Towards a unified theory of presupposition

Towards a unified theory of presupposition

REVIEWARTIC!!,E TOWARDSA UNIFIED THE03Y OF PRESt!PPOSITION* JOHN DINSMORE ** Presupposition is without doubt one of the most problematic and# contro...

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REVIEWARTIC!!,E TOWARDSA UNIFIED THE03Y OF PRESt!PPOSITION*

JOHN DINSMORE **

Presupposition is without doubt one of the most problematic and# controversial topics of linguistic theory today. The study of ;>resupposition has profoundly affected the w:ly linguists and philosophers view language, but has also brought *with it iin 8k3T!iin~l;:ji lwfge m.md3er of theors:tical treatments and very iittie ag:reement on their relative merit. In @ntax ali!c-isemntics 1 I, Oh and Dinneen have brought together a set: of articles which well represent the current state of research in this important field. They have assembled papers reflect:ing most of the main lines of thought, in philosophy, logic and1 computer science, as well a:: in linguistics. The follolwing papers appear in this volume: Lauri Karttunen and Stanley Peters, Conventional implicature Gerald Gazda r, ,/1solution to the projection problem Jerrold J. Katz, A solution to the projection problem for presupposition Traugott Schiebi:, 0n presuppositions in complex sentences Ralph M. Weischedel, A new semantic computation while parsing: presupposition and entailment S.-Y. Kuroda, K:atz and Langendoen on presupposition Janet Dean Fodor, In defence of the truth value gap ChoonKyu Olh irnd Kurt Codden, Presuppositional grammer Derek Bicker1on, Where presuppositions came from 3ohan Van der Auwera, Pragmatic presupposition: shared beliefs in a theory of irrefutable meaning Jan David Atlas, How linguistics matters to philosophy: presupposition, tru1.h and meaning Ruth M. Kempson, Presupposition, opacit,y , and ambiguity Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, ordered entailments: an alternative to presuppositional theories * Review of: Chom-Kyu Oh and David A. Dinnt:m, e$s+, Syntax and semantics 1 I : pmsuppositioa. New Yo::ksrndLondon: Academic Prws, 1979.4 &Ipp. $32.00 (cloth). ** Author’s ad&~~: John Dinsmcwe, 1$47S Old hhnta Rio Road, Cusrneville, CII 95446, USA.

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Philip L. Peterson, On representing event referefice R.K. Thomson, T:ruth-value gaps, many truth values, and possible worlds James D. McCawle:y, Presupposition and discourse structure Ivan A. Sag and Ellen F. Prince, Bibliography of works dealing with presuppositisn In this review, 1 will focus on thle two most central concertos of presuppositional theories, those of defining what presuppositions are, and of providing a solution to the projection problem for presupposition. I will attempt to sort out the positive contributions of the various papers and ultimately to show how they might form the basis of an adequate, unified and comprehensirite theory of presupposition. Attention will be given to the papers according to the extent to which they address these two central issues, and the impact they are lik4y to have on future research. Discussion of Peterson’s paper is omitted altogether as irrelevant to these concerns; I would not have included it in a volume; on presuppor;ition. Also Sag and Prince’s_ hihlinoranh~ V..H”.a~‘“y.‘,Jn&s no d&eunJ&n,

What are presuppositions? The problem of’ adequately defining the conc;ept: “presupposition” already has a relatively long history, going back ‘to philosophical discussions about Russell’s analysis of definite de:rcriptions, codified in the StrawsonSellar debate of the fifties. In S_JVI~QX a~td sertlantics 11, this debate continues. The S,WOmajor theories to emerge out of philosophical debate, the so-called semantic and pragmatic theories, are represented hen:, as well as some rlew theories . (1) Katz (hereafter Ka) proposes an esscntiall:y semantic theory of presuppositicIn. MnaMc theories define presupposition in terms of potential truth value gaps: 5 presupposes p iff’ the falsehood ofdylwould necessarily entail that S is neither true nor falx, or alternativeiy S presuppl)sesp iff S and not-8 each necessitate p. Ka presents two arguments in favor of a semantic theory, both of which are inconclusive. The first of these is that such a thleory offers a means of resolving Russell’s wellknow n paradox in natural language. However, Ka fails to show why l~~~u~tic theory would want to resolve Russell’s pa&ox. Can’t we accept it as real‘? C.6_swell (1973: 100-108~ points out that one can certainly define artificial lanes for which this paradox is unresolved. The !;econd argument is that the ~~~~rnption of t semantic theor!! allows one to characterize “aboutness” in nal ural language. ut Ka fails to demonstrate that thi,i is the only means of charac~~~~~~~“aboutness *, or that the semantic theory provides an adequate account. Both the semantic and pragraa tic theories hi& come under attack in recent ars as inadequate characterizatioblr: of speakers’ intuitions about presuppositions (e.g. Wilson 1975; 13&r and Lycan t 976; Dinsmore 19”79b:ch. 3). Tltis rather deciICChas belzn performed on various levels. Mos: attention has been given to /ation that the presuppositions of positive alid negative sentences behave

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in an alssymme:trical w y, predicted by neither theory, in that presuppos it:,ons of negativlz but not o typositive sentence can be cancelled, as in ( 1). (1) (a) * The King of France is bald; I in fact, there is no king of France (b) The King of France is not bald; 1

Seemingly, iu accord with the semantic theory the first clause of (a) or of (11)would be uniforml:~ truth-valueless if the second clause is true. Therefore (a) and (b) should be equally unacceptable. Ka adopts the traditional defence of the semantic theory in view of su& examples: 1-w;:wwnes that negative sentences are inherently an;biguJus bf tliveen ;I presuppositiohal (in tern al) reading and a non-presu#ppositional (external) rl:ading , Thus, in (la) tlhe external reading of the first clause is forced such that it is false! when the second clause is false. We will see later that this strategy is not justit’ied. The .,".*...I.".*" 5%mtnrhrtPir+honrv has lilrmuiea &spu’,ed ip, *hot onrxtovte Lawn l\narl *.a.- V.,"Ic hnati "YWSII w.llWb b"llcw*cu ‘Lc4.b ,/Vb,d 'rA'"VaJ found in which sentences clearly do not have t,he semantic (or pragmatic) presupg positions they are alieged to have, Ka attempts to disguise this problem in his spe’ cific formuhrtion of the semantic theory. Specifzahy, I& presents two definitions of presupposition, presumably with the intent that they should be extensionall~ equivale .1t . Thle first of these is an interpretiveckfidion, which tells what it means to satisfy a presupposition: (2) “The prcswp>osition of at-1assertive proposition 1’ is the condition under which P makes a statement, that is, under which P is a truth, or a falsehood” (p. 102). The second is ;1st~.~isr.va!de,f’irritim,which tells what conditions satisfy a prc supposition: (3) “The pnzsupposition of a proposition P is the riac_iuirementth:st every reading enclosed in heavy parent hcses appearin in the reading of P hav;! its approprate referent” (p. 124). The expressions “enclosed in heavy parentheses”’ and “approprizte referent” arc in turn ur~derstood as followsI. The apparatus of heavy plawnthewsis introduced to mark referenti:ll in c~~~trtst. to non-referential positions in a giver sentence. Ka himself admits 1hat referifnce in this sense is not to be confused wit5 the standard, ind,ependently 6 stablishe d seese defined iar t13rmsof the possibilit v of substituting cesreferential terms and preservi:ng truth valete. In fact 9 he states that there are. no generalizations to dtrternine whet. a position is referexnltial: this can only be decided orL a case-by-case basis hy oi: serving presuppositions. For instance, whereas the arguments of ‘kill’ are referential, that of ‘exists’ is not . The us of hewy p;mmtheses as a theoretical construct is cil*cular since Ka

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attempts to clarify pres:lpposition in terms of heavy parentheses, which can be identified only in terms of presuppositiarfi. Ka seems to be under the impreaion that to rise above the descriptive level it ASonly necessary to assume the existence of abstract theoretical constructs to attriWe a phenomenon to. I don’t doubt the need of theoretical constructs in scientific explanation., but some principles such as independent motivation are necessary in justifying such concepts. Otherwise such constructs would be as easy to come by as simply attributing any particular problemati: phenomenon to the will of God. An appropriate referent is the designatum df a referring term in a rsull context, one that contributes nothing to how the meaning of the term is understood. Pt is the concept of null context that allows Ka to explain a\Nay many of the counterexampies to the semantic theory. If a context is found m which a particular sentence S which presuppc~s p, clearly does not have p as a semantic presupposition, then Ka need only claim that that c:sntext is not a null context. But tile conlzept of null context is too unclear to be of any value in defining the concepts of truth and reference which Ka needs. A null context is 3ne which adds nothing to the meaning of the sentence. This in itself would seem to entail that deictic and other referring expressions cannot be assigned referents in a null context, such thaf most sentences are necessarily truth-vc,!ueless. Even if Ka could express his intent in this regard a little more clearly, the introduction of null contexts is as circular as that of heavy parentheses. Suppose :wewant to know what the semantic, inclu&ng presuppositional, properties of a givc:n sentence are. Ka asks us to look at its :nterpretation in a null conte:;t. Suppose that for two contexts the interpretations are in some way different. How do we kl?ow which of the contexts is thz null context, if either is? The null context is the one that adds nothing to the meaning of the sentence, so the ~11 context must be the one in which the meaning of the sentence does not deviate from the :::te semantic properties. But what the true semantl:: properties are, is the quest+ 1 we are tr!ling to answer in the first place. (2) The crucial question whethler negaticn is ambigul,us between a presuppositional and a noll-presuppositional reading is d%cussed by Atlas (A) and by Kempson We), who drau conflicting conclusions. The thesis that there is only one kind of negation is normally associated with the (Zcean iinalysis, according to which the external reading is the conventional meaniqg while the illtzrnaf (presuppositional) reading arises ac,’a conversational implica8 Ire. Against tl-!eseclaims, A argues (i) that there is no rat!onal basis for positing the external rather than the internal reading as the conve;ltional meaning of negation, and (ii) that the account fails to elcplairt why :he external reading, i.e., that whereby speakers say what they mean, anises a! all. A offers thrz alternative of simply assuming that the conventional meaning of notation is neil.her external nor interna; negation, but ratiher a more abstract entity that becomes t:xternal negation in son-e contexts and internal negation in others,

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just as a phoneme is ,ealized as one allop lone in one context an5 ils another in another* cc.39 tex t . A’S argument are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Gricean program. Contrary to A’S assumption, speakers almost always mean what they say; but they often mean something in addition to the conventional meaning, As Ke points out, the internal negation reading always entails the external negation reading. Therefore, if we assume that the internal negation reading is the conventional meaning, and allow the exterlral negation reading to arise as an implicature, the speaker would not be able to mean what he or she says, whereas if we assume that the external reading is the conventional meaning, and that the internal reading arises as an imp:icature, the speaker would mean what she or he says plus something Imore. Therefore, there is a rational basis for accepting the external reading as more basic. Furthermore, the Grfcean account does predict when the external reading arises. A conversational implicature can be inferred for a particular utterance on the basis of the form and conventional meaning of a given sentence as weii as the contextual circumstances that prevail. If we assume that the external negation is the convenlional meaning, the internal negation reading arise as an in@cature oniy under certain contextual circumstances. If those circumstances are not given, the internczi.reading will not arise and we are left with the more genera.1external reading. Ke makes this same point, viz. that the internal retding can arise from the external realding on the basis of specific assumptions but not vice versa, 2;s well as the point that transparent readings of noun phrases in modal environm<*nts can arise from opaque readings but not vice versa. She further argues that there is no c+rical or methodological basis for assuming that there is an ambiguity between internal and external readings or between transparent and opaque readings. Zwil:ky and Sadock’s well-known test for ambi ity fails to affirm the need for assumirrg ambiguity in these cases., though it mi e argued that the tests are not appKcab\e for technical reasons. Nevertheless, without these tests, Ke argues, there is no ejnpirical basis for assuming zmbiguity, since mere intuitions of zlmbiguify are normally problematic and l:rtJear . The reason for invoking ambiguity is for Ke theoretical: it may make it possible to pred.ict the range of entailments and contrad.ictions for sentences. Where semantically independent entailments and contradictions occur, it is necess;lry to assume ambiguity. Given that the entailments and possiblilities of contradiction follow from the mere general e:cternal or opaquie readings, the assumption cf ambiguity which allows the more specific internal or transpa.rent readings is redundant. I Grad Ke’s arguments quite cclevincing. If we accept them, the 6nly grounds remaining for assuming the ambiguity of negation would seem to be to explain away counterexamples to the semantic and pra,gmatic theories of pressupposition. (3) Two other papers are related to the theory of semantic pr:supposition, 7fiowtason develops several models of semantic presupposition for formal languages, He is particularly concerned with developing the distinction between metawili

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ikmgugre and objectlimgw~ mo&ls of presupposition. The latter mod4 introduces 3 prcsupposit ion3l connective into the object language, thus disp’aying properties of semantic presupposition which are not displayed in the meta’anguage model. He is not concerned with demonstrating the usefulness of a notion of semantic presqposition for natural language<. F&&W(F) defends the existence of truth vaiue gaps in natural language, srrawing how they might arise in cases of reference failure. For instance, because there is no king of France, (4) exhibits a truth value gap while (5) is siimply false. (4) The King of France visited the exhibition. (5) The exhibition was visited by the King of France. sts that these observations follow from the way such sentences are \ sentence is &vays interpreted with respect tlo some world. Pragmatic principles del:ermine the relevant world, depending f)n in which worlds referring terms refer. The real world and the world in which a topic (‘the King of France’ in (4) and ‘the exhibition’ in (5)) exists, are preferred. Thus (4) is interpreted wit 1 respect ao some world in which the King of France exists, while (5) is interpreted ‘with respect to the real world in which the exhibition presumably exists. A truth value gap results when 3 sentence must be interpreted with respect to 3 world which is not specified well enough for a truth value to be determined. We can say little abolJt a world in which a thin fiction like the Kir’igof France is supposed to exist. Specifically, we cannot determine iif (4) is true 01 not. Therefore (4) is without truth value. Since (5) on the o’cher hand is interpn.:ted with respect to the real world in which any proposition is either true or false, (5) is simply false. Although F’s fascinating suggestion supports the existence of truth value gaps in natural language, they in no way support the semantic theory of presuppoGtion. Contrary to l.he semantic theory, she 3ssumes for any givt:n world that if a term fails to refer, falsehood results. Furthermore, the occurrenl:e of 3 truth value gap s not refI:ct 3 necessary property of a sentence, according to her theory. For instance, the truth value gq in (4) would not arise if the state of the real world were different, for instance if the King of France existed, or if the King of France were not suclh a thin fiction that (4) would be of indeterminable truth value in i;r world in which he existed. 64,’ Kurodrt (Ku) su ests that althou the justification I$ the semantic theory of presupposition cems to ultimately depend on the intuitj13n about the presence of 3 truth value gap, intuition can be misleading. “Absence of truth value could be 3 ly illuw~~ amalgam of heterogeneous intuitive factors activated by the interact~ons of various concepts and notions, among them the conc:ept of falsehood” (p9). There IS no reason to believe it is not such an amalgam; some investigators hood, after all, where advocates of the semantic therv intuit a truth v3lu~ gap.

Ku’s main argument that an investigator’s intuitions may fail is based on the sentence (:6),which Katz and Langendoen (1976) claim presupposes (7). (6) if .Jack.hassisters, then all of Jack’s children are baJd. (7) Jack has children. KU creates a clear context in which (6) does not presuppose (7). According, we must Elssumeeither (i) that (6) in fact does not presuppose (7)3 or (ii) that the ;:resupposition of (6) has somehow been suppressed outside of the gramm:r in this particular context. Whereas the logic of the competence/performance distinction would entail that (ii) is the case, there is a reason to assume that (i) is the case, Ku arjauesthat the questi(Bnof truth value ‘Dnlycomes up with respect to tokens of sk:ntenceslike (6) because deictic elements, etc. make trutn value dependent on contextual features, Therefore, it would seem that intuitions about the absence of truth value would be more basic for tokens of (6). The methodology which Katz a!nd tangendoen assum(:, whereby the important intuitions are arrived at without t:onjurirrg up token:; for which the truth value is fully determined, is not justifie:d..lust as entailment is not immediateJy available to intuitive understanding, but must be investigated with the help of appropriately seiected contexts, so are the intuitions about the presuppositions of sentences not to be trusted. These points have been made about semantic and syntactic intuitions in general by La bov (1970), who supports his claims empirically. I/t should be r.o surprise tc: Katz ;\nd Langendoen if Ku should turn out to be right. Bever et al. (1976: introducticn) maintain that many phenomena that previously were considrbred grammatical because faith was placed in immediate intuitions, turn out to result rrom various pe~~formancefactors. Ku suggests that when intuitions cannot be trusted, ir theory of presupposition can nevertheless be evaluated on the basis of practic ea[son.He shows how speech act theory can provide a basis f’or such evaluation. e distinction b&ween truth and falsehood, but not that between falsehood and truth-valuelessness has a place in the analysis of speech acts. Truth and falsehood correspond respectively to the sincere al?d insincere uses of declarative sentences, but a sta:l:ement is insincere, regardless of whether it is false or without truth value. Xn contrast, Ku shows how practical reason supports the pragma.tic theory of

presupposition with respect to questions. The pragmatic theory seeks to define presuppordtion in terms of eoInditionson the appropriate use of sentencc:s:S presupposes p iff S can be used felicitously just in case p is old or given infonraatiofl. NOWconsider a question like (8). (8) presupposes (9) when (8) ha:; falling intonation. (8) Is *Cohna linguist of a philosopher? (9) Jolrn is either a linguist or a philosopher,

Ku explains that the speech act of utterring (8) demands a choice on the part of the hearer betwlten ‘John is a linguist’ and *John is a philosopher’. Therefore, it’ the speaker is sincere in uttering (8) he must believe that one of the choices wou1c.ibe 19true assertion, and furthermore believe that the hearer knows which one is Irue. ]It follows that If (8) is uttered sincerely, (9) must be given. By definition, (9) is therefore a pragmatic presupposition ef (8). Practical reason supports the pragmatic theory, but not the semantic. KU’Spoint is particularly enlightening, Actually his example can be viewed, as far as it goes, as a hypotheticodeductive argument for the pragmatic theory: in assuming the pragmatic theory, we are able to predict that questions presuppose in tie observed way, without having to assume a separate grammatical rule which assigns presuppositions to questions. (s) Like the semantic theory. the pragmatic theory ef presupposition has come under heavy attack, and for many of the same reasons. The prai,snatic theory is not consistent with the asymmetrical behavior of positive and negative sentences, unles negation is assumed to be ambiguous. Thus, if the presupposition of the first clause of ( 3I)) is a pragmatic presupposition, (10) could never be used felicitously, since if the second clause is true the presupposition of the first cannot be given. I[IQ) The King of France is not bald; in fact, there is no King of France. Likewk, contexts can be found in which sentences are felicitous even though their intuitive presuppositions are riot given. The context Ku creates for (6) above is an eX~Iple. tan der Auwera (V) proposes a revision of the pragmatic tht:ory of presupposi‘tion as a part of a more general theory of irrefutable meaning (see also Van der Au&era 1980). For him if p is th,o irrefutable meaning of an utterance of X then the foilswing is true when the speaker utters X: C1 I) The speaker speaks as if he wants to speak as if he believes p p is then ZIpragmatic presuppostion of X if and only if the following is true: ( 12) The speaker speaks as if he wants to speak as if he believes that the hearer acts as if he wants to listen as if he believes that the speaker speaks as if he believes P The most substantial innovation of V’s theory is his use of tjile term “as if’ in (12), which however does little more than to insulate his theory from the s of empirical refueatiol; discussed above. To say that someone does A as if he 63 is to draw an a ;Iaiogical connection between A and B and to presuppose an ding of w%at one does when one dloes B. V nowhere irrdicates what one one does B. For instance, if someone speaks as if he believes p, then

there :nust be some way of speaking when one believes p. Is this way of s:,bc.aking fixed ‘5~ the grammar? If one speaks this way does one necessarily, usually, \~r only sometmes believe p? This is unexplained, Ijnd consequently the statement that someone speaks as if he believes ~r;r is meaningless. V points out that G*azdar(1979) had raised objections of this nature to similar propo:sals. Gazdar claimed that there would be no possibility of finding ‘:ounterexamples to such a theory. V’s reply is that there are indeed counterexaml rles: the last ckurse of (13 j should presuppose that Mary had left, but in the cor:text created in (13) it is not neceslsary that the speaker act as if he believes that th-: hearer believes that Mary had left, as would be required by (12). (13) I know that you do not believe that Mary had left You know that I b&eve it. Jllhn believes it too. You see, John regrets that Mary had left . . . V’s arigument is alot binding, but instead serves to examplify Gazdar’s point. Since the meaning of ‘as if is by its very nature obscure, wz might just as well assume that the speaker is in fact acting as if he believes that the hearer believes that Mary had left, when hc utters the final clause. This is certainly no less reasonable than assuming, as V does elsewhere, that the speaker acts as if he believes some proposition when he utters X as au example of an English sentence. Gazdar’s objection holds, but his objection does not entail that V cannot arbitrarily be selective in his choice about what to consider a case of speaking “as if”. (6) Bickerton (B) offers an i Ispired alternative to the semantic and pragmatic theories, and shows how the pragmatic behavior of presuppositions might follow from logical facts. For him S p:esupposes P iff S entails P and -8 implicat\;a p. Thus, (14) presupposes (16) because (14) entails (16) and (15) implicates (16>. (14) The King of France is bidd. (15) The King of France is not ba d. (16) There is a King of France. Two cetails are in immediate r eed of correction in this definition. First. it is wrongly asymmetrical with respect to negation. For instance, B unfortunatel:l cannot pnzdict that (15) presupposes (163, since (15) doe i not entail (16). Second, sentences don’t have implicatures as B assumes; only WCSof sentences do. Thomason (1973) offers a similar definition of presupposition which overcomes these problems. On the bas,s of such a Cricean theory, B ties presupposition to given informarion indirectly via the following pragm atic principle : (37) “The second member of a pair of conjoined se :Itences must add substantifre iun if the resulting ;ientence is to be well formed” (p. 238).

From (17), it follows for instance that (18) but not (19) is well formed. (18:) Someone ate the co&ies and it was you who ate them.

( 19) It was you who ate the cookies and someone ate them. It follows more generally from (17) that the uttei lace of a sentence with al presupposition “must carry the implication that either its presupposition hasI already occurred, and is therefore acceptable to lboth speaker and hearer (otherwise it would immediately have been challenged), or that, if it had already occurred, it would have been accepted”’ (p. 246). Hence the apparent pragmatic nature of presupTo(sition. B’s theory combizz features of a semantic and of a pra,patic account while avoiding problems of each. In particular, the fact that the presupposition.s of negative sentences are not necessitated and in fact i:an be cancelled, a.s in (10) above, presen ts no problem for his theory as it does for traditional accounts. However, B’s insi ts do not provide a complete, workable thelxy of presupposition: First, his definition of presupposition assumes that the negation of a sentence can always be defined. Kuroda (1977) shows tilat this assumption is false. Some presuppositiortal sentences don’t even have negations. Second, some false predictions follow from the assumption that B’s flefinition is correct For instance, if we assume that (21) is the negation of (20) each must presuppose (22) in accord with the necessary revision of his definition discussed above. But intuitively neither (20) nor (21) presupposes (22). (20) George, who was present, ate my sandwich. (2 I ) George, who was present, didn’t eat my sandwich. (22) George was present. ‘Thirll, B’s account would seem to predict thsit any entailment of the kind he cabs ‘“weak’” entailments would have the same pragmatic behavior as presuppositions. S weakly entails P iff S entails P arid -S is compatible with either P or -P. us (23) weakly entails, but does not presuppose (24). (23) Ceasar managed to conquer the Gaul:. (24) Ihe Gauls were con:;uered, It should follow from (17) tlat (24) cannot be conjoined after (k3), but that (23) conjoined after (24). tiience (23) should, if we follow the s;ame argument y B deducelJ the generally pragmatic behacior of presupposi(iotls, carry the lication that (24,) has already occurred, or that if it had already occurred it have been accepted. However, (23) seems to have no such implication. M!mn and siserber (W&S) suggest that the presuppositions of a sentence ape pieces of infoipmation which are marked as ‘Deingof low relevance. Informa-

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tion expressed by subordinate clauses, definite noun phrases, ar d nonrestr;ictive relative clauses are so marked. Cleft: constructions and the placer lent of sentence stress also serve to separate relevant fJ3rn non-relet ant i9formiltiOn. It is apparent &hat this theory is inadequate as a strict account of intuitions about presupposition. Thus they would claim, and intuition would affirm, that the information (22) is marked as of low relevance in the sentence (20) above. However it would be counter to intuition to claim that (20) presupposes (22). W&S claim that they are able to make pr,?dictions a bouh ichebehavior of prem;uppositions from their theory. InformaGon which is low in relevance should behave under denial and questioring the way presuppositions are observed to behave: such information is preserved bet:ause the denial or questioning of information low in relevance would amount to a denial of the relevance of the whole utterance. This would seen to explain why (21) seems to entail (22) just as its positive counterpart (20) does, or why (25) seems to entail (26). (25) Is it Sydrie\j. who needs (261, Snmenne I_--_--_._

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W&S offer convincing arguments against the adequacy of semantic the Jries of presupposition as well as of Gricean theories of the type Bickerton prolzos~s. They do not, however, discuss pragmatic theories. If we accept their explanation of the behavior of information marked as of low relevance under denial or questioning, the same behavior could be predicted for pragmatic presuppositions. If 5’ rragmatically presupposes p9 then if S is used felicitously, p is given. But if $1is given, then it :is no longer relevant. Therefore, the denial or questioning of S would bea? on the information of S not contained in p, and leave p preserved. The bulk of W&S’s paper is devoted to the analysis of sentence stress. They suggest th;r for any sentence a set of gnmmatically specified entailments may be generated by variable substitution of each syntactic constituent which contains the sentence stress. For instance, the grammatically s Cfied entailments of (2” ) would be (28). (2’7) You’ve eaten all MY apples. (28) (a) You”ve eaten all of someone’s apples. (b) You’ve eaten all of something. (c) You’ve eaten something. (d) You’ve done something. (e) Some thing’s happened q One of these constittients, e.g. ‘all my apples’, is chosen as the fdcus.The entailment generated by substituting the focus, e.g (28) (c), is the backgmurrd and represents nonrelevant information, Grammatically specified entailments above the background, e.g. (28) (a) and (b), represent the foreground, and are entailments of increasing re:levz~.Xe.

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W&S go on to discuss the behavior of entailments which a.re not grammatically specified. They maintain that such entailments which k.re entailed by the background may be part of the presupposition, that those which entail the background may ‘be part of the point, and that all others contribute neither to the psint nor A the background. On the basis of these distirtctions they present a set of faulty explanations of why certain sentences have or fail to have the presuppositions they do. For instance, they observe that (29) (a) does not presuppose (29) (b) as @ted,but that (30) (a) does presuppose (30) (b). (29) (a) (b) (30) (a) (b)

My BROTHER wants to meet you. I have a brother. Susan regrets that she LEFT. Susan let?.

In each case, (b) is a not-grammatically :;peciAed entailment of (a), which neither entails nor is entailed by the background cf (a) (assuming t!!at ‘my brother’ and ‘that she left’ are the respective foci). W&S conclude that (‘Xl) (b) is, therefore, not 3 *i:ormaly Ijresupposes (38) normally part of the point of (30) (a) so that (30) (_) (b), but that (29) (b) must be added to .the background to obtain (29) (a) so that the presupposition (29) (b) is cancelled. But by the same token we might argue r.hat (29) (bJ: zmnot normally be a part of the point of (29) (a), and that (30) i[b) must be added to the background to obtaii? (30) (a). We may therefore just as well falsely predict that (29) (z) normally presupposes (129)(b) and that (30) (a) normally does not presuppose (30) (b). Even if these inconsistencies in their arguments 3re disregarded, W&s still fail to explain wh;g; (29) (a’, rl;s&ts in “cancellation” rather than inclondstency. And, in deriving e presuppositionality of (.30) crucially from the particular placement of sentence stress in (30), they are unaMe to explaini why (31) has the same presuppositon as (30) (a). (3 l) Susan J%EGRETSthat :;he left. (81 In spite of the great effort expended, no substantial theory of what preppositions are is offered in syntax am-l semantics II. Each proposal in this ard is either vacuous, or empirically rcf’utable. The volume has, however! added the already overwhelming body of evic’lelnceagainst the adequacy of the semantic and pragmatic theories of presupposition. In fact, we may conclude that the claim sitton is a homogeneous grammatical phenomenon is tenous at best. for an adequale theory of what ptesxppositions are, we should keep da’s point that practical reason can justif!{ a particular theory. I will w how the development faf a solution to the projection problem for can motivate ;B general theory of presupposition in this way.

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The projection problem The projection problem for presuppo&on, the problem of deriving the presuppositim of’ complex sentences from the presuppositions of the components, has proven every bit as precarious as the problem of defining what presuppositons are. Proposals for solving this problem of essentially three types, to which I now turn, appear in Syntax arnd semantics P4. (9) The name “projection problem” suggests that its solution should be compositional, i.e., that one posit a se: of grammatical rules which work up the syntactic tree to derive presuppositions for one level of structure from the next lower. Three papers follow this program, consistent with conventional methodology. Karttunen and Peters (K&P) develop a theory specifically of conventional impli(:atures, which they see as a proper subset of the general concept of presupposition. The latter, they claim, does not represent a ilomogeneous grammatical phenomenon at all, but rather provides a cover term for such distinct phtinomena as particularized and generalized conversational implicatures, preparatory conditions on speech acts, as well as conventional implicatures. They develop a formal means of computing the conventional in-plicatures of sentences as an extension of Montague grammar. In K&P’s system, conventional implicatures are assigned to sentences ;is foliows. Each syntactic COE!’ntuent A is assigned two expressions of intensional logic: an ex tens&o expres,rion , A ‘, and an implicatwe expression, A’. If A is a basic lexical item, Ae and A” are given in the lexicon. If A is a comphx expression with the immediate constituents B and C (in standard Montague grammer complex expressions are always put together pairwise), then Ae and A’ are tLnctions of Be, B’, c, and 6. Recursively, the extension and implicature expressions associated mwitha sentence follow from those of the contained basir etion of Be and c’. A’ is, on Where A is made up of B and C, Ae is purely a the other hand, a conjunction of two expressions, Si(m and Bh(d). 1p is arr irhbfance function associated with (Be, a’) which blocks, alters, or leaves untou&e d I he .impli~atui:es of C, M&P’s treatment of the projection problem consists of the statement of condotions ‘3n *this inheritance function. For functors over propositionsp e.,~., f0.r verbs taking :;ententi:al complements, the inheritance function is either the identit:, func tion (for holes:), a mapping onto null (for plugs), or a mapping from propositzionst0 beliefs .&out those propositions on the part of the subject. The latter applies to verbs Gke ‘hope’, ‘belic=ve’,‘fear’, etc. For instance, the complement of (32) has the: conventional impticature (33), represented in intensional logic as the implicatur(* expression of the complement. The inheritance function associated with ‘believe” i:s such that the implicature (33) is transformed into the implicature (34) of the serktence as a whole. (32) Fred believes that is was George who left.

(33) Somebody left. (34)

Fred believes that somebody left.

Filtering is likewise handled by means of conditions on inheritance functions. T%e rules for filtering are r,ot entirely equivalent to those of Kaittunen (1973). K&I% ru!es for handling the projection problem thus operate over conventilonal inrplicatures to the exclusion of other types of presupposition. Their claim that the generalizations that can be made about the conventional implicatures of complex sentences do not carry over to other kinds of !)resupposition is therefore vital to their theory. But this claim is demonstrably wrong. Fcr instance, consider the followi-lg sentences. In each case, (b) has been tr:tditionally regarded as a presupposition of (a), ‘but only for (35) would it be a conventional implicature as well. ( 35) (a) (b) (36) (a) (b) (3’7) (a)

Mary failed to arrive. h4afy was expected to arrive. John criticized Harry t”orwritting *theletter. Harry is responsible-for writing the letter. If it were raining outside, the drumming on the roof would drown out our voices. (A) It is not raining outside (38) (a) The King of France if; bald. (b) The King of France ex.isrs. By #&P’s filtering conditions for conventional implicatures (35) (b) is lost as a conventional inqlicature (and thereby as a presupposition), when (35) (a) is emedded as in: (39) Matv, was expected to arrive and Ma.ry failed to arrive. However, just as the presupposition is lost in ‘(J5) (b) and (35) (a)‘, it is also lost in ‘W) Ib) and (36) (a)‘, in ‘(37) (b) and (37) (a’)’and in ‘(38) (b) and (38) (a)’ as the reader can determine. Since (b) is not conver&nal implicature of (a) fot (36), (37), al~J (38) these last facts do no? follow from lKU?‘s filtering conditions. i!ariy, by K&P’s conditions on the in.heiitance of conventional implicatures 140) da) presupposes (40) (‘3). ) (a) George believes that Mary failed tu a.rrLe. (b)Ceorge believes that Mary was expecteci to arrive. t as the presupposition is altered by embedding under ‘Geoqse believes’ ves (35 j (a)‘,the reader will agree that the sentence ‘Geo;ge bel!eves ‘George believes (b)’ for ealch of (36), (37) and (38). Again, sinc.e

(b) is not a t:onvuntional implicature in these last cases, the.$e facts are not predicted from #&P’s rules, !t C&:Ibt: sinClarly !ihown that K&P’s rule which blocks conventiona’ implicatures embetided under plugs, corresponds to a generalizakn about all presuppositions embedded under plugs, etc. Counterexamples to K&P’s claim that heir generalizations about the inheritance of conventional implicakrres do not car ;y over to presunpositons in gekqeral,can be multiplied over and over .tt will. We are f4jrced to exten;l. K&P’s grammatical rules to preslppositions in general. The only alternative would be to assume that presuppositions which art: not conventional implicatures obey distinct principles, which by cgkcidence give the same res@ s :LSthe project on rules for conventional implicature!i. Bu;, if presupposition in genesal is not a hcmogeneous grammatical phenomenon, as K&P have i(I believe currcctly) argued, then projectioir rules for presupposition can?& be rules of gramm_ar, as K_&Ppropose thev are. The -I-i--wacnn -c k t!lat, there u/~ulA nn 0’” cwsbmrnatirsl w._ hf! WV a*.* . . . . ..I Y-e--. category for which the rules were to apply. Hence, K&P’s claims are inconsistent. Even if we assume that presupposition is a homogeneous grammaticaJ category, there would nevertheless be reason to question the explanatory signifku~ce of seiting up rules of projection as K&R have done. As Gazdar (1979: 109) and Morgan (1973: 136) point out, the generalizations about the conditions under which presuppositions are lost, retained, or altered, belong to descriptive linguistics. To posit formal rules which cancel, retain, OI alter presuppositions when the appropriate observed conditions obtain, adds nothing to the description of the phenomenon. Such an account is anything but explanatory; in no sense does it tell us why filtering occurs, why certain verbs should be associated with the loss of the presuppositions of their sentential complements, ETC.I conclude that K&P’s work is theoretically uninteresting, K&P’s theory can also be discredited at t more ~:ommonplaee level: the rules they ultimately need to capture the subtler facts :u-e prodigious and Jf extreme. complexity. Consi,der the rule that cancels the presuppositions of sentential ob_jects of plugs. (41) presupposes, and convc,ltionally implicates, (42) but under the plug ‘say’, 3s in (43) the presupposition iq i -St. (4 I) It was the King of France who fell our of his chair. (42) Someone fell our: of his chair. (43) The mar. sai,d that it was the King of France who fell out. of his chair. But the rule flor plugs, as it stands, would positi,on obsljrved in each of the following.

&cl

incorrectly eliminate the presup-

(44) ‘Fred says that it was the King of France who fell c)ut of his chair. (45) I said that it was the king of France who fell out of his chair.

TO account for (44) and (45),,wemust specify that the normal affect of p’lugsis lost when the plug is, in the generic fomj, or when the subject of the plug is in the first person. (This second aestric:tion, incidentally, cannot be stated in K&P’o~ Montagtre framework at all, because of the way their rules are structured.) But even these rules would be inadequate. 6azdar’s (46), with the plug ‘ask’, does not seem to prmuppose that there is a Duke of Edinburgh, although the subject is not th e fus t pmson and thaeverb is not generic. (46) The Queen asked the Prim? Minister to be more polite to the Duke of’ Edin-

burgh. What additional restriction i’Eneeded for (46), is anybody’s guess. The point is that the rules needed to keep the theory consistent with the empirical facts turn out to be quite complicated. Katz (Ka) and h/ei&edeZ (W) also offer theories of the compositional type. Virtually e:fery scruple- expressed here about K&P’s theory carries over to those of Ka and W, although the latter are much less explicitly worked out. Ws zccount is Tinmost essential respects equivalent to that of K&P, though it employs the formalism of an augmented transition network. Where K&P posit implicature expressions in the texicon, or inheritance functions, W assume: various computational processes which yield similar results. Of course, W’s is an account of presupposition rather than of conventional implicature. ,Although he doesn’t work out the details, W suggests that the conpositional rules of his parser be supplemented by a pragmatic mechanism for computing given nfot-mation, so that as the parser proceeds from left to right, computed presuppositrons are lost if the context has already been augmeued to include these presuppositi(Bns.This proposal bears similarities to that of Schic:be, to be discussed below. Strangely, Ka claims to have progressed beyond the descriptive level, at which ctious approaches to the projection problem have remained, by introducing the eoretical constructs necessary for accounting for tLe presuppositions of complex Serltences. What he gives us is a theory of minimal empirical content which is fundamenta!iy misconceived. The theoreticsg constructs he posits, aside from the heavy parentheses c&cussed above, are rules which install, or remove heavy parentheses. But the earlier argun~nts against thtr.justification of heavy parentheses as a theoretical construct apply ~qu~~~ to heavy parentheses wipe-out rules. We already know that presupposiitions of embedded ser;tences are often lost in larger sentences, and Karttunen ( 1973) has garnished USwith a fairlv good initial descriptive account of this phenornenon. To ~~t~bute the phenomenon tcl mysterious heavy parenrneses wipe-out rules, the exis&rice of which iz not independently motivated, adds nothing to the description. Furthermore, Ka has not even provided us with a very accurate descriptive accsunt. He makes no provision ‘for the alteration of presuppositions, for instance of ‘believe’, which K&P recognize. A term is either enclosed in heavy r it is not,

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1 conclude that theories dealing with the projection problem of the c:ompositional type, those mast closely associated with established methodolo:gy, have notlbing at all to recommend them. They explain nothing and ultimately describe the facts badly. f1’U)Two papers suggest th;it the solution to the projection problem lilas in the assumption of a mechanism whereby potential presupp asitions are carYtceUc?d when in conflict with Gricean. principles. Gzdar (G) posits the abstract categories of im-plhztuw and pw-supposition (hyphenated) which are assigned to structures, and an explicit system frfr c:ence!ling some im-plicatures and prce-suppositions stich that tl-.e others remain as reali presuppositions and implicatures of the complex sentence as;a whole. Jn+plicatures are of two types. A sentence S with a scalar expreniw~ h the scab quality im-plicature that the speaker knows th;rt rIota’, abbreviate{. K X’, for every sentence S’ produced by replacing the scalar e::pression in S by a strnriger expression :in the same sca!e. For instance, ‘some’ and ‘all’ are scalar expressions, ‘some’ being the weaker. Therefore (47) im-plicates K (48). (47) Some of the boys were at the party. (48) Noi all of the boys were at the party. A sentence S embedding a sentence S’, such that S neither entdils nor is entailed by S’, has the cZuusa2qutantity im-plkwtures that S’ is possible and that n&S” is possible, abbreviated PS’ and p1S’. For instance, (49) im-plicates P (50) and P? (50) . (49) If John sees me he will call the police. (SO) He will call the police. Pre-suppositions are assigned according to the oct:urrence of presuppos” tional , structures or lexical. items in the simplest way without regard to level of embedding. G allows for the cancellation of some im-plicatures and pre-suqpositions accord. ing to the Lollowing hierarchy: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

propositions given in the context entailments clausal implicatures scalar imlrlicatures presuppo: itions

Clausal implicatures are those clausal im-plicattules consistent with 1 abnd2. Scii:at inplicatures are those scalar im-plicatures coinsistent with 1,I 2, and 3. Presupp& tions are thoadepre-suppositions consistent with 1,2,3, and 4 For instant:e, (5 11)implicates X 1 (SJ), while (52) lacks this implicature.

(5 1) John dj,.~4 it or Mary did it. (52) John dIt3 it or Mary did it C)Pboth of them did it. (53) John did it and Mary did it. By G’s rules, K’l(551) is a scalar im~plicature of both (5 1) and (.Pi3).kiowever, P (53) is 3 clausal im-plicature of {52), but not of (5 1). Assuming this clausal im-plicature is not cancelled in (52), the scalar implicature must be cancellled, because it is inconsistent with P (53). Most cares of filtering are accounted for easily. The final clause of (54) presup poses # (55). yet the pre-supposition is lost in (54). (54) if there is a King of France, then the King of France is bald. (55) The King of France exists. By G’s ales, P 1(55) is 3 clausal implicilture of (54j. Since this is inconsistent ___1LL Y I CC, IL- --- ,__.-___tA?_X.._ :- 8--I wim A f33j, me pre-suppuwricln is Iusc. Conversational implicatutes are normally assumed to arise on the basis of the cooperativr: principle (Grice 1975) in a way that m3kes them sensitive to various contextual factors. G, on the othier hand, assigns implicaturt:s fairly strictly purely 011the basts ol’s~ntact~~c;rnd semantic properties with no regard to subtle pragmatic consideratrons. Thus, if G’s gener.aJizations about the conditions under which imp& catures arise and are cancelled are correct, they should ultimately follow from the cooperative principle. And if they follow from 3 principle which involves such sub ric contextual factors, it is not to be expected that the generalizations can be so uniformly stated in terms of syntactic and semantic factors as G assumes. As 3 :natter of fact.. there stem to be many counterex3mples to G’s generalizations. Here are a couple. G predicts that (56) (a) should carry the scalar implicature K 1 (b), since “try’ and ‘succeed’ zre members of a scale. Yet this implicature generally fails to arise, 56) (a) Mary was trying to cash a check. (b) Mary was sticceeding in c3shing a check. G predicts that (ST’) (a) should carry the clausA implicature P ‘l(b), yet (57) (a) ems in contrast to implicate K (b). (54) !a) ‘8hegiwere able to finish the building. bb) 1 hey finished ahe building. icts that the factive verb ‘regret’ must be associated with the clausal implit the coinp~ement is pb&bly true, but possibly false, The reason is that not asso&aled with the entailment of the complement. 3s sentences like

353

(33) Fred thinks that Mabel ate his cupcake, and his cupcake.

regrets

very mui:h that Mable ate

Yet ‘regre2’ is almost always associated with the implicature the complement is tirue,

as (33) demonstrates.

(59) Fred regrets very much that Mabel ate his cupcake. Although such counterexamples to the correctness of G’s cancellation hierarchy tlo exist, they in no way weaken G’s important main point: that when implicatures We, inconlpatible presuppositions disappear. The explanatc~y powers of this simple gem:ralization are too extensive to be dismissed. G makes another important point, that intuitions about th presuppositions of sentences (Iften depend on properties of those sentences in spe:ific:contexts of rl&. For instanl:e, (60) and (6 1) are problems for compositional accounts which associate the loss of a presupposition of a complement with the presence of a piug iike “say’. Although the presupposition K (55) ‘the King of France exists’ of the complement is in fact lost in (60), the presupposition K (62) in the complement of (61) is not. (60) Stl.awsonsaid that Russell WE wrong abolrt the King of France. (6 1) Lord .&on :raidthat Churchill regretted resigning. (62) Churc bill resigned. G’SP&S assign K (55) as a pre-supposition to (60) and K (62) as a pre-suppc;ition to (61:). However, he points out ?:W in most contexts not- (55) is given, Iwhereasthis is not the case for not- (62). Accordingly, K (55) is cancelled in (60) in most contexts., and this results in the illtuition th 60) doas not presuppcle K (55). G’s reference to %lost contexts” is an import:a step, because it involves the thesis that the data for which presuppositional theories attempt to account are not to be explained purely fn terms of gra.m\maticalrules, but rather in terms of the properties that sentences happen to have in some proper subset of all possible contexts, Although this position is encouraged b:v the failure of the pragmatic theory and by the concllusio:~that some intuitive presuppositions, e.g., those of negative sentences, are convcrsatiolilalimplica,tures which arist: in only some contexts, exactly what this subset is rnu!it be carefully specified if G”s claim is to be of predictive value. XForinstancl3,in most contexts, one would think, 419proposit?on that France is a republic is g&n. Yet in (63), the pre-supposition th;lt there is a King of France is not cancelled as it is in (60). (63) The King of France in not bald.

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The properties of sentences in “most contexts” can be seen to underlie the very existence of generalized conversational implicatures, and thereby most other cases of cancellation of presupposition. Conversational implicatures arise for utterar,ces when certain conditions are met, some of which are contextual, and some of which are syntactic and. semantic. Yet given that certain conditions can be assumed for most real contexrs, a particular sentence will fairly consistently be associated with the same conversational impliclatures from context to context. For instance, it is tsually the case that a speaker who knows that some A is B can be assumed to know whether all A is B, or it is usually the case that ifA regretsp, then p is true. Accordingly, ‘some A is B’ usually carries the generalized conversational implicature ‘not ;Jp A is B’, and ‘A regrets !I’ the implicature ‘p’. The intuitions about implicatures and thereby presuppositions seem to depend on what happens in “most COW IfZXW. In spite of its insights, the theory G proposes is, as it stands, inadequate in some essential ways. First, G carmitt account for rt’newe&known fact that existentiai sentences such as (64) are not associated with the presuppositions normally associated with the definite descriptions. (64) The mayor of Chicago exists. In fazt, since (64) entails (and is in fact identical to) the pre-supposition G would halve to assign, thi: pre-supposition could not be cancelled. Second, G’s =ystem cannat account for sentences like the following, which Soames (1979) discuses. (65) If Haldeman is guilty, then Nixon is guilty too. (66j Someone other than Nixon is guilty. G would have to assign the pre-supposition (66) to (653, since this is the presupposition of the ct_-nsequent clause of (65). However, (65) does not presuppose (66). To cancel this pre-supposition we must predict the implicature K 1(66) or P 1(66), but the best we (:an do is predict ‘possibly Haldeman is not guilty’, which does not entail cne of the needed implicature?. Third, G’s system suffers a fundamental inadequacy in dieregarding the kinds of examples for which Karttunen (1?73$ originality set up the categories of plug and oie. For instance, a presupposition of the complement of a verb of saying is normalignlost. G carnot account for tk fact thin (67) does not presuppose that Fred ate timecupcake. (67) George said that Mabel knows that Fred ate the cupcake. We have also y;een that K&P accotrnt for cases in which an embedded presupposi-

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tion is altered, rather than blocked or preserved. Since G’s system has nc mechanism to account for this phenomenon, it is in one respect descriptively less adequate than K&P’s system . Oh and Godden (O&G) propose a solution to the projection problem which combines elements of K&P’s and G’s accounts. Like K&P, theif propose compositional rules which predict presuppositions of complex sentences from those of th(e embedded sentences. But although their rules art not entirely equivalent, they suffer the same inadequacies oC K&P’s rules discussed earlier. Like G, they propose a mechanislm for cancelling presupp&tions, but on the surface this mechanism is quite different. First they explicitly ad,opt what a little thought shows to be equivalent to a pragmatic defmition of presupposition, i.e., one which relates presuppositions to propositions which must be given, if a sentence is to be felicitously uttered, Then they propose a set of g:eneruloperating principleswhich put additional restrictions (corresponding to Gricean principles) on the felicitous use of sentences. Finally, they demonstrate that ease: in which presup_fin;+:*.rn *_“.Ati”c.f, l-a& _,_A &I,.., ,,.t:_.l--.-.-l-I L:-r-l-'-:A ---- 2.. YV3~~~~~~~ ap)~~al LU UF 1~3~ SWIG CI~US~~: WIIIC;LI WUUIU ut: II~ICLICIZOUS in accmd with the general operating principles, if the respective presuppositions werpegiven information. O&G’s theory is very similar to that of Soames (1979). G’s theory is far more explicit and elaborate, >ret largely equivalent to O&G’s in principle. For instance, each can predict the loss of the presupposition (69) of the final clause in (68). (68) If Jack has children, then all of Jack’s children) are bald. (69) Jack has children. G would generate the clausal implicature that P 7 $9) and thereby cancel the! presupposition (69). O&G, on the other hand, would show that (68) could not be felirinciple which prohibits any citous if (69) were given, due to a general operati. proposition already given in a speech situation fr eing assertebd,questioned, or conditionalized. Since (68) cannot be used wht:re (69) is given, (68) cannot presuppose (69). In principle, O&G can account for the loss of any presupposition G can, by supplying the appropriate general operatlrrg principle which would underlie the implicature that G would generate to cancel the pre-supposition. Addition;dly , O&G as well as Soames are able to account for the loss of presuppositions in sentences like (64) above They need only show that if a sentence ike (64) were uttered in a rzontext in which (64) were already given, a violation of &ice’s maxim of quantity, “be informative’“, would result. ,S,o, O&G would aeaaon, (64) cannot presuppose itself. Whereas G, since he does not specifically *.ie .&ist!reory in with given information, cannot extend his generalizations to sen1ences Txe (64). ‘There is certainly something subjectively right about O&G’s basic idea. Never:.heless, as it stands, their theory suffers from a p.rofounci defect: for them, a pre!:upposition p of a sentence S is cancelled when:: (a) the rules of the presupposi-

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/A

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of prtwpposition

tional gramm8.r skould require that S is felicitous only if p is given, but (b) the general operating principles require that if p is given, S would be infelicitous. The exact nature of the rules mentioned in (a) is not stated even though the inference that s d(>esnot presuppose ~1’calrnot be made without knowing the nature of those rules. If (a) means that p mu!st be given if S is felicitous, tlhenwe cannot show that s does nvt presuppose p, otily that S cannot possibly be felicitous. Since sentences like (64) and @3) are presumably felicitous under some circumstances, this would be an unacceptable conclusion. If (a) means that p must be given if S is felicitous, W&Wa violation of the general operating principles would result, then rules which assign presuppositions to sc:ntences would be vacuous. Since the general operating principles are conditions 011the felicitous use of sentences, infelicity would never result frD,m presuppositior: failure under these circumstances. And it would be mrlningiess to say that S pragmatically presupposes p, unless it were possible for S to be iFfelicitous because ~1 is not given. Finally, if (aj means that one would r/r~. , by cog~paris~n wif_h cmtttmrm Iike S, tabat S w&!d be fdiritmlc nnP\r if p ~~“Prt .YS.“ICV”” “.‘.J _...W..YYY wc:re given, the cancellation mechanism O&G propose becomes redundant. Under these circumstances, we mlrslt assume that the rules of presuppositional grammer do nclt in fact assign p as a presupposition of S on the basis of the structure of S as expected. But if a presupposition is not assigned it c,mnc: be cancelled. In sum, any explicit interpretation of (a) renders O&G’s theory wrong, vacuous, or redundant. The problem lies in the fundamental inconsistency of assuming sentences are as:;igned presuppositions, bu t that these presuppositions can be cancelled in the wwz that the%! sentences can be used when presuppositiolns fail, without resulting in Plicity. A strict pragmatic, theory of presupposition is too strong if presuppositions are n:ancetJed in the way G and O&G envision. (II] Like O&G, SchierSe (S) tries to derive a solution to the projection problem from an essentially pragmatic, conception of presupposition. But S bases his analysis on a more sop!histicatecj understanding of the structure sf given information and what it takes to satisfy embedded presuppositions. S’s procedrEra1account of the prl>jection problem probably represents the best work in Synta,x nnd semantics I I. estg that the felicitous use of a sentence S with a presuppositional construction (PC), i.e., a definite NP, a factive verb, etc., associated with an embedded prlssupposition p, req..lires that p be given, but only in the local context of the PC. ?fFere are two aspects to defining what is given in the local context of a PC. The first of these is that the local context may be different from that in which the senterrci: as 6 whole occurs. Thus, the use of (70) requires that it be given that it is rain~g, in the context of the PC ‘stop’. It does not reqllire that this be given in the earlier context in which the utterance of (70) begins, since for (70) we are guaranteed that this irlfcrmation will1be communicated prior to the context of ‘stop’. (7(f)

It is

iainin g and it will not stop raining until tomorrow

+

The :zcond aspect is that what is given in the local context is relative to a spe-

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/ A unified thm y nf presupposition

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cific WW& depending on the scmamic structure of the sentence in which the FY occurs. There are two kind:: of worlds, model’ w;m’ds,created by the imagination, as in fictional stories: and WS~HSof persorts, in which th3se propositions which various persons believe, are true, For insltance, the use of (71) requires that in the contc.:xt in which ‘stop’ occurs it be given that. 1t is raining in Peter’s belief world. (71) Peter belit.ves that it wi’l not stop raining rlntil tomorrow. Presuppositi 3ns are thus :;&isfled pragmati.:ally in a uniform way ir the local contexts. When we speak 05 the presuppositic)ns of 2~complex szntenoe, we are speaking of what must be given in the context in wh.&:hthe utterance elf the sentence as a whcle begins. Thz general rules fo: the salisfaction of presuppositions determine this indirectly. T~LIS,(70) cotlId be felicitocs even if its utterance began in a context in which it wert! not given zhat it 1s rtining, while (71) could be felicitous only if its utterance began in a context in which it were given that Peter believes that it is raining. Aczordingiy, the presupposition appears to be filtered i;~ (70) and altered by embed Sing undes Peter’s Scliefs in (71). (S calls verbs like ‘believe’ which have this affect dyers.) The information given jn a specific world c:;m originate in another world in accordance with the principle of expectation. llti~ principle allows anything given in one world to be asssum(:d for any less bask world dependent on that world, alidity of such an assumption. For unless there is independent reason to doubt the *q i? raining, then it is given in Peter’s instance, if it is given in the real world that it belief world that is is raininjg unless ht is known :h;l(t Peter happens to believe that it is not raining. The principll: of expectation aX13wt)olie to account for filkl mg in sentences like: (72) It is raining and Peter b4ieves that it will n,o~stop raining until tomorrow

.

What S’:s theory lacks toi be of rigorous prIcc.i&ive value, is an explicit enough clarification of worlds: what worlds there are, w+en they need to be invoked, etc. This problem is dealt with at length in Dinsmore (198 I), where worlds arc given alxplicit logical and psychological characterizations. The principles of expectation are shown there to follow from independently motivated cognitive principles. Unfortunately, S does not demonstrate the explanatory pours of his system here as well as he does in Schiebe (1975). It may be helpful to review some of the types of dais that can be accllunted for. We have seen, with respet*t to (70), thal the asymmetry of fillering is predicted. More generally, S’s system allows the prediction of a certain indepsndence of filtering from syntactic form. For instance, in (73) the presupposirion associated with the PC ‘stop’, that Charles is negotiatinig with Peter, is filtered exactly as if I.he connecltive ‘and’ were present. (73) Mary is sure that Chctrles, whom she believes to be negotiating with Peter, will otiating with him.

To account for (73, K&P would have to extend the set of conditioning environments for filtering. These additional cases are simply a logical consequence of S’s system. Which verbs are holes and which dyers can also be predicted. Verbs for which the complement is entailed, for instance, will always be holes, since the complernerlt is assumed true in the real world, and accordingly it is in the real world that the presuppositions of the complement must be satisfied. Furthermore, we can predict a large number of different kinds of dyers. According to the logical criteria discussed above, ‘NP believes . . .‘, ‘according to the story . . .’ ‘under the assumption thatp,. . .’ each serve as a functor to introduce a world. Filtering between modal environments is predicted to occur in exactly the way that can be observed. Thus, S predicts correctly that filtering occurs in (79. (74)

George believes that it is raining and George ibelieves that it will not stop raining untii tomorrow.

In the context of ‘stop’, it must be given in George’s belief world that it is raining, but the content of the first conjunct ensures that this is given regardless of what is given in the initial context for the sentence. Similarly, S predicts that filtering will not be successful in (75). (75) Someone believes that it is raining and someone believes that it will not stop raining until tomorrow. in the context of ‘stop’, it must be given in some! particular person’s belief world that is is raining. Since we don’t know the identity of that person, this can be the case only if it is given in every person’s belief world that it is raining. The content of the first clause does not ensure that this is given in everybody’s belief world. Therefore it must be given in everybody’s belief world in the initial context of (75); hence the peculiarity of (75) results from the redundancy of the first clause. K&P, on the other hand, wou1d incorrectly predict filtering in (75) as in (74). In each case the second conjunct presupposes the first; therefore, in accord with the fittering conditions on ‘and’ filtering must occur in each case. The failure of filtering in (76) is explained in a way similar to that in (75). Here the presupposition must be satisfied in an indefinite world of possibility. (76) ?It :s possible th;t there is a King of France, but it is possible that the King of France is bald. Examples of the kinds of data for which S’s sy:;tem provides an explanation can be rnu1tiDlied at will. But in spite of its explanatory powers, S’s theory has some faults: s of filtering which Gazdar can explain, cannot be accounted for in S’s

J. Dinsmore /A um’fkd theory dpfprescppcsition

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theory. For instahce, Gazdar predicts the filtering of the embedded presuppositions that Hilary is female and that Hilary is male in (77). (77) Either Hilary is a spinster or Hilary is a bachelor. For S, the presuppositions of the first disjunct must be satisfied in a ~voz%-l in which Hilary is not a bachelor, while the second must be satisfied in a world, ir. which Hilary is not a spinster. Accordingly, S predicts the following presuppositions. (78) Either Hilary is a bachelor or Hilary is female. (79) Either Hilary is a spinster. or Hilarv. is male. But (78) and (79) together are equivalent to (77). S incorrectly predicts that (77) ^__“. presupposes itseli’i It”~urtuver, - - 3----- S’S thw~ y depends GE a paphe definition of presupposition, yet we have seen above that strict pragmatic theories are lintenable. For instance, a pragmatic theory of ptesup?Josition would be incomparible with cancellation in (77). This problem must be resolved. 1wcCawZey(M) motivates an analysis of definite descriptions which matches S’s work very closely. He holds that the interpretation of definites must be as$sumed to occur in a way depend.ent on a contextual domain, a set of objects which have been identified up to a given point in time during a particular discourse. A contextual domain is a structured set of increasingly larger dom;iin!<, n-r/~:.~ exclusive domains containing those objects which are more prominent. The interpretation of a defclnite involves searching through increasingly larger domains until one is found in which a unique object satisfies the definite description. This aspect of M’s system resembles Lewis (1973) model as he applies it to definite descriptions. The contextual domain is incremented in the course -of’a discourse when an existentially quantified expression is used, but under certain circumstances this incrementation is only temporary. For instance, the first clause of (80) introduces an object, a son, permanently into the contextual domain such that the definite pronoun ‘him’ can take that b:bject as a referent in the second. clause. The first clause of (8 1) introduces the same object tertnporarily into the contextual domain such that “him’ in the second clause refers to that object (80) We have a son and we’ll name him Oscar. (8 l)/ If we have a son, we’ll nan-te him Oscar, M shows very convincingly th b; this model avoids many of the prcablems traditionally involved in the logical analysis of definites, bol:h free.$standi.ngand bound by quantifiers. For instance, Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions entails that “the dog likes all dogs’ is synonymous with ‘the dog likes itself’, since it entails that

360

.I. Dirwmm /A unified theor.,,of presuppositiotr

there is only one dog, while M’s analysis avoids this prediction. Traditional analyses of quantification involve setting up a quantifier with all coreferential pronouns in its scope. Thus (81) would have to be represented as @2). (82) (Ax

:

son x) (we have x + we will name x Oscar).

For (8 1), such a representation is counter:intuitive, since the quantifier s:hould range over existing sons. This, and additional problems of more complex quantificational sentences are avoided by interpreting all definite pronouns with respecf to the conte:fthe behavior of holes and dyers on the basis of structure and meaning, wh:.le G or O&C azc*+unt for the failure of presuppositions to appear which would otherwise be exi>ected on the basis of formal considerations. O&G’s attempt tgosupplement a ~ar~~elIa~i~ntype theory by compositional principles can be unde Lstood in terms of this conplemen tarity . th of these worthwhile approaches to the projection problem are in need of r~f~e~~ent and explication, but their intents are clear. It is also interesting to nel:i& that the most fundamental problems for O&G and for S are connected with the assumption of a pragmatic theory of what presuppositions are, even though the Jmption of that theory is extremely fruitful in both cases.

J, Dinsmore /A unijkd theor) 1 of prewpposition

361

The basis of a unified theory of presuppmition Presupposition, perhaps more than any similar sublfield of linguistics, is characterized by multitudinous theoretical proposals on its behalf. Most of the major prop.Jsals are represented in Syntax and semap2tics11. Many of these are entirely incor+. patible, involving different empirical clains or methodological assump:ions. Yet, t:tn the basis of the foregoing reviews, I think we are in a position to make some tlefirntive statements about what features a comprehensive and unified theory of presupposition must have. First, presupposition is closely tied with information given in speech situations in which sentences are used. This claim has too much explanatory power not to be true. We have seen that Schiebe explains the asymmetry of filtering for sentences like (70), (72), and f73), in terms of the effect of the incrernentation of given info= mation during an utterance. O!r and Godden acco,unt for the non-presupprsitionality of sentences like (64), which contain PC’s in terms of the infelicil!l that would arise if certain propositions were assumed to be given information. Kuroda has shown that the association of questions with given information can be predicted from other facts. Similarly, given McCalvley’s analysis of definite descriptions, it is easy to see how the strong dependence of the use of definites on given ex$tential information can be lpredictzd from the dependence of the interpretation of definites on the context\lal domain. Second, grammatical theories of presu:,)position, including both the semantic and the pragmatic tireories, are inadequate insofar as they purport to characterize the intuitions speakers have about presuppositio:rs of sentences. Most significantly, the relation that .nust be assumed bethqreen presuppositions and given information is more tenuous than that entailed by a strict interpretation of the pragmatic theory. We have seen that grammatical theoril:s are in principle in conflict with the cancellation of presuppositions, and that contexts c-an often be found in which sentence may be used felicitously even :houg;h its presuppositions are not given. This last point has particular weight in light of Kuroda’s argument that properties of sentences in contexts of use more reliably reflect the grammar than prorZlertiesof sentences in abstraction from contexts of’ use. The failure of grammatical theories of presupposition does not mean, however, that there is no homoger~ous way to characterize presuppositions in a theory of performance. There are two reasons i;Oi*believing that this is in fact p~~:~sible:(a) the intuitions about the prl:suppositions of sentences set, ;I to be fairly homogenous (although the term “presupposition” has been applied to sentences rot considered here which do not reflect this intuition); anr’r(b) presuppositions selzrn to behave fairly uniformly under embedding, as I have shown wit” respect to sentences (35) through (38). Third, intuitions about presuppositions reflect prcjperties of sentences in some subset of all possible contexts of USC:.This fcAlows from three consl.deratiors: (a) Some presuppositions a;e generalized conversational implicatures, e.g. those of .

( 15). (37) (a). (59). etc. 1~1fact, Gazdar’s theorv. is more coh1ent

if we assume that an!’ presupposition which can be cancelled, i.e., which is ncjt an entailment, is a conversational implicature. Generalizecl conversation;4 implica!ures, in turn, arise in some subset of all possible contexts of use. (1~)Some presuppositions are cancelled because they conflict with generalizeld conversational implicatures. Since generalized conversational implicatures arise in a subset of all pcssible contexts, the conflict arises only in a subse? of all possible contexts. (c) G:lazdarhas shown that preositions are often dependent on what happens to be given in “most” contexts of use, but not all. Fourth. in lieu of grammatical rules associating presuppositions with specific Constructions, the association of specific constrtlctions with information given in contexts ctf use can often be predicted indirectly on the basis of other phenomena. I mention again Kuroda’s explanation of this association for queritions and the explanation of this association for definites whicil follows from McCawley’s work. Bickerton attempts to explain this association with only partial success for presupposition in gener 31. Fifth, the concept of given information is more complex than that traditionally assumed. Given information is dynamic, i.e., it is incremented continuously over the course of an utterance. It is structured in terms of “worlds”. Finally, it is inore mclusive that speaker and hearer beliefs: the fact that Schiebe’s expectanq principle under-lies tne satisfaction of some presuppositions indicates that it is enough Ior a presupposition to be antkipated irmthe appropriate world, rather than strictly

believed (0: 3ins;nlore 1979a). These points lead definitively to a conceptian of presupposition which- 1 have citveloped m considerable detail elsewhere (Dinsmore 1979b, 198 1). AccorfJin@:to rhis view, the presuppositions of 3 sentence are those propositions which w*Jufdbe caxpccted to be given in a normal or typical utterance of that sentence. TLIs, the sIrtuition that a partictllar sentenc e has a terrain presupposition, arises from the er’s e7fort to omtextualize that sentence on Ihe basis of his knowledge of

conditions most commonly prevail in cooperatve discourse. For instance, the it ion tl-wt a sentence with a factive verb presuppl3ses its sentential complement,

t

s not as a necessary property

of that sentence,

or as a necessary condition

on

1icitoJs use of that sentence, but from the fact that the sentential cornples most comm;>nly given when a factive verb is used. Why certain conditions this most commonly

prevail, is explained

in terns of very general principles of

rse. ESis a much weaker theory than the tradition4 pragmatic theory of presupposition, and suffers none of the inconsistencies of the latter. The so-called “cancelilation”’ of presupposition described by Gazdar and by Oh and Godden is no more than the re’iult of reconciling incompatible tendencies in the consistent contextualization of a particular sentence. The general prograf,mSchiebe outlines to explrrin the positions of complex sentences is a logica consequence of this view IIf pre; sitirJn, along with a cognitive theory of the wa;/ given information is struc-

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363

The blind application of established methodology in the hands of Katz, Karttunen, Peters and others, has brought us n3 closer to an umlerstanding of presupposition, only to frustration. The ultimate understanding cm only result from the search for an appropriate theoretical perspective, one th3t achieves the sin plest cornprehensiv: and unified explanation of the facts.

References Bcvcr, Thomas A., J(r:rroid .I. Katz aqd Thomas Lancendoen. cds. 1976. An integrate
and C. Sioat, eds.,, Praxeedings of the 8th Annual WeCoi. Carbondaleli~dmollton: Lpnpuistic Research Inc. pp. I5 -22. Dinsmore, John. 1979b. Pragn:.ztics, formal theory and the analysis of presupposition. Ph.D. d4ssertation, University of California, San Diego. (Available , from the Indiana iJniv. Linguistics Club.) Dinsmore, John. 198 1. The inheritance: oi’ presupposition. (=Pragmatics and beyond 9.) Amstcrdam: John Benjamins. Gazdar, Gerald. 19?9 Pragmatics: impiicature, presuppositio:: ;xtd logical form. New York/ London: Academic Press. Grice, H. Paul. 1975. ‘LoKic and conversation.’ in: P. Cole and J. Morgan, eds., Speech acts. (“Syntax and sem?.ntics 3). New York. Londoirg: Acadelnic Press. pp. d--58. Karttunen, Lauri. 19:!3. PIesuppositions uf compound sentences. Linguistic lnqtt.i,ry 6: i69193. Katz, Jerrold and D.T Langerdoen. 1976 Pragrnatics and prc-c;r pposition. Language 52: 1- 17. Ktrroda, S.-Y:. 1977. IPescript:on of presu~~positic\nal phcnomt~n:~ from a non-presuppositionaiist point of view. Linl:uistic,le Investigationes 1:53- 162. Labov, William, 1970. ‘The stvldy of langlrage in its social context’. In: William Labov, Socioiinguistic patterns. Philadtiphin: Univcrsiiy ot P’ennsyivania Press, 1972. pp. 183- 259. Lewis, David. 1973. Counterfal:tuals. Harvard ‘f.lniversity Press. Morgan, J.L. 1973. PresupposiGon ;md tl:e rcrresentation of meaning: proiegomena. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago. Schiebe, Traugott, 1975. ubcr Prisuppositionen zusammengesetzter Stitze im Dcut~he:1. Stcr(:khelm: Aimquist and Wikseii. Soames, Scott. 1979. A projection problem for speaker presuppositions. Linguistic Inquiry lO(4): 623 -656. F~honiason, R. 1973. Semantics, pragmatics, com~ersation, and presupposition. Ifnpublistled, University of Pitts?x@. Van der At.:wera, Jo!lan. 1980. On the meaning uf i)asic speech xts. Journal of Pragmatics 4 : 253-264. Wilson, D&&e. 197 5. Pressupposition and non-xrt h conditional seman t its. London/Ne*v York: Academic Press. ./ohrz 13insmore (b. 1949) did his doctoral work in linguistics at the University of California at San Diego. Spent t?w academic year i979-1980 doing research at the LJnivcrsity of Biolefcld. Presently cannectecl with the University of California at Berkeley, he works mainly in semantic and pragmatic theoI jr.