Bioethics and the Professional Animal Scientist1,2 w.
R. Stricklin 3 and J. A. Mench4
University of Maryland College Park 20742 Introduction
care we need to be open, truthful, constructive and prepared to improve conditions when they are inappropriate. Bioethics, however, is broader in scope than just ensuring humane care, since it involves a philosophical assessment of the degree of ethical responsibility and moral obligation that humans have toward other lifeforms. To date, professional animal scientists have largely ignored or avoided becoming involved in discussions about bioethics.
Professional organizations are responsible for establishing ethical standards pertaining to the professional conduct and obligations of their members. The American Registry of Professional Animal Scientists has developed a formal Code of Ethics (Article 5 of the Bylaws) and established an Ethics Standing Committee to "develop and publish a code of ethics and . . . monitor the professional conduct and relationship of Registry members, one to another, to other professionals, and to the general public." ARPAS has also addressed, in both its journal (Oltjen, 1988) and in symposia, issues related to the professional conduct and obligations of its members. Recently, there has been increasing attentiun given to the topic of bioethics among both laypersons and professionals (Bryant and Fraser, 1988; Gaunt, 1987; see also the Journal of Agricultural Ethics). The original ARPAS Code of Ethics stated that members are obligated to "uphold the humane treatment of all animals", and the current Code of Ethics states that "An animal scientist will have proper regard for the safety, health, environment and comfort of animals." Oltjen (1988) expounded on this topic and suggested that in order to promote ethical responsibility in the area of animal
History and Background
Historically, there has been a close tie between man's use of animals and his development of religious and ethical concepts. Judaism and Christianity, the bases for much of Western civilization's moral and philosophical attitudes towards animals, have roots dating to the era of early animal domestication. In Genesis 1 :28 it is recorded that humans were charged by God with stewardship, or dominion, over "every living thing that moveth upon the earth." This religious and philosophical position that humankind was higher and closer to God than other lifeforms permitted an exploitation of animals and the environment which propelled the artistic, religious, technological and political development of Western civilization to its current position. In the past, the majority of individuals in Western countries were directly involved in agriculture, and relied principally on religious beliefs to provide a philosophical framework for questions related to the appropriateness of human attitudes towards animals. In the last few decades, however, there has been a major technological revolution in agriculture. Farms have become larger and fewer, and there is now much less dependence on human labor to sustain productivity. Intensive confinement is now the predominant housing method for ani-
1 Published as Scientific Article No. A-4976, Contribution No. 8020, of the Maryland Agricultural Experiment Station. 2Portions of this paper were presented at the 1989 Mini-Symposium of the Washington, DC Chapter of ARPAS. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and suggestions of T. G. Hartsock and E. P. Young. Some of the ideas in this manuscript originated from discussions within the Farm Animal Ethics Subcommittee of the North Central Regional131 Committee on Animal Care and Behavior. 3Department of Animal Sciences. 4Department of Poultry Science. Reviewed by L. S. Bull and F. H. Baker.
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mals in technologically-advanced systems of production. Concomitant with this technological revolution has been the largest migration of humans in the history of this planet; the movement from rural areas to cities. As a consequence of the declining population in rural areas, most individuals in our society no longer derive their attitudes about human/animal interrelationships from direct contact with farm animals. Instead, pets and television and movie portrayals of animals play the major role in shaping attitudes. An increasing number of persons contend that the recent technological developments in agriculture, particularly those which are disruptive to the natural life patterns of animals, warrant consideration of a new ethical code for the treatment of animals that is not primarily Biblical in origin . These technological and societal changes have led to a need to incorporate bioethics into the animal sciences discipline. What are the implications of bioethics for animal agriculture? There appears to be confusion among agriculturalists as to how to respond to issues on the basis of bioethical considerations. Conferences, symposia, and published articles in some cases seem to suggest that there is an inherent anti-animal agriculture bias implied by the term "bioethics". Animal agriculturalists sometimes appear to believe that even raising bioethical questions is inappropriate, since it implies that sometnmg- Ts- wrong witfl Whal Iney are aoTng, and they are concerned that discussion will only further contribute to ''the problem". Individuals who hold Doctor of Philosophy degrees in animal agriculture sometimes contend that they are strictly scientists, and deny that they have any responsibility for being knowledgeable about the ethical and philosophical issues associated with animal use. This denial of responsibility in the area of bioethics is occurring at a time when questions of crucial significance to the future of animal agriculture are being raised. These questions will continue to be raised and discussed even if animal scientists do not address them. Avoiding the topic in Animal Science courses, publications, and discussions will only serve to prevent animal scientists from having any input into the evolution of society'S ethical positions on these issues.
Current topics in bioethics which should be of concern to animal scientists include 1) the costs and benefits of animal agriculture with respect to the environment and to society, 2) animal rights, 3) animal welfare, and 4) the potential impacts of genetic engineering and the patenting of lifeforms. Costs and Benefits of Animal Agriculture. An ethical assessment of animal agriculture should include the weighing of the economic, societal and environmental impacts of production agriculture. At this time there is a tendency for anti-agriculturalists to discuss only the costs of agriculture, and defenders of animal agriculture to discuss only the benefits. In the long-term, however, a balanced approach to cosVbenefit assessment is in the best interests of agriculture. Several serious accusations have been levied against animal agriculture in recent years, including the assertions that animal agriculture : 1. Is biologically inefficient because it consumes more energy and protein than it produces. It is also suggested that Americans, because of their reliance on animal agriculture, are contributing to human starvation on a global basis. 2. Is harmful to the ecosystem by causing desertification due to overgrazing and the destruction of rainforests, as well as contributing to stream and ground water pollution. 3. Produces food substances (fats and cholesterol) that are harmful to human health. 4. Is the major cause of human-induced pain, sLlfteritfg-;-oenavloral deprivation and soctalSlress in animals. An assessment of these charges can lead to the conclusion that it is possible to misuse animal agriculture, but we see no justification for the position that animal agriculture as a technology is inherently evil or wrong as some contend. A further discussion of the above points and the costs and benefits of animal agriculture can be found in Stricklin (1989). Animal Rights. Animal rights is a rapidly growing political movement based on a philosophical argument that it is immoral and unethical for humans to use animals for any purpose, including food production, biomedical research, sport, or as companion animals (Clark, 1977; linzey, 1987; Regan, 1983). In his book Animal Liberation (1975), Peter Singer, a philosopher who has been extremely in-
BIOETHICS
fluential in the animal rights movement, states that just as the exploitation of humans as a result of racism and sexism is wrong, so is the "speciesism" wrong that results in the exploitation of animals. Singer argues that the right to live a life free from exploitation should be granted to other animals not on the basis of their ability or intelligence, but because they are sentient and capable of suffering. The logic of the animal rights argument has been criticized by several authors on philosophical grounds (Cohen, 1986; Robb, 1988; White, 1976). It is important, however, that animal scientists also address the questions raised by animal rightists, as a major thrust of the movement is directed toward agriculture and there are many logical inconsistences in the animal rights philosophy from a biological standpoint. For example: 1. Singer never argues (or successfully defends) the position that killing animals is immoral, only that it is immoral for humans to exploit other species. Animal rightists argue that humans are not superior to other animals, but are only one branch in the tree of animal life. But they then separate humans from animals in arguing that humans have a special obligation not to "use" other life in the same way that other animals do. The animal rights philosophy thus actually assumes that humans are morally superior to animals, in effect creating the same dichotomy between animals and humans as that found in Genesis. The rightists seem to believe that humans have evolved to a point where they are outside of (or because of their awareness have a moral obligation to place themselves outside of) the chain of life that currently links all organisms on this planet. 2. In terms of evolutionary biology, the species that are the most successful are those that increase their representation in the gene pool at the greatest rate. Of the varied and diverse reproductive strategies that organisms have evolved, mutual exploitation between individuals is a common and successful one. Singer (1975) does not address the possibility that, from the standpoint of genetic fitness, domestication is a process of mutual exploitation between animals and humans. In fact, it could be argued that agricultural animals have been very successful in exploiting humans; the humble chicken, Gallus domesticus, is the most
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numerous bird on earth. 3. A major contention of Singer's philosophy is that animals used by humans invariably "suffer". An implied extension of this contention is that the only way to eliminate this suffering is to eliminate the use of animals; in effect that one must prevent the animal's life in order to prevent it from suffering. A counter-argument could be made that no life, not even that of a wild animal, is possible without some discomfort. It could also be argued that domesticated animals, whether managed under traditional or intensive confinement conditions, experience some benefit from being alive. The human obligation toward animals should not be to prevent animal life, but to optimize the balance between the pleasure and discomfort that animals experience. In short, we believe that the animal rights philosophy is severely flawed. But we also believe that Singer and others make a very good case that humans are ethically obligated to ensure that the animals they use are treated with appropriate consideration, respect for their sentience, and concern for their well-being. Animal Welfare. Animal welfare is not analogous to animal rights, but is instead an argument for the appropriate treatment and care of animals. Since the publication in Britain in 1964 of Ruth Harrison's book Animal Machines, there has been a steadily increasing concern about the ethical issues associated with the treatment of farm animals. These concerns are based primarily on a perception that intensive production systems may not provide an adequate environment for the expression of animals' behavioral "needs". It has been suggested that intensive production systems may disrupt behavior patterns, particularly social behavior, in a number of ways (Duncan, 1981). Groups in which animals are maintained are generally far larger or smaller than those of a more "natural" population and may contain only members of a single sex or age, thus making individual recognition difficult and preventing normal social behavior. Overcrowding or deprivation of normal social contacts may also occur. The barrenness of much animal housing may provide few facilities or key stimuli for the performance of particular behaviors. The greatest concern has been generated by
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those production practices which not only cause social disruption but also impose an unusual degree of long-term confinement, like veal crates, laying hen cages and farrowing stalls. In these housing systems, animals lack the "five basic freedoms" advocated for farm animals by the Brambell Committee (Thorpe, 1969) namely the freedom to turn around, to groom, get up, lie down, and stretch the limbs freely. There is a great deal of concern among animal agriculturalists today that public pressure will result in restrictive legislation in the area of animal housing and care. The real pressure from the general public will, however, come not from legislation, but from changes in spending patterns on animal products. In Animal Liberation, Singer did not suggest that legislation be used as a means of implementing change in animal production systems, but instead presented a carefully constructed argument as to how and why individuals should change their eating habits to reduce or eliminate meat in their diet. Each time a referendum is held or a bill is argued before a legislative body public awareness is raised and consumer habits are changed. Battling newly proposed bills year after year is thus ultimately a losing cause. Agriculture has become engaged in such a series of short-term strategy efforts, primarily because the animal welfare/rights area has been largely ignored until recently. Although minimal levels of societally endorsed moral standards may be established legislatively, ethical standards adopted by society are invariably the product of educational activities and intellectual debate. A long-term approach to solving animal welfare issues will require the complex balancing of economic and societal considerations, perceived ethical obligations to minimize animal suffering, and scientific evidence regarding animal well-being (Mench and van Tienhoven, 1986). Genetic Engineering. Considerable debate has been generated over which new lifeforms should be developed, if at all, and by whom they will be monitored, licensed, and owned. The basic issues involved in this debate are not new. The controversy over whether technology is inherently good or evil, how much technology is acceptable, and who should control it is an old one. Some of the expressed concerns about the ethical issues related to biotechnology have tended to emphasize
the sensational, potentially negative aspects of the new technology. Several serious important ethical questions, however, have arisen regarding the application of biotechnology to agriculture, for example: 1. Critics have contended that using genetic engineering to increase productivity of farm animals kept under current intensive husbandry conditions will increase the severity and incidence of animal suffering and sickness (Murphy, 1988). The USDA pigs that carry the human growth gene, for example, are arthritic, lethargic, prone to pneumonia and display other symptoms characteristic of a seriously impaired immune system . Since gene insertion into embryos is still far from preCise, and the ramifications of manipulating genes at the whole-an imal level still poorly understood, an a priori assessment of whether or not engineered animals are going to suffer is extremely difficult. 2. Concern has been expressed that genetically improved disease resistance in farm animals will allow the increasing expansion of animal agriculture into areas of wildlife habitat (Fox, 1989). Improved tsetse fly resistance in cattle, for example, may result in overgrazing in parts of Africa. 3. There is concern that permitting the development and patenting of lifeforms will not only pose environmental hazards, but will reinforce human attitudes that animals are merely property. Whether these concerns are legitimate, or not, are open to question. A recent QTA report (March 1989) stated that "lfisunCiear that patenting~ per se would- sub- stantially redirect the way society uses or relates to animals.". The report concluded that while a patent excludes others from making, using or selling an invention, the invention itself can still be regulated as society deems appropriate through legislative and executive action. Role of the Professional Animal Scientist
The ethical concerns that have been raised regarding animal agriculture are legitimate and important, and the impact of their resolution on the future of animal agriculture may be of great consequence. Animal rights/welfare issues alone may, in fact, have more effect on animal agricultural production practices than even the revolution in biotechnology.
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We believe that ARPAS should playa major role in the evaluation of the bioethical issues facing animal agriculture. The good intentions of animal agriculturalists are no longer enough. As professional animal scientists we have an obligation to consider the ethical ramifications of our work. While we may not be able to change or control the course or the impact of new knowledge, we must still attempt to anticipate problems and try to prevent them. If Professional Animal Scientists do not attempt to define the limits associated with animal use, then those limits will be determined by others who are less informed with much more restrictive and possibly detrimental results. Specific suggestions as to the role that ARPAS might play are to: 1. Ensure that all Professional Animal Scientists are properly educated in animal behavior (ethology), philosophical questions associated with animal welfare, animal rights and agricultural bioethics. We as Professional Animal Scientists should be the philosophers of animal science. Regrettably, in part because of the increasing emphasis on reductionist or so-called "basic" science, our education of graduate students now tends to emphasize training technologists, not educating philosophers. A Ph.D graduate should certainly have technical skills, but the primary requisite for granting the Ph.D should be that the student has developed the ability to assimilate knowledge and synthesize ideas. Without this ability students may have difficulty dealing with complex ethical issues. 2. Encourage agricultural research institutions to hire individuals educated in applied ethology to conduct basic research in farm animal behavior and applied research oriented toward improving both animal productivity and animal well-being. 3. Consider providing certification in animal welfare in order to ensure that spokespersons for animal agriculture have adequate and appropriate training. There has been a tendency in the U.S. to trivialize the topics of animal welfare and animal rights by treating them as if expertise is not required in order to address them. These topics are, of course, of general interest and, as with all topics which have political implications, there is need for input from all aspects of society. But there are
underlying scientific disciplines that are essential to an understanding of animal welfare, particularly ethology, physiology, and evolutionary biology. Similarly, an understanding of animal rights requires appropriate readings in philosophy and history. Treatment of animal welfare and animal rights solely as a public relations and political issue is not only detrimental to the discipline of animal science, but not in the best long-term interests of animal agriculture or society as a whole. There is a real need for active involvement and professional commitment to these issues by animal scientists. 4. Develop an oath for the Professional Animal Scientist (similar to the Veterinarian's oath) that incorporates a statement about ethical obligations to animals and the environment such as: "As a Professional Animal Scientist I proclaim and do swear that I will use my knowledge and talents in the service of producing healthful, safe and abundant food and other useful animal products. I will, at all times, remember my ethical obligations to provide appropriate care and handling to the animals under my stewardship and used by me, or the persons I serve, in my endeavors to provide for the needs of society. I will act to ensure that animal agricultural practices are employed in a manner that best conserves the natural resources and preserves the environmental integrity of this planet.". Conclusion
Bioethics is an area that will be of increasing importance. The Philosophers of Animal Science, particularly the professional animal scientists, have an opportunity, and we believe an obligation, to playa major role in the way these moral and ethical issues are addressed, especially as they affect animal agriculture. We believe that bioelhical issues may impact agriculture to a greater extent economically, legislatively and socially than any other factor, including research developments in biotechnology. ARPAS can playa major role in providing the leadership to bring bioethics to the forefront as an important topic for animal scientists.
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