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A behavioral alternative to an ecological approach to understanding the development of knowing in infancy: A commentary
DEVELOPMENTAL
REVIEW
A Behavioral Understanding
3, 405-409 (1983)
Alternative to an Ecological Approach to the Development of Knowing in Infancy: A Commentary FRANCES DEGEN HOROWITZ
The concept of affordance is proposed by Goldfield to account for “knowing” in infancy as an ecologically more valid approach than Piaget’s notion of representation. While the use of affordances is regarded as an improvement over the concept of representation an argument is put forth that a more parsimonious and scientifically useful approach to the development of knowing in infancy is to be found in a behavioral analysis of a learned association of stimulus cues with behavior patterns.
Eugene Goldfield (1983), in his article “The Ecological Approach to Perceiving as a Foundation for Understanding the Development of Knowing in Infancy,” has provided an extremely articulate presentation of the ecological approach to perceiving as an overarching account of knowing in infancy. The cornerstone of this approach is in the use of Gibson’s notion of “affordance.” Originally proposed by J. J. Gibson (1977) and taken up by E. J. Gibson (1982), the concept of affordance involves perception of the environment in the context of a particular perceiver whose perception is affected by the size, form, and capabilities of an object or person. Thus, an object takes on a “meaning” as a function of its dimensions and utility. In the illustrative example given by Goldfield, a chair “affords” sitting, i.e., imparts the meaning to the perceiver of an object for sitting when it has the characteristics of being a “sit-on-able” object and the perceiver associates a behavior with the object -a behavior within the perceiver’s own capabilities. While an object may afford sitting to an adult the same object may not afford sitting to a young infant who cannot yet sit. Goldfield has successfully demonstrated that Gibson’s theory of direct realism and the use of the concept of noticing affordances as an index of “knowing” are superior to Piaget’s account of knowing in which one must repair to the concept of representation. However, one might question whether Goldfield has merely substituted one higher integrative concept for another without much additional benefit. It is not clear that using the concept of affordances results in the derivation of more useful or testable hypotheses than is the case with Piaget’s notion of representation. In fact, in may be the case that a more fruitful approach to ac40s 0273-2297183 $3 .OO Copyright All rights
0 1983 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
406
FRANCES
DEGEN
HOROWITZ
counting for “knowing” in young infants would be better served by a behavioral interpretation involving a paradigm of conditioning in relation to evolutionarily determined structural constraints and behavioral predispositions. To more fully discuss the possibility of going beyond the notion of affordances and to forestall an “old saw” discussion of conditioning let it be said at the outset that in proposing a behavioral-conditioning paradigm no simple assumptions of a “tabula-rasa” are being made; nor is there an assumption that external sources of reinforcement lie only in socially mediated events. Rather, it seems that the considerable data on infant response capabilities and on the neonatal behavioral repertoire lead to a more sophisticated model involving initial behavioral capability, evolutionarily determined parametric constraints on behavioral probabilities and highly probable effects of physical consequent events in relation to behavioral responses on the part of the infant. Given this model it is possible to consider,the processes that account for the development of “knowing” in infancy and to test the validity of hypotheses that can be derived from postulating certain processes. The following elaborates upon this. First, in light of data gathered over the last 25 years, it is now clear that the human infant arrives with a relatively well-developed, albeit limited, behavioral repertoire. Further, it is likely that some environmental events have greater potential for attracting and maintaining infant attention and for being noticed as occurring in systematic and consequential fashion. These characteristics are likely adaptive for survival and may well reflect the evolutionary history of the human organism. We know that the normal human newborn responds discriminatively to visual, auditory, tactile, vestibular, and olfactory stimuli. Further, repeated presentations of these stimuli result in a response decrement which is not the result of receptor fatigue since presentation of a different stimulus within the same modality results in recovery of the response. Additionally, it is beginning to appear that some stimulus parameters may be more inherently attractive and attention maintaining than others. Stimulus motion, auditory stimuli within certain ranges, visual stimuli of particular characteristics, etc., appear to have particular preeminence for the neonate and the young infant. Thus, the initial behavioral repertoire is likely constrained by neurological structures and, again, likely the result of the evolutionary history of the organism. Immediately after birth the human newborn typically enters into a system of interaction with social and nonsocial stimuli and under proper conditions of nutrition (and possibly environmental stimulation) continues along a pathway of species-constrained structural development begun at conception. The trajectory of the developmental course is likely highly
A BEHAVIORAL
ALTERNATIVE
407
canalized with only significant physical insult or strong environmental aberrations capable of deflecting the course. The question of the degree to which environmental variables affect the quality of the behavioral development occurring along the course remains yet to be determined. Nevertheless, movement along the trajectory must be analyzable in terms of processes no matter what degree of predetermination one wishes to espouse. The central specific question is the question of process. One set of processes that can be offered for consideration involves the assumption that certain magnitudes and patterns of stimulus change have reinforcing properties for the human organism along with the primary and then the conditioned reinforcers. If this is the case then it is reasonable to postulate that a conditioning analysis, given the species COW straints and the structural realities of the organism, will provide a more powerful and testable account of the development of the acts of noticing affordances. In other words, the act of noticing affordances is considered, from this point of view, as an instance of learned behavior. However, it must be noted that learned behavior in a conditioning analysis need not require that the determinants of learning be solely environmental. Biological constraints likely provide some of the determinants of learned behavior but there is nothing magical about such a postulation. The scientific challenge for a full accounting of behavioral development requires a description of the processes involved in behavioral development. Some aspect of process will focus upon environmental events, some upon past history, and some upon biological parameters. Examples in the article abound that are more powerfully explained in terms of learned behavior than in the surplus meaning surrounding the terms “knowing” and “affordances.” For example, let us take the proposal that a chair “affords” sitting when the infant can sit and has perceptually mapped the environment in terms of the physical characteristics of objects that afford sitting, i.e., have the shape, size, and accessibility attributes of objects classified as being “sit-on-able.” The information about the object that defines it as sit-on-able serves to limit or constrain the degrees of behavioral freedom in the infant’s repertoire. The information that the object is sit-on-able may also involve affording “climbon-able” and “stand-on-able” and “fall-off-able” but not “throw-able” or “wear-able.” Goldtield describes the role of such information as constraining the degrees of behavioral freedom in the infant’s repertoire. However, it may be more parsimonious to consider the role of information to constrain behavior as the power of certain stimulus cues to bring certain behaviors under control as a function of a history of association of those stimulus cues with repeated patterns of action on the part of the perceiver and on the part of the perceiver’s observations of others in interaction with objects that have those stimulus cues. Rosch (1978) refers
408
FRANCES
DEGEN
HOROWITZ
to such stimulus cues as “exemplars.” When a core group of stimulus cues occur repeatedly in relation to one another and serve to categorize objects as same or different these stimulus cues are regarded as category exemplars. The behavioral analysis would involve the organism’s repeated encountering of a set of stimulus cues as cooccurring in an object class and in having an association with those cues a behavior or set of behaviors. Thus, it would be the history of association or learning that would account for an object such as a chair taking on the meaning of being sit-on-able. In a behavioral analysis the role of information is regarded as the power of certain stimulus cues to bring certain behaviors under better control of those cues as a joint function of past learning history and biological predispositions to attend to certain stimulus cues rather than others. The reason this explanation has greater power than simply attributing the development of “knowing” to an increased function of affordances is that it is difficult to discern what processes one should investigate in a knowing-affordance context except as one might translate the terms into learning-biological parameter variables which are measurable. If they are not measurable now then we have the present limitation on our ability to account for our phenomena. If they are not ever measurable then we have an ultimately limited science. It does not seem reasonable, given the youth of our science, that we are ready to declare eternal inability to measure. Gibson’s important contribution was to put perception where it belonged-in the pattern of light as it enters the receptor and to reject the internal representational component as necessary to perception. However, Gibson, along with Piaget, failed to discriminate that “knowing” is essentially a problem for philosophical analysis; it is behavior and not knowing that is the proper focus of a psychological analysis. A psychological analysis of a phenomenon may well involve biological variables in order to achieve a fuller account of a particular phenomenon. One adds variables as needed to increase the power of a scientitic account. To say that the meaning attributed to an object is an affordance does not increase the power of the scientific account of “knowing”; it merely provides a label for a behavioral sequence. The label does not explain the behavior nor lead to an analysis or to a testable hypothesis. Even Watson recognized the role of biological constraints on learning although this is often forgotten in the caricatures of Watsonian behaviorism. Even Hull recognized the role of organismic characteristics as controlling parameters on the learning process. A careful reading of some of Skinner’s more recent writings reveals a clear recognition of evolutionary forces having shaped probabilities of behavioral acquisition and the role of organismic constraints on response acquisition. If we discard
A BEHAVIORAL
ALTERNATIVE
409
the casting of behaviorism into simplistic lights we can choose from the behavioristic analysis the elements that promise to elucidate process. REFERENCES Gibson, E. J. The concept of affordances in development: The renascence of functionalism. In W. A. Collins (Ed.), The concept of development. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1982. Gibson, J. .I. The theory of affordance. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, actiq and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 1977. Goldfield, E. The ecological approach to perceiving as a foundation for understanding the development of knowing in infancy. Dev. Rev. 1983, 3, 371-404. Rosch, E. Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1978. RECEIVED:
May 27, 1983; REVISED: July 18, 1983
REVIEW
A Behavioral Understanding
3, 405-409 (1983)
Alternative to an Ecological Approach to the Development of Knowing in Infancy: A Commentary FRANCES DEGEN HOROWITZ
The concept of affordance is proposed by Goldfield to account for “knowing” in infancy as an ecologically more valid approach than Piaget’s notion of representation. While the use of affordances is regarded as an improvement over the concept of representation an argument is put forth that a more parsimonious and scientifically useful approach to the development of knowing in infancy is to be found in a behavioral analysis of a learned association of stimulus cues with behavior patterns.
Eugene Goldfield (1983), in his article “The Ecological Approach to Perceiving as a Foundation for Understanding the Development of Knowing in Infancy,” has provided an extremely articulate presentation of the ecological approach to perceiving as an overarching account of knowing in infancy. The cornerstone of this approach is in the use of Gibson’s notion of “affordance.” Originally proposed by J. J. Gibson (1977) and taken up by E. J. Gibson (1982), the concept of affordance involves perception of the environment in the context of a particular perceiver whose perception is affected by the size, form, and capabilities of an object or person. Thus, an object takes on a “meaning” as a function of its dimensions and utility. In the illustrative example given by Goldfield, a chair “affords” sitting, i.e., imparts the meaning to the perceiver of an object for sitting when it has the characteristics of being a “sit-on-able” object and the perceiver associates a behavior with the object -a behavior within the perceiver’s own capabilities. While an object may afford sitting to an adult the same object may not afford sitting to a young infant who cannot yet sit. Goldfield has successfully demonstrated that Gibson’s theory of direct realism and the use of the concept of noticing affordances as an index of “knowing” are superior to Piaget’s account of knowing in which one must repair to the concept of representation. However, one might question whether Goldfield has merely substituted one higher integrative concept for another without much additional benefit. It is not clear that using the concept of affordances results in the derivation of more useful or testable hypotheses than is the case with Piaget’s notion of representation. In fact, in may be the case that a more fruitful approach to ac40s 0273-2297183 $3 .OO Copyright All rights
0 1983 by Academic Press, Inc. of reproduction in any form reserved.
406
FRANCES
DEGEN
HOROWITZ
counting for “knowing” in young infants would be better served by a behavioral interpretation involving a paradigm of conditioning in relation to evolutionarily determined structural constraints and behavioral predispositions. To more fully discuss the possibility of going beyond the notion of affordances and to forestall an “old saw” discussion of conditioning let it be said at the outset that in proposing a behavioral-conditioning paradigm no simple assumptions of a “tabula-rasa” are being made; nor is there an assumption that external sources of reinforcement lie only in socially mediated events. Rather, it seems that the considerable data on infant response capabilities and on the neonatal behavioral repertoire lead to a more sophisticated model involving initial behavioral capability, evolutionarily determined parametric constraints on behavioral probabilities and highly probable effects of physical consequent events in relation to behavioral responses on the part of the infant. Given this model it is possible to consider,the processes that account for the development of “knowing” in infancy and to test the validity of hypotheses that can be derived from postulating certain processes. The following elaborates upon this. First, in light of data gathered over the last 25 years, it is now clear that the human infant arrives with a relatively well-developed, albeit limited, behavioral repertoire. Further, it is likely that some environmental events have greater potential for attracting and maintaining infant attention and for being noticed as occurring in systematic and consequential fashion. These characteristics are likely adaptive for survival and may well reflect the evolutionary history of the human organism. We know that the normal human newborn responds discriminatively to visual, auditory, tactile, vestibular, and olfactory stimuli. Further, repeated presentations of these stimuli result in a response decrement which is not the result of receptor fatigue since presentation of a different stimulus within the same modality results in recovery of the response. Additionally, it is beginning to appear that some stimulus parameters may be more inherently attractive and attention maintaining than others. Stimulus motion, auditory stimuli within certain ranges, visual stimuli of particular characteristics, etc., appear to have particular preeminence for the neonate and the young infant. Thus, the initial behavioral repertoire is likely constrained by neurological structures and, again, likely the result of the evolutionary history of the organism. Immediately after birth the human newborn typically enters into a system of interaction with social and nonsocial stimuli and under proper conditions of nutrition (and possibly environmental stimulation) continues along a pathway of species-constrained structural development begun at conception. The trajectory of the developmental course is likely highly
A BEHAVIORAL
ALTERNATIVE
407
canalized with only significant physical insult or strong environmental aberrations capable of deflecting the course. The question of the degree to which environmental variables affect the quality of the behavioral development occurring along the course remains yet to be determined. Nevertheless, movement along the trajectory must be analyzable in terms of processes no matter what degree of predetermination one wishes to espouse. The central specific question is the question of process. One set of processes that can be offered for consideration involves the assumption that certain magnitudes and patterns of stimulus change have reinforcing properties for the human organism along with the primary and then the conditioned reinforcers. If this is the case then it is reasonable to postulate that a conditioning analysis, given the species COW straints and the structural realities of the organism, will provide a more powerful and testable account of the development of the acts of noticing affordances. In other words, the act of noticing affordances is considered, from this point of view, as an instance of learned behavior. However, it must be noted that learned behavior in a conditioning analysis need not require that the determinants of learning be solely environmental. Biological constraints likely provide some of the determinants of learned behavior but there is nothing magical about such a postulation. The scientific challenge for a full accounting of behavioral development requires a description of the processes involved in behavioral development. Some aspect of process will focus upon environmental events, some upon past history, and some upon biological parameters. Examples in the article abound that are more powerfully explained in terms of learned behavior than in the surplus meaning surrounding the terms “knowing” and “affordances.” For example, let us take the proposal that a chair “affords” sitting when the infant can sit and has perceptually mapped the environment in terms of the physical characteristics of objects that afford sitting, i.e., have the shape, size, and accessibility attributes of objects classified as being “sit-on-able.” The information about the object that defines it as sit-on-able serves to limit or constrain the degrees of behavioral freedom in the infant’s repertoire. The information that the object is sit-on-able may also involve affording “climbon-able” and “stand-on-able” and “fall-off-able” but not “throw-able” or “wear-able.” Goldtield describes the role of such information as constraining the degrees of behavioral freedom in the infant’s repertoire. However, it may be more parsimonious to consider the role of information to constrain behavior as the power of certain stimulus cues to bring certain behaviors under control as a function of a history of association of those stimulus cues with repeated patterns of action on the part of the perceiver and on the part of the perceiver’s observations of others in interaction with objects that have those stimulus cues. Rosch (1978) refers
408
FRANCES
DEGEN
HOROWITZ
to such stimulus cues as “exemplars.” When a core group of stimulus cues occur repeatedly in relation to one another and serve to categorize objects as same or different these stimulus cues are regarded as category exemplars. The behavioral analysis would involve the organism’s repeated encountering of a set of stimulus cues as cooccurring in an object class and in having an association with those cues a behavior or set of behaviors. Thus, it would be the history of association or learning that would account for an object such as a chair taking on the meaning of being sit-on-able. In a behavioral analysis the role of information is regarded as the power of certain stimulus cues to bring certain behaviors under better control of those cues as a joint function of past learning history and biological predispositions to attend to certain stimulus cues rather than others. The reason this explanation has greater power than simply attributing the development of “knowing” to an increased function of affordances is that it is difficult to discern what processes one should investigate in a knowing-affordance context except as one might translate the terms into learning-biological parameter variables which are measurable. If they are not measurable now then we have the present limitation on our ability to account for our phenomena. If they are not ever measurable then we have an ultimately limited science. It does not seem reasonable, given the youth of our science, that we are ready to declare eternal inability to measure. Gibson’s important contribution was to put perception where it belonged-in the pattern of light as it enters the receptor and to reject the internal representational component as necessary to perception. However, Gibson, along with Piaget, failed to discriminate that “knowing” is essentially a problem for philosophical analysis; it is behavior and not knowing that is the proper focus of a psychological analysis. A psychological analysis of a phenomenon may well involve biological variables in order to achieve a fuller account of a particular phenomenon. One adds variables as needed to increase the power of a scientitic account. To say that the meaning attributed to an object is an affordance does not increase the power of the scientific account of “knowing”; it merely provides a label for a behavioral sequence. The label does not explain the behavior nor lead to an analysis or to a testable hypothesis. Even Watson recognized the role of biological constraints on learning although this is often forgotten in the caricatures of Watsonian behaviorism. Even Hull recognized the role of organismic characteristics as controlling parameters on the learning process. A careful reading of some of Skinner’s more recent writings reveals a clear recognition of evolutionary forces having shaped probabilities of behavioral acquisition and the role of organismic constraints on response acquisition. If we discard
A BEHAVIORAL
ALTERNATIVE
409
the casting of behaviorism into simplistic lights we can choose from the behavioristic analysis the elements that promise to elucidate process. REFERENCES Gibson, E. J. The concept of affordances in development: The renascence of functionalism. In W. A. Collins (Ed.), The concept of development. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1982. Gibson, J. .I. The theory of affordance. In R. Shaw & J. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, actiq and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. 1977. Goldfield, E. The ecological approach to perceiving as a foundation for understanding the development of knowing in infancy. Dev. Rev. 1983, 3, 371-404. Rosch, E. Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1978. RECEIVED:
May 27, 1983; REVISED: July 18, 1983