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A space for safety: the transformation of automobile safety advertising in response to NHTSA crash test implementation, 1977 and 1981
The Social Science Journal 40 (2003) 635–641
A space for safety: the transformation of automobile safety advertising in response to NHTSA crash test implementation, 1977 and 1981 Ronald G. Burns a,∗ , Michael J. Lynch b a
Department of Sociology/Criminal Justice, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX 76129, USA b Department of Criminology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620-8100, USA
Abstract Automobile safety became an issue of increased public concern during the 1960s. These concerns were institutionalized in the creation of a national regulatory administration charged with overseeing automobile safety. This article examines the impact of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 1979 mandated federal automobile crash testing program (FMVSS 208) on the content of automakers’ advertising. Automakers’ advertisements were not directly responsive to mandated safety testing, though references to safety features increased. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and background Symbolic interactionism focuses attention on interactive processes that “create, maintain and change the values of the game” (Turner, 1976, p. 178). This article examines whether automobile advertising content responded to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) implementation of automobile crash testing in 1979 in ways that maintained or changed the values of the game. We examined magazine advertisements produced by Ford, General Motors, Chrysler and Volvo two years before (1977) and two years after (1981) implementation of crash testing. Advertising is one expression of automakers’ responses to NHTSA rule changes that spell out specific social expectations concerning auto-safety. Our research examined whether automobile advertising responded to NHTSA crash test rule implementation during an era where ∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-817-257-6155. E-mail address: [email protected] (R.G. Burns).
0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0362-3319(03)00074-0
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automobile safety became a public concern, and externally imposed rules and regulations became institutionalized. Did automakers passively accept these rule changes or did they redefine the situation and seek to maintain the old values by failing to acknowledge safety issues in their advertising? Prior research on the construction of safety-related images in the automobile industry has: (1) measured safety-related images constructed by GM; (2) analyzed the “safety” of GM vehicles; and (3) compared GM’s safety-related image with the actual safety performance of its vehicles (Burns, 1999a). The present study expands upon that focus by analyzing changes in advertising messages for several automakers (Ford, GM, Chrysler and Volvo) across the preand post-NHTSA crash test program initiation period. In a consumer-oriented society, advertising is an important tool for promoting images that enhance sales. As a social space for communication, advertising is a relatively unregulated means for constructing discourse determined by access to capital. The “Big Three” automakers in the U.S. (Ford, GM and Chrysler) control significant capital, which allows them to buy and shape large segments of advertising space. Automakers have often used these resources (and others, e.g., lobbying, Burns, 1999b) to combat and neutralize governmental efforts at regulation. Public concern with automobile safety was formalized from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s by Congressman Kenneth Roberts, and later, Senator Abe Ribicoff. This period was marked by publication of muckraking books such as John Keats’ The Insolent Chariots and Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed, and the invention of high-powered muscle-cars that helped elevate roadway fatalities (Meier & Morgan, 1981). Prior to this time it was assumed that drivers were the primary automobile safety concern. During the 1960s, efforts to portray automakers as a significant source of automobile safety emerged (Yates, 1983), and shifted concern from drivers toward regulations that promoted safe automobiles with adequate occupant protection design. Governmental investigations of automobile safety culminated in the passage of The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 which required the National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB; later, the NHTSA) to establish “reasonable, practicable, and appropriate” safety standards for automobiles. This Act also required NHSB to develop an efficient and open system of reporting safety defects (Meier, 1985). A decade later, with automobile safety concerns institutionalized, NHTSA implemented automobile crash testing. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 mandates that new automobiles surpass specific injury thresholds measured in a 30 mph full-frontal barrier crash test using instrumented, safety-belted dummies in the driver and passenger seats. NHTSA has provided crash test results for consumer consumption since 1979, using a more demanding 35 mph test. Results from these tests provide buyers with comparative safety information and may encourage automakers to consider safety when designing vehicles (Nader & Ditlow, 1990). Negative crash tests results could have detrimental impacts on a firm’s ability to successfully market its products. In such a climate, corporations may attempt to sway public opinion through the use of advertising that speaks directly to the issue of safety. Accordingly, corporations employ different approaches toward shaping their public image: corporate sponsorships, lobbying, and strategic advertising. For example, Ford promoted the phrase “Quality is Job 1” in the face of quality problems (Sawyers, 1992), while Ford’s subsidiary, Mercury, touted the slogan “Imagine yourself in a Mercury” in the face of safety concerns regarding rear door latches in Villager minivans. The images corporate advertisements
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paint may be objective, or they may be influenced by external considerations (market forces) believed necessary to correct public images and enhance sales. By employing skillfully crafted and select information, corporations can purposefully alter the construction of image.
2. The present study The late 1970s was a significant time period with regard to automobile safety marked by the advent of automobile crash testing, the Ford Pinto case, and lowered speed limits that emerged from NHTSA National Center for Statistical Analysis studies. During this period fuel economy and production quality issues also emerged as major automotive industry concerns (e.g., “Sales of Big. . . ,”1981). Each of these issues may have an impact on automobile advertising. Our primary concern, however, is the impact of crash testing implementation on automobile advertising content. To address this question, we compare advertising content in Newsweek magazine before and after implementation of FMVSS 208, across four automakers, and relative to the crash test scores each manufacturer’s autos received.1 Two research questions were examined: did automaker advertising content change in response to implementation of FMVSS 208; and, were the producers of cars with the best crash test ratings (safest cars) more likely to stress safety in their advertising after implementation of FMVSS 208 compared to other manufacturers? Due to its noted concern for automobile safety we hypothesized that Volvo (Kurylko, 1992) advertisements would stress safety to a greater degree than Ford’s, GM’s, or Chrysler’s. Content analysis was used to assess safety-related information presented by automakers in Newsweek advertisements in 1977 and 1981. Magazine advertisements were chosen as the source of analysis due to their influential role in corporate image shaping. Safety-related content was based upon several criteria found in each advertisement (Burns, 1999a): number of times the terms “safety” or “safe” were used and number of safety-related features mentioned (e.g., safety belts, power brakes, etc.). To reflect the influence of other period specific effects, we coded references to miles-per-gallon (mpg) and pricing.
3. Findings Table 1 presents the findings for each automaker for each year under study and includes: number of advertisements (ad#); size of the advertisements in magazine pages (size); and frequency of miles-per-gallon, price, “safety”, and safety-related automobile feature (e.g., power brakes, power steering, etc.) mentions2 . The number of advertisements under analysis was 351 (1977 = 194; 1981 = 157). GM had the largest number of advertisements (151; 43.0%), followed by Ford (118; 33.6%),3 Chrysler (57; 16.2%), and Volvo (25; 7.1%). Ford increased its advertising, surpassing GM in terms of number of advertising by 1981. Overall, average advertising size changed little from 1977 to 1981. The largest change in size was found in Chrysler advertisements, which increased by a factor of 3.6. References to fuel efficiency (mpg) varied widely across the sample. Across the two years, GM was the only automaker to mention fuel efficiency above the average. Chrysler’s mpg
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Table 1 Content provided in advertisements by automaker, 1977 and 1981 Ford (per ad)
GM (per ad)
Chrysler (per ad)
Volvo (per ad)
Total (per ad)
38 19
17 8
194 157
Ads# 1977 1981
52 66
Size 1977 1981
74 (1.42) 84 (1.27)
120 (1.38) 85 (1.33)
49 (1.29) 37 (1.95)
19 (1.12) 9 (1.13)
262 (1.35) 215 (1.37)
mpg 1977 1981
28 (0.54) 63 (0.95)
89 (1.02) 91 (1.42)
8 (0.21) 42 (2.21)
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
125 (0.64) 196 (1.25)
Price 1977 1981
56 (1.08) 2 (0.03)
27 (0.31) 10 (0.16)
34 (0.89) 61 (3.21)
1 (0.06) 0 (0.00)
118 (0.61) 73 (0.47)
“Safety” 1977 1981
0 (0.00) 1 (0.02)
0 (0.00) 1 (0.02)
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
16 (0.94) 0 (0.00)
16 (0.08) 2 (0.01)
Features 1977 1981
61 (1.17) 88 (1.33)
77 (0.89) 84 (1.31)
58 (1.53) 97 (5.11)
34 (2.00) 0 (0.00)
230 (1.19) 269 (1.71)
87 64
Total N (per ad).
references were above the mean in 1981. Chrysler maintained some emphasis on pricing across the two years (with a particularly strong emphasis in 1981), while Ford’s strong 1977 pricing emphasis was almost nonexistent by 1981. Volvo was the only company to consistently employ the terms “safe” or “safety” in its 1977 advertisements (16 times or 0.94/ad). This focus disappeared by 1981. None of the Big Three automakers used safety-related terms in 1977 advertising. In 1981, Ford and GM each used these terms once. Finally, references to safety features by the Big Three increased substantially from 1977 (N = 196) to 1981 (N = 269). Automakers were less likely to mention mpg and safety features in 1977 advertisements, while references to price and safety declined by 1981. These patterns varied by automakers. For example, Ford advertisements were more likely to mention mpg in 1981 than in 1977, and far less likely to mention vehicle prices. Chrysler’s advertisements were more likely to mention mpg, vehicle prices, and safety features in 1981 than in 1977. GM advertisements showed an increase in mpg and safety features mentions in 1981. Contrary to our hypothesis, Volvo advertisements were less likely to mention the terms safe or safety, or safety features in 1977 compared to 1981. As Table 2 indicates, average crash test scores for GM (3.0) vehicles surpassed those of Chrysler (2.6) and Ford (2.5). In both 1977 and 1981, GM was last in terms of safety references (safety terms plus features) per advertisement; Chrysler ranked first in both years, increasing mentions from an average of 1.5 to 5.1 per advertisement. From this data there appears to be no association between NHTSA scores and safety feature advertising emphasis, refuting one of our hypotheses. It should be noted, however, that each of the Big Three automakers increased
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Table 2 Mean driver’s and passenger’s side crash test scores for vehicles tested, 1979–1981 Ford
Chrysler
GM
Driver Passenger
2.53 (N = 15) 2.50 (N = 16)
2.50 (N = 16) 2.71 (N = 14)
2.75 (N = 32) 3.25 (N = 32)
Average
2.52 (N = 31)
2.60 (N = 30)
3.00 (N = 64)
the average number of references to safety features in their advertisements, supporting one of our hypotheses.
4. Discussion The late 1970s and early 1980s was a period when automobile safety became increasingly important to consumers and regulators. Innovative safety developments were legislated and/or implemented. In this context, we hypothesized a relationship between implementation of FMVSS 208 and the content of vehicle advertisements. There is some limited evidence of an association. The number of references to safety features increased for all automakers (except Volvo) comparing 1977 and 1981 advertisements. In contrast, Volvo, a vehicle with a reputation for safety, abandoned discussions of vehicle safety by 1981. Automakers stepped up advertising attention to safety features, although they refrained from specifically using the terms “safe” or “safety” (with the exception of Volvo’s 1977 advertisements). The Big Three mentioned the terms twice in the 149 advertisements they placed in Newsweek in 1981, and no mentions were noted in the 177 advertisements they had placed in 1977. There was an overall decided shift toward mentioning safety features by 1981, which could be attributed to the increased number of safety features developed and/or required by law. Over the same period, advertisements also strengthened emphasis on fuel economy, while lessening emphasis on pricing (with the exception of Chrysler). Why the changes? Are they attributable to the effect of FMVSS 208? In specific cases, such as Ford’s Pinto, negative publicity may have played a significant role, and our data cannot directly answer this question. It is sufficient to note that Ford used advertising to remake its image in 1981; an image constructed with an increased emphasis on safety and fuel efficiency and less focus on pricing. Volvo’s advertising practices contrasted all other automakers’. Volvo’s advertising concern for safety disappeared from 1977 to 1981. It is perhaps reasonable to argue that Volvo’s already established safety reputation allowed the company to focus on quality and buyer retention (Sawyers, 1992; Serafin, 1995). Still, one wonders why Volvo would not take advantage of the new safety climate by continuing to promote safety claims. Chrysler was far more likely than GM and Ford to mention safety features in its advertisements, though its vehicles did not receive the highest average crash test score. GM, which had the highest safety scores, had the lowest rate of references to safety. Does this finding suggest that Chrysler is misleading consumers in its advertising by promoting safe vehicles? Such determinations are difficult to make (see e.g., Burns, 1999a), nevertheless it is possible that both Ford and Chrysler promoted a false sense of safety in their vehicles. Or, did GM fail to
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capitalize on strong crash test evaluations in efforts to promote its products? GM was the only automaker to promote something other than safety as its primary focus in 1981 advertisements. Finally, it should be noted that only one reference to crash test evaluations was made in any of the advertisements; an unexpected finding given the focus on automobile safety during this period. One could argue that the “newness” of the tests hampered their credibility, which, in turn, discouraged automotive companies from using them in their advertisements. It is equally plausible that automakers were unwilling to validate crash testing by referring to crash test outcomes in advertisements. Perhaps, more than anything else, our findings illustrate the following contention: “Auto makers are reluctant to discuss the safety issue, maintaining that all their cars are engineered for safety” (“Sales of big car. . . ,” 1981).
5. Conclusion Our study indicates that automakers altered advertising and discursive practices during the period under study. Advertisement content seems to reflect a number of market conditions, and not simply those we hypothesized (the impact of NHTSA crash test implementation). Automakers appear to respond to a variety of forces in the advertising space they purchase, and the messages this space contains changed over time. Automakers employed this space to demarcate the boundaries of several issues: fuel economy, price, features and safety. Responding to a host of market issues, auto advertising space is not one-dimensional and is fluid over time. Nevertheless, automobile advertisements do respond to prevailing concerns in ways that endeavor to redefine products. This may simply be a “marketing strategy,” or may reflect deeper issues such as “who has the power to define automobile safety issues?” Perhaps, automakers were attempting to diminish the impact of NHTSA’s crash test research on public consciousness by avoiding discussions of safety and crash test results. This may be an effort to shape knowledge through discourse exclusion. In some sense, advertising discourse is “the locus of the rules and prior practices forming the conditions of inclusion and exclusion that enable certain practices and prevent others from being accepted as ‘scientific’ or ‘moral’. . . ” (Flynn, 1994, p. 30). In this view, the space of advertising should be seen as part of the larger conflict or cultural space in which issues of automobile safety were being decided. Advertising, however, is a “controlled space,” to the extent that automobile manufacturers are able to present their products outside of the regulatory gaze. In this view, advertising space must be viewed as part of the broader cultural mechanisms involved in demarcating the boundaries of power. Advertising, then, can be seen as an effort to reassert lost power by managing images. Until the late 1950s and early 1960s, definitions of automobile safety were largely dictated by industry. During the 1960s, a new era of automobile regulation emerged, and NHTSA became the primary government agency that spoke to safety concerns. This evolution challenged the nature of the autonomous, self-regulated auto-industry. NHTSA’s rulings directly confronted the ability of automakers to act as they pleased in an unfettered marketplace. The juxtaposition of NHTSA’s and automakers’ interests established the basis for a struggle to determine safety standards. At a broader level, this struggle involved the right to determine the parameters of safety. Until this point, the space that safety had occupied was largely private, defined by the private interests of automakers. NHTSA’s interventions opened this private space to public discussion.
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Automakers employed advertising in an attempt to recapture that portion of the safety debate that had been made public. Private advertising space has certain advantages, such as being insulated from counter-claims as long as advertising discourse is not fraudulent. Through private advertising discourse, automakers provided a silent challenge to changing market conditions by avoiding discussions of safety. “Safety free” advertising space, in effect, challenged the legitimacy of NHTSA efforts to redefine the safety debate. The present research hopefully sheds light on the image-shaping practices of automakers and corporations in general. In sum, it appears that because concerns for ethical advertising are primarily limited to preventing blatantly fraudulent claims, image-shaping (including misleading images) remains a viable avenue for those interested in shaping consumer purchasing practices. Further research in this area should, among other things, examine the direct impact of image shaping practices.
Notes 1. Advertisements placed in Newsweek were assumed to be equivalent to advertisements found in other general readership magazines (e.g., Time). Future research might address the content provided in other media outlets targeting specific groups. 2. Originally, the analysis was to include picture content. Preliminary coding of a sample of advertisements revealed none of these themes in picture content. 3. One advertisement, which appeared twice during 1981, was removed from the analyses because it skewed the results considerably. That advertisement compared 30 Ford vehicles, referenced mpg 35 times, vehicle pricing 30 times, and safety features 18 times.
References Burns, R. G. (1999a). Socially constructing an image in the automobile industry. Crime, Law and Social Change, 31, 327–346. Burns, R. G. (1999b). Promoting corporate interests: The ‘invisible barrier’ between ethical business and unethical self-promotion. Social Pathology, 5(2), 144–156. Flynn, T. (1994). Foucault’s mapping of history. In G. Gutting (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Foucault (pp. 28–46). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kurylko, D. T. (1992, March 30). In Europe, image is key. Automotive News, 5439, S52. Meier, K. J. (1985). Regulation: Politics, bureaucracy, and economics. New York: St. Martin’s. Meier, K. J., & Morgan, D. R. (1981, August). Speed kills: A longitudinal analysis of traffic fatalities and the 55 mph speed limit. Policy Studies Review, 1, 157–167. Nader, R., & Ditlow, C. (1990). Lemon book: Auto rights. Mount Kisco, NY: Moyer Bell. Sales of Big Car Hold Steady Amid General Industry Slump. (1981, December 30). Edited Wall Street Journal Stories. Dow Jones News Service. Sawyers, A. (1992, January 6). Automakers mining niches for sales, image. Automotive News, 5427, 14. Serafin, R. (1995, October 2). Ginzu campaigns. Automotive News Insight, 5625, 10I–11I. Turner, V. (1976). Drama, fields, and metaphors: Symbolic action in human society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Yates, B. (1983). The decline and fall of the American automobile industry. New York: Empire.
A space for safety: the transformation of automobile safety advertising in response to NHTSA crash test implementation, 1977 and 1981 Ronald G. Burns a,∗ , Michael J. Lynch b a
Department of Sociology/Criminal Justice, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX 76129, USA b Department of Criminology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620-8100, USA
Abstract Automobile safety became an issue of increased public concern during the 1960s. These concerns were institutionalized in the creation of a national regulatory administration charged with overseeing automobile safety. This article examines the impact of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 1979 mandated federal automobile crash testing program (FMVSS 208) on the content of automakers’ advertising. Automakers’ advertisements were not directly responsive to mandated safety testing, though references to safety features increased. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and background Symbolic interactionism focuses attention on interactive processes that “create, maintain and change the values of the game” (Turner, 1976, p. 178). This article examines whether automobile advertising content responded to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) implementation of automobile crash testing in 1979 in ways that maintained or changed the values of the game. We examined magazine advertisements produced by Ford, General Motors, Chrysler and Volvo two years before (1977) and two years after (1981) implementation of crash testing. Advertising is one expression of automakers’ responses to NHTSA rule changes that spell out specific social expectations concerning auto-safety. Our research examined whether automobile advertising responded to NHTSA crash test rule implementation during an era where ∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-817-257-6155. E-mail address: [email protected] (R.G. Burns).
0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/S0362-3319(03)00074-0
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automobile safety became a public concern, and externally imposed rules and regulations became institutionalized. Did automakers passively accept these rule changes or did they redefine the situation and seek to maintain the old values by failing to acknowledge safety issues in their advertising? Prior research on the construction of safety-related images in the automobile industry has: (1) measured safety-related images constructed by GM; (2) analyzed the “safety” of GM vehicles; and (3) compared GM’s safety-related image with the actual safety performance of its vehicles (Burns, 1999a). The present study expands upon that focus by analyzing changes in advertising messages for several automakers (Ford, GM, Chrysler and Volvo) across the preand post-NHTSA crash test program initiation period. In a consumer-oriented society, advertising is an important tool for promoting images that enhance sales. As a social space for communication, advertising is a relatively unregulated means for constructing discourse determined by access to capital. The “Big Three” automakers in the U.S. (Ford, GM and Chrysler) control significant capital, which allows them to buy and shape large segments of advertising space. Automakers have often used these resources (and others, e.g., lobbying, Burns, 1999b) to combat and neutralize governmental efforts at regulation. Public concern with automobile safety was formalized from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s by Congressman Kenneth Roberts, and later, Senator Abe Ribicoff. This period was marked by publication of muckraking books such as John Keats’ The Insolent Chariots and Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed, and the invention of high-powered muscle-cars that helped elevate roadway fatalities (Meier & Morgan, 1981). Prior to this time it was assumed that drivers were the primary automobile safety concern. During the 1960s, efforts to portray automakers as a significant source of automobile safety emerged (Yates, 1983), and shifted concern from drivers toward regulations that promoted safe automobiles with adequate occupant protection design. Governmental investigations of automobile safety culminated in the passage of The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 which required the National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB; later, the NHTSA) to establish “reasonable, practicable, and appropriate” safety standards for automobiles. This Act also required NHSB to develop an efficient and open system of reporting safety defects (Meier, 1985). A decade later, with automobile safety concerns institutionalized, NHTSA implemented automobile crash testing. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208 mandates that new automobiles surpass specific injury thresholds measured in a 30 mph full-frontal barrier crash test using instrumented, safety-belted dummies in the driver and passenger seats. NHTSA has provided crash test results for consumer consumption since 1979, using a more demanding 35 mph test. Results from these tests provide buyers with comparative safety information and may encourage automakers to consider safety when designing vehicles (Nader & Ditlow, 1990). Negative crash tests results could have detrimental impacts on a firm’s ability to successfully market its products. In such a climate, corporations may attempt to sway public opinion through the use of advertising that speaks directly to the issue of safety. Accordingly, corporations employ different approaches toward shaping their public image: corporate sponsorships, lobbying, and strategic advertising. For example, Ford promoted the phrase “Quality is Job 1” in the face of quality problems (Sawyers, 1992), while Ford’s subsidiary, Mercury, touted the slogan “Imagine yourself in a Mercury” in the face of safety concerns regarding rear door latches in Villager minivans. The images corporate advertisements
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paint may be objective, or they may be influenced by external considerations (market forces) believed necessary to correct public images and enhance sales. By employing skillfully crafted and select information, corporations can purposefully alter the construction of image.
2. The present study The late 1970s was a significant time period with regard to automobile safety marked by the advent of automobile crash testing, the Ford Pinto case, and lowered speed limits that emerged from NHTSA National Center for Statistical Analysis studies. During this period fuel economy and production quality issues also emerged as major automotive industry concerns (e.g., “Sales of Big. . . ,”1981). Each of these issues may have an impact on automobile advertising. Our primary concern, however, is the impact of crash testing implementation on automobile advertising content. To address this question, we compare advertising content in Newsweek magazine before and after implementation of FMVSS 208, across four automakers, and relative to the crash test scores each manufacturer’s autos received.1 Two research questions were examined: did automaker advertising content change in response to implementation of FMVSS 208; and, were the producers of cars with the best crash test ratings (safest cars) more likely to stress safety in their advertising after implementation of FMVSS 208 compared to other manufacturers? Due to its noted concern for automobile safety we hypothesized that Volvo (Kurylko, 1992) advertisements would stress safety to a greater degree than Ford’s, GM’s, or Chrysler’s. Content analysis was used to assess safety-related information presented by automakers in Newsweek advertisements in 1977 and 1981. Magazine advertisements were chosen as the source of analysis due to their influential role in corporate image shaping. Safety-related content was based upon several criteria found in each advertisement (Burns, 1999a): number of times the terms “safety” or “safe” were used and number of safety-related features mentioned (e.g., safety belts, power brakes, etc.). To reflect the influence of other period specific effects, we coded references to miles-per-gallon (mpg) and pricing.
3. Findings Table 1 presents the findings for each automaker for each year under study and includes: number of advertisements (ad#); size of the advertisements in magazine pages (size); and frequency of miles-per-gallon, price, “safety”, and safety-related automobile feature (e.g., power brakes, power steering, etc.) mentions2 . The number of advertisements under analysis was 351 (1977 = 194; 1981 = 157). GM had the largest number of advertisements (151; 43.0%), followed by Ford (118; 33.6%),3 Chrysler (57; 16.2%), and Volvo (25; 7.1%). Ford increased its advertising, surpassing GM in terms of number of advertising by 1981. Overall, average advertising size changed little from 1977 to 1981. The largest change in size was found in Chrysler advertisements, which increased by a factor of 3.6. References to fuel efficiency (mpg) varied widely across the sample. Across the two years, GM was the only automaker to mention fuel efficiency above the average. Chrysler’s mpg
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Table 1 Content provided in advertisements by automaker, 1977 and 1981 Ford (per ad)
GM (per ad)
Chrysler (per ad)
Volvo (per ad)
Total (per ad)
38 19
17 8
194 157
Ads# 1977 1981
52 66
Size 1977 1981
74 (1.42) 84 (1.27)
120 (1.38) 85 (1.33)
49 (1.29) 37 (1.95)
19 (1.12) 9 (1.13)
262 (1.35) 215 (1.37)
mpg 1977 1981
28 (0.54) 63 (0.95)
89 (1.02) 91 (1.42)
8 (0.21) 42 (2.21)
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
125 (0.64) 196 (1.25)
Price 1977 1981
56 (1.08) 2 (0.03)
27 (0.31) 10 (0.16)
34 (0.89) 61 (3.21)
1 (0.06) 0 (0.00)
118 (0.61) 73 (0.47)
“Safety” 1977 1981
0 (0.00) 1 (0.02)
0 (0.00) 1 (0.02)
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
16 (0.94) 0 (0.00)
16 (0.08) 2 (0.01)
Features 1977 1981
61 (1.17) 88 (1.33)
77 (0.89) 84 (1.31)
58 (1.53) 97 (5.11)
34 (2.00) 0 (0.00)
230 (1.19) 269 (1.71)
87 64
Total N (per ad).
references were above the mean in 1981. Chrysler maintained some emphasis on pricing across the two years (with a particularly strong emphasis in 1981), while Ford’s strong 1977 pricing emphasis was almost nonexistent by 1981. Volvo was the only company to consistently employ the terms “safe” or “safety” in its 1977 advertisements (16 times or 0.94/ad). This focus disappeared by 1981. None of the Big Three automakers used safety-related terms in 1977 advertising. In 1981, Ford and GM each used these terms once. Finally, references to safety features by the Big Three increased substantially from 1977 (N = 196) to 1981 (N = 269). Automakers were less likely to mention mpg and safety features in 1977 advertisements, while references to price and safety declined by 1981. These patterns varied by automakers. For example, Ford advertisements were more likely to mention mpg in 1981 than in 1977, and far less likely to mention vehicle prices. Chrysler’s advertisements were more likely to mention mpg, vehicle prices, and safety features in 1981 than in 1977. GM advertisements showed an increase in mpg and safety features mentions in 1981. Contrary to our hypothesis, Volvo advertisements were less likely to mention the terms safe or safety, or safety features in 1977 compared to 1981. As Table 2 indicates, average crash test scores for GM (3.0) vehicles surpassed those of Chrysler (2.6) and Ford (2.5). In both 1977 and 1981, GM was last in terms of safety references (safety terms plus features) per advertisement; Chrysler ranked first in both years, increasing mentions from an average of 1.5 to 5.1 per advertisement. From this data there appears to be no association between NHTSA scores and safety feature advertising emphasis, refuting one of our hypotheses. It should be noted, however, that each of the Big Three automakers increased
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Table 2 Mean driver’s and passenger’s side crash test scores for vehicles tested, 1979–1981 Ford
Chrysler
GM
Driver Passenger
2.53 (N = 15) 2.50 (N = 16)
2.50 (N = 16) 2.71 (N = 14)
2.75 (N = 32) 3.25 (N = 32)
Average
2.52 (N = 31)
2.60 (N = 30)
3.00 (N = 64)
the average number of references to safety features in their advertisements, supporting one of our hypotheses.
4. Discussion The late 1970s and early 1980s was a period when automobile safety became increasingly important to consumers and regulators. Innovative safety developments were legislated and/or implemented. In this context, we hypothesized a relationship between implementation of FMVSS 208 and the content of vehicle advertisements. There is some limited evidence of an association. The number of references to safety features increased for all automakers (except Volvo) comparing 1977 and 1981 advertisements. In contrast, Volvo, a vehicle with a reputation for safety, abandoned discussions of vehicle safety by 1981. Automakers stepped up advertising attention to safety features, although they refrained from specifically using the terms “safe” or “safety” (with the exception of Volvo’s 1977 advertisements). The Big Three mentioned the terms twice in the 149 advertisements they placed in Newsweek in 1981, and no mentions were noted in the 177 advertisements they had placed in 1977. There was an overall decided shift toward mentioning safety features by 1981, which could be attributed to the increased number of safety features developed and/or required by law. Over the same period, advertisements also strengthened emphasis on fuel economy, while lessening emphasis on pricing (with the exception of Chrysler). Why the changes? Are they attributable to the effect of FMVSS 208? In specific cases, such as Ford’s Pinto, negative publicity may have played a significant role, and our data cannot directly answer this question. It is sufficient to note that Ford used advertising to remake its image in 1981; an image constructed with an increased emphasis on safety and fuel efficiency and less focus on pricing. Volvo’s advertising practices contrasted all other automakers’. Volvo’s advertising concern for safety disappeared from 1977 to 1981. It is perhaps reasonable to argue that Volvo’s already established safety reputation allowed the company to focus on quality and buyer retention (Sawyers, 1992; Serafin, 1995). Still, one wonders why Volvo would not take advantage of the new safety climate by continuing to promote safety claims. Chrysler was far more likely than GM and Ford to mention safety features in its advertisements, though its vehicles did not receive the highest average crash test score. GM, which had the highest safety scores, had the lowest rate of references to safety. Does this finding suggest that Chrysler is misleading consumers in its advertising by promoting safe vehicles? Such determinations are difficult to make (see e.g., Burns, 1999a), nevertheless it is possible that both Ford and Chrysler promoted a false sense of safety in their vehicles. Or, did GM fail to
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capitalize on strong crash test evaluations in efforts to promote its products? GM was the only automaker to promote something other than safety as its primary focus in 1981 advertisements. Finally, it should be noted that only one reference to crash test evaluations was made in any of the advertisements; an unexpected finding given the focus on automobile safety during this period. One could argue that the “newness” of the tests hampered their credibility, which, in turn, discouraged automotive companies from using them in their advertisements. It is equally plausible that automakers were unwilling to validate crash testing by referring to crash test outcomes in advertisements. Perhaps, more than anything else, our findings illustrate the following contention: “Auto makers are reluctant to discuss the safety issue, maintaining that all their cars are engineered for safety” (“Sales of big car. . . ,” 1981).
5. Conclusion Our study indicates that automakers altered advertising and discursive practices during the period under study. Advertisement content seems to reflect a number of market conditions, and not simply those we hypothesized (the impact of NHTSA crash test implementation). Automakers appear to respond to a variety of forces in the advertising space they purchase, and the messages this space contains changed over time. Automakers employed this space to demarcate the boundaries of several issues: fuel economy, price, features and safety. Responding to a host of market issues, auto advertising space is not one-dimensional and is fluid over time. Nevertheless, automobile advertisements do respond to prevailing concerns in ways that endeavor to redefine products. This may simply be a “marketing strategy,” or may reflect deeper issues such as “who has the power to define automobile safety issues?” Perhaps, automakers were attempting to diminish the impact of NHTSA’s crash test research on public consciousness by avoiding discussions of safety and crash test results. This may be an effort to shape knowledge through discourse exclusion. In some sense, advertising discourse is “the locus of the rules and prior practices forming the conditions of inclusion and exclusion that enable certain practices and prevent others from being accepted as ‘scientific’ or ‘moral’. . . ” (Flynn, 1994, p. 30). In this view, the space of advertising should be seen as part of the larger conflict or cultural space in which issues of automobile safety were being decided. Advertising, however, is a “controlled space,” to the extent that automobile manufacturers are able to present their products outside of the regulatory gaze. In this view, advertising space must be viewed as part of the broader cultural mechanisms involved in demarcating the boundaries of power. Advertising, then, can be seen as an effort to reassert lost power by managing images. Until the late 1950s and early 1960s, definitions of automobile safety were largely dictated by industry. During the 1960s, a new era of automobile regulation emerged, and NHTSA became the primary government agency that spoke to safety concerns. This evolution challenged the nature of the autonomous, self-regulated auto-industry. NHTSA’s rulings directly confronted the ability of automakers to act as they pleased in an unfettered marketplace. The juxtaposition of NHTSA’s and automakers’ interests established the basis for a struggle to determine safety standards. At a broader level, this struggle involved the right to determine the parameters of safety. Until this point, the space that safety had occupied was largely private, defined by the private interests of automakers. NHTSA’s interventions opened this private space to public discussion.
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Automakers employed advertising in an attempt to recapture that portion of the safety debate that had been made public. Private advertising space has certain advantages, such as being insulated from counter-claims as long as advertising discourse is not fraudulent. Through private advertising discourse, automakers provided a silent challenge to changing market conditions by avoiding discussions of safety. “Safety free” advertising space, in effect, challenged the legitimacy of NHTSA efforts to redefine the safety debate. The present research hopefully sheds light on the image-shaping practices of automakers and corporations in general. In sum, it appears that because concerns for ethical advertising are primarily limited to preventing blatantly fraudulent claims, image-shaping (including misleading images) remains a viable avenue for those interested in shaping consumer purchasing practices. Further research in this area should, among other things, examine the direct impact of image shaping practices.
Notes 1. Advertisements placed in Newsweek were assumed to be equivalent to advertisements found in other general readership magazines (e.g., Time). Future research might address the content provided in other media outlets targeting specific groups. 2. Originally, the analysis was to include picture content. Preliminary coding of a sample of advertisements revealed none of these themes in picture content. 3. One advertisement, which appeared twice during 1981, was removed from the analyses because it skewed the results considerably. That advertisement compared 30 Ford vehicles, referenced mpg 35 times, vehicle pricing 30 times, and safety features 18 times.
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