Are emotions consequences of affective expectations? A commentary essay

Are emotions consequences of affective expectations? A commentary essay

Journal of Business Research 63 (2010) 903–904 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Business Research Are emotions consequences of ...

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Journal of Business Research 63 (2010) 903–904

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Business Research

Are emotions consequences of affective expectations? A commentary essay Pierre Desmet ⁎ University Paris-Dauphine and ESSEC Business School, France

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Accepted 1 June 2009

a b s t r a c t This issue contains a reinterpretation of the pleasure–arousal–dominance (PAD) model that states only pleasure is pertinent and that cognition precedes pleasure (see Massara et al., 2010). However, such a reinterpretation of the PAD model, in which emotion is a simple signal of the need for an adjustment, suffers from some serious challenges. According to appraisal tendency theory, the theoretical framework should include many more dimensions, as well as individual variables that moderate the link between arousal and pleasure. From a methodological perspective, the utilitarian scenario (grocery shopping in a virtual store) actually appears in an emotional framework, and the atmospherics are sufficiently invasive to stimulate a cognitive appraisal of the situation. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

In their article, “Adapting to a retail environment: Modeling consumer–environment interactions,” Massara, Liu, and Melara (2010, hereafter, MLM) propose and test a model designed to clarify the effects of atmospherics, especially music and light. Understanding atmospheric effects remains an important issue for retailers and service providers, because atmospherics influence pleasure, and pleasure is a strong determinant of in-store behavior. Their article offers an alternative framework for understanding the effects of atmospherics on behavior. Starting with the classical Mehrabian and Russell (1974) model of emotion, this approach proposes a reinterpretation of the framework with some key changes.

1.2. Emotions are signals of a need to adjust

1. The role of emotions

Even if emotions can predict behavioral changes, like avoidance, emotion does not cause behavior directly. The need to adapt to an environment results from perceived discrepancies between expected and experienced environmental conditions. This view differs from the stimulus–organism–response (S–O–R) paradigm that Mehrabian and Russell (1974) retain, according to which emotions mediate the effect of atmosphere on consumer behavior. This concept contradicts theories of affective influences, which imply that emotions regulate a person's relation to an external environment. In this theory, emotions represent solutions to specific problems of survival or adjustment and serve clearly specified functions (e.g., prioritizing and organizing behaviors) that relate directly to behavior (Keltner and Gross, 1999).

1.1. Emotions as consequences of cognitive appraisals

2. The reinterpretation of the PAD model

Atmospheric stimuli have no direct effects on emotion. Instead, a person first evaluates his or her environment, and then the consequences of his or her appraisal generate emotions (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Whereas cognitive appraisal theory explores the cognitive aspects of emotion, MLM go one step further and propose that emotion is merely a product of cognitions. These authors adapt the appraisal tendency framework to study the influence of incidental emotions (irrelevant to present judgments), similar to those that atmospherics generate (Han et al., 2007).

Pleasure is the only emotion that MLM retain from the pleasure– arousal–dominance (PAD) model. Prior research also concludes that pleasantness always emerges as an important dimension, yet the assumption that pleasantness results from cognitive appraisal is questionable. For Zajonc (1980), for example, pleasantness is an immediate, automatic evaluation and therefore not a cognitive evaluation. Place and the role of pleasure also appear complex in this theoretical framework. Pleasure is an endogenous variable but also plays a moderating role. Arousal influences behavior, but pleasure moderates the effect of arousal, such that this influence is positive only when the store is pleasant (Donovan and Rossiter, 1982). 2.1. Dominance in the theoretical framework

⁎ University Paris-Dauphine and ESSEC Business School, 30, rue les clairieres rouges, 95000 Cergy, France. E-mail address: [email protected]. 0148-2963/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.09.006

Russell and Mehrabian (1977) initially proposed a tri-dimensional emotion model (Russell and Mehrabian, 1977). In addition, the

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original PAD model attempted to measure emotional traits or temperament, defined as the average of individual emotional states across a representative sample in everyday situations (Mehrabian, 1995). However, empirical tests fail to confirm the central role of these three emotions. No research documents the effect of dominance on behavior, which may explain why subsequent versions of the PAD model drop this element (Donovan and Rossiter, 1994). The theoretical and practical relevance of dominance for predictions of shopping behaviors remains undetermined (Donovan and Rossiter, 1982), yet MLM choose to reintroduce dominance into their model, as a consequence of shopping orientation, because the shopping goal appears as either specific or ambiguous. When the goal is very specific, the consumer searches for more dominance or control. For very specific goals, MLM argue that expectations become more specific. This decision to reintroduce dominance matches the increased weight that current literature attributes to the perceived role of control and dominance. For example, Ward and Barnes (2001) conclude that dominance has a direct effect on emotions, including not only pleasure but also arousal. Dominance requires a cognitive interpretation and therefore does not operate in situations that call for affective responses (Russell and Pratt, 1980). However, dominance fits well with the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions. The effects of atmospherics depend on situational characteristics. Bitner (1992) shows that a person's expectation about what he or she may find in an environment affects his or her response to the place. In their research, MLM attempt to explain contradictory results by demonstrating the moderating roles of dominance and the emotion (pleasure) that results from a match or mismatch between the expected and the experienced level of arousal. Similarly, prior research shows that goals influence the interaction between a person and a place, because those goals guide the person's actions, thoughts, and feelings about the place (Ward et al., 1988). This supposition has important managerial implications for store managers, who might personalize store areas according to customers' goals and buying processes. 3. Questions Despite some interesting assertions, MLM's framework proposals raise several questions that demand resolution. 3.1. Should the theoretical appraisal framework extend to include other appraisal dimensions? Early research on cognitive appraisals of emotions proposed eight dimensions: attention, control, certainty, perceived obstacle, legitimacy, responsibility, anticipated effort, and pleasantness (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). In their theoretical framework, MLM retain only two emotions (arousal and dominance) from the PAD as cognitive appraisals. If the framework extends to other appraisal dimensions, problems likely will relate to the relationships between the dimensions. For example, appraisals of the expected and experienced levels of various factors indicate the possible need to change, which could relate to the seventh dimension, anticipated effort. The decision to extract pleasantness from the appraisal dimension and make pleasantness instead a consequence of the appraisal also demands further explanation. Even if dimensions such as pleasantness are the same, the object of the evaluation must be clear. Instead, the object of the evaluation clearly varies: In appraisal theory, stimuli are pleasant, but for MLM, pleasantness represents an individual state that results from the absence of effort needed to adjust to the environment.

3.2. Should the model include individual, nonsituational variables? Mehrabian and Russell (1974) prioritize individual differences in stimuli perception, particularly with regard to arousal. A person's arousal response to the environment might reflect the extent to which each person has a disposition toward screening stimuli. This individual variable should appear in the model. 3.3. Do methodological choices affect external validity? The scenario that MLM use (a trip to the grocery store to buy items) is mainly utilitarian. Because few consumers find grocery shopping intrinsically satisfying, this simulated trip seems unlikely to involve hedonic goals. Therefore, the study should have incorporated other situations in which shopping provides an experience by itself. The choice of a simulated virtual store in MLM's study also limits their research, especially when the empirical domain consists of stores or service providers such as restaurants, for which realism is a key prerequisite for ecological validity. The simulated, virtual store may produce cognitive appraisals, because the consumers lack access to the “sensory” dimensions of a “true” store. As a consequence, MLM's research may be more relevant for e-shopping than for brick-andmortar stores (Eroglu et al., 2003). 3.4. Are PAD emotional measures adaptable to a cognitive view of arousal and dominance? MLM use the measures that Mehrabian and Russell (1974) propose for pleasure, dominance, and arousal. However, Mehrabian and Russell initially developed those measures to assess an emotion. Therefore, before applying these emotion measures to cognitive appraisals (arousal and dominance), the authors should undertake a careful validation and eventually an adaptation to ensure the measures are adequate. References Bitner Mary Jo. Servicescapes: the impact of physical surroundings on customers and employees. J Mark 1992;56(2):57–71. Donovan Robert J, Rossiter John R. Store atmosphere: an environmental approach. J Retail 1982;58(1):34–57. Donovan Robert J, Rossiter John R, Gillian Marcoolyn, Rossiter Nesdale. Store atmosphere and purchasing behavior. J Retail 1994;70:283–94 Fall. Eroglu Sevgin A, Machleit Karen A, Davis Lenita M. Empirical testing of a model of online store atmospherics and shopper responses. Psych & Mark, Special Issue on Behavioral Dimensions of e-Commerce. vol 20; 2003. p. 139–50. February. Han Seunghee, Lerner Jennifer S, Keltner Dacher. Feelings and consumer decision making: the appraisal-tendency framework. J Constr Psychol 2007;17(3):158–68. Keltner Dacher, Gross James J. Functional accounts of emotions. Cogn Emot 1999;13(5): 467–80. Massara Francesco, Liu Sandra S, Melara Robert. Adapting to a retail environment: modeling consumer–environment interaction. J Bus Res 2010;63(7):673–81. Mehrabian Albert. Relationship among three general approaches to personality description. J Psychol 1995;129(5):565–81. Mehrabian Albert, Russell James A. An approach to environmental psychology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; 1974. Russell James A, Pratt Geraldine. A description of the affective quality attributed to environments. J Pers Soc Psychol 1980;38(2):311–22. Russell James, Mehrabian Albert. Evidence for a three-factor theory of emotions. J Res Pers 1977;11:273–94. Smith Craig A, Ellsworth Phoebe C. Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. J Pers Soc Psychol 1985;48(4):813–38. Ward Lawrence M, Snodgrass Jacalyn, Chew Barry, Russell James A. The role of plans in cognitive and affective responses to places. J Environ Psychol 1988;8(1):1–8. Ward James C, Barnes John W. Control and affect: the influence of feeling in control of the retail environment on affect, involvement, attitude, and behavior. J Bus Res 2001;54:139–44. Zajonc Robert B. Feeling and thinking: preferences need no inferences. Am Psychol 1980;35:151–75.