Blind spots in interaction between actors in Swedish planning for critical infrastructure protection

Safety Science 118 (2019) 424–434

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Blind spots in interaction between actors in Swedish planning for critical infrastructure protection

T

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Christine Große , Pär M. Olausson Mid-Sweden University, Holmgatan 10, 951 70 Sundsvall, Sweden

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: National safety Governance networks Complex system governance Multi-level planning Interaction Critical infrastructure protection

Failures in the power supply threaten the safety of developed countries, as they are increasingly dependent on electricity to maintain important societal functions through critical infrastructure. To protect electricity-dependent critical infrastructure, Sweden has implemented a multi-level planning, called STYREL, which involves national-, regional- and local-level actors. This study focuses on interactions among key actors and their roles in the planning as well as the Swedish crisis management system. With evidence from interviews and a survey among the actors, analyses indicate blind spots in the current proceeding, such as the reliance of the outcome of the process on the actors’ commitment to achieve a common understanding of the importance of infrastructure assets and participate in collaborations. This paper reveals that actors lack awareness, knowledge, capability and resources to fulfil their roles in the national planning for critical infrastructure protection. By highlighting interrelations, this study contributes to the international discussion of identification, prioritisation and protection of critical infrastructure to mitigate consequences of power failures for a depending society.

1. Introduction 1.1. Infrastructure and vulnerability Electricity is a key resource in society’s everyday life, business and public operations. Some of these operations become critical if their continuity during disturbances is crucial for the survival and progress of a depending society. Thus, a reliable power supply is a central issue in the field of critical infrastructure (CI) and its protection (Cohen, 2010; Ghanem et al., 2016; Rinaldi et al., 2001). Continuous developments in key infrastructure, such as railways and electric cars, are likely to increase this dependency on electricity over time (Cedergren et al., 2015). Similar to other CI, the power grid is vulnerable to various risk events, such as failures due to aging components, destruction, cyber attacks or severe weather conditions, including storms and floods. In Sweden, the tripping of a nuclear power unit shortly followed by a major fault in a substation caused a large-scale blackout in 2003 (Larsson and Danell, 2006). Since other critical societal functions heavily rely on the power grid’s functionality, disturbances in the power supply can yield fatal consequences for interconnected CI and, subsequently, for the depending society (Gheorghe et al., 2006; Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). For instance, the storms named Gudrun, Per, Dagmar and Ivar caused major problems in Sweden, which lasted longer than a month in some

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cases (Große, 2018b, 2018a). Climate changes are likely to increase the number and magnitude of such extreme environmental conditions (Birkmann et al., 2016). Apart from human error, developments in information and communication technology have further intensified the risk of cyber-related origins of disturbances (e.g. (ICS-CERT, 2016). Given the serious effects of such events on societal safety, the Swedish Energy Agency is responsible for creating the necessary conditions for a reliable power supply in Sweden, even during a crisis. To strengthen the undisturbed power supply for crucial consumers in society under serious circumstances and enhance critical infrastructure protection (CIP) against short-term power shortages, the Swedish Energy Agency has developed a planning process called STYREL, which is an acronym for steering electricity to prioritised power consumers (EA 2014). The central character of the electricity supply for the maintenance of CI distinguishes STYREL as a unique planning process (Große, 2018b) and constitutes an essential part of the risk and crisis management system, which is responsible for the planning, preparation and performance of risk and crisis prevention and response in Sweden. 1.2. Aim and research question This study examines interactions among key actors and their roles in

Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Große).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2019.05.049 Received 13 September 2018; Received in revised form 29 April 2019; Accepted 28 May 2019 Available online 01 June 2019 0925-7535/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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C. Große and P.M. Olausson

Peters, 2000). Lovan et al. (2016) have further emphasised that governance devotes its concerns to the ‘distribution of public responsibilities across multiple stakeholders’ who interact ‘both as individuals and as participants with mutual interests’ (Lovan et al., 2016). In this context, networks are a significant phenomenon (e.g. Christopoulos and Ingold, 2011; Henry, 2011; McGinnis, 2011; Petridou, 2014). This study of the Swedish planning for CIP regards governance as a policy instrument that includes governance networks. The concept of governance describes the organisation of society and its political steering, including who is involved in dialogue, participation and networking. This view additionally integrates the concept of complex systems governance since such systems also provide a network structure, which consists of interdependent entities that together create value beyond the capability of a single node (e.g. Keating et al., 2017). Moreover, STYREL is interrelated to the concept of risk governance, which considers legal, institutional, social and economic contexts as well as the actors who engage in each of them (Renn, 1998). Governance or policy networks can be either self-organised or created and co-ordinated by the state (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). Individual organisations mainly use networks to achieve their strategic and operative objectives, maximise their influence over outcomes or avoid dependence on other actors in a system. From this perspective, governance includes the management of networks (Rhodes, 1996) and complex systems. Thereby, it aims to gain control of system performance and achieve proper communication and interpretation of information as well as co-ordination and integration of activities and objectives with the aid of nine meta-system functions (Keating et al., 2014). This study of STYREL focuses particularly on the following three functions of complex system governance (Keating et al., 2015; Keating et al., 2017; Keating and Bradley, 2015):

the planning process and the Swedish crisis management system. This paper aims to identify blind spots in the STYREL process and the multilevel system of CIP. To this end, it focuses on the views of various actors regarding interactions that are associated with their dedicated roles in STYREL and during the case of a power shortage. The leading research question is as follows: ‘How do blind spots appear during interactions in the Swedish planning process for CIP that concerns the case of a power shortage, and how can they affect the Swedish risk and management system?’ 1.3. The Swedish crisis management system Three principles substantiate the Swedish crisis management system: (1) The principle of responsibility implies that actors who are responsible for an activity or process in daily life retain this responsibility during a crisis. (2) The principle of parity suggests that societal functions should, to the greatest possible extent, be carried out during a crisis in the same way as they are under normal conditions. (3) The principle of proximity states that the actors who are closest to the event should handle the crisis where it occurs; thus, a municipality or county/region should primarily handle a crisis. If local resources are insufficient, the state can act through the County Administrative Board (CAB) (MSB, 2014; Pramanik et al., 2015; Tehler et al., 2012). Thereby, in practice, a CAB has to co-ordinate relevant actors within its county (MSB, 2014). Since there is no explicit process for resolving possible conflicts within the Swedish crisis management system, the co-ordinating role places immense demands on CABs. A study of the Swedish defence directors at all CABs in Sweden has revealed how these demands should be addressed (Wimelius and Engberg, 2015). Specifically, clearer governance, improvements in network management and an increase in resources are measures to improve co-operation among various actors in the county. Several defence directors expressed the opinion that weak governance and a lack of continuity characterise the Swedish crisis management system (Wimelius and Engberg, 2015). A study of river groups in Northern Sweden has further substantiated this view. These river groups exchange information during events such as floods and high flows through co-operation via networks. However, vague instructions from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency have resulted in differing operations between river groups as well as different objectives and actors (Olausson and Nyhlén, 2017). An investigation of sources of uncertainty in the Swedish emergency response planning has also highlighted several points of ambiguity that necessitate dedicated governance efforts to more closely align levels of planning (Große, 2018a). All of these reports emphasise the need for a more integrated and standardised system of crisis management in Sweden, which must also include planning for CIP in both normal and crisis conditions.

• Policy and Identity: Policies support direction and identity for system

•

•

2. Theoretical framework

entities, such as the actors in a network. In the Swedish case, the actors in the policy network are the planners who are involved in STYREL. Moreover, policies further present the system to external interested parties, such as the Swedish crisis management system and the wider public. Information and Communications: Communication specifies the sender, receiver and flow of information that is needed to provide a certain level of quality and security. Confidentiality and integrity are particularly important attributes in the context of national CIP. However, access to information for authorised persons is similarly vital to decision-making, as is the consistent interpretation of information which a multi-level planning system processes. Learning and Transformation: Learning can occur when an activity leads to a certain outcome. Depending on the quality of the outcome, such as success or failure, an assessment of consequences and means to achieve another outcome can trigger a transformation process. The result of such transformation is a mature response when a similar situation occurs. Ideally, governance seeks to improve both the governed and governing systems.

These three governance functions guide the subsequent examination of interactions within the STYREL process and create a significant chain of policy, interaction and learning. The following section narrows the focus of this study to aspects of interactions that are of particular interest in the context of large-scale planning for CIP.

2.1. Society management and system governance This study analyses the Swedish planning for CIP for the case of a power shortage that involves public and private actors (Große, 2017; Große and Olausson, 2018). Pierre and Peters (2000) have regarded the management of society as a continuum that extends from traditional top-down control on one end to self-organisation and networks on the other. The concept of governance is the common element of the continuum. Pierre and Peters (2000) have also acknowledged that the concept of governance has no clear definition and is ‘[s]ufficiently vague and inclusive that it can be thought to embrace a variety of different approaches and theories, some of which are even contradictory’ (Pierre and

2.2. Interaction in groups and networks Interaction is characterised by interaction partners who are mutually influential and dependent on each other (Bräuer, 2005). This concept of mutual dependency and interference of partners who participate in interactions and relations is called interdependency (BeckerBeck, 1997). Several variables can describe such interdependencies in accordance with interrelated actors and the situation in which 425

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Sweden from 2016 to 2018 and between October 2017 and April 2018, respectively. In total, 66 people participated in the interviews. Table 1 describes the respondents, who were involved in the Swedish planning case at their respective organisations in three counties in Sweden. Furthermore, the survey enriched the interview evidence by engaging with responsible experts at all 21 CABs and the 10 power grid operators (PGOs) that are responsible for effectuating a manual load shedding (MFK) in accordance with Swedish regulation. Fifteen of the experts at the CABs and the 10 PGOs responded to the survey, which translated to participation rates of 71.4% and 100%, respectively. The survey respondents answered 34 questions about their perceptions of the effectiveness and efficiency of the planning in general as well as the proceedings during the planning process within their area of responsibility in particular. Although 80.4% of respondents shared their perceptions in the general part of the survey, the rate decreased to 55.3% when it came to knowledge of the concrete proceedings of the respective actor. The overall frequency of answers to the survey questions was 63.1%, the answers to the remaining questions were ‘do not know (N/A)’ or even omitted in some cases. This survey is an example of a small-n study. It focuses on the interaction between actors in the STYREL process, which limits the number of possible observations (Lieberson, 2012). Therefore, it is important to be careful in the conclusions that are based on the interviews and the survey. Due to the limited experiences of the participants with regard to STYREL this study has no ambitions to draw general conclusions about the crisis management system or its parts; it rather highlights difficulties in the interaction between actors in this planning process within the crisis management system. The document study revealed crucial background information and complemented the interviews and survey, thereby allowing for data triangulation (Gerring, 2007). Apart from national regulations, the document study included a handbook for the planning process (EA, 2014), evaluations of the pilot implementation in 2008 (CAB Blekinge, 2009; Dalarna 2009) and two evaluations of the first round of planning in 2010 – one from a national perspective (EA, 2012) and the other from a regional one in Stockholm County (CAB Stockholm, 2012). A report on the plans of PGOs for MFK completed the document study (Veibäck et al., 2013). Insights from the document study informed the subsequently conducted interviews. This proceeding deepened the information from documents and allowed for a verification of the evidence from the documents in the interviews. Both in turn informed the preparation of the survey, which yielded evidence that broadens perspectives of the planning process.

interaction occurs. The interdependency theory proposes several criteria that specify mutual dependencies, the correspondence of interests, structures regarding time and the availability of information (Bierhoff and Frey, 2017; Kelley et al., 2003; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978). Therefore, interactions involve two levels, namely a factual and a relational one. Both levels of an interaction are subject to further interpretation if the available information is incomplete, which in turn poses repercussions for the interaction. Thus, interactions incorporate intended and unintended messages which originate from different motives of the interacting partners. Scholars have additionally argued that strategic objectives can lack proper alignment between national, regional and local levels in multilevel planning, such as national emergency response planning (Große, 2018b, 2018a). Regulations, policies or guidelines can articulate such objectives in a clear or rather ambiguous manner. A particular interpretation of objectives can influence a decision-maker who is entrusted with aspects of the planning in such large-scale planning environments. Individual behaviour is then a result of such interpretations of messages and objectives combined with a transformation of individual motives for actions (Rusbult and van Lange, 1996). In the context of STYREL, interaction occurs synchronously to a certain extent during face-to-face meetings but also asynchronously between and during the distributed activities of the long-term process. The development, pilot implementation and two executions of STYREL have hitherto provided individual expertise to actors who participated in the complex planning and the interactions that it involved. As certain actors gained experience, their knowledge influenced the interactions as well (Cundill et al., 2012). From a system perspective, interactions between components in a system cause system behaviour, which is not easily explained by the properties of components. The interactions and interdependencies between actors affect the predictability of system behaviour and thereby generate further properties of a complex system, such as entropy, emergence and adaptability (e.g. Onik et al., 2016). In summary, this study examines the chain of policy, interaction and learning between actors in the Swedish STYREL process and particularly discusses three considerations. First, the levels of fact and relation, which include interpretation, indicate an interrelation with system entropy. Second, motives and objectives can account for emergent system behaviour. Third, experience results in learning that transforms into an adaption of the planning system for CIP through development and maturation to suit certain circumstances. In addition, the study integrates the role of complex system governance into its investigation by considering the potential influence of policies and networks for steering on interaction, and vice versa. Evidence from public policies, interviews and a survey with actors in the network from both public and private organisations thus highlights problems in the design, execution and evolvement of the Swedish multi-level planning system for CIP.

4. Multi-level planning

STYREL

At the national level in Sweden, numerous actors share responsibility for the energy supply, including the supply of electricity. Such divided responsibility involves four national authorities. First, the Swedish Energy Agency is responsible for creating conditions for efficient, resilient and sustainable energy use as well as cost-effective distribution of energy (EA, 2012). Second, the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate is responsible for supervision, regulation and licensing in the energy market. Third, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency is

3. Methodical proceeding In addition to material that was collected by an initial study of publicly available documents regarding the Swedish case, this study analysed data from interviews and a survey which were conducted in Table 1 Participation in the Study. Region

Size

Participants acting on behalf of a 2

North: rural countryside Middle: includes heavy industry close to the capitol South: includes one of the three major cities

Area km

Population

CAB

Municipality

48 935 6 075 10 968

128 673 288 097 1 324 565

1 2 1

8 7 32

Further national, cross-regional and local power grid operators

426

Total Power Grid Operator

3

9 9 36

12

Sum: 66

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responsible for the crisis management system and the measures taken before, during and after an emergency or crisis. Finally, the Svenska Kraftnät is responsible for the Swedish power grid and operates the national grid. When a power shortage occurs, Svenska Kraftnät is accountable for and permitted to impose an MFK. Its mission is to defend the power grid from collapse by ensuring that such MFK can be performed within 15 min, at the regional grid level at minimum but ideally at the local grid level (EA, 2012; Veibäck et al., 2013). Because of this time restriction, a more detailed pre-planning appears necessary to enable PGOs at all levels to run an MFK without affecting CI. In Sweden, the four national-level actors, namely the Swedish Energy Agency, the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the Svenska Kraftnät, originated the STYREL planning. This process for planning CIP in the event of a power shortage was first executed in 2010 and repeated in 2014. The next iteration will commence in 2019. At the regional level, CABs act as points of intersection between governmental agencies and municipalities, which defines one side of the role of CABs in STYREL. Additionally, the co-ordinating role of CABs proceeds alongside the major part of the planning process until the distribution of the results to the PGOs, as Fig. 1 depicts. The activities (1–7) of and the information flow alongside the multilevel process that Fig. 1 illustrates were intended to apply as follows during the recent planning in 2014 (EA, 2014):

Table 2 Classification Scheme for Prioritising CI (MSB, 2010). Class

Weight

Electricity consumers that have/represent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant Others

impact on life and health—short term (hours) impact on society's functionality—short term (hours) impact on life and health—long term (days) impact on society's functionality—long term (days) economic value importance for the environment importance for social and cultural values

conflicts between lines that cross municipal or regional borders and finally determines the ranking of power lines. Each CAB sends the final document to the Svenska Kraftnät and portions of it to belonging PGOs. 7. Each PGO plans for MFK based on the results of STYREL to protect power lines that supply CI from early disconnection during MFK. Each PGO sends the final plan to the Svenska Kraftnät. 5. Actor’s views on interaction 5.1. National agencies – county administrative boards Depending on the role of a national agency as the controller of the process or as a participant therein, interaction between national agencies and CABs manifests in two forms. The Swedish Energy Agency bears overall responsibility for the planning process for both execution and further development. In this role, the Swedish Energy Agency has conducted a few personal group meetings with the CABs prior to the start of the process. Fig. 1 depicts the main role of the other 100 or so of the over 300 Swedish agencies that participate in STYREL. In this role, the agencies identify and prioritise the electricity-dependent CI that they operate and send this information, with respect to a certain deadline, to each of the 21 CABs whose geographical area physically contains the CI. Participants at the CABs reported experiencing a lack of time, which necessitated some deviations from the process model. Since the national agencies did not adhere to the predetermined schedule, CABs did not have enough time to complete their part of the process. In this regard, one respondent reasoned that ‘it may be necessary to give more time because it became very stressful when it became so delayed in the first line from the government agencies’. The survey results in Table 3 indicate that the CABs perceived the collaboration with national agencies to be sufficient, yet 84.6% of them expressed the need for a more structured process for this activity,

1. National agencies identify and prioritise the CI that each of them operates by applying the scale in Table 2. Each agency sends the ranked objects to each CAB to which the CI belongs. 2. Each CAB merges the lists of CI and divides them into portions that correspond to each municipality. Each CAB forwards these lists to the belonging municipalities in the region. 3. Each municipality identifies local CI and prioritises the objects in accordance with the scale in Table 2, which also involves the objects that it receives from the CAB. Each municipality sends a request for further information about the prioritised CI to each locally operating PGO. 4. Each PGO matches the CI objects to power lines within their local grid. Each PGO provides information about technical feasibility of control to each municipality that has sent a request. 5. Each municipality merges CI into a ranking list of power lines by aggregating the objects’ ranking scores. Each municipality is encouraged to assess this list of power lines to ensure that their order reflects the desired position of the particular municipality. Each municipality sends this list back to the CAB of its region. 6. Each CAB combines these lists from the municipalities, resolves

Fig. 1. Actors and Formal Information Paths in the Swedish Multi-level Planning Process for CIP against Power Shortages. 427

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Table 3 Perceptions of CABs of Interaction with National Agencies. Perceptions of CABs of interaction with national agencies

(n = 15)

Collaboration with national agencies Trust in the work of national agencies Trust in the Swedish Energy Agency

−5

−3

−1

1

3

5

N/A

Mean

0 0 0

1 1 0

1 2 1

3 4 1

4 3 6

0 0 2

5 4 4

1.22 0.80 2.80

No:

15.38%

Need for a better process

Yes:

84.62%

Table 4 Perceptions of CABs of Interaction with Municipalities. Perceptions of CABs of interaction with municipalities

(n = 15)

Collaboration with municipalities Trust of municipalities in CAB Trust of CABs in municipalities Commitment of municipalities View of CABs on involving further actors Feedback to municipalities

All:

−5

−3

−1

1

3

5

N/A

Mean

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 2 0

1 0 0 4 1

3 2 3 1 3

4 8 6 2 4

5 3 1 2 0

1 1 3 3 4

3.00 3.15 2.09 0.64 1.75

18.18%

Need for a better process

No one:

18.18%

N/A:

63.64%

Yes:

69.33%

No:

30.77%

CI and the identification and prioritisation that CABs and municipalities performed at the regional and the local level, respectively. According to the evaluation of the first process iteration in 2010, the major challenge was to establish a common view of the criticality of CI in a region (EA, 2012). In an attempt to resolve these discussions while simultaneously strengthening information security, changes to the initial reference process model have occurred. In the second row of the planning in 2014, CABs received masked information from municipalities. This information exchange precludes any evaluation of the received information and co-ordination of cross-municipality or cross-regional requirements for the CABs. In the current state of the reference process model, the CABs rely on the commitment of the municipalities and their assessment of CI. Nevertheless, according to the survey results in Table 4, the CABs appreciate the interaction with their municipalities and trust the quality of the municipalities’ assessments. Moreover, the interviews reveal that the CABs draw on already existing networks which ordinarily work with crisis management and emergency response. However, a study of municipalities (Danielsson et al., N/S) has demonstrated that municipalities in the three counties lack feedback from the CABs, which also affects the feeling of involvement in the process (see e.g. Bräuer, 2005). To facilitate participation in a process like STYREL, communication and feedback are two crucial elements. According to officials at the municipalities, this part failed during the work with STYREL. However, regional differences are present. The critique is comparably more emphasised in the county South. In the county North, the final ranking was the result of a group decision among the municipalities and the CAB, although this violated the reference process model. Such insufficient communication and feedback together with the lack of trust in the planning process from participants could affect the resilience of the planning process itself (Olausson, 2019). Finally, interviews with the municipalities also implied that size is significant. Officials from smaller municipalities seemed to possess more knowledge of the activities within their respective municipalities compared to officials from larger municipalities (Danielsson et al., N/ S). Because of the mentioned changes in the planning process, CABs mainly used face-to-face group meetings to acquire more information and conciliate municipalities with their planning results. In the counties North and Middle, the municipalities and the CAB worked together more closely in one group, whereas the CAB of the county South maintained four or five separate groups. Although this proceeding facilitated discussions for each group, it made it more difficult to obtain an understanding of the views of other groups and the region as a whole. As a

particularly to ensure consistent interpretation of priority classes. Since the proceedings were delayed and the process model did not require feedback, no nuanced discussion of the classification of CI occurred, which resulted in reservations regarding the trustworthiness of the national agencies’ work. 5.2. County administrative boards to municipalities and back According to the reference process model, CABs have a double role in STYREL as both a co-ordinator and a participant. On the one hand, CABs appear in a governance role as regional co-ordinators of the proceedings (Große and Olausson, 2018); in this role, each CAB is expected to provide guidance and training as well as mediation of the process to the municipalities during the subsequent planning. However, the policy allows each CAB to determine the actual structure and organisation of the regional proceeding. More than half of the responsible persons at the CABs have not previously participated in STYREL (see Table 8), which the survey results reflect in the low response rate on the part that targets concrete proceedings. This aspect suggests that knowledge within the planning system is stunted and that the CABs struggle within this role. A study of municipality officials (Danielsson et al., N/S) has also supported these conclusions. To participate in the process, officials need to have adequate knowledge, which includes both sufficient instructions from the Swedish Energy Agency and experience from previous rows. Almost 43% of the officials had no experience from STYREL, and only 40% of the 47 officials participated in the first row of STYREL, during which municipalities expended extra resources on the project in terms of both personhours and education about the planning system. During the second row, municipalities did not allocate any additional resources, which implies that officials who participated in the first row enjoyed an advantage compared to those who engaged only in the second iteration. Furthermore, officials highlighted the difficulty for predecessors to access the work that was performed in the previous row. There were also challenges in understanding the principles behind the previous ranking list (Danielsson et al., N/S). On the other hand, STYREL dedicates a participative role to the CABs. Since CABs are national agencies at the regional level, the policy encourages CABs to extend the first process step and identify and prioritise CI at the regional level. Since the publicly available policies are general and vague, the majority of participants in this study reported discussions of the classification of CI. These discussions revolved around both the classification that each CAB had received from national agencies and sent to each municipality in its jurisdiction that hosts such 428

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goals (cf. Bierhoff and Frey, 2017; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978). The results from the survey with the PGOs stress this view, as 20% estimated that the trust that municipalities have in their work is high, which indicates a close interaction. However, the statistic of 80% of respondents who answered ‘do not know’ implies a certain hesitation that may derive from poor collaboration. Municipalities perceived larger PGOs as both literally and physically unapproachable. They also reported difficulty with identifying a responsible contact person, particularly early in the proceedings, and an inability to establish positive collaboration. The three larger PGOs operate local grids in the area of up to 120 municipalities. According to participants in this study, the sheer amount of data that these companies had to process during the recent planning hindered closer interaction. The interviews reveal another problem that larger companies encountered during the data processing. In their role as operators of CI, PGOs are obliged to maintain an adequate information security standard. Therefore, the information they receive from municipalities must pass through a security system that uses sandboxing and encryption, among other means, to prepare data from municipalities for use as input for the various computer systems of PGOs. After completing the documents with regard to the reference process model, the documents must be passed through the security system in the opposite direction. This workload alongside ordinary business and in combination with strong information security requirements may also explain why PGOs do not recognise a need to involve further actors in the process. The interviews at municipalities also reveal that they mainly focused on communal business when identifying CI. This proceeding implies that a major part of privately operated CI did not penetrate the planning for CIP, which suggests reconsideration by municipalities and PGOs of the intended strategic objectives and common goals of planning for CIP. During the interviews, PGOs expressed doubts about the quality of municipalities’ work in identifying and prioritising CI, which the survey substantiates. In particular, the number of prioritised CI objects and their classification fuelled the debate over the adequacy of the result. Some PGOs perceived such identification and prioritisation of CI as drastically different. Since most municipalities reportedly received no feedback about their work, this debate does not seem to have transmitted to each participant in the process. The STYREL policy has insufficiently supported the direction and identity of the actors (cf. Keating and Bradley, 2015), which may also have influenced the interaction due to their different levels of knowledge about power supply (cf. Cundill et al., 2012). Apart from the debatable interpretation of priority classes, the initial delay that intensified under each activity is another issue that extended throughout the planning, and the latter may have a correlation to the former. Because of the delay in the process and the fact that the reference process model does not stipulate any feedback, no deeper discussion of the classification of CI occurred, which resulted in reservations about the trustworthiness of the municipalities’ work. Both counterparts admittedly expected stronger direction and guidance from the CABs, particularly in relation to the aforementioned issues. In addition, municipalities must incorporate prioritised CI objects from national agencies into their work at the local level, which may incite

consequence of this lack of relevant information and the variety of local interpretations, 69.2% of the CABs stated a preference for a more structured process with municipalities. This improvement may also include the last step of STYREL, wherein the CABs merge all information from their municipalities and weigh in regional concerns. Half of the CABs that answered that question indicated that they merged the received information entirely independently, and one announced changes to the concerned municipalities (see Table 8). The remainder stated that they compiled the final list in co-operation with the municipalities. However, during the interviews, the CABs expressed doubts about the usefulness of the planning outcomes for crisis management, which the survey confirmed. The municipalities emphasised that they require more feedback during and after the process to be able to integrate STYREL into local risk assessments and emergency response planning. Nevertheless, both signalled considerable reservations regarding the extent to which STYREL can provide the intended protection for society. 5.3. Municipalities to power grid operators and back According to the policy, interaction between municipalities and local PGOs is limited to the key elements of message exchange: a municipality sends a file to a PGO, which then completes the file with requested information and returns it to the municipality. Municipalities and PGOs that experienced the process reported that they largely organised the work in accordance with the reference process model. Moreover, expectations of them were clear. However, when it came to details regarding activities and information exchange, tensions arose with respect to areas of competence and responsibility. The results from the survey with the PGOs and the interviews with both actors emphasise the need for enhanced interaction between them. As Table 5 highlights, 88.9% of the PGOs stated a need for an improved process and further indicated a low quality of their co-operation. The interviews reflect a limited understanding among municipalities and PGOs of one another in regard to both daily business and activities during the planning process. The mentioned study of officials in municipalities has supported this result by demonstrating that municipalities stress the lack of feedback from PGOs as a major problem during their part of the planning process and especially after completing such part (Danielsson et al., N/S). However, evidence from the interviews suggests that municipalities maintained closer contact with smaller, locally based PGOs than with larger providers who operate many local grids. In some cases, the representative of a local-based PGO was part of the project group and therefore became completely involved in the group decision with his or her expertise. In such circumstances, a mutual understanding of common goals and objectives developed during the collaboration, and the partners exchanged feedback. Such collaboration often occurred in pre-established local networks. The aforementioned variations at the relational level of interaction thereby influence not only the perceptions of individuals who act on behalf of municipalities and PGOs but also the outcome of the process. Depending on such relational level, mutual trust or even a manifestation of prejudices and biases due to general suspicion can prompt a shift in individual motives towards shared strategic objectives and common Table 5 Perceptions of PGOs of Interaction with Municipalities. Perceptions of PGOS of interaction with municipalities

(n = 10)

Collaboration with municipalities Trust of municipalities in PGOs Trust of PGOs in municipalities Commitment of municipalities View of PGOs on involving further actors Feedback to municipalities

All:

−5

−3

−1

1

3

5

N/A

Mean

0 0 0 0 2

2 0 1 1 3

2 0 2 3 0

2 0 2 1 0

1 0 2 2 1

1 2 1 0 1

2 8 2 3 2

0.25 5.00 1.00 0.14 −1.57

12.50%

Need for a better process

429

No one:

25.00%

N/A:

62.50%

Yes:

88.90%

No:

11.10%

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conflicts between local, regional and national perspectives of the significance of objects. In the results of the interaction with the PGOs, each municipality merges the CI objects into a classification of local power lines, thereby masking the detailed information which reduce the influence of CABs on local, regional or national objects. Thus, enhanced governance at the regional level also requires improvements to governance at the national level as well as closer alignment between them.

Table 7 Perceptions of PGOs of Interaction with Public Actors. Perceptions of PGOs of interaction with public actors

(n = 10)

Collaboration with CABs Trust in CABs' work Trust in Swedish Energy Agency

−5

−3

−1

1

3

5

N/A

Mean

0 0 0

1 0 0

0 2 0

3 4 4

2 2 2

0 0 3

4 2 1

1.00 1.00 2.78

5.4. County administrative boards – power grid operators Table 8, only one-third of respondents reported interacting with CABs to receive final priority list. Meanwhile, the remaining two-thirds were unsure. Only one respondent noted that feedback was provided to one or more CABs, which exemplifies the shortcomings in interaction between these actors. Missing feedback, collaboration and process knowledge may also affect the planning result. Only a few of the PGOs consulted CABs in regard to the prioritisation of power lines that cross local and regional borders. Many respondents indicated that they did not know how such prioritisation was performed for cross-local and cross-regional power lines (66.7% and 77.8%, respectively). More than half of the CABs share this ignorance, namely 50% and 58.3%, respectively. These figures cast doubt on the quality of the aggregated list of prioritised power lines as well as the maturity of the process.

The evaluation of the pilot and first complete execution of the planning indicates that CABs perceive STYREL to be an important process to identify CI. The survey substantiates this perception, as 92% of the CABs and 90% of PGOs voted ‘agree/strongly agree’. During the major part of the process and in accordance with the handbook, CABs do not directly interact with any PGO unless municipalities need help with their interactions with PGOs who operate in their area of responsibility. Despite this interaction-free setting, 53.9% of the CABs stated that they still require a more structured process (see Table 8). This requirement may result from the absence of measures for a CAB to evaluate the results of the planning that is performed by national agencies and municipalities. The survey results in Table 6 further indicate a large discrepancy between CABs’ and PGOs’ perceptions of their knowledge levels, their power to affect the region and their respective impact on society. A particularly interesting insight is that PGOs reportedly applied a citizen perspective to their work to a significantly higher degree than CABs did. Moreover, evidence reveals that both actors expressed particular doubts about the adequacy of information security within the STYREL process. Since a CAB is encouraged to make the final decision based on fragmented information, an alignment of national, regional and local needs during an emergency warrants further comprehension. In the current setting, CABs receive hardly any feedback from PGOs on the correctness of the produced decision aid or the results of the subsequent planning for MFK due to information security concerns, which corresponds to the perceived lack of knowledge. The results indicate that most CABs have established collaborations with relevant actors in the proceeding, whereas PGOs perceive a distinct lack of collaboration. Even more than the CABs, 77.8% of the PGOs who are responsible for performing an MFK in 15 min would request a more structured process with CABs (see Table 8). The survey results in Table 7 indicate that PGOs perceived the collaboration with CABs to be rather mediocre, which is apparent in the lower trust they have in the work of CABs in the process compared to the trust in the Swedish Energy Agency. The lack of knowledge that the survey illustrates implies that the contact between CABs and PGOs is underdeveloped. According to Table 6 Perceptions of CABs and PGOs of Perceptions on

5.5. Power grid operators – local, regional and national: MFK planning Although the STYREL handbook identifies this planning as the seventh step (see Fig. 1), it is characterised as subsequent planning, which uses results of STYREL as constraints in the decision-making as much as possible while also considering technical feasibility. After the PGOs have received their portion of the final list, each is legally obligated to perform its planning for a potential MFK and to inform the Svenska Kraftnät and related CABs when it is due. However, the study findings reflect that only one-fourth of the PGOs complied with this planning according to the time schedule. After appealing to late operators, the fulfilment increased and reached 60% at the end of the most recent process iteration. One possible reason for this weak commitment is the structure of the power grid. Local PGOs rely on the power supply from the regional grid, which another provider typically operates. In turn, some of the regional PGOs additionally operate some local grids by themselves. Therefore, knowledge of local and regional circumstances varies. However, the results of STYREL consist of power lines at the local grid, so only local PGOs can employ these results in their MFK planning as intended to protect CI from a power outage as much as possible. Interview evidence

STYREL.

CAB (n = 15)

STYREL

Importance of STYREL Own knowledge Power to effect region/power grid area Expected impact of actor's work on society Application of citizen perspective Adequacy of control information access information flow information security resource access Effectiveness of planning results during a crisis Established collaboration with relevant actors in Understanding of expectations on the actor Further use of planning results Contribution to crisis management

STYREL

PGO (n = 10)

−5

−3

−1

1

3

5

N/A

Mean

Mean

N/A

−5

−3

−1

1

3

5

0 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0

0 2 3 3 3 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 0

0 1 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 2

1 4 2 5 2 2 2 3 1 6 3 1 5 2 1

3 3 2 0 3 4 2 5 5 0 3 6 2 6 6

10 1 0 1 0 3 2 0 1 2 0 4 2 3 5

1 0 5 3 6 1 5 4 2 2 7 1 4 1 1

4.29 −0.29 −0.33 −0.09 0.25 1.46 1.44 1.20 0.50 0.33 1.00 2.38 1.80 2.23 3.00

3.20 3.60 2.25 3.89 2.75 2.50 2.80 2.78 0.00 1.40 1.50 −0.33 2.78 3.29 2.40

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 0 0 0

0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 1 1

0 0 0 1 4 2 1 2 4 2 1 2 2 1 1

4 4 3 3 1 0 6 3 0 6 2 2 6 1 3

5 5 3 5 3 4 2 3 1 0 2 0 1 4 4

0 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 3 0

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Table 8 Perceptions of CABs and PGOs of Interaction in Perceptions of CABs and PGOs of interaction in

STYREL.

STYREL

Experience from former processes: CAB PGO

2x 16.67% 22.22%

Need for better process: CABs with PGOs PGOs with CABs

Yes: 53.85% 77.80%

Handbook was followed: CAB PGO

Completely 16.67% 44.44%

With certain changes 41.67% 11.11%

Own process developed 0.00% 0.00%

N/A 41.67% 44.44%

Interaction occurred in form of: CAB PGO

Individual meetings 8.33% 0.00%

Consultation when necessary 16.67% 0.00%

Sending finished list of CI 25.00% 33.33%

N/A 50.00% 66.67%

National/regional CI was handled: CAB PGO

By municipality 7.69% 23.08%

Co-operatively 30.77% 0.00%

By CAB 15.38% 30.77%

N/A 46.15% 46.15%

Prioritisation of cross-municipal power lines was performed: CAB PGO

By CAB 25.00% 11.11%

In co-operation with municipalities 16.67% 22.22%

In co-operation with PGO 8.33% 0.00%

N/A 50.00% 66.67%

Prioritisation of cross-regional power lines was performed:

By CAB

In co-operation with PGO

N/A

CAB PGO

0.00% 0.00%

In co-operation with neighbouring counties 25.00% 11.11%

16.67% 11.11%

58.33% 77.78%

PGO

In co-operation with municipality 25.00% 0.00%

N/A

Final compilation was handled:

CAB

CAB PGO

33.33% 33.33%

1x 25.00% 33.33%

Never 58.33% 44.44% No: 38.46% 22.20%

CAB and feedback to municipality 8.33% —

— 33.33%

33.33% 33.33%

third of the PGOs that are responsible for performing an MFK reported a need for an improved process among PGOs. The interviews indicate that this view depends on the lack of a holistic understanding of the consequences for society as well as security concerns in the power supply sector, which introduces immense pressures to information sharing.

indicates that regional PGOs can only perform MFK planning in accordance with STYREL in the parts of the local grid that they operate themselves. Information about important power lines in subordinate power grids, to which regional PGOs transfer electricity, is hidden at the regional level of the grid. Another reason for the low completion rate may interrelate to the fact that only nine out of approximately 160 PGOs fulfil the requirements to participate in an MFK’s critical phase (15 min from the Svenska Kraftnät’s order). Since interview and survey data suggest that PGOs have hardly any contact with each other in regard to MFK, some local PGOs may perceive this part of the process to be a waste of time. This outlined constellation prompts further concerns. First, the interviews defined considerations of the question of which power consumers a regional PGO shall cut off during an MFK. During an interview with one operator, the respondents pondered equal opportunities for internally versus externally controlled local grids and wondered about the extent to which the company is expected to only affect its own customers. In contrast, an interviewee from another operator stated that the MFK planning at the company completely related to the inhouse-operated local grids, as the provider believed that this approach is the only viable way to protect CI at the local level from a power outage. A second issue is the mentioned timeframe in which an MFK must be performed. The brevity of this period places high demands on the technical feasibility of both the power grid and the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. As the interviews indicate, the abilities of PGOs to shed enough load from the local grid in 15 min vary significantly, which implies that severe circumstances can force regional PGOs to reduce the load at the regional level without knowing which CI such cut will affect. All interviewees explained that this time pressure would render it impossible to align measurements between the local and regional levels. In view of this, such alignment needs previous planning and interaction. However, the STYREL process does not stipulate any co-ordination among PGOs, which is another concern regarding the interaction between PGOs. As Fig. 1 depicts, there is neither alignment between the MFK planning results nor maintenance of close collaboration of PGOs. Interestingly, only one-

6. Blind spots in Swedish critical infrastructure protection 6.1. Facts and interpretation STYREL has been executed in full scale in Sweden twice and can therefore be considered implemented. Nevertheless, many aspects remain ambiguous and uncertain, which may be due to the immense scope and dynamics of the complex system of CI and its protection. As this study reveals, the policies that have created the frame for this process and the guidelines that the Swedish Energy Agency has provided are thought to support consistency in proceedings. However, the preconditions for each actor vary considerably with regard to resources, time, knowledge and discernment. Since governance has acknowledged this variety, policies specify the proceeding at a general level and encourage local instantiations, which has led to a diversity of approaches in which both similar and different problems have emerged among actors. This effect challenges the governance of CIP because the number of possible system states rises, which can yield an immense variety of outcomes. Governance may address similar problems, such as the interpretation of the eight-point classification scheme, more easily than the variety of resource allocation at local and regional levels or the degree of participation of private organisations and civic society (Große, 2018a). Such limits of governance through policies also relate to enforced networks since the commitment among the actors will vary when the actors themselves do not identify the need of the process (see Olausson, 2019; Olausson and Nyhlén, 2017; Rhodes, 1996). To target such uncertainty stemming from a lack of knowledge, a systemic governance must involve not only system and process governance and management but also system leadership. In particular, when the predictability of outcomes decreases and consequences of actions become

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feedback in the reference process model was less significant in groups who worked closely together than in settings where individuals had to work on the basis of their own interpretation of objectives. While the former can achieve a shared understanding and common goals, which are not necessarily in line with the intended ones, the latter can cause resignation and a sense of inadequacy. This emphasizes the importance of interaction between the actors to manage knowledge transfer and inderdependies (see Cundill et al., 2012; Rusbult and van Lange, 1996). For instance, evidence reflects that municipalities perceived an insufficient integration into local risk and crisis management apart from limited resources, which diminished commitment in the most recent execution of STYREL compared to the first iteration. However, misunderstanding and the prioritisation of conflicting objectives can also result from a personal level of interaction that lacks adequate communication and thereby fails to support an interpretation of objectives in accordance with an initial intention (Große, 2018b). Because of such variety of perceptions of strategic objectives, motives and experiences, the planning system for CIP is likely to present an emergent behaviour during the next iteration of the process (cf. Onik et al., 2016). Systemic governance and policy networks have a significant role in addressing such emergence by integrating objectives and goals within STYREL as well as into the wider context of CIP and risk and crisis management at both national and international levels.

incomprehensible, governance encounters difficulty in establishing concrete rules. In such cases, system leadership could complement governance and management efforts to bridge interpretation and motivation gaps, for example through a more manifest coordination by the regional level (cf. Große and Olausson, 2018; Palm and Thoresson, 2014). The mentioned appeal to the PGOs to fulfil their MFK planning is one example within Swedish planning for CIP. Since humans define policies, rules and management pre-settings, they are limited by human interpretations of the problem at hand and subject to further interpretation by other humans (c.f. Rusbult and van Lange, 1996). This interpretation occurred in STYREL in several ways in the interaction of an individual decision-maker with the policy and the interaction with preceding and subsequent actors in the process. Each actor created an individual cognitive model of the process and its own role therein. Based on the evidence, conflicts arose from inconsistency between such individual perceptions. Distrust, reservations and solidified prejudices resulted from such interpretation of counterparts’ actions, which appeared to have stronger influence on the cognitive model in interactions without a relation of mutual esteem (cf. Becker-Beck, 1997; Bräuer, 2005). For example, the weak regional co-ordination that the reference process has proposed particularly caused the CABs to struggle with the proceeding in the assembly of the final ranking list because of un-moderated interactions and the absence of strategies to resolve conflicts. At this stage, the insufficient information nearly precluded the assessment of the preservation of local, regional and national requirements. In addition, the guidelines did not adequately specify process events, so partners in an interaction often had to wait on each other and then received a message or document that differed from that which they expected. Such information flaws and impersonal interaction intensified individual prejudices rather than alleviating them, which led to extensive variety in levels of mutual trust and respect between actors. Thus, entropy due to variety in participation, knowledge and proceedings in the context of Swedish planning for CIP in combination with a growing system of CI necessitates appropriate governance, management and leadership efforts to channel the dynamism of the complex system of CIP.

6.3. Development and maturity Some actors have documented key lessons from both the pilot and the two full-scale executions of the CIP planning. Unfortunately, it remains unclear how these experiences have systematically influenced subsequent planning, as there is no systematic approach to system monitoring, learning and development (cf. Keating et al., 2015). Nevertheless, this study could identify changes in the information sharing and aggregation process between CABs and municipalities in the handbook of the recent planning, as the interviews confirm. Still, the policy proposes no indicators that allow for an objective statement of the maturity of the process at the local, regional or national levels. Although policies with regard to the Swedish case do not propose measures for knowledge preservation that is intended to facilitate individual, organisational or system-wide learning, the Swedish Energy Agency has conducted a few meetings with decision-makers from CABs, as did some CABs with their municipalities through established networks (cf. Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). The aim was to facilitate the sharing of experiences among actors at the same hierarchical level. Such meetings established a shared reality among participants that had implications for individual perceptions of the process (Hardin and Higgins, 1996). According to insights from the interviews and survey, experiences of the extreme difficulty of the planning have become a shared reality in contrast to concrete proceedings, which have not been shared to a similar extent with new personnel. In this way, the system adapts to the conditions of the previous planning (cf. Onik et al., 2016). However, many decision-makers who participated in this study stated that they had no personal experience with the proceeding, which can be both problematic and beneficial. In terms of the former, it can lead to ‘copy-and-paste’ behaviour, whereby an inexperienced, overworked and lonely decision-maker relies on documents from a previous planning and simply finishes the task. In the latter, it can prompt curiosity and commitment, so the decision-maker is eager to learn and gain knowledge to prepare for the next round of planning in 2019. The importance of addressing learning and subsequently transforming experience in future behaviour is a significant task for governance, and it must not be undervalued. Otherwise, the shared reality based on experiences of other group members could profoundly influence individual judgements and thereby lead to adaption of the system to a certain state (cf. Cundill et al., 2012; Onik et al., 2016; Rusbult and van Lange, 1996). To enhance the intended collective learning, systemic governance in

6.2. Objectives and motives The rationale behind STYREL is to protect society from the negative consequences of power shortages. The process particularly focuses on CI that provide important services to society. However, the policy neglects the fact that a service that is critical to a society depends on not only a power supply to a particular building but also often an extensive network of supply, people who sustain the service and legal and organisational structures that connect such CI with the aid of information and the interconnected technology. Moreover, the main concern of the Swedish Energy Agency, which is responsible for STYREL, is to ensure a reliable energy supply to the entire society. This concern may explain the concentration of this planning for CIP on the power supply to CI. Nevertheless, the objective to produce an anticipated decision aid for PGOs in the case of a national power shortage may be too narrow to obtain the targeted CIP and even contradictory to the view of some actors, which also weakens the policy and identiy function (Keating and Bradley, 2015). Such blending of visions with incompletely integrated goals in policies without any measurements to evaluate a certain level of goal achievement makes it undeterminable whether an actor has completed a process activity as desired. Many actors in STYREL reported difficulties in such self-assessment to determine the number of working hours to spend on which activity, the amount of effort that is appropriate and the date to proceed with the process that concerns the protection of the local, regional and national society. As a consequence of variation in the regional mediation and the perceived interactions, decision-makers at municipalities have created a spectrum of attitudes that range from fatalism to meticulous accuracy. This study indicates that the absence of constructive dialog and 432

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the context of CIP needs to establish a consistent overall system framework in terms of scope, level of granularity and participation as well as particular parameters, such as selection criteria and success factors. Furthermore, governance must consider the integration of policies and alignment of particular planning in a larger context to facilitate further use of planning results in other interrelated public-private interactions. In particular, governance networks should support the establishment and maintenance of relevant information channels between both the actors who participate in a planning process for CIP, such as STYREL, and those who this process affects.

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7. Concluding remarks This study has examined interactions among key actors and their roles in the STYREL process and Swedish crisis management system. Evidence from public policies, interviews and a survey with actors in the network from both public and private organisations highlights blind spots in the design, execution and evolvement of the Swedish multilevel planning system for CIP. STYREL has been executed in full scale in Sweden twice and can therefore be viewed as implemented. Nevertheless, many aspects are still ambiguous and uncertain, possibly because of the immense scope and dynamics of the complex system of CI and its protection. During the chain of policy, interaction and learning between actors cause blind spots to emerge in the planning for CIP, some of which are vague instructions, a reference process model with poor specification of concrete proceedings, a lack of feedback and knowledge management, staff changes during and between process iterations and weak collaboration. Such circumstances introduce blind spots to CIP that include poor knowledge of activities, differences in interpretations of CI’s criticality and varying maturity of the activities of actors. In prolongation, these issues expand and interrelate with levels of participation in the process and perceived usefulness of collaboration, which induces individual transformations of objectives and motives. Due to such variety in perceptions of strategic objectives as well as in motives and experiences, the planning system for CIP is likely to present an emergent behaviour during the next process iteration. By elucidating blind spots in Swedish CIP, this study emphasises the need for a more integrated and standardised system of crisis management in Sweden which takes into account the wider context of CIP in normal and crisis conditions at both the national and international levels. System governance and policy networks thereby have a significant role in addressing the clarified blind spots by establishing two-way communication, structured knowledge exchange, moderation of the process and an enhanced holistic view of CIP among the various actors. The variety in participation, knowledge and proceedings in the context of CIP in combination with a growing system of CI necessitates appropriate systemic governance with governance, management and leadership efforts to channel the dynamism of the complex system of CIP. In that sense, system governance efforts must concern strategic objctives that address people, processes and technology in order to align action(s) that must be performed to reach a preferred future state, system management needs to concretise what with how, when and of whom and system leadership should address uncertainty and ambiguity by discussing reasons and means to move forward among actors in the entire system while maintaining a holistic system perspective. Acknowledgements This study is supported by the Swedish Energy Agency alongside the project: ‘Från myndighet till medborgare och tillbaka: En studie av samverkan och kommunikation inom ramen för Styrel’, which is gratefully acknowledged. References Becker-Beck, U., 1997. Soziale Interaktion in Gruppen. VS Verlag für

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