Carbon capture and storage: Frames and blind spots

Energy Policy 82 (2015) 249–259

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Carbon capture and storage: Frames and blind spots Alfonso Martínez Arranz School of Social Sciences, Monash University, 900 Dandenong Rd, Caulfield East, VIC 3145, Australia

H I G H L I G H T S







Absent much public debate, experts alone have framed CCS; yet serious biases exist. Powerful interests in the EU took advantage of a positive global framing of CCS. A hegemonic framing of CCS in the EU caused it to bypass rigorous evaluation. Claims regarding energy security and other benefits of CCS in the EU are dubious.

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 1 December 2014 Received in revised form 8 March 2015 Accepted 14 March 2015

The European Union (EU) carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration programme stands out for the speed with which financial support was agreed to, the size of this support, and its unusual format. This paper sets out to examine CCS policymaking in the EU by analysing the way this technology was framed. It draws up a simple model of technology framing with two variants. The first one describes the creation of “mainstream frames” of technologies in policymaking. The second one explains the effects of a “hegemonic frame”, namely the weakening of evaluation criteria and the increased salience of “blind spots”. On this basis, this paper explains the global mainstreaming of a CCS frame and its transformation into a hegemonic frame in the EU. Finally, the paper reviews the blind spots in this hegemonic frame and their impact on EU policy. & 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Carbon capture and storage Technology politics Framing European Union

1. Introduction The European Union (EU), with its Member States, has been one of the most generous funders of carbon capture and storage (CCS) research alongside the United States (US). The EU case stands out for the speed with which financial support was agreed to, the size of this support, and its unusual format. CCS first appeared in EU political documents in 2005. During 2008, a “Climate and Energy Package” was rapidly negotiated and passed, with a view to influencing that year’s UN Climate Convention negotiations. Among other measures, it contained an EU Directive enabling large-scale CCS activities as well as amendments to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to account for and fund “CCS demonstration”. As of 2012, the EU and its Member States had promised an estimated US$10 billion in public support for CCS (SBC Energy Institute, 2012). The lion’s share of this funding for CCS was to come from the EU level, which was unprecedented: European supranational institutions largely base their legal force on regulatory, not fiscal powers (Majone, 1994; Deloitte, 2012). Furthermore, the technical characteristics of CCS E-mail address: [email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.03.018 0301-4215/& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

do not make it, a priori, the most obvious low-carbon technology to be supported at the EU level. At this stage, CCS would have few or no cross-border issues. Finally, even under optimistic future scenarios, CCS use would be heavily concentrated in just a few EU member states (DG Environment, SEC, 2008 54). The literature on the politics of CCS in the EU explains that introducing ambitious policies for climate change mitigation and energy security was part of an attempt at reinvigorating the EU project after the failure of its constitutional process (Claes and Frisvold, 2011: 211). There is, however, little questioning of the concrete arguments that drove policymaking on CCS. There is even less questioning why specifically CCS was so suddenly discovered in the EU as a crucial technology for tackling these problems (Claes and Frisvold, 2011; Fischer, 2012; Brockett et al., 2008; Radgen et al., 2009; Bradshaw, 2009; Chiavari, 2010; Von Stechow et al., 2011; Scott, 2013). Since there were no cost-cutting breakthroughs or novelties that can easily explain the sudden increase in interest for the technology (Marchetti, 1976; IPCC, 2005), this paper focuses on the effects of “framing” on CCS policymaking in the EU (Scrase and Ockwell, 2010). It describes how a global “mainstream” frame of CCS, selected by major politico-economic trends, became

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“hegemonic” in the EU. This “hegemonic frame” has largely persisted even after its plans for CCS deployment and funding in the EU failed to materialise (Selosse et al., 2013; Bellona Foundation et al., 2013; DG Energy, COM, 2013 180; European Parliament, 2013/2079(INI); DECC, 2014). Section 2 below describes the materials analysed and develops two heuristic models to interpret them. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of analysing the framing of CCS globally and in the EU. It ends up by examining the “blind spots” of the EU frame for CCS. Section 4 draws conclusions and provides policy recommendations.

2. Materials and methods This paper is based on a discourse analysis (cf. Scrase and Ockwell, 2010; Curran, 2012; Cotton et al., 2014) of the promotion of low-carbon technologies in the EU, with a special emphasis on CCS. A corpus of texts was analysed to ascertain the framing of CCS in the EU during the Climate & Energy Package (C&EP). The corpus is centred on legislative, institutional and corporate documents cited in or relevant to the C&EP. Primary documents were collected through full-text searches of all EU institutional documents on the Eur-Lex engine using terms such as “carbon capture” and “CCS”. This set of documents was expanded by following the initial documents’ internal system of references, which also point to external sources (e.g. the Stern Review, European technology platforms, International Energy Agency). Finally, the corpus was contrasted for completeness with the academic literature. The corpus thus spans 1995–2014, with the majority of documents clustered around the C&EP negotiating period 2007-–2008. Materials before and after the C&EP provide background and contrast. Table 1 below quantifies the sources of documents, which broadly reflect the respective weight of actors in EU climate and energy policy (Jordan and Rayner, 2010; Maltby, 2013), plus a significant representation of international organisations and industry. This distribution ensures a good scrutiny of both institutionalised and more indirect influences on CCS policymaking. However, framing cannot be inferred from the number of times any one actor mentions a technology. Rather, it refers to the manner in which this actor frames the technology and how this framing is reflected in other actors’ assessments and in the policy outcomes. In order to identify frames and their formation, key passages describing CCS (its role within the EU and in global energy policy as well as its relation to other low-carbon technologies) were found in the corpus through detailed critical reading of an initial sample of documents. Thus, the patterns of reasoning and word collocations that dominated the discussion were Table 1 Distribution of document sources in the corpus by interest group. Document source

Quantity

Consulting/Research (NTUA, Deloitte, i.a.) Environmentalists (Greenpeace, WWF, i.a.) EU member states (Council of Ministers, UK government, i.a.) European Commission: DG energy European Commission: general/undefined European Commission: other DGs European Parliament (committees responsible: ITRE, ENVI, CLIMA) Industry (involved with CCS: Vattenfall, Alstom, ZEP i.a.) Industry (NOT involved with CCS: EREC, EWEA) External organisations (IEA, G8, GCCSI, IPCC, US DoE, i.a.) Legislation TOTAL

10 14 49 11 9 14 31 36 5 36 8 223

discovered. These reveal the narratives or “story-lines”, which end up constituting a frame (Scrase and Ockwell, 2010). These narratives were then systematically compared across the entire corpus through computerised searches. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below describe CCS frames that are present globally and in the EU as regards CCS. Section 3.1 draws heavily from the existing literature, while Section 3.2 is mostly sourced from the corpus. After qualitatively distiling the key frames in the corpus, these were cross-examined for potential blind spots, as expounded in Section 3.3. The cross-examination tests crucial assertions in the corpus for coherence both with other parts of the corpus and with general energy policy data. The intention is not to test whether policymakers were able to “see the future”, most notably the devastating crisis that engulfed Europe after 2009. Rather, the paper strives to contrast the frame with then-available trends and information. This discourse analysis was carried out simultaneously with and checked against semi-structured, in-depth interviews with experts. Their expertise lay in various aspects of EU energy policy and, in particular, the promotion of low-carbon technologies such as CCS.1 The experts were all involved in the policymaking and policy implementation around low-carbon technologies. Interviewees were balanced according to need across and within:


Civil society (WWF and Greenpeace)
European Commission Directorates General (Energy, Environment, Research, and Trade)


European Parliament (Liberals, Greens, Independents and committee staff)


Industry (Alstom, Vattenfall, Eurelectric, EWEA, ULCOS, ESTEP and ZEP)


International energy organisations (IEA, IEAGHG)
Member state energy policy institutions (UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain) Questions revolved around the policymaking process before, during and after the C&EP. This allowed the research to account for any “behind the scenes” or unwritten issues that may have affected the framing. 2.1. Models of energy technology framing The framing of energy technologies such as nuclear, biofuels, and hydraulic fracturing has been analysed with a focus on the general public or on media (Delshad et al., 2010; Corner et al., 2011; Cotton et al., 2014). A core idea of this research is that the public is particularly prone to misconceptions and manipulation through said framing. Accordingly, a significant amount of sociopolitical CCS literature has been devoted to analysing “public perceptions” and “media framing” (Einsiedel et al., 2013; Ashworth et al., 2010; Kraeusel and Möst, 2012; Riesch et al., 2013; Boyd and Paveglio, 2014). However, in contrast to nuclear, biofuels and so-called fracking, CCS has not developed enough to be debated widely on a national scale in most jurisdictions, with the only possible exceptions of Norway and Germany – both quite fleetingly (Tjernshaugen and Langhelle, 2011; Praetorius and Stechow, 2011). The results of the public surveys cited above confirm that CCS remains a largely experts-only field. However, framing is not limited to interactions between experts and an ignorant public. Rather it affects all forms of communication – not least among experts themselves (Scrase and Ockwell, 2010). 1 Some are cited explicitly below while respecting their anonymity. The Harvard style is used but with affiliation instead of name, and date of interview instead of year.

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Global CCS experts have delivered “a consistent and rather homogenous policy message related to the need for government support to advance the technology” (Stephens et al., 2011: 388). Scholars have published ambitious “demonstration programmes”, evaluated them, and mulled over the barriers they may encounter (Gibbins and Chalmers, 2008; Van Alphen et al., 2010, 2009; Markusson et al., 2011). Nonetheless, expert surveys reveal a tension between the positive, proactive framing and the factual indeterminacy of such an emerging technology: CCS experts are, on the one hand, convinced of the validity and potential of the technology and, on the other hand, concerned about the significant uncertainties in its development pathway (Hansson and Bryngelsson, 2009; Evar, 2011). Thus, this paper outlines two complementary heuristic models for analysing the expert framing of CCS captured in the corpus and interviews. 2.1.1. Mainstream frames, hegemonic frames and their blind spots Following Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2011), the models assume the existence of “winning” frames that shape policy and eventually technological development. However, Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2011) do not delve into the mechanism by which, in their case, different frames of biofuels dominated the Finnish policy landscape over time. From the broad literature addressing the sociological interface of technological change, this paper distils three factors as most important in creating a dominant frame:


Distribution of actors that can command resources and shape the







general discourse (e.g. on low-carbon technologies). Science and Technology Studies and similar areas of research have shown the importance of discursive (or “ideational”) as well as strictly physical elements in technological development (Curran, 2012). Range of alternative frames. Research on technological transitions has demonstrated the particular relevance of the existing constellation of incumbent and alternative technologies for engendering technological change (cf. Geels and Schot, 2007).2 Meshing with institutionalised discourses (the fundamental imperatives of the State). Within the context of this paper and bearing in mind the first two factors, new technological combinations must not only exist physically but also have ideational appeal and political backing (Scrase and Ockwell, 2010).

Frames facilitate action by focusing attention and resources, and coordinating actors. However, this focus comes at the price of “blind spots”, which are incongruences or unconsidered outcomes. In some ways, blind spots are an unavoidable consequence of our bounded rationality and the uncertainty of the future (Van Lente, 2012). They reflect the priorities and prejudices of the dominant (yet flawed) actors of the moment. In addition, successful frames come with a degree of “image pressure”. While some actors may see the disadvantages of a particular frame, they may downplay their reservations in order to (be seen to) further a cause with which they generally agree (Konrad, 2006). Framing for many current technologies can be explained through this lens. In Kivimaa and Mickwitz (2011), firstly, influential backers are present throughout in the form of the forestry industry and a sympathetic policy establishment. Secondly, the framing relies on the trusted technology of combined heat and power and the obvious availability of wood in Finland as opposed to fossil fuels. Finally, the undisputed discourse of security of supply provides a solid base for pro-biofuels framing. These three constant elements have ensured a certain continuity in Finnish 2 In the multi-level perspective, the level of maturity of the niche alternatives to a regime at the time of a landscape shock is a key determinant of the type of transition triggered.

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biofuels policy. In this context, image pressure acted to push producers into line. Nonetheless, as this policy is put into action in a changing environment (e.g. environmental acceptability, energy self-sufficiency), certain blind spots make themselves apparent (e.g. challenges of scale, availability of other conversion technologies, potential to combine with municipal waste, needs in transport). For the case of Finnish biofuels, these blind spots simply fed back on the framing factors and enabled slightly different frames (each with its own blind spots) to emerge. If greater discrepancies appeared, completely different frames could emerge as mainstream. Consider the evolution of nuclear power in Western democracies. In the 1950s, powerful state actors consistently framed nuclear power as the harbinger of post-war progress and a technological bulwark against the Communist threat. Governments throughout the West felt the image pressure. Backers also took advantage of specific events, such as the oil crises, notably in France. In this context, the possibility of largescale nuclear accidents was a significant blind spot. When such accidents started to happen, fears of Soviet expansion died down, and the promise of “too cheap to meter” failed to deliver; the nuclear option lost much of its lustre. Influential backers remain to this day (see Scrase and Ockwell, 2010). However, alternatives appeared increasingly attractive. As a result, the framing of nuclear energy as a central component of the energy mix is currently not a mainstream frame. This model of “frame mainstreaming”, summarised in Fig. 1 thus provides a useful heuristic for understanding framing processes. However, when the supporting factors of a frame become particularly strong, “image pressure” may mount significantly. If an initial “mainstreaming” iteration as in Fig. 1 strengthens the factors, a second iteration may encounter a weakened or altogether suspended evaluation stage (Konrad, 2006), as represented in Fig. 2. Removing this filter may create a truly “hegemonic frame” and increase the number and severity of blind spots. This model of “frame hegemony” will be particularly important when full policy implementation is distant or its interpretations are unclear, as is the case with CCS and, in general, with many lowcarbon technologies. In the remainder of this paper, the results of applying these heuristic models to the framing of CCS globally and in the EU are presented and discussed.

Fig. 1. Generation of mainstream frames and of blind spots. The arrows indicate the direction of influence of the elements in boxes and, through shading and size, the notional strength of this influence. The “Evaluation and debate” box is seen diluting the strength of the input from the factors into the frame, and diminishing the amount of blind spots that make it through.

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positive framings of CCS that drew attention to the technology in the 2000s. The degree of attention and hopes changed much more than factual knowledge about the climate or technology (Scrase and Ockwell, 2010). 3.1.1. Explaining global mainstreaming The competition between the three framings above resulted in the mainstreaming of a blend of enthusiastic and reluctant frames of CCS (Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2011), in accordance with the model in Fig. 1. This led to a much more favourable climate for CCS research policy, which in turn generated a flurry of proposed projects and initiatives. The factors supporting this global mainstreaming are expounded below.

Fig. 2. Creation of a hegemonic frame after a first mainstreaming iteration. Note that the factors have become extreme (represented by larger boxes and slightly altered descriptors), overwhelming the evaluation stage. Dashed lines indicate that feedback is delayed.

3. Results and discussion Section 3.1 lays out the global frames of CCS as described in existing literature. Drawing both on this literature and on connections discovered in the corpus, other subsections then explain the mainstreaming, as in Fig. 1, of a positive global frame that justified an enhanced CCS research policy around the world. In turn, Section 3.2 lays out the transformation of this positive frame into a hegemonic frame in the EU and the suppression of a critical frame of CCS. Subsequent subsections link the data on this frame to the elements of the “hegemonic frame” model in Fig. 2. Finally, Section 3.3 reveals the blind spots of this hegemonic frame by contrasting relevant factual information (e.g. statistical data and academic references) with the narratives and story-lines uncovered in the analysis. 3.1. Initial iteration: global CCS framing The idea of using CCS to tackle climate change was proposed already in the early years of recognition of a potential anthropogenic greenhouse effect (Marchetti, 1976). However, in the 1990s climate negotiations, CCS was largely notable for its absence. Climate change mitigation frames centred on or including CCS originated much later on with a global community of experts (Stephens et al., 2011: 388). The literature has already identified three of these global frames for CCS (Bäckstrand et al., 2011; Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2011):


The “enthusiastic” frame depicts CCS as unavoidable because of







the scale of the challenge of removing fossil fuels from the energy mix. It also views continued fossil fuel consumption as the best way to combat energy poverty and emphasises the critical role of CCS in compensating for renewable variability. The “reluctant” frame similarly describes CCS as unavoidable because of the urgency to remove fossil fuels from the energy mix, and the inconvenience of renewables variability. However, it tends to represent CCS as a transitional technology towards an all-renewables future. The “critical” frame portrays CCS as a diversion from the true meaning of sustainability: an end to the use of dirty, non-renewable fossil fuels. This frame would highlight the long lead times for any substantial deployment of CCS and the uncertainties regarding pricing and long-term storage. Crucially, it was the appearance of these new, predominantly

3.1.1.1. Backers. In the early 2000s, the new US administration under George W. Bush put forward a technology-based solution to the climate problem. Centred on the grand project of FutureGen, it framed CCS as the way to continue using “secure, domestic coal resources for our future energy needs” (NETL, 2004: 2). This early support granted US-based researchers (and their coal-centred frames) a dominant position in the CCS community (Stephens et al., 2011). Then, in 2003, the US and Saudi Arabia asked the IPCC to inform governments on the potential of CCS, which led to a Special Report on this technology – the first of its kind (IPCC, 2005). The largely positive Special Report secured CCS a place in the global mainstream mitigation portfolio (Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2011). The influential IEA, traditionally concerned with fossil fuel markets, also touted the prospects of CCS, again with a particular emphasis on coal power (IEA, 2004). It continued doing so, not least since invited to take on climate issues by the G8 (IEA, 2006, 2008). 3.1.1.2. Alternative frames. In the early to mid-2000s, renewables had been making some progress but the scale of the climate challenge seemed daunting without recourse to CCS (Pacala and Socolow, 2004), particularly given the rise of Chinese coal consumption alone in those very years (Rosen and Houser, 2007). Only later was doubt cast on the absolute necessity of CCS, e.g. through all-renewables scenarios (Krewitt et al., 2007; Singer, 2011) or the IEA’s first explicitly “non-CCS” mitigation scenario (IEA, 2012). Within the range of options for CCS itself, the IEA and the IPCC Summary for Policymakers presented imposing figures for its possible deployment on “Power” applications, ignoring large industrial sources (IEA, 2004; IPCC, 2005). Combined with the generally better economics of coal, this made “coal‐power CCS” virtually the only game in town to tackle deep decarbonisation with CCS. This monolithic picture of the technology would only be challenged much later – after the C&EP (IEA, 2009; IEA and UNIDO, 2011). 3.1.1.3. Discourses. The FutureGen frame painted a future where energy security took subtle precedence over climate change mitigation. In the United States immediately post-9/11, the prospect of reliance on abundant domestic coal resources rather than oil from the unstable and terrorist-financing Middle East was certainly attractive. Worldwide, CCS acted as political glue in many constituencies torn between climate protection and further exploitation of their fossil fuel resources (or those of others) (Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2011). In summary, in the time just prior to EU legislative action, a global mainstream frame appeared that was a blend of enthusiastic and reluctant elements. Its underpinning narratives were that, on the one hand, “the benefits of strong, early action on climate change outweigh the costs” (Stern and Great Britain. Treasury., 2006), and on the other hand, that CCS was “something

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we already know how to do” (Pacala and Socolow, 2004), so that governments merely needed to “accelerate [its] development and commercialization” (UK Government, 2005). “Image pressure” based on this frame thus mounted globally in the mid-2000s. As a result, countries around the world raced to imitate the US’s research effort (Shackley and Evar, 2012). In particular, the European Commission began sponsoring its by then largest study into CCS explicitly as a response to FutureGen (DG Research and DG Energy, 2007: 9). 3.2. Secondary iteration: CCS framing in the EU Nonetheless, analysis of this paper’s corpus reveals that few EU actors engaged with CCS early on and developed a clear image of the technology. The European Commission’s first mentions of CCS in political documents (DG Environment, COM, 2005 35 ) were ignored by the European Council, and only briefly commented on by the European Parliament. Bureaucratic groundwork was laid by a special group convened by the Commission under the guidance of the UK presidency of the EU (ECCP Working Group 3, 2006). However, it was the platform for Zero Emissions Fossil Fuel Power Plants (ZEP) that channelled the transmission of most of ideas about CCS. During the preparation of the EU’s CCS legislation, ZEP was widely cited as an authoritative representative of opinions on CCS (ECCP Working Group 3, 2006; Morgan, 2006; European Parliament, 2007/2091 (INI)). Its proposal for a demonstration programme for CCS essentially became the EU’s own (ZEP, 2008a), despite deployment being deemed likely in just a few countries and despite ZEP's call for EU resources being unprecedented. Using largely the corpus and interviews, supported by academic references where they exist, this section explains the transformation of the global mainstream frame of CCS into a hegemonic frame in the EU, with the concomitant sidelining of the critical frame. 3.2.1. The global mainstream frame in the EU Below are excerpts from the corpus that exemplify this transformation. These excerpts draw on substantially different sources: (1) ZEP’s “Vision for CCS”, released in mid-2006, (2) the initial legislative Communication by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Energy, published in January 2007, and (3) the European Parliament’s official Report on the CCS Directive drafted in mid2008. All aspects are present more or less explicitly in most documents. The purpose of these quotes is to showcase the continuity and coherence of the frame across time and space, as well as across different components of the corpus: (1) industry and civil society, (2) the coal interests in the EU institutions and (3) the generally environmentally-friendly Parliament (cf. Wurzel and Connelly, 2011). (1) ZEP characterises key imperatives of the EU as directly linked to CCS development Europe has entered a new energy era, in which sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply are the overriding objectives. The EU energy industry has three principal concerns:


Ensuring security of energy supplies on a sustainable basis;
Implementing technologies that can achieve deep reductions in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel power plants;


Maintaining EU industrial competitiveness to meet the global market challenge for advanced fossil energy power plants with integrated CCS (ZEP, 2006b: 13). (2) DG Energy’s Unit B3 “Oil and Coal” specifies that coal is the key fossil fuel in these calculations, and that renewables and efficiency do not represent an alternative.

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Coal is a key contributor to the EU’s security of energy supply and will remain so. Coal represents the fossil fuel with by far the largest and most widely distributed global reserves, estimated to last for some 130 years for lignite and 200 years for hard coal. Even with strategies to increase energy efficiency and the use of renewable sources, coal should remain an important option in the coming decades for covering essential electricity needs not satisfied by renewable energies (DG Energy, COM, 2006 843: 4). (3) Environment Committee Rapporteur Chris Davies MEP points to the (modelled) potential of CCS within Europe but also highlights the huge demand overseas. His appeal to develop CCS in the EU as “inspiration” to other countries ties in with the prospect of being competitive in a future global CCS market. The importance of developing the use of CCS in Europe cannot be underestimated. Deployed to its full potential it could secure a 50% reduction in our CO2 emissions by 2050 […] but it is the global picture that is so important. […] If the European Union does not set an example by encouraging rapid development of the technology, there will be no hope of persuading India and China to adopt its use (Davies, 2008/0015 (COD): 81). Because of its focus on guaranteeing continued use of coal for electricity generation in Europe and beyond, the remainder of the paper refers to the hegemonic CCS frame in the EU shorthand as “coal for electricity”. An often-unstated element, but frequent in interviews and academic papers, is the desire to avoid increasing gas use, as it would likely come from unreliable Russia (Claes and Frisvold, 2011; Vattenfall, 18/01/2013). The hegemonic frame’s key narratives are therefore:


The EU will need fossil fuels into the future but its main supplier of natural gas, Russia, may not be reliable.


Coal damages the climate more than gas but it is much





more abundant. Therefore, seeing as renewables will not cover demand adequately, the EU needs to use more coal to enhance its energy security but in a climate-friendly way – with CCS. Models show CCS could abate a significant amount of EU emissions and even more worldwide. CCS is a novel technology that the EU can make competitive so that foreign countries reliant on coal will be willing to use it – i.e. purchase it from European firms.

EU policy on CCS would eventually reflect this particular understanding of the technology, which went far beyond a commitment to enhanced research policy. Rather, this hegemonic frame placed CCS at the centre of hopes for both EU reindustrialisation and climate change mitigation. It drew much support (or at least benevolent indifference) from a wide range of actors: those wishing to (a) step up climate action, (b) increase energy security, and/or (c) make the EU more competitive. 3.2.2. The global critical CCS frame in the EU Indeed, the corpus shows that voices squarely critical of CCS were scarce during the C&EP. Greenpeace, after initial involvement in the process (ECCP Working Group 3, 2006), issued a belated statement arguing why CCS would not “save the climate”. It mostly criticised the long lead times, the “energy waste”, the possibility of leakage from storage sites, and the expense (Rochon and Greenpeace International, 2008). All of these were precisely what ZEP’s demonstration programme claimed to address (ZEP, 2008b). For its part, another environmentalist major, WWF, was itself involved in

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ZEP, if only to secure tight environmental regulation (WWF, 5/12/ 2011). In EU legislative procedures, the mild opposition to “coal for electricity” was quickly voted out of resolutions and final texts. In the initial parliamentary appraisal of the Commission’s proposals for the technology, Socialist and Green Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) presented two amendments that requested mandatory CCS for all new coal-fired power plants (ITRE Committee, A6-0348/2007: Amendments 78, 110). In another two amendments, they highlighted the difficulties or risks of CCS (Amendments 106, 107). All four were rejected. A Welsh MEP noted that CCS should be deployed “at the earliest practical opportunity”, but also that in a scenario with high penetration of renewables, integrating CCS might be difficult (Amendments 42, 44). Her first amendment was maintained but the second one rejected. Eventually, the strongest opposition at the time inside the institutions was not against CCS itself but against the subsidy arrangements at EU level. Parliament passed the legislation establishing financing of CCS through auctioning of 300 million allowances of the New Entrants Reserve of the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (aka the NER300). However, Member States would be the ones to miss out on this income. Therefore, the Council of (Member State) Ministers remained vague in its commitment to support CCS throughout the legislative process (French Council Presidency, 2008a,b: 13). In response, the “CCS Leadership Coalition”, a subgroup of ZEP without more neutral members, viz. WWF, decisively lobbied the Council to secure the funds (Claes and Frisvold, 2011). The critical frame of CCS as present during the C&EP was thus not a principle- or evidence-based opposition to the arguments used to support CCS, but rather a general reluctance to foot the bill and undermine established constituents (i.e. renewables). Given that CCS use would likely be concentrated in only some Member States, this seems the minimum degree of opposition that would be expected. Eventually, this opposition was overcome by spreading the benefits to other technologies (“innovative renewables”) that could be implemented more widely. 3.2.3. Explaining frame hegemony in the EU The analysis of the corpus, supported by interviews, reveals that the global mainstream frame appeared nearly uncontested and easily dominated the policy space in the EU. The subsections below analyse the expanded factors of framing, which lead to hegemonic framing as shown in Fig. 2. 3.2.3.1. Powerful backers. In contrast to similar “platforms” set up by the Commission to advise it on policy, ZEP brought together an impressive array of Europe’s largest companies: Shell, BP, Total, E. On, GDF Suez, Statoil and Siemens were members of ZEP ranked among the top 20 European companies by revenue.3 Other big players in the electricity and oil and gas sector were present: Alstom, EdF, Endesa, Enel, GE Energy, RWE, Schlumberger and Vattenfall. Many of these companies are (former) state monopolies or are nonetheless considered strategic assets by national governments (Eikeland, 2009; Reilhac, 2014). Furthermore, ZEP’s links with its initial creator, the Commission, were meant to be fluid. Finally, the presence of environmental groups Bellona, E3G and WWF allayed many fears in other camps. ZEP generally highlighted this broad range of participants to define itself as radically different to an “industrial lobby group” (ZEP, 14/11/2011). 3.2.3.2. Lack of alternative frames. Contrary to expectations, the 3

Available online at http://fortune.com/global500/2008/

corpus – including documents on CCS policymaking rather than simple brochures or technical material – barely contains mentions of alternatives to CCS. Nonetheless, some renewables advocates had long argued for a pan-European Supergrid to resolve the problems of variability of renewable energy sources that “coal for electricity” also claimed to address (Knies et al., 1999; Czisch, 2005). The Supergrid frame drew some attention before the C&EP (Fairley, 2006; Gordon, 2006). Furthermore, it was mooted alongside the C&EP, albeit only as an initiative of the ill-fated Union for the Mediterranean (French Council Presidency, 2008c) and as one of the aspirational objectives of renewable promotion in C&EP documents (ITRE Committee, C6 0046/2008: 81). It only became more widely advocated and seriously discussed after C&EP was passed (Ministers of the North Seas Countries, 2009; FOSG, 2010; House of Commons, 2011; Jefferies, 2014; WWF et al., 2011; Zervos et al., 2010). Crucially, at the time, the only vocal Supergrid advocate was small Irish renewable firm Airtricity (Veal, 2006). In addition, most issues relevant to the establishment of a European Supergrid had to be dealt with within the Third Energy Liberalisation Package. As the name indicates, much of this package was bogged down with liberalisation measures in the sensitive area of energy policy (EurActiv, 2009; Eikeland, 2009). By contrast, the C&EP, to which CCS was attached, was focused on delivering mitigation measures. 3.2.3.3. Discursive dominance. “Coal for electricity” explicitly targeted contemporary EU priorities on:


security of supply following the Russian–Ukranian gas rows (DG Energy and DG Environment, COM, 2006 105),


lack of competitiveness highlighted by the failure of the Lisbon


Strategy, which focused on R&D as driver of growth (Kok, 2004), and stepping up action on climate change following the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, in which the EU had been so invested (Buchner and Dall’olio, 2005)

Furthermore, “coal for electricity” relies on conservative discourses that assume societal and technological change to be difficult and potentially undesirable. At the time, both the Council and the Parliament were dominated by the conservative European People’s Party. Nonetheless, “coal for electricity” also draws on “weak ecological modernisation” and “prosperity through innovation” discourses (Christoff, 1996). Reformists use these discourses to avoid giving up the commitment to growth that also shoots through traditional left-wing ideologies, e.g. social democracy and Marxism–Socialism. A broad supportive coalition could thus be formed encompassing the two usual sides of European politics. In addition to these broader discourses, the research carried out for this paper identified a specific “prosperity through fossil fuels” discourse, often related to the topic of energy poverty, which is common among energy professionals (WCA, 15/11/2011; IEA et al., 2010). The reasoning is that fossil fuels enabled the large-scale industrialisation that generated modern prosperity. Excluding coal, the most abundant fossil fuel, would make a prosperous future for the world all the more difficult. This discourse fit in nicely with the long history of coal support within the European institutions. The focus on coal for the benefit of existing or former coal-mining regions was indeed echoed by the European Parliament (2005/2049 (INI); 2007/2091 (INI)). 3.3. Blind spots in “coal for electricity” These factors created a degree of frame hegemony that triggered significant image pressure, which in turn facilitated a

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“suspension of evaluation” (Konrad, 2006). Not even the academic literature on CCS in the EU was free from this influence. One chapter opens by claiming that “CCS could […] alter the position of coal – turning it into the most abundant, reliable and inexpensive energy source” (Claes and Frisvold, 2011: 211), which sounds thermodynamically impossible. A similar chapter happily endorses the EU’s support mechanisms for CCS as “an impressive achievement” all while noting that “little is in fact known” about the technology (Fischer, 2012). The following sections discuss five “blind spots” of the hegemonic “coal for electricity” frame. 3.3.1. Non-CCS mitigation options DG Environment relied on the PRIMES econometric model to assess the possibilities of CCS. From the initial modelling around 2005, DG Environment (14/03/2013) found in CCS the disruptive technology that would achieve its twin objectives of tackling climate change and continuing economic growth. PRIMES (and similar modelling done within a “coal for electricity” frame) projected that CCS would lower the costs of mitigation. For the EU, the costs of using CCS were estimated as ranging between 40% and 54% lower than alternatives (ZEP, 2008a: 3; DG Environment, SEC, 2008 54; Stangeland, 2006). However, the assumptions used make any other result almost impossible. In the PRIMES model, CCS automatically enters the market at a competitive price in 2020 and is then assumed able to use cheap coal for generation. PRIMES explicitly did not take into account the costs and uncertainty of developing the technology to a competitive level (DG Environment, SEC, 2008 54: 5). By implication, PRIMES assumed that other potentially disruptive technologies, such as a Supergrid or distributed renewables (Verbong and Geels, 2010) did not exist or did not have the same potential as CCS to develop. Notably, the sources of crucial data on CCS development possibilities were the industry members of ZEP, none of which operated many renewables, and the association of fossil-fuel power plant owners “VGB” (Capros et al., 2008). This fact was only declared in the cited academic publication reporting on the results – but not in legislative documents. These merely referred to other Commission documents, to the model used, and to broad “stakeholder consultations” (DG Environment, SEC, 2008 54: 5; DG Energy, SEC, 2006 1723). By extension, this partly explains and introduces the second blind spot, as no data was sought from steelmaking or other companies. 3.3.2. Mitigation options using CCS outside the power sector Within the narrow focus of fossil fuel technologies in the power sector, cheap, high-emissions coal was a justifiable choice for CCS deployment ahead of expensive, low-emissions gas (Metz et al., 2005). However, the CCS concept may be developed and used beyond the power sector. Forgetting these other CCS applications is particularly remarkable in the EU. Coal power plant owners estimated that coal‐power CCS could mitigate only around 3984 Mt CO2/a by 2050 (Eurelectric et al., 2007). By comparison, other industrial sectors susceptible of using CCS had aggregate annual emissions of 449 Mt CO2 in 2007 in the EU-27 and no alternative mitigation options in sight (IEA and UNIDO, 2011; EEA, 2010).5 The key advocate for CCS in the EU – ZEP – excluded other potential CCS actors in its very name. The utilities represented in ZEP, such as Vattenfall, had the clout and resources to incentivise other companies and to convince policymakers and civil society organisations. Vattenfall, a Swedish state-owned company, had 4 Value given as 100 Mtoe, converted according to average Carbon Emission Coeficient values in EU UNFCCC submissions. 5 Petroleum Refining (UNFCCC category 1A1b): 121 Mt; Manufacture of solid fuels (1A1c): 24 Mt; Pulp, paper and print (1A2d): 30 Mt; Food processing (1A2e): 40 Mt; Cement (2A1): 107 Mt; Ammonia (2B1): 26 Mt; Iron and steel (2C1) 101 Mt.

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had a strong CCS R&D programme for a decade. Its motivation lay in having acquired billions of euros in coal assets during privatisations in Germany and Poland. These assets could see their value completely wiped out by, e.g., a coal phase-out in favour of renewables. By contrast, incumbent steelmakers, despite displaying a research interest in CCS, face no such risk to their business from alternative technologies. They were thus far less approachable by technology providers involved with CCS (Schlumberger, 22/11/ 2011), which exacerbated the blind spot. CCS was further identified as a power sector technology by the fact that technology providers (viz. Alstom for capture or Shell for injection) were only members of ZEP. However, they certainly would have had potential for collaboration with steelmakers’ CCS groupings being established at the same time as ZEP, such as the European programme for Ultra-Low CO2 Steelmaking (ULCOS) and the European Steel Technology Platform (ULCOS, 4/06/2013; ESTEP, 10/01/2013). 3.3.3. Deployment in different regions The need for CCS in European coal power was often justified by statements on the large amount of global coal consumption, increasing electricity demand, and slow progress of renewables (DG Energy, COM, 2006) 843; Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2011: 274). EU coal use had actually more than halved over 20 years while renewable energy doubled. Overall electricity consumption increased very moderately, even before the economic crisis that gripped the continent (EC, 2012). This conflation of global and European apparent needs for CCS technology formed a severe blind spot in terms of the potential for deployment. Similarly, it was argued that the EU had to develop CCS on behalf of less developed economies that relied on cheap coal, with a special focus on China – and that the EU could benefit from exporting the technology to them (DG Energy COM, 2008 13; Davies, 2008/0015(COD)). Neither rationale seems robust (Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2011). China’s domestic technologies to improve coal power plant efficiency are already among the most advanced in the world (IEA, 2012: 36). Helping China add CCS to its world-class repertoire can only be done to suit local geological and technical conditions. However, EU-China CCS cooperation, started in 2005, stayed in the symbolic figures of a few million euros (Senior et al., 2011; DG Climate, 2010). In terms of profit, CCS would likely be part of any technology transfer programmes to the traditional category of “developing countries” (e.g. India and even China) under existing and forthcoming emissions reduction agreements (Wilson et al., 2011; Jaccard and Tu, 2011). 3.3.4. Energy security In turn, the emphasis on the abundance of coal led to an energy security blind spot. CCS was framed as a tool for the EU to increase its energy security because coal was both cheap and widely available (ZEP, 2008a; Deloitte, 2012). Prima facie, this strategy tied in with countering Russia’s aggressive (energy) politics towards former Soviet republics and, potentially, other countries in its “near abroad” (Claes and Frisvold, 2011). However, of all 34 initially proposed coal-power CCS projects just six were located in Eastern Europe (ZEP, 2008b; 2006a). Only one project in Poland (Bełchatow) ever had any hopes of actually getting off the ground. It has now been scrapped. Furthermore, EU indigenous coal reserves have long been known to be very concentrated, largely of poor quality, and expensive to extract (DG Energy COM, 2000 769: 21). As for imports, Russia itself became number one coal exporter into the EU in 2006 with 24.8% of total, year of the first gas row with the Ukraine that triggered discussion of energy (in)security in Europe. Thereafter, Russia increased its share to a peak of 30% in 2009, and remains top supplier with 25.9% as of the latest data available (Eurostat,

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2012). Since PRIMES assumes a “world price” for coal (Capros, 2011: 7, 21), Russia’s role in making coal ‘cheap’ for eastern Member States was ignored. This did not prevent the modelling reports, influenced by the “coal for electricity” frame, from warning of the “high risk” of coal not being able to “contribute to energy security”. These reports were also used to caution against “falling behind in clean coal technologies”, although the modelling itself explicitly did not compare developments outside Europe (DG Energy SEC, 2008 47). To sum up, CCS offers few prospects of weaning eastern Member States off Russian gas. The EU as a whole may be able to source coal from a wide range of reliable suppliers, such as the US, South Africa, Colombia or Australia; however, in terms of distribution and cost, this is of dubious interest to tackle “gas dependency” in the East. 3.3.5. The requirements and risks of a CCS demonstration programme “Coal for electricity” aimed for urgent deployment of CCS and efficiency improvements in coal power plants because it could not deny the risk of increasing coal emissions (DG Energy SEC, 2006 1723: 2–3). This was reflected in the setup of the "NER300" (see Section 3.2.2). Firstly, projects with a higher ratio of CO2 capture per euro spent were given priority, which favoured high-emissions coal ahead of gas or industrial applications. Secondly, funds will only be disbursed progressively as CO2 is successfully stored away, similar to renewable projects, which receive funds as electricity is generated (European Commission C, 2010 7499). This setup implied that CCS and “innovative renewables” had a similar capacity to get underway, which ignored the capital requirements of a CCS demonstration programme. For comparison, the first round of the NER300 needed to cover about 37.5% of costs to get one renewable project on track (DG Climate, 2012); yet the corresponding cap would have covered a maximum of 6.65% of the most promising CCS project. Without additional support from national governments to cover upfront costs, all 10 CCS contenders withdrew their proposals for the first round and no CCS project was funded (Van Renssen, 2012). By contrast, the second round of NER300 only had one CCS bidder, the smaller White Rose project (UK), which obtained the €300 million on offer in July 2014 and is almost guaranteed to obtain half of the €1.26 billion pledged to CCS by the British government (DECC, 2014). After the first round, some CCS proponents blamed DG Environment for the disadvantageous setup of NER300 in relation to CCS (Pearson and Whiriskey, 2013: 10–11). Nonetheless, straightjacketed by the “coal for electricity” frame, ZEP itself never actually mentioned any risk of failure to get the projects underway (ZEP and McKinsey & Company, 2008). Indeed, from the start, ZEP (2007: 3) referred to the need for EU funds to cover “ongoing operational costs”. In effect, CCS promoters both recognised the large upfront financial requirements of CCS (to request funds) and played them down (to argue that CCS was almost competitive and could be developed quickly). On the broader issue of financing, the problems of CCS are very often blamed on the economic crisis in Europe and its effect on floating carbon prices (Scott et al., 2013; GCCSI, 2013, 2012). The verdict in most of the literature is that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has indeed had a negligible effect in spurring disruptive innovation (Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2012; Anderson et al., 2011; Rogge and Hoffmann, 2010; Rogge et al., 2011; Fontini and Pavan, 2014). While other relevant trends such as lower total demand and the boom of renewable generation were well underway before the crisis, linking CCS incentives so strongly to the ETS certainly did not help with its prospects. Nonetheless, the failure of the Mongstad CCS project – backed

by Norway’s wealth and a mandatory installation law – is illustrative of the limits of these justifications. Indeed, an audit into this project found rather that “the complexity of implementing CCS was underestimated in 2006” (OAGN, 2013). In the terms discussed in this paper, this could be linked to the hegemonic frame of “CCS as Norway’s moon landing” very similar to the EU’s (Tjernshaugen and Langhelle, 2011). It is extremely unlikely that other projects within the EU would have avoided such issues.

4. Conclusion and policy recommendations This paper has examined the impact of expert framing of CCS on EU policymaking through two heuristic models. These models highlight three key contributing factors to dominance in framing: backers, alternatives and discourses. They include a feedback mechanism of “image pressure” and two different outcomes: the frame itself and its blind spots. The first model described the process of mainstreaming an “enthusiastic” framing of CCS, which took place on a global scale by the mid-2000s, notably through the actions of the IEA, the IPCC, the UK and the US. It dovetailed with the search for a breakthrough solution acceptable to more sceptical actors and seemingly tackling the skyrocketing increase in coal consumption in China. The second model, representing a continuation of the previous one, explained how this mainstream frame attained a hegemonic status in the EU in the later 2000s, thanks to (1) the overall strength of the backers attracted to CCS: oil giants, former government monopolies, etc.; (2) the weakness of alternatives such as the Supergrid, and (3) the creative targeting of contemporary policy discourses on energy security and innovation. This paper has not evaluated whether the technology of CCS is a worthwhile investment for EU in the long run. Rather it has emphasised that the hegemonic “coal for electricity” frame for CCS has significant blind spots with policy design implications, which should be addressed: 1. Non-CCS mitigation possibilities. Renewables and natural gas have successfully reduced coal emissions in Europe. An enduring argument, part of the “coal for electricity” frame, is that a simple continuation of this trend as a mitigation strategy could be extremely costly in comparison to using CCS (Bellona Foundation et al., 2013; DG Energy, COM, 2013 180; European Parliament, 2013/2079(INI)). However, the veracity of this argument is linked to the very political decisions it is meant to inform; namely, on carbon prices and the public funding for CCS, or for technologies that alleviate renewables variability (distributed generation, energy storage, a Supergrid, etc.). Since cost-reduction arguments (from any side) may be self-fulfilling, they should be treated with caution. 2. Other CCS applications. The long-term usefulness of a successfully developed CCS technology is much more certain in industrial sectors than in the power sector, and the emissions of the former may yet prove higher in the EU. However, industrial sector firms currently have no true incentive to carry out significant CCS R&D. 3. Deployment in different regions. Trialling CCS in a relatively coal-poor, advanced economy such as the EU’s is the least attractive proposition from a worldwide perspective, given that development must be adapted to local geology and emission sources. Furthermore, expecting large benefits from exporting this same technology to developing countries goes against the grain of common principles of the international climate negotiations (contrast with Gibbins and Chalmers, 2008). 4. Energy security. Further to the third point, deploying CCS in a comparatively fossil-fuel-poor continent such as Europe would

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hardly contribute to energy security, particularly in the parts of the EU that are most dependent on unreliable suppliers, viz. Russia. 5. The needs of demonstration programmes. CCS is capital intensive and technically complex and thus does not allow for the easy “trial and error” assumed in the notion of a “demonstration programme”. The combination of urgency and the significant path-dependency of large public investments mean that a degree of “picking of winners” may well be unavoidable. Considering these points has only acquired urgency since the passing of the C&EP, as CCS continues to be supported in the EU, notably in the UK, along the same “coal for electricity” lines. Documents that review the little progress of CCS in the EU still emphasise vague and highly conditional claims about lower cost and energy security, and consider non-power applications of CCS simply a good second choice, if at all (Selosse et al., 2013; Bellona Foundation et al., 2013; DG Energy, COM, 2013 180; European Parliament, 2013/2079(INI); DECC, 2014). In particular, these documents make much of the supposed effects of the US fracking revolution or the Fukushima disaster on European coal consumption. These effects are far from clear, unlikely to endure, and certainly unlikely to affect the entire EU in the presence of strong climate policy (Poyry, 2013; WWF-UK, 2013). In sum, it would seem important to avoid positing CCS (or any technology) as an ineluctable part of a successful climate strategy. Focusing on the strengths of CCS, e.g. in industries without other mitigation options, or in carbon negative applications (Scott et al., 2013), would dispel concerns with fossil fuel lock-in and with delaying “real” climate action (Stephens, 2014). Finally, an important corollary is that low-carbon technologies more generally would seem particularly susceptible to the framing processes described by the “hegemonic model”. Continued scrutiny is necessary, particularly from more detached observers in academia and elsewhere.

Appendix A. Supplementary material Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.03.018.

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