A socio-technical analysis of an attempted innovation: The clash of cultures

A SOCIO-TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF AN ATTEMPTED INNOVATION: THE CLASH OF CULTURES MARCIA V. WILKOF* Philadelphia

College of Textiles and Science

This article analyzes an attempt to design and implement a computer-based system for managing discretionary scientific and technical information (STI). Socio-technical and organizational culture theory are used to explain why corporate technical information service (TIS) groups championed the innovation while intended users, line product development groups, were indifferent and uninterested. The article highlights the importance of building working relationships among organizational subcultures and encourages TIS groups to develop a different perspective on their role in ST1 management.

Once upon a time we (members useful

ideas on the design

of formal

of an academic systems

research

to facilitate

team) thought

the collection

we had some

and dissemination

and technical information (STI). Feeling we should put them to the test, we approached the librarian of one of the most prestigious high technology companies in the United States to work with us on the application of our ideas. A company task force was set up, including representatives from the major information service areas. We rapidly sparked interest and commitmetit from the task force and our design work proceeded apace. In short order we had the outline of a system design for “discretionary” ST1 management. Since the company had already implemented a broad range of electronic communication systems, we felt that implementation would be time consuming but faced no major obstacles in principle. We were wrong. We chose as our pilot group one of the most capable and respected development groups in the company. We explained our ideas. We were met by a bemused shrug of indifference. The group was not about to participate. They explained that they found the content of the ideas alright but they were not interested in a system-any of scientific

*Direct all correspondence

to Marcia V. Wilkof,

1519 Naudain Street, Philadelphia,

The Journal of High Technology Management Research, Copyright Q 1991 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 1047-8310

PA 19146.

Volume 2, Number 1, pages 99-112

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system of that type. We talked about evolutionary development, about decision support systems with a special emphasis on support. Still no response. This article is about the combined indifference and anti-system attitude that exists as a general norm among many product development groups. It is also about the people who both provoke and have to deal with this attitude-the various corporate technical information services (TIS) groups. The focus is on discretionary STI, that is, information which an engineer may or may not use either to generate new ideas or find specific solutions to specific problems. We are not concerned with mandatory, programmed information transfer such as would be found in a management information system, an accounting system or an engineering documentation system.

THE IMPORTANCE

OF ST1 MANAGEMENT

Concerns about the competitiveness of the U .S . high technology industry have increased in the past several years because of slow corporate and industry growth, increased domestic and foreign competition, and concerns over the general health of the economy. High technology organizations that develop new products using state-of-the-art technology are addressing these concerns in part by examining the product development process itself. While this process has generally been effective, it has often been inefficient. For example, not long ago it was common for companies to assure product development groups that it was fine to be over budget and over schedule, that quality was most important, at any cost. Companies can ill afford that attitude today. There is a need to bring some degree of efficiency into the creative, uncertain, ambiguous product development process while still maintaining high quality. One important component of product development is the management of scientific and technical information (STI). The ability to obtain, disseminate and utilize ST1 is one leading competitive issue for high technology companies because of the rapid technological and environmental changes in that industry. While many corporate resources are devoted to the management of STI, there are indications that these resources are misdirected because line development groups do not utilize services provided by the technical information service (TIS) departments. And some TIS departments have not been interested in offering services development groups identify as being useful to their product development efforts. The management of ST1 is a “key internal operation” (Benjamin, Rockart, Scott Morton, & Wyman, 1984) and improving it could potentially speed product development and lower costs.

METHODOLOGY This article is based on an action research project aimed at the design and implementation of a computer-based system for managing discretionary STI. Action research is a process aimed at advancing scientific knowledge through solving the problems of a client system and enhancing that system’s capacity to diagnose and solve problems in the future. It is

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based on a collaborative effort that involves the researcher and the client system in all phases of the change process (Lewin, 1947; Lippitt, et al., 1958). The action research project presented here focused on an attempted innovation. The article examines why the corporate TIS groups championed the innovation and why the intended users, development engineers, were indifferent and uninterested. It highlights the importance of understanding the relevant socio-technical systems and taking a cultural perspective\when developing and implementing policy alternatives around ST1 management. The analysis presented here is based on qualitative data (e.g., interviews, participant observation, archival review) obtained while working with engineers and information specialists in a very successful high technology organization which we call DW Enterprises. Table 1 outlines the steps taken during the action research project. To provide overall guidance and direction to the project, an Information Task Force was created made up of representatives from DW’s TIS groups (the Library, Management Information Services Group and Marketing Information Center) and the academic research team. The Task Force worked for several months on the development of DW ASSIST, a document which detailed a proposed computer-based discretionary ST1 management system. Over the same period of time, the academic research team focused on becoming more familiar with DW’s organization, personnel, tasks and information needs. The first step was to conduct a user study which served as a vehicle through which we became more familiar with the corporation, the information services and information problems. Interviews were conducted with twenty-seven engineers chosen by the librarian because they frequently used the corporate technical information services. The interviews focused

TABLE 1 Steps in the Action Research Project 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

Task force created to provide overall guidance and direction. Task force developed DW ASSIST, a document detailing proposed computer-based discretionary STI management system. Academic research team conducted a user study to become familiar with corporation, information services and information problems. Academic research team proposed pilot project using a representative group to diagnose the strengths and weaknesses of the current STI management situation and to introduce any changes carefully, and on a small scale, so that the changes could be evaluated and modified before extending them to other parts of the corporation. Members of academic research team conducted individual interviews with pilot project engineers to establish a project relationship and to explore issues of importance to product development groups. Academic research team evaluated activities and decided to engage in a planning process that would address the TIS group’s and product development group’s interests and concerns separately at first with the goal of bringing the two groups together later. Corporate librarian resigned. Because new corporate librarian did not view the work as central to the library’s charter, there was no internal champion for the computer-based discretionary ST1 management system. Therefore, the action research project was abandoned.

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on the users’ personal characteristics, background, current activities, information needs and usage as well as the evaluation of and costs associated with information services. The user study raised two major issues for the project: (1) the complexity of the corporation, its organization, tasks and ST1 management and (2) the importance of personal contact in the accomplishment of the organization’s tasks. These issues cast serious doubts on the acceptability of an electronic system even for the transfer of discretionary STI. However, the TIS groups were still very enthusiastic about DW ASSIST so we decided to develop a pilot project around one product development group. A pilot project would focus our attention on a smaller more manageable piece of the organization, thus bounding the complexity issue. We could immerse ourselves in the ST1 issues of one representative group in the company, to diagnose the strengths and weaknesses of the current situation and to introduce any changes carefully, and on a small scale, so that the changes could be evaluated and modified before extending them to other parts of the corporation. In this way we could better assess the applicability of DW ASSIST. Proposition

1:

The purpose of such a pilot project is to work with one part of an organization to discover issues and variables that are important to the specific activity of interest. This strategy allows learning about how the relevant issues and variables manifest themselves so that the specific activity (in this case a planning process) can be modified before extending it to other groups. For a successful pilot project, it is important that the chosen group be somewhat representative of other groups in the organization, visible to other parts of the organization and respected (i.e., credible) within the company. These characteristics enhance the generalizability of the effort as well as the organization’s interest in it (Davis & Wilkof, 1980).

One of the most respected product development groups agreed to participate as the pilot project group. However, they made it clear from the outset they did not believe the kind of system we were proposing was appropriate or had any chance of success if implemented. We could not evaluate their negative reaction because we were unfamiliar with their tasks and ST1 management style. To begin to establish a project relationship, and explore issues of importance to product development groups, personal interviews of one to two hours were conducted with twelve people related to the product development activity. While the interviews were focused around tasks, organization and STI, they were unstructured to encourage discussion of issues of particular importance to each person. Similar areas were covered in each interview but with differential emphasis on each depending on the person’s location in the organization, tasks performed, and particular issues of salience to the interviewer at the time of the interview. The interviews gave us an overview of the product development group, and an understanding of the context within which we were working. It was clear that the engineers viewed ST1 in the context of the tasks associated with product development activities. To focus on the management of STI, per se, had very

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little meaning to them and was of little importance in the abstract. When discussing ST1 in terms of task completion, schedules, technical alternatives, design issues, etc., however, the management of ST1 took on a sense of importance to them. Proposition

2:

While the ST1 literature is interesting, it seems to lack relevance because it focuses on information management, not on an organizational perspective of task completion or product development (Davis & Wilkof, 1988). It is only through this latter framework that policy alternatives around ST1 management can be developed and implemented that are relevant to development engineers. This process approach allows for an action research posture of diagnosis, alternative generation, pilot project implementation, evaluation and monitoring to develop possible improvements in the current state of affairs with the clear goal being task improvements. By understanding the functional and dysfunctional aspects of both the overall task system and the ST1 management system, solutions appropriate to the organization can be designed. Only by grounding activities in the work context, in this case product development, can we assure that we do not force inappropriate solutions on to “imaginary” or peripheral problems.

At this point the academic research team evaluated the activities to date and several alternative directions that could be pursued. We were faced with a major choice: to continue to focus on the TIS groups’ proposed computer-based discretionary ST1 management system or to focus on issues of concern to the development engineers. We decided to engage in a planning process that would address each group’s interests and concerns. While designing this process, the corporate librarian resigned. Because she had been the driving force behind the project, we determined that the optimal course of action was to continue to work with the development engineers around issues that were of importance to them regarding the management of ST1 until a new librarian was hired. While the corporation was looking for a new librarian, we focused on those problems the development engineers felt were most important to their task activities as a way to get into relevant ST1 issues. It had become clear that the information issues were most salient for them when viewed within a task and decision making framework. Proposition

3:

This orientation is not the way ST1 management is usually explored in an organizational context. Our experience, however, has been that development engineers are most aware of the tasks they must perform and the ways they usually complete these tasks. ST1 is not very important to them unless they explore it in the context of the work they perform, in which case they view it as an important tool for them that supports the work they do. This figure/ground reversal suggests a framework of understanding what tasks must be

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performed and what decisions must be made to complete the tasks; tasks and decision making become the figure and ST1 management the ground (Davis 8z Wilkof, 1988). We engaged in a number of data collection activities to explore STI-related issues. For example, participant observation was used when observing hallway conversations and attending various kinds of meetings (e.g., technical design reviews, staff meetings). Interventions were used to gather data or raise employees’ awareness of a situation. Archival data such as internal company reports, memoranda, letters and video tapes as well as external documents including articles from trade journals, business periodicals and newspapers were reviewed. A new corporate librarian was hired. However, he did not view the work we were doing with the development groups as central to the library’s charter. Given the indifference of the engineers and the TIS groups to each other’s activities, the action research project was not continued. The approach we would have used to work with these two groups is presented later in this article. It illustrates one possible solution to the problems associated with the development of appropriate policy for the management of discretionary ST1 in high technology companies. EFFECT

OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT

SYSTEMS OF ST1

ON THE

Work with the TIS groups and the development engineers revealed that each group’s reactions to the attempted innovation were influenced by its socio-technical system. The concept of socio-technical systems is based on a recognition that there is a social system which impacts the technical aspects of work and a technical system which impacts the social organization of work (Susman, 1976). According to socio-technical theory, the interface between the social and technical systems must be optimized for the organization to perform effectively (Trist, 1974). In this framework, technology is regarded “as an essential part of the enterprise, rather than something which emerges as an oddity in the relations between people,” and the social system “that is the psychology and the sociology of the people in the enterprise, ” is seen “as an essential part of it and not as a nuisance or unmeasured or uncontrolled bit of the technical system” (Hutton, 1969:30). Its thesis is that to understand work group behavior one must examine the socio-technical whole. Among groups made up of professionals, a critical aspect of the socio-technical system is the professional culture individuals are socialized within during their training and work. Professional cultures span organizational boundaries (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984) and “provide employees with identities and significant reference groups within and outside the company” (Gregory, 1983:370). Professional training socializes groups to different cognitive and emotional orientations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) and influences how they define their work, what tasks are valid and valued. Our focus here is with the professional cultures of the engineers and information specialists at DW. We are primarily concerned with the relationship between the sociotechnical systems and the management of STI. At DW, the engineers and TIS specialists

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had frequent interactions with members of their own professional culture and infrequent or no interactions with members of the other professional culture. Given their sociotechnical systems, a part of which was their professionai orientation, both developed their own approaches to ST1 management. The development engineers’ socio-technical system revolved around the product development process and they looked at the management of ST1 in the context of the activities that occurred during this process. For the development engineers, knowledge had an instrumental value-ST1 was useful only if it helped them accomplish their tasks. They were primarily concerned with the effectiveness of ST1 management in facilitating product development. To complete their tasks, development engineers needed information, but information that was internally generated and relevant to a specific application. They also needed to be able to evaluate the information source. Personal trust among the people working on a particular task and an ability to assess technical competence among colleagues facilitated such evaluation. These activities could not be readily accomplished by obtaining information from a computer-based system. While the development engineers were not excited about DW ASSIST, they enthusiastically suggested creating a computer-based who’s who in the company that would list peoples’ technical areas of interest, past and current projects, etc. They felt that this kind of system would greatly facilitate access to the kinds of ST1 they needed and urged that the TIS groups focus their attention on this area. TIS groups, however, were enthusiastic about DW ASSIST. Their socio-technical system revolved around information management, not product development. The TIS groups looked at knowledge for knowledge’s sake, were primarily concerned with the efficiency of ST1 management, and wanted to engage in activities deemed appropriate by their profession. They engaged in task activities for which they had been trained (e.g., acquiring books and journals, subscribing to external bibliographic services); their focus was on acquisition and dissemination of information external to the organization. A computer-based system fit their orientation and professional posture, would help improve the management of their current activities and would enhance their reputation in the broader information service community since other companies had such systems. In fact, the TIS groups looked more to the info~ation professions for their standards of performance in part because most development engineers were not utilizing their services. Not only did they spend little or no time talking with development engineers about what services would improve product development; they were unwilling to provide a service the development engineers suggested and enthusiastically supported (the computer-based who’s who in the company), which could have been viewed as a first step in the development of a more comprehensive compu~r-based ST1 m~agement system. Two parallel systems for the management of discretionary ST1 developed. Both consumed corporate resources and both were aimed at the acquisition, dissemination and utilization of discretionary STI. For all intents and purposes, however, there was no communication between the two. ~0~sitIon

4:

It is irn~~nt for staff groups to view the line groups to whom their services are aimed as customers. Staff groups should have frequent interactions with the line groups to ascertain their needs and how best to meet those needs.

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Without a customer orientation the staff groups can begin to overly identify with their own professional cultures and become isolated from their customers. The result can be the development of products and services that do not enhance the performance of the line groups or the organization.

CL~I~CATION OF THE SITUATION BY TAKING AN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PERSPECTIVE At this point we understood each group’s attitude toward DW ASSIST given how each defined its tasks-development engineers designed and built products, TIS groups acquired and disseminated info~ation. What we did not underst~d was why the TIS groups were so satisfied with their role in the corporation given that their users were open and direct in stating that the technical information services were of little value to the work of the development engineer. We needed a perspective different from that of the work group to explain this situation. Organizational culture provided this perspective. Organizational culture is (1) that complexly interrelated whole of standardized, institutionalized and habits ways of linking, feeling and acting, and (2) the resulting symbols whose meaning is understood and shared to a greater or lesser degree by all members of an organization or a subgroup within the organization (cf., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Jacques, 1952; Kluckhohn, 1949; O’Toole, 1979; Pettigrew, 1979). It includes but is more than the socio-technical systems. In recent years research on organizational culture has proliferated. Many studies have examined one org~i~tion’s culture, focusing on such issues as its relationship to strategy (Schwartz & Davis, 198 1; Weick, 1985), leadership style (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1986; Sathe, 1983), politics (Riley, 1983), organizational performance (Schein, 1985; Wilkins & Ouchi, 19X3), or organizational change (Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984; Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985; Tichy, 1982; Tunstall, 1983). Most deal with a culture that exists as a unified whole at the organizational level. A few have begun to look at organizational culture as it affects mergers and acquisitions, exploring how the new organization tends to take on the characteristics of one of the two organizations (Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985; Walter, 1985). Other studies have begun to explore the notion that organizations have multiple cultures (Gregory, 1983; Jones, 1983; Martin & Siehl, 1983; Riley, 1983; Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). This case looks at two organizational subcultures that developed, in part, from the influences of professional orientations on organizational employees. It explores the interactive effect among professional cultures, socio-technical systems and organizational culture. Proposition

5:

When professionals enter an organization they bring with them the professional culture within which they were socialized. Their professional culture influences the sociotechnical system they become a part of in that p~icular organization. At the same time, however, the socio-technical system influences members’ professional orientations. The resulting socio-technical systems combine with organiza-

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tional characteristics to create an organizational culture or subcultures. The organizational culture or subcultures in turn exert influence over the socio-technical systems including which aspects of a professional culture are legitimated and which aspects are not in that particular organization. We will examine how four cultural themes at DW Enterprises influenced the sociotechnical systems of the development engineers and the information specialists to create two subcultures. Briefly, these themes are the primacy of engineering; an emphasis on individual responsibility in the context of teamwork and cooperation; participative, collaborative decision making; and power, influence and status based on perceived technical competence and interpersonal skills. The engineers incorporated these aspects of the culture in completing their work as they defined it, designing and building products. In the Engineering Division, to obtain what is believed to be the best choice under the circumstances, everyone who might have relevant input participated in decision making. This teamwork and participative decision making style encouraged a verbal transfer of information and engineers claimed that verbally obtaining ST1 from colleagues was superior to obtaining it from a computer-based system for several reasons. First, it was more efficient to find a person knowledgeable in the area than to use a written information management system, since by the time (if ever) most information is available in written form, it is out of date. Second, the engineers were able to assess others’ technical competence and interpersonal skills as well as exhibit their own. Third, it allowed them to continually assess their own standing in the corporation. Given that the company was engineering driven, power, influence and status were based on peer recognition which was based on perceived technical competence and interpersonal skills, not hierarchical position. While technical competence was the bottom line, it was a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. Power, influence and status were also related to peoples’ interpersonal skills, i.e., how well they influenced others, how hard and well they played the game (“fight hard for what you believe in, but fight in an above board, fair, clean fashion”). Engineers were strongly encouraged to share information and listen to anyone who had opinions about what they were doing. Power, influence and status were enhanced by being members of the “best product development projects” as defined by the engineers’ standards of interest (building “neat new products” not maintaining old ones, complexity, challenge, fun) not the organization’s standards of sales, market share, etc. The TIS groups incorporated three aspects of the culture in completing their work as they defined it, the acquisition and dissemination of information. They used teamwork and participative decision making to develop efficiency in the management of STI. They attempted to gain power, influence and status by championing a “neat new product” (a computer-based ST1 management system) which would allow them to display their technical competence and interpersonal skills. And therein lies the crux of the problem. They did not embed their activities in the context of major organizational goals which related to engineering product development and were based on the cultural theme of the primacy of engineering. They felt peripheral to the mainstream of the organization and turned to each other and their professional affiliations to justify their activities (Van Maanen &

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Barley, 1984). They viewed their role and their priorities more in terms of what was valued in their professional culture than in the organization’s culture (Goldner & Ritti, 1967). In developing their new product, the cultural themes of teamwork, participative decision making and power, influence and status were used, but in the context of their own professional culture, not that of their users. With respect to information management, this situation resulted in two parallel systems for the acquisition, dissemination and utilization of ST1 that had little if any interdependence. Management was unhappy, not being able to justify its overhead expense; development engineers were unhappy at what they saw as a waste of money and unnecessary support activities; and TIS specialists were unhappy at the increasingly marginal role they occupied within the corporation and the uncertainty about their future. Management handled the situation by throwing money at it or ignoring it; development engineers h~dled the situation by developing their own methods for ST1 m~agement and TIS specialists handled it by looking more and more to their own profession to define work activities and set performance standards. An uneasy coexistence was maintained until there was an attempt to work on a joint project. This effort increased their interdependence and revealed a clash between the two subcultures. Each group saw the innovation in terms of its own interests in the context of its own culture (Benson, 1973; Gregory, 1983; Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). The TIS groups pushed for an innovation, DW ASSIST, that made sense to them, to increase the efficiency in the management of STI. In an attempt to gain power, influence and status in the organization, they felt they had to come up with a state-of-the-art project that would reveal their technical competence and interpersonal skills. What was forgotten was the fact that the project had relevance only within their own subculture, not that of the development engineers; therefore, regardless of how elegant or state-of-the-art it was, it was still peripheral for the user. They borrowed a cultural theme that was not salient for their subculture and applied it to a project that was not salient for the subculture from whom it was borrowed. The development engineers were disinterested and resistant to DW ASSIST and were interested in an innovation that would improve their effectiveness in ST1 m~agement, the computer-based company who’s who. They felt that DW ASSIST would cut them off from the broader professional scene and reduce their ability to assess their standing in the corporation. The computer-based who’s who could enhance their performance and status by giving them quicker and easier access to relevant colleagues, especially those they may not know. A PLANNED

CHANGE

STRATEGY

Had we continued to work with both groups we would have engaged in a planning process to create a situation where TIS groups and development engineers would work together to develop a discretionary ST1 management system that would be supportive of DW’s goals and objectives. Creating this situation would require the TIS groups and the development engineers to come to some agreement about the goals of a discretionary STI management system. Getting to that point would require an organizational climate charac-

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terized by trust, openness, and interpersonal competence (Argyris, 1971). Achieving this condition is no small step for most corporations; it often takes several years of effort and is usually difficult. However, if Argyris (1971) and others are right, its achievement is necessary if an active role for the TIS specialist is to evolve. Given the tenuous relationship that existed between the engineers and TIS specialists, building an organizational climate would initially involve a consultant working with each group separately. The process would involve the following steps: 1.

Engineering

Groups Define Their Tasks and ST1 Needed to Perform Them

The focus of activities is on determining the kinds of tasks performed needed to perform the tasks at each stage in the product life cycle. 2.

Conduct

and the ST1

a General ST1 Scanning

Attention is also given to more general ST1 scanning activities including current ST1 communication networks, usage levels and evaluations of the technical information services currently available in the corporation. 3.

Create Descriptions

of Desired Future States

In conjunction with these activities, descriptions of the engineers’ current state of ST1 and their desired future state is obtained. 4.

Compare Engineers’

Perceptions

with Scanning

perception

of the

and Desired Future States

Comparing the relationship between ST1 in the context of task activities; the current ST1 state; and desired future states will highlight areas that should receive further attention. 5.

TIS Groups Analyze

Current Purpose,

Process and Activities

The focus of activities with the TIS groups is on identifying their current activities, why each TIS group does what it does (their corporate charter), what future activities they are thinking of doing and what criteria they and the company use to evaluate their performance. As with the engineering groups, descriptions of each TIS group’s perception of the current state of ST1 and its desired future state are obtained. Comparing the data highlights areas that should receive further attention from the TIS groups. 6.

Compare Engineering

Groups’ and TIS Groups’ Views

Comparing the data from the engineering groups and the TIS groups identifies the degree of convergence or divergence that exists in activities, perceptions, desires, etc.; the amount and types of resistance that operate to keep the groups from interacting with each other; and the kinds of roles that TIS specialists could play to facilitate ST1 management.

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Raising

The general approach is to work with the engineers and the TIS specialists to explicate how their tasks and culture influence their view of the problem situation(s) around ST1 management. After each group has an understanding of its own situation, the consultant begins a process with each group, individually at first, to help each understand (not agree with) the other’s culture and how it affects the management of STI. 8.

Create a Shared Vision of the Future and a Plan for Getting There

The next task is to devise a strategy for creating a shared appreciation (Vickers, 1966) between engineering groups and TTS groups. At first the consultant serves as the link between the two groups, carrying each group’s “message” to the other. With further understanding of each other’s culture and their resistances to working together, the consultant then begins to bring the groups together. With an open organizational climate, a negotiated order (Strauss et al., 1963) is developed focusing on rights and responsibilities of the different groups and the boundary conditions which regulate their interaction. Clarifying procedures such as responsibility charting are used to define who does what, for what reason, with what intended outcome. Such procedures can be extremely beneficial in developing a working relationship when boundary regulation is a sensitive issue. The success of their application is entirely dependent upon the absence of a feeling on the part of the participants that they are going to be victimized as a result of the process. 9.

Periodically

Evaluate the Progress of the Plan

Objectives are negotiated on a periodic basis. Negotiations involve engineering, management and TIS groups. Initially, broad ST1 objectives are established (e.g., to develop an internal company who’s who directory, to increase general magazine readership, to improve the dissemination of information on relevant technical innovations, to develop a gatekeeper role for market information). Over time more specific objectives are established and agreement is reached on how to measure performance toward these objectives.

CONCLUSIONS This article has illustrated that the development of ST1 management policy and procedures requires an understanding of the relevant socio-technical systems, organizational culture and subcultures. In the case presented here the development engineers’ culture was valued because it was directly related to the organization’s purpose, the development of high technology products. The TIS groups’ culture was devalued. While their technical expertise, the management of STI, was critical to the success of the organization, their activities were carried out in a way that did not enhance product development. The engineers’ culture was rewarded and fostered by the environment, i.e., the organization’s culture. The TIS groups’ culture, however, became marginalized because it defined itself more in terms of its broader professional culture than the organizational culture. DW is in the business of building high technology products, not providing information services.

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The TIS groups probably could play a valuable role in the management of STI but only if they developed a different perspective on their role. If they viewed themselves as consultants to the development engineers, working collaboratively and utilizing their ST1 management expertise to assist and support the engineers to improve product development, they probably could have increased their power, influence and status at DW. Their reactions to the situation, however, were driven by their own culture which had become marginal to that of their user group.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank Peter Davis for contributions to an earlier draft of this article; Thomas G. Cummings and Jerome Katz for suggestions on an earlier draft; Deborah Britzman for theoretical insights and suggestions on earlier drafts as well as the final article. The research leading to this article was supported, in part, by a grant from the National Science Foundation. REFERENCES Allaire, Y., & Firsirotu, M.E. 1984. Theories of organizational

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