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Competitive intelligence: Insights from executives
Competitive Intelligence: Insights from Executives Betsy D. Gelb, Mary Jane Saxton, George M. Zinkhan, and Nancy D. Albers
iven the current strategic focus in business, a c o m m o n p l a c e admonition is to understand competitors' strengths and weaknesses, then to position one's o w n offerings to take advantage of weaknesses and avoid headto-head clashes against strengths (Aaker 1988). It is important therefore to gather competitive intelligence, if only as a first step in the process of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of competitors. The field is the subject of a range of books and articles, but most authors focus below top management: Either they write for or about information systems professionals w h o must protect and systematize data, or they write for and about marketing, planning, or intelligence professionals w h o seek or gather information rival organizations are trying to protect. Are the professionals gathering the intelligence top m a n a g e m e n t wants? H o w will the information that comes to top m a n a g e m e n t be
G
Figure 1 H o w Data Were Gathered We notified a convenience sample of 30 executives that we were conducting a university study exploring competitive intelligence priorities. We were able to make appointments with 20, to talk to them in person or, more often, by telephone. The industries represented included industrial manufacturers, such as chemical producers and oil companies, and service organizations, including health care, consulting organizations and law firms. The executives were CEOs, vice presidents, or partners (e.g., in law firms). The interview was only minimally structured: we asked them what topics interested them in the overall competitive intelligence area and what topics they felt qualified to discuss. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and one hour.
Competitive Intelligence: Insights from Executives
used? These are the kinds of questions that suggest the value of viewing competitive intelligence from the executive perspective. This article examines a study that did so. At this executive level are a range of issues of interest. Why do companies seek competitive intelligence? H o w successfully do they use the information gathered? What are the ethical issues? Are there iriternational implications? One study did probe the views of executives (Wall 1974). However, there have b e e n several changes in the competitive environment since that time. Increased international competition, increased emphasis on international markets, and at least occasional lip service given to government-business cooperation in planning for the development of U.S. industry could all be expected to affect competitive intelligence in m a n y ways. Therefore, it seemed wise to seek n e w e r insights. To do so, we interviewed 20 high-level executives in U.S. enterprises, seeking to shed some light on competitive intelligence from a top-management perspective. F i g u r e 1 describes the method of the study. The study offered insights into w h y executives seek competitive intelligence, what topics of information are useful at the executive level, the sources of this information, and h o w the collected data were ultimately used. Additionally, the respondents talked about potential barriers to collecting competitive information as well as their concerns for protecting internal information. Some of their comments support conventional wisdom; others m a y run counter to it.
People who gather competitive intelligence should be less •
•
m
x
43
WHY EXECUTIVES SEEK COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
xecutives of major organizations seek insights about what their competitors are doing or planning not so m u c h to try to outsmart them as to imitate them in areas where they are successful or avoid surprises. The reasoning we heard ran as follows:
E
I want to do m y job better. I want to k n o w what our competitors are doing that's effective so that w e can emulate it. But I can't call up a competitor and ask what's going well. So I have to w o r k at finding out both what they're trying and h o w successfully it's working out. I want to k n o w what m y competitors are doing because I want to improve as a manager, and m a y b e I can learn from them. If I got a competitor's business plan, I wouldn't think that was unethical. I'd like to see h o w they put it together and h o w they would decide whether this would be a profitable product. Their process for making that decision might be better than ours. That's m y objective, to make our processes better. <'Self-improvement" was hardly the only motive in seeking competitive information, however. Executives also wanted to know: • Operating procedures and policies that provide a competitive edge, including international strategies; • Financial information, such as costs, overhead allocation, and profits earned at the current selling price; • Personnel information, including benefits, training techniques, and salary ranges; • New product information--in addition to what products were being developed and introduced, the strengths and technological advances of the n e w products; • Marketing c o n c e r n s - - h o w aggressively the competition is marketing a product line, h o w m u c h international exposure a product has, and strategies to define and develop markets. However, one executive said that what he requested was information to help him decide what "cultural" factors gave other firms a competitive edge; he requested a '
D 44
espite conventional wisdom that intelligence is a relatively new field and therefore perhaps an unsophisticated one, the
respondents found competitive information relatively easy for their organizations to obtain. They tapped a wide variety of potential sources, and several observed that a great deal of data is available through direct, o p e n channels. These channels include: • Published sources such as trade magazines for general information; • Governmental data for information such as new patent listings; and • Other public documents for assessing the financial health and market share of a competitor. In addition to published sources, there is an established custom, or even policy, within some industries for sharing information. A bank's senior vice president, for example, noted that a "formal circuit" in the banking industry shares information on clients w h o engage in fraudulent activities. Another executive commented: Competitive intelligence information is easy for our organization to obtain. We live in a closed environment in our industry. A lot of people k n o w each other, so you hear what you need to know. One of the best ways to get competitive intelligence is to do surveys and promise everyone the results. The downside associated with the custom of intra-industry sharing of data can occur, however, w h e n an industry is abruptly deregulated. A telep h o n e c o m p a n y executive c o m m e n t e d that going from being a "big h a p p y family" [as an industry] to being competitors meant that his firm would '
In contrast, other executives felt it was difficult to obtain "meaty" data. The barriers were not only competitor skill in protecting data such as raw costs or pricing policies, but also the legal inhibitions in going after it. However, several indirect methods of obtaining information were reported. The methods mentioned were: • Use of consulting firms; • Surveillance of the competition (examples included debriefing job applicants about former employers, obtaining samples of competitors' products, sales literature, and contracts, and use of helicopters for fly-over observations); • Conducting telephone surveys of the competition to discover pricing or n e w product information; and • Noting changes in the labor market. One executive c o m m e n t e d that a flood of resumes from employees of one c o m p a n y can prove to be useful competitive information.
Figure 2 H o w Competitive Intelligence Looks f r o m the Top The chief executive of one of the nation's top chemical companies offered the opinion that strategic planning "has gotten people out of businesses where they can't compete." Consequently, he observed, such issues as costs, volume, and operating rates for a competitor could be assumed to be pretty much in line with what a thoughtful observer would calculate them to be. What would not be at all obvious, however--and therefore would be worth discovering--would be the priorities that a competitor would place on different products and/or different geographic markets. Furthermore, there would always be the possibility of a competitor's improving a product--and it would be useful to find that out sooner, rather than later. The planning vice president of a large integrated oil company offered a similar perspective. "You'd like to know their strategy," he said.
HOW EXECUTIVES USE COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
BARRIERS TO COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE COI].ECTION AND USE
ecause significant amounts of executive time and m o n e y m a y be spent in the pursuit and evaluation of intelligence, it seemed worthwhile to investigate the use of the information gathered. From these respondents, several practical uses of competitive intelligence information emerged. Many emphasized that a competitive edge is found more in h o w the data are used rather than simply the fact of having or not having it. Primary uses discussed had a strategic slant (See F i g u r e 2). They were: • To improve corporate processes and decision making and to improve overall performance as a manager; • To anticipate problems and opportunities so m a n a g e m e n t is not surprised b y major competitive activities; • To develop an understanding of h o w the c o m p a n y is performing relative to their immediate competition and to plan accordingly; and • To develop basic strategies, such as planning activities to help develop a niche, and to help guide m a n a g e m e n t out of businesses where they cannot effectively compete. Despite the ample uses for competitive intelligence, the respondents warned of several drawbacks and pitfalls. One executive complained that the time m a n y organizations spend on surveillance might be better spent on planning activities. Many found that the data gathered were only useful in confirming decisions already made or for making relatively routine decisions. One oil c o m p a n y executive said he had noticed two uses of intelligence: "to leapfrog to r e s u l t s . . . [and] to fill the wastebasket."
everal specific barriers to effective collection and use of information were offered. One obvious barrier is the difficulty of finding out the desired information. Although the respondents provided m a n y sources of competitive data, collection techniques often struck them as unsophisticated. Some executives doubted that most companies have an effective system for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating competitive intelligence data. Several respondents complained that past presentations of competitive intelligence have jumped directly to the results and have tended to sidestep the process or method of data collection. They felt they would be better prepared to use competitive intelligence if they: • Knew h o w their competitive data were collected; and • Knew h o w to gather, package, catalog, disseminate, and best use the data. Their o w n organizations have no formal system for gathering or reporting competitive intelligence, some:observed. Furthermore, some were uncertain about h o w to set competitive intelligence budgets. Currently the level of expenditures for competitive intelligence activities in m a n y firms is not based on sales or any other objective basis. Some executives interviewed for this study r e c o m m e n d e d that competitive intelligence responsibilities should be centralized in one office. One suggested that a business intelligence manager should be utilized to improve the processes of gathering, disseminating, and formatting the data; then an organization's top executives should receive information reports on a regular basis.
B
Competitive Intelligence: Insights from Executives
S
45
INTERNAL CONTROL OF DATA Figure 3 "What If Y o u C a t c h a Spy?" The chief executive officer of a national manufacturing company reported an unusual problem: supervisors in his plant had stopped an unauthorized visitor who admitted he was there as a spy for a competitor. Said the CEO with a chuckle, "Now what do you do with the guy? We just let him go."
Unanswered questions about method gave rise to qualms about reliability a m o n g some respondents. They questioned the data provided in trade journals and expressed concerns about misleading information being fed to their firms. Most of the interviewees expressed some apprehension about the overall accuracy of the competitive data they have received. Furthermore, legal issues cloud competitive data collection. Many respondents expressed some degree of frustration about the legal constraints on competitive intelligence. A typical c o m m e n t was: If you are doing successful intelligence gathering, it's probably illegal. By the time the lawyers get through telling you what you can't do because of antitrust, you can't find out anything useful. Information gathered legally is too general to be of any value. Unfortunately, Japanese and European companies can find out legally what works for their competition. In addition to unclear guidelines on legal issues, a similar concern was expressed about the ethics of competitive intelligence gathering. One respondent explained that his c o m p a n y has a policy of not debriefing new employees from a competitor for fear of setting an unethical precedent. Overall, the usefulness of m u c h competitive intelligence was questioned. Problems associated with the competitive intelligence presented to the executives included: • Information given as averages, or without product-by-product breakdown, was too general to be an effective decision-making tool; • Data often were not presented in an effective format for planning functions; and • Changes in the marketplace occur frequently, resulting in a lot of competitive intelligence ending up in the wastepaper basket. In fact, the respondents warned that overreliance on competitive data may interfere with timely and consistent decisions. 46
A
final concern of the respondents was a need for internal control of an organization's o w n data (Figure 3). Many were concerned about internal leaks and leaks from previous employees. Many were not quite sure h o w to handle competitive intelligence internally. Recommendations from the executives included security measures on computerized data bases, formal policies on sharing competitive information, and installing a sense of responsibility a m o n g employees regarding intellectual property. Employees should be warned not to discuss business in public, said one. Another explained, however, that the necessity of providing product or quality information to customers, which is something a c o m p a n y wants them to know, prevents protection. Once 100 customers have b e e n told anything, there is no longer a secret to protect, he observed. learly, it is only a beginning to talk with 20 persons, and there is no implication that in doing so we have "covered" the world of competitive intelligence. Nevertheless, a few tentative conclusions do emerge, subject to further investigation: 1. Competitive intelligence gathering is a fact of life. Nobody expected its importance to shrink. 2. Improved competitive intelligence gathering techniques can ultimately improve the performance of an organization, in the belief of the executives. However, the emphasis should be on strategy undertaken by competitors, to the extent that it can be uncovered or inferred. 3. Thus, the technique-oriented books and articles on intelligence that focus on data acquisition m a y offer insufficient advice; what is needed to satisfy executives is a blend of data-gathering and then strategy inference. 4. Sentiment exists for permitting more collaboration a m o n g domestic competitors. Overall, the interviewed executives were less worried about the nuts and bolts of intelligence and more interested in using it to improve their o w n performance and that of U.S. industry as a whole. To the extent that they reflect a shifting emphasis, there is food for thought for regulat o r s - a n d a market for international intelligence gatherers. [~
C
References David Aaker, Strategic Market Management (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988). Dominick B. Attanasio "The Multiple Benefits of Competitor Intelligence," Journal of Business Strategy, MayJune 1988, pp. 16-19.
Business Horizons /January-February 1991
William Cohen and Helena Czepiec, "The Role of Ethics in Gathering Corporate Intelligence," Journal of Business Ethics, March 1988, pp. 199-203.
Jerry L. Wall, "What the Competition is Doing: Your Need to Know," Harvard Business Review, NovemberDecember 1974, pp. 22-28.
Leonard M. Fuld, Competitor Intelligence: How to Get It; How to Use It (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1985). John E. Prescott, Advances in Competitive Intelligence (Vienna, Va.: Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, 1989). John E. Prescott and John H. Grant, "A Manager's Guide for Evaluating Competitive Analysis Techniques," Interfaces, May-June 1988, pp. 10-22. John E. Prescott and Daniel C. Smith, "A Project-Based Approach to Competitive Intelligence," Strategic ManagementJournal, September-October 1987, pp. 411423.
Competitive Intelligence: Insights from Executives
Betsy D. Gelb is a professor of marketing, Mary Jane Sexton is an assistant professor of management, George M. Zinkhan is an associate professor of marketing, and Nancy D. Albers is a doctoral candidate, all at the College of Business Administration, University of Houston,
47
iven the current strategic focus in business, a c o m m o n p l a c e admonition is to understand competitors' strengths and weaknesses, then to position one's o w n offerings to take advantage of weaknesses and avoid headto-head clashes against strengths (Aaker 1988). It is important therefore to gather competitive intelligence, if only as a first step in the process of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of competitors. The field is the subject of a range of books and articles, but most authors focus below top management: Either they write for or about information systems professionals w h o must protect and systematize data, or they write for and about marketing, planning, or intelligence professionals w h o seek or gather information rival organizations are trying to protect. Are the professionals gathering the intelligence top m a n a g e m e n t wants? H o w will the information that comes to top m a n a g e m e n t be
G
Figure 1 H o w Data Were Gathered We notified a convenience sample of 30 executives that we were conducting a university study exploring competitive intelligence priorities. We were able to make appointments with 20, to talk to them in person or, more often, by telephone. The industries represented included industrial manufacturers, such as chemical producers and oil companies, and service organizations, including health care, consulting organizations and law firms. The executives were CEOs, vice presidents, or partners (e.g., in law firms). The interview was only minimally structured: we asked them what topics interested them in the overall competitive intelligence area and what topics they felt qualified to discuss. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and one hour.
Competitive Intelligence: Insights from Executives
used? These are the kinds of questions that suggest the value of viewing competitive intelligence from the executive perspective. This article examines a study that did so. At this executive level are a range of issues of interest. Why do companies seek competitive intelligence? H o w successfully do they use the information gathered? What are the ethical issues? Are there iriternational implications? One study did probe the views of executives (Wall 1974). However, there have b e e n several changes in the competitive environment since that time. Increased international competition, increased emphasis on international markets, and at least occasional lip service given to government-business cooperation in planning for the development of U.S. industry could all be expected to affect competitive intelligence in m a n y ways. Therefore, it seemed wise to seek n e w e r insights. To do so, we interviewed 20 high-level executives in U.S. enterprises, seeking to shed some light on competitive intelligence from a top-management perspective. F i g u r e 1 describes the method of the study. The study offered insights into w h y executives seek competitive intelligence, what topics of information are useful at the executive level, the sources of this information, and h o w the collected data were ultimately used. Additionally, the respondents talked about potential barriers to collecting competitive information as well as their concerns for protecting internal information. Some of their comments support conventional wisdom; others m a y run counter to it.
People who gather competitive intelligence should be less •
•
m
x
43
WHY EXECUTIVES SEEK COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
xecutives of major organizations seek insights about what their competitors are doing or planning not so m u c h to try to outsmart them as to imitate them in areas where they are successful or avoid surprises. The reasoning we heard ran as follows:
E
I want to do m y job better. I want to k n o w what our competitors are doing that's effective so that w e can emulate it. But I can't call up a competitor and ask what's going well. So I have to w o r k at finding out both what they're trying and h o w successfully it's working out. I want to k n o w what m y competitors are doing because I want to improve as a manager, and m a y b e I can learn from them. If I got a competitor's business plan, I wouldn't think that was unethical. I'd like to see h o w they put it together and h o w they would decide whether this would be a profitable product. Their process for making that decision might be better than ours. That's m y objective, to make our processes better. <'Self-improvement" was hardly the only motive in seeking competitive information, however. Executives also wanted to know: • Operating procedures and policies that provide a competitive edge, including international strategies; • Financial information, such as costs, overhead allocation, and profits earned at the current selling price; • Personnel information, including benefits, training techniques, and salary ranges; • New product information--in addition to what products were being developed and introduced, the strengths and technological advances of the n e w products; • Marketing c o n c e r n s - - h o w aggressively the competition is marketing a product line, h o w m u c h international exposure a product has, and strategies to define and develop markets. However, one executive said that what he requested was information to help him decide what "cultural" factors gave other firms a competitive edge; he requested a '
D 44
espite conventional wisdom that intelligence is a relatively new field and therefore perhaps an unsophisticated one, the
respondents found competitive information relatively easy for their organizations to obtain. They tapped a wide variety of potential sources, and several observed that a great deal of data is available through direct, o p e n channels. These channels include: • Published sources such as trade magazines for general information; • Governmental data for information such as new patent listings; and • Other public documents for assessing the financial health and market share of a competitor. In addition to published sources, there is an established custom, or even policy, within some industries for sharing information. A bank's senior vice president, for example, noted that a "formal circuit" in the banking industry shares information on clients w h o engage in fraudulent activities. Another executive commented: Competitive intelligence information is easy for our organization to obtain. We live in a closed environment in our industry. A lot of people k n o w each other, so you hear what you need to know. One of the best ways to get competitive intelligence is to do surveys and promise everyone the results. The downside associated with the custom of intra-industry sharing of data can occur, however, w h e n an industry is abruptly deregulated. A telep h o n e c o m p a n y executive c o m m e n t e d that going from being a "big h a p p y family" [as an industry] to being competitors meant that his firm would '
In contrast, other executives felt it was difficult to obtain "meaty" data. The barriers were not only competitor skill in protecting data such as raw costs or pricing policies, but also the legal inhibitions in going after it. However, several indirect methods of obtaining information were reported. The methods mentioned were: • Use of consulting firms; • Surveillance of the competition (examples included debriefing job applicants about former employers, obtaining samples of competitors' products, sales literature, and contracts, and use of helicopters for fly-over observations); • Conducting telephone surveys of the competition to discover pricing or n e w product information; and • Noting changes in the labor market. One executive c o m m e n t e d that a flood of resumes from employees of one c o m p a n y can prove to be useful competitive information.
Figure 2 H o w Competitive Intelligence Looks f r o m the Top The chief executive of one of the nation's top chemical companies offered the opinion that strategic planning "has gotten people out of businesses where they can't compete." Consequently, he observed, such issues as costs, volume, and operating rates for a competitor could be assumed to be pretty much in line with what a thoughtful observer would calculate them to be. What would not be at all obvious, however--and therefore would be worth discovering--would be the priorities that a competitor would place on different products and/or different geographic markets. Furthermore, there would always be the possibility of a competitor's improving a product--and it would be useful to find that out sooner, rather than later. The planning vice president of a large integrated oil company offered a similar perspective. "You'd like to know their strategy," he said.
HOW EXECUTIVES USE COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE
BARRIERS TO COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE COI].ECTION AND USE
ecause significant amounts of executive time and m o n e y m a y be spent in the pursuit and evaluation of intelligence, it seemed worthwhile to investigate the use of the information gathered. From these respondents, several practical uses of competitive intelligence information emerged. Many emphasized that a competitive edge is found more in h o w the data are used rather than simply the fact of having or not having it. Primary uses discussed had a strategic slant (See F i g u r e 2). They were: • To improve corporate processes and decision making and to improve overall performance as a manager; • To anticipate problems and opportunities so m a n a g e m e n t is not surprised b y major competitive activities; • To develop an understanding of h o w the c o m p a n y is performing relative to their immediate competition and to plan accordingly; and • To develop basic strategies, such as planning activities to help develop a niche, and to help guide m a n a g e m e n t out of businesses where they cannot effectively compete. Despite the ample uses for competitive intelligence, the respondents warned of several drawbacks and pitfalls. One executive complained that the time m a n y organizations spend on surveillance might be better spent on planning activities. Many found that the data gathered were only useful in confirming decisions already made or for making relatively routine decisions. One oil c o m p a n y executive said he had noticed two uses of intelligence: "to leapfrog to r e s u l t s . . . [and] to fill the wastebasket."
everal specific barriers to effective collection and use of information were offered. One obvious barrier is the difficulty of finding out the desired information. Although the respondents provided m a n y sources of competitive data, collection techniques often struck them as unsophisticated. Some executives doubted that most companies have an effective system for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating competitive intelligence data. Several respondents complained that past presentations of competitive intelligence have jumped directly to the results and have tended to sidestep the process or method of data collection. They felt they would be better prepared to use competitive intelligence if they: • Knew h o w their competitive data were collected; and • Knew h o w to gather, package, catalog, disseminate, and best use the data. Their o w n organizations have no formal system for gathering or reporting competitive intelligence, some:observed. Furthermore, some were uncertain about h o w to set competitive intelligence budgets. Currently the level of expenditures for competitive intelligence activities in m a n y firms is not based on sales or any other objective basis. Some executives interviewed for this study r e c o m m e n d e d that competitive intelligence responsibilities should be centralized in one office. One suggested that a business intelligence manager should be utilized to improve the processes of gathering, disseminating, and formatting the data; then an organization's top executives should receive information reports on a regular basis.
B
Competitive Intelligence: Insights from Executives
S
45
INTERNAL CONTROL OF DATA Figure 3 "What If Y o u C a t c h a Spy?" The chief executive officer of a national manufacturing company reported an unusual problem: supervisors in his plant had stopped an unauthorized visitor who admitted he was there as a spy for a competitor. Said the CEO with a chuckle, "Now what do you do with the guy? We just let him go."
Unanswered questions about method gave rise to qualms about reliability a m o n g some respondents. They questioned the data provided in trade journals and expressed concerns about misleading information being fed to their firms. Most of the interviewees expressed some apprehension about the overall accuracy of the competitive data they have received. Furthermore, legal issues cloud competitive data collection. Many respondents expressed some degree of frustration about the legal constraints on competitive intelligence. A typical c o m m e n t was: If you are doing successful intelligence gathering, it's probably illegal. By the time the lawyers get through telling you what you can't do because of antitrust, you can't find out anything useful. Information gathered legally is too general to be of any value. Unfortunately, Japanese and European companies can find out legally what works for their competition. In addition to unclear guidelines on legal issues, a similar concern was expressed about the ethics of competitive intelligence gathering. One respondent explained that his c o m p a n y has a policy of not debriefing new employees from a competitor for fear of setting an unethical precedent. Overall, the usefulness of m u c h competitive intelligence was questioned. Problems associated with the competitive intelligence presented to the executives included: • Information given as averages, or without product-by-product breakdown, was too general to be an effective decision-making tool; • Data often were not presented in an effective format for planning functions; and • Changes in the marketplace occur frequently, resulting in a lot of competitive intelligence ending up in the wastepaper basket. In fact, the respondents warned that overreliance on competitive data may interfere with timely and consistent decisions. 46
A
final concern of the respondents was a need for internal control of an organization's o w n data (Figure 3). Many were concerned about internal leaks and leaks from previous employees. Many were not quite sure h o w to handle competitive intelligence internally. Recommendations from the executives included security measures on computerized data bases, formal policies on sharing competitive information, and installing a sense of responsibility a m o n g employees regarding intellectual property. Employees should be warned not to discuss business in public, said one. Another explained, however, that the necessity of providing product or quality information to customers, which is something a c o m p a n y wants them to know, prevents protection. Once 100 customers have b e e n told anything, there is no longer a secret to protect, he observed. learly, it is only a beginning to talk with 20 persons, and there is no implication that in doing so we have "covered" the world of competitive intelligence. Nevertheless, a few tentative conclusions do emerge, subject to further investigation: 1. Competitive intelligence gathering is a fact of life. Nobody expected its importance to shrink. 2. Improved competitive intelligence gathering techniques can ultimately improve the performance of an organization, in the belief of the executives. However, the emphasis should be on strategy undertaken by competitors, to the extent that it can be uncovered or inferred. 3. Thus, the technique-oriented books and articles on intelligence that focus on data acquisition m a y offer insufficient advice; what is needed to satisfy executives is a blend of data-gathering and then strategy inference. 4. Sentiment exists for permitting more collaboration a m o n g domestic competitors. Overall, the interviewed executives were less worried about the nuts and bolts of intelligence and more interested in using it to improve their o w n performance and that of U.S. industry as a whole. To the extent that they reflect a shifting emphasis, there is food for thought for regulat o r s - a n d a market for international intelligence gatherers. [~
C
References David Aaker, Strategic Market Management (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988). Dominick B. Attanasio "The Multiple Benefits of Competitor Intelligence," Journal of Business Strategy, MayJune 1988, pp. 16-19.
Business Horizons /January-February 1991
William Cohen and Helena Czepiec, "The Role of Ethics in Gathering Corporate Intelligence," Journal of Business Ethics, March 1988, pp. 199-203.
Jerry L. Wall, "What the Competition is Doing: Your Need to Know," Harvard Business Review, NovemberDecember 1974, pp. 22-28.
Leonard M. Fuld, Competitor Intelligence: How to Get It; How to Use It (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1985). John E. Prescott, Advances in Competitive Intelligence (Vienna, Va.: Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, 1989). John E. Prescott and John H. Grant, "A Manager's Guide for Evaluating Competitive Analysis Techniques," Interfaces, May-June 1988, pp. 10-22. John E. Prescott and Daniel C. Smith, "A Project-Based Approach to Competitive Intelligence," Strategic ManagementJournal, September-October 1987, pp. 411423.
Competitive Intelligence: Insights from Executives
Betsy D. Gelb is a professor of marketing, Mary Jane Sexton is an assistant professor of management, George M. Zinkhan is an associate professor of marketing, and Nancy D. Albers is a doctoral candidate, all at the College of Business Administration, University of Houston,
47