Australian aviation safety — observations from the ‘lucky’ country

Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55 — 62

Australian aviation safety — observations from the ‘lucky’ country G.R. Braithwaite !, *,1, R.E. Caves ", 2, J.P.E. Faulkner !,3 ! Department of Aviation, University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia " Department of Transport Studies, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leics LE11 3TU, UK

Abstract This paper examines the reasons behind Australia’s good record for commercial jet aircraft operations. The results indicate a complex system of factors ranging from the anecdotal theories on weather, terrain, traffic density and luck together with deeper human factors issues such as the influence of culture at national, industry and organisational levels and the influence of key historical events and personalities. This paper illustrates how these inputs have interacted with each other and the effect this has on the level of risk acceptability within Australian aviation. It also highlights the commonly held perceptions of what makes Australian commercial aviation safe and how these support or contradict the results of scientific case study research into the area. The perceptions of future threats are also highlighted along with some suggestions for how other systems can learn from the Australian experience. ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Aviation, Flight safety, Human factors, Culture, Systematic Investigation

1. Introduction No one has ever died in Australia as a result of an accident involving a commercial jet aircraft. This fact is supported by a number of scientific studies, including those conducted by Barnnett et al. (1979), Oster et al. (1992), Eastburn (1987) and IAPA (1993a, b) who all concluded that the safety record for Australian commercial jet (RPT) regular passenger transport operations was above average. This is not to say that Australia is, or indeed its airlines are, ‘the safest’. Such a statement is all but impossible to justify and of little value for future progress in flight safety. A good safety record in itself is no guarantee of future performance. When an American Airlines Boeing 757 collided with terrain on approach to Cali in December 1995, the airline had accumulated over nine million sectors without loss. This was a figure far and above the number of sectors many established airlines have completed in their entire histories, but what does such a figure mean in terms of flight safety immediately after the event? Supposing that

* Corresponding author. 1 Research Associate. 2 Director of Aviation Studies. 3 Adjunct Associate Professor. 0969-6997/98/$19.00 ( 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 9 - 6 9 9 7 ( 9 7 ) 0 0 0 3 1 - 8

this was American Airlines 9,000,001st flight, then statistically, the airline could be considered as either having an accident rate of one fatal event per nine million and one flights (a very respectable rate) or that it had flown no sectors since its last fatal accident (which sounds very poor). The crucial point is that while safety records may appear to be a valid tool for comparing past accident rates, they are only the starting point for deeper investigations if significant advances are to be made in preserving good safety records and improving bad ones. 2. Proactive investigation From the day a child is born, it learns from its mistakes. As it becomes older and wiser it will begin to learn not just from its own mistakes but those of others to avoid unnecessary suffering. As aviation developed in the early twentieth century, mistakes were one of the greatest sources of learning. Man’s new found ability to fly was in an area where there were no experts and learning came at a price. The knowledge acquired through mishaps and accidents crafted the way aviation developed. However, aviation has reached a maturity whereby the same type of accidents are recurring as variations on a theme. There are no ‘new causes’ and yet the stakes are getting higher. Aircraft are carrying more people (the new proposed

56

G.R. Braithwaite et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55—62

Airbus A3XX-100 will carry 555 passengers in three class configuration) and the threat of litigation in the event of an accident exacerbates the input of the regretful loss of life that aircraft accidents frequently represent. The need for safety investigation to go beyond accident investigation and into the realms of proactivity may seem obvious, but so far the shift in emphasis has been limited. It is only in the last few years that agencies such as the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) and British Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) have been able to focus more on investigation of serious incidents rather than just accidents. At the 22nd IATA Technical Conference in 1993, Reason (1993) suggested; ‘‘Should we not be studying what makes organisations relatively safe rather than focusing upon their moments of unsafety? Would it not be a good idea to identify the safest carrier, the most reliable maintainer and the best ATC system and then try to find out what makes them good and whether or not these ingredients could be bottled and handed on?’’ It was in response to Reason’s challenge that this research work focused on what a ‘safe system’ i.e. Australia, did correctly.

density’’. Even for rare meteorological events (such as snow), there are hazards associated with their infrequency such as the lack of experience by flying crews. Australia’s relatively flat terrain is also frequently cited as a reason for safe operations; ‘. . . no mountains to fly into’. Although this has the operating advantage of minimising ‘hot and high’, performance limited operations, it is not as major a factor in preventing controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) type accidents — aviation’s biggest killer, as first thought. Boeing (Russell, 1994) observe that 48% of CFIT accidents occur in areas of flat terrain or water. Traffic density in Australia is relatively low. Former Australian CAA Chairman, Dick Smith (1994) suggested Australia only had 3% of the traffic flying at any one time of the similarly sized continental USA. However, traffic is concentrated in a few areas and the risk of collision is only loosely linked to traffic density, except under see and avoid rules. The majority of RPT flights are made around the Eastern Seaboard and Perth, where, co-incidentally, the risk of severe storms is greatest.

4. Luck and reality 3. Myths and legends The question; ‘how has Australia achieved its good record for airline safety?’ attracts a wide variety of answers from all sorts of ‘experts’. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest geographic features of the ‘lucky’ country (weather, terrain, traffic) or even just plain luck, but is it really possible for a complex socio-technical system such as aviation to be so dependent on the forces of nature and chance for its successful operation? In an industry where 100% of accidents have some form of human error as a causal factor, is it feasible that safe operations are the result of forces beyond human control? Although Australia is often described as having ‘good aviation weather’, the presence of weather as a primary cause of accidents involving large aircraft is low; BASE (1996) estimate it to be the primary cause in 4.1% of accidents while Ashford (1994) found only 51 weather factors amongst 933 causal factors in 219 accidents. The most significant meteorological threat to civil aviation comes in the form of windshear/microburst encounters around airports. The only two studies of these events conducted in Australia (Spillane and Lourensz, 1986; Potts, 1991) both concluded that the observed number of such encounters surpassed any earlier predictions. Spillane and Lourensz (1986) warn that ‘‘. . . a significant hazard to safe operation is considered to presently exist and such hazard will increase with traffic

There is no reason why Australian carriers should have been blessed with any more luck than those from any other nation. Indeed any study which attempts to prove the existence of luck would be treading on stony ground (Ashford, 1993). As any sportsman will contend, individuals create their own luck — in other words, luck is often a convenient term for things that are difficult to explain. However, this has not prevented the development of the widely held belief of the importance of luck in creating the safety record. A large survey has been undertaken of the attitude of pilots and air traffic controllers in Australia to aviation safety (Braithwaite, 1997). Asked what they perceived to have been the factors behind Australia’s good safety record, Air Traffic Controllers (military and civil) placed luck at number one, as shown in Fig. 1. Flight crew from large transport aircraft (military and civil) ranked luck as the fifth most important factor (see Fig. 2); While a number of ‘near-misses’ are heralded as examples of Australian luck, there are plenty of similar stories from around the world to balance them out. When an Ansett A320 had to make a go-around at Sydney Airport in 1992 to avoid colliding with a DC-10 at the intersection of the two main runways, there were critics who suggested the difference between a near miss and an accident was luck. The Ansett flight crew would dispute that, as would the regulatory authority which deemed that SIMOPS (simultaneous operation of runways) should only operate in visual conditions.

G.R. Braithwaite et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55—62

57

Safety is a societal construct which may be described as ‘‘. . . a judgement of the acceptability of risk’’ (Lowrance, 1976). As such, it does not mean the elimination of risk, merely the attempted control of it through various countermeasures. The theory of risk homeostasis confirms that the acceptability balance will be found no matter what — if hazards are minimised by nature, then the human will tend to accept more risk and vice versa. So what might separate Australians from other nationalities around the world and how may this affect airline safety? To answer this question, it is important to look at the groups that exist because it is the personality or culture of these groups that have the greatest effect on risk taking and safety.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

6. Culture and risk taking Johnson and Covello (1987) discuss the subject of risk highlighting the issues behind ‘‘. . . the claim that risk is a social construct stemming primarily or wholly from social and cultural factors’’. One perspective is that this implies ‘‘. . . that people are incapable of perceiving what is really dangerous since there are no actual or objective risks in the world.’’ Risk perception research treats the convergence (and even divergence) of psychology, sociology and politics in an attempt to explain a process that is governed by ‘‘. . . knowledge, values and feelings and is considerably dependent on the cultural/societal context’’ (Rohrmann, 1995). Culture is concerned with group norms and ‘‘. . . is to a human collectivity what personality is to an individual’’. (Hofstede, 1980). In the absence of complete information, it influences the perception of risk. Put more simply, ‘‘People respond to the hazards they perceive.’’ (Slovic et al., 1980) and consequently if these ‘‘. . . perceptions are faulty, efforts at public and environmental protection are likely to be misdirected’’. The question for researchers to answer is therefore, ‘‘is there something special about the Australian or indeed Australian aviation culture which has made it safe’’?

5. The human factor The presence of human error in 100% of aviation accidents makes the contribution of positive human factors to establishing a safe system seem logical. Human beings represent both the strongest and weakest links in any socio-technical system and there are a number of experts around the world who suggest that the above average airline safety record in Australia is largely a function of the human environment (Green, 1993; Caesar, 1993; Johnston, 1994). In other words, regardless of the contribution of weather, terrain or traffic, the human operators and decision makers still have the capability to cause (and therefore prevent) accidents!

7. The Australian culture There are many stereotyped images of the average Australian. The world tends to picture a country of easy-going ‘Crocodile Dundees’ gathered around the barby for a steak and a cold beer. However, more scientific studies have managed to describe the average Australian in slightly more technical terms. Hofstede (1980) examined 117,000 IBM employees from 66 different countries to develop four measures of culture. These were individualism, power—distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. This work was

58

G.R. Braithwaite et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55—62

supplemented by Trompenaars (1993) who compiled a further database of 15,000 responses from 50 countries. The two most significant cultural dimensions for aviation are individualism and power—distance (Merritt, 1993). Australia was found to be a country which exhibited a high level of individualism and a low power—distance effect. In other words, the actions of others have a small effect on the way individuals act and they perceive a relatively flat power gradient between manager and subordinate. Individualism and low power—distance may present themselves as skills on an aircraft’s flight deck. Junior

crew members feel able to speak up if they see an error being made without fear of reprisal or a loss of face on the part of their superiors. The failure to cross-check actions is one of the highest rated human factor problems in aviation and one of the greatest challenges for crew resource management (CRM) training. In numerous accidents, crew members have held vital information which could have prevented the occurrence if it had been communicated in the right way to the right person. Openness in communication is not just important on the flight deck, but throughout the aviation system. The principles of crew resource management training ‘‘the

Fig. 3 (continued opposite).

G.R. Braithwaite et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55—62

59

Fig. 3 (continued ).

effective co-ordination and utilisation of all available resources in the service of flight’’ (Helmreich, 1987), have started to be introduced elsewhere in aviation in the form of programs for air traffic controllers and maintenance crews. Ansett Australia plans to introduce a companywide CRM type training program called ‘Operational Team Skills’ over the next year. Attitudes towards communication were seen, in an extension to the main Australian survey (Braithwaite, 1997) to differ even between the Australian and British cultures (which Hofstede’s indices plot close together). When flight crew were asked what they would do if a new rule was introduced by management which they felt was unsafe, the results were as shown in Fig. 3, the answers being from Qantas Airways, Ansett Australia and comparative major British airlines. Although studies of national culture traits have suggested that open communication and a less hierarchical society are Australian strengths, deeper investigation reveals historical influences, specific to Australia, which have affected the way the airlines operate.

8. History and hard lessons Openness of communication on the flight deck is not just a function of national culture. In Qantas, for example, strong emphasis has always been placed on strict adherence to standard operational procedures. This included the procedure whereby Second Officers were required to cross-check the flying pilot and alert

them to any errors. In practice, a Second Officer was more likely to be reprimanded for an error he did not spot rather than one he did! Deviation from standard operational procedure has been detected in a third of aircraft accidents (Sears, 1986). The high level of professionalism and discipline which exists within the Australian RPT carriers has its roots in the early history of aviation and Australia’s so-called ‘tyranny of distance’. From the start of its colonisation by the British, Australia’s trading partners were predominantly found in the ‘western world’ of Europe and North America. Transportation (in more ways than one!) was exclusively by ship and took many weeks. The advent of aviation early in the 20th Century brought with it the promise of a high speed link which was vital if Australia was to keep pace with her trading partners. However, early aviators had to suffer unreliable aircraft which led to a number of tragedies in Australia. Even when aircrafts were able to make a successful emergency landing, the vast country and sparseness of population meant that rescue was often a long way away, if it came at all. When the Southern Cloud collided with terrain between Sydney and Melbourne in 1931, there were no witnesses and, in spite of significant efforts, the wreckage was not found until 27 years later in 1958. The industry demanded a level of reliability in excess of that which existed in Europe and the USA. The risks to Australian aviation were greater, both in terms of the hazards of equipment failure and the price of failure to

60

G.R. Braithwaite et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55—62

the economy. This translated into a level of risk acceptability which has been instrumental in producing protective margins of safety.

9. Margins of safety Margins of safety exist not just as explicit procedures or regulations, but also as what is known as the ‘safety culture’. The conservative regulation which Australian aviation worked within under the Department of Civil Aviation played a large part in keeping aviation safe, but it did not work in isolation. The attitude of individuals and, more importantly, the organisations they worked for, have played an often underestimated role. The Qantas or Ansett ‘way of doing things’ has influenced its employees from their formation, influenced in no small way by key personalities such as Hudson Fysh, Fergus McMaster and Reginald Ansett. Economic regulation in the form of the ‘two-airline policy’ played its part too, but again, this was not a process that worked in isolation. Financial security is no guarantee that expenditure will be directed towards safety related activities.

10. The missing piece The perceptions of what has made Australia safe are based on a wealth of knowledge and experience. However, it seems that certain causal relationships have been presumed that are not quite correct. These include the size of the role played by weather, terrain and the ‘big sky’ theory. It also includes the contribution of luck and of national culture. To return to an earlier comment, ‘‘People respond to the hazards they perceive.’’ (Slovic et al., 1980). Once the industry starts to believe that safe operations are the result of factors that are in fact misconceived then there is a danger that risk countermeasures will be misdirected.

11. Future threats There are a number of threats to the safety record which need to be recognised and tackled. These include the following. Complacency Safety continues to be an aim rather than an achievement. The belief that Australia has achieved some fixed state that is safety or is blessed with external factors such as good weather, low terrain or luck has led to beliefs which are probably mistaken about the future. There needs to be considerable proactive effort if the safety

record is to be preserved. Major changes have occurred within Australian aviation over the last few years including the ending of the ‘two-airline’ policy of domestic regulation, merging of Qantas and Australian airlines, public floatation of Qantas and Ansett Australia’s expansion into international operations. These are in addition to the radical changes within the Civil Aviation Authority and a high level of public attention and political interference. The importance of organisational culture, both within the airlines and regulator, is even now, underestimated. The organisational accidents which involved Monarch Airlines at Young and Seaview en route to Lord Howe Island clearly demonstrated the catastrophic results of defective safety cultures. In the case of the former accident, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI, 1994) found that ‘‘latent failures identified within Monarch included; organisational factors, relating to management and structural deficiencies in the operation of the airline’’. Within the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), latent organisational failures included ‘‘. . . inadequate resources, which restricted the ability of the CAA to conduct regulatory activities concerning the safety of flight operations’’. The process of change is inevitable, but requires a level of caution if a safety record is to be maintained or improved. Historically, progress in aviation has always been made at a price, but as the industry has reached maturity, so a process of ‘trial and error’ has become unacceptable. However, if the industry’s perception of what makes it safe is wrong, it is unlikely that current and future risks will be adequately counteracted. Fatalism In many ways, the antithesis of complacency, the notion of fatalism represents a very ‘un-Australian’ cultural trait. However, there is a worrying section of aviation which has started to believe that a fatal accident involving an RPT jet aircraft is inevitable. Comments such as ‘‘. . . well we are due for an accident’’ were heard more than once during this research. Such an attitude ignores a crucial point; that regardless of the accident rate for aviation, no accident has ever occurred because of statistics. There is no reason why an operation which has an accident-free record should not continue to do so. It is incredible that an element of the aviation community is prepared to shrug its collective shoulders and accept an accident as an inevitability. When the safety culture shifts from one which believes it can prevent accidents to one which accepts them to be inevitable, so the risk of them occurring will increase. An understanding of the high proportion of controllable factors which have contributed to safe operations so far can help reduce the onset of fatalism. Since all accidents have some sort of human error as a causal factor, if

G.R. Braithwaite et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55—62

this error can be recognised and mitigated, accidents can be prevented. Luck believers As mentioned earlier, there are a number of people who put Australia’s good safety primarily down to luck. There is no doubt that there have been a number of incidents where an accident was very narrowly avoided by circumstances which could easily be described as luck, but it is not responsible for the safety record of a nation. There are those who may say that explaining factors which others may have put down to luck is an excursion into semantics, but this ignores another crucial issue. If the next generation of aviators are brought up to believe that luck has played a major role in the safety record, then there is a danger that they will believe this force to be beyond their control. In other words, the danger is either in taking the complacent approach of believing Australia to be the lucky country, or the fatalistic approach of assuming luck to be out of our control and therefore that it will inevitably run out at some point. It is vital to understand and communicate what made Australian aviation safe if it is to remain so in the future. Even if some of the historical factors may change, an awareness of them allows adaptive solutions.

12. Lessons for others The value of a case-study approach to systemic safety investigation, as represented by this work, extends well beyond the Australian coastline or indeed the operations of her major airlines. Whilst recognising the value of reactive safety tools such as accident and incident investigation, there is a critical need to place more effort into the area of proactive safety. Advances in the area of human factors or organisational safety require more than ‘leadership by bad example’ which has tended to been the focus of a lot of training in this area. For personnel being trained in the area of crew resource management (CRM), the emphasis has tended to be on videos or case-studies of where things went wrong (e.g. Air Ontario F-28, Dryden; British Midland B737, Kegworth or United Airlines DC-8, Portland.). It is only recently that airlines have started to use examples of where people have performed well or used good CRM (e.g. United Airlines DC-10, Sioux City, Ansett Australia BAe 146 at Meekatharra.). Examination of the factors behind Australia’s good safety record has acknowledged the contribution of natural environment factors which are specific to Australia. However, more importantly it has highlighted the contribution of cultural factors which may exist at a number of levels from work group or organisational level to industry and even national level. These influences

61

can represent both the weaknesses and strengths of an operation and require both awareness and concerted effort if they are to change. Culture will continue to influence behaviour, even with the continued march towards multiculturalism. As Hayward (1997) lightheartedly observes ‘‘While a solution to creating a culture-free work environment has been proposed; fill it with Australians; in practice, even this does not work’’. Future expansion of international air operations, the formation of global alliances and merging of carriers in take-over or franchising arrangements will only lead to new mixes of cultures at both organisational and national levels. Harmonious coupling is not only desirable for the sake of flight safety, but has real benefits in the area of operational efficiency. Safety is more than a cost to airline operations, it represents a ‘profit centre’ which can minimise inefficiency and reduce incidents ranging from ramp accidents to major hull losses.

13. Conclusions Recent advances in the area of systemic safety investigation and a better appreciation of the role of human error has helped develop a more complete understanding of the reasons behind Australia’s above average aviation safety record. Wide margins of safety, whether they be the result of overestimated risk or a purposefully lower acceptability of risk, have helped reduce the ‘window of opportunity’ (Reason, 1990) and prevent accidents. The clear and present danger is that of underestimating the current risk and allowing safety margins to be eroded. This process may be a subtle change towards complacency or fatalism which can only be mitigated through the effective communication of risk. This paper set out to communicate the importance of what has kept Australia safe so far in the hope that the difficult lessons of the past are not re-learnt painfully. There are no new accidents, only organisations with short memories . . .

References Ashford, N.J., 1993. Professor of Transport Planning, Loughborough University. Personal correspondence. Ashford, R., 1994. Safety in the 21st century — the need for focused regulatory targets and maximised safety benefits. Paper presented at the 47th International Air Safety Seminar, Flight Safety Foundation, Lisbon, Portugal, Oct. 31st—Nov. 3rd. BASI, 1994. Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, Investigation Report 9301743 — Paper PA31-350 Chieftain VH-NDU, Young, NSW, 11 June 1993, Department of Transport, Canberra. Barnnett, A., Abraham, M., Schimmel, V., 1979. Airline safety: some empirical findings. Management Science 25 (11), 1045—1056. BASE, 1996. Boeing Airplane Safety Engineering, Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Aircraft Accidents — Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet 1959—1995. Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, Seattle.

62

G.R. Braithwaite et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 4 (1998) 55—62

Braithwaite, G.R., 1997. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. Department of Aeronautical and Automotive Engineering and Transport Studies, Loughborough University. Caesar, H., 1993. Former Chief Safety Pilot, Lufthansa, personal correspondence, November. Eastburn, M.W., 1987. A Management Tool — The Accident Record. 4th Annual International Aircraft Cabin Safety Symposium, University of Southern California, Las Vegas, 2—6th. March. Green, R., 1993. Chief Scientist, Defence Research Agency. Personal correspondence, November. Hayward, B., 1997. Culture, CRM and aviation safety. Paper presented to the 1997 Australian and New Zealand Societies of Air Safety Investigators Seminar, Aviation Safety for the 21st Century in the Asia Pacific Region, Brisbane, 29—31st May. Helmreich, R.L., 1987. Theory underlying CRM training: psychological issues in flight crew performance and crew co-ordination. In: Orlady, H.W., Foushee, H.C. (Eds.), Cockpit Resource Management Training. Proceedings of a workshop sponsored by NASA Ames and the USAF Military Airlift Command, San Francisco. Hofstede, G., 1980. Culture’s Consequences; International Differences in Work Related Values. Sage Publications, Beverley Hills. IAPA — International Airline Passengers Association. 1993a. Honour Roll of The World’s Safest Airlines. IAPA Travel Safety Alert, London. September 22nd. IAPA — International Airline Passengers Association. 1993b. The World’s Safest Airlines. IAPA World Magazine, London. November 22nd. Johnson, B., Covello, V.T., (Eds.), 1987. The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk. Reidel, Dordrecht. Johnston, N., 1994. Aer Lingus CRM Manager. Personal correspondence, May. Lowrance, W., 1976. Of Acceptable Risk. Kaufmann, Los Angeles.

Merritt, A., 1993. The influence of national and organisational culture on human performance. Paper presented at the Australian Aviation Psychology Association Industry Seminar, Sydney, October. Oster, C.V. Jr., Strong, J.S., Kurt Zorn, C., 1992. Why Airplanes Crash —Aviation Safety in a Changing World. Oxford University Press, New York. Potts, R., 1991. Microburst observations in tropical Australia. Paper Presented at the 4th International Conference on Aviation Weather Systems, June 24—26, Paris. Reason, J., 1990. Human Error. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Reason, J., 1993. Human Factors In Aviation. Proceedings of 22nd IATA Technical Conference, Montreal. Rohrmann, B., 1995. Risk Perception Research — Review and Documentation Programmgruppe Mensch, Unwelt, Technik (MUT) des Forschungszentrums Julich GmbH. Russell, P.D., 1994. Chief Engineer, Airplane Safety, Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. Personal correspondence, September. Sears, R.L., 1986. A new look at accident contributors and the implications of operational and training procedures. Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, Seattle. Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Lichtenstein, S., 1980. Facts and fears: understanding perceived risk. Paper from ‘Societal Risk Assessment’. Proceedings of an International Symposium held October 8—9th 1979, GM Research laboratories, Warren, Michigan. Plenum Press, New York. Smith, D., 1994. Ex-Chairman of the Australian Civil Aviation Authority, Personal correspondence, February. Spillane, K.I., Lourensz, R.S., 1986. The hazards of horizontal windshear to aircraft operations at Sydney Airport. BMRC Research Report No. 3. Melbourne, Australia. Trompenaars, F., 1993. Riding the Waves of Culture — Understanding Cultural Diversity in Business. Nicholas Brealey Publishing Ltd., London, England.