 2015, pp. 29-30. 15 The Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2015, http://www.wsj/u-s-surveillance-on-island-revealschinese-arms-1432864632. 16 Want China Times, June 1, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-printcnt.aspx?id=20150601000001&cid=1501, citing Yazhou Zhoukan, Asia Weekly, Hong Kong. 12
Fall 2015 | 7
TEUFEL DREYER
Will the PRC’s Strategy Work? Beyond asserting control over the area within the 9-dashed line, this combined economic and military strategy will, if successful, push the United States out of Asia. In addition, China will gain control of the sea lanes of communication in the area. The consequences are not negligible: more than $5 trillion of shipping transits the South China Sea alone each year. The South China Sea also provides about a tenth of the world’s annual fishing catch. In other words, control of the area within the 9-dashed line will change the geopolitical configuration of Asia, with China definitively dominant. As the Chinese media frequently point out, the United States is not an Asian country and hence, Beijing concludes, has no right to determine the configuration of power therein. The best-laid plans often go astray, and there are no guarantees that this aspect of President’s Xi Jinping’s China dream will be fulfilled. On the military aspect of the strategy, hybrid warfare has the disadvantage of being hard to coordinate. To succeed, its numerous disparate component parts must work in harmony. In the process of translating theory into actual implementation, there is a high probability that something will go wrong, with potentially disastrous consequences not just for China but for the other countries involved. As for the economic prong, the “one belt, one road” concept is currently a slogan, not a reality. As evidenced by the rush to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), virtually every country wants Chinese investment. However, they also have concerns about Beijing’s willingness to use economic sanctions to obtain political ends. These states are increasingly aware of the dangers of becoming more dependent on the PRC for economic prosperity. Other nations worry that China intends to re-create the tribute system of the imperial era, forcing them to ketou (kowtow) to Beijing’s wishes. Russia, although nominally an ally of China, is worried about Xi Jinping’s previously noted “one belt, one road” development plan stretching from China through Central Asia to Europe, recognizing the road’s potential for diminishing Russia’s influence in the former Soviet republics through which it passes. As in the case of the Nicaragua canal and Himalayan tunnel, ecosystem damage is a further concern. The Philippine government estimates that China’s reefbuilding will cost fishermen up to a $100 million per year, since the reefs are breeding grounds for high-value fish. Dredgers have been pulling up the coral itself, crushing it to use as landfill.17 Japan has made similar complaints with regard to the illegal removal of red coral from its Ogasawara Islands.18 The Washington Post, May 12, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/12/beijings-power-play-inthe-south-china-sea-may-be-killing-coral-reefs/; http://www.rappler.com/nation/90878china-west-philippine-sea-reclamation-fisheries-food-security. 18 According to Asahi TV, Oct. 27, 2014, four unusual features characterized the poaching activities: 1. Most of the Chinese ships continued to stay in the waters even after the crews of three of them were arrested; 2. The poaching ships sailed about 2,000 kilometers from China to the waters, meaning that the income from the red coral would not cover their travel costs; 17
8 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
Chinese Domestic Concerns Additionally, the PRC has many internal problems that could hinder and perhaps even prevent these ambitious plans from reaching fruition. There are questions about the wisdom of Beijing taking on so many expensive projects when its economic growth is slowing. While a slowdown from the growth rates of previous years has been expected, it is impossible to tell whether the process will be gradual or sudden. There are ominous signs: newly-constructed apartment complexes stand empty, and capital flight out of the country has increased. Local debt is large and growing: As much as 50 percent of local government borrowing is for the purpose of servicing existing debt, thus requiring additional loans to produce growth. The stock market has shown worrisome volatility. On the other hand, China has shown an impressive capacity for muddling through difficult economic times before, and may well do so again. There are many discontents among the citizenry; protests and demonstrations have increased in frequency. Concerns with its rising defense expenditures notwithstanding, Beijing actually spends more on domestic security than it does on the military. The intent seems to be not, as in most democracies, to protect citizens from criminal elements so much as to protect party and government from angry citizens. News media are censored; the internet is monitored closely. Filters are in place to screen out words and phrases that have been deemed subversive. The ecosystem is in danger of collapse and pollution is severe. A devastating documentary “Under the Dome,” made by a woman whose unborn child was discovered to have a tumor caused by pollution19 was censored soon after it came out, but had already been seen by tens of millions. China is also in danger of running out of water. A massive project to move water from better endowed southern China to the parched north has caused water stress in the south while cities in the north typically do not have the facilities to clean and process the water that has been brought to them. Taking advantage of the reality that most of Asia’s major rivers rise in the Tibetan plateau, China has been building dams along them. This, however, means less water for countries in South and Southeast Asia, which, since their economies are heavily dependent on agriculture, is a constant irritant in their relations with the PRC. China’s enduring need for additional resources reinforces a strategy of greater international assertiveness.
3. The poachers appeared to want to show themselves; and 4. The number of ships, 113 according to the Japanese coast guard, was unusually large. An expert on maritime security, Tokai University professor Yamada Yoshihiko, speculated that the intent was to test Japanese capability to monitor its islands. 19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbK4KeD2ajI&feature=youtu.be.
Fall 2015 | 9
TEUFEL DREYER
Countermeasures There could be a catastrophic international event that would galvanize the current rather tepid will to resist China’s protracted tactics but so far these tactics have served Beijing well, at very low cost, and therefore will probably continue until they either succeed in establishing a new geopolitical, China-in-charge configuration or meet resistance causing China to back off. Given the disparity in size between the PRC and its smaller neighbors, as well at the latter’s dependence to varying degrees on the Chinese economy, Beijing’s increasingly nervous neighbors have reacted in small ways are less than effective. As previously noted, the Philippines has taken China to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, although Beijing has argued that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction. India has published its own map based on data from 500-1000 A.D. It shows India as the fulcrum of trading patterns, thus rebutting Chinese claims of an ancient maritime silk route focused on China. India has also increased its arms purchases, as have many other countries in the region. Japan has ended its self-imposed ban on selling weapons abroad, finding interested customers in India, Australia, and Vietnam. There are regular consultations among members of these four countries, but little appetite for any steps that might anger Beijing. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has stated his desire for a closer defense partnership with the United States, and has called for a change to article nine of the Japanese constitution, prohibiting collective military action. 20 However, he faces strong opposition in the Diet, as well as polls indicating that Japanese public opinion does not favor amendment. Without wishing to downplay the significance of these actions, they do not meaningfully redress the balance between Chinese power and that of its neighbors and, therefore, have little deterrent value. There is no unity among the affected nations, and observing their deliberations reminds one of the fable of the mice who agree that a bell should be put around the neck of a predatory cat—yet none of them is willing to do so. What Should the United States Do? Washington’s previous policy has been to facilitate China’s growth on the assumption that an economically prosperous country will become both more democratic and more peaceful. It has become increasingly apparent that the second part of the assumption has not followed from the first: the PRC has become more prosperous but remains decidedly undemocratic and also more aggressive. Some commentators have suggested that the United States has suffered from “imperial overstretch,” but the same might be said of China’s actions in recent years. The stringent conditions under which the Japanese constitution can be amended make it nearly impossible to do so. Hence Abe arranged for a cabinet interpretation of the document that allowed collective action against military aggression. It has proved highly controversial, with critics, including legal scholars and members of his own party, arguing that this action is unconstitutional.
20
10 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
President Barack Obama with President Xi Jinping of the PRC in Rancho Mirage, CA June 8, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza.)
It is possible that the PRC may, like the Soviet Union before it, fall victim to its internal contradictions. If so, one alternative would be for Washington to take a wait-and-see attitude. That worked with the Soviet Union, albeit abetted by Reagan Administration policies that encouraged Moscow to overspend on military activities to the point that its economy teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. But China is not the Soviet Union. The United States never did assume that the USSR would become more peaceful if it became wealthier, and hence did not encourage its growth, even to the extent of trying to discourage its European allies from participating in projects like the Yamal pipeline that might enrich the Soviet government. The USSR also had a far larger proportion of ethnic minorities, amounting to nearly the total of Russian citizens, than China, where the total is under ten percent. Although ethnic fault lines exist, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, they are not of comparable magnitude to those of the Soviet Union. Given the reluctance of most nations in the area to risk poor relations with the PRC by resisting its assertive moves, a second policy option would be for Washington to encourage the affected states to solve their own problems, either by negotiating with the PRC or acquiescing to its demands. But doing so would most likely push those countries into the arms of the PRC. This is tantamount to a U.S. withdrawal from Asia—in effect giving the Chinese leadership what it wants. It also means fewer allies for the United States against a Chinese government that scarcely hides its antagonism toward America.
Fall 2015 | 11
TEUFEL DREYER
A third alternative would be to pursue a policy of containment, recognizing that America cannot deter Chinese assertiveness by itself but hoping that it can get other countries to partner with it, in essence creating a coalition of those willing to help and capable of doing so. Candidates are in short supply, though Japan, India, and Vietnam look like better possibilities than most. Judging from recent U.S. activities—for example, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s words at Shangri La, and the navy’s invitation to CNN to witness, tape, and then air a segment illustrating China’s belligerence---there is an increased willingness to publicly confront what U.S. intelligence has been aware of for some time. What actions these will translate into remain to be seen. Speaking loudly while carrying a small stick will not suffice. As former ambassador to the PRC Jim Lilley observed, bluffing does not work. The Chinese translate strong words without strong actions as a sign of weakness and will press their advantage. It is past time for the administration to discuss with its closest allies what actions they are prepared to back and actively participate in. Absent such commitments, it may be best to quietly concede control of Asia to the PRC. An effort to create a countervailing coalition with allies will be difficult. Critics observe that Beijing will respond by escalating, thereby creating a security dilemma. Typically, however, they offer no viable alternative save negotiations— which have shown themselves useless in the past: there has been much talk, but no diminution of China’s assertiveness. All the aforementioned alternatives—waiting for a regime change, ceding control to China, and attempting to create a countervailing coalition—have disadvantages. However, the last seems the least unpalatable. As always, however, the future is unpredictable.
12 | Orbis
By June Teufel Dreyer June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. This article is a slightly revised version of a text delivered as part of FPRI's Stanley and Arlene Ginsburg Family Foundation Lecture Series, hosted and cosponsored by the National Liberty Museum in Philadelphia, PA, May 12, 2015.
Abstract: The assertive actions China has taken to press its claims in the East China and South China seas since 2010 indicate that its leadership has decided that the time has come to end Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide [the country’s capabilities] and bide [its time].” Beijing has combined economic incentives and sanctions with small but incrementally meaningful military pressures. Efforts by neighboring states to form a countervailing coalition have thus far proved ineffective. Beijing’s tactics have been stunningly successful, though there are financial, structural, and resource weaknesses within China that indicate that the effort to assert control over the area will remain unrealized.
T
wenty-five years ago, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping advised his countrymen to hide their capabilities and bide their time. By 2010, the increasingly assertive behavior of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) indicated that its leadership felt that the time had come to move beyond Deng’s advice. The rise of China has by now become a standard phrase. How long it can continue to rise and what this implies for the geopolitics of Asia and, for that matter, the rest of the world are major unanswered questions. It is not certain that the Chinese leadership is sure about either one, but they do seem to have ambitious plans. Publicly, these plans generally are stated in the most benign terms possible: x
China wants nothing but to improve living standards for its people, and for people elsewhere as well
x
the best way to achieve this is through cooperation for mutual benefit
© 2015 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.
© 2015 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.
Fall 2015 | 1 doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2015.08.001
TEUFEL DREYER
x
China is a “friendly elephant”—although it dwarfs its neighbors, China means no harm
x
a rising tide lifts all boats
President George H. W. Bush meets with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, February 26, 1989.
Sometimes, however, the rhetoric seems less benign, as in September 2010, when the then-foreign minister Yang Jiechi told the assembled delegates at an ASEAN meeting in Hanoi that small countries would just have to realize that they are small countries while China is a big country.1 A short while later, Yang, who has since been promoted to the rank of state councillor, stormed out of the meeting when then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that the numerous territorial disputes in the area should be settled through peaceful negotiation. Beijing often likes to admonish other countries that their actions speak louder than words. However, its own actions are frequently at odds with its words. These actions are not reassuring—at such times, the elephant no longer seems so friendly. The PRC claims jurisdiction over 80 percent of the South China and East China Seas on the basis of a self-generated nine (sometimes ten) dashed line that has no foundation in international law. To complaints from those who fear that shipping through these busy areas may be adversely affected, Beijing pledges freedom of navigation. Yet, as illustrated by separate incidents involving the Indian navy, these promises may not be honored. In the first episode, in 2011, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warned an Indian naval ship leaving Vietnam, in what Vietnam ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, comprises ten states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
1
2 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
considers its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that it was in Chinese waters.2 In the second incident, a year later, PLAN “escorted” Indian naval ships on their scheduled trip from Manila to Seoul, in international waters.3 In 2014, after protracted negotiations, China signed a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) with 20 other nations, but indicated that it would not necessarily observe the code.4 In 2010, a Chinese fishing boat in waters administered by Japan but claimed by China, rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels who had ordered it to leave. The coast guard arrested the captain, with the government announcing that he would stand trial for the damage he had caused. In 2012, there was a stand-off with Manila over Scarborough Shoal, previously considered part of the Philippines but within Beijing’s nine-dashed line. Not all disputes involve Asia, or even freedom of navigation: in 2012 also, Argentina filed an anti-dumping case against China in the World Trade Organization. What these three cases have in common is that China used its economic strength to get the solution it wanted. In the first case, Beijing argued that, since the islands belonged to the PRC, it was the Japanese coast guard, not the fishermen, who had been trespassing. It demanded the immediate release of the captain. When this did not happen, the Chinese government threatened to embargo rare earth shipments to Japan, subjected Japanese imports to excruciatingly slow customs procedures, discouraged Chinese travel agents from booking trips to Japan, and arrested several Japanese nationals for alleged spying. The captain was released, and returned home to a hero’s welcome. As for the Philippines, Beijing discovered insect pests on bananas and stopped importing them. In addition, it announced that, for safety reasons, it would have to begin scrutinizing mangoes, papayas, and other Filipino agricultural products. Fruit exports to the PRC are a multi-million dollar source of income to the impoverished Philippines. Manila backed off. In the case of Argentina, Beijing stopped importing its soya beans, transferring the orders to Brazil. President Cristina Kirchner withdrew the complaint. Economic Incentives Beijing has economic carrots to offer as well as sticks. Its growing prosperity makes the PRC an attractive market for other countries’ products, despite frequent trade deficits on the part of the latter. Moreover, China has been willing to commit large sums of money to infrastructure enhancement in developing countries. Beijing began to formally claim the role of world financial leader with the founding of the Bo’ao Forum in 2001. The forum held its first meeting at Bo’ao in Hainan, an islandhttp://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-warship-confronts-indian-navy-vessel-in-southchina-sea-2011-9. 3 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/in-south-china-sea-a-surprise-chinese-escort-forindian-ships/article3524965.ece?css=print. 4 The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014252702304788404579519303809875852?KE YWORDS=China&mg=reno64-wsj.. 2
Fall 2015 | 3
TEUFEL DREYER
province just to the south of the main Chinese landmass, in February 2002. Technically, the forum’s name is the Bo’ao Forum for Asia (BFA), but representatives of many non-Asian states attend, attracted by the promise of the Chinese market and, since the forum meets in mid-winter, possibly by the location’s Hawaii-like climate as well. The establishment of Bo’ao was a conscious effort to parallel the World Economic Forum that has been held annually in Davos, Switzerland, since 1971 and is attended by 2,500 top business leaders, international political leaders, selected intellectuals, and journalists. Since the twenty-first century is predicted to be the century of Asia, the existence of an alternate structure to Davos seems appropriate. For Beijing, it was also a way to signal that Japan was no longer the engine of Asian development. Previously, the metaphor had been of Japan as lead bird in a vformation of geese flying toward industrialization and prosperity. Since the two nations are historic rivals, displacing Japan was especially pleasing to Beijing, as was the revelation in 2010-2011 that the Chinese economy had surpassed that of Japan to become the largest in Asia and, after the United States, second-largest in the world. The 2015 Bo’ao meeting concentrated on Chinese president Xi Jinping’s “one belt, one road” development plan, modelled on a fanciful reinterpretation of an ancient trading route that stretched from China through Central Asia to Europe. The land segment of this new “silk road”5 will retrace that path, while a maritime silk road, will connect China with Southeast Asian countries, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Neither belt nor road follows any clear geographic line, but are better envisioned as a web, centered on Beijing and a roadmap for Chinese plans to further integrate the PRC into the world economy, while strengthening its influence in these regions. Xi Jinping has pledged large financial contributions to further the infrastructure needed to implement these plans. Having already founded a BRICS Bank 6 and a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Bank,7 Beijing will contribute $50 billion toward the establishment of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). All three are headquartered in Beijing. If successful, these infrastructure plans will tie the economies of those states along the belt and road more closely to Beijing—and profoundly change the geopolitics of the area in China’s favor. They are nothing if not ambitious, having an estimated cost upwards of $8 trillion. One plan involves tunneling through the Himalayas to connect Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, with Kathmandu in Nepal. Skeptics pointed out that construction would destroy a fragile ecosystem that is one A term actually coined in the 19th century by German geographer/geologist Ferdinand von Richthofen, uncle of the more famous Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron of World War I aviation fame. There were actually several routes, with silk but one of many commodities that were traded. 6 The BRICS comprise Brazil, Russia, India, China and, according to some, South Africa. The collectivity was at one point thought to be on a steep development trajectory. In past years, apart from China, their performances have been disappointing. 7 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, established in 1996 to counter the closer U.S.Japan relationship occasioned by Beijing’s saber-rattling in the Taiwan Strait, includes China, Russia, and four Central Asian states. 5
4 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
of the last pristine areas on earth, in order to build a line that could not possibly be commercially profitable. Moreover, in addition to the formidable engineering problems posed by construction on what is often referred to as the roof of the world, the terrain is prone to earthquakes. This last concern proved prophetic: scarcely a week after the plans were announced, a devastating earthquake, measuring 7.8 on the Richter scale, hit Nepal. The confirmed death toll exceeded 8,000, with twice that many injuries. Avalanches triggered by the quake buried the Mount Everest base camp, killing eighteen climbers. Shortly after cleanup operations began, a second strong quake struck. Presumably this will cause a reconsideration of the plan. Another major project, this one financed by a Chinese company,8 involves a canal through Nicaragua which, if completed, will rival that of Panama. Three times as long as the Panama Canal, it can accommodate larger ships and will connect Punta Gorda on the Caribbean with Brito on the Pacific, from whence goods can be transported to China. While some see benefits to the economy of the second poorest country in the Americas, others see a looming ecological catastrophe. The proposed route goes through Lake Nicaragua, which is the nation’s major source of drinking water as well as of the fish that are an important part of the livelihood of the people around it. An oil spill could be devastating. As in the Himalayas, the area is earthquake prone and has several active volcanoes.9 There have been off-again on-again discussions between China and Thailand about a canal through the Kra Isthmus, the narrowest part of the Malay peninsula. Again, the costs are staggering: an estimated $28 billion and ten years to complete. If completed, the distance between the Pacific and Indian Ocean/Andaman Sea would be cut by 1200 kilometers and eliminate the need to pass through the Straits of Malacca. Such a canal would fit in well with Xi Jinping’s one belt-one road plan.10 Military Enhancements Economic pressure, or the threat of economic pressure, has been successful but is only one part of the strategy, the other being military action or the threat of it. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has since 1989 benefitted from double-digit budget increases every year but one,11 2010, and even in that year it was a winner in the PRC’s budget wars, rendered more acute by the impact of the global financial crash on the country’s finances. The increases are notable in that they began as the Cold
While there is speculation that the developer Wang Jing is backed by the Chinese government, there is no definitive proof of its direct involvement. 9 The Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/can-a-chinese-billionaire-build-acanal-across-nicaragua/2015/02/03/e9cf3482-9aa5-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6_story.html. 10 Want China Times, June 1, 2015. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-printcnt.aspx?id=20150601000001&cid=1501. 11 While the initially announced increment for 2003 was up 9.6% to 185. 3 billion yuan ($22.3 billion), expenditures were over budget, for an actual increase of 11.72%. 8
Fall 2015 | 5
TEUFEL DREYER
War was ending and most other countries were reducing drastically their defense expenditures. Moreover, the PRC faces no external enemies. As in other sectors of the PRC, there is a great deal of corruption in the military. While a recent campaign against corruption has revealed that billions of dollars meant for military modernization were diverted into luxury homes and cars for the officer corps, there can be no doubt that China has been able to acquire impressive military capabilities. The bulk of newly developed weapons have gone to the navy and the air force, indicating that that is where the leadership thinks it will have to fight. In April 2015, the U.S. Navy issued a report, the first unclassified version since 2009, describing the PLA’s expanded capabilities. These included the launch of China’s first aircraft carrier; development of longer-range and more accurate missiles; significant improvements in the nuclear submarine force; and deployment of the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) designed specifically for attacking aircraft carriers So far, these assets have been used for intimidation and harassment. American analysts believe that the Chinese intend to exert pressure by keeping the military at a distance. The intent is to use paramilitary forces such as the coast guard, local militias, and fishing boats in a coordinated effort. In one scenario that worries Japanese policymakers, hundreds of fishing boats arrive in the area of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which although under Japanese jurisdiction, are claimed by China. Their numbers are too large for the Japanese coast guard to handle, and moreover the Japanese coast guard has been skittish since the ramming incident in September 2010. The fishermen carry arms. Backing them up are provincial sea patrol boats manned by maritime militia—described by Japanese intelligence as young men raised on propaganda about the need to “recoup” China’s sacred territory and armed with machine guns. At least some can be presumed to have itchy trigger fingers. The dilemma for Japanese policymakers is how to respond if one or more of these young men fires on their ships. It is widely believed that the Chinese leadership is trying to get the Japanese side to fire the first shot, allowing Beijing to declare that it has been provoked and therefore has no alternative but to respond; the situation could escalate from there. Yet if they do not respond, the islands will be slowly absorbed. Turning from the East China Sea to the South China Sea, in May 2014, a Chinese state-owned oil company moved an oil rig into an area near the Paracel Islands, claimed by both China and Vietnam. For several days, clashes took place between Chinese coast guard vessels and Vietnamese boats that tried to enter the approximately 12-mile perimeter the Chinese ships had established around it. Several Vietnamese vessels were rammed, and one sank. The Chinese also trained water cannon at the ships, as their air force jets flew over the rig and PLAN hovered in the background. These actions set off anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam that resulted in two deaths and significant property damage. In July 2014, the rig was withdrawn, earlier than originally scheduled, with the explanation that weather factors
6 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
were involved.12 A year later, it was reinstated, just prior to the visit of the head of the Vietnamese communist party to Washington.13 Shortly thereafter, Chinese ships accelerated the pace of a project begun in 2013, building islands from reefs and shoals in several areas of the South China Sea and adding landing strips for planes. According to Beijing, these are for civilian purposes: search-and-rescue operations, marine meteorological forecasting, and the like. However, U.S. intelligence discovered two Chinese motorized artillery pieces on one of the artificial islands. The airfields will eliminate the PLA’s need for in-flight refueling to maintain air control of the South China Sea.14 Beijing has maintained that this island construction is within its sovereign rights, and has warned off U.S. reconnaissance planes conducting surveillance near them.15 It has also reserved the right to declare an ADIZ over the South China Sea. If built, the Kra Isthmus canal would have military significance as well. Singapore allows American warships to use its naval facilities, meaning that, in time of hostilities with China, the U.S. Navy could quickly interdict the pivotal Straits of Malacca. The Kra canal would provide the PRC with a critical alternative.16 Hybrid Warfare Beijing’s strategy, which entails coordinating various component parts that include economic carrots and stick, civilian and semi-civilian fishermen, provincial coastal patrols, and the regular Chinese coast guard, while the navy remains in the background is called “hybrid warfare.” Since only the Japanese military and the Indian military are even remotely a match for the PLA, this leaves other states with two unpalatable choices: either they can withdraw or risk provoking a kinetic confrontation they cannot hope to win. The Philippines, while withdrawing, has filed a complaint against the legality of the nine-dashed line with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Hague, but the PRC has rejected jurisdiction. Even an ITLOS ruling in Manila’s favor, though perhaps enabling it to score a point in the court of world public opinion, is unlikely to change the PRC’s stance.
The New York Times, July 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/asia/chinese-oil-rig-near-vietnam-to-bemoved.html?_r=0. 13 Reuters, June 16, 2015.,http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/26/us-southchinaseachina-vietnam-idUSKBN0P60X320150626 14 Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R43894, Jan. 28, 2015, pp. 29-30. 15 The Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2015, http://www.wsj/u-s-surveillance-on-island-revealschinese-arms-1432864632. 16 Want China Times, June 1, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-printcnt.aspx?id=20150601000001&cid=1501, citing Yazhou Zhoukan, Asia Weekly, Hong Kong. 12
Fall 2015 | 7
TEUFEL DREYER
Will the PRC’s Strategy Work? Beyond asserting control over the area within the 9-dashed line, this combined economic and military strategy will, if successful, push the United States out of Asia. In addition, China will gain control of the sea lanes of communication in the area. The consequences are not negligible: more than $5 trillion of shipping transits the South China Sea alone each year. The South China Sea also provides about a tenth of the world’s annual fishing catch. In other words, control of the area within the 9-dashed line will change the geopolitical configuration of Asia, with China definitively dominant. As the Chinese media frequently point out, the United States is not an Asian country and hence, Beijing concludes, has no right to determine the configuration of power therein. The best-laid plans often go astray, and there are no guarantees that this aspect of President’s Xi Jinping’s China dream will be fulfilled. On the military aspect of the strategy, hybrid warfare has the disadvantage of being hard to coordinate. To succeed, its numerous disparate component parts must work in harmony. In the process of translating theory into actual implementation, there is a high probability that something will go wrong, with potentially disastrous consequences not just for China but for the other countries involved. As for the economic prong, the “one belt, one road” concept is currently a slogan, not a reality. As evidenced by the rush to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), virtually every country wants Chinese investment. However, they also have concerns about Beijing’s willingness to use economic sanctions to obtain political ends. These states are increasingly aware of the dangers of becoming more dependent on the PRC for economic prosperity. Other nations worry that China intends to re-create the tribute system of the imperial era, forcing them to ketou (kowtow) to Beijing’s wishes. Russia, although nominally an ally of China, is worried about Xi Jinping’s previously noted “one belt, one road” development plan stretching from China through Central Asia to Europe, recognizing the road’s potential for diminishing Russia’s influence in the former Soviet republics through which it passes. As in the case of the Nicaragua canal and Himalayan tunnel, ecosystem damage is a further concern. The Philippine government estimates that China’s reefbuilding will cost fishermen up to a $100 million per year, since the reefs are breeding grounds for high-value fish. Dredgers have been pulling up the coral itself, crushing it to use as landfill.17 Japan has made similar complaints with regard to the illegal removal of red coral from its Ogasawara Islands.18 The Washington Post, May 12, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/12/beijings-power-play-inthe-south-china-sea-may-be-killing-coral-reefs/; http://www.rappler.com/nation/90878china-west-philippine-sea-reclamation-fisheries-food-security. 18 According to Asahi TV, Oct. 27, 2014, four unusual features characterized the poaching activities: 1. Most of the Chinese ships continued to stay in the waters even after the crews of three of them were arrested; 2. The poaching ships sailed about 2,000 kilometers from China to the waters, meaning that the income from the red coral would not cover their travel costs; 17
8 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
Chinese Domestic Concerns Additionally, the PRC has many internal problems that could hinder and perhaps even prevent these ambitious plans from reaching fruition. There are questions about the wisdom of Beijing taking on so many expensive projects when its economic growth is slowing. While a slowdown from the growth rates of previous years has been expected, it is impossible to tell whether the process will be gradual or sudden. There are ominous signs: newly-constructed apartment complexes stand empty, and capital flight out of the country has increased. Local debt is large and growing: As much as 50 percent of local government borrowing is for the purpose of servicing existing debt, thus requiring additional loans to produce growth. The stock market has shown worrisome volatility. On the other hand, China has shown an impressive capacity for muddling through difficult economic times before, and may well do so again. There are many discontents among the citizenry; protests and demonstrations have increased in frequency. Concerns with its rising defense expenditures notwithstanding, Beijing actually spends more on domestic security than it does on the military. The intent seems to be not, as in most democracies, to protect citizens from criminal elements so much as to protect party and government from angry citizens. News media are censored; the internet is monitored closely. Filters are in place to screen out words and phrases that have been deemed subversive. The ecosystem is in danger of collapse and pollution is severe. A devastating documentary “Under the Dome,” made by a woman whose unborn child was discovered to have a tumor caused by pollution19 was censored soon after it came out, but had already been seen by tens of millions. China is also in danger of running out of water. A massive project to move water from better endowed southern China to the parched north has caused water stress in the south while cities in the north typically do not have the facilities to clean and process the water that has been brought to them. Taking advantage of the reality that most of Asia’s major rivers rise in the Tibetan plateau, China has been building dams along them. This, however, means less water for countries in South and Southeast Asia, which, since their economies are heavily dependent on agriculture, is a constant irritant in their relations with the PRC. China’s enduring need for additional resources reinforces a strategy of greater international assertiveness.
3. The poachers appeared to want to show themselves; and 4. The number of ships, 113 according to the Japanese coast guard, was unusually large. An expert on maritime security, Tokai University professor Yamada Yoshihiko, speculated that the intent was to test Japanese capability to monitor its islands. 19 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbK4KeD2ajI&feature=youtu.be.
Fall 2015 | 9
TEUFEL DREYER
Countermeasures There could be a catastrophic international event that would galvanize the current rather tepid will to resist China’s protracted tactics but so far these tactics have served Beijing well, at very low cost, and therefore will probably continue until they either succeed in establishing a new geopolitical, China-in-charge configuration or meet resistance causing China to back off. Given the disparity in size between the PRC and its smaller neighbors, as well at the latter’s dependence to varying degrees on the Chinese economy, Beijing’s increasingly nervous neighbors have reacted in small ways are less than effective. As previously noted, the Philippines has taken China to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, although Beijing has argued that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction. India has published its own map based on data from 500-1000 A.D. It shows India as the fulcrum of trading patterns, thus rebutting Chinese claims of an ancient maritime silk route focused on China. India has also increased its arms purchases, as have many other countries in the region. Japan has ended its self-imposed ban on selling weapons abroad, finding interested customers in India, Australia, and Vietnam. There are regular consultations among members of these four countries, but little appetite for any steps that might anger Beijing. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan has stated his desire for a closer defense partnership with the United States, and has called for a change to article nine of the Japanese constitution, prohibiting collective military action. 20 However, he faces strong opposition in the Diet, as well as polls indicating that Japanese public opinion does not favor amendment. Without wishing to downplay the significance of these actions, they do not meaningfully redress the balance between Chinese power and that of its neighbors and, therefore, have little deterrent value. There is no unity among the affected nations, and observing their deliberations reminds one of the fable of the mice who agree that a bell should be put around the neck of a predatory cat—yet none of them is willing to do so. What Should the United States Do? Washington’s previous policy has been to facilitate China’s growth on the assumption that an economically prosperous country will become both more democratic and more peaceful. It has become increasingly apparent that the second part of the assumption has not followed from the first: the PRC has become more prosperous but remains decidedly undemocratic and also more aggressive. Some commentators have suggested that the United States has suffered from “imperial overstretch,” but the same might be said of China’s actions in recent years. The stringent conditions under which the Japanese constitution can be amended make it nearly impossible to do so. Hence Abe arranged for a cabinet interpretation of the document that allowed collective action against military aggression. It has proved highly controversial, with critics, including legal scholars and members of his own party, arguing that this action is unconstitutional.
20
10 | Orbis
The Rise of China and the Geopolitics of East Asia
President Barack Obama with President Xi Jinping of the PRC in Rancho Mirage, CA June 8, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza.)
It is possible that the PRC may, like the Soviet Union before it, fall victim to its internal contradictions. If so, one alternative would be for Washington to take a wait-and-see attitude. That worked with the Soviet Union, albeit abetted by Reagan Administration policies that encouraged Moscow to overspend on military activities to the point that its economy teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. But China is not the Soviet Union. The United States never did assume that the USSR would become more peaceful if it became wealthier, and hence did not encourage its growth, even to the extent of trying to discourage its European allies from participating in projects like the Yamal pipeline that might enrich the Soviet government. The USSR also had a far larger proportion of ethnic minorities, amounting to nearly the total of Russian citizens, than China, where the total is under ten percent. Although ethnic fault lines exist, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, they are not of comparable magnitude to those of the Soviet Union. Given the reluctance of most nations in the area to risk poor relations with the PRC by resisting its assertive moves, a second policy option would be for Washington to encourage the affected states to solve their own problems, either by negotiating with the PRC or acquiescing to its demands. But doing so would most likely push those countries into the arms of the PRC. This is tantamount to a U.S. withdrawal from Asia—in effect giving the Chinese leadership what it wants. It also means fewer allies for the United States against a Chinese government that scarcely hides its antagonism toward America.
Fall 2015 | 11
TEUFEL DREYER
A third alternative would be to pursue a policy of containment, recognizing that America cannot deter Chinese assertiveness by itself but hoping that it can get other countries to partner with it, in essence creating a coalition of those willing to help and capable of doing so. Candidates are in short supply, though Japan, India, and Vietnam look like better possibilities than most. Judging from recent U.S. activities—for example, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter’s words at Shangri La, and the navy’s invitation to CNN to witness, tape, and then air a segment illustrating China’s belligerence---there is an increased willingness to publicly confront what U.S. intelligence has been aware of for some time. What actions these will translate into remain to be seen. Speaking loudly while carrying a small stick will not suffice. As former ambassador to the PRC Jim Lilley observed, bluffing does not work. The Chinese translate strong words without strong actions as a sign of weakness and will press their advantage. It is past time for the administration to discuss with its closest allies what actions they are prepared to back and actively participate in. Absent such commitments, it may be best to quietly concede control of Asia to the PRC. An effort to create a countervailing coalition with allies will be difficult. Critics observe that Beijing will respond by escalating, thereby creating a security dilemma. Typically, however, they offer no viable alternative save negotiations— which have shown themselves useless in the past: there has been much talk, but no diminution of China’s assertiveness. All the aforementioned alternatives—waiting for a regime change, ceding control to China, and attempting to create a countervailing coalition—have disadvantages. However, the last seems the least unpalatable. As always, however, the future is unpredictable.
12 | Orbis