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Coalitions and alliances in humans and other animals
BOOK REVIEWS
Coalitions and Alkiances in Humans and Other Animals, edited by Alexander H. Harcourt & Frans B. M. de Waal. New York: Oxford University press, 1992, cloth, 531 PP. Reviewed by Richard W. Byrne, Scottish primate Research Group, School of Psychology, University of St Andrews, Fife KY 16 9JU, Scotland.
Modem interest in all forms of co-operative behavior among animals (and plants) stems from the triumphant success of sociobiology in explaining data that were formerly seen as evidence of “group selection,” but in ways consistent with the genetical theory of natural selection. Time after time, apparent puzzles of “altruism” among animals, when examined more closely, have neatly fitted the predictions of Hamilton’s kin selection. Now, co-operation is no longer an embarrassment to Darwinists, and whole animals are viewed as intricately symbiotic collections of what were once independent micro-organisms. Sociobiology has been dominated by genetical causation, although it has been known since Trivers’ description of reciprocal altruism that this is not necessary: under certain circumstances, we should expect “altruistic” co-operation to occur, based on memory of previous help or on the expectation of future help in return. Involvement of learning, memory, and expectations brings sociobiology excitingly into the realms of psychology, especially when we remember that the special conditions favoring reciprocal altruism-persisting social groups of individuals who recognize each other as such, and have good memories-are met most closely among some species of non-human primates. The way seems set for a proper understanding of the evolution of human helpfulness and trust, revenge and suspicion, and even perhaps moral and ethical codes. But the data have so far failed to match the hopes: well-documented cases of reciprocal altruism are rare, although frustratingly many cases of animal coalitions seem consistent with such interpretation. What is evidently needed is a careful study of the many cases of coalition and alliance usage, recorded mostly but not entirely among primates; and Harcourt and de Waal have done sociobiologists a valuable service in providing it. Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animuls is an impressively scholarly collection of papers on the subject, well organized and strongly edited into a valuable research resource. Its first section describes the effects that extensive coalitional behavior can have on society, with several papers exploring the way female kin-based alliances cause “inheritance” of rank in Old World monkeys, and I have never seen the large and complex body of evidence as well summari zed as in the chapters by Chapais and Datta. In
Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 19(1):193-203 ISSN: 1061-7361
Copyright 8 1996 by JAI F’ress, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
193
194 -BOOK
REVIEWS
male-bonded apes, the consequences of intergroup hostility become important for relations within the social group: Boehm’s explicit comparison of chimpanzees and humans in their intercommunity warfare and their powerful male kin-alliances is particularly fascinating, and he makes a number of long-overdue points. Zadel et al’s study of coalitions among young hyaenas rests uneasily among this group of studies, but the simplicity of their proposed explanation for “monkey-like” behaviors in hyaenas is in interesting contrast to the frequent assumption of cognitive complexity made by primatologists. The next group of studies investigate the rules of alliance making and breaking, in monkeys, apes and people. De Waal’s brilliantly clear review of chimpanzee coalitions and reciprocation shows that his early use of “political” to describe their behavior was no exaggeration, and Falger’s analysis of international politics as alliance-behavior drives the point home. The approach throughout the book is strongly functional, and I couldn’t help wondering, while reading Grammer’s nice analysis of children’s conflict interventions, and No8’s elegant use of game theory to analyze baboon alliance strategies: are baboons’ and children’s mental processes the same, when they make these decisions? And if so, what are they? Such heretical ponderings are given little encouragement by the editors or their team of contributors, and readers determined to go on believing that people “think,” whereas brute beasts get no further than a few ESSs and simple NkS-Of-thumb for making their decisions, can continue to do so. Is it fair to wish that a book, explicitly directed at explaining how behaviors relate to their functional consequences, has a serious discussion of possible cognitive mechanisms for the many subtle and complex behaviors described? Perhaps not, but the editors invite it by evoking Kummer’s amusing sideswipe at seductive terminology, “If I find a bottle labelled ‘Chateau Lafite-Rothschild’ I am more motivated to ascertain whether that is really true than when the label says ‘Fermented grape juice of undetermined quality.“’ Surely the great energy and interest that has been &voted to the study of coalitions and alliances has its origin in just such “wishful” possibilities? In the normal discourse from which ethologists have borrowed them, the terms suggest planning, scheming, and calculating in the animals’ minds. Nobody could complain if the data had happened to come out quite otherwise. In fact, if a few simple, genetically coded algorithms can cause behavior so wonderfully flexible that it simulates the devious efforts of great human minds, this would be a satisfying finding in itself. But we should be told! Given the editors’ functional stance, it’s no surprise that the final, evolutionary section of the book has some fine contributions. Van Hooff and van Schaik give a masterly review of the ecology of primate relationships, showing how the complicated patterns of bonding can be explained by the operation of just a few principles in different ecologies. Lee and Johnson examine the mechanics of how young monkeys of both sexes gain rank, a contribution closely related to the book’s opening chapters. Connor et al’s dolphin data will be a revelation to many, since even primates seldom reach the point of having alliances among alliances; and Boyd sounds a note of caution in his analysis, of what happens when more realistic conditions are added to the standard models of reciprocal altruism, by showing how small changes in circumstances can mean very different predictions. Reciprocity is evidently hard to detect empirically, but perhaps this is not bad luck, rather an intrinsic part of reciprocation. Harcourt comes closest to tackling the mental mechanism issue head on, in a chapter asking whether primates’ alliances are more “complex” than those of non-primates, or not. While admitting the possibility of widespread species-bias, he concludes that primates do
IkwkR&ews-195 stand out, on present evidence. only primates reciprocate support; only primates take into account the rank and power of possible allies when choosing their friends, preferentially grooming dominant individuals; only primates compete for these “good” allies. It looks as if primates calculate the odds, non-primates follow simple rules: is that what we should conclude? Ck is it that primates follow less simple rules, thus showing more flexibility? Harcourt sums up by saying that primates use alliances “tactically.” In my work on deception, I’ve always used “tactical” in the sense of showing flexibility and choice from occasion to occasion, and “‘intentionally tactical” for the very different case where the actor understands the situation and calculates its actions in advance. In the elaborate world this book documents-of alliances, coalition formation, reconciliation behavior, reciprocation of help-1 have seen no strong evidence that any thinking is going on in in the animals’ minds, any symbolic calculation of situations and outcomes. Complexity of behavior there is in plenty, but complexity can be an outcome of genetically specified rules and/or trial-and-error learning. only by paying attention to cases where species-general rules cannot apply, will any evidence be obtained against this bleak assessment. This may mean ethologists having to “dirty their hands” with data that is not readily replicable, and not easily brought under experimental control in the laboratory (like poor old astronomers and social scientists do all the time); new principles will be needed to decide objectively among competing hypotheses, and perhaps a very different picture will then emerge of these socially complex animals. Never mind! For now, Harcourt and de Waal have done a fine job in editing this authoritative collection of papers on the important subject of alliances and help in coalitions. Each section is helpfully introduced by an editorial, and the editors’ historical chapter at the beginning, and suggestions for future research at the end, are important contributions in their own right. I shall be using this book as a source for years to come, and its appearance in paperback is a boon for graduate students.
Why We Get Sick: The New Science of Darwinian Medicine by Randolph M. Nesse t George C. Williams. New York: Times Books, 1995, pp. xi + 291. (In the UK: Evolution and Healing: The New Science of Darwinian Medicine. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.) Reviewed by Guy Richards, 327 666 Leg in Boot Square, Vancouver, B.C. VSZ 4B3, Canada.
Hurried writing of prescriptions in abbreviated pharmacopoeial Latin earned earlier generations of doctors a bad reputation as writers, and a liking for obscure jargon lasted all too long. This does not apply to this book. Seldom does one find a medical book which is such a pleasure to read. Why has natural selection, which has brought about such wonders of design, not eliminated our defects and our vulnerability to infection? The authors’ evolutionary perspectives provide persuasive answers.
Coalitions and Alkiances in Humans and Other Animals, edited by Alexander H. Harcourt & Frans B. M. de Waal. New York: Oxford University press, 1992, cloth, 531 PP. Reviewed by Richard W. Byrne, Scottish primate Research Group, School of Psychology, University of St Andrews, Fife KY 16 9JU, Scotland.
Modem interest in all forms of co-operative behavior among animals (and plants) stems from the triumphant success of sociobiology in explaining data that were formerly seen as evidence of “group selection,” but in ways consistent with the genetical theory of natural selection. Time after time, apparent puzzles of “altruism” among animals, when examined more closely, have neatly fitted the predictions of Hamilton’s kin selection. Now, co-operation is no longer an embarrassment to Darwinists, and whole animals are viewed as intricately symbiotic collections of what were once independent micro-organisms. Sociobiology has been dominated by genetical causation, although it has been known since Trivers’ description of reciprocal altruism that this is not necessary: under certain circumstances, we should expect “altruistic” co-operation to occur, based on memory of previous help or on the expectation of future help in return. Involvement of learning, memory, and expectations brings sociobiology excitingly into the realms of psychology, especially when we remember that the special conditions favoring reciprocal altruism-persisting social groups of individuals who recognize each other as such, and have good memories-are met most closely among some species of non-human primates. The way seems set for a proper understanding of the evolution of human helpfulness and trust, revenge and suspicion, and even perhaps moral and ethical codes. But the data have so far failed to match the hopes: well-documented cases of reciprocal altruism are rare, although frustratingly many cases of animal coalitions seem consistent with such interpretation. What is evidently needed is a careful study of the many cases of coalition and alliance usage, recorded mostly but not entirely among primates; and Harcourt and de Waal have done sociobiologists a valuable service in providing it. Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animuls is an impressively scholarly collection of papers on the subject, well organized and strongly edited into a valuable research resource. Its first section describes the effects that extensive coalitional behavior can have on society, with several papers exploring the way female kin-based alliances cause “inheritance” of rank in Old World monkeys, and I have never seen the large and complex body of evidence as well summari zed as in the chapters by Chapais and Datta. In
Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 19(1):193-203 ISSN: 1061-7361
Copyright 8 1996 by JAI F’ress, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
193
194 -BOOK
REVIEWS
male-bonded apes, the consequences of intergroup hostility become important for relations within the social group: Boehm’s explicit comparison of chimpanzees and humans in their intercommunity warfare and their powerful male kin-alliances is particularly fascinating, and he makes a number of long-overdue points. Zadel et al’s study of coalitions among young hyaenas rests uneasily among this group of studies, but the simplicity of their proposed explanation for “monkey-like” behaviors in hyaenas is in interesting contrast to the frequent assumption of cognitive complexity made by primatologists. The next group of studies investigate the rules of alliance making and breaking, in monkeys, apes and people. De Waal’s brilliantly clear review of chimpanzee coalitions and reciprocation shows that his early use of “political” to describe their behavior was no exaggeration, and Falger’s analysis of international politics as alliance-behavior drives the point home. The approach throughout the book is strongly functional, and I couldn’t help wondering, while reading Grammer’s nice analysis of children’s conflict interventions, and No8’s elegant use of game theory to analyze baboon alliance strategies: are baboons’ and children’s mental processes the same, when they make these decisions? And if so, what are they? Such heretical ponderings are given little encouragement by the editors or their team of contributors, and readers determined to go on believing that people “think,” whereas brute beasts get no further than a few ESSs and simple NkS-Of-thumb for making their decisions, can continue to do so. Is it fair to wish that a book, explicitly directed at explaining how behaviors relate to their functional consequences, has a serious discussion of possible cognitive mechanisms for the many subtle and complex behaviors described? Perhaps not, but the editors invite it by evoking Kummer’s amusing sideswipe at seductive terminology, “If I find a bottle labelled ‘Chateau Lafite-Rothschild’ I am more motivated to ascertain whether that is really true than when the label says ‘Fermented grape juice of undetermined quality.“’ Surely the great energy and interest that has been &voted to the study of coalitions and alliances has its origin in just such “wishful” possibilities? In the normal discourse from which ethologists have borrowed them, the terms suggest planning, scheming, and calculating in the animals’ minds. Nobody could complain if the data had happened to come out quite otherwise. In fact, if a few simple, genetically coded algorithms can cause behavior so wonderfully flexible that it simulates the devious efforts of great human minds, this would be a satisfying finding in itself. But we should be told! Given the editors’ functional stance, it’s no surprise that the final, evolutionary section of the book has some fine contributions. Van Hooff and van Schaik give a masterly review of the ecology of primate relationships, showing how the complicated patterns of bonding can be explained by the operation of just a few principles in different ecologies. Lee and Johnson examine the mechanics of how young monkeys of both sexes gain rank, a contribution closely related to the book’s opening chapters. Connor et al’s dolphin data will be a revelation to many, since even primates seldom reach the point of having alliances among alliances; and Boyd sounds a note of caution in his analysis, of what happens when more realistic conditions are added to the standard models of reciprocal altruism, by showing how small changes in circumstances can mean very different predictions. Reciprocity is evidently hard to detect empirically, but perhaps this is not bad luck, rather an intrinsic part of reciprocation. Harcourt comes closest to tackling the mental mechanism issue head on, in a chapter asking whether primates’ alliances are more “complex” than those of non-primates, or not. While admitting the possibility of widespread species-bias, he concludes that primates do
IkwkR&ews-195 stand out, on present evidence. only primates reciprocate support; only primates take into account the rank and power of possible allies when choosing their friends, preferentially grooming dominant individuals; only primates compete for these “good” allies. It looks as if primates calculate the odds, non-primates follow simple rules: is that what we should conclude? Ck is it that primates follow less simple rules, thus showing more flexibility? Harcourt sums up by saying that primates use alliances “tactically.” In my work on deception, I’ve always used “tactical” in the sense of showing flexibility and choice from occasion to occasion, and “‘intentionally tactical” for the very different case where the actor understands the situation and calculates its actions in advance. In the elaborate world this book documents-of alliances, coalition formation, reconciliation behavior, reciprocation of help-1 have seen no strong evidence that any thinking is going on in in the animals’ minds, any symbolic calculation of situations and outcomes. Complexity of behavior there is in plenty, but complexity can be an outcome of genetically specified rules and/or trial-and-error learning. only by paying attention to cases where species-general rules cannot apply, will any evidence be obtained against this bleak assessment. This may mean ethologists having to “dirty their hands” with data that is not readily replicable, and not easily brought under experimental control in the laboratory (like poor old astronomers and social scientists do all the time); new principles will be needed to decide objectively among competing hypotheses, and perhaps a very different picture will then emerge of these socially complex animals. Never mind! For now, Harcourt and de Waal have done a fine job in editing this authoritative collection of papers on the important subject of alliances and help in coalitions. Each section is helpfully introduced by an editorial, and the editors’ historical chapter at the beginning, and suggestions for future research at the end, are important contributions in their own right. I shall be using this book as a source for years to come, and its appearance in paperback is a boon for graduate students.
Why We Get Sick: The New Science of Darwinian Medicine by Randolph M. Nesse t George C. Williams. New York: Times Books, 1995, pp. xi + 291. (In the UK: Evolution and Healing: The New Science of Darwinian Medicine. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.) Reviewed by Guy Richards, 327 666 Leg in Boot Square, Vancouver, B.C. VSZ 4B3, Canada.
Hurried writing of prescriptions in abbreviated pharmacopoeial Latin earned earlier generations of doctors a bad reputation as writers, and a liking for obscure jargon lasted all too long. This does not apply to this book. Seldom does one find a medical book which is such a pleasure to read. Why has natural selection, which has brought about such wonders of design, not eliminated our defects and our vulnerability to infection? The authors’ evolutionary perspectives provide persuasive answers.