Benefits and challenges of voluntary contribution to GEOSS

Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Space Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

Benefits and challenges of voluntary contribution to GEOSS Christine Heumesser a, *, Steffen Fritz b, Michael Obersteiner b, Jay Pearlman c, Siri Jodha Singh Khalsa d a

University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences (BOKU), Institute for Sustainable Economic Development, Feistmantelstraße 4, 1180 Vienna, Austria International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Ecosystems Services and Management Program, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria c IEEE Committee on Earth Observation, 2241 Prescott Ave SW, Seattle, WA 98126, USA d University of Colorado, National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), Boulder, CO 80309-0449, USA b

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 10 August 2011 Received in revised form 26 March 2012 Accepted 18 April 2012 Available online 15 October 2012

The vision of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) is the achievement of societal benefits through voluntary contribution and sharing of data, metadata and products at no or minimum cost. Such undertakings, where contribution provides positive externalities, benefiting contributors and non-contributors alike, are often described as ‘social dilemmas’, usually resulting in small levels of voluntary contribution. We investigate the benefits and challenges of voluntary contribution to GEOSS, surveying economic and game theoretic literature and examining how the concepts of social dilemmas apply to the provision of GEOSS. We conduct an exploratory survey among individuals involved in the Group on Earth Observation (GEO) to understand their perception of voluntarily contribution. Even though contribution to GEOSS was perceived as rather low, e.g. because of a perceived lack of funds, commitment or organization, survey respondents also perceived many (exclusive) benefits of contribution, e.g. networking, visibility for their work or collaborating with motivated individuals. To increase participation, respondents suggested increasing financial support and raising awareness of GEOSS. We conclude that communicating the efficacy of individuals’ contributions, the personal benefits of contribution and strengthening of group identity and knowledge about fellow participants’ work can constitute incentives for future voluntary contribution. This could be facilitated by an externally established institution providing a framework for cooperation, or by institutions, agreements or frameworks agreed upon by contributors themselves. Ó 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: GEOSS Collective action Social dilemmas Game theory Survey approach

1. Introduction In 2003 the first political summit on Earth Observation was convened in Washington DC, and the need to strengthen “cooperation and coordination among global observing systems and research programs for integrated global observation” [1] was highlighted, to ensure cost-efficiency, to reduce gaps and avoid data redundancies. Thus, in 2005 the Group on Earth Observation (GEO) was formed and adopted a 10-year Implementation Plan (2005e 2015) to set up the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) [2]. GEOSS is a network coordinating Earth observing and information systems, contributed to on a voluntary basis. GEOSS facilitates access to data resources, information and computer technologies, existing and future observation systems and forecasting models, to add value to Earth observation activities through

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ43 1 47654 3670; fax: þ43 1 47654 3692. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Heumesser). 0265-9646/$ e see front matter Ó 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2012.09.011

coordination. The products and services are to be made accessible for free or at very low cost, benefiting contributors and noncontributors alike. The vision for GEOSS, is thus “to realize a future wherein decisions and actions for the benefit of humankind are informed via coordinated, comprehensive and sustained Earth observations and information” [2]. Even though the 2003 summit increased political awareness of collaborative efforts, voluntary cooperation remains challenging. With regards to GEOSS we distinguish two types of voluntary contribution. The first is contribution by continuous or one-time provision of data, services or infrastructures. Generally, data sharing can be complicated by technical and functional aspects, such as data harmonization, sensor selection and deployment, technical incompatibility of systems or standards [3], or differences between data access and delivery infrastructure [4]. Earth observation has a history of restriction by matters of national prestige, security and sovereignty. Many countries lack consistent political and fiscal support to engage in cooperative projects, or incompatible data access-, sharing- or pricing policies. Additionally, different languages and cultures can add to the difficulty of cooperation [3,5].

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

The second form of voluntary contribution to GEOSS is the allocation of time, labor and effort. Both forms of contribution are crucial and not mutually exclusive, even though the latter represents a stronger commitment. In economic and game theoretical literature the voluntary provision of a good meant to benefit contributors and noncontributors alike is often referred to as a ‘social dilemma’ [6]. Social dilemmas characterize situations where it is in the collective interest that everyone contributes, but individual interest suggests free-riding on the contributions of others. Individual interest is assumed to dominate, leading to an under-supply of the respective good and to a situation where everyone is worse off. Social dilemmas are often described by the voluntary provision of a pubic good or Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons [6,7]. Theoretical and experimental approaches in economics and game theory have investigated social dilemmas and provided suggestions how to overcome them (see Section 5). Our analysis aims to provide an understanding of the benefits and challenges of voluntary contribution to GEOSS from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective. We discuss the extent to which the concept of social dilemma applies to the provision of GEOSS. We then provide the results of an exploratory survey among individuals involved in/contributing to GEOSS and/or GEO about their perceptions of the benefits and challenges of voluntary contribution. This is followed by discussion of these results based on findings from theoretical and experimental approaches, postulating how to overcome social dilemmas in the implementation of GEOSS. Concluding, we aim to provide insights about future strategies to sustain or increase contribution to GEOSS.

2. The construct of GEOSS GEOSS is a ‘system of systems’ that builds on existing and future observing and processing systems, which continue to operate within their own mandates. GEOSS aims to support common standards and practices to ensure that the shared observations and products are accessible, comparable and understandable, and to address users’ needs [2,8,9]. The 10-year Implementation Plan is non-binding, but addresses important steps to achieve international collaboration and outlines the vision, purpose and expected benefits of GEOSS within nine Societal Benefits Areas (SBAs): weather, climate, energy, water, biodiversity, ecosystems, health, agriculture and disasters. As of September 2011 GEO’s members include 87 countries and the European Commission and 64 intergovernmental, international, and regional participating organizations [10]. GEO consists of a Plenary, its primary decision-making body, and Committees and Working Groups to further GEOSS’ implementation. Currently there are four Committees, related to the cross-cutting areas user interface, architecture and data, science and technology, and capacity building, as well as the Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group [11,12]. GEO activities are supported by in-kind contributions from member states or voluntary contributions to a Trust Fund [11,13]. Based on the levels of the past four years, annual cash contributions of CHF 3.3 million are typical [14]. The Work Plan is central to GEOSS’s implementation [11]. It establishes the GEOSS Tasks, which pursue a mix of activities (producing, applying and analyzing data, or addressing barriers to using the data) supporting strategic targets for GEOSS implementation. Within Work Plan 2009e2011, the Tasks are divided into: 1) 20 Transverse Tasks aimed at “Building an integrated GEOSS” in the areas architecture, data and management, user interface, capacity building, and science and technology; and 2) 24

245

Tasks related to the nine SBAs [15]. The GEO 2012e2015 Work Plan follows this general approach [10]. Data sharing is a declared aim of GEOSS [2], and is based on three main principles: “(i) Full and open exchange of data, metadata and products shared within GEOSS, recognizing relevant international instruments and national policies and legislation. (ii) All shared data, metadata and products will be available within minimum time delay and at minimum cost. (iii) All shared data, metadata and products being free of charge or no more cost than cost of reproduction will be encouraged for research and education” [4]. To implement the data sharing principles, a White Paper was drafted as well as Implementation Guidelines for the GEOSS Data Sharing Principles and the GEOSS Data Sharing Action Plan.1 In addition, an architectural framework to search and access data, products and a metadata catalog, the GEOSS Common Infrastructure (GCI), was developed [10].2

3. GEOSS, a social dilemma? A social dilemma characterizes a situation where individual rationality leads to collective irrationality and individually reasonable behavior leads to situation in which everyone is worse off. Social dilemmas are often described by the provision of a public good or the Tragedy of the Commons [6]. The provision of a public good exhibits positive externalities, i.e. the behavior of one agent has an unintended impact on other agents’ utility [16], providing incentives to free-ride. A brief classification of goods should help identify GEOSS as a social dilemma. Two relevant characteristics of goods are: rivalry e an agent’s consumption happens at the expense of another agent’s consumption e and excludability e an agent’s consumption excludes other agents’ consumption. Pure private goods are characterized as rivalrous and exclusive [16], and are produced and optimally distributed by the free market [17]. Pure public goods exhibit neither rivalry nor excludability [16]. Samuelson describes them as goods “which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good” [18], p 387]. Pure public and private goods are polar cases and several intermediate cases exist. The most frequently used intermediate cases are open-access resources and congestible resources. Open-access resources exhibit rivalry but not excludability [16]. An example is Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons [7], or ocean fishery. In the latter case, no fishing boat can be excluded from catching the fish; but fishing is rivalrous, as one boat’s catch decreases the potential catch of the other fishing boats. Congestible resources or club goods [19] are excludable but, up to a point where congestion sets in, nonrivalrous. An example is a National park, where individuals are

1 The White paper provides an overview of international data sharing laws, principles, and policies. It recommends implementation guidelines, and was established by the GEOSS Task DA-06-01 under the leadership of the Committee on Data for Science and Technology (CODATA) of the International Council for Science. The Task team drafted a set of Implementation guidelines, which were later refined by the GEOSS Data Sharing Task Force. The GEO-VI Plenary in 2009 accepted the Implementation Guidelines for the GEOSS Data Sharing Principles, and in 2010 a “GEOSS Data Sharing Action Plan” was accepted. It is incorporated into the “Beijing Declaration”, which calls for the creation of GEOSS Data Collection of Open Resources for Everyone (GEOSS Data-CORE), a pool of documented datasets [10]. 2 The components of the GCI include registries for components, services, interoperability arrangements, best practices, and user requirements, a Clearinghouse (common search facility), and GEO Web Portal solutions. These components have to be coordinated and maintained to provide GEOSS functionality. The components are defined and coordinated by the Architecture Tasks AR-09-01 “GEOSS Common Infrastructure (GCI)” and the Sub Task AR-09-01a “Enabling Deployment of a GEOSS Architecture” [10].

246

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

subject to an entrance fee. At the same time, an individual’s enjoyment of the parks does not prevent others from consuming the services of the Park, provided the overall rate of usage is below a specific threshold level at which congestion occurs and an individual’s visit affect another’s [16]. Earth observation data also have attributes of a public good. When data and information are used to improve the state of the environment, e.g. in biodiversity or forestry research or monitoring, this is often done in the name of public interest. Contributors and non-contributors of Earth Observation data benefit from the resulting improvement in the environment [20]. Further, the data is to a high degree non-rival as (re)distribution and reproduction of digital data is increasingly facilitated and possible at very low to zero marginal cost [20,21]. But use, reproduction or dissemination of Earth observation data are often restricted by intellectual property rights, licensing agreements or contract law [20]. These aspects can be referred to as ‘hard’ excludability, whereas ‘soft’ excludability refers to needed skills and training to deal with the data. As a result of excludability, Earth observation data are often more closely related to the concept of information goods, which, similarly to a club good, exhibit nonrivalry, but degrees of excludability. In contrast to club goods, information goods can have a potentially infinite club size [21]. Another categorization of Earth observation data is via the concept of merit goods [20,21]. Musgrave introduces merit goods as “considered so meritorious that their satisfaction is provided for through the public budget, over and above what is provided for through the market and paid for private buyers” [22], p 13]. The main distinction between merit and public goods is that a central authority wants to ensure an adequate provision of the good as the current level of provision on the free market is insufficient. To increase the provision of the good the authority intentionally interferes with consumers’ preferences (e.g. by providing subsidies) [17,23]. A similar argument can apply to GEOSS. On the one hand, GEOSS’s Implementation Plan states explicitly that data sharing should be “based on the premise that the data and information within GEOSS is a public good for public-interest” [2]. On the other hand, its implementation is still based on uncertain terms [21]. Additionally, the principles state explicitly that a degree of excludability might exist as data might be available at cost or with time delay [4]. However, goods often cannot be precisely classified [17]. GEOSS is a complex and still progressing undertaking with different levels of organization, contributions e some voluntary, others remunerated, for instance by employment in FP7 projects3 e commitment and benefit. Therefore, it seems sensible to oppose a straightforward definition. We concentrate on two aspects of GEOSS e the aim to realize full and open data sharing, which should benefit contributors and non-contributors alike, and the potentially realized benefits through provided data, services and supporting infrastructure, which will benefit contributors and noncontributors alike. Due to these positive externalities of contribution, there might be incentives to free-ride on the contribution of GEOSS, such that GEOSS resembles a social dilemma and might be under-provided if contributions are non-binding. Free-riding can happen by providing less effort, staff, data or time than possible, or by pursuing a restrictive data policy while others pursue an open

3

A query for research projects funded within the 7th Framework Program, containing the term ‘GEOSS’ yields 36 projects (http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ projects_en.html; November 2011). These include for instance, EuroGEOSS, GEOVIQA, GEOWOW, EGIDA, to name a few. A query on the webpage http://www. earthobservations.org/geoss_imp.php (November 2011) for tasks which contain the term ‘FP7’ 21 Tasks are found.

data policy. Based on these assumptions, our survey aims to highlight what contributors to and participants in GEO and GEOSS perceive as the challenges and benefits of voluntary contribution. 4. Evaluation of the survey on voluntary contribution to GEOSS 4.1. Design of the qualitative survey Between May and September 2010 a questionnaire “Identifying challenges in the provision of GEOSS” was provided through online survey and hard copy. The link to the online survey was sent by email. The questionnaire was reviewed in advance by several experts involved in GEO. It included multiple choice questions, with options to provide additional answers or explanations, and open questions. The distribution of the questionnaire was supported by all SBA leaders, which was essential for the success of the survey. Seventy-nine participants completed the questionnaire. Some participants indicated that they were involved in more than one GEOSS Task while others did not indicate activity in any specific Task. We categorize the respondents into three groups: No Task; Transverse Task (reaching across SBAs); or SBA-related Task. Respondents who mentioned Tasks from various groups, are assigned to a group according to how often they have mentioned Tasks from this particular group. Twenty-one (27%) respondents did not indicate a Task. This does not mean that they have no experience with GEOSS, but could imply that the respondent is otherwise actively involved in GEO, or responds from an overall perspective. Thirty-four respondents (43%) were aligned to SBArelated Tasks, and 24 (30%) to Transverse Tasks. Overall, respondents named 72 Tasks in the following areas: architecture (mentioned 12 times; or 17% of mentioned Tasks), capacity building (11 times; 15%), data management (seven times; 10%), science and technology (twice; 3%); agriculture (nine times; 13%), water (seven times; 10%), health and biodiversity (each six times; 8%), disasters (four times; 6%), and energy, ecosystems and climate (each mentioned twice, 3%). It must be kept in mind that the questionnaire was distributed to a set of contacts available to us or the SBA leaders. The resulting sample may not be representative of the entire range of GEO participants. Additionally, former participants, i.e. those who had contributed to GEOSS in the past but had subsequently stopped for some reason, were not considered in the sample. 4.2. Benefits of contributing to GEOSS, the system of systems Table 1 summarizes the participants’ perceived benefits of contributing to GEOSS, which is the system of systems. Some benefits are exclusive to contributors and others accrue to non-

Table 1 Respondents’ perceived benefits of participating in GEOSS. Results are indicated in percent (%). Degree of agreement

Much/very much

Moderate

Little/very little

No answer

Visibility of your work Facilitated collaboration on joint projects Improved metadata catalog Provided data is easy to use Search time for data is reduced

61 49

20 27

9 10

10 14

34

28

27

11

28

35

20

16

32

23

25

20

Note: N ¼ 79; the highest proportion is indicated in bold.

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

contributors as well. Most respondents agree that participation in GEOSS provides exclusive benefits, i.e. has much/very much increased the visibility of their work (61%), facilitated collaboration on joint projects (49%), or reduced their search time for data (32%). Fewer respondents (27%e34%) agree that contributing to GEOSS has much/very much increased their non-exclusive benefits, by providing improved metadata, data which is easy to use. Other benefits from contributing to GEOSS were named as: exchange across multiple disciplines and across SBAs; and increased awareness of remotely sensed data. We found that not only was the presence of exclusive benefits from contributions higher compared with non-exclusive benefits, but that also respondents who participated in Tasks perceived these exclusive benefits more than respondents who were not part of a Task (Fig. 1). Among respondents who were part of a Task, agreement that collaboration was facilitated or search time reduced was stronger than among respondents not participating in a Task. None of the respondents within SBA-related Tasks stated that the visibility of their work was little/very little increased, whereas 19% of respondents without a Task thought so. Whether contribution to GEOSS has substantially helped the participants’ work can be classified as an exclusive benefit of participation in GEOSS. Overall, 38% of respondents agreed that contributing to GEOSS had helped, while 10% stated it had not helped their work and 52% did not respond, or provided an invalid response. As to whether their work would still exist without GEOSS, 9% agreed that it would not, and 30% stated that it would. The remaining 61% provided no, or an invalid response. Fig. 2 illustrates that agreement is relatively large among respondents in Transverse Tasks and relatively low for respondents who indicated no Task. Thus, the interrelation of the Tasks’ work has to be kept in mind. For instance the work of SBA-related Tasks depends to a degree on the work achieved by the Transverse Tasks, such that some exclusive benefits might be realized subsequently instead of simultaneously.

much unwillingness to cooperate or copyright problems with data. Where technical problems were concerned, 19%e25%, indicated an experience of little/very little problems in converting data, integrating data, or with uploading data for GEOSS, and only 6e8% confirmed there were many/very many problems in these regards. The high proportion of no response to these technical problems most probably reflects the fact that either most respondents did not contribute data, but rather time and effort to GEOSS, or, among those respondents responsible for providing data to GEOSS, this provision did not extend beyond declaring the availability of existing resources, in which case converting, integrating or uploading data did not apply. Survey respondents named a range of other problems: lack of infrastructure and standard format for data or systematic data processing and sharing; low data quality; difficulty in assessing data quality; data origin not always clear; difficulty in finding updates on data and lack of comparable time series; and too little attention to high quality ground data. Low bandwidth and downloading capacity were also mentioned as a technical problem. These technical problems seem to reflect primarily the experiences of data consumers rather than data producers. Before finding out which problems participants experienced when contributing to GEOSS, participants indicated which problems they experienced in general when using and sharing data (Fig. 3). Some of the aspects which were perceived as problematic, such as high expert knowledge required, data availability, data quality, or access to data, are hoped to be overcome with the further development of GEOSS. Other aspects perceived as problematic, such as restrictive data policy, or the unwillingness to share data might also be detrimental to the establishment of GEOSS. 4.4. Benefits of contributing to GEO, the organization developing GEOSS The results in Table 3 show that a large fraction of survey participants agreed that participation in GEO provided a range of exclusive benefits. In addition, survey participants named a range of other benefits, of which the majority can be categorized as exclusive benefits as well: sharing experience, challenges and strategies with people from various areas; facilitated cooperation with international institutes; awareness raising among policy makers about the benefits of Earth observation data; offers of

4.3. Challenges experienced when contributing to GEOSS Table 2 reports on perceived problems in the provision of GEOSS. The proportion of no responses was rather high, between 36% and 56%. Regarding institutional problems, a large number of respondents (41%) was dissatisfied with the level of financial support. Few participants indicated an experience of much/very

19

15

13

6

8

4 14

17

24

29

24

17

24

33

35

little/very little

29

46 33

no response

38

21 29

19

13

29

24

moderate

15 29

54

Increased visibility

Improved meta data

33 24

29

32

much/very much

42

Data easy to use

No Task

19

Transverse Tasks

29

SBA related Tasks

38

No Task

No Task

SBA related Tasks

Transverse Tasks

Facilitated collaboration

35

Transverse Tasks

56

SBA related Tasks

57

No Task

Transverse Tasks

10

29

33

SBA related Tasks

17 4

24

25 33

63

10 21

19 14

62

18

Transverse Tasks

26

10

No Task

8 13

SBA related Tasks

12

247

Reduced search time

Note: Proportions are calculated for each group separately. The number of observations in group varies: SBA related Tasks, n= 34; Transverse Tasks, n=24, No Task indicated, n = 21. Fig. 1. Perceived benefits of participating in GEOSS. The results are indicated in percent (%).

248

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

invalid and no response Inclusion in GEOSS has NOT helped work Inclusion in GEOSS has helped work 100%

invalid and no response Work would NOT exist without GEOSS Work would exist without GEOSS 100%

29

80% 65 60% 40%

65

54

62

60% 40%

3

20%

80% 57

8

63

20%

32

19

0%

13 6

24

10

29

33

29

SBA related Tasks

Transverse Tasks

No Task

0% SBA related Tasks

Transverse Tasks

No Task

Note: Proportions are calculated for each group separately. The number of observations in group varies: SBA related Tasks, n= 34; Transverse Tasks, n=24, No Task indicated, n = 21. Fig. 2. Perceptions on whether or not GEOSS has helped further respondent’s work. Results are indicated in percent (%).

research and funding opportunities and at a later stage capacity building opportunities. Additionally, respondents named improved quality of research and the harmonization of observation architecture as benefits which accrue to contributors and noncontributors alike. Similarly to the perceptions on whether GEOSS had helped their work, Fig. 4 confirms that participants within Transverse and SBArelated tasks experienced more benefits from GEOSS than participants who did not indicate a Task. The Mid Term Evaluation (2010) provides similar results. Respondents recognized as benefits: attracting international attention; high level of political recognition, which facilitated the acquisition of resources to implement GEOSS activities in multiple areas; help with securing or increasing funding for individual activities through other sources such as the EU FP7, and enhanced interaction between various governments and organizations [24]. 4.5. Advantages and disadvantages of voluntary contribution The provision of GEOSS is ambitious and the engagement model based on voluntary contribution is often perceived as a unique challenge [24]. Fifty survey participants shared their perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary contribution (Figs. 5 and 6). They mentioned most frequently that being part of an open

Table 2 Problems in the contribution to GEOSS. Results are indicated in percent (%). Degree of agreement

Much/very much

Moderate

Little/very little

No answer

Sufficient institutional support Sufficient financial support Sufficient technical support Copyright problems with Data Unwillingness to cooperate Converting data for GEOSS Integrating data for GEOSS Uploading data to GEOSS

16

28

19

37

15

8

41

37

11

22

15

52

10

15

32

43

8

25

32

35

8

10

25

57

8

18

19

56

6

14

24

56

Note: N ¼ 79; the highest proportion is indicated in bold.

network and its opportunities, such as improving experience and knowledge, being aware of activities, visibility and the potential to stay on the leading edge of research, were advantages. Similarly, willingness, motivation and commitment to contribution, in particular strong personal commitment or idealism, were named, and there was a perception that if everyone contributed according to their capacities and willingness, ideas could develop more freely in contrast to a top-down approach. Several respondents named the advantage of having no commitment and no cost, or, to a lesser degree that there were no advantages of voluntary contribution. But voluntary contribution was also believed to lead to a wide range of data and products and would sustain GEOSS’ philosophy of keeping it open and inclusive. It was mentioned that sustaining this vision might ensure that GEOSS remained politically accepted. On the question of the disadvantages of voluntary contribution 51 respondents (64%) provided 56 answers (Fig. 6). Most responses perceived a lack of commitment and continuity, and lack of funding as a major disadvantage of voluntary contribution. A low level of organization or strategy and the substantial time-investment, which contributors might find difficult outside their regular work, were criticized as disadvantages. As a consequence, commitment would either rely on individuals, or was ‘phantom’ or ‘virtual’, without real action. It was stated that projects based on voluntary efforts were perceived to have a low prestige and standing, that the quality of the final product might suffer, and that important products and capacities would not be provided. These perceived disadvantages might have a negative effect on the level of contribution to GEOSS, which, many respondents thought, was rather low. 4.6. The current level of participation in GEOSS Overall, survey respondents perceived that the current level of contribution to GEOSS was rather low (Table 4). Forty-percent of respondents named the following strategies as possibilities for increasing the level of contribution: an increase in financial support for the realization of projects or for participation in Workshops, or increased focus on how financial resources might be mobilized; proving the concept and potential of GEOSS by pushing a specific activity, improving communication, providing success stories and raising awareness; working together with or getting support from governments, and supporting information exchange and awareness raising at the highest level; increasing capacity building and inclusion of developing countries in the

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

Never/Rarely Reuse data for other applications

Moderate

Always/Often

40

Converting data to/from different sources

Integration with other data

32

Accessing data is difficult

Data availability

16

38 43

40%

4 10

60%

5 8

62

20%

8

37

41

19

5 10

11

37

35

9

0%

33

37

14

High expert knowledge required

31

29

33

16

Restrictive data policy

29

30

26

Data quality

13 24

22

24

16

16

38 39

Unwillingness to share data

11

35

33

Cost of data

No answer

34

36

Finding data is difficult

249

10

80%

100%

Note: N = 79; the highest proportion is indicated in bold. Fig. 3. Currently perceived problems in using and sharing data. The results are indicated in %.

process; and promoting a top-down approach to increasing participation, e.g. by formalization of the commitment. Another suggestion focused on the work within the Tasks, such as more focus on provision of compatible data, but also the need to develop a clearer and less fragmented vision of what the communities want to do and what they can contribute to GEOSS. Respondents also mentioned that, even though many aspects, such as data sharing and development of a common data standard had not yet been achieved, efforts were going in the right direction. 5. Discussion: challenges of voluntary contribution in social dilemmas GEOSS aims to provide societal benefits [10]. Studies indicate that increased access to Earth observation data, or geographical information data, can achieve substantial benefits (e.g. [25,26]). At the same time, the results of our survey reveal that the current level of contribution to GEOSS was perceived as rather low. Low commitment and continuity, because of lack of funding, time and doubt about the quality of contributions were perceived as problematic. These findings indicate that the provision of GEOSS resembles a social dilemma. The survey results indicate a range of exclusive benefits to participation, such as networking, visibility or facilitated collaboration. Hence, GEOSS might not be a pure public good, but has the characteristics of an information good, which is

Table 3 Perceived benefits of participating in GEO. Results are indicated in percent (%). Degree of agreement

Much/very much

Moderate

Little/very little

No answer

Improved networking opportunities Increased visibility for work Increased awareness for existing data Facilitated collaboration in a project Increased information flow Political support for your work

73

14

12

3

66

16

13

5

64

21

12

4

64

13

20

4

58

25

11

6

41

29

20

9

Note: N ¼ 79; the highest proportion is indicated in bold.

non-rivalrous but may have variable degrees of excludability, or a merit good, which is considered meritorious but under-provided by the market. To increase participation, survey respondents suggested provision of financial support and, similarly to the results of the Mid Term Evaluation (2010) [24], an increase in marketing and awareness raising, and provision of evidence of the added value of GEOSS through improved communication and information sharing with senior decision makers, the public and end-user communities. What is the position of game theoretic and economic literature on the provision of goods with degrees of non-rivalry and nonexcludability? Regarding the provision of a public good, the literature finds that self-organized cooperation will always be too small to provide the optimal amount of the good. Under certain functional specifications a self-enforcing, i.e. mutually beneficial, agreement to provide a public good can only sustain two or three agents [27]. The fraction of agents to an agreement usually decreases with the number of agents affected, as each of them views its own contribution as negligible [28]. There exists a tradeoff between the breadth and depth of cooperation: when the net benefits between the full cooperative and non-cooperative outcome are small, the degree of cooperation is high; the larger the potential gains to cooperation, the greater are the benefits of free-riding. Thus, agreements to provide a public good cannot induce great changes, but tend to codify actions which agents were already undertaking [27]. Despite these bleak predictions, humans often do cooperate to provide public goods. Experimental game theory conducts field and laboratory experiments to find factors which might lead to cooperation. These include when agents are oriented towards social values and give weight to their partners’ payoffs [6]; when communication takes place, to strengthen group identity, moral suasion, and gather information about others [6,29]; when marginal gains from contribution are high; by ensuring that individuals perceive the real efficacy of their contribution e in experiments, most individuals who actively provide a public good are found to believe that their actions really matter [29]; when interaction takes place repeatedly and the opponents’ past behavior is known [30]; and when individuals know each other (nonanonymity) and care for their good reputation (reputation-effect), which might be advantageous in the future [29,30]. Additionally, groups of contributors are heterogeneous and free-riding might not always be the main incentive to defect. Instead a large proportion of

250

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

9

8

12

21

5 33

3 26

4 17

41

3 6 9

5 29

71

71

24

18 6 74

14 71

10

17

5

6

29

9

4 8

21

29

17

5 19

4

18

21

19

8

3 24

4 33

5 43

no response

29 71

19

65

32 67

38

58 48

38

3 9

29 67

62

57

54

24

82

8 17

3 8 21

48

little/very little 24

52 41

38

moderate 25

29

Political Increased support for visibility of work work

Increased networking opportunities

Facilitated Increased collaboration on information flow projects

Increased awareness of data

No Task

Transverse Tasks

SBA related Tasks

No Task

Transverse Tasks

SBA related Tasks

No Task

Transverse Tasks

SBA related Tasks

No Task

Transverse Tasks

SBA related Tasks

No Task

Transverse Tasks

SBA related Tasks

No Task

Transverse Tasks

SBA related Tasks

No Task

Transverse Tasks

SBA related Tasks

much/very much

Reduced redundancy

Note: Proportions are calculated for each group separately. The number of observations in group varies: SBA related Tasks, n= 34; Transverse Tasks, n=24, No Task indicated, n = 21. Fig. 4. Perceived benefits of participating in GEO. Results are indicated in percent (%).

Invalid

2

No advantages

3

Bottom-up contribution according to capacities

4

Wider range of data/products

6

Keeps alive GEOSS' philosophy

6

No committment and no cost

8

Willingess - leading to committment and success

10

Being part of an open network and opportunities

11 0

5 number of responses

10

Note: N=50 Fig. 5. Advantages of voluntary contribution to GEOSS. Results are indicated as number of naming.

group members are conditional cooperators, who are willing to cooperate provided others cooperate as well. On average people are found to be ‘imperfect conditional cooperators’ and match the others’ contributions only partly. Contributions also depend directly on the belief about others’ contributions. Thus beliefs decline if the others’ contribution declines. In the long run, contributions decline [31]. Another strand of literature suggests changing the rules of the games to overcome social dilemmas. Elinor Ostrom investigated

Lower recognition/prestige of the project Low level of organization/strategy No disadvantage Invalid Time intensive Quality of product No funding Commitment and continuity

the problems of governing an open-access resource, where one agent’s use affects the others ability to use the resource. Agents usually fail to provide open-access resources adequately, and they run the risk of being over-exploited. Ostrom found that, throughout history, there have always been groups which govern scarce resources adequately, by creating institutions, contracts, agreements or incentives to enable cooperation for mutual benefit. Crucial for these solutions is that the groups are clearly defined, the rules to govern the resource are matched to local needs, the group

3 4 4 4 5

6 15 15

0

5 10 number of responses

15

Note: N = 56 Fig. 6. Disadvantages of voluntary contribution to GEOSS. Results are indicated as number of naming.

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252 Table 4 Perception whether contribution to GEOSS is currently sufficient. Results are indicated in percent (%). Low/rather low level of participation

Sufficient level of participation

High/rather high level of participation

No response

51%

20%

13%

16%

Note: N ¼ 79.

members can devise and modify the rules, and a system of monitoring and sanctions is established [32]. In contrast to establishing institutions as a self-organizing process, yet another strand of literature emphasis the role of an external institution with little or no enforcement power, to strategically frame a situation and make cooperation mutually desirable. It may do this by revealing situations where most benefits can be achieved; by influencing the issues which are negotiated, by modifying the accession and abrogation rules [33e36]; by linking negotiations to ensure exclusive benefits to public good contributors [36,37]; providing side payments to induce non-contributors [37]; establishing multiple agreements according to the specific interests or financial endowments of agents at a time [33e36]. The effectiveness of implementation depends on the available information about the involved agents, benefits and costs. 6. Conclusion Concerns about the sustainability of GEOSS past 2015 have been raised because of its voluntary nature and the lack of financial and human resources [24]. Our results reveal that, even though efforts were perceived as moving in the right direction and survey respondents experienced many exclusive benefits of contribution, the current level of contribution to GEOSS was perceived as rather low. On the one hand, the theoretical literature suggests that voluntary endeavors, such as GEOSS, with the aim of providing goods similar to public goods are social dilemmas and prone to fail. On the other hand, the literature provides recommendations on how these failures can be prevented and voluntary cooperation supported. Also, survey respondents and the Mid Term Evaluation (2010) suggest that the provision of financial support and increased communication, marketing and awareness raising about GEOSS [24] could further voluntary contributions. Based on the results of our survey and the literature, it seems worth investigating three additional options. First, awareness raising and communication should not only target the public, user-communities and politicians, but in particular groups of current and potential contributors. This has three dimensions: 1) the experimental literature found non-anonymity, the reputation-effect, group identity, team-building and communication within a group of collaborators promising in furthering cooperation. This seems to have been partly fulfilled as survey respondents already perceive being part of a heterogeneous, motivated network as benefits of participating in GEOSS and GEO. Assuming a proportion of participants to GEOSS pursue similar motives as ‘conditional cooperators’, basing their contributions on their belief about others’ contributions, efforts to improve ‘teambuilding’ could be strengthened. Strengthening group identity and making the work of fellow contributors better known could thus help to maintain the belief in the progress of the network and thus maintain incentives to participate. 2) In addition, emphasizing the personal, exclusive benefits which they can gain from contributing time, effort or products

251

could be a promising strategy. In particular, survey participants who were part of GEOSS’ Tasks indicated that they experienced exclusive benefits from participation, i.e. visibility for their work, political support, being part of the network, increased information flow and facilitated collaboration on projects. Increasing awareness of these personal, exclusive benefits among current and future contributors could help to sustain or increase contributions. 3) Providing evidence of the efficacy of contributions, i.e. how contributions have affected the provision of GEOSS, or societal benefits, may be an important incentive for contribution. Currently there is no clear and consistent mechanism in place to attribute contributions to GEOSS and GEO or to enable tracking of them. Parsons et al. emphasize that a consistent approach is needed to establish citation rules and practices for data [38]. This can help to reward the efforts of collecting and preparing data, such that they can be cited and recognized by the community, and the authors can follow up how and where their data is being used. Currently, the means to provide visible recognition of contributions to GEOSS are being discussed [24]. They include the introduction of a ‘GEO Label’ for data and services provided to GEOSS, assigned according to a formally recognized or established data reviewing process.4 A label could communicate value to providers and users of the data and could encourage future contribution [39,40]. As suggested in the literature, these strategies can be pursued by an external institution, which is already in place with GEO and its bodies. Second, this external institution could provide incentives to increase contributions: apart from communication and providing evidence of contribution by means of a GEO label, the process of contribution as such could be made more efficient. This might be achieved by the adoption of a brokering approach to data provision, which could decrease the burden on data providers and facilitate the accessibility of GEOSS significantly. Third, a strand of literature suggests that the establishment of a framework or clear conditions of contribution by the contributors themselves might be helpful in increasing contributions. Thus, contributors must agree on clear rules of contribution, monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, identification of a group of contributors and their needs [32]. Such mechanisms are partly in place. For instance, some GEOSS Tasks have resulted from funded projects. Before a project is approved, the writing of the proposal, consenting to members, administrative issues or research content are all agreed on by the group members. From our material at hand, it is not possible to conclude how the future of contribution to GEOSS and GEOSS might look. It is without doubt, however, that the modality of voluntary contribution is challenging. As GEO transitions from development to operations in 2015 or before, the issues relating to voluntary contribution will become more pronounced and a structure to provide greater value to voluntary contributors will be essential. Acknowledgments This project was funded by the European Commission’s FP7 project EuroGEOSS e A European Approach to GEOSS (www. eurogeoss.eu). We would like to thank everyone who was involved in designing, reviewing, distributing and in particular filling out our questionnaire and providing feedback on the manuscript. In particular we thank Ian McCallum, Nikolay Khabarov, Alexia Massacand, Douglas Cripe, Kathleen Fontaine, Max Craglia and Francoise Pearlman for their support.

4

Suggested by Task ST-09-02 of the Science and Technology Committee [39].

252

C. Heumesser et al. / Space Policy 28 (2012) 244e252

References [1] Declaration of the Earth Observation Summit, Washington, DC, adopted July 31, 2003. Available at: ; [accessed 21.12.2011]. [2] The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) 10-Year Implementation Plan, as adopted 16 February 2005. Available at: ; [accessed 21.12.2011]. [3] Thomas GB, Lester JP, Sadeh W. International cooperation in remote sensing for global change research: political and economic considerations. Space Policy 1995;II(2):131e41. [4] GEOSS Data Sharing Action Plan, Document 7(Rev2), as accepted at GEO-VII Plenary e 3e4 November 2010. Available at: ; [accessed 21.12.2011]. [5] Rendleman JD, Faulconer JW. Improving international space cooperation: considerations for the USA. Space Policy 2010;26:143e51. [6] Kollock P. Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology 1998;24:183e214. [7] Hardin G. The tragedy of the commons. Science 1968;162:1243e8. [8] Christian E. Planning for the global earth observation system of systems. Space Policy 2005;21(2):105e9. [9] Butterfield M, Pearlman J, Vickroy S. A system-of-systems engineering GEOSS: architectural approach. IEEE Systems Journal 2008;2(3):321e32. [10] ; [accessed 21.12.2011]. [11] Group on Earth Observation Rules of Procedure, updated on 4 November 2010. Available at: ; [accessed 21.12.2011]. [12] Fritz S, McCallum I, Williams M, Kraxner F, Obersteiner M. Global earth observation system of systems (GEOSS). In: Njoku E, editor. Encyclopedia of remote sensing. Berlin: Springer; 2012. [13] Schaffer AM. Design of an international collaboration mechanism for space exploration. Acta Astronautica 2008;63(1e4):509e28. [14] Secretariat Operations Budget for 2011, Document 23, as accepted at GEO-VII e 3e4 November 2010. Available at: ; [accessed 21.12.2011]. [15] GEO work plan 2009e2011, revision 3. Available at: http://www. earthobservations.org/documents/work%20plan/geo_wp0911_rev3_101208. pdf; 08 December 2010 [accessed 21.12.2011]. [16] Perman R, Yue M, McGilvray J, Common M. Natural resources and environmental economics. 3rd ed. Essex: Pearson Education Limited; 2003. [17] Ver Eecke W. The concept of a “merit good” the ethical dimension in economic theory and the history of economic thought of the transformation of economics into socio-economics. Journal of Socio-Economics 1998;27(1): 133e53. [18] Samuelson PA. The pure theory of public expenditure. The Review of Economics and Statistics 1954;36(4):387e9. [19] Buchanan JM. An economic theory of clubs. Economica 1965;32(125):1e14. [20] Smith LJ, Doldirina C. Remote sensing: a case for moving space data towards the public good. Space Policy 2008;24:22e32. [21] Harris R, Miller L. Earth observation and the public good. Space Policy 2011; 27(4):194e201.

[22] Musgrave RA. The theory of public finance. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company; 1959. [23] Ver Eecke W. Adam Smith and Musgrave’s concept of merit good. Journal of Socio-Economics 2003;31:701e20. [24] Mid-Term Evaluation of GEOSS Implementation, Document 6(Rev1), as accepted at GEO-VII, GEO-VII Plenary e 3e4 November 2010. Available at: ; [accessed March 2011]. [25] MacKay H, Finlayson CM, Fernández-Prieto D, Davidson N, Pritchard D, Rebelo L-M. The role of earth observation (EO) technologies in supporting implementation of the Ramsar convention on Wetlands. Journal of Environmental Management 2009;90:2234e42. [26] Bouma JA, Kuik O, Dekker AG. Assessing the value of earth observation for managing coral reefs: an example from the great barrier Reef. Science of the Total Environment 2011;409(21):4497e503. [27] Barrett S. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue on Environmental Economics 1994;46: 878e94. [28] D’Aspremont C, Jaquemin A, Gabszewicz JJ, Weyman JA. On the stability of collusive price leadership. Canadian Journal of Economics 1983;16:17e25. [29] Gächter S, Herrmann B. Reciprocity, culture and human cooperation: previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 2009;364:791e806. [30] Axelrod R. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books; 1984. [31] Fischbacher U, Gächter S. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of freeriding in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 2010;100(1): 541e56. [32] Ostrom E. Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press; 1990. [33] Yi S-S, Shin H. Endogenous formation of research coalition with spillovers. International Journal of Industrial Organization 2000;18:229e56. [34] Yi S-S. Endogenous formation of economic coalitions. A survey of the partition function approach. In: Carraro C, editor. The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Cheltenham: E. Elgar; 2003. p. 80e127. [35] Finus M, Rundshagen B. Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control: a partition function approach. In: Carraro C, editor. The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Cheltenham: E. Elgar; 2003. p. 199e243. [36] Carraro C, Marchiori C. Stable coalitions. In: Carraro C, editor. The endogenous formation of economic coalitions. Cheltenham: E. Elgar; 2003. p. 156e98. [37] Carraro C, Siniscalco D. Policy coordination for sustainability: committments, transfers and linked negotiations. In: Goldin I, Winters LA, editors. The economic of sustainable development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1995. p. 264e82. [38] Parsons MA, Duerr R, Minster J- B. Data citation and peer-review. Eos, Transactions AGU 2010;91(34):297e8. [39] Task Sheet ST-09-02: Promoting Awareness and Benefits of GEO in the Science and Technology Community. Available at: ; [accessed August 2011]. [40] A GEO Label: Informing Users About the Quality, Relevance and Acceptance of Services, Data Sets and Products Provided by GEOSS. GELACO. September 18, 2010; Prepared by: ST-09e02 Task Team For: Scientific And Technology Committee. Available at: ; [accessed 21.12.2011].