Chapter 3 Coalition Formation from a Socio-Psychological Perspective

COALITION FORMATION Henk A.M. Wike (ed.) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1985

115

Chapter 3 COALITION FORMATION FROM A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICALPERSPECTIVE Henk A.M. Wilke' Vakgroep Sociale Psychologie Instituut voor Sociale- en Bedrijfspsychologie Rijksuniversiteit Groningen The Netherlands I n t h i s c h a p t e r w e w i l l d e s c r i b e c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n from a s o c i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l view. We w i l l f o c u s mainly on c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n i n t r i a d s . F i r s t l y w e w i l l d e s c r i b e t h e phenomenon; t h e r e a f t e r w e w i l l d e f i n e i t more s t r i n g e n t l y . T h e r e a f t e r t h e most i m p o r t a n t t h e o r i e s a b o u t c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n b e h a v i o r w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d . An i m p o r t a n t p a r t of t h i s p a p e r i s d i r e c t e d t o t h e e f f o r t t o see whether t h e s e t h e o r i e s are s u p p o r t e d by e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e . I n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n an i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g model w i l l b e u n f o l d e d . T h i s q u a l i t a t i v e model makes i t p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d m o s t of t h e u n e x p l a i n e d v a r i a n c e i n t h e r e s u l t s of f o r e g o i n g e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d i e s . I n an e p i l o q u e w e w i l l compare t h i s approach with more quantitatively stated theories. Contents 3.1

3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6

The phenomenon Definition Main t h e o r i e s Empirical evidence An i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g approach t o c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n Epiloque

116 116 118 126 155 170

116

H. Wilke

3 . 1 THE PHENOMENON

The making of c o a l i t i o n s i s v e r y common i n g r o u p s , f a m i l i e s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s and i n n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t e x t s . I n a f a m i l y a f a t h e r and d a u g h t e r may c o a l e s c e a g a i n s t a mother t o d e p r i v e t h e mother of c e r t a i n outcomes. F r e u d ' s O e i d i p u s complex assumes a h i d d e n c o a l i t i o n of a son w i t h h i s mother a g a i n s t h i s f a t h e r . O r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e o f t e n s e e n a s

c o n s i s t i n g of a set of c o a l i t i o n s : bound by common i n t e r e s t s , p e r s o n s i n c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s c o a l e s c e i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n c e r t a i n d e s i r e d outcomes. P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s often join t h e i r resources, e . g . t h e i r votes, in order t o g e t c o n t r o l o v e r c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s , p o r t f o l i o ' s i n t h e government e t c . N a t i o n s j o i n t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , power, weapons, t o c o n t r o l c e r t a i n outcomes ( e . g . o i l , s c i e n t i f i c outcomes, i n f l u e n c e o v e r f o r e i g n m a r k e t s .

3.2 DEFINITION

C o a l i t i o n s may be d e f i n e d i n s e v e r a l ways. M i l l s (1953) c h a r a c t e r i z e s mutual s u p p o r t , B o r g a t t a (1961) common a c t i v i t y i n i n f o r m a l g r o u p s a s t h e e s s e n c e of c o a l i t i o n a c t i v i t y . Where T h i b a u t and K e l l e y (1959) stress t h e f a c t t h a t by c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n outcomes a r e d i v i d e d among c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s , Komorita and Meek (1978) and Gamson (1964) d e f i n e c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n a s a s i t u a t i o n where c o a l i t i o n p a r t i e s j o i n t h e i r r e s o u r c e s i n o r d e r t o g a i n c e r t a i n outcomes. A f t e r i n s p e c t i n g s e v e r a l d e f i n i t i o n s Shaw (1971) summarizes t h a t c o a l i t i o n s o c c u r "when (1) t h r e e or more p e r s o n s a r e i n v o l v e d , ( 2 ) two or more a c t a s a u n i t a g a i n s t a t l e a s t one o t h e r , and (3) t h e j o i n t a c t i o n produces a r e s u l t s u p e r i o r t o any r e s u l t p o s s i b l e by i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n " ( p . 1 0 6 ) . Shaw's d e s c r i p t i o n seems t o e x c l u d e ( 1 ) t r i p l e a l l i a n c e s i n g r o u p s of t h r e e and all-member c o a l i t i o n s i n l a r g e r g r o u p s ( 2 ) c o a l i t i o n s which do n o t add some extra p r o f i t t o individual p r o f i t .

We p e r s o n a l l y p r e f e r a d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of s o c i a l exchange t h e o r y (Homans, 1961) which i s less r e s t r i c t i v e : c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n is c o n s i d e r e d t o be a p r o c e s s i n which some group members j o i n c e r t a i n r e s o u r c e s , do some i n v e s t m e n t s , i n o r d e r t o g e t some r e w a r d s , outcomes, Under t h e above mentioned d e f i n i t i o n a l s o f a l l all-member c o a l i t i o n s . Moreover t h e m o t i v a t i o n of t h e c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n a c t i v i t y ( e . g . i n c r e a s i n g p r o f i t s Shaw 1 9 7 1 ) , maximizing r e w a r d s (Komorita en Meek 1978) is n o t included.

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation jrom a socio-psychological perspective

117

I n t h e f o l l o w i n g w e w i l l mainly c o n s i d e r c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n i n g r o u p s of t h r e e , where two u n i t e a g a i n s t a t h i r d . W e s e e t h i s a s a r e s t r i c t e d c a s e o f what c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n by d e f i n i t i o n i s . T h e r e f o r e , a s a working d e f i n i t i o n , w e r e f o r m u l a t e c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n i n a mixed-motive s i t u a t i o n

as a p r o c e s s i n which two g r o u p members j o i n t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , i . e . j o i n t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t s , i n o r d e r t o l e t t h e i r r e s o u r c e s o u t d o t h e t h i r d ' s man r e s o u r c e s ' , t h e y do t h i s t o g e t c o n t r o l o v e r r e w a r d s , t h e outcomes. Gamson (1964) h a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t s u c h a c o a l i t i o n o n l y makes s e n s e , i f t h e r e e x i s t s a mixed-motive s i t u a t i o n . I n a p u r e c o - o r d i n a t i o n s i t u a t i o n t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e g r o u p members a r e p e r f e c t l y p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n a c o a l i t i o n i s n o t n e c e s s a r y . I f one member i n c r e a s e s h i s p r o f i t s , h i s outcomes, h e a l s o i n c r e a s e s t h e outcomes of t h e o t h e r g r o u p members. I n a p u r e c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n t h e i n t e r e s t s a r e n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d . A l s o i n t h a t c a s e a c o a l i t i o n i s senseless. I f o n e member a c h i e v e s p o s i t i v e outcomes, he b r i n g s t h e o t h e r n e g a t i v e o n e s . I n a mixed-motive s i t u a t i o n e l e m e n t s o f c o n f l i c t and c o - o r d i n a t i o n p l a y a r o l e . Two members c o - o r d i n a t e t h e i r r e s o u r c e s t o t h e i r own b e n e f i t , w h i l e l e a v i n g o u t t h e t h i r d . I t i s a q u e s t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i f o n e s t r e s s e s t h e f i r s t e l e m e n t o r t h e second one or b o t h . A f t e r t h e making of a c o a l i t i o n one may a t t r i b u t e t h i s e f f e c t t o c o - o r d i n a t i o n :

one s t r e s s e s t h e n

t h e j o i n i n g of r e s o u r c e s . One may a l s o a t t r i b u t e t h i s e f f e c t t o c o n f l i c t : one stresses t h e n t h e f o r m i n g of a c o a l i t i o n i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e t h i r d person.

C o a l i t i o n s may be formed b o t h i n t e n t i o n a l l y a s w e l l a s u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y . U n i n t e n t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n s ( K e l l e y , i n T e d e s c h i e t a l . 1973) are formed by c h a n c e and n o t on p u r p o s e . T e d e s c h i o n l y c a l l s t h e g r o u p , which a c t i v e l y c o o r d i n a t e s , a c o a l i t i o n . Thus congressmen who o r g a n i z e t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n

a r e c a l l e d a c o a l i t i o n , whereas congressmen who c o i n c i d e n t a l l y v o t e f o r a c e r t a i n b i l l are n o t supposed t o form a c o a l i t i o n . I n g e n e r a l , we t h i n k t h i s i s an u n n e c e s s a r y a d d i t i o n , b e c a u s e (1) i n t e r e s t s may b e c o i n c i d e n t a l l y c o - o r d i n a t e d . For t h e o u t s i d e r t h e e f f e c t may b e t h e same as by a c t i v e c o - o r d i n a t i o n behaviour

-

(2) o b s e r v a t i o n of c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n

e s p e c i a l l y i n games - l e a r n s t h a t p l a y e r s v e r y o f t e n stress

t h e o c c a s i o n a l c o n v e r g e n c e of i n t e r e s t s which l e a d t o c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n . By d o i n g s o t h e c o a l i t i o n members seem t o d e c r e a s e t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n , w h i l e s o f t e n i n g a t t h e same t i m e t h e c o n f l i c t u a l

118 element of c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n ; a s t r a t e g y which may a l s o be f r u i t f u l f o r f u t u r e b a r g a i n i n g w i t h t h e e x c l u d e d member.

3 . 3 Main t h e o r i e s 3 . 3 . 1 . SIMMEL'S RECONNOITRING.

Simmel (1922, 1950, 1955) was o n l y sideways i n t e r e s t e d i n c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n . The s t u d y o f t h e dyad and t r i a d b r o u g h t him t o i t . For Simmel t h e dyad i s t h e s m a l l e s t g r o u p . I n t h e t r i a d two p r o p e r t i e s are added: t h e c h o i c e o f a n i n t e r a c t i o n p a t t e r n and t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a s u p e r - i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t y . The t r i a d may f a l l a p a r t i n s e v e r a l ways: 1) " t h e non p a r t i z a n t h i r d " t h e t h i r d man i s e i t h e r n o t o r a s much

i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e members of t h e t r i a d . 2) " d i v i d e e t impera", t h e t h i r d p e r s o n sows d i s s e n s i o n and t a k e s a d v a n t a g e of i t . 3 ) " t e r t i u s gaudens", " e i t h e r two of t h e p a r t i e s a r e h o s t i l e toward o n e a n o t h e r and t h e r e f o r e compete f o r t h e f a v o r of t h e t h i r d e l e m e n t ; or t h e y compete toward one a n o t h e r and t h e r e f o r e a r e h o s t i l e toward a n o t h e r " (Simmel 1 9 5 5 ) . Simmel a p p l i e s h i s i d e a s a b o u t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a t r i a d and a dyad t o s i t u a t i o n s i n which p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , n a t i o n a l g r o u p s e t c . a r e i n v o l v e d .

H e only p o i n t s o u t i n p a s s i n g

t h a t a c o a l i t i o n may be formed where he

o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n of t h e t e r t i u s may d i s a p p e a r

if t h e

two o t h e r s form a c o a l i t i o n .

3.3.2

AN INTERACTIONISTIC APPROACH.

The s u g g e s t i o n of Simmel a b o u t t h e f a l l i n g a p a r t of a t r i a d gave rise t o t h e i d e a ( B o r g a t t a 1961, M i l l s 1953) t h a t t r i a d s a l w a y s f a l l a p a r t . M i l l s o b s e r v e d 48 i n t e r a c t i n g t r i a d s who had t o make s t o r i e s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h r e e T.A.T. p i c t u r e s . The two most a c t i v e members were p e r d e f i n i t i o n c o n s i d e r e d t o have formed a c o a l i t i o n . The mutual s u p p o r t was t a k e n a s a measure t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e c o a l i t i o n . The two most a c t i v e members c o u l d p o s i t i v e l y s u p p o r t one a n o t h e r ( a s o l i d a r y or a t r u e c o a l i t i o n ) o r c o u l d n e g a t i v e l y s u p p o r t one a n o t h e r ( a c o n f l i c t i n g c o a l i t i o n ) . I f t h e most a c t i v e member showed n e g a t i v e s u p p o r t and t h e l e a s t a c t i v e member o f t h e dyad p o s i t i v e s u p p o r t , t h e c o a l i t i o n was c o n s i d e r e d t o be a dominant o n e . I f t h e s u p p o r t w a s t h e r e v e r s e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p was l a b e l e d a s a c o n t e n d i n g o n e . M i l l s ' r e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

119

i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e s o l i d a r y c o a l i t i o n i s t h e most s t a b l e . Moreover t h e e x c l u d e d p e r s o n i s t h e n i n t h e weakest p o s i t i o n . A f i n d i n g which a l s o r e c e i v e s s u p p o r t i n a n o t h e r s t u d y ( M i l l s 1 9 5 4 ) . H i s r e s u l t s a l s o show t h a t t h e c o n t e n d i n g and t h e dominant c o a l i t i o n a r e t h e l e a s t s t a b l e . They t e n d t o be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o e i t h e r a c o n f l i c t i n g o r a s o l i d a r y r e l a t i o n .

The i n t e r a c t i o n i s t i c a p p r o a c h h a s e v o c a t e d some r e s e a r c h w i t h n a t u r a l g r o u p s . T o r r a n c e ( 1 9 5 5 ) o b s e r v e d i n t e r a c t i o n between members o f a bomber crew, S t r o d t b e c k (1954) between members of a f a m i l y , and Turk and Turk (1962) between members of a n u r s i n g team. S t r o d t b e c k (1954) c o u l d n o t r e p l i c a t e M i l l s ' f i n d i n g s . H e remarks t h a t " w e do n o t f i n d i n f a m i l i e s t h e r e g u l a r i t i e s and d i s t r i b u t i o n

o f s u p p o r t which

M i l l s r e p o r t e d . Nor do w e c o n f i r m t h e t e n d e n c y f o r s o l i d a r y p a r t i c i p a t i n g members t o dominate t h e d e c i s i o n making which M i l l s a n t i c i p a t e d would m a t e r i a l i z e " . T h a t S t r o d t b e c k c o u l d n o t r e p l i c a t e M i l l s ' f i n d i n g s may b e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e i n s u f f i c i e n t knowledge of f a m i l y s i t u a t i o n s . Already Simmel (1950) s t r e s s e d t h a t a c h i l d v e r y o f t e n p l a y s t h e r o l e o f a m e d i a t o r between h i s p a r e n t s . A f a m i l y i s a p p a r e n t l y d i f f e r e n t from a group of which t h e members have n o t s e e n each o t h e r b e f o r e , which w a s t h e case i n M i l l s ' study.

Most i n t e r a c t i o n i s t i c s t u d i e s f a i l t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t ,

the

d i v i s i o n of power b e f o r e a c o a l i t i o n i s made. An e x c e p t i o n forms Turk and T u r k ' s s t u d y . Turk and Turk (1962) d i d o b s e r v a t i o n s i n g r o u p s i n which one member had a b s o l u t e power. R e l a t i v e

t a l k a t i v e n e s s o f a member w a s t a k e n a s

an i n d e x f o r power. Turk and Turk f o u n d t h a t t h e i n t e r a c t i o n d i d n o t g i v e

r i s e t o t h e f o r m a t i o n o f c o a l i t i o n s . They a l s o found t h a t " b o t h t h e volume of communication and t h e r a t e o f p o s i t i v e s o c i o - e m o t i o n a l

s u p p o r t between

any p a i r of members i s a f u n c t i o n of t h e combined power of t h e p a i r , w i t h t h e higher-powered member communicating more t o t h e o t h e r and s u p p o r t i n g him more". Summarizing, t h e above-mentioned

s t u d i e s c a r e f u l l y a n a l y s e d t h e p r o c e s s of

i n t e r a c t i o n , w h i l e n e g l e c t i n g p r e - c o a l i t i o n c o n d i t i o n s . For i n s t a n c e M i l l s o b s e r v e d i n t e r a c t i o n s , w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t t h e v a r i a b l e s , which lead t o c e r t a i n interaction processes.

I n t h e f o l l o w i n g w e s h a l l s e e t h a t Caplow d i d t a k e t h e s e p r e - c o a l i t i o n c o n d i t i o n s , i . e . t h e power of t h e g r o u p members, i n t o a c c o u n t . H e

120

H. Wilke

c o n c e n t r a t e d o n l y on t h e f o r m a t i o n of c o a l i t i o n s . O t h e r s a l s o c o n s i d e r e d t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes. However, it took a l o n g t i m e b e f o r e t h e p r o c e s s of i n t e r a c t i o n a g a i n r e c e i v e d t h e a t t e n t i o n from s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s it deserves. PRE-COALITION APPROACH.

3.3.3

M i l l s (1953, 1954) o b s e r v e d i n t e r a c t i o n i n t r i a d s . T h e r e a f t e r h e a n a l y s e d which c o a l i t i o n s were formed. Caplow (1956, 1959, 1 9 6 8 ) , Gamson (1961a, 1961b, 1 9 6 4 ) , Shapley and Shubik ( 1 9 6 4 ) , Luce and R a i f f a ( 1 9 5 7 ) , Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) p r i m a r i l y c o n s i d e r t h e s o - c a l l e d p r e - c o a l i t i o n c o n d i t i o n s (Borgatta 1961).

They p r e d i c t on a c c o u n t of i n i t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n power, r e s o u r c e s o r p i v o t a l power, who w i l l c o a l e s c e w i t h whom and how outcomes a r e t o be d i v i d e d . They d i s t i n g u i s h e d s e v e r a l ways i n which power among p l a y e r s c o u l d b e d i v i d e d . By means of a f i n i t e number of a s s u m p t i o n s t h e y a r e a b l e t o make p r e d i c t i o n s . We w i l l d e s c r i b e now ( s e e a l s o c h a p t e r 2 ) t h e most dominant a p p r o a c h e s .

a . CAPLOW: CONTROL AND ADVANTAGE.

Caplow (1956, 1959, 1968) i n t r o d u c e s 6 a s s u m p t i o n s t o p r e d i c t what w i l l happen i n a t r i a d i n which members d i f f e r i n power. The c o n c e p t "power" a s s u c h i s n o t d e f i n e d by Caplow, b u t s u b s t i t u t e d by c o n c e p t s a s " c o n t r o l " and " s t r e n g t h " . H i s main 3 a s s u m p t i o n s a r e : "

I . Members of a t r i a d may d i f f e r i n s t r e n g t h . A s t r o n g member c a n

"

1 I . E a c h member o f t h e t r i a d s e e k s c o n t r o l o v e r t h e o t h e r s . C o n t r o l

c o n t r o l a weaker member and w i l l seek t o do s o . "

o v e r two o t h e r s i s p r e f e r r e d t o c o n t r o l o v e r one o t h e r . " " 1 I I . T h e s t r e n g t h of c o a l i t i o n s t a k e s p l a c e i n a n e x i s t i n g t r i a d , so there is a pre-coalition

c o n d i t i o n i n e a c h t r i a d . Any a t t e m p t by

a s t r o n g e r member t o c o e r c e a weaker member i n t h e p r e - c o a l i t i o n c o n d i t i o n w i l l provoke t h e f o r m a t i o n of a c o a l i t i o n t o oppose t h e coercion".

(Caplow 1956, p . 490)

.

L a t e r on Caplow added two e x t r a a s s u m p t i o n s :

"IV.

The ' c h o o s e r i n a t r i a d s e e k s t h e maximum a d v a n t a g e o r minimum d i s a d v a n t a g e of s t r e n g t h r e l a t i v e t o h i s c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r " .

I'

V . The ' c h o o s e r '

i n a t r i a d s e e k s t o maximize t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formution from u socio-psychological perspective

121

coalition in relation to the excluded members". (Caplow 1959, p. 492). Because "strength" has not been defined,these assumptions are rather ambigious. The first assumption assumes that players try to control their fellow-members, especially weak members. The second one is, that they try to control as many of their fellow members as possible. The last two assumptions stress the formation of advantageous coalitions. Caplow seems to indicate that a player is inclined to form coalitions, which are as weak as possible. Recently, Walker (1973) has resolved the above-mentioned ambiguity by assuming that "strength" refers to the number of resources a member owns. In the situation A)B)C;

A<(B + C), see fig. 1, A prefers a coalition with

B as much as with C , because in both cases A owns most resources; C has no preference for either a BC- o r an AC-coalition, since in both coalitions he is dominated by the other member of the coalition; B on the contrary prefers a BC-coalition to an AB-coalition, since he dominates C in the BC-coalition, and is submissivcto A in an AB-coalition. Walker (1973) predicts that an AB, an AC and a BC-coalition will respectively occur in S%, 33% and 58% of the cases a caolition is formed. A prediction which is

in agreement with empirical data (e.g. results from an experiment by Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957). A prediction which also gives a better fit than Caplow's own prediction (Caplow 1959) and Chertkoff's revision of Caplow's theory (Chertkoff 1967). Possibly Caplow's main contribution to coalition formation theory is his distinction of several types of triads (see fig. 1).

122

H. Wilke

weights

types

Predict ions

Predict ions

Predictions

llinimum Power

Minimum Resource theories

theories A

B

C

Caplow

:oalition

coalition

outcome division

1.A=B=C

1 1 1

2.A>B;B=C 3

outcome division

Any

50/50

An Y

50/50

h Y

50/50

BC

50/50

2

2

3 . A
2

2

AB or AC

Any

50/50

AB o r AC

50/50

4.b(B+C) 3

1

1

None

None

absent

None

absent

4

3

2

BC or AC

Any

50/50

BC

50/40

4

2

1

None

None

absent

None

absent

A
B=C

5 . A>B>C A< (B+C)

.

6 A>B>C

A>(B+C)

F i g u r e 1. Caplow's t r i a d t y p e s , p r e d i c t i o n s . One s e e s t h a t i n t y p e 4 and 6 one member h a s a b s o l u t e power. T h i s i s t h e s i t u a t i o n Turk and Turk c o n s i d e r e d : n o c o a l i t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y . F o r t h e o t h e r t y p e s a c o a l i t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o r e c e i v e t h e outcomes. One may c l e a r l y see t h a t t h e l i s t of t y p e s i s n o t a t a l l e x h a u s t i v e . B e s i d e s t y p e

6 (4-2-l),

etc.

one may a p p a r e n t l y a l s o c o n s i d e r t y p e s X (5-1-1)

o r Y (6-4-1)

I n f i g u r e 1 one a l s o sees t h a t Caplow d o e s n o t make p r e d i c t i o n s for

t h e d i v i s i o n of c o a l i t i o n a l outcomes.

b. M I N I M U M RESOURCE THEORY: PARITY AND SIZE. Gamson (1961a, 1961b, 1964) and R i k e r (1962) have worked o u t t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s , which i n c l u d e b o t h i d e a s from game t h e o r y a s w e l l a s from Caplow's t h e o r y . R i k e r (1962) assumes t h a t ( 1 ) a c t o r s a r e r a t i o n a l : t h e y p r e f e r winning t o l o s i n g , ( 2 ) t h e p a y - o f f s of t h e game a r e zero-sum,

( 3 ) a c t o r s have p e r f e c t

i n f o r m a t i o n , ( 4 ) side-payments a r e p e r m i t t e d , ( 5 ) o n l y winning c o a l i t i o n s g i v e p o s i t i v e outcomes, (6) members of t h e winning c o a l i t i o n s r e c e i v e p o s i t i v e pay-offs,

( 7 ) c o a l i t i o n s have t h e a b i l i t y t o add o r d r o p members.

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

123

Murnigham (1978) points out that the first 3 assumptions are derived from game theory. The last 3 are politically relevant. Given the 7 assumptions Riker predicts that minimum size or minimum winning coalitions will be formed: "those who can form a minimal winning coalition may be able to agree on a more profitable arrangement of pay-offs" (Riker 1962). On other assumptions Gamson (1964) comes to the same prediction. His main idea is that "a coalition will form in which the total resources are as small as possible, while still sufficient to win" (Gamson 1964). He bases this prediction on the operation of the parity norm. The parity norm is identical with Homans' principle of distributive justice (Homans 1961) and Adams' equity principle (Adams 1965): people expect a share of the coalition outcomes, which is proportional to their investments. Thus the coalition member with the most resources may claim the greatest amount of coalition outcomes. If the pay-offs of a coalition are constant, e.g. always 100 points, a player may maximize his outcomes, if he maximizes the ratio of his resources to the total number of resources of the coalition. Since his resources are determined independently of the coalition he joins, the lower the total number of coalition resources, the greater will be his share. For type 5 (figure 1) Gamson predicts BC-coalitions: A expects more outcomes than B , while B expects more outcomes than C; they expect resp. 40%, 30% and 20% of the outcomes if they enter into a coalition. F o r B and C the BC-coalition is the most profitable, because in the BC-

coalition the ratio of their resources to the total number of resources is maximized and is dominant over the one in an AB- or AC-coalition. Minimum resource theory also predicts that within a coalition the outcomes are divided on account of the investments, the resources of the players. For type 5 , minimum resource theory predicts that B should receive 60% and C should receive 40% of the coalition outcomes. The bargaining theory (Komorita and Moore 1976; Komorita and Chertkoff 1973; Komorita and Meek 1978) may be seen as a special case of minimum resource theory as formulated above with the following additions: (1) it is a process theory; it takes changes of reward in time into account. (2) at the beginning of a game players do not expect outcomes in proportion to their resources, as Gamson assumes, but halfway between parity and equality. For instance, for an AB coalition A in type 5 (4-3-2) does not expect 4/7

or 16/28 of the rewards, but (4/7 + 1/2)/2=15/28

of the rewards; ( 3 ) on the

asymptotic level the theory predicts that the outcomes for each of the coalition members should be directly proportional to each member's maximum

in alternative coalitions; (4) the model predicts that as the process continues, those coalitions will be formed that minimize the temptation to defect. This temptation is at a minimum in that coalition, which minimizes the discrepancy between the predicted asymptotic reward G d t h e players' maximum rewards from alternative coalitions. For type 5 (4-3-2) this means that at the beginning of the games a BC-coalition is formed and that B receives 55% and C 45% of the pay-offs, i.e. halfway between 40%, his parity share, and 50%, his equality share. On the asymptotic level, a level which is not defined by the theory, B will receive 50% and C also 5 0 % . B and C expectations in the alternative coalitions, i.e. the AB and AC-coalitions, are also 50%. Therefore B and C's

temptation to defect is equal to zero, A BC-coalition is then formed,

because the temptation is zero, which is not the case for either an AB- or an AC-coalition (see Komorita and Meek 1978 and chapter 2). c. MINIMUM POWER THEORY: PARITY AND PIVOTALITY. Under this heading Gamson (1964) summarizes the predictions of various game-theoretical approaches. Since we only consider here simple games with a characteristic function of : V(A)=V(B)=V(C)=O;

V(AB)=V(AC)=V(BC)=V(ABC)=

1, where V( ) indicates the value or pay-off t o a coalition, and A, B and C are the actors and we thus do not take into account games with more than 3 persons and games for which the sum of the outcomes vary, we will for

this reason not go into Komorita's weighted probability model (Komorita, 1974) and bargaining set models (Aumann and Maschler, 1964). For a more comprehensive treatment of this topic the reader is referred to chapter 2 . Gamson (1964) and also Tedeschi et al. (1973) use Shapley's theory of pivotal power to demonstrate the game-theoretical approach. Shapley's theory (Shapley and Shubik, 1964) describes how a player should behave. Shapley suggested a formula for calculating the bargaining power of a player. A player's pivotal power is proportional to the number of times he is able to change a losing coalition into a winning one. It is given by P/N!, where N! is the totalnumber of permutations (all possible orders of entry of group members into the coalition) and P is the number of permutations in which a player is pivotal. In the (4-3-2) type the number of permutations is equal to 3 1 , i.e. 6 ; each player is pivotal twice. Coalition players demand a share. which is equal to their pivotal power. Thus Gamson's version of minimum power theory predicts that for the 4-3-2

Chapter 3 J Coalition formation f r o m a socio-psychological perspective

125

type (see figure 1) all coalitions are equally likely; the outcomes of a coalition are to be divided equally, since outcomes are divided proportionally to pivotal power. Murnigham (1978) has pointed out that Gamson's equity o r parity principle is also the underlying assumption in minimum power theory. In minimum power theory someone's pivotal power is seen then as the relevant input, whereas in minimum resource theory the resources are seen as the relevant contribution to a coalition; inputs which should be compensated by an equitable share of the outcomes. d. MINIMAL RANGE THEORIES: SIZE AND POLITICAL SIMILARITY. Leiserson (1970) and Axelrod (1970) suggest that political similarity which results from interaction, should facilitate coalition formation. They assume that political parties, which may be placed on an unidimensional ideological scale (e.g. from Left towards Right), form coalitions that minimize ideological range. For a situation where three parties A, B and C have the ideological positions of Left, Centre and Right, only Left-Centre and Centre-Right-coalitions should be formed. Leiserson points out that the minimum range principle holds even if the minimal size principle will be affected. Larger coalitions than necessary will be formed in order to give priority to the minimal range principle. Axelrod (1970) and Miller (1979) also stress the minimal range principle. However, the underlying rationale for them is the establishment of the least conflict of interests among coalition members. De Swaan (1973) has pointed out that Leiserson's version of minimal range theory may skip one of the parties on the ideological scale. For instance if the parties Left, Right and Centre have the resources 2, 3 and 2, Leiserson's model leaves open the possibility that a Left-Right coalition will be made. De Swaan's version of minimal range theory, which gives higher priority to the effects of ideological distance above the minimum size principle (Riker 1962), predicts in this case, that Centre will also be included in the coalition: closed minimum range coalitions will be formed. For other versions of minimal range theory the reader is referred to chapter 5 and to a recent article by Murnigham (1978). From a socio-psychological point of view (Byrne 1971), the minimal range principle which emphasizes the connection between similarity and attraction, appears highly plausible: the more similarity, the greater the attraction.

126

H. Wilke

Balance t h e o r y g i v e s a l s o r i s e t o t h e same p r e d i c t i o n (Mazur, 1 9 6 8 ) . Balance t h e o r y assumes t h a t p e r s o n A v i c a r i o u s l y i d e n t i f i e s w i t h p e r s o n 8, i f A ' s r e a c t i o n s t o B's s i t u a t i o n are l i k e l y t o b e c o n g r u e n t w i t h B ' s r e a c t i o n ( H e i d e r 1958, p . 2 7 8 ) . Transposed t o t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d s i t u a t i o n t h i s means t h a t L e f t i d e n t i f i e s more w i t h C e n t r e and t h a t R i g h t i d e n t i f i e s

-

more w i t h C e n t r e t h a n t h e o t h e r p o t e n t i a l c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r . C e n t r e

Left

and C e n t r e - R i g h t c o a l i t i o n s may be e x p e c t e d .

3 . 4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.

The c o a l i t i o n s i t u a t i o n i n which w e a r e mainly i n t e r e s t e d is Caplow's t y p e 5 (4-3-2),

f o r which A>(B+C) and A>B>C.

T h i s game may b e c o n s i d e r e d a t h r e e - p e r s o n game o r a s i m p l e m a j o r i t y game. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f u n c t i o n is, a c c o r d i n g t o Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) : V(A)=O; V(B)=O; V(C)=O; V(AB)=l; V(BC)=l; V(AC)=l; V(ABC)=l.

T h i s means t h a t a p l a y e r a l o n e does n o t r e c e i v e outcomes (V( ) = O ) ,

i f he i s

l e f t o u t of a c o a l i t i o n ; any c o a l i t i o n o r c o m b i n a t i o n o f a l l p l a y e r s s o - c a l l e d t r i p l e a l l i a n c e o r grand c o a l i t i o n

-

-

a

r e c e i v e s a l l outcomes of t h e

c o a l i t i o n , i f formed.

We w i l l r e s t r i c t o u r a n a l y s e s t o t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s : (1) t h e d e c i s i o n makers are more o f t e n i n d i v i d u a l s t h a n g r o u p s ; ( 2 ) Only 3 d e c i s i o n makers

are i n v o l v e d ; ( 3 ) D e c i s i o n making i s o n l y done on a s i n g l e i s s u e ; ( 4 ) P r i c e s ( q u o t a s ) o r c o a l i t i o n outcomes a r e f i x e d and t h e same f o r a l l c o a l i t i o n s ; (!i) The r e s o u r c e s of t h e t h r e e d e c i s i o n makers A , B and C a r e 4 , 3 and 2 r e s p e c t i v e l y ;

( 6 ) Because grand c o a l i t i o n s are n o t p r e d i c t e d and

a r e u s u a l l y e x c l u d e d by e x p e r i m e n t e r s

-

t h u s V(ABC)=O

-

w e w i l l not consider

them. According t o Caplow (1968) i n t h e 4-3-2-type

an

AR-coalition

may b e

c o n s i d e r e d a c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n , s i n c e t h e two most r e s o u r c e f u l members of t h e t r i a d c o a l e s c e , whereas a

BC-coalition

may b e s e e n a s a

r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n . I n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n t h e t w o weakest members make a c o a l i t i o n , i . e . t h e y c o n s p i r e a g a i n s t t h e most p o w e r f u l p e r s o n . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g w e w i l l see t h a t t h e r e s e a r c h e v i d e n c e demonstrates

instances

of b o t h c o a l i t i o n s . A n t i c i p a t i n g t h e model i n t h e

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

127

n e x t s e c t i o n s , w e a l r e a d y s t a r t g i v i n g a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r some d i v e r g i n g f a c t s . We w i l l s p l i t up o u r r e v i e w of e x p e r i m e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t h e following s e c t i o n s :

3.4.1

REVOLUTIONARY COALITIONS

3.4.2

PROBABILITY O F SUCCESS

3.4.3

CUMULATIVE SCORES AND CHANGING PARTNERS

3.4.4

CONSERVATIVE COALITIONS

3.4.5

ATTITUDINAL SIMILARITY AND CONTROL

3.4.6

COALITION PROCESSES

3.4.1

REVOLUTIONARY COALITIONS.

Because o f t h e many r e p l i c a t i o n s of t h e Gameboard e x p e r i m e n t (Vinacke 1959, Amidjaja and Vinacke 1965, Chaney and Vinacke 1960, Bond and Vinacke 1961, Vinacke 1964, Vinacke e t a l . 1966, K e l l e y and Arrowood 1 9 6 0 ) , t h e Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n c a n b e c a l l e d a c l a s s i c a l o n e . I n t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d e x p e r i m e n t o f Vinacke and Arkoff t h e p l a y e r s were p l a c e d around

a s t a n d a r d p a c h i s i b o a r d . The winner - t h e p l a y e r who r e a c h e d t h e end f i r s t

-

r e c e i v e d a symbolic p r i z e f o r winning t h e game. The p l a y e r s r e c e i v e d a w e i g h t by c h a n c e . The p r o g r e s s o f a p l a y e r on t h e b o a r d was d e f i n e d by t h e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of t h e v a l u e of a s i n g l e d i e , which was d e f i n e d by t h e E , by t h e weight o r s p e e d of e a c h p l a y e r . A l l p l a y e r s moved on e a c h t h r o w . A t any

t i m e a p l a y e r c o u l d make an o f f e r t o a n o t h e r t o form a c o a l i t i o n . The o t h e r d i d n o t need t o a c c e p t t h e o f f e r . I f t h e o t h e r a c c e p t e d t h e p r o p o s a l t h e c o a l i t i o n was a d e f i n i t e o n e . The c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s added t h e i r w e i g h t s and went t o a p l a c e which was a f u n c t i o n of t h e i r s e p a r a t e p o s i t i o n s a t t h a t moment. When t h e game c o n t i n u e d , t h e i r p r o g r e s s was d e t e r m i n e d by m u l t i p l y i n g t h e sum o f t h e i r w e i g h t s by t h e t h r o w o f t h e d i e . P l a y e r s had t o t r y t o win a s many outcomes a s p o s s i b l e . Every three-men group i n t h e Vinacke and Arkoff e x p e r i m e n t p l a y e d e a c h o f t h e s i x power p a t t e r n s d e s c r i b e d by Caplow (1956) t h r e e t i m e s . The r e s u l t s o f t h e Vinacke and Arkoff e x p e r i m e n t show t h a t v e r y o f t e n (60% of t h e c a s e s ) r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s a r e formed. T h i s r e s u l t s u p p o r t s b o t h Caplow's p r e d i c t i o n s a s w e l l a s minimum r e s o u r c e p r e d i c t i o n s . S t r i c t minimum power p r e d i c t i o n s a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d .

Vinacke and Arkoff a r e of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t , f o r example, i n power p a t t e r n 5 (4-3-2), ~L

A o v e r e s t i m a t e s h i s power b e c a u s e i t i s ' h a r d e r f o r t h e i n i t i a l l y . .. . .. - .. .. . ..

.

.

-

H Wilke irrelevant'. The misperception of A , so seems to be their reasoning, evokes a coalition of the other two players who are likely to perceive the relative strenghts as irrelevant. In their experiment, however, they did not check to see if A, indeed, saw himself as more powerful than the other two. Nor did they inquire whether A was less inclined to agree upon an equal division of outcomes. Kelley and Arrowood (1960) also started with the notion that A in the 4-3-2- power pattern overestimates his power. They assert that this misperception of A has been induced by the complex experimental circumstances of the Vinacke and Arkoff experiment. In particular, each triad played all six of Caplow's power patterns. For some of the power patterns the initial weights were relevant to power, e.g. the power patterns 4(3-1-1) and 6(4-2-l),

and for others, e.g., power pattern 5(4-3-2),

they were

not. In their experiment, Kelley and Arrowood used clearer instructions, gave each subject a permanent weight, placed Ss only in power pattern 5 , and gave the subjects an average of 36 chances to come to a coalition. They expected that these changes would allow the Ss to realize increasingly that, in the 4-3-2 situation, the weights are irrelevant to power. With the above-mentioned modifications they replicated the Vinacke and Arkoff experiment. It appeared from the results of this experiment that in later trials A(4) was excluded from the coalition less often and also received less often more than half of the outcomes than in the first trials. Kelley and Arrowood concluded that A's misperception diminished as A had more opportunity to learn. They suggest two possible bases for the misperception of A: 1) if B and C do not form a coalition, A will win all the outcomes; 2) the Ss have learned in the past that more weight

-

more resources

-

mostly means more real power. Nevertheless also Kelley and Arrowood (1960) found more revolutionary coalitions than might be expected from chance, both in the first trials (46% of the total number of coalitions) as well as a tendence to it in the last trials (41%). It is noteworthy that the outcomes of the coalitions were not always divided proportionally, as could be expected from Gamson's minimum resource theory but that also equal and disproportional divisions were realized. Moreover minimum resource theory does predict that always BC-coalitions should occur, which apparently is not the case. Chertkoff's (1967) and especially Walker's (1973) post hoc revision of minimum resource theory

Chapter 3 f Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

129

give a somewhat better estimation of the exact expectation of the occurrence of coalitions than minimum resource theory. Vinacke, Crowell, Dien and Young (1966) informed subjects about both the minimum power principle as well as about the minimum resource principle. It was explained that two principles could be applied: (1) "it does not matter who holds which weights, because any pair can win", and ( 2 ) "two weaker players could join forces to defeat the strong player". Even after subjects had been given this information, and even provided that they could use their knowledge during 24 games, revolutionary coalitions occurred more often than could be expected from chance. Caldwell (1971) found that if the formation of the coalition did not guarantee winning, A , the member with the greatest number of resources had little desire to join a coalition. If the forming of a coalition did guarantee winning, A joined more often. However also in the last condition revolutionary coalitions were dominant. In the experiments by Wilke and Mulder (1971), Wilke and Mulder (1974) and Wilke, MeertenE and Steur (1973) also the standard pachisiboard was used. In Dutch 4-3-2 triads the most dominant coalition was also the BC(3-2) coalition, which accounted for resp. 74%, 70% and 80% of the total number of coalitions formed. It appeared that the division of outcomes was halfway between equity and equality, i.e. in a coalition with C, A received an average outcome between 66% - his equity share - and SO%,

-

his equality

share. In the experiment by Wilke and Mulder (1971) subjects were asked about their motivation about coalition formation. It appeared that subjects favored the minimum power principle far more than the minimum resource principle as a motivation of their behavior. In this respect A was not less rational than B and C, a suggestion which has been done by Kelley and Arrowood (1960), and which was based on the fact that the rules of the game give A the opportunity to gain all resources, if no coalitions are formed. Player A favored as much as player

B and C the minimum power principle as a motivation for his behavior. Revolutionary coalitions are also formed in

other paradigms, experimental

set-ups. Chertkoff (1966) and Cole and Phillips (1967) used a poker game. In conditions similar to those realized by Vinacke and Arkoff, Chertkoff found revolutionary coalitions in 58% of the total number of cases a

H. Wilke

130

coalition had been formed. Chertkoff and Esser (1977), Chertkoff and Braden (1974), Chertkoff (1971) and Toda and Shinotsuka (1978) used a stockholders simulation. To realize the 4-3-2 condition, the players own 80, 60, and 40 shares. In order to gain control of the company a groupneededa majority of shares. This group had to divide the annual profit of the company. Chertkoff (1971) found revolutionary coalitions in 95%, Cherkoff and Braden in 70% and Cherkoff and Esser in 58% of the total number of coalitions. Also with a card game Crosbie and Kuhlberg (1973) found 47,5%revolutionary coalitions, which is also more than might be expected from chance. Most convention games (e.g. Gamson 1961a) have more than three players. An exception is a study done in Holland (Wilke 1968). Three players had to assume they were representatives of three political parties, who had 40, 30 and 20 seats in parliament. Only 2-party coalitions were permitted. Coalitions were formed by dividing 8 cabinet posts. It appeared that revolutionary coalitions were formed in 51% of the total number of cases a coalition had been formed. Moreover the outcomes of the coalition were, also in this situation, divided halfway between equity and equality. Summarizing, we observe that in various experimental settings a preference for revolutionary coalitions has been found. The above experiments differed in several respects. They agreed, however, in the sense that in a face-to-face relation A (4), B (3) and C (2), whose resources had been randomly assigned, had to divide the coalitional outcomes. The division of the outcomes was halfway between equity and equality. It may be concluded that minimum power theory is not supported by the above reported results. Minimum resource theory receives more support. Especially the bargaining theory, which we think is a special case of minimum resource theory, is strongly supported. Bargaining theory assumes that players divide outcomes helfwny between equity and equality; it also predicts revolutionary coalitions. 3.4.2

PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

A coalition once formed may always be winning, i.e. the formation of a

coalition always guarantees winning for the prospective coalition partners.

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

131

Most of the aforementioned studies have this characteristic. Probability of success may also be varied. In a questionnaire study Lawler and Youngs (1975) systematically varied (1) attitudinal agreement, (2) pay-off and ( 3 ) probability of success. They found that persons were more likely to choose a candidate (1) the higher the probability of winning the subsequent election (path coeff. 319) ( 2 ) the greater the estimated pay-off (path coeff. 217) and ( 3 ) the greater the attitudinal agreement with the potential ally (path coeff. 4 7 6 ) , a result which underlines the importance of the probability-of-success variable, In the following we will distinguish between studies in which the probability of success of coalitions is varied so that it affects all possible coalitions in the same degree and studies in which the probability of success of coalitions is varied differently, i.e. the probability of success for one coalition (e.g. the 4-3 coalition) is larger than for another (e.g. for the 3-2 coalition). a. ALL COALITIONS ARE UNCERTAIN IN THE SAME DEGREE. Vinacke, Lichtman and Cherulnik (1967) induced both a deterministic as well as a probabilistic condition. In the deterministic condition the subjects used a common die, so that a coalition once formed was certain of success. In the probabilistic condition the subjects had each their own die. No significant differences between these conditions were found. Cole (1969) also compared a deterministic and a probabilistic condition. In the first condition coalition partners were certain that their coalition was a success, in the probabilistic condition the players were more Uncertain about this. Contrary to his expectations, Cole did not find a difference between both conditions, In a study of Wilke, Meertens and Steur (1973) the probability that a coalition, once formed, also received the desired outcomes was resp. 1.00 (the deterministic condition), .67 and .87 (probabilistic conditions). Although these inducements were well understood by the subjects no difference between the three conditions was found. In all conditions a preference for revolutionary coalitions was found. From the above studies it may be concluded that if the probability of success for all possible coalitions is varied in the same degree, no

132

H. Wilke

effect may be expected. Two studies (Caldwell 1971 and Simpson and Punwani 1975) report differences between deterministic and chance conditions. Caldwell (1971) compared a "coalition wins" condition, which implies that a coalition has a probability to win that is equal to one, and a "chance" condition. In the latter condition, which was also played on a pachisiboard, coalition members could use their most advanced marker and remove the other marker from the board. For the rest of the game their collective weight was equal to the sum of their individual weights. Caldwell reasoned that under the condition of "coalition wins", player 4 "should bargain more eagerly and consequently be included in more coalitions than under a condition in which his high weighting factor makes it theoretically possible for him to defeat a coalition". Caldwell found indeed that A entered more often into a coalition in the "coalition wins" condition than the "chance" condition. However, he also reports that under the "coalition wins" condition there is a tendency for A to be excluded from a coalition, i.e. revolutionary coalitions are formed more often. This result may be interpreted as follows. In the "coalition wins'' condition, players (also A ) have stronger sense they are equal. In the "chance"-condition the experimenter gives the players the idea they are slightly different. Because they are slightly different they try to eliminate these differences. They do this by forming revolutionary coalitions (see also: 3.4.4). In the study of Simpson and Punwani (1975) which is only partly of relevance here and also the study of Lirtzman and Wahba (1972), the differences among the players seems to be induced much more strongly. Like Caldwell (1971), Simpson and Punwani (1975) also induced the meaning of the initial resources of the players. They induced "automatic success", which is comparable to Caldwe1l's"coalition wins" condition, and a probabilistic condition, which seems to be comparable to Caldwell's "chance" condition. Instead of the 4-3-2 type, Simpson and Punwani implemented a 3-2-2 type. In the "automatic success"-condition they found a preference

for BC (2-2)-coalitions.

For the probabilistic condition, however,

they found a preference for coalitions of which A was a member. Simpson and Punwani (1975) see this result as a strong support for the idea that if the coalition is partly dependent on the joint resources of the partners and partly on the dice game, a preference for strong coalitions may be expected. Unfortunately, the rather short description of the procedures do not allow

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation f r o m a socio-psychological perspective

133

a closer comparison between Caldwell's experiment and the one done by Simpson and Punwani (1975). On theoretical grounds one may expect this result from a much stronger inducement of either the expectation of outcomes o r the utility of outcomes, o r both. In thatcase Simpson and Punwani make

the same argument as Wahba

C.S.

(Lirtzman and Wahba, 1972; Wahba and

Lirtzman, 1972; Wahba, 1972a and 1972b). They base their research on an expectancy theory of coalition formation. I t predicts that (1) coalitions are formed to maximize their expected utility and (2) that coalitions are formed with the highest expected utility, In their experiment coalition success was partially dependent on the joint resources of the partners and partly on the values of the cards drawn. In this experiment, which followed procedures recommended by Swingle (1968), it appeared that the coalitions with the highest product of expectation multiplied by utility were formed. It is remarkable that Simpson and Punwani use almost the same wording, when they describe their "chance" condition: "a coalition success was partially dependent on the joint powers of the partners and partly on the dice game" (p. 175).

b. POTENTIAL COALITIONS DIFFER IN PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS.

In the studies reported before the probability variation affected all potential coalitions in the same degree, e.g. if each player used his own die, instead of a common die, then the probability of success remains statistically the same. We know of two studies in which the probability of success of the various potential coalitions has been systematically varied. In an additional experiment by Wilke et al. (1973) the probability that an AB coalition could win was .86; for an AC coalition this was .71; while this probability of success f o r a BC coalition was .57. Also in this study the pachisiboard game was used, a game which evokes a strong preference f o r BC coalitions. The results indicate that under the present probability differences the AB coalitions occurred as often as might be expected from chance. Thus one may say that the introduction of a higher probability of success for an AB coalition has more or less eliminated the a priori preference for a BC coalition. On the other hand the a priori BC preference seems to be so strong that a dominance of AB coalitions has not had the

134

H Wilke

chance to be realized entirely. In Chertkoff's experiment (Chertkoff 1966) also a 4-3-2 type has been induced. The subjects played a political game. In a deterministic condition the variable of a candidate's probability of victory was omitted. In the three probability conditions, B and C had a 50% probability of victory in the national elections. The probability of election victory of A was varied (i.c. 50%, 70% and 90%). It appeared that in the deterministic game the BC coalition was preferred. This result is analogous to that in the Wilke et al. study. In the probabilistic conditions (A has resp. 50% and 70% chance for victory) a clearly random choice pattern was reported. This is also true for the 90% chance on victory condition; although a tendency for a stronger occurrence of AB coalitions was observed.

In view of the results of the Wilke et al. experiment and of the Chertkoff experiment it seems reasonable to say that a coalition with A must be made very attractive for B and C, before A will indeed come more often into a coalition than is warranted by chance, Player A has apparently a backlog, which is not easy to recover. By increasing his probability for future success he may catch up again. 3.4.3 CUMULATIVE SCORES AND CHANGING PARTNERS. Chertkoff (1975) remarks that the tendency for those who are behind to coalesce against the one who has obtained an advantage, is a reliable and dramatic phenomenon. The effect of cumulative scores has been studied in several studies (Vinacke 1959; Bond and Vinacke 1961; Vinacke 1964). Vinacke (1959) compared the behavior of subjects in two conditions. In the game-by-game condition players played each game separatly. In the cumulative score condition players kept records of the outcomes which they had received in previous trials. He reports a strong tendency for those behind in cumulative score to unite against a player who has obtained an advantage. As an explanation for this he expresses the idea that the tendency to

equalize the cumulative scores is mainly a consequence of increased competition. Emerson (1964) did a 20-trial experiment in which Ss kept a list of their accumulated scores during the previous trials. His results indicate that

Chapter 3 / Coalitioti formation from a socio-psychological perspective

135

when t h e S s had e q u a l r e s o u r c e s (3-3-3), t h e two p l a y e r s who a r e b e h i n d c o a l e s c e a g a i n s t t h e o n e who i s a h e a d . The c o a l i t i o n member who i s most b e h i n d i s l i k e l y t o r e c e i v e t h e l a r g e s t s h a r e of t h e o u t c o m e s . I f two c o a l i t i o n members have t h e same number of c u m u l a t e d s c o r e s t h e y d i v i d e t h e outcomes e q u a l l y .

Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) c o m p a r e d a c o n d i t i o n i n which Ss m a i n t a i n e d cumulative s c o r e s with

a

condition

i n which t h e y d i d n o t . I t w a s found

t h a t i n g e n e r a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s ( B C - c o a l i t i o n s ) were formed. T h i s tendency w a s s t r i k i n g l y r e d u c e d i n t h e c o n d i t i o n i n which a l i s t o f cumulat i v e scores w a s m a i n t a i n e d . When t h e p l a y e r s w e r e reminded of t h e c u m u l a t i v e s c o r e d i f f e r e n c e s among them, t h e y w e r e v e r y much c o n c e r n e d w i t h removing c u m u l a t i v e s c o r e d i f f e r e n c e s and less w i t h c o n s p i r i n g a g a i n s t A , t h e strongest player a s f o r the assigned resources. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n t h e e f f e c t o f a l l o c a t e d r e s o u r c e s seems t o b e l e s s i n f l u e n t i a l t h a n t h e e f f e c t of c u m u l a t i v e s c o r e s .

I n t h e Hoffman e t a l . (1954) e x p e r i m e n t t h e S s h e l d less e x p l i c i t l y a l i s t of c u m u l a t i v e s c o r e s . They p l a y e d s e v e r a l t r i a l s w i t h t h e same set of o t h e r p l a y e r s . I n t h e equal c o n d i t i o n S s were s a i d t o have s c o r e d e q u a l l y on a p r e t e s t . I n t h e u n e q u a l c o n d i t i o n , i t w a s s a i d , one of them was i n c o m p a r a b l g b e t t e r t h a n t h e two o t h e r s . I n b o t h c o n d i t i o n s a r o l e p l a y e r who was s a i d t o be r e s p . e q u a l and more competent t h a n t h e two r e a l s u b j e c t s , s u b s e q u e n t l y c o u l d s o l v e a p u z z l e problem a l o n e . H e r e c e i v e d a bonus f o r t h i s ; which h e d i d n o t s h a r e a s was p e r m i t t e d by t h e r u l e s . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g t r i a l s o t h e r puzzle-problems had t o b e s o l v e d which c o u l d b e s o l v e d by any two of t h e t h r e e p l a y e r s . I t a p p e a r e d t h a t t h e two r e a l s u b j e c t s i n t h e e q u a l c o n d i t i o n c o a l e s c e d a g a i n s t t h e c o n f e d e r a t e , who a p p a r e n t l y was e q u a l t o them. One may d e f i n e t h i s a s a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n , s i n c e t h e two r e a l s u b j e c t s c o n s p i r e d a g a i n s t t h e c o n f e d e r a t e , who had r e c e i v e d a n o c c a s i o n a l a d v a n t a g e . N o e x p l i c i t r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s were formed i n t h e u n e q u a l c o n d i t i o n , where t h e c o n f e d e r a t e had o b t a i n e d a n i n i t i a l a d v a n t a g e , which he a p p a r e n t l y d e s e r v e d . Thus i t was found t h a t t h e c o n f e d e r a t e i n t h e e q u a l c o n d i t i o n e n t e r e d less o f t e n i n t o a c o a l i t i o n and a l s o r e c e i v e d a s m a l l e r p a r t o f t h e outcomes t h a n t h e c o n f e d e r a t e i n t h e unequal c o n d i t i o n .

H Wilke

136

Several explanations are given for the fact that players who are behind coalesce against the player who is ahead. Laing and Morrison (1974) have proposed two models of coalition which apply to a situation where the goal is to

formation,

maximize cumulative scores,

where the resources of the participants are equal, and the group size is three. In the myopic model S s try to maximize their current ranks. The hyperopic model assumes a longer time perspective. Each player tries to maximize his ranks; however, he does so on the basis of the ranks he hopes to attain if the settled coalition continues to be formed in the future. Also later formulations (Friend et al. 1977) and tests (Friend, Laing and Morrison 1974/1975) merely restate t b ? idea that people try to maximize their ranks, without explicitly giving a psychological rationale for it. The other explanations do offer an explanation f o r the fact that people try to surpass others.

Emerson (1964) and Anderson (1967) and Festinger (1954) try to explain the effect of maximizing ranks by referring to power differences. Emerson (1962/1964)'s theory has three notions which are summarized by him as follows. Power (Pa,).

The power of actor A over actor B is the amount of

resistance on the part of B which can potentially be overcome by A. ) : The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) ab directly proportional to A's motivational investments in goals

Dependence(D

mediated by B , and ( 2 ) inversely proportional to the availability of these goals outside the AB relation.

(P =D ) : The power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, ab ab the dependence of B upon A. In an unbalanced situation someone (e.g. A) may have power advantage. In that situation the power of A over B (P ) is larger than the power of B ab ) o r consequently D is larger than D ba ba abEmerson distinguishes 4 balancing operations:

over A ( P

1) decreased motivational investment on the part of B. 2) network extension: searching for attractive goals outside the

AB relation by B. 3) status giving: increased motivational investments by A.

Clrapter 3 f Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective 4)

137

coalition formation: decreased availability of goals outside of the relation for the stronger member.

In the Emerson (1964) experiment, previously accumulated scores are taken as a measure of power. The player who has collected fewer outcomes has a power advantage in that trial. It was predicted and found that the least dependent member

was

given the larger share of the rewards within the

subsequent coalition. The Hoffman et al. experiment is one of the studies that support Festinger's social comparison theory. The theory assumes that people strive to equalize differences, the so-called drive for uniformity. This drive is the stronger, the more equal persons are. This is the case for comparison of opinions and abilities. For abilities an extra force is at work; people strive for superiority, i.e. they try to do better and better. The combined result of both forces implies that f o r abilities people strive for a slight superiority. This drive is the stronger, the more equal people are. Therefore the theory predicts that competition, i.e. the motivation to surpass others o r the tendency to be superior to the others, is the stronger

the smaller the

differences among players are. The Hoffman et al. (1954) experiment demonstrates this. In the equal condition the weaker subjects compete against the stronger player. This tendency is absent in the unequal condition. Moreover the strongest person in the unequal condition received more of the points per coalition. Anderson (1967) made a very interesting theoretical analysis of coalition formation studies. He stresses that in coalition formation studies power processes are at work. He uses the following arguments. 1. In the standard pachisi experiment (e.g. Vinacke and Arkoff 1957) the resources (4-3-2) of the players are not legitimized: "there was no attempt to legitimate the distribution of resources or power".

2. In the Emerson (1964) experiment, S s who are behind coalesce against the player who is ahead. If the two coalescing players have obtained the same accumulated scores obtained in the previous games, they divide more often evenly than if they have an unequal accumulated score. In that case the larger proportion always went to the player with the less cumulative score. 3. In the Hoffman et al. (1954) experiment also evidence for the status

138

H. Wilke argument was f o u n d . I n t h e u n e q u a l c o n d i t i o n t h e more a b l e p l a y e r

A

e n t e r e d more o f t e n i n t o a c o a l i t i o n t h a n i n t h e e q u a l c o n d i t i o n . Moreover he r e c e i v e d a l a r g e r s h a r e of t h e outcomes. Anderson rejects t h e i d e a from Gamson (1964) t h a t t h e e q u a l i z a t i o n of c u m u l a t i v e s c o r e s c o u l d b e a s c r i b e d t o accommodative b e h a v i o r . P l a y e r s a r e n o t de-emphasizing c o m p e t i t i o n

-

s o r u n s h i s a r g u m e n t . For i n s t a n c e i n t h e

above-mentioned Hoffman e t a l . e x p e r i m e n t t h e y a r e n o t conforming t o a n a l t r u i s t i c norm o r s e n s e

t h a t a n accommodative s t r a t e g y w i l l i n t h e l o n g

r u n o p t i m i z e t h e i r g a i n . I f t h a t had been t h e c a s e , no d i f f e r e n c e between t h e unequal and e q u a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e Hoffman e t a l . e x p e r i m e n t would have been f o u n d .

3.4.4

CONSERVATIVE COALITIONS.

C o n t r a r y t o most of t h e above-mentioned

s t u d i e s , i n which BC c o a l i t i o n s

o c c u r r e d , t h e s t u d i e s we w i l l now d e a l w i t h d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t u n d e r c e r t a i n conditions,

A B , s o - c a l l e d c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s , do

o c c u r more o f t e n

Cole and B a r n e t t (1978) s t a t e t h a t members o f a t r i a d w i l l t e n d t o form a c o a l i t i o n t h a t h a s t h e b e s t chance t o win t h e p a y - o f f .

I n game 1 o f a b a l l -

-throwing e x p e r i m e n t , t h e p e r f o r m a n c e s o f a p l a y e r c o u l d be s e e n by t h e o t h e r o n e s . I n o r d e r t o win t h e pay-off

i n game 2 , a c o a l i t i o n o f 2 p l a y e r s

was allowed t o compete a g a i n s t t h e t h i r d s u b j e c t . We o n l y r e p o r t t h e main r e s u l t s of t y p e 5 (4-3-2).

I t appeared t h a t achieved s t a t u s , t h e a c t u a l

performance o f a p l a y e r , had a s t r o n g

e f f e c t : (1) s u b j e c t s s e l e c t e d s t r o n g

r a t h e r t h a n weak p a r t n e r s f o r a c o a l i t i o n , ( 2 ) c o n t r a r y t o C o l e and B a r n e t t ' s e x p e c t a t i o n t h e a c t u a l outcomes w e r e n o t d i v i d e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y ,

i . e . based on t h e r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a c o a l i t i o n , b u t were d i v i d e d more e q u a l l y . Cole and B a r n e t t (1978) c o n c l u d e from t h e i r r e s u l t s t h a t i n t h e i r s t u d y where a c h i e v e d s t a t u s i n s t e a d o f a s s i g n e d s t a t u s had b e e n i n d u c e d , c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s a r e most l i k e l y . They r e f e r t o s t u d i e s o f C h e r t k o f f ( 1 9 6 6 ) ; C o l e (1969, 1972) and Wahba ( 1 9 7 2 a , b ) were t h e same r e g u l a r i t y h a s been o b s e r v e d . I n o u r o p i n i o n i t i s n o t j u s t t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a s s i g n e d and a c h i e v e d s t a t u s , which seems t o d i r e c t c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n , as w e l l as t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t o a f f e c t t h e d e f i n i t i v e outcomes. I f o n e c h o o s e s f o r a p l a y e r who h a s d e m o n s t r a t e d a g r e a t e r s k i l l i n t h r o w i n g a b a l l , one h a s more

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation f r o m a socio-psychological perspective

139

chance to gain the final outcomes then if one coalesces with someone who has only some symbolic, but for this task irrelevant higher status. The studies to which Cole and Barnett refer, support this point. For instance in Chertkoff's study A's power had been assigned by the experimenter. Nevertheless, it was found that when

A ' s probability of success was

90% it was more likely that he became a member of a coalition. Results of

the study of Lirtzman and Wahba (1972) also sustain this finding: because a coalition with A had a higher probability of success and higher expected definite outcomes, A was most often chosen as a coalition partner,

A recent study of Hartman, Cole and Phillips (1978) in which the game allowed the players to have control over the outcomes, also demonstrates this point. Because A has greater control than B, and B more than C, the AB coalition - a conservative coalition

-

is formed most often.

We think it is also useful here to note that in Apex and quota games, (see ch. 2) the assigned utility of an outcome affects the selection of a coalition partner: a coalition which evokes more outcomes is formed most often. Moreover Medlin (1976) has found that if the assigned outcomes, quota, of a grand coalition increase the probability of the realization of a grand coalition also increases. In several studies (Mess6 et al. 1975; Mess6 et al. 1974/1975; Michener and Lawler 1971; Lawler 1975a; Lawler 1975b) the appearance of revolutionary and conservative coalitions has been observed. In the studies of Lawler and his associates a slightly different experimental set-up was used. In all studies status was achieved. The highest status member was a confederate. The behavior of the real subjects was object of study. It appeared that the highest status member provoked more revolutionary coalitions (1) when he rewarded inequitably (Lawler 1975a, 1975b), ( 2 ) when the subjects perceived that the highest status member lacked support (Michener and Lyons 1972), especially if he failed (Michener and Lawler 1971). These results suggest that if a certain legitimacy has been attached to the position of the most powerful member of a triad, a conservative coalition is most likely. However, if the so-called most powerful member is perceived as having an illegitimate advantage, a revolutionary coalition may be expected. Legitimacy or endorsement may be achieved in several ways: by having a greater influence on the receiving of the final outcomes, e.g. by having effective competence (Cole and Barnett 1978; Lawler 1975) as

H Wilke

140

much a s by h a v i n g more a s s i g n e d chance t o make a c o a l i t i o n a winning one ( C h e r t k o f f 1966) and by e v o k i n g a c o a l i t i o n w i t h a h i g h e r u t i l i t y ( s e e Apex games i n Ch. 2 ) . Only 3 s t u d i e s (Mess6 e t a l . 1974/1975, Mess6 e t a l . 1975, Wilke and Pruyn 1981) c o n s i d e r t h e f o r m a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s explicitly. Mess6 e t a l . (1975) p l a c e d 3 s u b j e c t s i n a p a c h i s i b o a r d game (Vinacke and Arkoff 1957) where A , B and C r e c e i v e d i n t y p e 5 r e s p . 4 , 3 and 2 r e s o u r c e s These r e s o u r c e 8 were p r e s e n t e d i n several ways. I n t h e ' n o - i n p u t '

condition

Ss merely r e c e i v e d t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , a c o n d i t i o n which i s comparable t o t h e

u s u a l p a c h i s i b o a r d s i t u a t i o n . I n t h e p r e - p a i d and t h e i n p u t - r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n , A , B and C worked f o r t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r d u r i n g 2 h o u r s ,

14

hour

and 1 hour r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n t h e ' p r e - p a i d ' c o n d i t i o n A was given 4 d o l l a r s b e f o r e a c o a l i t i o n was formed, B 3 d o l l a r s and C 2 d o l l a r s . I n t h e ' i n p u t -relevant'

c o n d i t i o n no pre-payment

was made. I n t h e p a c h i s i - b o a r d game,

which was s u b s e q u e n t l y p l a y e d , t h e w i n n e r ' s s h a r e w a s 7 d o l l a r s . The l o s e r g a i n e d 2 d o l l a r s . Mess6 e t a l . (1974/1975 and 1975) b a s e d t h e i r p r e d i c t i o n s on e q u i t y t h e o r y , which s a y s t h a t outcomes s h o u l d b e d i v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i n p u t s (Adams 1 9 6 5 ) . The r e s u l t s , a l t h o u g h n o t e n t i r e l y c o n v i n c i n g , indeed d e m o n s t r a t e f o r t h e ' i n p u t - r e l e v a n t '

c o n d i t i o n t h a t a m a j o r i t y of

c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s was formed. However f o r t h e ' n o - i n p u t '

condition,

a c o n d i t i o n which i s e q u a l t o t h e u s u a l Vinacke and Arkoff c o n d i t i o n s , r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s d i d o c c u r more o f t e n . The p r e - p a i d c o n d i t i o n r e s u l t s s u g g e s t e d a m i x t u r e of p o s s i b l e c o a l i t i o n s . Mess6 e t a l . c o n c l u d e from t h e s e r e s u l t s t h a t i n t h e u s u a l p a c h i s i b o a r d game, t h e r e s o u r c e s a r e r a t h e r t r i v i a l . A s soon a s t h e y become m e a n i n g f u l , a s is t h e case i n t h e ' i n p u t - r e l e v a n t '

c o n d i t i o n , r e w a r d s are s h a r e d

a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e r e s o u r c e s . I f t h e y a r e made s e n s e l e s s i n t h e pre-paid c o n d i t i o n

-

-

a s is t h e c a s e

t h e n a l l c o a l i t i o n s have an e q u a l c h a n c e of

o c c u r r e n c e . For an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e ' n o - i n p u t '

results i . e . t h e

o c c u r e n c e of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n - t h e y vaguely r e f e r t o t h e c o m p e t i t i o n which a r o s e . Mess6 e t a l . (1975) do n o t r e p o r t r e s u l t s a b o u t t h e a c t u a l d i v i s i o n of outcomes, a l t h o u g h t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r e imply t h e c o l l e c t i o n of t h e s e d a t a . From e q u i t y t h e o r y (Adams 1965) one would e x p e c t a h i g h e r f r e q u e n c y of p r o p o r t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s i n t h e so c a l l e d ' i n p u t - r e l e v a n t ' c o n d i t i o n . Mess6 et a l . r e p o r t d a t a a b o u t t h e motives of t h e s u b j e c t s

Clzapter 3 1 Coalition formatioii from a socio-psychological perspective

141

a f t e r w a r d s . They r e p o r t t h a t 14 o u t o f 18 s u b j e c t s i n t h e ' i n p u t - r e l e v a n t ' c o n d i t i o n mentioned t h e e q u i t y m o t i v e , w h i l e o n l y 1 o u t of 36 i n t h e o t h e r conditions did so.

Murnighan (1978a) s y s t e m a t i c a l l y v a r i e d S s ' s p i v o t a l power and r e s o u r c e s . H e found r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s , i f S s were e q u a l i n p i v o t a l power, b u t d i f f e r e d i n r e s o u r c e s . H e found c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s i f p l a y e r s had different

p i v o t a l power.

Also i n an e x p e r i m e n t by Wilke and Pruyn (1981) c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s were f o u n d . S u b j e c t s w e r e t o l d t h e y would make a t e s t which had two p a r t s : an i n d i v i d u a l i n t e l l i g e n c e t a s k and a s o c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e t a s k . A l l s u b j e c t s f i r s t made t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t e l l i g e n c e t a s k . T h e r e a f t e r A , B and C r e c e i v e d

8 , 6 and 4 v o t e s r e s p e c t i v e l y . For h a l f of t h e Ss t h e s e v o t e s were a l l o c a t e d randomly (random c o n d i t i o n ) . F o r t h e o t h e r h a l f ( t h e l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n ) t h e v o t e s were a p p a r e n t l y b a s e d on t h e r e a l p e r f o r m a n c e s i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l t a s k . The ' r e a l ' performance s c o r e s were g i v e n by bogus f e e d b a c k . I n t h e s o c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e t a s k o n l y two of t h e t h r e e p l a y e r s c o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e . By a d d i n g t h e i r v o t e s two p e r s o n s c o u l d j o i n and form a c o a l i t i o n , which made i t p o s s i b l e t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r t o t a l s c o r e . F o r t h e e x c l u d e d member of t h e t r i a d t h i s was n o t p o s s i b l e . Thus o n l y two o f t h e t h r e e c o u l d i n c r e a s e t h e i r t o t a l i n t e l l i g e n c e s c o r e , which a p p a r e n t l y c o n s i s t e d of a n i n d i v i d u a l and a s o c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e p a r t , by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e subsequent s o c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e t a s k . Before t h e s u b j e c t s s t a r t e d b a r g a i n i n g , t h e y expressed t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e f o r a c e r t a i n c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r : moreover t h e y i n d i c a t e d t h e p e r c e n t a g e of t h e t o t a l number o f p o i n t s t h e y e x p e c t e d t o r e c e i v e i n t h e s o c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e t a s k . By b a r g a i n i n g i n t h e t r i a d , c o a l i t i o n s were s u b s e q u e n t l y formed. I t a p p e a r s t h a t i n t h e l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n mostly c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s a r e formed. T h i s e f f e c t i s a l r e a d y p r e s e n t i n t h e p r e f e r e n t i a l c h o i c e : A and B p r e f e r o n e a n o t h e r . I n t h e r a n d o m c o n d i t i o n s more o f t e n r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s a r e f o u n d . I t a l s o a p p e a r e d t h a t i n t h e l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n a more p o w e r f u l member e x p e c t e d t o g e t more outcomes t h a n a l e s s - p o w e r f u l member, a d i f f e r e n c e which is a b s e n t i n t h e random c o n d i t i o n .

3 . 4 . 5 ATTITUDINAL SIMILARITY AND CONTROL.

A n e g l e c t e d v a r i a b l e of c o a l i t i o n behavior r e s e a r c h i s t h e s i m i l a r i t y i n

142

H. Wilke

p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s , L e i s e r s o n (19701, i t i s t r u e , f o r m u l a t e d t h e Minimal Range t h e o r y , which a s s e r t s t h a t t h o s e p a r t i e s w i l l c o a l e s c e , which have a minimal d i f f e r e n c e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i r p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n , i . e . c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s a r e most l i k e l y t o be n e i g h b o u r s on an idealogical s c a l e , From a s o c i o - p s y c h o l o g i c a l view t h e minimal r a n g e t h e o r y p r e d i c t s t h a t t h e g r e a t e r t h e s i m i l a r i t y t o a p e r s o n , t h e g r e a t e r t h e a t t r a c t i o n . The e x p e r i m e n t a l work of Byrne (1971) h a s r e p e a t e d l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t one i s more a t t r a c t e d towards a p e r s o n whose s e l f d e s c r i p t i o n i s more e q u a l t o t h e s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n h i m s e l f . T r o s t (1965) found t h a t p e r s o n s who a r e a t t i t u d i n a l l y s i m i l a r and who a r e presumably a t t r a c t e d t o one a n o t h e r , more o f t e n t e n d e d t o form a c o a l i t i o n t h a n p e r s o n s who a r e d i s s i m i l a r . H e l m , Nacci and T e d e s c h i

(1976) a l s o found t h a t a most s i m i l a r

p l a y e r w a s p r e f e r r e d as a c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r . The c o n n e c t i o n between minimum r a n g e t h e o r y and minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y h a s not s u f f i c i e n t l y been examined i n one s t u d y . Most e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d i e s on c o a l i t i o n s ( s e e e . g . Gamson 1964) o n l y s t u d y t h e e f f e c t of t h e s i z e of t h e p a r t i e s . The most r e l e v a n t s t u d i e s which t a k e b o t h r e s o u r c e s and i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t a n c e s i n t o account were done by Lawler and Youngs ( 1 9 7 5 ) , L e i s e r s o n ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Wilke, Pruyn and d e V r i e s (1978) and Miller ( 1 9 7 9 ) .

L a w l e r and Youngs d i d a q u e s t i o n n a i r e s t u d y on c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n . P a t h a n a l y s i s r e v e a l e d t h a t e x p e c t e d a t t i t u d i n a l agreement had t h e g r e a t e s t i n f l u e n c e on c o a l i t i o n p r e f e r e n c e . P r o b a b i l i t y of e x p e c t e d outcomes w a s second and e x p e c t e d pay-off

had a s m a l l e r e f f e c t .

L e i s e r s o n ' s experimental r e s u l t s suggest t h a t i n t h e i n i t i a l a t t e m p t s t o a r r i v e a t a c o a l i t i o n , t h e b a r g a i n i n g i s about t h e c o a l i t i o n programme. A f t e r some t i m e , however, t h e b a r g a i n i n g i s more o f t e n about t h e distribution

of t h e outcomes. The d a t a of c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n a r e b e s t

e x p l a i n e d by minimal range t h e o r y : p e o p l e p r e f e r p a r t n e r s w i t h no opposed i n t e r e s t s . A r e s t r i c t i n g f a c t o r i n L e i s e r s o n ' s s t u d y i s t h a t i n t e r e s t s of c o a l e s c i n g w i t h a p a r t n e r were e x p r e s s e d i n f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s , i . e . f i n a n c i a l a d v a n t a g e s which p a r t i c i p a n t s c o u l d d e r i v e from a c e r t a i n coalition.

I n M i l l e r ' s e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d y a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y was a l s o e x c l u s i v e l y e x p r e s s e d by f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s . The 4-3-2

r e s o u r c e d i f f e r e n c e s were

e x p r e s s e d by a number of v o t e s . The d a t a s u g g e s t a s t r o n g e f f e c t of

Chapter 3 / Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

143

a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y (or i n t e r e s t , e x p r e s s e d by pay-off c u r v e s ) . A l t o g e t h e r , 137 L e f t - C e n t r e - c o a l i t i o n s , 40 c o a l i t i o n s R i g h t - C e n t r e and j u s t one c o a l i t i o n between L e f t and R i g h t were o b s e r v e d . The e f f e c t o f t h e v a r i a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s between L e f t and R i g h t were o b s e r v e d . The e f f e c t of t h e v a r i a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s was s m a l l : 6 3 30-20 c o a l i t i o n s , 54 40-20 c o a l i t i o n s and 6 1 40-30 c o a l i t i o n s were made. Thus a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y p l a y e d a much s t r o n g e r r o l e t h a n r e s o u r c e d i f f e r e n c e s , which had a n e g l i g i b l e e f f e c t . I n D e Swaan's s t u d y p o l i t i c a l s i m i l a r i t y w a s measured o n a p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s c a l e . H e d i d a l o n g i t u d i n a l s t u d y on c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n i n Europe a f t e r 1981. I n s p i t e o f c o n f o u n d i n g f a c t o r s , s u c h as (1) t h e e n t a n g lement of r e l i g i o u s d o c t r i n e s w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l l e f t t o r i g h t o r i e n t a t i o n

(2) t h e c o n t a m i n a t i o n of t h e r i g h t - l e f t

dimension w i t h t h e formed c o a l i -

t i o n s , minimal r a n g e t h e o r y b e s t e x p l a i n s h i s d a t a ( s e e Ch. 2 ) . I n t h e Wilke e t a l . s t u d y p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n was n o t i n d u c e d by f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s , b u t by i n d u c i n g d i f f e r e n c e s i n a t t i t u d i n a l o r i e n t a t i o n . One p a r t y was L e f t , t h e second C e n t r e , t h e t h i r d R i g h t on a p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s c a l e , which w a s c a r e f u l l y c o n s t r u c t e d . The s u b j e c t s p l a y e d t h e p o l i t i c a l game, a s r e p o r t e d above (Wilke 1 9 6 8 ) . One p a r t y had 40 v o t e s , a second 30 v o t e s and t h e t h i r d 20 v o t e s i n p a r l i a m e n t . I t was s a i d t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s had ( 1 ) t o t r y t o e n t e r i n t o a c o a l i t i o n (2) t o g e t a s many c a b i n e t p o s t s a s p o s s i b l e ( 3 ) t o t r y t o r e a l i z e t h e i r p a r t y programme a s much a s p o s s i b l e . I n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t c o n f o u n d i n g of r e s o u r c e s w i t h a t t i t u d i n a l agreement c a r e was t a k e n t h a t a l l r e s o u r c e - a t t i t u d e c o m b i n a t i o n s o c c u r r e d e q u a l l y o f t e n . During t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e b a r g a i n i n g w a s observed. The minimum r a n g e - t h e o r y r e c e i v e d s t r o n g s u p p o r t : 75 C e n t r e - R i g h t c o a l i t i o n s , 76 C e n t r e - L e f t c o a l i t i o n s and o n l y 4 L e f t - C e n t r e c o a l i t i o n s w e r e formed. Minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y was o n l y s u p p o r t e d i n C e n t r e - L e f t c o a l i t i o n s : 30-20 c o a l i t i o n s o c c u r r e d 39 t i m e s , 40-20 c o a l i t i o n s 25 times, w h i l e 40-30 c o a l i t i o n s o c c u r r e d 12 t i m e s . W i t h i n C e n t r e - R i g h t c o a l i t i o n s these d i f f e r e n c e s w e r e not observed. From t h e above-mentioned s t u d i e s i t may be c o n c l u d e d t h a t a t t i t u d i n a l c o n s e n s u s d o e s seem a much s t r o n g e r v a r i a b l e t h a n r e s o u r c e d i f f e r e n c e s . I n t h e r e p o r t e d s t u d i e s a much l a r g e r p a r t o f t h e t o t a l v a r i a n c e h a s been exp l a i n e d by minimum r a n g e t h e o r y t h a n by minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y . T h i s r e g u l a r i t y i s a l s o found back i n t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s r e s u l t s ( L e i s e r s o n 1970, Wilke e t a l . 1 9 7 8 ) . For i n s t a n c e , Wilke e t a l . r e p o r t t h a t i n i t i a l l y

b a r g a i n i n g i s mainly c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e c o a l i t i o n programme. B a r g a i n i n g a b o u t t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e c a b i n e t p o s t s becomes o n l y somewhat more import a n t t o w a r d s t h e end of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n p e r i o d .

H Wilke

144

Also t h e r e s u l t s about t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes s u p p o r t minimum r a n g e t h e o r y : t h e C e n t r e p a r t y does n o t o n l y e n t e r more o f t e n i n t o most c o a l i t i o n s , t h i s p a r t y a l s o r e c e i v e s t h e l a r g e s t s h a r e of t h e c o a l i t i o n outcomes and i t a l s o r e a l i z e s i n a s t r o n g e r d e g r e e i t s p a r t y programme. Summarizing, i t seems t h a t t h e a p p r o a c h , which stresses t h e e f f e c t of r e s o u r c e d i f f e r e n c e s and which h a s evoked most of t h e c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s ,

i s n o t so f r u i t f u l a s h a s a p p a r e n t l y been assumed. The c o a l i t i o n p r o c e s s i s more c o n t r o l l e d and b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d by a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t i e s t h a n by d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e s o u r c e s among t h e p l a y e r s .

3.4.6

COALITION PROCESSES

I n t h e f o l l o w i n g we d e s c r i b e t h e main f i n d i n g s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o c e s s of t h e f o r m a t i o n of a c o a l i t i o n . A s i n d i c a t e d by C h e r t k o f f (1966) and P h i l l i p s and N i t z (1968) w e may d i s t i n g u i s h two s e p a r a t e p h a s e s of t h e c o a l i t i o n p r o c e s s : a c o n t a c t phase d u r i n g which t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d i c a t e w i t h whom of t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s t h e y p r e f e r t o form a c o a l i t i o n and how t h e y l i k e t o d i v i d e t h e p r o s p e c t i v e outcomes, and a b a r g a i n i n g p h a s e d u r i n g which t h e p l a y e r s a t t e m p t t o r e a c h an agreement on who c o a l e s c e s w i t h whom and how t h e c o a l i t i o n outcome6 a r e t o b e d i v i d e d . The d e f i n i t i v e f o r m a t i o n o f a c o a l i t i o n may i n t h i s s e n s e b e s e e n a s t h e f i n a l s t a g e of t h e b a r g a i n i n g phase,

A . CONTACT PHASE. Some s t u d i e s o n l y r e s t r i c t themse1vesCe.g. Nacci and T e d e s c h i 1976; C o l e

1971) t o t h e c o n t a c t p h a s e . A f t e r t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t h e s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e a

q u e s t i o n n a i r e . I n t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e , q u e s t i o n s a s "with whom do you

l i k e t o make a c o a l i t i o n ? " o r "which p a r t o f t h e t o t a l outcomes would you ask f o r yourself

. . .?"

were f i l l e d o u t .

P h i l l i p s and N i t z (1968) gave each s u b j e c t a one-page form which d e s c r i b e d a p o l i t i c a l c o n v e n t i o n s i t u a t i o n of t h e t y p e u s e d by C h e r t k o f f (1966). I t a p p e a r e d t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of c o n t a c t i n g t h e c a n d i d a t e w i t h fewer r e s o u r c e s was h i g h . P h i l l i p s and N i t z (1968) see t h i s r e s u l t a s a s u p p o r t f o r minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y , s i n c e s u b j e c t s seem t o b e i n c l i n e d t o c o n t a c t a weaker p l a y e r r a t h e r t h a n a s t r o n g e r one.

N i t z and P h i l l i p s (1969) a l s o t o o k d i v i s i b i l i t y of t h e outcomes i n t o a c c o u n t . They found s u p p o r t f o r t h e s o - c a l l e d c o m p a t i b i l i t y h y p o t h e s i s ,

Chaprev 3 1 Coalitioriformation from a socio-psychological perspective

145

which implies that a forced equal division is compatible with a coalition among equals, while a coalition among unequals is favored by a forced unequal division of outcomes. Subjects seek to form coalitions in which the division of pay-offs can be negotiated with a minimum of intra-coalition conflict, a result which also seems to have been found by Nitz (1976). Nacci and Tedeschi (1976) did also study the effect of attraction besides the effect of the 4-3-2 type. The subject was always in the B (=3) resources position. Liking for A and C was varied. Three conditions were involved: (1) No information about liking, ( 2 ) A had the same attitudes as B, while C differed, (3) C had the same attitude as

B, while A differed.

A strong difference between male and female subjects was observed. Males

preferred BC ( 3 - 2 ) coalitions and proportional divisions of outcomes; females chose liked persons and divided the outcomes equally. Nacci and Tedeschi called the proportional division a division according to the equity norm, while an equal division suggests a so-called equality norm. Pruyn

C.S.

(1979) varied both legitimacy of the resources as well as

fixedness of the outcomes. In the legitimate condition the parties had deserved their outcomes in a legitimate way, while in the illegitimate condition, they had gained their resources in an illegitimate way. In the outcomes division

fixed

condition the outcomes had always to be divided

equally (50-50), whereas in the outcomes division variable condition, the outcomes could be divided at will. The political game

used has repeatedly

evoked a preponderance of revolutionary coalitions, i.e. in role-playing situations. However, in this questionnaire study a preference for conservative coalitions was found. This preference was weaker in the illegitimate condition. The outcomes division variable was introduced to test the basic assumption of minimum resource theory, which states that people try to maximize their outcomes. They do this by trying to make their part of the resources as large as possible. Since this motive is supposedly not working if the division of outcomes is fixed, one may expect that in this condition fewer revolutionary coalitions are formed. This did not appear to be true. We did not observe a difference between the two outcomes division conditions. As

in many other studies (see Chertkoff 1966), it was found that in the

outcomes division variable condition the outcomes were divided halfway between equity (i.e. proportionality) and equality ( 5 0 - 5 0 ) . Summarizing, the questionnaire studies give some insights into the cognitive

146

FI. Wilke

mechanisms which a r e a t work. N i t z and P h i l l i p s (1969) and N i t z (1976) d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t a f o r c e d e q u a l d i v i s i o n of outcomes f o s t e r s c o a l i t i o n s between e q u a l s , w h i l e a f o r c e d unequal d i v i s i o n of outcomes seems t o f o s t e r c o a l i t i o n s between u n e q u a l s .

The a t t r a c t i o n v a r i a b l e (see a l s o : a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y and c o n t r o l ) seems t o have o n l y e f f e c t f o r f e m a l e s (Nacci and T e d e s c h i 1 9 7 6 ) , b u t n o t f o r males. T h i s h a s p o s s i b l y t o do w i t h t h e widespread f i n d i n g t h a t f e m a l e s a r e less c o m p e t i t i v e and more accommodative t h a t males (see W i l l i s ,

1969; Amidjaja

and Vinacke 1965; Ashour, 1975; C r o s b i e and Kuhlberg 1973; Lirtzman and Wahba 1972; Vinacke ( i n : Lieberman 1 9 7 1 ) ; S t a n f i e l d 1974; S c h n e i d e r 1978; McGaffey 1976 and Vinacke 1 9 5 9 ) . F i n d i n g s which a r e s t i l l t o b e e x p l a i n e d ( s e e f u r t h e r Ch. 1 ) .

That a s t r o n g e r p r e f e r e n c e f o r c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s (Pruyn 1979 c . s . ) h a s been found i n l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n s , i s q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s (see c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s ) . Where r e s o u r c e s a r e r e c o g n i z e d a s l e g i t i m a t e a p r e f e r e n c e f o r s t r o n g c o a l i t i o n s may b e f o u n d . I n t h e l e g i t i mate c o n d i t i o n t h e p r e f e r e n c e f o r s t r o n g c o a l i t i o n s are i n d e e d o b s e r v e d . I n t h e i l l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n t h e p r e f e r e n c e f o r s t r o n g c o a l i t i o n s i s weaker.

That c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n does n o t seem s t r o n g l y a f f e c t e d by f i x e d n e s s of t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes, does n o t o f f e r a s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r t h e maximiz a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s , which u n d e r l i e s t h e minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y . T h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t i n g e n e r a l t h i s h y p o t h e s i s is f a l s e . One may p r o b a b l y assume t h a t t h i s n o t i o n i s made more s a l i e n t d u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n p h a s e and t h a t d u r i n g t h e c o n t a c t phase t h i s i d e a i s n o t w i d e l y s h a r e d . The r e s u l t s of t h e p r e f e r r e d c o a l i t i o n s a r e r a t h e r p u z z l i n g . P h i l l i p s and N i t z (1968) and a l s o Nacci and T e d e s c h i (1976) found r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s . Pruyn

C.S.

(1979) found c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s , where p r e v i o u s l y

i n r o l e - p l a y i n g e x p e r i m e n t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s had been found (Wilke 1968; Wilke, Pruyn and d e Vries 1 9 7 8 ) .

B . CONTACT AND BARGAINING PHASE. Most c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s i n v e s t i g a t e d a t a about c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n a s a consequence of i n t e r m e d i a t i n g c o a l i t i o n p r o c e s s e s . The s t u d i e s of Vinacke and Arkoff ( 1 9 5 7 ) , K e l l e y and Arrowood (1960) and C a l d w e l l (1971) a r e

Chapier 3 f Coalition formation f r o m a socio-psychological perspective

147

examples of t h i s a p p r o a c h . They a p p e a l t o t h e i n s i d e o f t h e b l a c k b o x , w i t h o u t g i v i n g any e v i d e n c e a b o u t t h e p r o c e s s i t s e l f . The s t u d i e s ( e . g . Wilke and Mulder 1971, 1974; C h e r t k o f f 1966) which a r e r e p o r t e d h e r e a f t e r , t r y t o open t h e b l a c k box a l i t t l e f u r t h e r , by o f f e r i n g d a t a on p e r c e p t i o n s of t h e p l a y e r s and some r e s u l t s a b o u t t h e n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e s s a s a s e q u e n c e of e v e n t s , which l e a d s t o t h e f i n a l f o r m a t i o n o f a c o a l i t i o n . Because w e t h i n k t h a t c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n i s v e r y s t r o n g l y c o n t i n g e n t on t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l s e t - u p w e w i l l r e s t r i c t o u r s e l v e s t o t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d game and t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n v e n t i o n game. T h e r e f o r e we do n o t r e p o r t r e l e v a n t s t u d i e s i n which a s t o c k h o l d e r ' s paradigm ( C h e r t k o f f 1971; C h e r t k o f f and Braden 1974) o r a b o t t l e - c o l l e c t i o n s i t u a t i o n (Roth 1979) was i n v e s t i g a t e d a s f o r the c o a l i t i o n a l process. THE PACHISIBOARD GAME. I n Vinacke and A r k o f f ' s s t u d y (Vinacke and Arkoff 1957), i n which among o t h e r s t h e 4-3-2 t y p e was p l a y e d , s u b j e c t s p l a y e d

-

a s said - t h e standard

p a c h i s i b o a r d game. F o r t h i s t y p e i t was found t h a t ( a ) t h e weakest p l a y e r (C) more o f t e n i n i t i a t e d a c o a l i t i o n t h a n A a n d B , ( b ) A p r e p o n d e r a n c e of BC c o a l i t i o n s w a s f o u n d , ( c ) outcomes were d i v i d e d a s many times i n a

p r o p o r t i o n a l way a s e q u a l l y ; d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of outcomes s e l d o m l y o c c u r r e d , ( d ) C ' s w i n n i n g s were " l a r g e r t h a n h i s s t r e n g t h might w a r r a n t , mainly b e c a u s e t h e r e was c o m p e t i t i o n f o r him",

( e ) t h e above t r e n d s d i d n o t

t o change over t i m e .

K e l l e y and Arrowood's e x p e r i m e n t ( K e l l e y and Arrowood 1960) i s p a r t l y a c r i t i q u e on t h e above d e s c r i b e d e x p e r i m e n t : ( a ) o n l y o n e s e t o f w e i g h t s was i n d u c e d (4-3-2), ( b ) e a c h p l a y e r k e p t h i s w e i g h t t h r o u g h o u t t h e game, ( c ) t h i s game w a s p l a y e d many times ( a v e r a g e 36 t i m e s ) . K e l l e y and Arrowood mainly found a p r e f e r e n c e f o r BC c o a l i t i o n s (46% i n t h e f i r s t t r i a l s and

41% i n t h e l a s t t r i a l s ) . They g i v e two p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e i n i t i a l " e r r o n e o u s " a t t r i b u t i o n of power h o l d by p l a y e r A , who was e x c l u d e d most o f t e n from c o a l i t i o n s and who, i f he was i n c l u d e d i n c o a l i t i o n s , r e c e i v e d more t h a n h a l f o f t h e p o i n t s .

1. L o g i c a l l y , p l a y e r A i s more p o w e r f u l u n l e s s t h e o t h e r s j o i n f o r c e s a g a i n s t him, i . e . if n o c o a l i t i o n i s made, A ' s s p e e d a l l o w s him t o r e a c h t h e g o a l first.

2. S u b j e c t s have l e a r n e d t o u s e a p e r s o n ' s r e s o u r c e s as a n i n d i c a t i o n of power. K e l l e y and Arrowood r e f e r t o B r u n s w i c k ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e s i z e -weight i l l u s i o n : p e o p l e h a v e l e a r n e d and t h e r e f o r e assume a c o r r e l a t i o n

148

H. Wilke

between s i z e and w e i g h t . A n a l o g o u s l y , s u b j e c t s i n t h e K e l l e y and Arrowood experiment might have u t i l i z e d t h e weight c u e , which h a s some e c o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y , i . e . i t s t a n d s f o r power. I n t h e e x p e r i m e n t , s u b j e c t s i n i t i a l l y u t i l i z e d t h i s c u e ; b u t l a t e r on

-

so s a y K e l l e y and Arrowood

-

they

l e a r n e d t h a t t h i s c u e u t i l i z a t i o n i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e and " h e n c e , i t s subs e q u e n t d e g r e e of u t i l i z a t i o n d e c l i n e s " ( p . 2 4 2 ) .

The d e t e r m i n i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s o f C a l d w e l l (1971) r e s e m b l e v e r y much t h e exp e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s i n which t h e s u b j e c t s i n t h e above-mentioned s t u d i e s have been p l a c e d . C a l d w e l l a l s o found a p r e f e r e n c e f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s . The weak man r e c e i v e d more outcomes t h a n was w a r r a n t e d by h i s w e i g h t . C a l d w e l l o n l y r e p o r t s a n e c d o t i c a l e v i d e n c e a b o u t t h e c o a l i t i o n p r o c e s s its e l f . H e stresses t h a t Ss a r e g i v e n an i n s o l v a b l e t a s k : a l l p l a y e r s have e q u a l r e a l power and must n e v e r t h e l e s s choose who wins and who i s o u t . I t

i s t o o c o s t l y ( T h i b a u t and K e l l e y 1959) t o s i t and n o t t o t a k e any d e c i s i o n . T h e r e f o r e s u b j e c t s ( a s i s r e p o r t e d by S t r y k e r and P s a t h a s 1960) o f t e n d e c i d e t o t o s s t o d e t e r m i n e who i s e x c l u d e d from t h e c o a l i t i o n . I n t h e same a r b i t r a r y way s u b j e c t s may u s e t h e w e i g h t s g i v e n by e x p e r i m e n t e r . C a l d w e l l s h a r e s T h i b a u t and K e l l e y ' s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t A o v e r e s t i m a t e s h i s power.

The s t u d y of Wilke and Mulder (1971) was done t o g e t a somewhat b e t t e r i n s i g h t i n t o what i s r e a l l y h a p p e n i n g d u r i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n p r o c e s s . I t a p p e a r e d t h a t o v e r t h r e e t r i a l s r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s were formed most o f t e n . The outcomes were d i v i d e d between p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y , a d i v i s i o n which

i s assumed by minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y , and e q u a l i t y (50-50). Only f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s i t was found t h a t p r o p o r t i o n a l outcome d i v i s i o n o c c u r e d more o f t e n t h a n a n e q u a l outcomes d i v i s i o n . C o n t r a r y t o minimum resource t h e o r e t i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s w i t h i n a n AC c o a l i t i o n outcomes w e r e as many t i m e s d i v i d e d e q u a l l y as p r o p o r t i n a l l y . From t h e d i v i s i o n o f outcomes i t was conc l u d e d t h a t A must a c c e p t outcomes i n a c o a l i t i o n w i t h C , which a r e a p p a r e n t l y not a c c e p t a b l e o r n e c e s s a r y f o r B i n a c o a l i t i o n w i t h C .

B e f o r e t h e game, p r e f e r e n c e f o r a c e r t a i n c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r a n d f o r a c e r t a i n d i v i s i o n o f outcomes was a l s o s t u d i e d . I t a p p e a r e d t h a t A and B h a d no c l e a r p r e f e r e n c e f o r a c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r ; o n l y i n t h e f i r s t t r i a l , C p r e f e r r e d A a s h i s c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r . T h i s i s a l s o a g a i n s t t h e minimum

r e s o u r c e t h e o r y , which assumes t h a t C s h o u l d p r e f e r B a s h i s c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r , while B should p r e f e r C a s h i s c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r .

Cliapter 3 1 Coalitiori formation from a socio-psychological perspective

149

I t a l s o appeared t h a t i n d e e d A e x p e c t e d more outcomes t h a n C and B , which minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y assumes. During t h e i n t e r a c t i o n p r o c e s s t h e number of p r o p o s a l s a p l a y e r d i d , were o b s e r v e d . I t a p p e a r e d t h a t o v e r a l l , A was i n i t i a t i n g more p r o p o s a l s t h a n 5 and C .

A f t e r t h e f i r s t and t h e t h i r d t r i a l t h e s u b j e c t s were asked about t h e i r

m o t i v a t i o n d u r i n g t h e e x p e r i m e n t . I t a p p e a r e d t h a t p l a y e r s A and C c l e a r l y had t h e i n s i g h t t h a t t h e w e i g h t s were i r r e l e v a n t a s a d e t e r m i n a n t of b o t h c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n and t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes. T h i s tendency was s t r o n g e r i n t h e l a s t t r i a l t h a n i n t h e f i r s t t r i a l . For p l a y e r B t h i s p i c t u r e was t h e same, a l t h o u g h somewhat l e s s e x p l i c i t .

I t was concluded t h a t i f t h e r e

was one p l a y e r who was m i s t a k i n g l y t a k i n g w e i g h t s a s r e l e v a n t ,

i t was B ,

i n s t e a d of A .

From t h e above-mentioned a n a l y s e s i t w a s c o n c l u d e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h minimum resource theory i s ab le t o explain th e f a c t t h a t revolutionary c o a l i t i o n s

are most o f t e n formed and t h a t A i s e x p e c t i n g more outcomes t h a n B and C , t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l r e s u l t s which p l e a a g a i n s t i t : (1) outcomes a r e

not

most

o f t e n d i v i d e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y . T h i s appears t o b e only t r u e f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s , ( 2 ) p l a y e r s A and B had no c l e a r p r e f e r e n c e f o r a c e r t a i n c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r , (3) t h e p l a y e r s had a s t r o n g c o n v i c t i o n t h a t w e i g h t s as s u c h were i r r e l e v a n t f o r c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n and t h e d i v i s i o n o f outcomes.

Also t h e n o t i o n t h a t A o v e r e s t i m a t e s h i s power d i d r o t r e c e i v e u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t . I t i s t r u e t h a t A e x p e c t s more outcomes t h a n C , b u t a l s o B e x p e c t s more outcomes t h a n C . There i s no d i f f e r e n c e between A and B i n t h i s r e s p e c t Moreover t h e r e s u l t s of t h e r e p o r t e d m o t i v a t i o n a f t e r w a r d s i n d i c a t e t h a t A no less t h a n B and C , p e r c e i v e s t h e i n i t i a l w e i g h t s t o b e i r r e l e v a n t t o power. I f t h e r e is a p l a y e r who m a i n t a i n s t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e i n i t i a l w e i g h t s are r e l e v a n t t o power, it i s B , n o t A!

From an a d d i t i o n a l e x p e r i m e n t ( s e e Wilke and Mulder 1971) i n which t h e p l a y e r s had e q u a l w e i g h t s ( 1 - 1 - l ) ,

b u t i n which one of t h e p l a y e r s ( a s A i n

t h e p r e v i o u s e x p e r i m e n t ) c o u l d win a l l outcomes, w e found s u p p o r t f o r t h e i d e a t h a t t h e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e s t r o n g p l a y e r had e f f e c t , a f a c t t o which a l s o C a l d w e l l ' s e x p e r i m e n t a l r e s u l t s ( C a l d w e l l 1971) r e f e r and which i s one of t h e two e x p l a n a t i o n s of K e l l e y and Arrowood: one p l a y e r i s more powerful

I€. Wilke

150

u n l e s s t h e o t h e r s j o i n f o r c e s a g a i n s t him. The r e s u l t t h a t A d o e s more p r o p o s a l s i n l a t e r t r i a l s t h a n B and C , g i v e s some a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r t h i s r e a s o n i n g . I n t h e f i r s t t r i a l s A b i d e s h i s t i m e . Because he i s t h r e a t e n e d t o be e x c l u d e d from a c o a l i t i o n , i n l a t e r t r i a l s he becomes more a c t i v e t h a n B and C . T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s more l i k e t h e one we o f f e r e d i n t h e s e c t i o n about t h e e f f e c t o f c u m u l a t i v e s c o r e s , a h y p o t h e s i s which a l s o predicts revolutionary coalitions.

W e a l s o found s u p p o r t f o r t h e second e x p l a n a t i o n of K e l l e y and Arrowood t h a t r e s o u r c e s are s e e n as i n d i c a t i o n s o f power: A and B e x p e c t more o u t comes t h a n C ; i n about h a l f of t h e c a s e s t h e outcomes are d i v i d e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y ; t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e f o r BC-coalitions. Also i n s t u d i e s of Wilke 1968, Wilke, Meertens and S t e u r 1973, Wilke and Mulder 1974, i n d i c a t i o n s a r e found t h a t b a r g a i n i n g i s p a r t l y d e t e r m i n e d by

A ' s i n i t i a l advantage and p a r t l y by power d i f f e r e n c e s . I n t h e s e s t u d i e s r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s a r e found. Outcomes were d i v i d e d somewhere between p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y and e q u a l i t y . The l a t t e r s t u d y a l s o r e v e a l e d some r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e f i r s t p r o p o s a l and t h e u l t i m a t e c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n : more c o a l i t i o n s were formed between t h e s e n d e r and t h e r e c e i v e r of t h e f i r s t p r o p o s a l t h a n between one of them and t h e t h i r d p l a y e r . T h i s tendency f o r a r e c i p r o c a l c h o i c e h a s a l s o been found i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t u d i e s of Ofshe and Ofshe ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Wilke (1968) and Chertkof f (1966)

.

R e c i p r o c a t i o n , which might be e x p l a i n e d by l e a r n i n g t h e o r y , may be s e e n as a s t r o n g i n t e r m e d i a t i n g f a c t o r : p e o p l e a p p a r e n t l y see a p r o p o s a l i n t h e i r d i r e c t i o n as a r e w a r d , which i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e p l a y e r who d o e s t h e proposal.

I n a s e p a r a t e s t u d y w i t h t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d paradigm t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r o t a t e d and n o n - r o t a t e d

s u b j e c t s was s t u d i e d (Wilke and Mulder, 1 9 7 4 ) . I n

t h e r o t a t e d conditions, s u b j e c t s a r e during each t r i a l confronted with a new set o f p l a y e r s . T h i s i s done by i n v i t i n g n i n e s u b j e c t s a t t h e same

time and by u s i n g a r o t a t i o n scheme so t h a t d u r i n g e a c h t r i a l e a c h p l a y e r k e e p s t h e same w e i g h t : 4 , 3 o r 2 r e s p e c t i v e l y , b u t meets a new s e t of o t h e r p l a y e r s . So A i n t r i a l 1 meets i n t r i a l 2 two o t h e r p l a y e r s w i t h r e s p e c t i -

v e l y 3 and 2 resources. I n t h e n o n - r o t a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s u b j e c t s p l a y s e v e r a l

t r i a l s w i t h t h e same set of p l a y e r s . C h e r t k o f f ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Gamson ( 1 9 6 4 ) , Levinsohn and Rapoport ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Cole (1971)

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

151

and Lieberman (1971), praise the rotation method as a means to prevent subjects from carrying over interpersonal experiences from one trial to another.

It appeared that subjects in the non-rotation condition are not as satisfied with the experimental situation. They make proposals and decline proposals less often than Ss in the rotation condition. Besides in the non-rotation condition S s tend to coalesce in trial 4 with the same partner as the one in trial 3. In de rotation condition, coalition formation and the division of outcomes are more strongly determined by a coalition of B and C against A. Thus the Ss in the rotation condition stress the cue of the initial advantage of A in the pachisiboard. In the non-rotation condition we cannot indicate a cue which may entirely explain the coalition formation. More than in the rotation condition the experimental situation in the non-rotation condition is an unstable one. Several cues have an effect on the formation of a coalition in the non-rotation condition, but none may exclusively interpret the decision process. Most coalition experiments(Vinacke, 1959; Vinacke and Arkoff, 1957; Kelley and Arrowood, 1960) are experiments in which S s play several games with the same set of players. For instance, in the experiment by Kelley and Arrowood (1960) S s have to make approximately 36times a coalition with the same set of players. Our results suggest that in these multi-trial-non-rotation experiments the effect of the experimental inducements is weaker than in thethzee-trial-non-rotation condition of our experiment. Wilke and Mulder advise rotation of the Ss in future coalition experiments. Non-rotation has the effect that other cues, difficult to control, may exercise a stronger influence. The operation of these cues can be diminished by rotating the S s . POLITICAL CONVENTION GAMES. Chertkoff (1966) had one condition in which only the type 4-3-2 was induced. Subjects in this condition played a convention game. The method to form a coalition was stepwise: 1) subjects, who received the 40-30-20 resources, nominated a candidate, 2) if two candidates had done reciprocal choices, these two continued their negotiation in another room. It appeared from the initial partner preferences, that players 40 and 30 preferred 20 as a prospective coalition partner. In the three trials (conventions) of the experiment this systematic preference disappeared as for A (=40), but not

152

H. W ilke

f o r B ( = 3 0 ) . During t h e n e g o t i a t i o n phase mostly 30-20 c o a l i t i o n s were formed. T h i s tendency was n o t p r e s e n t i n l a t e r c o n v e n t i o n t r i a l s . I n a s t u d y of Wilke (1968) s u b j e c t s were a l s o p l a c e d i n a p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n game. P l a y e r s had 4 0 , 30 and 20 s e a t s r e s p e c t i v e l y i n p a r l i a m e n t . I n each of t h e 4 t r i a l s t h e y were c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a new s e t of p l a y e r s ,

i . e . r o t a t i o n took p l a c e . The p l a y e r s had t o d i v i d e 8 c a b i n e t p o s t s . I t a p p e a r e d t h a t r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s o c c u r r e d most o f t e n . The outcomes were most o f t e n d i v i d e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y a l t h o u g h t h e d i f f e r e n c e between p r o p o r t i o n a l and an e q u a l d i v i s i o n was g r e a t e r f o r BC c o a l i t i o n s t h a n f o r AC c o a l i t i o n s . P r i o r t o t h e game t h e p l a y e r s ' e x p e c t a t i o n about a p r o s p e c t i v e c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r and about t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes w a s r e q u e s t e d . I t a p p e a r e d t h a t i n g e n e r a l no systematic p r e f e r e n c e f o r a p r o s p e c t i v e c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r w a s found, a l t h o u g h t h e r e w a s a n o v e r a l l tendency t h a t p l a y e r C p r e f e r r e d B t o A and t h a t A was more p r e f e r r e d by B t h a n by C. The d a t a s u g g e s t t h a t A e x p e c t s more outcomes t h a n B , w h i l e B e x p e c t s more outcomes t h a n C The r e s u l t s of t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n i n d i c a t e ( a ) o v e r a l l A and B a r e more a c t i v e t h a n C ,

( b ) A r e c e i v e s fewer p r o p o s a l s t h a n B , w h i l e

B r e c e i v e s fewer p r o p o s a l s t h a n C , ( c ) B does more p r o p o s a l s t o C A , while

than t o

C d o e s more p r o p o s a l s t o B t h a n t o A.

The two m o t i v a t i o n q u e s t i o n n a i r e s , which were handed o u t a f t e r t h e c o a l i t i o n had been made, asked about t h e p r i n c i p l e s on which c o a l i t i o n s were formed and t h e l e a d i n g p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g t o which outcomes were d i v i d e d . For c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n t h e minimum power p r i n c i p l e

-

-

a l l p a r t i e s are equal

was f a v o r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y more t h a n t h e minimum r e s o u r c e p r i n c i p l e , i . e .

t h e s m a l l e s t p o s s i b l e m a j o r i t y h a s t o make a c o a l i t i o n . For t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes t h e minimum power p r i n c i p l e

-

b o t h members a r e e q u a l l y n e c e s s a r y -

and t h e minimum r e s o u r c e p r i n c i p l e , i . e . "members i n a c o a l i t i o n s h o u l d d i v i d e t h e outcomes a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r e s o u r c e s ; t h e p a r t y who h a s more s e a t s , h a s t h e r i g h t t o more seats", were c h o s e n e q u a l l y o f t e n . From t h e above-mentioned r e s u l t s i t was c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y d o e s i n d e e d e x p l a i n t h e formed c o a l i t i o n s : r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s

were formed. However, s e v e r a l d a t a p l e a a g a i n s t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : (1) b e f o r e h a n d no s y s t e m a t i c p r e f e r e n c e f o r a p r o s p e c t e d c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r was f o u n d . From

Chapter 3 / Coalition fomation from a socio-psychological perspective

153

minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y one might e x p e c t t h a t A and B would p r e f e r C a s t h e p r o s p e c t i v e c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r , w h i l e C s h o u l d p r e f e r B . T h e r e was i n d e e d a tendency t o w a r d s t h e l a t t e r r e s u l t , however, B p r e f e r r e d A i n s t e a d o f C! ( 2 ) As f o r t h e c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n , s u b j e c t s had t h e i n s i g h t t h a t t h e y were

e q u a l and t h a n any c o a l i t i o n c o u l d be formed. We c o n c l u d e d from t h e s e r e s u l t s t h a t o t h e r p r o c e s s e s t h a n t h o s e i m p l i e d by minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y were a t work. On t h e o t h e r hand t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes i s more s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d by t h e e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e , i . e . by a p r o p o r t i o n a l d i v i s i o n , which i n d e e d u n d e r l i e s minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y : p l a y e r s e x p e c t e d outcomes t h a t

were i n p r o p o r t i o n

t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r e s o u r c e s ; outcomes were a l s o d i v i d e d somewhere between e q u i t y and e q u a l i t y . The r e s u l t s of t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a r e more a c c o r d i n g t o e x p e c t a t i o n s of minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y : A and B a r e more a c t i v e t h a n C . P l a y e r B a l s o r e c e i v e s most p r o p o s a l s . P l a y e r s B and C a r e i n t e r a c t i n g more with each o t h e r than w i t h A . Summarizing: w e s e e t h a t t h e minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r e t i c a l a s s u m p t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y t h a t w e i g h t s , r e s o u r c e s , a r e s e e n a s i n d i c e s f o r power

does n o t

h o l d . However, t h e e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e as such h a s a s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e . One c a n o b s e r v e t h i s i n b o t h t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s as w e l l a s i n t h e r e s u l t s Of t h e m o t i v a t i o n q u e s t i o n n a i r e a b o u t t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes. From t h e o b s e r v a t i o n d a t a i t seems v e r y l i k e l y t h a t d u r i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n p r o c e s s , c o n s e q u e n c e s of a " c h e a p e s t c o a l i t i o n " , which u n d e r l y minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y , become more s a l i e n t . The e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e a s s u c h i s n o t a p p l i e d q u i t e r i g o r o u s l y : one e x p e c t s and d i v i d e s outcomes somewhere between s t r i c t p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y and e q u a l i t y ( s e e a l s o C h e r t k o f f 1 9 7 5 ) .

The ' p r o c e s s ' s t u d i e s r e p o r t e d above d e m o n s t r a t e v e r y c l e a r l y t h a t a d i s t i n c t i n s i g h t i n t o what i s r e a l l y h a p p e n i n g i n s i d e t h e b l a c k box, i s still lacking.

One g e t s t h e i d e a t h a t t h e same r e s u l t may be r e a c h e d a l o n g v a r i o u s p a t h s . One a l s o sees c l e a r l y t h a t a c o n v i n c i n g b a r g a i n i n g t h e o r y d o e s n o t p r e s e n t i t s e l f . A f a c t , which h a s a l r e a d y been s i g n a l l e d by T e d e s c h i

e t a l . (1973,

p . 166), when t h e y remark t h a t "no s o p h i s t i c a t e d t h e o r y of b a r g a i n i n g i s available". We d i d r e s t r i c t o u r s e l v e s t o two games. As f a r a s t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d game i s c o n c e r n e d w e a g r e e w i t h K e l l e y and Arrowood a s much a s w i t h C a l d w e l l when t h e y s t a t e t h a t A ' s i n i t i a l a d v a n t a g e and a l l p l a y e r s '

tendency t o a t t a c h

154

H. Wilke

value t o t h e randomly r e c e i v e d r e s o u r c e s might p l a y a r o l e . Our r e s u l t s however, c l e a r l y demonstrate t h a t t h e p l a y e r s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l convention game do n o t a t t a c h much v a l u e t o i t , They had a c l e a r i n s i g h t t h e y were e q u a l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e y had t o make a c o a l i t i o n and t o exclude t h e t h i r d person. On t h e o t h e r hand we see t h a t p l a y e r s f r e q u e n t l y use t h e i r r e s o u r c e s t o determine how many outcomes t h e y should d e s e r v e . Outcomes which a r e s u b s e q u e n t l y d i v i d e d somewhere halfway between p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y of e q u i t y and e q u a l i t y . One may e x p l a i n t h i s by assuming t h a t on t h e one hand t h e p l a y e r s had t h e i n s i g h t t h e y were e q u a l and on t h e o t h e r hand t h a t t h e y had t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n among them, i . e . t h e y had t o u s e t h e i r r e s o u r c e s t o d i s c r i m i n a t e among them. One may wonder, i f t h i s i s t h e b e s t e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e b a s i c i d e a of t h e s o - c a l l e d b a r g a i n i n g t h e o r y ( s e e Kommorita and Meek, 1978 and c h a p t e r 2 . Contrary t o t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d game, t h e cue of t h e i n i t i a l advantage of A , who i n t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d game

could win a l l outcomes

was not a v a i l a b l e i n

t h e p o l i t i c a l convention game. On t h e o t h e r hand, one c o u l d e x p e c t t h a t t h e r e c o u r c e s would have a somewhat h i g h e r f a c e v a l i d i t y . The r e s u l t s of t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s b e f o r e t h e game do n o t confirm t h i s i d e a . The s u b j e c t s had t h e i d e a t h e y were e q u a l and d i d n o t show a s t r o n g p r e f e r e n c e f o r any player. On t h e o t h e r hand w e saw q u i t e c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t d u r i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n t h e e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e , which assumes t h a t t h e r e should e x i s t some c o n s i s t e n c y between r e s o u r c e s and outcomes, p l a y s a s t r o n g r o l e . The r e s u l t s s u g g e s t t h a t minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,

-

n o t a b l y t h e e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e combined with t h e i d e a t h a t people maximize t h e i r outcomes, which l e a d s t o a p r e f e r e n c e f o r c h e a p e s t winning c o a l i t i o n s

-

p l a y a s a l i e n t r o l e d u r i n g t h e b a r g a i n i n g , a tendency which was a b s e n t

p r i o r t o t h e game!

The above-mentioned r e s u l t s l e a d us t o t h e i d e a t h a t t h e r e i s no s i n g l e cause i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n t h a t may e x p l a i n a l l c o a l i t i o n b e h a v i o r . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g w e w i l l c o n s t r u c t a q u a l i t a t i v e model which tries t o e x p l a i n most of t h e above-mentioned d a t a .

155

Chapter 3 f Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective 3.5

AN INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION

3.5.1

Conservative c o a l i t i o n s (a) the cognitive c o n f l i c t ( b ) t h e c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s

3.5.2

Revolutionary c o a l i t i o n s (a) the cognitive c o n f l i c t ( b ) t h e c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s

3.5

AN INFORMATION PROCESSING APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION

W e assume t h a t i n m o s t s i t u a t i o n s i n which a c o a l i t i o n h a s t o b e formed t w o

s p e c i f i c c o n f l i c t s a r e i n v o l v e d . The f i r s t i s a c o g n i t i v e c o n f l i c t . Brehmer and Hammond (1977) assume t h a t i t i s d e f i n e d by d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p r o b a b i l i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between c u e s o r p r e d i c t o r s and a c r i t e r i o n t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e s o l u t i o n of a s h a r e d problem. Druckman e t a l . (1977) s t a t e t h a t i n t h i s c a s e ' p a r t i e s d i s a g r e e o v e r t h e b e s t way t o a c h i e v e a p a r t i c u l a r outcome r a t h e r t h a n o v e r what t h e p a r t i c u l a r outcome s h o u l d b e ' .

In

t h i s sense players t r y t o fi n d a consensual p redi ct or o r input var i abl e f o r t h e way outcomes of a c o a l i t i o n s h o u l d b e d i v i d e d . T h i s c o g n i t i v e c o n f l i c t

i s more i n t e n s e , i f t h e r e a r e more competine p r e d i c t o r s i n v o l v e d and i f t h e c r i t e r i o n i s more ambiguous. The second c o n f l i c t i s a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s . Each p a r t y t r i e s t o g e t a s many of t h e s c a r c e outcomes a s p o s s i b l e . The c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t i s t h e g r e a t e s t i f t h e outcomes are i n d e e d h i g h l y d e s i r e d and i f t h e outcomes o b t a i n e d by one p a r t y a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e o t h e r p a r t y . B a r g a i n i n g about t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes is required.

According t o Brehmer and Hammond (1977) t h e c o g n i t i v e c o n f l i c t

i s s o l v e d by a d e b a t e about p r e d i c t o r s and c r i t e r i a , whereas t h e c o n f l i c t

of i n t e r e s t i s d e t e r m i n e d by b a r g a i n i n g about t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes. I n c o a l i t i o n s i t u a t i o n s b o t h p r o c e s s e s may be assumed t o p l a y a r o l e . I n t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d game e . g . , t h e exchange of communication i s p a r t l y about whether o r n o t t h e 4-3-2

resources a r e relevant predictors,

i . e . it r e f e r s

t o a d e b a t e t o s o l v e t h e c o g n i t i v e a m b i g u i t y . On t h e o t h e r hand t h e communication c o n s i s t s of t h e b a r g a i n i n g about s c a r c e outcomes. That t h e two c o n f l i c t s a r e n o t independent m a y b e i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e c a s e of A i n a 4-3-2

power t y p e . I f i n t h e d e b a t e about a c o n s e n s u a l p r e d i c t o r i t i s

a c c e p t e d t h a t "4" s t a n d s f o r r e a l power, t h e n i t i s a l s o a c c e p t e d t h a t A

w i l l be a more e x p e n s i v e c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r , which may s e r v e A ' s p e r s o n a l

156 interest. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g w e w i l l t r y t o i n t e g r a t e t h e above r e p o r t e d e x p e r i m e n t a l r e s u l t s by p l a c i n g them a g a i n s t t h e background of a q u a l i t a t i v e model, which i s f i r s t d e s c r i b e d f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n of c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s and a f t e r t h a t f o r revolutionary coalitions.

3.5.1

CONSERVATIVE COALITIONS

a ) THE COGNITIVE CONFLICT

We may see groups a s o r g a n i s m s i n which incoming a m b i g u i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n

i s broken o f f . For i n d i v i d u a l s i n most c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n e x p e r i m e n t s , t h e g o a l of t h e group i s q u i t e d i s t i n c t . I t i s made c l e a r t h a t a c o a l i t i o n h a s t o b e formed and outcomes have t o b e d i v i d e d . U s u a l l y i t i s a l s o made c l e a r t h a t o n l y two of t h e p l a y e r s a r e a b l e t o e n t e r a c o a l i t i o n . Because a c o a l i t i o n c o n s i s t s of t h e i n c l u s i o n of two and t h e e x c l u s i o n of o n e , t h e most dominant c o n s e n s u a l problem i s t o f i n d o u t a p r e d i c t o r on which t h i s d e c i s i o n may b e b a s e d . C o a l i t i o n s i t u a t i o n s may d i f f e r t o t h e e x t e n t t o which t h i s c o n s e n s u a l p r e d i c t o r is made c l e a r , i . e . i s g i v e n by t h e s i t u a t i o n i t s e l f o r , t o p u t i t d i f f e r e n t l y , i s induced by t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r . I n s e c t i o n s 3 . 4 . 2 , 3 . 4 . 4 and 3 . 4 . 5 w e have r e p o r t e d s e v e r a l s t u d i e s i n which t h e c r i t e r i o n was r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r , i . e . t h e p l a y e r s had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n a g r e e i n g upon a c o n s e n s u a l p r e d i c t o r . ( 1 ) In 3 . 4 . 2 ( p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s ) i t was c o n c l u d e d t h a t i f p r o b a b i l i t y

Of

s u c c e s s f o r a l l p o s s i b l e c o a l i t i o n s had been v a r i e d i n t h e same d e g r e e , no e f f e c t c o u l d be f o u n d . However, i f t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f o i a c o a l i t i o n w i t h one s p e c i f i c member, e . g . A (see C h e r t k o f f 1966) i n c r e a s e d , t h a t member had a h i g h e r chance t o become a member of a c o a l i t i o n . A p p a r e n t l y , s t r o n g d i f f e r e n c e s among p a r t i e s i n p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s l e a d t o a c c e p t a n c e of a c o n s e n s u a l p r e d i c t o r . The same may be s a i d about s t r o n g d i f f e r e n c e s among p l a y e r s who d i f f e r i n t h e amount of q u o t a (Kahan and Rapoport 1977, 1979; Roth 1979; Komorita 1979; see a l s o c h . 2 ) . S t r o n g d i f f e r e n c e s among q u o t a s of p l a y e r s i n c r e a s e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e s e c u e s become e f f e c t i v e p r e d i c t o r s . (2)

I n 3 . 4 . 4 ( c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s ) w e r e p o r t e d s t u d i e s where c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s have been found most o f t e n . For a l l t h e s e s t u d i e s t h e c o n s e n s u a l p r e d i c t o r was r e l a t i v e l y c l e a r . I n B a r n e t t and Cole's s t u d y (Cole and B a r n e t t 1978) t h e r e s o u r c e s of p l a y e r 4 i n d e e d may b e s e e n a s

Chapter 3 f Coalition formation f r o m a sociu-psychological perspective

151

a good p r e d i c t o r . The r e s o u r c e s of A e x p r e s s i n d e e d a n e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e outcomes o f t h e game, b e c a u s e A more t h a n B and C

- by h i s r e l a t i v e competence - i n c r e a s e s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e c o a l i t i o n i s i n d e e d s u c c e s s f u l . The same h o l d s f o r t h e l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n i n t h e Wilke, Pruyn e x p e r i m e n t (Wilke an6 Pruyn 1 9 8 1 ) . I n t h e s t u d i e s of Hartman, Cole and P h i l l i p s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , L i r t z m a n and Wahba (1972) t h e c o n n e c t i o n between r e s o u r c e s and f u t u r e success o f t h e c o a l i t i o n was i n d u c e d more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y . A c o a l i t i o n w i t h A gave a h i g h e r p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s a n d a l s o more outcomes t h a n a c o a l i t i o n w i t h B and C . In a l l t h e s e c a s e s t h e d e b a t e about t h e consensual p r e d i c t o r i s s o l v e d by a c l e a r c u e , p r e d i c t o r , i . e . t h e r e s o u r c e s , which c l e a r l y d i s c r i m i n a t e among t h e p l a y e r s . The c o g n i t i v e c o n f l i c t a b o u t a s h a r e d p r e d i c t o r may a l s o b e s o l v e d otherwise. In the input-relevant

c o n d i t i o n of t h e s t u d y of Mess6 e t a l .

( 1 9 7 5 ) , A , B and C worked 2 h o u r s , 14 h o u r s and 1 h o u r r e s p e c t i v e l y p r i o r t o t h e e x p e r i m e n t . I n t h i s way t h e d e b t of t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r t o A w a s g r e a t e r t h a n t o B and C . These d i f f e r e n c e s i n d e b t a p p a r e n t l y were a c c e p t e d a s a c u e t o d i s c r i m i n a t e among t h e p l a y e r s . Recent s t u d i e s of L a w l e r ( 1 9 7 5 a , 1 9 7 5 b ) , Michener and Lyons (1972) and Michener and Lawler (1971) s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t l e g i t i m a c y o f r e s o u r c e s b r i n g s up c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s . L e g i t i m a c y of r e s o u r c e s r e f e r s t o t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e o r d e r i n g of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s on a s h a r e d c r i t e rion.

( 3 ) I n 3 . 4 . 5 ( a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y and c o n t r o l ) w e r e p o r t e d s t u d i e s i n which a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t a b o u t a common p r e d i c t o r was s o l v e d by a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y . A t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y was a p p a r e n t l y s h a r e d as a d i s c r i m i n a t e c u e . The s t u d i e s o f Lawler and Youngs ( 1 9 7 5 ) , L e i s e r s o n ( 1 9 7 0 ) , M i l l e r (1979) and Wilke e t a l . (1978) s i m p l y s u g g e s t t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n a t t i t u d e - o r p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n a r e more l i k e l y t o b e s h a r e d a s a d i s c r i m i n a t e c u e t h a n d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e s o u r c e s among t h e p l a y e r s . T h e r e f o r e , e . g . i n t h e Wilke e t a l . s t u d y , a g r e a t e r p a r t o f t h e t o t a l v a r i a n c e i s e x p l a i n e d by a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y .

The f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n i n g may b e somewhat s h a r p e n e d by r e f e r r i n g t o t w o r e l a t e d i d e a s a b o u t i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g . The f i r s t , which i s d e r i v e d from c y b e r n e t i c s , r e f e r s t o i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s e s i n g e n e r a l . I t e x p l a i n s how i n f o r m a t i o n i s p r o c e s s e d and how a m b i g u i t y i s d e c r e a s e d i n a g i v e n

H. Wilke

158

s y s t e m . The second i d e a , which i s borrowed from F e s t i n g e r (1950), shows how i n a group t h e s e p r o c e s s e s a r e a c t i v e . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g w e w i l l e x p l a i n b o t h i d e a s . Moreover w e w i l l demonstrate t h a t , having decided on a c e r t a i n c r i t e r i o n , t h i s h a s i t s e f f e c t f o r b o t h c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n a s w e l l a s f o r t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes. A.

INFORMATION PROCESSING

I n t h e f o l l o w i n g we make u s e of i d e a s developed by Miller e t a l . (1960)

Exit

Test

congruity

incongruity

r Operate

Figure 2

A c y b e r n e t i c model. (TOTE: u n i t ; i.e. test-operate-test-exit).

Group i n t e r a c t i o n may be seen a s a c o n t r o l system. Incoming i n f o r m a t i o n

(see f i g . 2 ) is c o n t r o l l e d by comparing it w i t h a c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d . If t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s n o t congruous w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d , t h e second mechanism ( o p e r a t e ) i s a c t i v a t e d . ' O p e r a t e ' changes t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s somewhat. Following ' o p e r a t e ' ,

' t e s t ' o c c u r s . I f t h e i n p u t i s congruous w i t h

t h e s t a n d a r d , t h e f i n a l mechanism ' e x i t ' o c c u r s . Then t h e system i s d e a c t i v a t e d . I f on t h e o t h e r hand t h e test r e v e a l s t h a t i n c o n g r u i t y s t i l l e x i s t s , again ' o p e r a t e ' i s a c t i v a t e d . T h i s p r o c e s s c o n t i n u e s u n t i l a l l i n c o n g r u i t y ,

i . e . ambiguity i s removed. Congruity between i n p u t and s t a n d a r d i s a t t a i n e d . The room t h e r m o s t a t p r e s e n t s a n i l l u s t r a t i v e example. The t h e r m o s t a t s e n s e s t h e t e m p e r a t u r e . I t compares t h a t

temperature with a p r e - s e t s t a n d a r d . If

t h e temperature i s below t h e s t a n d a r d t h e f u r n a c e s t a r t s o p e r a t i n g . The

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation f r o m a socio-psychological perspective

159

operation of furnace ends if the temperature of the room is equal to that of the pre-set standard, i.e. congruity is reached. Carver (1979) states that in psychological systems control structures are active. As examples he mentions a child's self-correcting attempt to reach out to touch a nearby object, and the adult's checking and adjusting his or her clothes in a mirror. The application of the information processing model to the behavior of coalition forming groups is not a simple one. The main problem is to determine what the pre-set standard is. The answer to this question has to be found in the task situation. Mostly an experimenter explains to the subjects that it is their task to make a coalition, in which two persons are included and one is excluded. We assume that this is the pre-set standard: to separate two from one. If this pre-standard, criterion, is set, the cybernetic model assumes that the incoming input is compared with the pre-set standard. In the above-mentioned experiments the differences among the players allow for this. The resources of the players permit an ordering of the players on a dimension; two players are dominant over the third on a certain predictor. The debate in the group about the tuning of input, the resources, to the standard is in our opinion rather easy in this situation. The situation implies strong differences among the players.

B. FESTINGER'S THEORY OF INFORMAL COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY In the foregoing we assumed that the members of an experimental group have a debate about the best way to meet the pre-set standard. Festinger's theory of informal communication refers to this debate as to'lpressures to uniformity."If a discrepancy about the best predictor (input-variable) to meet the task arises, group members will develop forces to create uniformity. They do this by informal communication. Festinger assumes that these communications are 'instrumental': 'the communication is not an end

H. Wilke

160

in itself but rather a means by which the communicator hopes to influence the person he addresses in such a way as to reduce the discrepancy that exists between them'. The pressures to uniformity are assumed to be greater

if the discrepancy in the group increases and if the task is

more relevant. For our coalition setting Festinger's ideas explain why group members develop pressures to uniformity. The task consists of discovering a predictor (an input-variable), which makes it possible to meet the pre-set standard. For the above mentioned coalition settings we may assume that the discrepancy among the players is not very large, since the differences in resources, which are easily fitted to the pre-set standard, do not seem to create large discrepancies in the perception of the pre-set standard and the input among the players. On the other hand the task (i.e. the tuning of an input-variable to the pre-set standard) is a highly relevant activity f o r the group members. Summarizing, Festinger's theory of informal communication may be seen as a theory that describes the way potential coalition members elaborate all information, so that a consensus arises about what the relevant input-variable (see fig. 2) should be. In this view the coalition situation corresponds to the thermostat example. The experimenter determines the pre-set standard: e.g.

Z O O

C.

He also presents differences in temperature,

humidity, atmospheric pressure etc. The group members have to determine which measure (input-variable) should be selected to meet the pre-set standard. By communication they should select temperature a s the relevant input-variable. It is clear that the selection of a relevant input-variable (temperature) is quite easy. In the same way we assume that it is quite easy for the players in the coalition situation in which conservative coalitions are formed to select initial differences as the relevant input-vaTiable. Festinger's social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) makes it clear why in the case of accepted differences on an input-variable the two more competent and powerful are chosen and why in the case of attitudinal differences attitudinal similarity is most often chosen as a preferred ordering of the players on the input-variable. Festinger (1954) builds on his 1950 article. The aforementioned pressure to uniformity is now formulated as 'The existence of a discrepancy in a group with respect to opinions or abilities will lead to action on the part of members of that group to reduce the discrepancy' (derivation D). The more similar others

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socic-psychological perspective

16 1

a r e , t h e h i g h e r t h e c h a n c e t h e y a r e c h o s e n f o r s o c i a l comparison. F e s t i n g e r (1954) makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between comparison of o p i n i o n s or a t t i t u d e s and a b i l i t y o r power. H i s h y p o t h e s i s V s t a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s ' a u n i d i r e c t i o n a l d r i v e upward i n t h e c a s e of a b i l i t i e s which is l a r g e l y a b s e n t i n o p i n i o n s . '

H e e x p l a i n s t h i s by assuming t h a t a h i g h e r competence and a g r e a t e r power

i s more d e s i r a b l e i n o u r c u l t u r e , whereas a p r e f e r r e d d i r e c t i o n i s a b s e n t f o r o p i n i o n s and a t t i t u d e s , Thus f o r b o t h power- and a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e among p l a y e r s F e s t i n g e r p r e d i c t s ( s e e S u l s and Miller 1977; Rijsman and Wilke 1980) t h a t t h e more s i m i l a r o t h e r w i l l b e chosen a s a c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r . This w e observed f o r a t t i t u d i n a l d i s c r e p a n c i e s ( s e c t i o n 3 . 5 . 5 ) : saw a p r e f e r e n c e f o r r i g h t - c e n t r e

we

and l e f t - c e n t r e c o a l i t i o n s o v e r l e f t -

-right coalitions. However, f o r a c c e p t e d a b i l i t y d i f f e r e n c e s w e s a w t h e upward d r i v e f o r a b i l i t i e s and power a t work: A had a p r e f e r e n c e f o r B , w h i l e B p r e f e r r e d A a s h i s coalition partner (see section 3.5.4).

I n r e c e n t r e a s o n i n g a b o u t s o c i a l comparison p r o c e s s e s ( s e e Rijsman and Wilke 1980) t h e d i f f e r e n c e between s o c i a l comparison of a b i l i t i e s and a t t i t u d e s h a s been worked o u t . They s u g g e s t t h a t (1) f o r b o t h a s i m i l a r i t y tendency works ( 2 ) f o r a l l p r e - s e t s t a n d a r d s i . e . p r e d i c t o r s f o r which a p r e f e r r e d , a d e s i r e d s c a l e end i s known, an upward d r i v e may b e assumed. Thus a l s o f o r a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s f o r which one a t t i t u d e i s more p r e f e r r e d t h a n o t h e r a t t i t u d e s , a tendency may be e x p e c t e d . For p r e - s t a n d a r d s

i n the preferred direction

where o n l y s i m i l a r i t y i s i n v o l v e d ,

always a more s i m i l a r o t h e r i s c h o s e n . Sometimes o p i n i o n s and a t t i t u d e s have t h i s c h a r a c t e r . For p r e d i c t o r s f o r which a p r e f e r r e d d i r e c t i o n i s known,

t h e upward d r i v e ( h i g h e r on t h e p r e - s t a n d a r d

scale) results in

t h e c h o i c e of a somewhat more p r e f e r r e d p e r s o n . A b i l i t i e s always have t h i s c h a r a c t e r ; a t t i t u d e s sometimes ( s e e s y s t e m 2 i n F i g . 3).

EQUITY THEORY, THE DIVISION O F OUTCOMES I n most c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n s t u d i e s c o a l i t i o n s are formed and outcomes a r e d i v i d e d . E q u i t y t h e o r y (Adams 1 9 6 5 ; Homans 1961; Berkowitz and Walster 1976; L e r n e r 1975; von Crumbkow and Wilke 1974) s t a t e s t h a t outcomes a r e t o b e d i v i d e d e q u i t a b l y . E q u i t y i s r e a l i z e d if i n p u t s of e a c h p l a y e r are p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e i r outcomes. For c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n t h i s means t h a t a p l a y e r s h o u l d r e c e i v e a s h a r e of t h e outcomes, which i s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o h i s l e g i t i m i z e d r e s o u r c e s . As one may remember, t h i s i s one of t h e

162

H Wilke

a s s u m p t i o n s o f minimum r e s o u r c e t h e o r y (Gamson 1 9 6 4 ) . From t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g model i t may b e made c l e a r t h a t p l a y e r s i f t h e y h a v e d e c i d e d upon a c e r t a i n i n p u t - v a r i a b l e ( s e e test 1 i n f i g . 3) a n d h a v i n g o r d e r e d t h e p l a y e r s o n i t ( s e e t e s t 2 i n f i g . 3) t h e y w i l l s t r i v e f o r c o n g r u i t y b e t w e e n i n p u t s , i . e . t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e p l a y e r s on t h e i n p u t - v a r i a b l e , a n d t h e o u t c o m e s , which h a v e t o b e d i v i d e d . The i n p u t d i f f e r e n c e s s e r v e t h e n a s a p r e d i c t o r a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e o u t c o m e s , a r e t o b e d i v i d e d Thus h a v i n g d e c i d e d upon a c o n c e n s u a l p r e d i c t o r , i . e . d i f f e r e n c e s among p l a y e r s , t h e o u t c o m e s are t o b e d i v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n p l a y e r s . I n t h i s c a s e o u t c o m e s are t o b e d i v i d e d i n p r o p o r t i o n t o a c c e p t e d d i f f e r e n c e s between p l a y e r s , b e c a u se c o n g r u i t y o r consonance (Gamson 1964) i s p u r s u e d . So the e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e may b e s a i d t o s e r v e as a t h i r d pre-set

standard.

SYSTEM 1

'

input-vnriablos

,

select that exit: v n r i n b l ~which most9 t h e p r e - s e t S t a n d a r d as much 118 p o s a i b l e

legitimate input-variable selected 1.e. roBL)"*cBz

are lagitlmieod

PRE-SET STANDARD 1 i n c l u s i o n of two nnd

incongruity

~ l w i o anf one member oporationa

1I

SYSTEY 2 1egitimte

or

~~BDUTCBB

players

SELECT t h o s e PlnYBrs, which congruity' meet t h e p r o - s e t s t a n d a r d 0 8 much 8 8 p o a e i b l e

exit: coalition member selected

PRE-SET STANDARD 2

ioCOngrUity

f o r ATTITUDES B e l O C t t h o most s i m i l a r one. For WWER: s e l e c t t h o Somewhat more p o w r f u l

I SYSTEM 3 legitimate

or

~~SOYICDI~

player. IllCOngNity

II

Test 3

I divide the eongruityP e x i t : O U t E O r n D S O"tC0rn08 so nllocatcd t h a t t h e division meets t h e pre-set standard

PRE-SET STANDARD 3 the equity principle: s l l o C n t D O"tCOrn.3* i n p r O p a r t i o " t o t h e l o g i t i n i n e d resources

Figure 3 S o l v i n g t h e c o g n i t i v e c o n f l i c t f o r l e g i t i m i z e d resource:3.

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socio-psychologicalperspective

163

I n f i g . 3 w e s e e a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e t h r e e s e p a r a t e p r o c e s s e s . They d e s c r i b e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y t h e t h r e e s u b p r o c e s s e s which a r e a c t i v e i n o r d e r t o reduce i n c o n g r u i t y . The f i r s t i s aimed a t t h e s e l e c t i o n of a r e l e v a n t input-variable;

t h e second a t t h e s e l e c t i o n o f c o a l i t i o n members; t h e t h i r d

a t t h e d i v i s i o n of outcomes. The i n p u t of t h e t h r e e s y s t e m s c h a n g e s : t h e f i r s t system describes a l l possible input-variables; t h i r d t h e l e g i t i m i z e d (consensual) input-variable.

t h e second and t h e

For c o n s e r v a t i v e

c o a l i t i o n s t h e s e a r e t h e r e s o u r c e s of t h e p l a y e r s . The p r e - s e t

standards

d i f f e r : t h e f i r s t d e s c r i b e s t h e t a s k g i v e n by t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r - i . e . i n c l u s i o n of 2 and e x c l u s i o n o f 1

-

t h e second and t h e t h i r d o n e s a r e p r e s c r i b e d

by p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e n d e n c i e s i n t h e p e r s o n , namely f o r t h e second p r e - s e t s t a n d a r d t h e s e l e c t i o n of a more a b l e , a more powerful p e r s o n and i n t h e c a s e of a t t i t u d e s a more s i m i l a r o t h e r o n e . As a p r e - s e t

standard f o r the

third system the equity principle serves. The 3 s y s t e m s d e s c r i b e how i n c o n g r u i t y i s broken off. Group members do t h i s by i n f o r m a l communication. The i d e a t h a t t h i s d e b a t e is e x e c u t e d w i t h t h e l e a s t c o n f l i c t (Brehmer and Hammond 1977) means i n o u r s y s t e m s t h a t i n c o n g r u i t y i s broken o f f by means of t h e smallest p o s s i b l e number of o p e r a t i o n s , i . e . communications.

COGNITIVE CONFLICT

--+

system

input

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS:

bargaining o f f e r s

InconKruity

c

TI

s e l e c t that o f f e r which meets

congruity

Offer 88 l e c t e d

t h e pre-SET standard a s much as possible PRE-SET STANDARD 4 : maximize outcomes.

Figure 4 Simultaneous o p e r a t i o n of 3 c o n g r u i t y c r e a t i n g s y s t e m s where t h e c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t i s assumed t o b e a 4 t h i n c o n g r u i t y reduction s y s t e m .

I64

H. Wilke

To make the picture somewhat more complicated we assume that the three information processes take place at the same time. This we have depicted in figure 4 . This figure also stresses that the debate about the creation of congruity takes place at the same time as the bargaining, in which everybody tries to maximize his personal outcomes. Cognitive conflict b

Conflict of interests outcomes

Exit

Figure 5 Interaction of incongruity reduction and maximizing outcomes. The cognitive conflict is solved (c) or not solved (d). If solved (c) look after the extent to which it maximizes outcomes; if not solved re-elaborate the input (a). The conflict of interests is solved ( e ) or not solved to own advantage (f).

If solved (e) stop further bargaining; if not solved re-elaborate the input (b). b. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST In figure 5 we may find a tentative model of how the interaction of incongruity reduction and maximizing outcomes takes place. I f the cognitive conflict about which coalition has to be formed and how the outcomes are to be divided is sufficiently solved (c), each of the players asks himself if the outcomes indeed maximize his outcomes. If this is so, a coalition is definite (e).

If this is not so the players try to redefine the situation

(b) in the hope that a more attractive solution (e) may b e found. If the cognitive conflict is not solved (d), operations of the kind mentioned in system 1, 2 and 3 (see fig. 3) follow ( s e e (a) in figure 5 ) . Three points may be made about the notion of,conflict of interest developed above: 1) This presentation adds another congruity system to the 3 already mentioned

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation f r o m a socio-psychological perspective

165

( s e e lower p a r t of f i g u r e 4 ) . The o f f e r s of t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s may b e s e e n a s the input-variable; t h e pre-set

s t a n d a r d of t h e s u b j e c t t h e n i s t h e r u l e

t h a t a p l a y e r t r i e s t o maximize h i s outcomes: he p r e f e r s h i g h e r outcomes t o lower o n e s . One may a l s o i n c l u d e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h which t h e outcomes a r e t o be o b t a i n e d . Combining b o t h v a r i a b l e s ( p r o b a b i l i t y a n d u t i l i t y ) comes v e r y c l o s e t o f o r m u l a t i o n s of d e c i s i o n t h e o r y ( T e d e s c h i e t a l . 1973; Miller 1979): p e o p l e t r y t o maximize t h e i r e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y . The maximal e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y of a n outcome s e r v e s a s a p r e - s e t

s t a n d a r d w i t h which t h e

o f f e r e d outcomes a r e t o be f i t t e d . 2 ) S o c i a l l e a r n i n g t h e o r i s t s ( e . g . S t a a t s 1975) assume t h a t h a v i n g f i t t e d a p r e - s e t

s t a n d a r d means a reward

f o r l e a r n i n g o r g a n i s m s . For i n s t a n c e , i f one r e a c h e s a p l a n n e d g o a l , one

is r e w a r d e d .

So one

3 i s a reward i n i t s e l f .

may s a y t h a t h a v i n g f i t t e d p r e - s e t s t a n d a r d

W e agree with t h e

idea t h a t people always

maximize rewards (see T e d e s c h i e t a l . 1973). On t h e o t h e r hand w e p r e f e r a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s p e c i f i c r e w a r d s which a r e i n v o l v e d ( s e e f i g . 3 and 4) t o a more g l o b a l o n e . T h e o r e t i c a l l y however, t h e r e is no c o n t r a d i c t i o n between a n e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y a p p r o a c h and t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g a p p r a o c h , an a p p r o a c h which may be s e e n a s a f r a m e of r e f e r e n c e , which d e s c r i b e s t h e s e v e r a l r e w a r d s i n v o l v e d more s p e c i f i c a l l y .

3) S o , w e have now 4 s y s t e m s w i t h 4 p r e - s e t

s t a n d a r d s ( a ) i n c l u s i o n of 2 ,

e x c l u s i o n of 1 ; ( b ) s e l e c t most s i m i l a r ; s e l e c t most p o w e r f u l one ( c ) ; t h e e q u i t y s t a n d a r d ( d ) ; t h e maximizing g a i n s s t a n d a r d . One may assume t h a t t h e s e s t a n d a r d s p l a y a r o l e d u r i n g t h e c o n t a c t p h a s e ( s e e 3.5.6): o n e selects a p a r t n e r a n d d i v i d e s t h e outcomes s o t h a t t h e 4 pre-set

standards a r e f i t t e d at t h e s a m e t i m e .

I n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n phase whom t h e p r e - s e t

e a c h p l a y e r meets 2 o t h e r p l a y e r s f o r

s t a n d a r d s may have d i f f e r e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h i s c o m p l i c a -

t i o n a d d s a 5 t h s y s t e m . T h e o r e t i c a l l y one may p r e d i c t t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h a t c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r w i t h whom t h e e x p e c t e d i n c o n g r u i t y i s minimal. B e s i d e s t h i s , o t h e r f a c t o r s may t h e n come i n t o e f f e c t : (1) The f i r s t o f f e r c r e a t e s a s t r o n g primacy e f f e c t : f i r s t o f f e r s have a s t r o n g p r o b a b i l i t y of f i n a l s u c c e s s (Wilke 1968). ( 2 ) R e c i p r o c a l c h o i c e s (Ofshe and Ofshe 1969, 1970) which may b e done on c h a n c e , i n c r e a s e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a f i n a l c o a l i t i o n ( s e e C h e r t k o f f 1966; Wilke 1968). (3) Lieberman (1971) p o i n t s o u t t h a t mutual t r u s t may d e v e l o p d u r i n g t h e game. Mutual t r u s t may b e s e e n as a form o f r e c i p r o c i t y , which is acknowledged by t h e p l a y e r s . As w e have d e p i c t e d i n s y s t e m 2 ( s e e f i g u r e 3) a t t i t u d i n a l s i m i l a r i t y may work as a pre-set

standard.

166

H. Wilke

As for reciprocity and trust, we think it is possible, that during the game, players may add attitudinal reciprocity as a legitimate resource (see system 2, fig. 3).

(4) In the same way liking may result from mutual bargaining. From the results of the study of Nacci and Tedeschi (1976) we know that induced liking has this effect. We do not see any reason why self-induced liking as much as experimenter's induced liking should not have its effect on coalition formation. (5) From studies in which the making of contractual norms is investigated in a dyadic situation (Murdoch 1967; Murdoch and Rosen 1970; Thibaut and Faucheux 1965) we know that strong players (e.g. 4) appear to stress the equity norm, whereas weak players stress the equality norm. Psathas and Stryker (1965) and Nitz (1976) point out that the same occurs in coalition formation settings. From fig. 3 it may be made clear that these strategic moves are intended to redefine the characteristics of the situations. As soon as a strong player gets the idea accepted that his resources are legitimate, it follows that he gets more outcomes and more rights to become a member of a final coalition (system 2 and 3), which is highly advantageously for him, i.e. it meets the requirements of system 4 , which is also implied in fig. 5 . One may say that during bargaining people negotiate about a (re)definition of the situation. (6) Occasional subtleties may also influence the definition of the situa-

tion. The so-called compatibility hypothesis (Nitz and Phillips 1969) may have this function. This hypothesis states that if outcomes are to be proportionally divided, more often strong coalitions are formed, whereas if outcomes are to be divided equally, more often weak coalitions are formed. This has been found in a questionnaire study, but may also work in a more full-fledged coalition formation situation. With a forced asymmetrical division of outcomes, the experimenter apparently induces more strongly asymmetry of the players' resources. With a forced equal division the experimenter facilitates a definition of the situation, for which the equality of players gets a higher chance on consensual acceptance.

(7) Personality differences (see Amidjajah and Vinacke 1965; Ashour 1975; Kalish et al. 1954; Stanfield 1974; McCaffey 1976) may serve as a legitimate resource (see system 2, fig. 3), which may redefine the situation. ( 8 ) The same holds for differences between male and female subjects. The

Chapter 3 / Coalirwn formarion f r o m a socio-psychological perspective

167

r e s u l t s of Nacci and T e d e s c h i (19761, namely t h a t males a r e m o r e s e n s i t i v e t o power d i f f e r e n c e s among p l a y e r s , whereas f e m a l e s a t t a c h a g r e a t e r s a l i e n c y t o l i k i n g a s a r e l e v a n t p r e d i c t o r , mean t h a t males a n d f e m a l e s d i f f e r i n t h e way an i n p u t - v a r i a b l e

i s s e l e c t e d ( s y s t e m 1, f i g . 3; s e e

a l s o c h . 1).

I n t h e f o r e g o i n g w e have mainly f o c u s s e d on t h o s e s t u d i e s i n which a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f s t r o n g o r c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n s h a s been f o u n d . We must, however, n o t f o r g e t , t h a t i n t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s a l s o some weak o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l it i o n s were f o u n d . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g w e w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e o n s t u d i e s i n which a p r e p o n d e r a n c e of r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s is f o u n d . We w i l l assume t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s e s a c c o r d i n g t o which r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s a r e formed i n so-called

' c o n s e r v a t i v e ' s e t t i n g s , a p p l y s i m i l a r l y t o formed r e v o l u t i o n a r y

coalitions in 'revolutionary' settings.

3.5.2

REVOLUTIONARY COALITIONS

( a ) COGNITIVE CONLFICT I n Our o p i n i o n t h e c o g n i t i v e c o n f l i c t i n s t u d i e s , d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 3 . 5 . 1 1s r e l a t i v e l y h i g h . I n t h e p a c h i s i b o a r d game two i n p u t - v a r i a b l e s ( s e e s y s t e m 1, f i g . 3) were p r e s e n t e d by t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r . F i r s t t h e p l a y e r A c o u l d e a r n a l l outcomes, i f no c o a l i t i o n was made. S e c o n d l y , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r a s s i g n e d t h e r e s o u r c e s a t random. The c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s is t h a t t h e s e l e c t i o n o f a c o n s e n s u a l input-variable

i s a h i g h l y troublesome a f f a i r .

The s e l e c t i o n o f a c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r ( s y s t e m 2 ) and t h e d i v i s i o n of t h e r e s o u r c e s ( s y s t e m 3, f i g . 3) becomes v e r y u n s t a b l e b e c a u s e a c o n s e n s u a l input-variable

i s l a c k i n g . R e s u l t s of t h e c o a l i t i o n p r o c e s s e s ( s e c t i o n 3.5.6)

support t h i s idea. The p l a y e r s had a c l e a r i n s i g h t t h a t t h e i r r e s o u r c e s were e q u a l , b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s had t h e t a s k t o make a c o a l i t i o n , t o i n c l u d e t w o and t o e x c l u d e one p l a y e r . In t h e s t a n d a r d p a c h i s i b o a r d game t h e outcomes are d i v i d e d halfway between e q u i t y , which stresses t h e r e s o u r c e s as d e t e r m i n a n t c u e s , and e q u a l i t y , which seems t o l o o k away from d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e s o u r c e s . A t f i r s t s i g h t , one

i s i n c l i n e d t o s e e t h i s c h o i c e a s a compromise: on t h e one hand one acknowledges d i f f e r e n c e s , on t h e o t h e r hand one d o e s n o t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , w e

168

H. Wilke

think this is not a tenable theoretical position, because (1) also in situations where conservative coalitions were found, this division of outcome was found. ( 2 ) this compromise between equity and equality is not only found in bargaining studies, but also in questionnaire studies. That it is a reliable finding may be proved by the fact that Komorita and Chertkoff (1973) made this idea the cornerstone of their quantative model. We assume that the division of outcomes halfway between equity and equality may be seen as a choice which acknowledges differences in resources, since this division is also found in conservative coalitions. A possible explanation runs as follows. Coalition formation is a task which

consists of the inclusion of two and the exclusion of one. Or formulated differently, to place some units in one category and other units in the other category. Within the social categorization tradition (Tajfel 1978) it is widely known that the effect is that one increases differences between categories

and decreases differences within a category. Or said differently,

assimilation within a category occurs, whereas contrasts between categories may be expected. In this case it means that differences among the players within a coalition, within a category, are decreased. The division of outcomes halfway between equity and equality may thus be explained by the simultaneous operation of system 1 and 3 (see fig. 3). Because one has to create one category, one coalition, one has to decrease'equitable'differences between the participants of that coalition. The differences in resources had some effect, as has been demonstrated above. As for this, the situation is analogous to the one in studies about the cumulative scores: the players who are behind coalesce against the player who is ahead (section 3.5.3). In terms of our information processing approach we are inclined to explain this by referring to system 1. The players do not see other differences than this one. Since the players (e.g. in Emerson's study 1964, 1962) indeed had the idea that resources were not a viable input-variable, they had only left over the initial advantage of one player. This input-variable could be fitted with the pre-set standard, since this recommends the exclusion of 1 and the inclusion of 2 . Because the coalition task requitIeS this, the initially favored player subsequently meets a coalition of the two players who are behind. In this way also the requirements of system 2 are met. Because the selected input variable ( t o be behind) has a preferred direction, as Emerson has pointed out, a somewhat higher person is chosen. This is the person who is further behind.

Ckapter 3 1 Coalition formation f r o m a socio-p5ychoidgiLal perspective

169

That t h e i n i t i a l d i s a d v a n t a g e becomes a l e g i t i m a t e r e s o u r c e , w e may i n f e r from t h e d i v i s i o n of o u t c o m e s : t h e member t h a t i s f a r t h e s t b e h i n d r e c e i v e s t h e g r e a t e s t amount o f outcomes. The above r e a s o n i n g a l s o f i t s i n w e l l w i t h Emerson's i d e a about b a l a n c i n g c h o i c e s and w i t h F e s t i n g e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Hoffman e t a l . e x p e r i m e n t ( s e e a l s o Wilke 1980). Emerson assumes t h a t t h e p e r s o n who is f a r t h e s t b e h i n d , may b e s e e n as t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l . To make up f o r h i s g r e a t e r power, t h e o t h e r p l a y e r s have t o make him more dependent by i n c r e a s i n g h i s outcomes. Emerson r e f e r s t o t h e e q u i t y p r i n c i p l e

(see s y s t e m 3 ) : t h e g r e a t e r o n e ' s l e g i t i m a t e r e s o u r c e s i . e . t h e more one i s b e h i n d , t h e more one s h o u l d by compensated. S e c o n d l y , w e have o f f e r e d an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e r e a s o n , why t h e p e r s o n who i s f a r t h e s t b e h i n d , w i l l be s e e n a s most p o w e r f u l . S i n c e b e i n g b e h i n d h a s become a l e g i t i m a t e i n p u t - v a r i a b l e ( s y s t e m 1, f i g u r e 3) and s i n c e f o r t h i s p r e - s e t

standard a

p r e f e r r e d d i r e c t i o n is known, t h e p e r s o n who is f a r t h e r b e h i n d i s most o f t e n t h e most p r e f e r r e d ( s e e s y s t e m 2 , f i g . 3) p a r t n e r . I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t Hoffman e t a l . s u g g e s t t h e same e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e b e h a v i o r of t h e s u b j e c t s i n an e q u a l c o n d i t i o n who a r e i n c l i n e d t o c o n s p i r e a g a i n s t t h e s u b j e c t who h a s r e c e i v e d a n u n d e s e r v e d a d v a n t a g e . For t h e u n e q u a l c o n d i t i o n , s u b j e c t s a r e n o t o r a t l e a s t less a b l e t o s e l e c t t h i s d i s c r i m i n a n t c u e ( t h i s i n p u t - v a r i a b l e ( s y s t e m 1, f i g . 3)) and t h e r e f o r e a l l p o s s i b l e c o a l i t i o n s a p p e a r t o b e formed e q u a l l y o f t e n .

( b ) THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST B e f o r e w e a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d some o f t h e known r e g u l a r i t i e s which may h a v e

an e f f e c t on t h e s o l u t i o n o f t h e c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t , and w h i c h , i n o u r o p i n i o n a l s o h o l d s f o r t h e f o r m a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n . Although

w e know r a t h e r l i t t l e a b o u t t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s i t s e l f ( s e e s e c t i o n

3.5.6) w e w i l l t r y t o s k e t c h some o f our p r e l i m i n a r y s u r m i s e s . For b o t h t h e s t a n d a r d p a c h i s i b o a r d game and t h e p o l i t i c a l power game t h e c o g n i t i v e c o n f l i c t i s n o t e a s i l y r e s o l v e d . No s i n g l e c l e a r i n p u t - v a r i a b l e a c c e p t e d a s a dominant

is e a s i l y

c u e . T h i s h a s t h r e e consequences. F i r s t t h e 3

s y s t e m s ( f i g . 3) have v e r y u n s t a b l e e x i t s . Second

o n e may assume t h a t

b e c a u s e t h e s y s t e m s 1, 2 and 3 have u n p r e d i c t a b l e e x i t s , s y s t e m 4 (which has a s i t s pre-set

s t a n d a r d t h e m a x i m i z a t i o n o f outcomes) r e c e i v e s a r a t h e r

heavy a c c e n t . Third

, one may even assume t h a t s y s t e m

4 steers t h e o t h e r s y s t e m s . I n

o t h e r words, i t may b e p o s s i b l e , t h a t p l a y e r s have t h e s t r o n g s e n s e t h a t t h e y a r e e q u a l and n e v e r t h e l e s s have t o meet d e c i s i o n s a s f o r m u l a t e d i n

170

H Wilke

System 1, 2 and 3. If this is right, then the systems 1, 2 and 3 are used as arguments, i.e. as ad hoc reasons, rather than as a priori reasons, which seems more the case for revolutionary than f o r conservative coalitions. Fourth

,

occasional phenomena (as described in section E.1.b) may have a stronger effect on coalition formation results in this unstable situation than in situations where the cognitive conflict is resolved more straightforwardly, as has been described for situations in which conservative coalitions are formed most often. The effect of all these instabilities may therefore be summarized by repeating the inference which we already drew after the reporting of the process results for pachisiboard- and political convention games: 'the above-mentioned results lead us to the idea that there is no single cause in this situation that may explain all coalitions behavior'.

3.6 EPILOQUE

In the above-mentioned description of results and theory we have looked away from quantitative models. Of course, exact predictions of a certain percentage of certain coalitions, based on the operation of one of two pre-set standards has its value. We may indicate, however, several problems. (1) The history of minimum resource theory and its subsequent demonstra-

tions prove that this quantitative approach almost distorts as much as it explains. Later on, it appeared that the relevant results could be explained by several other factors, which lay hidden and undiscovered in the experimental set-up. (2)

These quantitative models only explain a part of the experimental re-

sults. With a sufficient number of observations already 55% of BC-coalitions may give rise to the conclusion that BC-coalitions are formed most often. One may wonder then why and how 45% of the other coalitions are formed.

(3) Most of the quantitative models are ad hac formulated: after collection of the data one constructs the model, which explains most of the variance. (4)

Weick (1979) indicate that coalition theories seem to be accurate and

simple, but its generality is suspect, because "much of it is tried to highly contrived situations" (p. 36). (5) The accuracy as such of most coalition theories is not impressive. Recently Miller (1980) did two experiments to test validity of bargaining, minimum resource and minimum power theories in situations involving diffe-

Chapter 3 1 Coalition formation from a socio-psychological perspective

171

rent pay-offs for some of the winning coalitions. It appeared that none of the three theories did accurately explain the results. We have clearly chosen for a more qualitative model. It tries to analyse the coalition process as 4 interdependent systems, each having their own input and output, which are fitted by a pre-set standard. Although a distinction is made between a cognitive conflict which is resolved by a debate and a conflict of interest, which is resolved by bargaining, it is clear that also in negotiations the 4 systems are involved, because negotiation moves do influence the individual cognitive processes. An advantage of this qualitative model is that it describes the prerequisites for the formation of a certain coalition. It also gives some help to analyse concrete situations. Both in the lab as well as in real life. As for this we think the external validity is relatively high.

A disadvantage is that it is not (yet) able to specify how large the exact number of specific coalitions will be. It is hoped, that such an insight will develop gradually with the help of this qualitative model.

For the References to Chapter 3, see page 275.