Challenge of Research Ethics Committees to the nature of operations research

Omega 37 (2009) 1083 -- 1088

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Challenge of Research Ethics Committees to the nature of operations research夡 Leroy White∗ Department of Management, University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TN, UK

A R T I C L E

I N F O

Article history: Received 30 September 2007 Accepted 11 December 2008 Available online 30 December 2008 Keywords: OR Nature of OR Ethics Research Ethics Committees

A B S T R A C T

This article is concerned with operational research (OR) practice in light of growing concerns about ethical conduct. It asks whether OR, in the context of increasing regulation through Research Ethics Committees, should consider whether there are certain ethical issues that are affected by the specific context of OR. The article sets out some of the central concerns about Research Ethics Committees and the nature of OR. © 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction Recent decades have seen a number of debates and comments attempting to delineate the ethical dilemmas faced by operational researchers [1–6]. These dilemmas tend to be complex and only hazily definable. They reflect debates in other areas of management as to whether unethical behaviour or practice is more a function of “bad apples” or of “bad barrels” [7]. The bad apple argument attributes unethical behaviour or practice to the personal characteristics of individuals. The bad barrel argument, in contrast, refers to organisational or societal issues influencing the behaviour of organisational members. While this article is essentially about ethics and OR, it has to be borne in mind that ethical issues connect with other contexts, for example, where ethical reviews occur, such as Research Ethics Committees (REC) (or institutional review boards) and research governance frameworks. There has been a rapid growth in such committees over the last few years in the UK [8,9], and the relevance of these to OR will be the main focus of this paper. The interest in REC is

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raised here because, like other occupational groups, OR is applied to problems that affect people, and there are not many areas in OR that can be considered to escape from ethical consideration [5]. It also seems that the emergence of REC may be fruitful to focus on, specifically in terms of the fact that the ethical agenda is increasingly set by national and international institutions. To that end, this paper will address the nexus between the debates on ethics and OR and the discussions on REC, where it is suggested that ethical practice involve a complex interaction between individual and organisational factors. The paper will review whether OR, in the context of increasing regulation through REC, needs to consider whether there are certain ethical issues that are affected by the specific context of operational research. The article begins by contextualizing the discussion in relation to the recent debate on ethics in OR. Following this, some of the central concerns about REC and the nature of OR are set out. 2. Background As mentioned, a path that seems to run through the debates on ethics and OR reflect ones in other areas of management; that is, whether unethical behaviour or practice is more a function of “bad apples” or of “bad barrels”. The first argument focuses on unethical behaviour or practice of

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the practitioner/researcher. In relation to OR, this centres mainly on the operational researcher as modeller [4–6]. In particular, the focus is on the behaviour of the researcher/ professional within his/her activity, such as methodological rigour, objectivity, no advocacy, results emerging from analysis and not vice versa, and correctness and honesty in relations with clients (see [4,10]). Responses to this aspect of ethical conduct can be theoretically explained by deontology, which is concerned with duty or moral obligation [11,12]. This view focuses on the rightness or wrongness of actions themselves and sees a sharp difference between self-interest and morality, and proposes that an action only has moral value if it is performed from duty. The deontological perspective underlies much of the discussion on self-regulation in OR [4] shown by the continuing debates on codes of conduct and the professionalisation of OR [13–16]. Deontological ethics is uncompromising by definition, and has been commonly contrasted with consequentialist ethical theories for its complete disregard for circumstances which can lead to morally dubious requirements. This perspective also fails to specify which principles should take priority when rights and duties conflict. Thus, a deontological approach cannot offer complete ethical guidance [11]. The second argument, in contrast, refers to organisational or societal issues influencing the behaviour of organisational members. This focuses on the practitioner/researcher responsibility towards the client or, more importantly, towards all those affected by the actions and decisions which are taken based on models and towards society. The argument focuses on not only the clients but also towards all those people affected by the actions and decisions which are taken based on his/her models, and towards society and the external world at large. Thus, the practitioner/researcher cannot ignore the consequences of his/her action and will bear full ethical responsibility for them. The effort to act responsibly is then presented as a consequentialist responsibility which judges the rightness or wrongness of an act by its consequences [11,12,17]. For example, as well as the debates on the social responsibility of OR [2,3,5], there are concerns relating to the whole process of OR, which connects the real world and models, where ethical issues are raised in terms of the consequences for those not participating but are affected by the process in which professionals (and others) are taking part [6]. Thus, it appears that commentators have sought to clarify how far individual ethical theories and principles are applicable to operational research dilemmas, although the discussions appear to have been limited to consequentialist and deontological theories [11]. A helpful contribution to the above debate is a recent article by Gallo [5]. He distinguished two levels of ethical discourse; rules and principles and values. Deontology falls into the former category, while the consequentialism, identified through our self-comprehension, and self-reflection and experience, relates to the latter. However, he claims that the shaping of our principles and values should be emergent and be a sense making process—or a `quest', as Weick puts it [18]. Gallo also warns against an over-reliance on rules and to place a strong emphasis on developing values. Other commentators have also extended

the discussion on ethics beyond consequentialist and deontological principles. For example, Le Menestrel and Van Wassenhove [6], following Habermas [19], suggest building communicational ethics, while Mingers [20] and Midgley [21] suggest a critical approach. The call for more attention to be given to ethics within operational research [6] is a sign that there is need to debate the ethical considerations in OR in a way which continues to allow for diversity in the field. However, the increased emphasis on OR and ethics in social problems and the burgeoning of REC means that operational researchers are likely to face pressure to address ethical issues with regards to their conduct where deontological and/or consequentialist reasoning may not be appropriate. This connects to recent attention to ethics and OR which has focused on the process of OR (e.g. [22]). The process of building or structuring models is an on-going process or dialogue where ethical concerns can and ought to be addressed. This issue has been much discussed in the UK, particularly in relation to problem-structuring methods or Soft OR [23], and more recently in connection with the issues of values and the participation of the different stakeholders in the structuring process [24]. But what would a REC make of this practice? The next section will look at the rise of RECs, and their rationale and principles. 3. Research Ethics Committees In the UK, there has been a growth of RECs that are attempting to institutionalize ethical decision-making to a greater extent than before [25]. Drawing on models developed in the field of medicine [26,27], RECs have now become well established in the health and social care fields which may seem of limited relevance to readers of this journal. But given that some operational researchers seek to conduct investigations in organizations with responsibilities for health and social care and that the process of OR is sometimes offered as a model for research in areas where poor practice could have a direct consequence on the health or well-being of the public, its implications may turn out to be greater than is immediately apparent. The UK's Economic and Social Research Council's (ESRC) has developed a Research Ethics Framework [28]. Developments of frameworks such as the ESRC's are likely to give rise to ethical governance administrations that will be less `light touch' in orientation. It appears that there is afoot a `globalisation of ethics' whereby the ethical agenda is increasingly set by national and international ethics committees, conventions, protocols and the like. The rationale for this derives from changes in public attitudes and expectations of research, through increased concern about the nature of research and transparency, and the implications of changes in the context of social science research in relation to advances in globalisation, information and communication technology. There is also a concern for the investigators on research projects (including those on OR projects) who inherently have multiple legitimate interests—i.e., to conduct high quality research, to complete the work expeditiously, to protect participants, to obtain funding and

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to advance their careers to name but a few. It is in this light that it is claimed that RECs exist to ensure, first, that there are no conflicts of interests, second, that any proposed research will not expose participants to unacceptable risks and practices; and, third, that the potential participants can evaluate the expected consequences of their involvement and decide for themselves whether to participate. RECs also have a wider responsibility to promote the public interest by helping to ensure that relevant research is done [25]. While much of the literature on RECs has focused on the effectiveness of the committees [29,30], there are other parts that are concerned with the ethical theories they draw on [31–33]. It is difficult to trace clearly and unambiguously how ethical theory has been operationalized into the principles that are used today by RECs, such as informed consent and anonymity of research participants [32]. However, some principles have emerged and are now commonly in use for guiding RECs' decision making in particular situations. These are: autonomy (i.e., participants should be able to choose whether to participate or not); non-maleficence (i.e., the risk to participants should be minimised and benefits enhanced); beneficence (i.e., the work must be of social or scientific value); and justice (i.e., there is fairness in the treatment of participants). When it comes to recruitment of participants, for example, the suggestion is that these principles have different priorities; the consequentialist prioritizing informed consent, and the deontological prioritizing reciprocity. In recent years, there has been a good deal of research into informed consent and the findings suggest that it is far from straightforward as a principle, let alone in practice. For example, one of the principles of the ESRC's ethics guidance is that “research participants must participate in a voluntary way, free from any coercion”. But, it is accepted that “covert research and deception may be acceptable as a last resort” [28]. Thus, these committees have ramifications for OR interventions, in that principle-based ethics rarely ever give unambiguous advice. The committees often face counterexamples, and sometimes their conclusions runs counter to moral intuition. To give an example, recently the author submitted a research proposal to a local RECs to investigate decision making and networks across children social services over a large area of the South West of England. The proposal involved collecting primary data on the interaction of stakeholders as well as modelling their networks and decision making environment, while the final stage involved participatory action research in understanding the decision making intervention. The context of the research crossed several health and social care districts and focused on children services such as child protection and safeguarding issues, which has received heightened interest in the media following recent high profile cases of neglect and abuse. The proposal and research was of sufficient complexity to challenge the RECs and questions posed by the committee seem to get to the heart of a widely debated matter of what is the nature of OR practice. These questions touched on the relationship between the OR process and the stakeholders involved in the intervention, issues of conflict of interest, the participatory nature of the intervention and the role of the conceptual

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models and confidentiality. An example of concern was directed to at the action research element of the proposal. The committee claimed that it would be very time-consuming, and opportunities may be lost. That is, the time saved by a less-involved study could be used to further investigate the research questions. OR, in that it seeks not only to understand how and why, but also to bring change to a situation, is intrinsically different from traditional academic research that ethics committees are set up for. Thus, this raises much greater concerns about the effects of OR research, stakeholders, clients, recipients or those affected. It appears that OR projects could be disadvantaged in a system requiring RECs approval because in OR, the research design can be `emergent' and the balance between risks and benefits for research subjects are difficult to ascertain prior to study implementation. Whether it is OR per se that is problematic in this respect is possibly missing the point. OR is varied in its subject areas, varied in its methods and methodological approaches, and raises numerous ethical issues, many of which do not become apparent until after the intervention has begun [5,6,22]. 4. RECs and the nature of OR Very few commentators have been concerned with the implications for OR practice of ethical oversight committees. However, there has been a feeling for a while that the imposition of ethics frameworks makes the practice of OR more difficult, because frameworks are predicated upon a model of the research process that is insensitive to a more flexible, open-ended strategy of research or modelling [6] and often fail to take into account a more personal ethic or perceived as a threat to individual autonomy [34]. This stems from the idea that ethical frameworks are seen as evidence of an attack on independence, and are regarded as regulatory mechanisms that reflect a form of de-professionalization. Furthermore, the practice of relying on general guidelines does not consider the possibility that operational researchers tend to face different types of ethical situations from other disciplines [5,6]. Much the same arguments could be levied against RECs, in that they could be perceived as a bureaucratic/regulatory device that may threaten academic freedom to pursue research. This section sets out some of the main ethical challenges these committees pose, after which a discussion is provided on whether an understanding of the challenges could inform the development of ethics and operational research. It is suggested here that RECs pose a number of questions about the nature of OR. The literature on understanding OR interventions is large and varied, with some articles concerned with exploring the underpinning theoretical basis for OR interventions [35–39]. Others have explored the practical aspects of OR interventions [36,40,41]. It would be a large undertaking to review all the themes and arguments here, thus the debates will not be fully rehearsed here, other than to say that the common themes to have emerged seem to focus on: whether OR is a knowledge oriented science or problem based technology [35,38], OR as technique or problem focussed [2], OR's client orientation and social

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responsibility [3]. There has been much debate on OR's status as a social science, often invoking OR's inter-disciplinary nature [42]. The nature of OR has continued to be a subject of study, and as a result there is a greater recognition that OR is a social process concerned with interventions in social situations. Therefore OR processes should be put to greater ethical scrutiny. Ormerod [36] provides a summary of the process of OR which is modest and represents its evolutionary development. This article will take as the focus of this section Ormerod's codification of the OR process, since this closely relates to the kind of approach that the author would adopt and use in a research proposal an research ethics group might review. Ormerod describes the process as a number of steps which are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Research the context. Negotiate the issues. Design an intervention process. Analyse the issues. Advise on what could be done. Assist with implementation. Reflect on the intervention.

There is a further step which is not included, but one which would be extremely important to an ethics committee, which is dissemination. In terms of ethical consideration only the second step (negotiate the issues) mentions any. He states: It is at this stage that all parties have to consider their political and ethical positions . . . is the client prepared to allow the [researcher] to address issues that they think are important? How are the concerns of other stakeholders to be addressed? How will conflicts of interests be resolved? Are the [researchers] prepared to conform to the rules and norms of the host organization if required to do so? Issues of confidentiality may be raised. [36] p. 14. Given the above description of the process of OR, there are many contextual factors that would need to be taken into account regarding the ethical aspects of an OR intervention. The first relates to the fact that there are grounds for thinking that operational researchers are susceptible to conflicts of interest and affiliation bias. This would need to be taken into account during the first step in Ormerod's process. In all manner of OR interventions it is recognized that affiliations, particularly those related to who is sponsoring the work, have the potential to influence the way that intervention issues are defined and findings presented. Many practitioners and researchers have established projects through their relationship with their clients and these clients are often sponsors of the research. Another contextual factor that affects operational researchers stems from their engagement with powerful individuals and organizations. This relates to the second step in Ormerod's framework in which the parties have to consider their political and ethical position. One of the main purposes of ethical regulation here is to protect vulnerable research participants from exploitation and potential harm (the

non-maleficence principle), which might result from their involvement in the OR process. This subject has been debated in depth in UK OR, particularly from those interested in Critical OR [3,20]. The critical perspective has challenged the traditional position in terms of their limitations and assumptions, with the effect that some advocates have sought to encourage a more emancipatory use of OR [3,20,21], that is encourage OR to help the development of a better society for all rather than simply more profits for the few. Another difficulty stems from the fact that certain types of OR interventions are described as action research [43], which make it impossible to obtain informed consent in advance of the intervention activity being undertaken (a problem which would arise from steps 3, 4, 5 and 6 in Ormerod's process). This is because action research relies on a process of ongoing reflective practice involving researcher and participants working collaboratively to solve a problem. It is therefore not always possible to fully inform participants of the precise nature of the study in advance of the intervention. There is need to recognize the fluid and ever-changing nature of consent rather than seeing it as achievable by getting participants to sign a consent form or gaining approval from a RECs. Given the nature of OR interventions, operational researchers may face increasing pressure to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of the stakeholders in order to avoid effects such as victimization. This would need to be considered in the remaining steps of the Ormerod's framework. Reflections or the writing up of many OR interventions are usually in the form of case studies and many of these often use pseudonyms or remove any information which may lead to identification of the organisations described in the study in order to protect the identity of the participants. Although confidentiality and anonymity are often treated as overlapping concepts, there are differences between them. Confidentiality relates to the protection of information supplied by the participants from other parties, whereas anonymity involves protecting the identity of an individual or organization by concealing their names or other identifying information. If the organizational identity must also be concealed this has implications since case studies may rely on revealing the identity of the organization as a means of substantiating it as an illustration of real practice. Sometimes the meaning of a case cannot adequately be conveyed without reference to its identifying features, such as geographical location. Such issues also give rise to ethical difficulties over whether data can be made available for subsequent secondary analysis at a later date. One suggestion offered by one of the referees for this paper, is that it would be helpful if the OR Societies addressed these concerns, whether in a code of practice or just a document. This would then be available for OR academics to use when they had to deal with a RECs and may well help them to defend themselves. 5. Discussion and conclusion The main point of this article is to suggest that the issue of ethics and OR will become of greater significance with

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the emergence and proliferation of RECs. These committees (drawing on a number of principles) seek to broaden the definition of ethics by making judgments on the integrity and quality of research involving people and organizations. This means that for OR there is a greater emphasis than before on ethical considerations and that there is a greater need to influence this agenda. In proposing to do OR, a RECs would suggest that a number of issues would need to be addressed. First, operational researchers have a responsibility to declare affiliations or potential conflicts of interest. This would enable other practitioners and society generally to take this into account when evaluating the interventions findings. Second, the power relations need to be considered and therefore the idea of informed consent needs to be interpreted flexibly. Third, judgment of the risk of treatment of the participants in the intervention and organizations must be balanced against the need for an intervention that challenges or undermines the interests of powerful elites. Fourth, an overly prescriptive requirement for the protection of confidentiality and anonymity in the write-up of an OR intervention could undermine the ability to conduct meaningful operational research. Fifth, operational research relies on a process of ongoing reflective practice involving researcher and participants working collaboratively to solve a problem. Therefore, it is not always possible to fully inform participants of the precise nature of the study in advance of the intervention. This last point brings us back to the reason for this article (in light of a RECs review of a current research proposal) in that the current climate is one where there is an increasingly strict ethical governance administration. This will increase the need for operational researchers to consider factors specific to their context and to develop ethical guidelines that take account of these while continuing to allow for diversity within the field. In dealing with these issues, it seems that there is a relationship between the actions of individuals and the ethicality of institutions (such as RECs), and most of the debates on ethics and OR, and the theories that have influenced these debates, are not so useful here. For example, being ethical requires being a person whose individual moral responsibility leads one to be morally assertive so as to mediate institutional or organisational priorities. Also, the individual is responsible for ethical behaviour and so institutions/ organisations should avoid restricting individuality through rules and instead create an `empowering ethics' that enable people to realise and meet their ethical responsibility (see [44]). Thus, ethics is not the property of the individual, despite the organisation, nor something that organisations control either formally or informally. Instead they are a complex and mutually constituting relation between the two. It is also important to remember Gallo's point in that we cannot talk of ethics without talking of freedom: the two go together [5]. There is no room for ethics nor for ethical responsibility where there is no freedom of choice. It is the possibility of choosing between different alternatives which makes us subject to moral judgment. The fact that we can choose does not mean that the choice is always an easy one; in

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fact, often it is not. Sometimes it might appear that there is no choice. [5]. Foucault's work is invaluable and relevant here, because of his concern for ethics which is principally about how people constitute themselves as moral subjects of their actions [45] while, at the same time, being `governed' by institutions into being particular types of people [46] through the organisational attempts to govern ethics and their effects on individual ethical conduct. For Foucault, ethics is a “conscious practice of freedom [46]: 284 through which people develop a notion of the “self” that can be considered ethical. Such practice is, however, not free in the sense that it is done in the absence of constraint, but rather in the sense that the ethical self emerges in relation to (or even against) those social and organisational rules and norms which seek to determine or dictate what a person should or should not be. On this basis it is to see ethics in the relation between individual morality and organisationally prescribed principles assumed to guide individual action. Thus, a complex interaction exists through which the individual researchers/practitioners must negotiate their own ethical conduct. The new challenge to OR is research ethics (or oversight) committees. We need to understand the way that ethics is constituted in these institutions. There is a need to be somewhere between understanding the relationships in terms of ethical norms and rules, and the way individuals adhere to them. Thus, future discussion on ethics and OR (and in relation to RECs) should seek to theorise ethics in terms of the meaning of being an operational researcher who is an active ethical subject. Such a person is so in relation to the organisational structures and norms that govern the conduct of ethics. Such an approach would locate ethics not in terms of `bad apples' or `bad barrels' but in the relationship between individual morals and organisationally prescribed principles assumed to guide personal action. In this way, ethics as a practice is seen to be between an individual's freedom to make choices about what to do and who to be, and the organisational context in which those choices are situated and governed. References [1] W-Churchman C. OR as a profession. Management Science 1970;17(2):B37. [2] Ackoff R. The social responsibility of operational research. Operational Research Quarterly 1974;25(3):361–71. [3] Rosenhead J. One-sided practice—can we do better?. In: Wallace WA, editor. Ethics in modeling. Oxford: Pergamon Press; 1994. p. 195–206. [4] In: Wallace WA, editor. Ethics in modeling. Oxford: Pergamon Press; 1994. [5] Gallo G. Operations research and ethics: responsibility, sharing and cooperation. European Journal of Operational Research 2004;153: 468–76. [6] Le Menestrel M, Van Wassenhove L. Ethics outside, within, or beyond OR models?. European Journal of Operational Research 2004;153: 477–84. [7] Trevino L, Youngblood S. Bad apples in bad barrels. A causal analysis of ethical decision-making behaviour. Journal of Applied Psychology 1990;75:378–85. [8] Edwards S, Kirchin S, Huxtable R. Research Ethics Committees and paternalism. Journal of Medical Ethics 2005;30:88–91. [9] Uys L. Are ethics committees always ethical?. International Journal of Ethics Committees 2006;12:1–2.

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