Alternative strategies for legislative analysis of public policy

ALTERNATIVE

STRATEGIES FOR LEGISLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY*

ANALYSIS

RICHARD BURTON and DAVID DELLINGER Duke University.

Durham.

NC 27706

and WILLIAM R. KING University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh. Pa., U.S.A. and US Senate Committee on the Budget (Rrcrirrtl

Seprernber

1977)

Abstracb Current methods for providing analytic support for public policy choices provide a severely limited basis for decisions by the legislative branch. The executive branch currently dominates the system in that it employs most of the analytical talent, maintains data bases, and determines the alternatives to be analysed. In this paper, two alternative models designed to correct this deficiency are defined and illustrated-i.e. (I) an independent legislative analysis model. and (2) a joint executive-legislative analysis model, and the three alternatives are compared. The conclusion reached is that the joint analysis model is preferable. Two alternative institutional arrangements-an in-house bureaucracy and contracts with outside consultants are also compared with the conclusion that a mixture of the two institutional arrangements is desirable.

ONE OF THE AREAS of greatest deficiency in the development of public policy lies in the legislative analysis of policy issues. Most legislatures are ill equipped to deal with complex policy questions on an analytical basis. Legislative analysis is therefore usually more subjective and ‘political’ rather than objective and ‘scientific’. Of course, judgement-based political analysis is properly applied to complex issues by legislative bodies. However, in the absence of objective analysis, or in the presence of biased ‘scientific’ analysis, the legislature may be led to believe an invalid set of ‘facts’. If their subjective political judgement is based on analyses which are incorrectly assumed to represent fact. the result may be ineffective from both the political and scientific point of view. One of the greatest benefits which has resulted from the activities of the analysts who have come to prominence in )he executive branches of many governments since the early 1960s has been the more accurate delineation of the ‘facts’ surrounding public policy issues. For instance, in assessing the overall impact of systems analysis in social policy analysis, Rivlin [l p.73 says that: ..

considerable progress problems in our society”.

has been made in identifying

and measuring

social

and that : “

of the distribution . . systematic analysis has improved our knowledge the initial costs and benefits of social action programs”. However worthwhile has been this better definition of the public policy benefits have most often accrued primarily to the executive, and not the branch of government. This is so because the executive branch, with its need for operating data, and its need for analyses to substantiate program

of

‘facts’, the legislative, continuing and budget

*The opinions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organizations with which the authors are or have been athliated or the views of the colleagues with whom they have worked on the projects and studies described herein. 9

requests. has been a primary employer of policy analysts. system analysts and management scientists. b) The legislative branch of government has largely relied on analyses performed executive branch program proponents for data and analyses on which judgements can be based. Legislative stall’s ha\ c traditionally performed legal analysis of policy proposals. but analysis of projcctcd costs and benctits. contingencies. second-order conscquences and the other grist of the policy analysis mill, have not been ;I nia_ior area for legislative stafl‘ concern. This analytical imbalance haa had profound impact on the ability of legislaturca to make choices which rcfect sound ctecision-making principles. In the U.S. Congress. foi example. the creation of Budget Committees in both Houses. along with a Congressional Budget Office to provide analytical support, refccts an awareness that C’ongress had previously been unable to take an overall ‘systems view’ of the budgetary impact of various appropriations bills 121. Without the discipline provided by tho Budget Act and the appurtenant committees and stall’ analysts. Congress had consistently violated the important principle of looking at the ‘big picture impact’ of each minor decision. The classic illustration of this analytical imbalance is that of an executive branch proposal for a change in an important public policy which is submitted to a legislative body and substantiated with extensive charts, graphs. and forecasts. The legislative body. with its small overworked staff, is left with only the unenviable alternatives of accepting the proposal or of rejecting it on subjective grounds. There is little opportunity 1‘01 the legislature to define alternatives \\hich might be. in their ,judgemt‘nt. more in the public interest. because such worthwhile altcrnativcs arc usually more the product of careful design and rigorous analysis than of momentary insight. The /VP\\, I’or/~ Ti/nc~.i; 13 1 has characterized the situation in the budget context in even stronger terms : “The Presidency has achieved mastery because O.M.B. and its predecessor Bureau of the Budget has scores of highly qualified experts who can analyze masses of data. project trends into the future. preparc alternative spending programs. and thereby enable a Chief Executive to know the right questions to ask. By contrast. members of C‘ongress recieve a glut of information but often in forms they are not technically qualified to analyze and interrelate. .” This paper seeks to addrcsb the important issue of developing ef’fective legislative policy analysis processes through the spccitication of a conceptual framework for the definition and evaluation of altcrnativc processes. This framework is used as a basis for operationally defining a n~~,n-traditional ‘,ioint‘ policy analysis processes in the context of a cast study involving the U.S. Congress. The overall objective of the paper is the evaluation of the intrinsic merits of the various approaches as well as the contingencies under which each may be most ett‘ectivc.

THE

BASIC‘

ALTFRNATIVE

ANALYTIC‘

PROCFSSES

The basic practical alternative processes for legislative policy analysis may be thought of in terms of a continuum ranging from an ‘executive dominant’ mode-- which largely characterizes the imbalanced system which predominates today --to an ‘independent legislative analysis’ mode in which the legislature performs its own extensive analysts independent of those being conducted by the executive branch. Along the continuum between these extremes lie a range of ‘joint’ analytical processes in which both legislative- and executive-based analysts participate to varying degrees. While some of these joint processes are easy to conccivc. many arc impractical for organizational, economic or political reasons. Because of this. we seek here to give a detailed description of one such process which has been shown to be both feasible and effective.

Legislative

analysis

of public

policy

11

The various process alternatives can be distinguished on the basis of the level and format of the contact between the executive and legislative bodies and the nature of the analytic tasks performed by each. Table 1 describes these facets in terms of the ‘three’ alternative processes as previously described. It should be noted that the ‘joint’ alternative is really representative of a wide variety of mixed analytic processes, as suggested in the table. Table 1 shows the ‘executive dominant’ process to involve executive proposals, legislative hearings at which the proposals are scrutinized, and subsequent acceptance or rejection of the proposal by the legislature. At the other extreme is the ‘independent legislative’ mode, in which legislative staffs perform independent studies using ‘captive’ data bases and analytical models so that they can fully evaluate proposals and prepare carefully-conceived alternatives. Between the two extremes are a variety of ‘joint’ alternatives which involve varying degrees of analytic involvement of the legislature and executive. Some of those which appear to be qualitatively distinct are described in the table. A secondary, but nonetheless important, basis for distinguishing among various analytic processes, has to do with the role played by ‘outsiders’ (consultants). This dimension is not reflected in Table 1, but it has important ramifications as to whether or not new bureaucracies are created by an analytic process, and therefore to the overall cost of various processes. We shall account for this structural dimension in performing analyses of the various process alternatives as though it were a third dimension in Table 1.

THE

BASES

FOR

COMPARISON

Since the various analytic processes involve different decision making behaviors, they will undoubtedly affect both the nature and the quality of the choices which are ultimately made by the legislature. The comparison and evaluation of the various alternatives requires that a number of bases for comparison be defined. The dimensions used here are: (1) the nature and degree of cooperation between executive and legislative branches, i.e. those issues of analysis, data, etc. which are accepted by both parties without serious question, and which form and level of exchange is involved, (2) the cost of operating the alternative systems, (3) the basic value judgements which are likely to be embedded in the resulting analyses, (4) the range of alternatives likely to be considered, and, (5) the bases for ‘debate’ between the legislative and executive branches.

In the next sections. the three primary

alternatives

are further

specified and evaluated

according to these criteria. Subsequently. a brief cast study. which serves lo more adcis discussed. and concluquately depict the most complex alternative joint analysis sions are drawn. ETX E C‘ I ’ T I \’ Ei H R A N C‘H D 0 M I N A N T A N A L Y S

IS

The ‘oxccutivc branch predomiwrnt mode whether on an ‘in-house’ governmental bureaucracy basis or supported by outside consultants-~ probably best dexcribcs the

Considering ni:~_jority of current policy analysis situations at all Ic\ela of go\crnment. the first of our dimensions for comparison. this alternative is essentially 2 ‘pure’ coopcrati\c undertaking. Granted. there may be long debate. and the Icgislaturc can modif) or rc,ject the proposal. but in thu final analysis. the Congress uses the data. analyses and models of the executive branch. Thus. while the process gives the supcrfcial appearancc of a dialectic inquiry. it is. in fact. almost purely cooperati\‘c. On the cost dimension, this executive-dominant process appears to bc very ctlicicnt. One might argue that there is no theoretical

making analysis this

it ;I \cry desirable situation. is realisticall> and honestly

reason that it is not also clfccti\c. thus analysis is competent. and if the

If the cxccuti\c

done. the ‘bat’

approach a\oids duplicate costs of analysis.

answer should

the opportunity

result.

Although

costs may bc high

Value judgments of the analysts arc an important consideration. E\ cry nianagcni~nt scientist and po\crnment policy maker is aMarc that the ‘best’

for many reasons.

is a relative term. A policy is ‘best’ only in the context of the model which ~+;Is used to daelop it and the assumptions which arc :I part of that model. At ;I broadcr Ic\,cl. ;I proposed policy is best only in tcrmh of the \;11uch of those \vho ha\e gcncrated it. since their \ aIri

The notion

are reflcctcti in the choice of assumptions and d ;I model. foundation [4. p. 47X]. Kaplan statcs

that analysis is value-free is without

the issue unambiguously

[S. p. 3X5].

‘-The problem for methodology is not \\M/w values are involved in inquiry. but R~I~C/I. and above all. how t hcq are to be empirically grounded.” The

sources of values in analyses follow

from

at least two general sources:

one is

professional and the second is organizational. With respect to professional \nlues, WC kno\v that la\\yers and scientists ask di@crcnt c/~c.\tior~s.and pursue lines of questioning in diffcront legislation.

“How

ways Again

even when concerning the sanic Kaplan states [S. p. 3X0] :

\vc put the question

rctlects

policy

issue or the same

pieces of

on \ alues on the one hand. and on the

other hand helps dcterminc the answer u’t‘ get.” To attempt to dctcrminc who ix right or \vho has the correct analytic approach is ;I mcaningleas search. The issue is the propensity of ;I pro’ce~~ to rccogni/c these ditfcrcnces

and to huilci upon tlum

rather than to submerge them. Analysts

to be neutral. but thcq arc not value-free. The risk of listening can lead to \vhat Kaplan callx I-;/YL,CI/i/eciior~,\ [S, /I, 3Ol].

ma! attempt

to one group

onlk

expert consultant often makes rivf~rtrl decisions. presupposing certain policies in his very formulation of the problem or in the tacit assumptions underlying his solution. and this intrusion is rationalized as non-existent by the formula that as a scientist. he is only providing the basis for a decision which others, uftcr all. must make. Thus the policy makers‘ wills ends \\ithout scientific assessment of their conditions and consequences. While the scientist exercises power without corresponding responsibility. refusing indeed. ‘as ;I scientist’ to assume responsibility.” “The

A second source of value is orgaiiization~ll. For instance, dots an Agricultural Department proposal to the C‘ongress for 8 new farm subsidy rcfcct primarily the intcreat of frtrmcrh or does it more broadly relate to the public good’.’ Arc the \alucs of those

Legislative

analysis

of public

policy

I!

who have made the proposal biased primarily toward the maintenance of their organization and the stufu.s quo or do they reflect more basic public interests? Other values, which help determine policy positions and analyses. are amplified by a bureaucratic phenomenon which restricts thr range of’ questions \z4iclz WJ~ hr uskrtl in NIZJ orgtrnixtim How one puts any question depends on where the question originates. Few organizations operate so openly as to permit the frequent raising of questions concerning their basic values and policies. Certainly most do not do so in the short term. even if they may do so in the long run. Analysts who construct models and perform analyses which would continually raise such basic questions are the exception for most modern organizations. Organizational analyses are subject to the organization’s need to have a public posture or ‘image’. This need for a stable. well-defined posture serves to impose a kind of artificial consistency on the positions which are taken by the organization. For instance. an executive agency might feel compelled to adopt a position on one proposal that gave the public appearance of being consistent with a previous position on another issue. even though there might be a good public-interest basis for doing otherwise. Thus, if a regulatory agency has taken the position that genera1 tariff cuts are in order, it may well not wish to recommend a tariff increase in some localized situation. even though it might be warranted. Since the basis for debate in the ‘executive branch dominant’ process mode is left to open hearings between the Congress and high-level executive officials, these debates are frequently in the mode of the executive branch taking strong advocate position, and the Congress attempting to understand and probe the issue. Such interactions probably do not form an effective means in which to search for ‘truth’. INDEPENDENT

LEGISLATIVE

ANALYSIS

The ‘independent legislative analysis’ analytic process alternative is at the opposite end of the continuum from the ‘executive branch dominant’ alternative. It introduces the possibility for competition on all levels of the analytical process; in question asking, data gathering, data processing, and interpretation and assessing implications. This mode may represent the true ‘dialectic’ in that directly opposing views may be championed by executive and legislative analysts. (See [4] for discussion of the Liebniz, Locke, Kant, Hegel, and Singer-Churchman inquiry systems for public policy analysis.) The practical issue with this approach is whether a synthesis of positions would actually be the usual outcome. If not. the ‘independent legislative’ mode might lead to stalemate and inaction, or to legislative anarchy. The nature of the cooperation between the legislative and executive branches in this mode is an agreement to compete on all levels. Therefore, this approach requires a viable method of resolving the inevitable conflicts which arise when legislative and executive analytic groups are not in concert. The processes which may be used to resolve them are unquestionably not well understood, but there is ample evidence to suggest that such resolutions are often accomplished in practice. If no resolution is reached. the legislature is left with a choice between reliance on its own analysts or resorting to the hearings mode to resolve the conflict. Blind belief in one’s own analysts on the basis of organizational loyalty is hardly a sound basis for policy making. The alternative-using hearings to resolve conflictPmmis also poor for the reasons that were discussed earlier. The mot/us operarztli of hearings. like that of the courts. is too well structured and too ‘public’ for ‘truth’ to be sought efficiently and effectively. On the cost dimension this approach involves duplication which is inherent in having separate analytical staffs to perform parallel analyses. While such costs may seem small in comparison to the enormous potential benefits which might be obtained from better policy analysis, they are not necessarily so. The cost of data bases, computers, and sophisticated analysts is very high. Moreover, since legislative bodies do not have the advantage of existing data bases and data processing systems which are used for the

day-to-day management of government. the legislative analysts might well have to develop enormous duplicate data systems. To ‘compete’ effectively with the vast range of executive departments would require huge resources. If done in-house. this would create a large new legislatively-based bureaucracy. Even if designed to operate principal]) through outside consultants-a mode commonly used by US Congressional committees now- -an internal bureaucracy would be required to administer and co-ordinate the outside efforts. In such a case. it is not unlikely that pressures for conversion to ;III in-house operation would be great in order to achieve better control. do away with the problems of disclosure of confidential information. and feed the natural growth tendencies of bureaucracies. In tither event. the cost would be high. Many of these phenomena have already been experienced by the U.S. Congress in the establishment of two Budget committees and the Congressional Budget OfGce to deal with budgetary matters [S]. If Congress were able to establish similar new bureaucracies to analyze other-than-budgetary issues, there is every reason to believe that the same problems would occur. Of course, an independent legislative branch analysis group would incorporate its own value judgments. The discussion of the \~aluc issues for the ‘exccutivc branch dominant’ alternative apply here as well. Professional values will remain for individual analysts. Organizational \,alues NilI bc evident. only in this case for ;I diRerent organiration. The explication of the values will emerge in the intcrfacc which must take place between the executive and legislative branches. This alternative is likely to allow the construction of a wider range of proposal altcrnatives. Given the diversity of values and orientations. alternative proposals will emerge. If left alone, the legislative group would gcneratc difrercnt altcrnativcs than those dcveloped by the executive branch. Indeed. gi\,en the competition. the legislative group v,ill be forced to generate alternatives in order to justify its cxistencc. The debate between the legislati\;c and cxccutivc branches under this approach is multilevel and may take on various forms. If the debate is limited to open forums. this milieu is unlikely to lead to a synthesis. One characteristic of the way in which conflicting results are often discussed in an open forum makes any such process particularly a public one -unlikely to achieve resolution. This characteristic is the tendency to debate in terms of analytic ~‘oI~sc~LIII~‘II~‘~~.s, rather than inputs. is equivalent to policy arguments which are conducted solely in subjective terms. as though no analysis had been performed. Such processes arc more likely to lead to additional conflictas in the clichkd admonition to avoid religious and political argumentsPm than they are to lead to confict resolution on rational grounds. The key to successful resolution of analytic conflict is to conduct the process in inpuf, rather than output. terms. Emphasis should not be on the relative merits of the answer obtained by different analytic groups. but rather on H~I!. the answers are different. Did one analytic group use a different forecast of the future than another’? Did one group make an assumption that the other did not make’? This conflict-resolution process is obviously time-consuming since it focuses on the constituent elements, rather than the conclusions. of the respective analyses. TIILIS. it cannot usually be conducted effectively in the context of legislative hearings or in a time-sensitive environment. JOINT

LEC;ISLATIVF-E.>(~C‘lJTIVt~

ANALYSIS

The ‘joint’ approach to an analytic strategy involves joint. or mixed, analyses conducted by representatives of both executive and lcgislativc hranchcs. Ideally, this joint analysis could be conducted by intcrbranch tcama in the fashion suggested by King [7] for public-private systems analyses. The degree of cooperation between the legislative branch :~nd executive branch is different both in amount and kind for the joint approach. Where there could be littlc. if any, cooperation under the extreme alternatives. there must bc considerable cooperation in the ioint approach. e.g. if the legislative analysts choose not to maintain a data base. it is imperative that the oxccuti\e branch support them with data. This

Legislative analysis of public policy

I5

cooperation would also involve agreement to interact on a continuing basis among both sets of analysts. A quick review of Table 1 indicates that the communications required to make a joint approach work involves considerable agreement on information, form and content. However, an element of competition would be evident as well. Each group can probe the other about analyses, assumptions, etc. If for no other reason than a sense of professional pride and organizational loyalty, there would be competition. The cost of the joint system also would lie between the other two. More analysts would be required than for the executive-dominant alternative. but there would be some savings in data costs over independent legislative alternative. As the joint alternative itself is not unique, the cost for variations of the joint approach could be quite different. Value judgements-both professional and organizationalmust be brought out in the debate and communications between analytic groups under this approach. Thus, one would not pretend to seek value-free analysis; only explication of the values which are to be applied. Indeed various value bases may be explicitly incorporated into sensitivity analyses using this approach. (See King [S] for a discussion of sensitivity analysis as used in this way.) The range of alternatives likely to be generated, considered, and analyzed in some depth will undoubtedly be greater in joint approaches than in the executive dominant alternative. It is not clear how this measure might compare with the independent legislative, because the independent legislative alternative could serve to generate many alternatives, or it is possible that only two will be given as the two analytic groups choose to defend fixed positions. The basis for debate in the joint mode is a continuing process which focuses on the substance of the analysis-data, models, assumptions, and interpretations. From the created dialectic, a synthesis may emerge. This does not suggest that differences would not remain. Indeed, this is not the desired result. The desired result would be a clear statement on the rra.son.s for the differences, their origins, and their implications. Since the joint approach has been implicitly evaluated in the discussions of the two extreme processes. a further analysis will be abbreviated in favor of a brief description of a particular kind of joint analysis in which the authors participated. This case study serves to operationally define the ‘joint analysis’ mode in concrete terms and to provide a basis for drawing further conclusions about the relative merits of the several processes. A CASE

STUDY

OF JOINT

ANALYSIS

A form of a joint analysis was done by the authors for the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (CAS) of a Department of Defense (DOD) proposal in connection with a major revision of a statute dealing with the appointment, promotion, separation, and retirement of officers of the armed forces [9]. The 300-page proposal delivered to the U.S. Congress would comprehensively change existing statutes. Faced with this proposal and with a wide array of less comprehensive ideas resulting from many years of Congressional actions regarding military personnel statutes, the CAS asked for assistance in “asking the right questions” of the executive branch proposers as well as in performing independent analyses of the proposal. Initial discussions between CAS personnel and the consultants focused on the ‘natural’ independent analysis approach. When many of the generic problems of that mode, as outlined previously, became apparent. it was determined that a better approach would be to conduct a ‘joint’ study in several phases. In the initial phase, the consultants reviewed the DOD proposals and its supporting materials, analyzed and critiqued these materials and made recommendations for analyses that could be performed to permit comprehensive cost benefit evaluation of the proposal. A second phase involved consultation between the consultants and CAS personnel to develop an analytic design. Then, the consultants worked with DOD analysts to execute the analytic design. Finally, the consultants, working with the counsel of DOD experts, performed final analyses and made recommendations to the committee. A critical element of this policy analysis strategy was the conclusion that the analysts

would be in a better position to initially “pose the right questions” about the proposal because DOD personnel would be limited in their ability to do so because of organi;rational values. and Congressional personnel would be limited in the time that they could expend on the analysis of so complex a proposal. However. the ultimate choice of the “questions to bc asked” the analytical design were made jointly by CAS personnel and the consultants because a design which was to be useful to the Committee was recognized to require both a logical technical basis and a political one. i.e. if the analytic results were to have a high likelihood of acceptance by CAS. it should be designed on the basis of l)orll technical and ‘managerial’ cxpertisc.” Another critical premise in the approach was that of ~~~l~+ingOIZ ccyisriruj c~scuctirv (111 trlriv~r~frlirr~ rwtlel. Since both hr1mh /hnrli/~~j ri~otl1Jl.s. r~rrrlll~r lllrtrl t,~Yill~j to crctrtc OSD and the various military services were known to have de\;cloped sophisticated computer models for the management of their otticcr personnel. it was deemed desirable to use their models to the rn~xii~LiI1~ degree possible rather than to try to construct other models. Any newly constructed models would necessarily have been of lcsscr detail and sophistication than those in existence in DOD. if only because of the lesser resources available to perform the modeling cll’ort. However. the assumptions. and model construction. were examined in detail so that the output could be undcrstoc>d. It would indeed have been duplicative to adopt an ~in~Iep~ndeilt legislative’ stance and to construct new models. However. another. perhaps more ilnport~~n~. issue is that doing so might have led to the challenging of Congressional analyses on the basis of lack of sophistication and detail. By choosing to make use of existing operating DOD models, this dificulty. as well as that of possible errors in developing a manpower data base. were avoided. In terms of the process ~~lterll~~tiv~s of Table 1, the selected prnccss was of the joint variety. No alternative data base was generated. Some modest new computer cost models were devised. but no alternative manpower planning models were constructed. The primary areas which DOD and the Congress differed concerned the goals which were implicit and explicit in the proposal. DOD rightfully stressed ‘fairness’ to the individual officer and the degree of managetncnt flexibility in the proposed system. The Conpressional staff agreed to the irnport~lrl~e of ‘fairness’. but also cmphasi7cd the costs and the changeover management difficulties as well as the appropriate lcvef of ln~~~~~~~e~ne~~t flexibility. or Congressional control. These issues were explored at length between Congressional stair. consultants. and DOD stall‘ analysts, civilian and military. Initially. the Congressional staff and analyst consultants expressed concern o\cr several issues which turned out to be relatively unimportant, yet they were yuite reasonable; conversely. many of the issues which did turn out to he inlport~lnt were those that were e\:olved through detailed analysis rather than those which Marc held II f~io~i. We believe that the consequent open hearings focused on important *public interest’ issues which were identified through the joint analysis. The end results and subsequent open hearings were thereby quite different from what they might otherwise have been. EVALUATING THE PROCESSES

~~LT~RNATIV~ CONCLIJSIONS

ANALYTIC

The basic alternatives. ‘executive dominant’, ‘independent legislative’. and ‘.joint’ may now be better evaluated. Table Z is a comparative evaluation of the ‘three’ approaches in terms of the pairwise relationships on a number of rlelvant dimensions. These relationships arc described in terms of an ‘is preferred to’ relation > which indicates that the joint alternative is preferred to the executive dominant one on the basis of the ‘degree of constructive cooperation’, while either the joint or independent legislative alternatives may be prefcrable on this dimension. depending on the particular circumstances.

Legislative

* A > B means

‘A is preferred

analysis

of public

policy

17

to B’.

In the ‘executive-joint’ comparison. this means that while the executive-dominant mode is superficially competitive it is actually highly cooperative. The cooperation is so ‘pure’ that some have considered a serious imbalance in the process. Niskanen has characterized the process as “. . a stylized farce with every actor playing his institutional role” 114, p. 1481. One might argue that the legislative process is designed to cope through the legislative committees and hearings which are the medium for legislative impact in this mode. In hearings, legislators can query executive branch proponents of proposed legislation and insist that the answers to their question be supported with analyses. While this is so, reliance on such a process suffers from two major faults. First is one of time pressure. The detailed analysis of complex issues requires so much time that it may make it impractical to perform the analyses needed to fully respond to a legislator’s query. A second major Raw in this approach is well known to both analysts and legislators. The ability to “ask the right question” about an issue is a function of one’s understanding of the intricacies of the issue. Most legislators and their staff must deal with so many diverse, complex issues that they have little time to develop such detailed understanding, Thus, even though the process facilitates such questioning. the legislature is at a disadvantage in being relatively less able to frame questions in appropriate terms, despite the fiery rhetoric often exchanged. This alternative fails to provide a true dialectic. In contrast, the joint approach is more competitive along those dimensions which are likely to ferret out assumptions, values. and models. Thus, the ‘executive dominant’ mode is rated as less preferred than the joint approach in Table 2 in terms of the degree of c’onstruc’ticr cooperation that it entails. Table 2 also indicates that while the cost of the executive dominant approach is high, it is not as high as that of the joint approach. The joint approach is not a substitute for executive analysis. and costs are likely to grow in two ways. First. the cost of legislative analysis is almost entirely a net addition to the existing system. Secondly, executive costs themselves may go up as more time, effort, etc.. will be spent in the debate, explanation, and justification of analyses. For the joint approach to be preferred. it is necessary to obtain added benefits. Those benefits are in better-thoughtout proposals, and ultimately in a better allocation of public funds. Table 2 shows that value judgements are highly embedded in the ‘executive branch dominant’ alternative. Niskanen provides a ‘realist’s’ viewpoint regarding this value question in commenting on the nature of our governmental processes and institutions {14, p. vi]. L‘

I came to recognize that there is nothing inherent in the bureaus and our political institutions that leads public officials seek out. or act in the public interest. Cynics and a few political could have told me this earlier- but without effect, prior to my experience in the bureaucracy.. .” .

Such

.

.

a view point

suggests

that

executive

branch

predominant

nature of to know. scientists personal

analysis

may

lead,

bq its Lcry

nnt~tre.

organizational

to proposals

which

are

not

nccesaaril>

in

the

public

interest. In a diff‘crent

context.

“Keeping arc

analnt

the

the

Brcwcr

analyst’s

posed

opcratinf

in hia niodels’.’ Is hc made cxpendcd for discipline-rclc\ and To

dept-i\

hedge

issues. The

of the

2 also indicates that under joint analysis alternati\r invol~~cs

programs. The exccuti\c and rc.jected. and hou format injites

is to adopt the proposing

this n,ill assessed

could

debate

proposal

sidcr

unwding

function.

What

arc I-ollocted ctforts being ant rewards

joint

appt-oath

range under

of the

adoption

altcrnatiw~ openly considered is likely to cxcculive-dominant mode. The oxccuti\eof the advocacy role of its proposals and it has considered The niorc LISLI~I

one altcrnativc and to dcfcnd it as the ‘bat‘. The joint of various alternatives from both cxccuti\c and lcgislati\,e.

with

\.arintions

The only

;I theme.

pro\,idcs

thu ‘c.xccuti\c for debate

;I fea.sihlu

and

kinds

altcrnati\c

lo

true

dominant

dominant

connection\

or

is considcrabl~

assun~ption~.

‘executibc loose

on

approach

\vhere

that the basis bc on \ alucs.

cot~scq~~et~ccs.

proposals

wc deal \\ irh complc.\ public polic! it ih not ;I guaranfcc of ob.jccti\ ity. can force \ aluc .judg!ctncnts to surface.

when

hut

branch will >eldotm rc\ cal the ;tltcrn;ttiLcs that it rcachcd the one which it chooses to propose.

of altcrnati\cs. altcrnati\cs.

7 indicates

Table The

consciow ant rather

the than the

ser~~c to gcncratc only in ad\ ancc. But the joint

a wide range to subnicrgc

and Which

ations’.)”

cotmpctilion

basic

[ 15, p. 531.

among thcsc of lhcni’! Arc analytical than policy problctii-rcl0

norms‘!

against this ~aluc risk is dcsirablc joint approach is such ;I hedge.

The

Table be larger dominant

problem

ih ;I multifaceted

honest

owti

the

their

altcrnati\es

mechanism alternative

cnh~~nccd of

for

alternative Whcthetcannot hc pcnerating

inherently \\ilh

joint

wr\cs analysis.

analysis II> thq relate to lca\tz.s lhc C‘ongrcas lo con-

rec~ttiremcn~s

or

conscqttenccx.

All of these factors ht’r\c to snuggest IIXSOIIS M,II~ an c\ccuti\c prop~~s;tI. and its sup porting a~~al~ses. may zomctimcs bc biased away from rhc public intcrcsl. This ma> be so purely hcca~~sc of ’ ttncontroll~tbl~. professional and OI gani/ational phcnotmena which do not at ~111 reflect negatively on thoac uho do the analysis and tnakc tht’ choices. T~LIS. sa\‘e for COSL thq all st‘nc LO indicate the prefcrabililq of ~hc joint approach

o\ cr Ihc

Comparisons

cult

10 niuhc.

curt-cntl!

bet\\ccn As \ho~n

-~~t~cdomin~ilin,

~7 cxtmiti\,e

the joint and independent in Table 1 the dcgrw

dominant

enc.

lcsislativc

altcrnati\ch of cooperation could

hc

are niorc dillimore or Ia\

depending on the nature of the specific joint process that is chosen. l~su~~ll~. i( ~oulci require cooperation on all dimensions for the independent legislatibc approach to be eft‘ectiic. This would t‘\en cstcnd to tht: data base. c5hicli i5 norniall~ lhc domain ol the cxccuti\e branch. since the csccuti\c branch’s operatin, 0 data IXISC will probabl!~ be the basis of all analysis. On a cost basis. the joint approach offus ;I clear advantage. Moreo\ cr. it is uncertain whether anythin, cr of ~aluc is boulrhtc li)r thcw ~_~ded costs. Indeed social

such

;I process

ma>

bc 50 adversarial

thn~

it stifles

change

anti

incurs

additional

costs.

In terms of ~a1uc.s and ranges at its best. the joint pt-occs5. with positions.

should

be preferable

of alternati\~e~. ~hc conipat-ison i> Icss clear. Howmu. its cniphasis on clarifyin f assuniption~ and qitc5tioning to the

independent

legislative

enc.

In terms of rhc criterion related IO the hasi for debate. no cleat- prcf’crcnw can be expressed berueon the joint and indcpcndcnt lcgisl:tti\c app~-oacha. :Igain. (his cornparison depends on lhc specific circumstance5 of catch c;iw. The ‘itnplemcntatioli’ a.spccts of the approach are significant. ;15 indioatcd b!, the last itcm in the table. ‘.loint‘ analyws. by definition. bcttcr rcflcct the opinion ;~nd \ alues of conllicting groups than indcpcndent anal~ws can possibly hope to do. In ;I dcrnocralic society. only anal~wa which rcflecr the‘ \ic\\s of the \;irioLi5 clicntcl cati 1X expected and on rhc c\ccution of thoc dccihions. Morco\cr. to haw impact on policy dccision5

Legislative

analysis

of public

policy

I’)

joint analyses which are structured in a phased fashion have the potential for incorporating diverse sets of values and objectives on a reasonably economic basis. Overall, the basic merits of the joint approach appear to be significant. The broadest benefit to the approach is the pot~~i~ti~l/ for conducting analyses using criteria which relate more directly to the ‘public interest’ than might analyses conducted in other ways. The joint executive4egislative aspect of this approach itself would appear to enhance this likelihood. while the inclusion of outside consultants should serve to amplify it further. The benefits which can be attained using this approach would appear to be substantial when compared with the costs of duplicate analyses and duplicate data bases. the increased likelihood of error inherent in independent analysis, and the parochial analytic viewpoint which is an intrinsic characteristic of the ‘executive dominant’ mode. The analytical issues of which data and which techniques are appropriate are necessarily resolved at the analytic level rather than at the policy level using the joint approach. This frees the legislators and executive policy makers to debate the real issues rather than the analytical details. Moreover, the mixed group of bureaucrats with different loyalties. political realists, and objective consultants which makes the ‘analytical choices’ in the joint process probably leads to ‘better’, as well as more implementable, analysis. The weaknesses of the approach are primarily managerial. Despite the fact that the use of outside consultants obviates the need for a large internal bureaucracy, the joint process does need to be managed. Moreover. it needs to be managed by knowledgeable legislative people who can motivate the executive branch to cooperate and to contribute. While outside consultants can be valuable, they probably cannot perform such managerial functions. Another benefit which is also a potential weakness is the implicit cooperation among professionals. The executive branch analysts and the Congressional analysts tend to reflect similar professional, if not organizational, values. This means that they are likely to eventually agree on analytical questions. However. this could lead to ‘analytic values’ predominating over political and other values which are presumably best reflected in legislators and line executives. The best insurance against this is tough minded legislators and executives who will not allow themselves to be ‘snowed’ by staff specialists. The institutional alternatives also warrant discussion. In general. there are two alternatikcs the in-house bureaucracy and the outside consultant contractor. The Congressional Budget Office is an example of the first, and the case study situation oll‘ers us an example of the latter. There are advantages and disadvantages to each. We shall argue that a combination of the two is preferable to either alone. At first glance. the difference. and thus the issue. may not seem important. Both involve government expenditures, and both involve the studies as products. In broad terms. they can be viewed as equivalent. but the institutional and organizational issues are significant. First, a bureau is budgeted for general operations; and it need not yield a service or product which can be measured and valued on a per unit basis. For outside consultants. it is necessary to require a reasonably-well-defined product which can be valued on that basis. e.g. a specific study. The outside alternative requires a certain time and effort to define the study and identify the interested parties. This requires both money and time. Outsiders otTer wide flexibility among studies or projects, but require that each be well defined. Finally. the use of consultants permits direct control since each study must be desired in and of itself. The legislature has great control over what it wants studied. and what it does not. In general. control over internal bureaucratic activities is less direct and less finely tuned than for consultant contractors. Moreover, analytic bureaucracies may not be different than other bureaucracies. As they grow. they became powerful and self perpetuating. In such a situation, a ‘third player’ could be created in the legislative ‘game’-a bureau with its own goals. Although this has happened to some degree in the executive branch where departments have