Attitude consistency and change

Attitude consistency and change

SYMPOSIUM XXXVII ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY AND CHANGE Chairman: RENSlS t_,IKERT, University of Michigan, USA Organizer: HF.RB~RT HYMAN, Columbia Universit...

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SYMPOSIUM XXXVII

ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY AND CHANGE Chairman: RENSlS t_,IKERT, University of Michigan, USA Organizer: HF.RB~RT HYMAN, Columbia University, USA

A T T I T U D E STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR A N D MOTIVATIO.'4AL T U N I N G UL1~ HIMMELSTRAND

Universi~ of Uppsala, Sweden A model of attitude structure slightly different from the prevailing one i:~ first presented. Attitude structure is defined in terms of a set of vah~tions. a se~ of cognitions, a set of "affective loadings', and a stock of referent objects to which given valuations and cognitions refer. A central concept in eharacte1:izi~g this kind of attitude structure is ~he concept of the Lvariable which states whether "affeetiv,~ loadings" (motivational energies) are mainly ~nvested in pure verbalizafioi~ of an attitude (== hi-L), or into a two-way process including verbalization a~ well as confrontation with attitudinal object.,..'.(=: medium-L), or whether motivation is focussed mainly on attitudina! objects (== lo-L). Then a graphical model is indicated Which presents factors and processes assumccl to be important in the formation and reduction of cognitive dissonance in an attitude-behavior context. From this model the factor of mot/w¢tional unity of attitude structures is taken out for special consideration. The L-variable is linked theoretically to this factor, and this faetor then is assumed to partly determine whether or not dissonance will actually be formed and reduced in situations where there are discrepant cognitive elements, i.e. elements which follow f,'om the obverse of each other. Some empirical data are supplied about the relation of the L-variable to the reduction of discrepancies between (1) politiea~ opinions of young male Swed-~sh voters on a number of party-discriminating issues, a~d (2) the corresponding opinions of their parties, when these voters are e×ro~ed to unidirectional pressures or to cross-pressures. The L-va:riable is also assumed to be associated with the sizc and ~wganiz~,tion of "cognit,~ve files" relating to a given attitude, and some suggestions are made about the way "cognitive files" influence cognitive dlsg~mance reduction. Some tentative d:gta are mentioned which correlate the L-w~riable 318

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with degree of cognitive differen!iation and rate o[ concept-.tormation in a given attitude area. Finally, the L-variable is .discussed as a special case of the motivational "tuning" of an individwal. Taking Robert Zajonc's recent paper on "'cognitive tuning in communication" as a point of departure, the present paper: suggests research on a number of dimensions of motivational tuning (the ':erm motivationa:! tuning i,~ considered more adequate th; n Zajonc's term c~,g~titive tuning). The strategic importance of such research for dissonance theory is indicated by reference to a statement in Jack Brehm & Arthur Cohort's "Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance" saying that eissonance may not after all have t;ae energizing properties of a moti,,e; in order to be able to "push" a perso,x to do things, cognitive dissonance is said to presuppose the existence of some other, prior motivation. If the larger motivational context of cognitive dissonance is so important, we argue, this context should be explored from the vantage points of motivalional concepts tailored to fit the cog~,~itive dissonance situation..Here the concept of motivational tuning and the theoretical and empirica! speaification of ratio,as dimensions of tuning seem particularly relevant.

ACCI:;IrI'~NCL; AN[) R E J E C T I O N OF AR(,.iU~4ENTS iN R E L A T I O N TO A I q I T U D E S T R E N G T H , C R I T I C A L ABILITY, A N D INTOLERANCE OF INCONSISTENCY NORMAN T, FEAI'HER

University o/ New England, N.S.W., Australia INTRODUC'I 1ON AND tlYPOTHESES

It is commonly asst'a~led ihat the components of an individuaF~ tmtude tend towards consistent relations, The present study is ccmcerned ~ith .he tendency tc, evaluate al'gunlentt; in a manner consistent with attitude. It is p r ~ i c t e d that this tendency wilt be posRively related to strength of the attitude (Hyp~'4kcsis i), negatively related to level of critical .~bility (Hypotkesg 2). and positively related to intolerance of inconsistency (Hypothes6 3). There is evidence in the research literature supportirg the first hypothesis but a reta~i~'e lack of information about th- second an0 third hypotheses TM

PROCEDURE

One hundred 0rod sixt~-t:ve male students, enrolled in an introductory course in psycl~ology, completed a Reasoning Test in which they judged

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the logical validity of 40 s:yllogisms. Twenty-four syllogisms concerned refigion. They comprised six ;valid pro-religious syllogisms, six invalid proreligiolas syllogisms, six va?(id aati-reli~';ous syllogisms, and si:~ invalid anti-religious syllogisms. Pro-religious and anti-religious syllogizms were matched for length of arg:Jment and zor logical form to control for "atmosphere effect". For ea'eh subject a Syllogism Evaluation score was computed, de.fined as the number of pro-religious syllogisms marked sound plus the number of anti-religious syllogisms marked unsound. The 16 remainhig syllogisms concerned "neutral" topics and were Iandomly intersper,~ed with the religious !iyllogisms. Half of the neutlal syllogisms were valid and. ha)f invalid. Tot',d ~mmber cf neutral syllogi,;ms correct was taken as the Critical Ability score for each subject. Subjects zubsequently completed a Religious Attitude scale in which they checked the extent to which they agreed ( + l , + 2 , --1-3) or disagreed (--1, - - 2 , ..--3) with each ol~ the conclusions of the 24 religious syllogisms. This scale was scored for strength of pro-religious attitude. Sc6res on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (Form E) and Budner's Intolerance 95 Ambiguity Test were assumed to provide measures of intolerance of ix~consistency. Results were ~malyzed separ~tely for subjects with a positive score on the Religious Attitude Scale (Proreligious Group, N ~--- 131), and for subjec!s with a negative score on ,he scale (Anti-religious Group, vV == 34). RESULTS

For the Pro-religious Gr,:mp, Syllogism Evaluation and Religiou.,, Attitude scores are positively correlated (p,(.005), Syllogism Evaluation and Critical Ability scores are r:egatively correlated (p<.L005), and Syllogism Evalaation and Intolerance ,Df Ambiguity scores are positively correlated (p<~.01). These three correlations s,apport i~\vpotheses 1, 2, aml 3 respectively. Syllogism Evahmtion and Dogmatism scores are not significantly related. For the Anti-religious Group, Syllogism Evaluation and Inloleraace of Ambiguity scores are 1 ositively related (p~..05), but this relationship is not in the expc~cted direcl ion for anti-relig!ous subjects. None of ~he other correlations involving Syllogism Evalualion scores are significant for this group. The Anti-religious Group has a significantly lower mean Syllogism Evaluation score (p<.[.001), a significantly higher mean Critical Ability score (p.~.05), and a significantly lower Intolerance of A::'~biguity score (p-~.01) than does the Pro-religious Group. CoNc:~tJsIo.~ Predictions are thus clearT,y supported by results from the Pro-religious. Group but not by results from the Anti-religious Group. The latter group is, however, .,~mall in ~ize and contains few subjects with high anti-religioa.,~

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scores. It is suggested that f~r:taer research might investigate a strongly anti-religious group, and e~'~:mine the generality of the predictmns by studying other ,types of attitude The desirability ot developing a more spectacle measure of intole~ , -e of inconsistency is noted. Finally, it is suggested that the present research design permits the inw:stigation o~ other personality variables which might affect acceptance or rejection of arguments in a manner consistent with attitude.

S O C I A L C H A N G E A N D A T T I T U D E C H A N G E iN TIlE ARAB MIDDLE EAST LEVON H. MELIKLAN American University o] Beirut, Lebanon The Arab Middle East has undergone, ~md is still undergoing, some fundamental social changes that are changing its t~'aditional picture. These changes have been quite intense during ~he past ten years und are manifested by three psychologically important ~rends. In tile first place there has beer~ a change in the focus of the problems facing the area. The causes lor its problems are perceived to be more from within than from without. In the second place ttaere has been a grow!ng trcr.d towards authoritarian forms of government. The lack of unity among the Arab States, the relatively low standard of economic development, and the unwise and often selfish use of its economic resources by a small group of privileged people are now considered a vital source for the problems of the area. The culture and some of its institutions are perceived to be inadequate. An increase in the role of the army (armies) ira politics, as a result of the mounting sentiments for unity among the different Arab countries, and the steps that have so far been taken by Egypt, Syria and lraq for such unity, a third trend, has become ;~pparent. A growing fe,-ling of insecurity has appeared among a large see'.icn of the Christian Arab minorities who fear to be engulfed by a Moslem oriented rather than a secular oriented United Arab State. These trends are psychologically important and are botmd to reflect themselves in the .attitudes of people who come under their influence. "to find o l t what the psychological consequences of these changes are, a srf,~al! hum ~er of at0:udes were chosen for study. T~e choice was limited to attitude s~dies carried om in 1952 whi.ch if repeated in 1963, were tc, make ~ver t i n e comparisons possible. This method is in line with Adelson's suggestiou f2,r the study of the psychological consequences of social change.

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The authoritarian F scale and a modified form oI~ the Bogardos Social Distance Scale were administered to two groups of Arab studen~g at the American University of Beirut during the acadenfie year 1962/63. The same scales had been administered to essentially simitar groups of students at the same University in 1952. Some differences in the results of the two scales were noticeable. Significam changes appeared in the authoritarian scores. The scores for the 1963 group on this scale where significantly higt~er than they were in 1952 for both Christian and Moslem Ss--where~s in 1952 t!he Moslem Ss scored ,~ignifiicantly higher than the Christians, in 1963 the differences between therr~ were not significant. A general increase on the mean Social Distance scolzs for both Christiaas and Moslems was also noted. The increase occured towards most of the nationality and religious groups which were included in the study. The increase in the mean s c o r ~ of the Christians was noticeably higher than that of the Moslems. There was a tendency for the mean scores of the Moslems to be lower than those of the Christians. -l?hese were clear-cut trends rather than statistically significant changes. Ti~e.~ results were interpreted as ego defense reactions to the uncertainfie,~, :.nd instabilities that have accompanied the social changes in the Arab ~,Tiddle East during the past ten years.

ATTITUDES AND NON-ATTiTUDES: CONTINUATION OF A DIALOGUE PHILIP E. CONVERSE

University o] Michigan, USA The', point of departure for the paper is Hovland's plea (1959) for a more vigorou~ di~dogue between work on attitude change in the experimental and sample-survey traditions. To further this dialogue, data are presented on attitude change drawn from a three-stage, four-year national panel survey, whh an analysis of underlying processes generating change in response pat~rerns f3ver time. In a crucial test utilizing the double retest provided by the, second and third waves, responses to a key item are shown to have an e×cellent fit with a mode~ which supposes a core of perfectly stable resl~omes and another segment of respondents whose stated attitudes vary ran0onqy i u a strict statistical sense over time. The division of the population JpAo these two types is sufficiently cle~n to permit estimates of the proportions of the population with random "non-attitudes." v~rhile the attitude meas~aremvnt had been handie~q, in such a way as to urge re-

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spondents without preformed attitudes to say so, and while the propori:ion of such confessed non-opinion was much greater than usual in attitude measurement, the most striking f',ct was the proportion of the popula;ion which feit obliged to express ao attitade despite the invitations to abstain, yet whose responses showed ramZ .i time-paths. Implications of the findings are developed first in the direction of attitude measurement procedures common to much experimental study of attitude change, Along with a discussion of the conceptual meaning of e~assical concepts of measurement reliability and the mid-zone of the attitude continuum, the suggestion is made that certain kinds of e×perimental studies probably have involved measurement of actual "non-attitudes" in a degree quite beyond the expectations of the investigators. Hence it is oossJble that "'change" induced through experimental persuasion in such cases might better be seen a~ attitude "formation" rather than as attitude "change." Finally, some implications are developed in the direction of a number of the currently popular theories of attitude change. Stress is placed on the motivational and cognitive "centrality" of the attitude object for the subject as a prim..~ modifier of attitude-change phenomel~a. Gross variations in object centrality, laid against "balance" or "congruity" propositions with respect to attitude change, generate a number of hypotheses which seem reasonable in the light of sample-survey evidence, and which might war'ant closer experimental investigation.

DISCUSSION NATALIA P. CHAPANIS Johns Hopkins University., USA