Chapter 11 Psychology As Applied Philosophy

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CHAPTER 11

PSYCHOLOGY AS A P P L I E D PHILOSOPHY

The construction o f a psychological reality involves philosophical decisions, especially metaphysical ones, at virtually every level o f analysis: methodological, epiphenomenal, explanatory, and t h e metaphysical level itself.

In the course o f analyzing t h e disci-

pline's compositional problem, w e have: 1. implicitly considered t h e classic and contemporary approaches t o t h e mind-body issue in t h e context o f discussing the composition o f a mental event ;

2, proffered the notion that every system o f Western psychology t o s o m e degree i s committed t o empiricism a s t h e appropriate route t o psychological truth;

3. treated t h e metaphysical principle o f determinism a s a corollary o f scientific explanation;

4. applied various philosophical criteria t o assorted approaches t o explanation; 5. argued that a so-called psychological fact

possesses both epistemological and evaluative, moral, or ethical components;

6. specified mental philosophy a s one o f t h e progenitors o f academic, experimental psychology;

7. briefly alluded t o t h e philosophical underpinnings o f t h e major t y p e s o f psychology;

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Chapter I 1

8. explicitly discussed the t w o primary philosophical resolutions o f t h e nature o f homo sapiens: moral agency and mechanism. In t h i s chapter we a r e going t o analyze some o f t h e consequences o f taking a n empirical approach to psychological truth, specifically with respect t o the metaphysical o r existence status o f various components o f t h e psychological universe.

In t h e empirical ap-

proach t o epistemology, s e n s e impressions o r sense data constitute the source o f knowledge (see Chapter

2).

Within t h e over-all empirical tradition, philos-

o p h e r s make different assumptions a s to what legitimately can be inferred from sense data with respect to what really exists.

I n other words, different meta

physical conceptions about t h e nature o f reality are possible within t h e general framework o f empiricism with differential consequences f o r t h e nature o f psychological reality.

The classic philosophical ap-

proaches t o t h e nature o f reality a r e derived and then related t o ( 1 ) the various t y p e s o f psychology and ( 2 ) the fundamental proposition o f t h e book: psychology i s t h e study o f conscious intelligence by conscious intelligence. APPROACHES TO T H E NATURE O F REALITY Metaphysics subsumes t w o philosophical issues: (1) what is t r u e about existence o r real about t h e universe a s opposed t o what is mere appearance, i.e., what is the ultimate substance o r substances composing reality; and ( 2 ) what is the relationship between appearance and reality, i.e., how are sense impressions related to reality?

We are going t o focus o n the sec-

ond question explicitly and only consider t h e first question derivatively. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPEARANCE A N D REALITY

Ap-

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pearance depends o n or is related t o sense impressions and t h e conditions under which sense impressions occur. The world, or t h e universe, a s revealed by our seven sensory modalities (vision, audition, gustation, and t h e like) is appearance. appearance. sions.

Reality is what s t a n d s behind

Reality is what causes t h e sense impres-

Appearance is given o r the input.

Reality is

a derivative concept: it is inferred or the output. Reality is a hypostatization, induced from given sense data. The traditional approaches to t h e relationship between appearance and reality derive from t h e assumpt i o n s one makes about the degree t o which one or

has to

reality.

can

infer

infer from given appearance t o a n underlying It is possible t o distinguish among four such

approaches: ( 1 ) idealism, ( 2 ) phenomenalism, (31 critical o r pragmatic realism, and (4) physical o r radical realism [see Simkins, 1969).

The labeling of

these ap-

proaches i s somewhat misleading: t h e third approach amounts to a conceptual extension o f t h e s e c o n d , while the last one is not related t o the third. IDEALISM

In t h i s approach, it is assumed

that n o valid inferences at all can be made about the nature o f a n underlying reality from t h e givens o f appearance.

A l l that can ever be known is t h e literal

content o f the sense impressions themselves. these operate a s reality f o r us.

In effect,

Because sense impres-

sions exhaust reality and traditionally are assumed t o be mental in nature, mind constitutes the only possible substance; and reality is exclusively composed o f ideas. No inference can b e made about t h e existence o f a physical world o f matter transcending mind and ideas. PHENOMENALISM

In t h i s approach, it i s as-

sumed that valid inferences c a n be made about t h e na-

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340

ture o f an underlying reality from t h e givens o f appearance--but

only when one currently is consciously

experiencing something.

F o r instance, assume I cur-

rently experience sense impressions labeled "tree."

I legitimately can infer that the tree is really there or exists: it is the source o f m y current conscious experience.

However, a s soon a s I t u r n m y back and no

longer experience sense impressions labeled "tree," t h e inference no longer can be made that t h e tree is still there or exists.

I n phenomenalism, reality does

not exist independent o f t h e content o f one's current sense impressions; reality is strictly contingent on the content o f current awareness. This approach gives rise t o t h e classic generic conundrum o f whether t h e crash o f a tree in a forest makes a noise if no human, or some remote sensing device, is presenr. t o perceive t h e sound.

T h e perceptive

reader w i l l realize that t h i s conundrum is a variant o f one o f

t h e fundamental assumptions made about reality

in Chapter 1: The physical universe itself d o e s not exist unless o r until it is reified by some entity's consciousness. CRITICAL OR PRAGMATIC REALISM

In t h i s ap-

proach, it is assumed that valid inferences can be made about t h e nature o f an underlying reality from the givens o f appearance--but

at any time, independent-

l y o f t h e content o f one's current sensory experience. F o r instance, assume I experienced sense impressions labeled "tree"

yesterday, but now am experiencing sense

impressions labeled "Sophia Loren."

I legitimately c a n

infer that t h e tree still is there or exists, although

I no longer directly experience it.

Reality does exist

independent o f t h e conten% o f o n e ' s current sense i m pressions, but not independent o f t h e totality o f one's

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past experience or t h e content o f one's ory system.

long term mem-

In critical o r pragmatic realism, reality

is contingent o n the content o f t h e totality o f past experience o r memory. PHYSICAL OR RADICAL REALISM

In t h i s approach,

it i s not necessary t o make inferences at all about the nature o f underlying reality from t h e givens o f appearance.

It is assumed that reality o r t h e real

world exists independently o f experience o r appearance.

Even if no form o f life or no sense impressions

existed, there would still be a real world o r world o f reality.

In physical o r radical realism, reality is

a n absolute concept, not contingent upon anything. The conundrum associated with t h i s approach should be obvious: if sense impressions do not serve a s the inferential source o f reality, a s dictated by empiricism, then what does? CONCEPTUAL S U M M A R Y

The status o f reality in

t h e f o u r approaches can be summarized a s follows: 1. Idealism admits o f no reality beyond t h e content o f sense impressions themselves. 2. Phenomenalism posits a reality contingent on

the content o f current conscious experience.

3. Critical or pragmatic realism generates a reality contingent on the content o f present and past conscious experience.

4. Physical or radical realism yields a n absolute reality, one that transcends sense experience. FUNDAMENTAL SUBSTANCES

Two possible fundamental

substances exist: ( 1 ) mind and ( 2 ) matter (Churchland, 19841.

In dualism, both substances are presumed to

exist.

In monism, either substance, but not both, is

assumed t o exist.

Monism o f the mental variety is

called idealism; monism o f t h e physical variety is

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342

called materialism.

T h u s , there a r e three generic ap-

proaches t o t h e nature o f t h e fundamental substances: ( 1 ) dualism, ( 2 ) idealism, and (31 materialism.

Using

dualism a s the reference point, it can be appreciated that (11 idealism reduces matter t o mind and (21 materialism reduces mind t o matter. Do not g e t confused about t h e t w o uses o f t h e

term "idealism."

Idealism is both a n epistemological

approach and a metaphysical approach.

As t h e former,

it is a position with respect t o what c a n b e known [only ideas o r mental events); a s the latter, it is a position with respect t o what exists [only mind). Only one o f t h e approaches to t h e relationship between appearance and reality is committed t o a fixed position with respect t o t h e question o f fundamental substance(s):

idealism must assume a monism o f t h e men-

tal variety.

Although t h e inferred reality underlying

sense impressions usually is described in physical o r material language, phenomenalism and t h e t w o varieties of

realism do not logically imply dualism o r either

variety o f monism.

However, phenomenalists tend t o be

idealists; critical or pragmatic realists tend t o be materialists; and physical o r radical realists tend t o be dualists (Simkins, 1969). METAPHYSICS A N D TYPES OF PSYCHOLOGY The nature o f t h e psychological universe varies according t o t h e type o f psychology that s e r v e s a s t h e reference point: f o l k , action, epistemological o r cognitive, understanding, depth, o r dialectical.

Each

type o f psychology is associated with a characteristic resolution o f t h e dual metaphysical issues o f ( 1 ) relationship between appearance and reality and ( 2 ) fundamental substance(s). FOLK

Folk psychology (Stich, 19831 is common-

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343

s e n s e , cultural, o r presystemic psychology.

As anal-

yzed by contemporary philosophers (see Chapter 9 1 , it treats t h e triadic relationship o f desire, belief, and action a s a n indissoluble whole. is part o f

The psychology that

our folklore is dualistic in orientation

and implicitly assumes a transcendental reality o f t h e physical or radical realist variety. T h e folk view o f reality entails both a material

or external world, independent o f the self a s perceiver, and a n internal, mental world characteristic o f each person.

The physical, material world subsumes

t h e activity o f inanimate objects and deterministic causal laws, and serves a s t h e object o f interest f o r physics.

The internal, mental world is characterized

by conscious experience and consciousness, including t h e feelings o f self-awareness and f r e e will.

Perhaps

t h e fundamental metaphysical tenet o f folk psychology

is that mentation is efficacious in t h e Cartesian interactionist sense o f t h e term [see Chapter 3).

If

folk psychology were t o have a n official object o f analysis, it would be the mind per se o r t h e mind a s the cause o r source o f action. It will be convenient t o use t h e folk psychological conjunction o f dualism and physical o r radical r e alism a s a comparative reference point f o r evaluating the metaphysical stance o f t h e five t y p e s of

disciplin-

ary psychology. ACTION

Action psychology either implicitly or

explicitly focuses o n overt behavior.

The f o c u s i s

implicit in functionalism, classical learning macrotheory, and t h e contemporary mathematical learning model approach; it is explicit in t h e Watsonian and Skinnerian brands o f descriptive behaviorism.

Action

psychology that explicitly focuses o n behavior is ma-

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terialistic in orientation and assumes a contingent reality characteristic o f t h e critical o r pragmatic realist: it subsumes a psychological universe that is indistinguishable from t h e physical universe envisioned by t h e hard physical sciences.

In comparison

with folk psychology, mind is reduced t o matter; and transcendental reality devolves to a contingent one. CLASSICAL WATSONIAN BEHAVIORISM t h e behaviorist's

As part o f

revolt against any psychological

system concerned with consciousness in either t h e content or function s e n s e , material monism became the only acceptable resolution o f t h e mind-body problem (see Chapter 3).

Watson (1913, 1925, 1930) vacillated

between t h e strict materialism and more liberal mental epiphenomenalism interpretations in his writings.

Men-

tal epiphenomenalism is a variant o f material monism in which it is assumed that mental events merely are the nonefficacious byproducts o f possessing a body (Churchland, 1984).

Each variant o f material monism

is associated with a different kind o f behaviorism. Strict material monism generates so-called metaphysical or dogmatic behaviorism: ist.

mind simply d o e s not ex-

Mental epiphenomenalism generates so-called

methodological

or empirical behaviorism: mind is a de-

rivative, nonefficacious entity irrelevant f o r explaining behavioral

occurrence.

The content o f Watson's

contingent reality is limited t o physicalistic stimulus and response events. SKINNERIAN RADICAL BEHAVIORISM

Although Skin-

ner (19741 is definitively materialistic in orientation, he personally dislikes classification a s any kind o f traditional behaviorist at the philosophical level. The notion o f radical means that he is willing t o treat mental events as empirical objects o f interest; how-

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345

ever, they merely are epiphenomena1 in nature.

Con-

scious experience merely i s another form o f behavior: what is experienced a s t h e content o f conscious experience merely i s t h e substance o f tacting responses under t h e control o f societal reinforcement contingencies.

Skinner's contingent reality strictly is phys-

icalistic; however, it is one that extends beneath t h e skin.

F o r Skinner, t h e notions o f stimulus and

response are functional, relational t e r m s that c a n be applied t o virtually any phenomena deemed psychological in nature. EPISTEMOLOGICAL

Epistemological psychology is

implicit in t h e philosophical progenitors o f academic, experimental psychology: Cartesian, British empirical, and Kantian philosophy.

Three o f t h e four classical

schools o f psychology--structuralism, functionalism, and Gestalt psychology--were epistemological in orientation.

Contemporary epistemological s y s t e m s in-

clude cognitive behaviorism, o r t h e information processing approach, and genetic-epistemological psychology.

Given t h e longevity o f interest in cognition,

it should not be surprising that t h e metaphysical stance o f epistemological psychology r u n s the gamut with respect t o specific philosophical approaches. PHILOSOPHICAL PROGENITORS

The epistemologi-

cal psychology implicit in Cartesian philosophy is dualistic and presumes a transcendental reality ( O e s cartes, 1650, 1662).

This metaphysical stance is i m -

plicit in folk psychology and is t h e standard philosophical doctrine against which academic, experimental psychology eventually rebelled.

The British em-

piricists, except f o r Thomas Hobbes (1650, 16511, advocated a n idealist approach t o reality and a mental monism view o f fundamental substance,

Bishop Berkel-

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Chapter 11

ey (1710) reified the universe o f ideas by making them a component o f God's

consciousness; David Hume

(1748) denied any ideas other than those pertaining t o t h e self, a view k n o w n a s solipsism (Flanagan,

1984).

Kant ( 1 7 8 1 ) initiated t h e classic distinction

between t h e noumenal and phenomenal worlds.

Because

Kant assumed that we cannot induce t h e nature o f t h e noumenal world from t h e phenomenal world, he must be classified a s a n idealist.

Kant's

epistemology i s

not a pure empiricism: s e n s e impressions are a product both o f t h e nournenal world and innate, apriori, cognitive categories in t h e mind.

According t o Weth-

erick (19791,t h e idealism o f British empiricism and Kantian philosophy is compatible with t h e conduction o f physical science: it i s irrelevant whether t h e reg-

ularities or laws studied by physical science are a property merely o f sense impressions o r some underlying contingent or transcendental reality.

Ideal-

i s m cannot support a n experimental cognitive psychology: cognitive mechanisms or information processing r u l e s do not appear a s part o f sense impressions themselves. CLASSICAL SCHOOLS

Recall that t h e classical

schools o f epistemological psychology tended t o focus o n mental events a s a n end in itself, i.e., t h e structure o r dynamics o f the m i n d , and not only allowed but also promulgated first person access t o cognition. Classical epistemological psychology, in general, was dualistic in orientation and adhered t o a transcendental view o f reality. STRUCTURALISM

Structural psychologists,

such a s Wundt (18961 and Titchener ( 1 8 9 8 1 , focused o n the content o f conscious experience and presumed that a n underlying physical o r physiological state corres-

Psychology as Applied Philosophy

ponded t o each conscious mental state.

347

T h i s trans-

lates into a psychophysical parallelism at t h e metaphysical level. iant o f

Psychophysical parallelism i s a var-

dualism, in which it is assumed that t h e men-

t a l and physical do not interact, but merely exist o r present themselves in a condition o f pre-established harmony.

Mental phenomena (conscious experience) and

physical phenomena [physiological o r neural processes) constitute parallel, but covarying, s y s t e m s (Churchland, 19841. FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalist psychology

[Angell, 1904, 1907; Carr, 1 9 2 5 ) focused o n how t h e dynamics o f consciousness guided t h e individual organism's adaptation t o t h e environment.

It c a n be con-

ceived a s a formalization o f common-sense psychology. Although t h e views o f individual functionalists varied t o some degree, t h e approach a s a whole can be characterized a s being Cartesian dualistic in orientation and admitting t h e existence o f a transcendental reality. GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY

Gestalt psychology

[Wertheimer, 1912; Koffka, 1922; Kb'hler, 1920) focused o n t h e structure and dynamics o f t h e phenomenal, especially perceptual, field and resolved overt behavior in t h e context o f a behavioral environment.

It i s

very difficult t o categorize the Gestalt approach at a metaphysical level.

Some psychologists

( f o r in-

stance, Lundin, 1979) argue that t h e system advocated a modified psychophysical parallelism.

Other psychol-

ogists [viz., Marx and Hillix, 1979) argue that t h e system advocated a strict double aspectism interpretation.

Double aspectism amounts t o a functional mon-

ism in which mind and matter merely constitute linguistic attributes o r categories.

Mental and physical

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348

are not absolute properties o f t h e universe, but merely semantic labels that a r e applied t o a phenomenon contingent on t h e psychologist's current purposes o r perspective ( B u n g e , 1980). CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMS

Recall that t h e con-

temporary approaches t o epistemological psychology tend to focus o n mental events a s t h e antecedents o f behavior and primarily employ a third person access to cognition.

Contemporary epistemological psychology is

materialistic in orientation and fosters a contingent reality subsumed by t h e critical o r pragmatic realist approach. COGNITIVE BEHAVIORISM

Contemporary cog-

nitively oriented behaviorists associated with t h e information processing approach [e.g., Anderson, 1980) are modified material monists.

They investigate men-

tal processes, but these are regarded a s physical events, emergent in nature and irreducible t o more basic physiological o r conditioning processes.

Cogni-

tive behaviorists study t h e mind, but mind is simply a linguistic euphemism f o r emergent physical cognitive processes.

Either central state identity theory o r

some variant o f causal. r o l e functionalism (not t o be confused with t h e classical school o f the same name) can be used t o philosophically justify t h i s view o f mental events [see Chapter 3). GENETIC-EPISTEMOLOGICAL

Piaget's

(1953, 1954) developmental-cognitive system, which emphasizes various logically based capacities that unfold in a sequential stage-dependent manner, is best conceived a s a material monistic one in which mentation basically is a biological or physical process. UNDERSTANDING

The Verstehen tradition i s best

exemplified in America by humanistic, existential,

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phenomenological psychology Rogers, 1961).

349

(Maslow, 1970; K e e n , 1975;

The humanistic aspect connotes a special

status f o r t h e human being, one that usually is specified in t e r m s o f possession o f self-consciousness.

The

existential component emphasizes o u r essential rootlessness and state o f freedom, especially with respect t o a choice o f purpose o f life.

The phenomenological

facet leads t o a n acceptance o f experienced reality a s given.

T h i s kind o f psychology generates a privatis-

tic, subjective psychological reality contingent o n individualistic consciousness o r state o f mind: n o transcendental psychological universe exists. Understanding psychology essentially is neutral with respect t o t h e two metaphysical issues; however, it is conducive to a monistic orientation o f t h e mental variety and a phenomenal o r idealistic view o f

reality.

The essential psychological reality o f t h e understanding approach is experiential, epiphenomenal, mentalistic, immediate, given, and self-contained.

It is t h e

antithesis o f t h e materialism and critical or pragmatic realism characteristic o f behaviorally oriented experimental psychology. DEPTH

Although many different versions o f depth

psychology e x i s t , Freudian psychoanalysis constitutes t h e prototypical case.

Freud (1939, 1949) postulated

a n elaborate mental apparatus that directly affects overt behavior, in which context unconscious determina n t s are stressed over conscious determinants.

The

current dominant interpretation is that Freud's system is not dualistic (see F l a n a g a n , 1984).

Rather, Freud's

psychic determinism is resolved in a modified material monistic orientation in which mental events a r e conceived a s nonreductive physical or physiological entities.

Freud's

metaphysical stance with respect to the

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relationship between sense impressions and reality is best interpreted a s a critical o r pragmatic realism. Thus, the Freudian psychological universe and t h e descriptive behaviorist psychological universe possess similar metaphysical properties; however, t h e former is internal or located within t h e s k i n , while t h e lat-

t e r is external or located outside the skin. DIALECTICAL

The dialectical philosophical tradi-

tion cross-cuts t h e idealism-materialism dichotomy. Hegelian (18071 philosophy subsumed a dialectical idealism; Marxist (1867) philosophy subsumed a dialectical materialism.

The latter has had a profound e f -

fect on Russian psychology: consciousness is physicalistic or social in nature; it is a reflective property o f matter.

Free will is a n illusion; the individual is

submerged in a never-ending dialectical progression. The material world transcends individualistic consciousness: Marxism subsumes a physical o r radical realism. The dominant American derivative o f Russian dialectical psychology is Riegel's

(1978, 1979) system.

Although dialectical in orientation, Riegel is neither a n idealist nor a materialist.

He is a double aspec-

tionist, in which consciousness (mind) and behavior [matter) are interpenetrating, dialectically determined phenomena, t h e distinction between which is solely semantic in nature.

Riegel is a physical o r radical

realist with respect t o t h e status o f reality. METAPHYSICAL STATUS OF CONSCIOUS INTELLIGENCE Recall that we have characterized psychology a s the study o f conscious intelligence by conscious intelligence.

Under the assumption that conscious intelli-

gence is a fundamental property o f homo sapiens, psychology i s a discipline in which t h e human being f o cusefi o n itself.

No psychologist directly s t u d i e s con-

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351

The traditional epiphenomena1

foci o f interest are a s p e c t s o f

conscious experience

o r consciousness and overt behavior o r action.

The

notion o f conscious intelligence must be invoked in order t o give experience and behavior psychological s t a t u s o r meaning.

The social science discipline that

i s psychology is concerned with materially composable o r functionally definable phenomena that ( 1 ) are generated by a n entity possessing a nervous system and

( 2 ) involve o r are relatable t o conscious intelligence (see Chapter 7).

Conscious intelligence is a metaphysical notion; however, it would be ridiculous t o assign it a set o f absolute properties--primarily phor.

because it is a meta-

It is a way o f representing t h e fact t h a t t h e

human organism is a self-aware, efficacious, reactive, creative, self-maintaining, self-reifying, and symbol o r knowledge generating form o f life.

It i s conven-

ient t o assume that conscious intelligence is a physicalistic, materialistic entity that is ultimately physiologically o r biochemically based.

It is t h e

real-time and real-space entity that creates o u r conception o f reality and existence.

Taking a critical

o r pragmatic realist approach t o reality, conscious intelligence is t h e key aspect o f t h e process t h a t converts sense impressions into underlying reality. It might seem that t h e concept o f conscious intelligence is analogous t o Kant's

( 1 7 8 1 ) notion o f a n in-

nate, apriori category; however, it is more basic than a Kantian organizational precept.

It is what c o n -

structs t h e organizational principles underlying the induction o f t h e nature o f reality and existence in t h e first place. T o demonstrate t h e metaphorical status o f c o n -

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scious intelligence, we c a n allude t o Wetherick's (1979) conception o f psychology.

Wetherick subscribes

t o physical or radical realism--in his phraseology, transcendental realism: t h e physical world exists independent o f t h e self.

I n t h i s context, Wetherick as-

sumes that the fundamental property o f the human organ-

i s m is its capacity t o create literally a n infinite number o f different models o f reality.

The human being

possesses a structure that creates other subsidiary structures for resolving reality and existence.

This

underlying structure is conscious intelligence.

The

fundamental characteristic o f the human organism is i t s "act o f imaginative modeling."

Psychology must study

all t h e extant derivative models we have created with the ultimate goal o f inducing the nature o f intelligence.

conscious

In t h e laboratory, t h e human subject

merely exhibits phenomena that conform t o t h e experimental psychologist's model o f

homo

sapiens.

In other

words, traditional experimental psychology presumes that t h e human being is a repository o f fixed capacities, while in fact it i s capable o f a n infinite array o f capacities.

CONCEPTUAL S U M M A R Y Folk psychology and t h e classical epistemol'ogical systems entail a dualistic and transcendental psychological universe.

Most f o r m s o f disciplinary psychol-

ogy reduce one o f the fundamental substances to t h e other, or convert them t o linguistic entities, and transform transcendental reality t o a contingent one. Presystemic epistemological psychology and understanding psychology take the idealist route and confine reality to appearance o r t o t h e objects o f current conscious awareness.

Action psychology, contemporary cog-

nitive psychology, depth psychology, and Russian dia-

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353

lectical psychology opt f o r materialism and generally equate reality with t h e content o f past and present conscious experience.

Resolving t h e discipline’s com-

positional problem via a n appeal t o coriscious intelligence r e t a i n s its materialistic stance, but makes its adherence t o critical o r pragmatic realism a necessary byproduct o f t h e act o f imaginative modeling.