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Comparing the incommensurable: Where science and politics collide
J. Behav Filer. & Exp. Psychiat. Vol. 26, No, 3, pp. 259-263, 1995. Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0005-7916/95 $95(I + 0.00
Pergamon 0005-7916(95)00031-3
COMPARING THE INCOMMENSURABLE: WHERE SCIENCE AND POLITICS COLLIDE C H R I S T I N A LEE The University of Newcastle, Australia
Summary - - Arguments about the possibility that cognitive variables may play a causal role in human behavior are unlikely to be resolved in favor of one side or the other, because they set against each other two incommensurable views of human agency. Contemporary cognitive models of psychology are based on an implicitly dualist view of human behavior, assuming the existence of a nonmaterial mental realm which has the capacity to act on the material world. Critics, by comparison, frequently argue from an epiphenomenalist position. While there may be sound scientific reasons for rejecting self-efficacy theory, and particularly for rejecting the utility of the concept that behavior is caused by efficacy expectations, this paper argues that epistemic criteria are frequently less important than a sense that a theory is compatible with a particular world view. I argue that cognitive theories are accepted by the psychological mainstream because their dualist basis accords with deeply held cultural beliefs about the relationship between the person and the world. However, the social and political consequences of such models are rarely articulated, and there is a need for psychologists to develop a more explicit understanding of the relationship between psychological theories and their broader implications.
A string of raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and description on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, hut not a single law in the sense that physics shows us laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence causally can be deduced. We don't even know the terms between which the elementary laws would obtain if we had them. (James, 1893, p. 468) What I tell you three times is true. (Carroll, 1876) O n c e again, an a c a d e m i c has p r e s e n t e d a w e l l argued case against the role o f s e l f - e f f i c a c y as a causal m e c h a n i s m in b e h a v i o r ( H a w k i n s , 1992). O n c e a g a i n , A l b e r t B a n d u r a h a s p r e p a r e d an e l e g a n t r e b u t t a l ( B a n d u r a , 1995). T h i s is by no m e a n s the first t i m e that a r g u m e n t s h a v e b e e n raised against the fundamental principles underlying self-efficacy theory (see, for e x a m p l e , Biglan, 1987; Borkovec, 1978; Eastman & Marzillier, 1984; Kirsch, 1986; Lee, 1989; Tryon, 1981, 1982), nor the first t i m e that B a n d u r a has
r e s p o n d e d to his c r i t i c s (e.g., B a n d u r a , 1978, 1981, 1984). A r g u m e n t o f t h i s n a t u r e is an e n j o y a b l e a c a d e m i c exercise. But this is one a r g u m e n t w h i c h n o b o d y is g o i n g to win, b e c a u s e it sets a g a i n s t each other two v i e w s o f science and o f p s y c h o l o g y w h i c h are basically i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e . O n the one h a n d , w e h a v e the f u n d a m e n t a l l y d u a l i s t v i e w adopted by Bandura and by the majority of "cognitive" psychologists, that the mind has independent, although nonmaterial, existence and that p r o c e s s e s and e v e n t s in the m i n d i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s in the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . O n the other, w e h a v e the e p i p h e n o m e n a l i s t v i e w o f H a w k i n s , that conscious events are no m o r e than by-products of physiology and behavior, side effects which cannot h a v e any causal role. In such a debate, there can be no q u e s t i o n o f one side c o n v i n c i n g the other o f the rightness of
Requests for reprints should be addressed to C. Lee, Department of Psychology, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan NSW 2308, Australia. 259
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its position, because the underlying philosophical assumptions are fundamentally incompatible. Thus, the issue becomes not that of which side is right and which wrong, but that of which is the more useful. Which model of human beings provides the more accurate predictions of human b e h a v i o r ? W h i c h leads to a more c o m p l e t e understanding of human action? Which is more compatible with the dual goals of understanding behavior and reducing human distress? Which (and this may be the crucial question) is more compatible with contemporary views of human beings and their relationship with society? I have previously outlined my objections to self-efficacy theory on scientific grounds (Lee, 1989). In this paper, I will briefly reiterate those points, before turning to the broader issue of the social and political implications of cognitionbased models in general. It is my contention that this debate is not about facts or theories, but about essentially incompatible views of the relationship between individuals and society. Despite the sociopolitical nature of human b e h a v i o r , p s y c h o l o g y is often r e l u c t a n t to recognise the social influences which have shaped it (Buss, 1975), and to recognise the potential of psychology to be used for social and political ends. Ours is a field in which value judgments are often not identified as such (Scarr, 1985), in which we maintain the illusion that we are studying "behavior" in a pure, ahistorical, apolitical context (Prilleltensky, 1989), and in which the search for scientific "truth" is artificially disconnected from the society in which the research is conducted. A f t e r s u m m a r i s i n g some o f my scientific objections to self-efficacy and related theories, I will argue for a need to examine the broader, social and political, implications of cognitionbased models of human behavior in order to understand why this debate continues to generate so much heat and so little light.
Scientific Problems with Self-Efficacy Theory I have argued on previous occasions that selfefficacy theory is fundamentally flawed (Lee,
1989, 1990). It is based on the assumption that events in the real world affect one's behavior, not directly, but through the mediating effects of e f f i c a c y e x p e c t a t i o n s . P r e v i o u s personal experience, observations of others, information and other symbolic knowledge, and physiological states are all weighted and combined to produce the e f f i c a c y e x p e c t a t i o n , the final c o m m o n pathway through which all these factors influence behavior (Bandura, 1986). A major weakness of the theory is that the process by which this synthesis takes place is not specified. There is no model for predicting the weighting of various types of information. Thus, there is no way of predicting efficacy expectation from a knowledge of these inputs. Because of the large number of potential influences, and the lack of a rigorous model, almost any level of selfefficacy could potentially arise from almost any set of circumstances. A similar problem arises in describing how efficacy expectations interact with other variables. Bandura (1986) has argued that skill levels and incentives are also important influences on behavior. Again, the model reflects the complexity and variability we perceive in human behavior, and accords with the satisfying view that people are very complicated. However, it is of no actual use. The naming of variables has been substituted for e x p l a n a t i o n . There is no f r a m e w o r k for specifying how skills and incentives might be assessed independently of the behavior they are supposed to affect, nor for identifying the way in which efficacy expectations will interact with these other variables. Thus, there is no way of predicting what behavior will result from any particular combination of skill, efficacy and incentive. Further, the vagueness of the basic constructs precludes the successful development of such a framework. What, for example, is "incentive"? How is it distinct from outcome expectations, from the perceived benefits of action, from health protection motivation? The theory, and other related theories, postulate a large number of unobservable processes and argue that they interact in an unspecified manner to produce observable behavior. The lack of
Science and Politics p r e c i s i o n m e a n s that h y p o t h e s e s c a n n o t be developed which will test these theories. It is almost impossible to come up with an outcome which could not be explained, post hoc, in terms of self-efficacy theory. To be scientific, a theory must specify not only what will happen but also what will n o t happen. It is true that self-efficacy does predict behavior in relatively uncomplicated contexts with a fair degree of accuracy. But at the level of explaining the p r o c e s s e s i n v o l v e d in b e h a v i n g and in behavior change, rather than simply providing one of a number of different possible descriptions of them, it does not increase our understanding of human activity. To state that a person behaved in a particular way primarily because of his or her level of self-efficacy is a circular and nonscientific characterisation of that behavior. In summary, theories of this type, despite their apparent value, are fundamentally invalid. This is because they rely for their apparent explanatory power on unpredictable interactions between hypothetical variables which cannot be observed and are not operationally defined (e.g., Eysenck, 1978; Lee, 1987; Skinner, 1977, 1987). These arguments, when previously published, have left cognitive psychologists unmoved. I submit that this is because theories are chosen and d e v e l o p e d , not solely on the basis of their scientific integrity, but also because they "feel right" to their proponents and to the society within which they are promulgated. Freimuth (1992) has argued that scientists, including psychologists, frequently ignore formal epistemic criteria in the development of theory. Theories, he argued, may be viewed as narratives, as constructed stories about the way the world is. From this perspective, a sense of fitting in with an overall view of the world may be more important in selecting one model over another, than is adherence to formal, logical criteria of scientific value. The Cartesian concept of a division of the universe into two fundamentally different kinds of stuff - - mind and matter - - remains ingrained in our ways of thinking about the world. Cognitive theories, including self-efficacy theory, are based explicitly or implicitly on the computer metaphor
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(Salzinger, 1992), and are essentially dualist in nature (Costall, 1991; Hineline, 1992; Staddon, 1993). E f f i c a c y e x p e c t a t i o n s , arising f r o m cognitive processes, are neither material nor observable: they, like a computer program, serve as "an abstract set of instructions that controls the body" (Costall, 1991, p. 157). Thus, in contemporary cognitive psychology, mind is seen as other than, and fundamentally different from, the body. The assumption is made that mental p r o c e s s e s exist in a d i f f e r e n t , nonphysical realm, and that the concepts and processes of thought owe nothing to biology except at the most trivial of levels (Staddon, 1993). Psychology is artificially separated from the natural sciences, and the human being is artificially separated from other animals (Massey. 1993). In the following section of this paper I examine some social and political implications of the adoption of a dualist model of the human being. No field of scientific endeavor is independent of political and cultural context; however, implicit political and cultural assumptions impact on psychology more directly and more importantly than they do on other disciplines, because our subject matter is human beings, who themselves exist in political and cultural contexts. Thus, it is important for us to be aware of the broader reasons why we might prefer one model over another, and of the possible implications of these broader reasons.
Social and Political Implications of Dualistic Models Contemporary hostility to behaviorism and other noncognitive models of human behavior, I submit, arises because these models run counter to a deeply-held philosophy that human action is determined by the soul, spirit or mind, and that the m e c h a n i s m of human agency lies outside the natural world (Hickey, 1994). Our cultural and professional traditions favour a view of the person as a discrete individual, an individual whose essence is a collection of subjective experiences,
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with a body more or less tacked on as a way of getting around. Skinner's model of the human o r g a n i s m as one l a r g e l y c o n t r o l l e d by the environment challenged deeply held, culturally determined assumptions about the relationship between the person and the world (Hineline, 1992). Cognitive and social psychology focus largely on internal processes and tend to downplay or ignore actual behavior (Argyle, 1991); they are based on the implicit assumption that cognitive e v e n t s are m o r e i m p o r t a n t , m o r e c e n t r a l to understanding human beings, than are social and physical circumstances (Sampson, 1981). An unintended implication of these assumptions is that cultural and political context, together with social conditions, are marginalised, and the current local cultural and political climate is taken as absolute (Jahoda, 1988). This in turn can lead to the a c c e p t a n c e of p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l l y or politically based views as if they reflected a permanent, indisputable reality. A professional and scientific culture which places more importance on cognitive events than on o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y is likely to e n c o u r a g e psychologists to focus interventions on changing c o g n i t i o n r a t h e r than a l t e r i n g o b j e c t i v e circumstances. Such a tendency will have as one of its effects the protection of the status quo, and the virtual ignoring of cultural and political i n f l u e n c e s on b e h a v i o r . B r o a d e r issues of i n e q u a l i t y , p o v e r t y and v i o l e n c e are lost in contemporary psychological analysis. "The primacy ascribed to the mind and the individual a g e n t in c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , in the best Cartesian tradition, tends to reinforce the need to adjust i n t r a p s y c h i c , as o p p o s e d to societal, structures in the remediation of personal and social problems" (Prilleltensky, 1990, p. 127). An implicit acceptance of dualism leads to the proposition of an abstract "person" who exists independently of physical, social, historical or cultural context and has "cognitions" which also exist independently of the material world. Thus, dualist models serve to reduce our subject matter from the entirety of human activity to the study of the subjective and individual (Sampson, 1981).
This both rests on and underlies an unexamined assumption that the answer to personal difficulty or distress is not to act to alter reality, but to change cognitions to make them more consistent with existing conditions. The implicit ideology of c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y was d e s c r i b e d by Prilleltensky (1989) as follows: A pervasivedichotomybetween the individual and society is observed in psychology . . . the individual is studied as an asocial and ahistorical being whose life vicissitudes are artificially disconnected from the wider sociopolitical context. Consequently, solutions for human predicaments are to be found within the self, leaving the social order unaffected. (p. 796) Regardless of the personal and political beliefs of individual psychologists, psychological theories which have cognition as their primary focus must inevitably assume this dichotomy between the person and the world, and must see human agency as residing within the individual. Kipnis (1994) has argued that, because academics generally lead pleasant, comfortable and desirable lives, it is not surprising that we will feel more comfortable with research paradigms which focus on helping other people to fit into this same society, than with those that seek fundamental change. Individualism and cognitivism thus work together to reduce the probability that social inequalities will actually be addressed, except at the most trivial of levels (Prilleltensky, 1990). My argument is not that social and cognitive psychologists are part of a deliberate conspiracy to m a i n t a i n social inequity. My point is that psychology is often unaware of, and uninterested in, the cultural basis and the cultural implications of its chosen focus. The political and social conservatism that psychblogy demonstrates is an unintended consequence of the preference for dualist models of humanity. A focus on individual cognition must lead to a view of society as an agglomeration of independent individuals which exist primarily as cognitive processes and only secondarily as physical entities. The purpose of this discussion has been to m a k e e x p l i c i t s o m e of the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l implications of a dualist model of human beings, a model which emphasises the subjective over the
Science and Politics objective,
which ignores
actual behavior
and
emphasises hypothetical constructs. Although I h a v e b e e n i n t e n t i o n a l l y political, m y a i m is not to p e r s u a d e r e a d e r s o f a specific political v i e w p o i n t but r a t h e r to e n c o u r a g e p s y c h o l o g i s t s to c o n s i d e r the implications and broader context of their theories. M y a r g u m e n t is t h a t t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a causal role for c o g n i t i o n in h u m a n b e h a v i o r is n o t , f u n d a m e n t a l l y , a scientific comparison of alternative t h e o r i e s . It is a discussion at cross-purposes, in which the protagonists hold fundamentally incompatible views about the relationship between brain and c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a b o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the individual and society, and about fundamental mechanisms of human agency: whether our a c t i o n s are d r i v e n b y the C a r t e s i a n " g h o s t in the m a c h i n e " o r w h e t h e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s is n o m o r e t h a n T h o m a s H u x l e y ' s " s t e a m a b o v e the f a c t o r y " .
References Argyle, M. (1991). A critique of cognitive approaches to social judgments and social behavior. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and social judgments (pp. 161-178). New York: Pergamon. Bandura, A. (1978). Reflections on self-efficacy. Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1,237-269. Bandura, A. (1981). In search of pure unidirectional determinants. Behavior Therapy, 12, 30---40. Bandura, A. (1984). Recycling misconceptions of perceived self-efficacy. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 8, 231-255. Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Bandura, A. (1995). Comments on the crusade against the causal efficacy of human thought. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26, 179-190. Biglan, A. (1987). A behavior-analytic critique of Bandura's self-efficacy theory. Behavior Analyst, 10, l-15. Borkovec, T. D. (1978). Self efficacy: cause or reflection of behaviour change'? Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1,163-170. Buss, A. R. (1975). The emerging field of the sociology of psychological knowledge. American Psychologist, 30, 988-1002. Carroll, L. (1876). The hunting of the snark: an agony in eight fits. London: Macmillan. Costall, A. (1991). "Graceful degradation": cognitivism and the metaphors of the computer. In A. Still & A. Costall (Eds), Against cognitivism: alternative foundations for cognitive psychology (pp. 152-169). New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Eastman. C., & Marzillier, J. S. (1984). Theoretical and
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methodological difficulties in Bandura's self-efficacy theory. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 8, 213-229. Eysenck, H. J. (1978). Expectations as causal elements in behaviour change. Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 1, 171-175. Freimuth, M. (1992). Is the best always preferred'? American Psychologist, 47, 673-674. Hawkins, R. P. 11992). Self-efficacy: a predictor but not a cause of behavior. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 23, 251-256. Hickey, P. (1994). Resistance to behaviorism. Behavior Therapist. 17, 150-152. Hineline, P. N. 11992). A self-interpretive behavior analysis. American Psychologist, 47, 1274-1286. Jahoda, G. (1988). J'accuse. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The crosscultural challenge to social psyehology (pp. 86-95}, Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications. James, W. (1893 i. Psychology. New York: Holt. Kipnis, D. (1994). Accounting for the use of behavior technologies in social psychology. American Psychologist, 49, 165-172. Kirsch, 1. (1986). Early research on self-efficacy: what we already know without knowing we know. Journal Of Social and Clinical P~ychology, 4, 339-358. Lee, C. (1987). Affective behaviour modification: a case for empirical investigation. Journal of Behavior Therapy and E.~perimental Psychiatry, 18, 203-213. Lee, C. (1989). Theoretical problems lead to practical difficulties: the example of self-efficacy theory. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry. 20, 115-123. Lee, C. 11990). Theoretical weaknesses: fundamental flaws in cognitive-behavioral theories are more than a problem of probability. J(Jurnal of Behavivr Therapy and Experimental P©,chiatr3', 21,143-145. Massey, G. J. (1993). Mind-body problems. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 15, $97-S115. Prilleltensky, I. (1989). Psychology and the status quo. American Psychologist, 44,795-802. Prilleltensky, I. t1990). On the social and political implications of cognitive psychology. Journal of Mind and Behavior. 11, 127-136. Salzinger, K. (1992). Cognitive therapy: a misunderstanding of B. F. Skinner. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 23, 3-8. Sampson, E. E. (1981). Cognitive psychology as ideology. American Psychologist, 36, 730-743. Scarr, S. (1985i. Constructing psychology: making facts and fables for our times. American Psychologist, 40, 499-512. Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not a cognitive psychologist. Behaviorism. 5, 1-10. Skinner, B, F. (1987). Whatever happened to psychology as the science of behavior? American Psychologist. 42, 780-786. Staddon, J. E. R. (1993). Pepper with a pinch of psalt. Behavior Analyst, 16, 245-250. Tryon, W. W. i1981). A methodological critique of Bandura's self-efficacy theory of behavior change. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 12, 113-114. Tryon, W. W. (1982). Reinforcement history as a possible basis for the relationship between self-percepts of efficacy and responses to treatment. Journal of Behavior Therapy and K~perimental Psychiatry, 13,201-202.
Pergamon 0005-7916(95)00031-3
COMPARING THE INCOMMENSURABLE: WHERE SCIENCE AND POLITICS COLLIDE C H R I S T I N A LEE The University of Newcastle, Australia
Summary - - Arguments about the possibility that cognitive variables may play a causal role in human behavior are unlikely to be resolved in favor of one side or the other, because they set against each other two incommensurable views of human agency. Contemporary cognitive models of psychology are based on an implicitly dualist view of human behavior, assuming the existence of a nonmaterial mental realm which has the capacity to act on the material world. Critics, by comparison, frequently argue from an epiphenomenalist position. While there may be sound scientific reasons for rejecting self-efficacy theory, and particularly for rejecting the utility of the concept that behavior is caused by efficacy expectations, this paper argues that epistemic criteria are frequently less important than a sense that a theory is compatible with a particular world view. I argue that cognitive theories are accepted by the psychological mainstream because their dualist basis accords with deeply held cultural beliefs about the relationship between the person and the world. However, the social and political consequences of such models are rarely articulated, and there is a need for psychologists to develop a more explicit understanding of the relationship between psychological theories and their broader implications.
A string of raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a little classification and description on the mere descriptive level; a strong prejudice that we have states of mind, hut not a single law in the sense that physics shows us laws, not a single proposition from which any consequence causally can be deduced. We don't even know the terms between which the elementary laws would obtain if we had them. (James, 1893, p. 468) What I tell you three times is true. (Carroll, 1876) O n c e again, an a c a d e m i c has p r e s e n t e d a w e l l argued case against the role o f s e l f - e f f i c a c y as a causal m e c h a n i s m in b e h a v i o r ( H a w k i n s , 1992). O n c e a g a i n , A l b e r t B a n d u r a h a s p r e p a r e d an e l e g a n t r e b u t t a l ( B a n d u r a , 1995). T h i s is by no m e a n s the first t i m e that a r g u m e n t s h a v e b e e n raised against the fundamental principles underlying self-efficacy theory (see, for e x a m p l e , Biglan, 1987; Borkovec, 1978; Eastman & Marzillier, 1984; Kirsch, 1986; Lee, 1989; Tryon, 1981, 1982), nor the first t i m e that B a n d u r a has
r e s p o n d e d to his c r i t i c s (e.g., B a n d u r a , 1978, 1981, 1984). A r g u m e n t o f t h i s n a t u r e is an e n j o y a b l e a c a d e m i c exercise. But this is one a r g u m e n t w h i c h n o b o d y is g o i n g to win, b e c a u s e it sets a g a i n s t each other two v i e w s o f science and o f p s y c h o l o g y w h i c h are basically i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e . O n the one h a n d , w e h a v e the f u n d a m e n t a l l y d u a l i s t v i e w adopted by Bandura and by the majority of "cognitive" psychologists, that the mind has independent, although nonmaterial, existence and that p r o c e s s e s and e v e n t s in the m i n d i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s in the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . O n the other, w e h a v e the e p i p h e n o m e n a l i s t v i e w o f H a w k i n s , that conscious events are no m o r e than by-products of physiology and behavior, side effects which cannot h a v e any causal role. In such a debate, there can be no q u e s t i o n o f one side c o n v i n c i n g the other o f the rightness of
Requests for reprints should be addressed to C. Lee, Department of Psychology, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan NSW 2308, Australia. 259
260
CHRISTINALEE
its position, because the underlying philosophical assumptions are fundamentally incompatible. Thus, the issue becomes not that of which side is right and which wrong, but that of which is the more useful. Which model of human beings provides the more accurate predictions of human b e h a v i o r ? W h i c h leads to a more c o m p l e t e understanding of human action? Which is more compatible with the dual goals of understanding behavior and reducing human distress? Which (and this may be the crucial question) is more compatible with contemporary views of human beings and their relationship with society? I have previously outlined my objections to self-efficacy theory on scientific grounds (Lee, 1989). In this paper, I will briefly reiterate those points, before turning to the broader issue of the social and political implications of cognitionbased models in general. It is my contention that this debate is not about facts or theories, but about essentially incompatible views of the relationship between individuals and society. Despite the sociopolitical nature of human b e h a v i o r , p s y c h o l o g y is often r e l u c t a n t to recognise the social influences which have shaped it (Buss, 1975), and to recognise the potential of psychology to be used for social and political ends. Ours is a field in which value judgments are often not identified as such (Scarr, 1985), in which we maintain the illusion that we are studying "behavior" in a pure, ahistorical, apolitical context (Prilleltensky, 1989), and in which the search for scientific "truth" is artificially disconnected from the society in which the research is conducted. A f t e r s u m m a r i s i n g some o f my scientific objections to self-efficacy and related theories, I will argue for a need to examine the broader, social and political, implications of cognitionbased models of human behavior in order to understand why this debate continues to generate so much heat and so little light.
Scientific Problems with Self-Efficacy Theory I have argued on previous occasions that selfefficacy theory is fundamentally flawed (Lee,
1989, 1990). It is based on the assumption that events in the real world affect one's behavior, not directly, but through the mediating effects of e f f i c a c y e x p e c t a t i o n s . P r e v i o u s personal experience, observations of others, information and other symbolic knowledge, and physiological states are all weighted and combined to produce the e f f i c a c y e x p e c t a t i o n , the final c o m m o n pathway through which all these factors influence behavior (Bandura, 1986). A major weakness of the theory is that the process by which this synthesis takes place is not specified. There is no model for predicting the weighting of various types of information. Thus, there is no way of predicting efficacy expectation from a knowledge of these inputs. Because of the large number of potential influences, and the lack of a rigorous model, almost any level of selfefficacy could potentially arise from almost any set of circumstances. A similar problem arises in describing how efficacy expectations interact with other variables. Bandura (1986) has argued that skill levels and incentives are also important influences on behavior. Again, the model reflects the complexity and variability we perceive in human behavior, and accords with the satisfying view that people are very complicated. However, it is of no actual use. The naming of variables has been substituted for e x p l a n a t i o n . There is no f r a m e w o r k for specifying how skills and incentives might be assessed independently of the behavior they are supposed to affect, nor for identifying the way in which efficacy expectations will interact with these other variables. Thus, there is no way of predicting what behavior will result from any particular combination of skill, efficacy and incentive. Further, the vagueness of the basic constructs precludes the successful development of such a framework. What, for example, is "incentive"? How is it distinct from outcome expectations, from the perceived benefits of action, from health protection motivation? The theory, and other related theories, postulate a large number of unobservable processes and argue that they interact in an unspecified manner to produce observable behavior. The lack of
Science and Politics p r e c i s i o n m e a n s that h y p o t h e s e s c a n n o t be developed which will test these theories. It is almost impossible to come up with an outcome which could not be explained, post hoc, in terms of self-efficacy theory. To be scientific, a theory must specify not only what will happen but also what will n o t happen. It is true that self-efficacy does predict behavior in relatively uncomplicated contexts with a fair degree of accuracy. But at the level of explaining the p r o c e s s e s i n v o l v e d in b e h a v i n g and in behavior change, rather than simply providing one of a number of different possible descriptions of them, it does not increase our understanding of human activity. To state that a person behaved in a particular way primarily because of his or her level of self-efficacy is a circular and nonscientific characterisation of that behavior. In summary, theories of this type, despite their apparent value, are fundamentally invalid. This is because they rely for their apparent explanatory power on unpredictable interactions between hypothetical variables which cannot be observed and are not operationally defined (e.g., Eysenck, 1978; Lee, 1987; Skinner, 1977, 1987). These arguments, when previously published, have left cognitive psychologists unmoved. I submit that this is because theories are chosen and d e v e l o p e d , not solely on the basis of their scientific integrity, but also because they "feel right" to their proponents and to the society within which they are promulgated. Freimuth (1992) has argued that scientists, including psychologists, frequently ignore formal epistemic criteria in the development of theory. Theories, he argued, may be viewed as narratives, as constructed stories about the way the world is. From this perspective, a sense of fitting in with an overall view of the world may be more important in selecting one model over another, than is adherence to formal, logical criteria of scientific value. The Cartesian concept of a division of the universe into two fundamentally different kinds of stuff - - mind and matter - - remains ingrained in our ways of thinking about the world. Cognitive theories, including self-efficacy theory, are based explicitly or implicitly on the computer metaphor
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(Salzinger, 1992), and are essentially dualist in nature (Costall, 1991; Hineline, 1992; Staddon, 1993). E f f i c a c y e x p e c t a t i o n s , arising f r o m cognitive processes, are neither material nor observable: they, like a computer program, serve as "an abstract set of instructions that controls the body" (Costall, 1991, p. 157). Thus, in contemporary cognitive psychology, mind is seen as other than, and fundamentally different from, the body. The assumption is made that mental p r o c e s s e s exist in a d i f f e r e n t , nonphysical realm, and that the concepts and processes of thought owe nothing to biology except at the most trivial of levels (Staddon, 1993). Psychology is artificially separated from the natural sciences, and the human being is artificially separated from other animals (Massey. 1993). In the following section of this paper I examine some social and political implications of the adoption of a dualist model of the human being. No field of scientific endeavor is independent of political and cultural context; however, implicit political and cultural assumptions impact on psychology more directly and more importantly than they do on other disciplines, because our subject matter is human beings, who themselves exist in political and cultural contexts. Thus, it is important for us to be aware of the broader reasons why we might prefer one model over another, and of the possible implications of these broader reasons.
Social and Political Implications of Dualistic Models Contemporary hostility to behaviorism and other noncognitive models of human behavior, I submit, arises because these models run counter to a deeply-held philosophy that human action is determined by the soul, spirit or mind, and that the m e c h a n i s m of human agency lies outside the natural world (Hickey, 1994). Our cultural and professional traditions favour a view of the person as a discrete individual, an individual whose essence is a collection of subjective experiences,
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CHRISTINALEE
with a body more or less tacked on as a way of getting around. Skinner's model of the human o r g a n i s m as one l a r g e l y c o n t r o l l e d by the environment challenged deeply held, culturally determined assumptions about the relationship between the person and the world (Hineline, 1992). Cognitive and social psychology focus largely on internal processes and tend to downplay or ignore actual behavior (Argyle, 1991); they are based on the implicit assumption that cognitive e v e n t s are m o r e i m p o r t a n t , m o r e c e n t r a l to understanding human beings, than are social and physical circumstances (Sampson, 1981). An unintended implication of these assumptions is that cultural and political context, together with social conditions, are marginalised, and the current local cultural and political climate is taken as absolute (Jahoda, 1988). This in turn can lead to the a c c e p t a n c e of p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l l y or politically based views as if they reflected a permanent, indisputable reality. A professional and scientific culture which places more importance on cognitive events than on o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y is likely to e n c o u r a g e psychologists to focus interventions on changing c o g n i t i o n r a t h e r than a l t e r i n g o b j e c t i v e circumstances. Such a tendency will have as one of its effects the protection of the status quo, and the virtual ignoring of cultural and political i n f l u e n c e s on b e h a v i o r . B r o a d e r issues of i n e q u a l i t y , p o v e r t y and v i o l e n c e are lost in contemporary psychological analysis. "The primacy ascribed to the mind and the individual a g e n t in c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , in the best Cartesian tradition, tends to reinforce the need to adjust i n t r a p s y c h i c , as o p p o s e d to societal, structures in the remediation of personal and social problems" (Prilleltensky, 1990, p. 127). An implicit acceptance of dualism leads to the proposition of an abstract "person" who exists independently of physical, social, historical or cultural context and has "cognitions" which also exist independently of the material world. Thus, dualist models serve to reduce our subject matter from the entirety of human activity to the study of the subjective and individual (Sampson, 1981).
This both rests on and underlies an unexamined assumption that the answer to personal difficulty or distress is not to act to alter reality, but to change cognitions to make them more consistent with existing conditions. The implicit ideology of c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y was d e s c r i b e d by Prilleltensky (1989) as follows: A pervasivedichotomybetween the individual and society is observed in psychology . . . the individual is studied as an asocial and ahistorical being whose life vicissitudes are artificially disconnected from the wider sociopolitical context. Consequently, solutions for human predicaments are to be found within the self, leaving the social order unaffected. (p. 796) Regardless of the personal and political beliefs of individual psychologists, psychological theories which have cognition as their primary focus must inevitably assume this dichotomy between the person and the world, and must see human agency as residing within the individual. Kipnis (1994) has argued that, because academics generally lead pleasant, comfortable and desirable lives, it is not surprising that we will feel more comfortable with research paradigms which focus on helping other people to fit into this same society, than with those that seek fundamental change. Individualism and cognitivism thus work together to reduce the probability that social inequalities will actually be addressed, except at the most trivial of levels (Prilleltensky, 1990). My argument is not that social and cognitive psychologists are part of a deliberate conspiracy to m a i n t a i n social inequity. My point is that psychology is often unaware of, and uninterested in, the cultural basis and the cultural implications of its chosen focus. The political and social conservatism that psychblogy demonstrates is an unintended consequence of the preference for dualist models of humanity. A focus on individual cognition must lead to a view of society as an agglomeration of independent individuals which exist primarily as cognitive processes and only secondarily as physical entities. The purpose of this discussion has been to m a k e e x p l i c i t s o m e of the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l implications of a dualist model of human beings, a model which emphasises the subjective over the
Science and Politics objective,
which ignores
actual behavior
and
emphasises hypothetical constructs. Although I h a v e b e e n i n t e n t i o n a l l y political, m y a i m is not to p e r s u a d e r e a d e r s o f a specific political v i e w p o i n t but r a t h e r to e n c o u r a g e p s y c h o l o g i s t s to c o n s i d e r the implications and broader context of their theories. M y a r g u m e n t is t h a t t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a causal role for c o g n i t i o n in h u m a n b e h a v i o r is n o t , f u n d a m e n t a l l y , a scientific comparison of alternative t h e o r i e s . It is a discussion at cross-purposes, in which the protagonists hold fundamentally incompatible views about the relationship between brain and c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a b o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the individual and society, and about fundamental mechanisms of human agency: whether our a c t i o n s are d r i v e n b y the C a r t e s i a n " g h o s t in the m a c h i n e " o r w h e t h e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s is n o m o r e t h a n T h o m a s H u x l e y ' s " s t e a m a b o v e the f a c t o r y " .
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