Choosing scientific goals: The need for a normative approach

Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 81-96, 1998 0 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0039-3681/98 $19.00+0.00

Pergamon

Choosing Scientific Goals: The Need for a Normative Approach David Baumslag* Introduction

It is generally accepted that there are certain goals of science, that tell us what science ought to achieve. Writers on science typically mention cognitive goals, such as understanding or explaining the world, and technical goals, developing technologies which allow us to do things we desire to do. But while goals are occasionally mentioned by philosophers, little time is typically spent discussing different sets of goals and how the choice of one set over another could be justified. I think this is a mistake. The goals of science should be regarded as a very important topic in the philosophy of science. Knowing what the goals of science are, we can justify what is done in science and how methods and theories are chosen. We can also recommend changes to scientific practice on the basis of an analysis of the goals. But to do this we must decide on a well warranted set of goals. Several philosophers of science have in fact briefly discussed what the goals of science are, but without giving any justification for their formulations of the goals. For Hempel, the goal of science is to ‘produce a sequence of increasingly comprehensive and accurate systems of empirical knowledge’ (Hempel, 1979). Popper, on the other hand, favours the idea that science aims for ‘satisfactory explanation of whatever strikes us as being in need of explanation’ (Popper, 1983). Hempel and Popper thus disagree about what the goals of science are, one aiming for knowledge and the other for explanation, in which only certain types of knowledge, those which allowed us to explain other facts, would be valued. These two goals can lead to differing prescriptions for doing science. Hempel might regard a systematic but non-explanatory description of the characteristics of organisms as being of considerable value, while Popper, with his stress on explanatory value, would not. Thus, which of these two views we accept would have a considerable impact on how we do science. But neither philosopher gives any reason for accepting his goals. If we are not given any reason for accepting one or the other view, then the choice of goals seems to come down to arbitrary selection. *Department of Philosophy, Alberta T2N lN4, Canada

University

PII:

of Calgary,

2500 University

soo39-3681(97)00011-3 81

Drive

N.W.,

Calgary,

82

Studies in History and Philosophy

Larry situation

Laudan (Laudan,

why a particular accepted

according

has pointed

out that

1984). Theories theory

should

this puts us in a very unsatisfactory

are justified

be accepted,

to a legitimate

of Science

method

by methods.

In order to explain

one needs to show that it can be for theory choice. In turn, methods

are justified by goals. A method is a good one if it enables us to achieve the goals of science. So if we cannot justify the goals, then we cannot ultimately justify our methods and theories either; given a different choice of goals, we will use different methods and so come up with different theories. If this is the case, Laudan thinks we are reduced to relativism. Since different goals yield different theories, and we have no way to justify accepting any particular set of goals, we cannot say that any given set of theories should be accepted by scientists. Furthermore, there are no reasons that anyone could give for someone to give up one set of goals in favour of another. If we want to argue against relativism, as Hempel, Popper and Laudan want to, we need to have some way of arguing for the superiority of some goals over others. In order to respond to this, Laudan offers several methods for rational goal selection.’ He proposes a set of formal conditions that any adequate set of goals must satisfy, so that those goals that do not satisfy the conditions will be eliminated. Some writers have argued against Laudan’s proposals on the ground that these presuppose an instrumentalist concept of rationality that they wish to reject (Siegel, 1990). I accept Laudan’s replies to these criticisms (Laudan, 1990) but claim that his conditions are nevertheless inadequate for the task of goal selection. Most of them are unacceptable, and the one condition that can be accepted, that we should not have goals which are unachievable, is insufficiently powerful to do the work required. So while he can deal with some cases of goal choice, Laudan

is unable

in many instances

could be given for choosing a given set of goals. Instead of this, I propose that we should justify arguments.

By showing

that a proposed

to show what reasons goals

goal is intrinsically

by normative

valuable,

we give

reason for it to be pursued as a goal. Any possible goal can be assessed in this way, so that we can avoid the problem of incompleteness that Laudan faces. At the same time, we are not faced with the relativism

that Laudan

feared. We can

engage in reasoned argument about the choice of goals, so that this is not simply a matter of arbitrarily picking some goals. I will call these two contrasting methods of choosing goals the cutting down and the building up approaches. On the first, we take an existing set of goals, often those held by scientists, and attempt to remove or modify those which are unacceptable, so emerging with a pruned or cut down set which is deemed adequate. The building up approach, on the other hand, starts out by trying to derive a set of goals for science by means of normative arguments. Only the second, I will claim, can do the work we require. ‘C&I.cil.. Laudan, Science und Values, pp. 50-62.

Choosing Scient$c

Goals

83

I do not think we are able to provide a method for choosing goals which would allow us to pick a unique best set of goals. Often several competing normative claims can all be held on reasonable grounds. But this is what we should expect. Science, like other areas of human inquiry, has a fair degree of dissensus as well as consensus. What is important is that dispute over goals never comes down to arbitrary selection, and that there is always the possibility of further debate and so the removal of disagreement. In this way, while we may not always get consensus, we will not be faced with irresolvable dissensus. Laudan’s

strategy

Laudan does not fully characterize his method for goal selection, but perhaps it is best interpreted as follows. We start out with a set of existing goals, namely those held by scientists. In some cases, scientists will agree about the goals, but in other cases they will disagree. In order to assess the goals we apply a set of conditions. Those which pass the test are accepted as goals; the others are rejected. Laudan’s conditions fall into two groups. The first consist of principles which rule out various kinds of what Laudan calls utopianism. The second is an independent principle which requires us to model our methods on what we take to be our best theories. I will consider each in turn. Laudan thinks that we should abandon utopian goals. Laudan distinguishes several forms of what he calls utopianism. The first form is demonstrable utopianism. We regard those who try to attain eternal youth, to become immortal or to build perpetual motion machines as unreasonable since they are attempting to achieve what we think cannot possibly be done. Laudan gives a scientific example in the case of the abandonment of the goal of infallible knowledge by scientists. If we have universal laws, then the only way that we can demonstrate these laws to be certainly true is to show that they work in each instance. But it is impossible for us to check every single instance of such a law, since there are an indefinite number of these and we have limited capacities for making checks. So the goal of having infallible laws should be abandoned. Scientists in the 19th Century gradually came to realize this and so gave up infallibilism.2 I agree with Laudan here. If we can show that goals are demonstrably utopian then we should reject them. Where I disagree is on whether we should extend his criticisms of utopianism to the further forms he discusses. Another type of utopianism is what Laudan calls semantic utopianism. If we cannot precisely characterize goals, then we should abandon them. Laudan claims that values such as simplicity and elegance are examples of these kinds of goals. One cannot adequately explain what these involve, he thinks. As a result, many scientists can claim to follow them, but only because they are so imprecise as to allow a variety of different interpretations. These goals, then, do not have any role in directing behaviour. What is needed for an adequate ‘Op. cit., Laudan,

Science and Values, pp. 51-52.

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84

characterization abstract

of goals? Laudan

description,

gives two options:

or give examples

If we do not do this, then, Laudan

which will explain

we can either

give an

the use of the concept.

claims: ‘there is no objective

way to ascertain

when that aim has been realized and when it has not. Values of that sort are too arbitrary to deserve any place in a rational activity’.’ It is tempting to hoist Laudan with his own petard and point out that his own characterization of semantic utopianism is somewhat imprecise. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, however he cashes it out, Laudan’s criterion will be unacceptable. It is true that a criterion which can be specified with great precision will be more useful than one that is less precisely characterized. Then we will be able to know exactly when a given theory meets the criterion and when it does not. Accordingly, we should try to make our criteria as precise as we can. But in the case of simplicity and elegance, it does not seem that we can do this. We cannot capture these concepts in terms of exact rules. But this does not make them useless. While we may not be able to say exactly when a theory is simple and when it is not, we can say that certain theories are less simple than others. Newtonian mechanics when fully developed, with its ability to account for the behaviour Ptolemaic

of planets astronomy.

in terms of a few laws, was much more simple than So there are some clear cases where we can use the value

of simplicity to decide between theories. Furthermore, in other examples we may try to convince others than one theory is more simple than another by pointing to features of one or the other theories that make them more or less simple. If a theory requires a lot of assumptions, or involves postulating processes which consist of numerous and highly diverse stages, then these count as reasons for saying that it is not as simple as another which does not introduce these elements. So we can have arguments about the simplicity of theories and use our decision about which theories are more simple to decide which to accept. Accordingly, while imprecise goals may be less useful than precise ones, they are still worth precise equivalents, of their application that one theory

retaining

when they cannot

be readily

replaced

by more

and do some useful work because there are some clear cases and other cases in which we can give reasonable arguments

fits the goal more than another.

We should

not discard

goals

simply because they are semantically utopian. Laudan’s third form of utopianism is epistemic utopianism. If we have a goal but are unable to specify any way of finding out when it is satisfied, then even though the goal may not have been shown to be unrealizable we should reject it. Laudan claims that if we cannot determine when a goal has been reached, then we cannot develop actions designed to achieve that goal. There is then no way to pursue such a goal, so that adopting it as a goal has no influence on how we will act.4 ‘Op. cit., Laudan. 40p. cit.. Laudan.

Science und Vulues,pp. 52. Science and Vulues,pp. 53.

Choosing Scienttjic

Goals

85

Laudan’s argument is far from conclusive. The fact that we cannot determine that a goal has been reached does not prevent us from taking actions to promote it. For example, even if we cannot tell that our theories are true, we can be pretty sure that taking into account evidence is a better way to achieve truth than not doing so. We can know that certain measures may be effective without knowing that they will be or knowing at the end that they have been. Yet there might seem something strange about adopting goals whose achievement we will never be able to know about. In fact, we do adopt such goals in normal life. Parents bring up their children in the hope that they will live a happy life even after they themselves have died. Those who support a radical political cause will take part in it even though they know that it will only succeed, if at all, long after their lives have ended. Sometimes a person might promote a goal regardless of whether anyone, even those who live after his or her own death, will know about it. One might seek to ensure that a particular area of land be preserved in its natural condition, not so that others will know about and be pleased about this fact, but simply because one considers it worthwhile in itself. So epistemic utopianism does not seem unreasonable as a general practice. Since Laudan only mentions one example of epistemic utopianism, we cannot be sure how he would apply the concept in criticising scientific goals. The one example that he does discuss in some detail is realism, which he takes to mean the goal of obtaining true theories about the world.5 While he has other arguments against realism, one of them is that we could never know that we have actually achieved true theories. But in this case, contra Laudan, epistemic utopianism appears acceptable. It does not seem prima facie unreasonable for a scientist to say: ‘I am trying to obtain true theories. I do not know whether I have achieved this goal, but I am doing those things which will make it most likely for me to be successful. With any luck, my theories may actually correspond to the ways things are’. One might consider the goal of having true theories worthwhile enough that it should still be pursued even if we will never know that we have achieved this goal. So in the case he discusses, Laudan’s criticism is inconclusive. He might be able to argue that having true theories is not as valuable as we might think, so that given the uncertainties involved it is not worth trying to do this, given that we could instead aim for theories which were just of pragmatic value. But this would involve further argument. Again, epistemic utopianism does not give us good reason to reject goals. Laudan also proposes another condition, which he discusses in somewhat more detail, that we should change our goals so that they fit in with our best theories.6 Often people espouse certain goals explicitly, but in fact act on different ones. In science, too, individual scientists or even a whole community ‘Op. cit., Laudan, ‘Op. cit., Laudan,

Science and Values, Ch. 5, pp. 103-137. Science and Values, pp. 53-62.

86

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

of scientists may exhibit the same divergence between their professed goals and the goals they genuinely act on in their choice of theories. According to Laudan, scientists of the late 18th and early 19th Centuries held the methodological principle that science should not postulate unobservable entities. But many of the best theories of the 18th Century did, such as Franklin’s theory of electricity, Boerhaave’s theory of heat or Buffon’s theory of organic molecules. By the 1830s scientists had become more aware of the conflict between the theories they were inclined to accept and their methodological principles, and so rejected the restriction on unobservable entities. John Worrall has criticised Laudan’s analysis in the following terms. The only way in which a theory gets accepted in the first place is that it satisfies our implicit goals. If we have a conflict between a theory and our professed goals, that only shows that our implicit and explicit goals are different. What the scientists in Laudan’s example were doing was coming to realize that there was this conflict, and as a result they altered their explicit goals to coincide with their implicit ones. But since the implicit goals remain the same we do not get a genuine change in the goals used to select theories. Laudan does not then show how we can change our implicit goals in a rational manner (Worrall, 1988). Laudan has replied to Worrall in a later article (Laudan, 1989). But interestingly, he does not attempt to respond to Worrall’s specific argument about goal changes. Instead, he criticises Worrall for claiming that we should retain a fixed methodology for science. In the absence of a counterargument from Laudan, I will assume that Worrall’s point goes through. Laudan does not give us a method for genuine goal change here. The only acceptable condition that Laudan has offered, then, is the demand that we avoid demonstrable utopianism; that our goals must be realizable. As I will argue next, this is too weak to resolve many problems about goal selection. The Insufficiency of Laudan’s Condition

As we have seen, only one of Laudan’s conditions, that we should not have unachievable goals, is acceptable. How effective, then, is this condition in resolving arguments about goals? Realizability is an important condition, but it can play only a minor part in goal selection. This is obvious in cases of goal selection outside the domain of science. No one would suppose that it would be enough to tell a political leader trying to decide what goals to promote that this person should simply do those things that could be done. This might lead to the most disastrous consequences, since many harmful programmes are realizable, just as beneficial ones are. In science, realizability is an important consideration when it is difficult to make progress in any direction, since then any realizable

Choosing

Scientific

Goals

87

project, provided it has some chance of being valuable, may be worth trying. But most of the time when scientists are trying to decide which of a given set of projects to pursue they are choosing between different options all of which, as far as they know, are achievable. The question is more one of the potential worth of a given project rather than whether it can be carried out at all. The purpose of grant committees, for example, is to decide which of a number of alternative projects should be funded. Virtually all of these proposals are potentially realizable, since the scientists making them will have examined them to see if they can be carried out. Instead, other factors, such as the likelihood that a piece of research will yield worthwhile results, come into play. Realizability is insufficient whenever one must choose between several different realizable projects. As a result, Laudan is unable to cope with many cases of decision making in science. Laudan might respond that this does not matter; it is enough that he has shown that some cases of goal selection are rational, disproving the claim that the choice of goals must necessarily be arbitrary. Towards the end of his discussion of goal selection, for example, Laudan comments: We cannot end our discussion of this matter without stressing that the two general models of goal evaluation sketched in this chapter are not cure-alls or panaceas for the resolution of all disagreements about scientific aims. ... But this is a far cry from the familiar claim, with which this chapter began, that virtually all cases of disagreement about cognitive values are beyond rational resolution. In this regard, disagreements about goals are exactly on a par with factual and methodological disputes. Sometimes they can be resolved, sometimes they cannot.7 This seems insufficient. As we have seen, Laudan can explain only a small amount of goal choices, those in which only a very limited number of goals can be achieved. If many of the choices of goals are arbitrary, we will still be unable to respond to the relativist challenge. Relativists might be prepared to accept that in a small number of cases goals are selected on a rational basis, but argue that most of the time no reason can be given for choosing goals. Laudan sets out his task in Chapter 1 of Science and Values as being to show how scientists can reach the high level of agreement on disputed issues that they do. If he can only explain how it is occasionally possible for scientists to do this, then he will not have shown how agreement can generally be maintained. In particular, Laudan cannot deal with some of the disputes which previous writers were concerned about. Reichenbach wanted to claim that we should study science in order to learn the truth rather than in order to believe what made us feel good. But since he thought that choosing between these goals was a purely subjective matter, he saw no way of justifying this claim, regarding it instead as the expression of personal preference.* Both can be achieved through ‘Op. cit., Laudan, Science und Values, pp. 61-62. ‘Op. cit., Laudan, Science and Values, p. 49.

Studies in History and Philosophy of’ Science

88 scientific reinforce

activity; I could try to come up with true beliefs or simply try to beliefs that I previously found agreeable. So Laudan cannot deal

with major

differences

goal disputes

in goals.

does not enable

The fact that

he can deal with some other

us to deal with the problem

of relativism

in

science. An Alternative Suggestion for Goal Selection Simply showing

that Laudan’s

proposals

do not give us a complete

method

for goal selection does not show that the cutting down approach cannot give us such a method. We need to look at other possibilities. The problem here is that there are no ready alternatives. Laudan’s method stands unique in the philosophy of science literature as a method for selecting goals. We must therefore look outside the philosophy of science for suitable strategies. What I will do is to investigate another approach to goal assessment based on the work of Richard Brandt in moral philosophy. Brandt’s work provides an interesting

alternative

way of assessing

goals

which

may

be applied

to the

philosophy of science. Interestingly, though, this method faces similar problems to Laudan’s. There are many cases of goal choice that Brandt’s theory cannot help us with and so his method is not adequate for a complete theory of goal choice. Brandt discusses how to choose desires, rather than goals. But his strategy fits in well with the cutting down approach and can be transferred to discussions of goal selection. When we are trying to find out what desires are rational, Brandt thinks, what we should do is to investigate how they came to be formed, a process he calls cognitive psychotherapy (Brandt, 1979). We may come to realize that they have been formed in an illegitimate manner and so abandon them. Brandt gives some examples of how this can happen. Sometimes we have a certain desire due to false beliefs. Someone might aim to become an academic because of the belief that his or her parents want this, when in actual fact they do not. Once this mistaken belief is rectified, the person may have no reason to continue

to hold the desire. Alternatively,

desires may be artificially

aroused

by

childhood experiences. A person may become highly ambitious because, at an earlier stage of life, doing well brought affection and rewards while failure led to punishment and neglect. Again, realization of this may lead someone to abandon the desire. In the same way, we might analyse how particular goals have come to be accepted in science. We start off with those goals which are currently held, and eliminate those which have been formed in inappropriate ways, provided there is no further reason to continue to accept them. We may find cases in which we now hold goals for reasons which are no longer valid. Perhaps certain goals, such as simplicity and elegance, are more appropriate in the context of a universe constructed by an all-powerful designer than in the current scientific world view from which theological doctrines are banished. The ideal of

Choosing Scientific Goals

89

individual autonomy for scientists might have been valuable when scientific discoveries were made by individuals working on their own, but is less appropriate now when almost all scientific work is done in institutions and frequently in teams. The method suggested is then another form of the cutting down approach; we start out with our current goals and then remove those for which there is no longer a valid reason. This suggests the importance of historical and sociological analysis in the history of science. We might be inclined to claim that certain values in science are self-evidently worth pursuing. But this could simply be a result of our socialization into a scientific culture in which these values are stressed. Seeing the historical origin of currently accepted practices can give us reason to re-evaluate them. But while Brandt’s work can potentially enrich our understanding of scientific goals, it suffers from several problems. First, it is hard to apply. Cognitive psychotherapy is likely to be difficult even with individuals, since claims about why people desire the things that they do will be very difficult to evaluate. We often do not have access to enough information about someone’s past life to know whether he or she was exposed to stimuli likely to have the relevant effects on desires. In the case of scientific goals, claims about causation are even more difficult to decide, since we are dealing not with individuals but with a group activity. Rather than trying to understand why one person holds the desires he or she does, we need to do this for many people, when it is possible that different people hold the goals they do for very different reasons. The goals of a group may have been formulated a long time ago, and simply passed on to more recent members of the group. For example, the goal of obtaining general explanatory principles goes back at least as far as the Pre-Socratics, and has developed in complicated ways over time. It will then be difficult to arrive at conclusive results about the origination of goals, so that we will often not have enough information to decide whether we should continue to hold these goals. More importantly, Brandt’s theory only applies to those cases where, once we know the true reasons why we hold our goals, we automatically see that they are insufficient. But in many cases of disputes about goals, those who hold the goals in question may each have plausible reasons for their views. In this case, simply pointing to the reasons they have for their goals will not reveal the insufficiency of one set of reasons. Instead, we must resort to argumentation to show that one set of reasons is better than another set. Brandt does not give us any hints as to how we could conduct such an assessment. Except in the simplest cases, then, Brandt’s approach is incomplete. To supplement it we need a theory about what are good reasons for accepting goals, which I will sketch in the next section. Procedures such as Brandt’s may be very helpful in getting us to reconsider some of our goals, when we discover their unsuspected antecedents. But while

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90

this can help us to eliminate some of our undesirable goals, in many cases we are still left with very difficult questions about goal choice.

Weighing Goals

Laudan does not discuss at all another important issue: how to weigh goals. If we are trying to make scientific decisions, then we need to take actions that will promote not just one but several different goals. Often these goals will conflict: for example, while it is desirable to have theories which are likely to be true, it is also desirable to have theories which are significant. As Popper pointed out, one can always achieve the first aim simply by formulating tautologies (Popper, 1957). This, however, would not help us much in trying to understand the world. If we try to find theories which are significant, then they may be false, so we cannot have complete certainty about them. Accordingly, we must make some compromise between the values of certainty and significance. Laudan gives no account of how this kind of comparison could be done; his theory tells us how to eliminate goals, but not how to adjust their strength. If a goal is realizable, we may attach any value we choose to achieving it. So Laudan’s condition cannot be extended to this new problem. Brandt’s theory might be more promising. Sometimes we have desires which, while their objects are not unreasonable, have unreasonable strength. It may be reasonable to desire success, but it is unreasonable to do this to such an extent that success is favoured over all other considerations. One might be able to trace the genesis of such a desire to someone’s upbringing, to the overly high ambitions encouraged in a child by his or her parents. Parallel examples might be drawn for science. Some scientists have placed an excessively high value on knowledge. Even though they realized the vast destruction it would cause, some scientists nonetheless investigated the atomic bomb because of its technical interest (Vollrath, 1990). Here, while the desire for knowledge is not a bad thing, desiring knowledge excessively and to the exclusion of other worthwhile goals is. We might perhaps explain the desires that the scientists had by looking at the way in which they came to have them. Anne Roe, for example, found that many scientists had childhoods in which they were cut off from other people, having few friends and avoiding social activity.9 It could be argued that this limited social environment led them to form desires in which the social emotions were underplayed and those involved in solitary activity were overemphasized. We could perhaps then argue that they should weaken the force of these desires, if there is no further reason for maintaining them. Brandt’s method might conceivably help us in diagnosing some cases of imbalanced valuation of goals. But this application of Brandt’s approach still “Op. cit., Vollrath,

Sciencr und Moral

Vulucs, p. 144.

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91

suffers from the problems noted earlier. It will often be very difficult to work out the causal history of desires. Furthermore, those who attach different weights to goals will often have plausible reasons for the weightings they propose, ones which cannot simply be seen to be inadequate when we realize what they are. Brandt’s method, then, is not sufficient for weighting goals. In keeping with the spirit of the cutting down approach, however, we might attempt to develop conditions which will allow us to decide on different methods, without having to resort to normative arguments about the weights of different goals. If we have decided on a set of goals, we can then assess how well each goal can be achieved by a given method.iO Suppose that one method promotes each goal better than another method. We can then apply a version of the Pareto Principle to this case. Standardly, the Pareto Principle is applied to group preference. The principle states that if each member of a group regards one option as at least equally good as another option, and at least one member of the group regards it as better than the second, then we ought to choose the first option. The principle seems eminently reasonable since no individual can complain that the choice damages his or her interests, while some are benefited. In the case of weighing goals, however much weight we attach to some of the goals, if two methods are equal with respect to achieving these goals then we should not prefer either on the basis of these, while if one method is better with respect to one goal, however unimportant, we ought to choose this. The achievement of a scientific goal is not independent of the achievement of others, so that this method may prove more effective than one would at first suppose. In particular, the more knowledge we gain, the greater our ability will be to manipulate the world in order to achieve technical gains, so that any course of action that better achieves cognitive goals is likely to better achieve technical goals also. In a debate about the purpose of physical chemistry, Wilder Bancroft argued that it should be more oriented towards industry, while Alfred Noyes instead placed the emphasis on developing fundamental theories. Despite its initial promise, Bancroft’s strategy in the end had little pay off, whilst the Noyes’s version of physical chemistry began to be of great practical value (Servos, 1990). Trying to improve knowledge eventually resulted in the better achievement of technical goals also. So often one course of action will be better at achieving all the various goals, and we will be able to apply this version of the Pareto Principle to argue for this course of action. But it is implausible to suppose that this should always be the case. When one comes to apply the knowledge one has gained, one must, at least temporarily, place the emphasis on promoting technical rather than cognitive goals. In these cases, then, the Pareto Principle cannot be applied. Those actions which would best achieve technical goals are separate from those which achieve cognitive ‘“I will ignore

problems

with deciding

how well a given method

achieves

the goals.

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92

goals, so no one action is best on all dimensions. applicable to a limited class of cases. The cutting

down approach,

deciding

scientific

disputes.

building

up approach.

then, ultimately We must

instead

The Pareto Principle

of’ Science

is at best

turns out to be insufficient

for

turn

the

to another

method,

The Building Up Approach On the building up approach, rather than trying to remove goals from an already existing set, we instead generate them through normative arguments. This approach is the most straightforward way of picking goals. If something is to be a goal of science then it should be something that is worth achieving. While there can be disputes about the value of different goals, we are not left to make an arbitrary choice of goals. Instead, we can make reasonable arguments about these, based on theories worthwhile, I can give reasons In order to decide what goals have normative theories which

of value. to pursue we should will tell

By showing that a particular goal is it. promote through science, we need to us about these goals. Sometimes the

normative theories we require are readily available. One of the goods that can be achieved by science is the development of useful technologies. This can be shown to be a theories regard by science; the this. This is all

good in that it promotes human well being, and most ethical this as something which is good. Furthermore, it is achievable past record of science in producing valuable inventions shows that is needed to justify the claim that technical goals are goals

of science, and so deal with the problem the use of ethical that

something

theories

that Laudan

allows us to go further.

is a goal of science,

courses of action are for achieving

was concerned Rather

we can also decide

the goal, helping

with. But

than simply saying how good

different

us to decide between

these

different options. Depending on which theory we adopt, we will arrive at different assessments of the value of a given project for achieving technical goals. In evaluating how good a given technology will be, we will typically take into account several different factors. Firstly, we must assess its impact on the well being of individuals, whether this well being is assessed according to the pleasure, the satisfaction of desire, or the objective goods obtained by those affected by the technology.ii Secondly, we must consider what the distribution of these goods will be. Certain technologies will be available only to the rich and it may be argued that these benefits should be accorded less weight than those which would improve the lives of those who are currently much worse off.12 Which theory we adopt will determine the evaluation of different courses of action. But the choice of theory will not depend on factors peculiar to “For “The

a discussion of the different theories of well-being see e.g. Griffin (1986). most famous argument for this view is given by Rawls (1971).

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science; instead, it will depend on arguments which are familiar from political philosophy. For other goals of science, such as the improvement of knowledge, we can again draw upon ethical arguments in order to justify their adoption. Here there are a number of possible arguments available, with the selection of a given argument depending on the ethical approach one regards as most defensible. Utilitarians and preference utilitarians can base the value of knowledge on the pleasure or desire satisfaction which results from obtaining knowledge. Ross argued that knowledge was good by getting us to compare two worlds, both of which contained equal amounts of pleasure and virtue, but in one of which the inhabitant had a much greater understanding of the workings of the world than those in the other. On his intuitionistic theory, the fact that most people would regard the world with greater understanding as being more valuable shows that knowledge has intrinsic value (Ross, 1930). Perfectionists argue that knowledge is valuable because it enables us to fulfil our essential natures.i3 Given the acceptance of a particular ethical theory, one of these arguments could be used to justify the claim that knowledge is a goal of science, and to show that Reichenbach’s fear that this is simply a subjective preference is misguided. But while we can argue that knowledge is a valuable goal, there is currently little discussion as to how to evaluate specific items of knowledge. While many theorists have claimed that knowledge is valuable, they have not said much about its value beyond saying that certain claims are not very valuable, such as knowing the number of grains of sand in the universe, while others, such as knowing powerful theories of the universe, are. We might suggest various factors, such as the degree of generality of a theory, its ability to make precise predictions, and so on, in order to decide which kinds of theories are worth developing. The area of how to evaluate the cognitive goals of science is one that surely needs work. But there is no reason to think that the argumentative techniques that have been successful in other areas of ethics cannot also help us in deciding the value of different items of knowledge. So precisely how the building up approach will operate remains to be worked out, following the development of suitable normative theories. Some examples will help to show the greater effectiveness of the building up strategy in evaluating goals, compared to Laudan’s strategy. Modern physics has been characterized by a continuing search for more and more general theories, culminating in the current search for a so-called grand unified theory. What could justify this effort? If we adopt the building up approach, we can draw on the widely accepted principle that more general theories are more valuable to justify this course of action. Laudan’s theory does not offer this option. If anything, his principle of realizability would appear to counsel against a goal ‘jA position recently defended by T. Hurka in Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford 1993); see Chapter 9, pp. 1428 for a discussion of the worth of knowledge.

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which is so uncertain of realization. Furthermore, his approach does not allow us to understand the debate which might go on between those who aim for highly general theories and those who concentrate on developing less general, but more easily realizable theories. Here the question of how likely one is to get a given type of theory is important, but so also is the comparative value of each. Accordingly, the cutting down approach is severely impoverished. It is unable to justify some widely accepted aspects of present science. Another aspect of current science is the stress on studies of things which are closely related to human beings. Thus, human biology and evolution are more intensely studied than the biology and evolution of most other organisms. Laudan has no way of justifying this; we are equally, indeed better, able to study other organisms, some of which are simpler and for most of which the ethical constraints on experiments are taken to be weaker than for humans, so one cannot prefer humans to animals on the grounds that studying them is more easily realizable. On the building up method, we can justify the greater emphasis on humans. The simplest way of doing so is to point out that learning about things related to us satisfies our curiosity; our desire to know about these things is generally greater than knowing about other aspects of nature. Since desires are prima facie worth satisfying, then we should place more emphasis on finding out about our own species. As well as justifying some aspects of current science, the building up approach also allows us to advocate new goals. For example, one could argue that science should aim to improve our ethical knowledge because of the valuable ethical results this would produce. Scientific information is relevant to dealing with ethical problems. Whatever theory of ethics one accepts, people should try to find out what is the right thing to do in a given ethical situation. In order to make the right ethical decisions, we need to have access to the facts. And to find out about these facts, we often need to engage in scientific investigation. One example of how science could be relevant to ethical decisions is in discussions of abortion. In discussing abortion policy it is important to know facts about the foetus in order to establish its status. In particular, whether a foetus is sentient is generally regarded as a relevant consideration in deciding how it should be treated. L. W. Sumner, for instance, employs a criterion of sentience in order to decide whether a foetus has moral standing. By looking at the development of the nervous system one can rule out the possibility of a very early development of sentience. Sumner concludes that, at the least, the foetus is not sentient before the end of the first trimester, on the basis of what is known about the development of the nervous system. But as Sumner remarks in a footnote, embryologists do not seem to regard this question as worth studying (Sumner, 1981). Perhaps they have been influenced by the tradition of thinking about science which regards only one type of goal, cognitive goals, as worth

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taking account of. But if ethical goals are a good which can be achieved, and perhaps can only be achieved, by scientific study, then there is good reason for scientists to pursue them. Again, then, we have a goal that can be justified by the building up approach but not by the cutting down approach. Ethical goals are realizable, and so are non-ethical ones, so which of these goals we decide to achieve depends on normative assessments of the value of each. The building up approach turns out to be much more powerful than the cutting down approach. Weighing goals can also be dealt with by the building up method. It is good to appreciate the natural world, and so this should be a goal of science (Rolston, 1988). But this is a goal that has generally been underplayed in science. While 19th Century writers such as Lye11and Darwin employed a style of writing that allowed them to express and arouse feeling towards the natural world, too many modern day works in biology and geology are written in a turgid style that prevents much expression of emotion (Montgomery, 1996). As a result, the emphasis in science has been on the acquisition of knowledge with virtually no attention being paid to the increasing appreciation of nature which can be gained from new knowledge. This is not to say that present day naturalists do not appreciate nature, rather that the ethos of the discipline has caused this concern to be greatly underplayed in the interests of a supposedly greater precision of knowledge. Whatever the precise weight of the goals of understanding and appreciating, we have good grounds for arguing that much more attention should be paid to the latter. The appreciation of nature greatly enriches the lives of many people, often being more important to them than knowledge. Accordingly, we should give each goal roughly comparable weight in science, rather than emphasizing cognitive goals so greatly. One problem that might be raised against the approach offered here is that it creates all the difficulties of subjectivity that writers like Hempel and Reichenbach were aware of, and that Laudan aimed to avoid by proposing his own system. Surely, if how we do science depends on such normative arguments, then it will be incurably subjective? Previously, the contrast between science and ethics seemed a sensible one to draw. According to the logical positivists, science provided objective answers to questions whereas ethics was completely subjective. But recent work in the history and philosophy of science and in ethics suggests a different view. In science, we often get initial disagreement, followed only later if at all by agreement. On the other hand, work in practical ethics has shown that reasoned argument often allows us to make progress and come to agreement. In medical ethics certain claims, such as that informed consent is necessary before medical procedures should be initiated, have become widely accepted (Faden et al., 1986). What is important is that it is possible to make reasonable arguments about these normative principles. We are not left in the position of simply arbitrarily choosing

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principles. Note that this is the case whether or not one adopts a realist position about ethics. The point is that we can make reasoned arguments about ethical issues, regardless of the status of the claims which result. The building up method, then, is a very promising approach for dealing with questions of goal selection. Much remains to be done. But by developing normative arguments about science we will be able to deal with some important questions in the philosophy of science which cannot be addressed with the current alternatives. References Brandt, R. (1979) A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Faden, R. R., Beauchamp, T. L. and King, N. M. P. (1986) A History and Theory of Informed Consent (New York: Oxford University Press). Griffin, J. (1986) Well Being (Oxford; Oxford University Press). Hempel, C. (1979) ‘Scientific Rationality: Analytic Versus Pragmatic Perspectives’, in T. F. Geraets (ed.), Rationality Toduy (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press), pp. 46-58, see p. 51. Laudan, L. (1984) Science and Values (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Laudan, L. (1989) ‘If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, 369-375. Laudan, L. (1990) ‘Aim-less Epistemology’?‘, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21, 3155322. Montgomery, S. (1996) The Scientt@ Voice (New York and London: Guildford Press). Popper, K. (1957) ‘Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report’ in C. A. Mace (ed.), British Philosophy in the Mid-Century (London: Allen and Unwin). Popper, K. (1983) Realism and the Aim qf Science (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield). Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory qf Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). Rolston, H. III (1988) Environmentul Ethics: Duties to und Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). Ross, W. D. (1930) The Right und the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Servos, J. W. (1990) Physical Chemistry from Ostwuld to Pauling: The Making of a Science in Americu (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Siegel, H. (1990) ‘Laudan’s Normative Naturalism’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21, 2955313. Sumner, L. W. (1981) Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Vollrath, J. (1990) Science and Moral Vulues (Lanham, MD: University Press of America). Worrall, J. (1988) ‘The Value of a Fixed Methodology’, British Journal fbr the Philosophy of Science 39, 265-267.