Contrasts in enacting TQM: Mechanistic vs. organic ideology and implementation

Contrasts in Enacting TQM: Mechanistic vs. Organic Ideology and Implementation Janice M. Beyer The University of Texas at Austin

Donde P Ashmos The University of Texas at San Antonio

Richard N. Osbom Wayne State University A qualitative longitudinal study of the enactment of TQM in two semiconductor supplier firms revealed that adoption, implementation, and institutionalization of TQM in one firm was mechanistic, with a ritualistic use of specific TQM methods, procedures, and language while the otherfirm used an organic approach in which a local adaptation of TQM emerged as people learned and adapted concepts and tools to fit their specific needs. Results suggest that how TQM is implemented affects its institutionalization. Specifically, changes achieved through mechanistic approaches to TQ implementation may produce only short-lived conforming behaviors while organic implementation appears more likely to produce lasting change.

Although the term Total Quality appears less often in the business press than it did a decade ago, recent reports indicate that 93% of America’s largest 500 firms have adopted TQM in some form (Powell, 1995). One possible explanation for its disappearance from popular discourse is that the general principles underlying TQ are no longer matters of contention, but rather have become such an accepted and taken-for-granted part of the business culture that TQ no longer has news value. With TQ programs so pervasive, it is not an exaggeration to observe that Total Quality has reached the status of a social movement (Hackman & Wageman, 1995) and has become a key symbol of U.S. industry’s struggle to revitalize and reform itself to meet global competition. Such revitalization is generally presumed to Direct ull corrrspondm~e

to:

Janice

M. Beyer, The University

of Texas at Austin, Management

Department,

CBA 4.202, Austin. TX 7873 1. Journal of Quality Management, Copyright 0 1997 JAI Press Inc.

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pp. 3-39 All rights of reproduction

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ISSN: 1084-8.568 in any form reserved

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require fundamental change; TQM promises to achieve such change (Reger, Gustafson, DeMarie & Mullane, 1994). One way to look at the Total Quality movement is as prepackaged culture. TQ programs provide a kind of cultural toolkit (Swidler, 1986)-doctrine, symbols, rituals, and habits-that managers can use to “guide organizational behavior in predictable ways, essentially changing habit and routine” (Manley, 1996, p. 7; emphasis ours). A cultural perspective recognizes the breadth and depth of the changes advocated by TQ. The TQ movement seeks to change both people’s basic beliefs and values about their work and their customary work behaviors. Although TQ efforts rest on certain unifying principles, substantial variations exist in how TQ has been advocated (Crosby, 1979; Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989) and implemented in actual firms. Hackman and Wageman (1995, p. 312) have commented that “there is now such a diversity of things done under the name ‘total quality’ that it has become unclear whether TQM still has an identifiable conceptual core, if it ever did.” Other analysts see certain common ideas across different variants of TQ; they include a focus on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, teamwork (Dean & Bowen, 1994), a systems view of the organization (Sitkin, Sutcliffe & Schroeder, 1994), employee empowerment, constancy of purpose, and attention to horizontal processes (Spencer, 1994). While there is overlap among these lists and others that could be cited, each list differs somewhat from others. The lack of uniformity among these lists does not invalidate the importance, impact, or significance of TQ, if it is viewed from a cultural perspective. Cultures are inherently fuzzy (Trite & Beyer, 1993, p. 7; Gluckman, 1963; Moore, 1975). This fuzziness is one of culture’s strengths, for it permits adaptation to changing circumstances and minimizes conflicts (Beyer, 1981; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1976). These variations, however, complicate the study of TQ. To discover what TQ is in any given organization requires observing how it is enacted. Enactment occurs when people “act, and in so doing create the materials that become the constraints and opportunities they face” (Weick, 1995). Enactment thus involves ongoing social processes that arise from and are constrained by the particularities of each situation. Enactment unfolds and evolves; it is what happens over time after a process like TQ has been set in motion. We still know relatively little about the enactment of TQ-that is, how people act and what happens as a consequence in firms that are implementing these programs. Although there is considerable recognition of the importance of implementation in the literature of TQ (Dean & Bowen, 1994; Juran, 1989; Port & Smith, 1992; Reger, Gustafson, DeMarie & Mullane, 1994; Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 1997), critics of these and other change programs tend to focus on outcomes, usually arguing that positive outcomes are negligible or less than promised. As Beyer and Trite (1978) and others have pointed out, however, it makes little sense to try to evaluate the outcomes of planned change programs if we do not know how well they have been implemented. Without data on implementation we cannot know whether deficiencies in outcomes are the result of a poorly conceived program or poor implementation. JOURNAL

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One reason that knowledge of implementation is scarce is that implementation of any management strategy or planned change like TQ entails a long-term, complex social process that is difficult to study. Thoroughly investigating such a social process requires collecting data over time from many different actors. In addition, the very pervasiveness of the prototypical TQ process means that the actions and understandings of all members of an adopting organization are relevant; all reflect some aspect of how TQ is or is not being implemented. Key informants in top management and the quality program cannot possibly know how everyone feels about TQ or what everyone is or is not doing in every unit of their organizations. Finally, the many variants of TQ that have grown up militate against common quantitative measures being able to capture much of the details of what has actually happened in any discrete case. The aims of this study were to observe the enactment of Total Quality in sufficient specificity to begin to understand some of the variations that occur in its implementation, to identify factors that give rise to these variations, and to suggest implications of these variations for long term institutionalization of TQ. Also, by observing and learning about how TQM is implemented and institutionalized we hoped to gain a clearer understanding of what TQ is. To accomplish these goals we investigated: (1) How TQ programs were actually implemented in two firms within the semiconductor supplier industry; and (2) Whether the changes implemented persisted over time.

METHODS The research reported here is based on two longitudinal case studies. We employed qualitative methods in these studies because our aim was to develop new theory, grounded in detailed data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) that would further an understanding of the process of implementing Total Quality. We sought especially to uncover the dynamics of how and why TQ is enacted in particular ways. Only intensive case studies can yield such data. We chose to study two cases because looking at similarities and differences across cases would help us to go beyond initial impressions, capture novel findings (Eisenhardt, 1989), and generally force us to confront the how and why questions. Because we studied only two cases, however, we do not claim empirical generalizability for our results, but hope that the theory we derive may have more theoretical generalizability and insights than if based on a single case. Study Sites Two supplier firms in the semiconductor industry were the focus of this study. They were chosen with the advice and assistance of managers at SEMATECH, the research consortium in the semiconductor industry, as having made substantial progress in implementing Total Qua1ity.l They were similar in size, but manufactured different products, and were deliberately chosen to represent two major semiconductor manufacturing regions in the U.S.-the area around Boston and SilJOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1997

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icon Valley in California. The Boston area firm we will call the Bradley Company and the California firm, the Systems Company. Data Collection We employed a variety of qualitative methods to learn about implementation of TQ in these firms. We relied primarily on semi-structured interviews, but also used observation and archival data to round out our understanding of the histories of these firms and their patterns of implementation. The initial data collection occurred when two of the authors visited the firms in July and August of 1993. Using the questions given in the Appendix A, they conducted 19 interviews with managers and employees at the Bradley Company and 35 at the Systems Company. The focus of these interviews was to learn about respondents’ experiences with their company’s TQ program in the context of their particular jobs and duties. The researchers also toured the facilities to observe the nature of the work and observed other TQ-related activities going on during their visits. In addition, they collected relevant documents and literature. All members of top management, other managers who occupied key roles in either general management or in their TQ programs, and a cross-section of lower level managers and other employees were interviewed. All interviews were taperecorded with the informants’ permission and subsequently transcribed. A second wave of data collection investigated progress and persistence of TQ implementation. The first author revisited the Bradley Company in December of 1994; she and the third author returned to Systems Company in May of 1995. During these second visits, 11 interviews were conducted at Bradley and 20 were conducted at Systems. When possible, the same key actors in general management and TQM implementation were re-interviewed. In the relatively few instances in which turnover had occurred, successors of the original informants were interviewed on the second visit. Business Context The two firms studied exhibited some general similarities The firms resembled each other in the following ways: l

l

9 l

l

l

Both Both Both Both Both Both

and differences.

were financially successful at the beginning of the study; appeared to have strong market positions in their market segment; were relatively small firms, with 200-400 employees; had strong traditions of customer service before TQ was introduced; had stable workforces, but were growing; and underwent ownership changes just before the study.

One way to summarize these similarities is to observe that they provided relatively fertile ground for the growth of TQM. This innovation was not introduced to turn around failing companies but to improve their competitiveness. FurtherJOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT,

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more, the focus on quality and customer service was not new to these firms; both had built their reputations and market position on attending to these concerns. Finally, both firms were small enough that most employees knew one another and members of management. Also, most seemed to be highly loyal and committed to their companies, perhaps because their smallness fostered a family-like atmosphere. Everyone ate together in the same cafeteria, interactions were informal, and even rank-and-tile employees did not hesitate to greet members of top management by their first names. The two firms, however, also differed in significant ways: their location, their products, their ownership, and their history with TQ. These differences will become evident as our findings are presented. Analysis Although we began the data collection relatively free of prior theories and hypotheses, it became clear after collecting the data that applying some kind of general theoretical framework would be of great assistance in coding and analyzing the data. A general model of the change process, developed by Beyer and Trite (1978) for a study of implementation, was therefore adopted as a guiding framework for the coding and analysis. Three assistants and the first author coded and summarized each interview in terms of this framework and a few other general concepts that emerged as relevant. The individual summaries were then compared to develop a within-case analysis for each company at the first time period. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1984), tables were then constructed to facilitate cross-case comparisons. Because the Beyer and Trite model was less detailed about the institutionalization of change processes, we added some additional concepts to it for the coding and analysis of the second set of interviews. These concepts were drawn from the knowledge of TQM we had gained from the earlier part of the study. As before, two of us summarized individual interviews in terms of our framework and then constructed both within-case summaries and between-case comparisons. Tables were again used to summarize the data in a way that facilitated detecting overall patterns and comparisons. Both coding frameworks are given in Appendix B. Using multiple coders and interviewers helps to reduce possible interpretive bias and lends reliability to our results. The coding processes were carried out iteratively with back-and-forth discussions by coders and the authors. Thus, the interpretations given to specific bits of data are the product of the consensus of two of more persons. GUIDING FRAMEWORK TQ as a Change Process The conceptual framework that guided this analysis considers TQM as a planned change process. Although TQM philosophies vary in some respects, they JOURNAL

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all embody certain assumptions and principles that involve change (Hackman & Wageman, 1995, p. 311). They focus on providing employees with new ways to think about and do their jobs. Although the TQ programs in the two firms studied were labeled differently and based on rather different philosophies, it was clear that members of both firms saw their efforts to implement TQM programs as change processes: Sales Manager, Bradley: . ,it has significantly changed.. .the way we work now, our mental approach to doing business . .it changed my mindset from [a functional emphasis] to a much broader responsibility.. .it requires significant culture change. VP for Human Resources, Bradley: President, Bradley:

different concept..

[it’s] a new way of thinking about the business

TQ Champion, Systems Co.: the world differently Applications does

[it’s] a fundamentally

[it’s] learning to think differently, learning how to view

Manager, Systems Co.:

.attitudes

Marketing Communications Manager, Systems caused the people to look at things differently.

have to change before behavior Co.:

The quality program

has

These informants’ emphasis on how their TQ programs had changed the way people think was echoed by other members of both firms. Most of those interviewed also reported some changes in how they did their jobs. As is typical of TQM programs, both firms taught their employees a variety of analytical tools and techniques considered integral to implementing their particular variant of TQ. Respondents varied in the degree to which they had put these tools and techniques to use and thus changed their customary work behaviors, but some changes in behavior had clearly occurred. A Basic Model of Change Processes The model of change processes developed by Beyer and Trite (1978) consisted of three basic stages, which we defined in terms of TQ implementation as follows: 1. 2. 3.

Adoption-all of the processes involved in deciding to pursue total quality and choosing a particular vehicle or methodology to achieve that goal. Implementation-all of the mental shifts and changes in activities involved in putting the TQ principles and tools to use. ZnstitutionaEization-all of those activities designed to ensure that TQ remains vital and becomes part of the regular routines of the organization.

In addition, Beyer and Trite identified three phases of the implementation stage: diffusion, receptivity, and use. We used both of these frameworks to structure our analysis and will follow them in presenting our findings. JOURNAL

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Most of the data on adoption were collected on the first site visit and then verified on the second site visit. Data regarding implementation were collected on both visits. Our findings regarding institutionalization rely most heavily on data collected during the second visit. FINDINGS Adoption General trends in the industry played a role in these companies adopting TQ. Although both already had excellent reputations for customer service and had cultures that fostered quality practices, by the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, they were experiencing general pressures present across the whole semiconductor industry to meet more and more demanding quality standards (Powell, 1995; Westphal et al., 1997). They were aware that their customers in semiconductor manufacturing were adopting quality programs; they also received feedback on TQ issues from customers via regular quality audits. Sales and marketing people were also quick to pick up these trends and envision TQ as a public relations tool and a potential competitive advantage. However, our interviews revealed that other surrounding circumstances and the types of TQ programs and philosophies adopted differed for the two firms. Bradley Company. This company, named for its inventor-founder, was an early adopter of TQ, having tried its first program about six years prior to the first interviews conducted for this study. The primary advocate was the Senior Vice President of Operations. He was sufficiently persuasive to get top management support for the general idea. Top management hired a consulting firm that advocated and taught a very participative variant of the Deming approach. Management and employees were trained in the philosophy and tools of this approach, but, as our respondents later reported, it never got buy-in from some units of the firm. Despite these apparent gaps in implementation, the firm won numerous quality awards from its customers and others. The company also launched an effort to win the Baldridge Award, ended up qualifying as a semi-finalist, but exhausting its employees in the process. Unfortunately, quality problems actually increased as managers and employees “took their eye off the ball” and devoted much time and energy to applying for the award. As a result, the TQ program was considered a failure and lost most of its credibility at Bradley, especially among members of top management. Some employees later told us, however, that they quietly took some of the lessons embodied in their TQ program to heart and continued to use some of the statistical tools they had been taught. One interesting aspect of the Bradley case was that this company did not try to improve or reinforce the existing Deming-type TQ program, but rather attributed problems that arose to flaws in its approach. At about the same time, the president of Bradley (son of the founder) was exposed to training by a consulting firm known for a version of TQ called Total Cycle Time (TCT). He was attracted to the ideology, tools, and techniques of TCT JOURNAL

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as a solution to: (1)Bradley’s recent quality problems; and (2) as a general approach to improving its competitiveness through better management of all functions and activities within the firm. Soon thereafter, Bradley searched for and hired a Vice-President and Director of Quality who had experience with TCT, as taught by this consulting firm. He in turn hired the same consulting group to come in to explain their approach in some detail to top management, which soon decided to adopt TCT. In retrospect, top management now talked about the earlier TQ effort as a rather soft-headed, diffuse set of ideas and tools that didn’t work. By contrast, they saw TCT as a practical and hard-headed set of ideas and tools that had been proven to work. Because the earlier Deming-type program had only been partially implemented and institutionalized, implementing the new TCT program involved not only the creation of a new culture, but the destruction of the existing TQ culture (Biggart, 1977). Soon thereafter, the founders of Bradley finalized the sale of the firm to a large, diversified conglomerate and retired. Their son continued as president and the parent company sent one of its employees to be the new CEO. The TCT program adopted by Bradley advocated a highly structured way of improving quality and work processes. It provided a detailed set of tools and techniques for improving discipline and efficiency in order to reduce total cycle time in all parts of the business process, and thus the overall time from the original conceptualization of any product to its delivery to a customer. It relied heavily on measurements, documentation, statistics, and a hierarchy of teams that identified goals and barriers to quality, set priorities, and developed ways to remove barriers. During our initial interviews, people at Bradley described the TCT program as “hard-hitting, ” “results oriented,” and as “a total business process.” Because it employed highly specified rules and procedures for how to go about reducing cycle time, we have labeled this program as mechanistic (Bums & Stalker, 1961). This California-based firm made its decision to adopt Systems Company. TQ more recently than Bradley Company. Its impetus for adopting TQ was the exposure of two top managers to some TQ training at executive seminars sponsored by a customer and by Systems’s parent company. The executives at Systems realized that a well-executed quality program could benefit the company. But, as the CEO put it, they wanted something different from the usual “quick-and-dirty” quality program, another “program du jour.” They shopped around for the right person to lead their TQ effort, and when they located someone whose views about TQ were attractive to them, they tried him out as a consultant before hiring him. This individual had had considerable experience and frustration with quality programs at other firms in the same industry. He arrived with a synthesized version of TQ he believed in and was eager to apply. After a 5-week trial, he was hired as Vice-President and Director of Quality. What Systems’ executives bought, by hiring the quality manager they did, was a eclectic version of TQ that he had developed through experience, study, and interaction with other TQ specialists. Since there had been no previous TQ effort at Systems Company, there was not the same need to destroy earlier ideas about quality that there was at Bradley. Also, at Systems adoption was not triggered by a crisis or perception of quality problems. Rather institutional pressures from customers and competitors (WestJOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT,

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phal et al., 1997) seems to have persuaded top management that they should take the movement seriously. The version of TQ that the new Director of Quality brought with him was very employee-oriented. He genuinely believed in employee empowerment and felt that teamwork was the generative force behind TQM. He called the program he launched the Continuous Improvement Process (CIP). It included the usual elements of TQ-new techniques of measurement as well as a general philosophy aimed at continuous improvement. The personal philosophy the TQ champion brought to Systems saw management-dictated processes, rather than employee deficiencies, as the source of most quality problems. As he put it, “It’s the things that management is doing that causes the problems; barriers are created by management, not people trying to do their work.” He also believed that employees came to work every day and did the best they could. Most unusual was that he was convinced that the most effective way for people to learn TQ was from using it, and if they had success, the philosophy and techniques would spread throughout the company. Because of the flexible and relatively emergent nature of System’s TQ program, we have labeled it organic. Implementation Implementing a planned change logically and practically involves at least three social processes: diffusion, receptivity, and use (Beyer & Trite, 1978). We applied them to our data on TQ as follows: 1. 2.

3.

DifSusion-employees and others affected are informed about the principles and tools of TQ-what it means and what they are supposed to do. Receptivity-employees react to this information in ways that make them more or less ready to actually use the principles and tools to which they have been exposed; e.g. they will have more or less understanding and feel more or less acceptance of these principles and tools. Use-management sets up structures and employees take actions to put the principles and tools to use.

Our analyses of implementation focused on understanding how these three processes unfolded at these two firms. Diffusion at Bradley. Bradley Company used consulting firms in the major diffusion of the philosophies and tools of both of its TQ programs. Bradley’s first TQ program involved extensive contact with a consulting firm that provided all Bradley employees with at least a basic training session. Other employees received additional training and guidance as they participated in the many teams that grew up to deal with problems employees identified. As the Bradley president put it, “We had consultants running around here for a year and a half to two years.. . .and a zillion cross-functional task forces addressing a myriad of problems, including having 10 people hammer a nail into the floor.. .“. He and other employees felt the consultants did a nice job of teaching concepts and basic statistical tools. But in the process, they also apparently engendered an almost religious faith that if their techJOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT.

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niques were followed, positive results would automatically follow. When problems cropped up, top management lost faith in the program. The President later called it a “trust-me” program, based on too much “religious fervor and hype.” Bradley’s second attempt at TQ, the TCT program, was introduced with an inspirational talk by its inside champion. Consultants later came in to give an introduction to TCT principles and techniques, but subsequent TCT training was done by the inside champion and his staff because they did not feel the training given by the consultants was effective. The champion quickly gave employees serving on teams additional training, but put off additional training for lower level employees not serving on teams. During the diffusion stage, Bradley carried out a substantial amount of organizational redesign that created considerable stress. Many teams, involving people from across the organization, were instituted. Departments were created and dissolved, while people unfriendly to TCT left the company and were replaced. In particular, the champion of the earlier Deming-type TQ program, who was a longtime employee of the company and friend of the founding family, left under a cloud. Receptivity at Bradley. To Bradley’s senior management, the “failed’ experience with the previous TQ program produced a receptivity to consider other approaches to TQ. The subsequent TCT program was only about 13 months old and not fully implemented at the time of our first visit. The pattern of receptivity seemed to vary according to the degree of direct involvement in the program. Those who became involved could begin to see some concrete results and understand how the TCT techniques could work. For example, a supervisor of the quality assurance unit said her people had been working overtime before TCT was instituted and now they had more time because unnecessary procedures had been eliminated. TCT was seen by several other informants as having systematized various work processes and problem solving. Others were more skeptical and saw the program as being driven mostly by its champion. His evident power within the firm and the strong support he was perceived to have from the President and the new CEO, coupled with a stern management style, meant that few employees dared to openly question or fail to cooperate with the TCT approach. Contrary to the classic TQ principles preached by Deming, receptivity at Bradley was promoted amidst an atmosphere of fear. Several employees reported that anxiety and resentment had been engendered by the strong top management pressure behind TCT. As they put it, no one would dare to resist TCT. The personal style of the TCT champion was also a factor; more than once he was referred to as a dictator. He was able to exert such strong autocratic leadership because he obviously enjoyed strong support from the President and also from the new CEO. He had been promoted to Chief Operating Officer (COO) early in the implementation stage, just a few months after he was hired. His quick promotion powerfully communicated top management’s support for him and for TCT. Acceptance of TCT at Bradley, however, varied considerably on a departmental basis. The most serious “disconnects” were reported to be in sales and R&D. A practical problem for the sales department was that employees who were in the JOURNAL

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field could not attend team meetings and missed many of the other TCT activities. They also initially lacked enabling interfaces via computer with headquarters. R&D objections to TCT stemmed in part from political factors and in part from occupational cultural considerations. In the structural redesign that accompanied TCT, a newly established product engineering function replaced R&D as the steering force behind new product development. Also, R&D activities were now subject to protocols set by the engineering department. In addition, R&D people saw TCT as constraining and at odds with the exploratory, chance-driven nature of experimental work. Unlike marketing or manufacturing functions, they explained, the R&D function does not generate or operate by the kind of hard numbers that can be put to use by TCT. As Sitkin et al. (1994) pointed out, approaches to TQM that put strong emphasis on control and measurement are not well-suited to conditions of high task uncertainty. Use at Bradley. The earlier TQ program had been in place in Bradley Company for about four years. Respondents agreed that it had had some positive effects: employees learned statistical techniques that some of them still used, some people in the organization developed a mindset that was more focused on quality and problem-solving, and the company gained considerable public relations benefit from its participation, especially in the Baldridge competition. Most felt, however, that the program was never fully implemented, especially outside the manufacturing sector. Explanations for failures of implementation included the lack of operational definitions for what was expected, of clear linkages to the business and the bottom line, of a strong champion, and of training at the work group level in how to implement methodologies. Some informants commented that, especially when Bradley was going for the Baldridge Award, employees were doing things that had no value just to show they were doing something. Other employees also commented on the emphasis at Bradley on counting procedures completed rather than actual outcomes. The reports of the early history of TCT within Bradley varied. Some saw the program as an immediate success and reported that it was immediately put to use in workgroups who saw how well it worked when they tried it. Others commented that TCT had not yet reached to the lower levels of Bradley Company, but felt it had been pretty well received and was being practiced at the top and middle management levels. Early in the program, Bradley chose two areas on which to concentrate its TCT efforts throughout the company. One was the make-market cycle, and the other was the time-to-market for new products. Several respondents reported that cycle time in both areas was decreasing as people established AIPs (action in progress), set priorities, and simplified work processes. Several levels of teams were set up: core teams, cross-functional teams, barrier identification and removal teams, and cycle time teams. Each type of team had a unique purpose and specified procedures and tools. Many mid- to upper-level managers found themselves on multiple teams. The next planned step, in Phase 2 on their TCT program, was to get more involvement from the lowest levels of the organization. Various managers at Bradley reported that communication across functions had improved and that there were much clearer connections between activities and JOURNAL

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the business plan since TCT had been adopted. The only operational problem attributed to the introduction of TCT was a delivery problem that resulted from cutting back inventories too far, but even here a manager pointed out, TCT supplied the solution as well as generating the problem. At the conclusion of the first site visit, the COOACT champion commented that if he were to leave right then, the company and its employees would revert to their old ways. This remark was consistent with what most employees and managers said during our interviews. Relatively few individuals, besides the champion and the President, talked as if they had begun to internalize the core principles of TCT. But there were a few who said their thinking and working routines had been permanently changed by their exposure to TCT, and that they couldn’t imagine going back to their old ways again. The champion estimated that only about 5% of the employees fell into that category. Diffusion at Systems. At Systems Company, training in CIP began with extensive seminars for top and middle management-20 to 30 hours held off-site at a nearby college campus. These sessions were conducted by the new Director of Quality and some trainers he hired. The initial diffusion of detailed information about the program to the remainder of the employees occurred through 13- 15 hour basic training sessions given to all employees. These sessions covered fundamental TQ tools like brainstorming, histograms, fishboning, and Pareto charts, but little time was spent on teamwork or working together in groups. The TQ champion of the program, as the Director of Quality, employed a subtle and incremental strategy for diffusion following the training sessions. He adopted an initial strategy of working with what he called his “friendly allies” to launch successful projects and more or less ignored the “unconverted.” One reason he could afford to adopt this strategy was that he had strong support from a patient top management that did not expect results overnight. He did not start cross-functional teams immediately because he felt they involved “too much baggage to deal with.” Rather, he encouraged nonmanagerial work groups to concentrate on their own internal work problems, and as they did so, some of them used TQ principles without evoking them as such. The champion’s strategy was to get nonmanagerial employees to analyze and talk about the problems they encountered in their own work groups and then interact to solve those problems first. As they worked on their problems the champion then taught them techniques for gathering data, and they were empowered to make internal decisions in their workgroups. Another important way Systems employees learned about the program was from each other. Cross-functional teams were gradually formed, and the employees on these teams became additional diffusers of TQ as they shared their knowledge and enthusiasm with other employees with whom they worked. According to a productions manager, they became “teachers to go out and spread the word.” Many teams emerged; some worked for only a brief time; others persisted. Consistent with the synthetic, eclectic nature of their CIP program, this firm also adopted and diffused some aspects of TCT. For example, some engineers and managers received training from a consulting firm and from a customer on specific TCT procedures like measuring first pass yields. JOURNAL

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The variable amount of training given to different employees caused some anxiety among those who felt they were missing what others had received. Employees who were excited at the initial announcement and training and then heard no more about it were disappointed at the time of our first visit. Other employees continued learning because they were included in teams or had, through their own efforts, formed cross-functional teams to deal with specific problems. Systems’s champion believed that once a threshold of acceptance and enthusiasm for the program among a substantial number of employees was reached, the rest of the employees would naturally follow. Thus, he bent his early efforts toward working with the most receptive employees rather than toward immediate, uniform, universal implementation. Receptivity at Systems. In Systems Company there was a general agreement among managers and employees that TQ is necessary to compete in today’s markets. At the time of our first visit, most employees felt that some progress has been made, but that their firm could be doing more to achieve high quality. One engineer commented, that the company had previously had an “individual” approach to quality; TQ gave them a “structured’ approach to quality. Responses from our interviews indicate that the initial company-wide training sparked enthusiasm among many employees for three reasons: (1) employees were told and believed that top management was strongly behind the TQ effort; (2) many employees were aware of work-related problems and ways they could do things better; and (3) many employees saw the TQ program as empowering them to improve their own work processes. Acceptance of the CIP program varied considerably across departments and by level within the firm. Many employees thought the program was most relevant for manufacturing, and manufacturing employees, particularly those at the nonmanagerial level, did widely support the philosophies behind CIP The functional group seen as least supportive to CIP was engineering. One engineer explained that their work was noncyclical in nature, not subject to routinization, and that in any case, engineers were individualists who liked to decide for themselves what tools they should use. Again task uncertainty seemed to engender resistance to TQ (Sitkin et al., 1994). Other informants reported that some middle managers were resistant to the CIP program. They were seen as worrying about loss of control over their subordinates. Lower level employees suggested they were only paying lip service to the program and reported that “they fight him [the TQ champion] more than he knows.” Also, some members of top management worried whether their subordinates had the knowledge and perspective needed to make decisions for the good of the company as a whole; others expressed concern that being involved with teams might lead employees to invent problems to have something to solve. Clearly, the receptivity to use the program was mixed at Systems Company at the time of our first visit. Some employees suggested that the support was more intellectual than visceral. Some employees were involved and enthusiastic while others were favorably disposed and perhaps doing more than they knew to implement it. Others were not yet actively involved. A substantial number apparently had serious reservations that had not yet been overcome. JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, No. 1, I997

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Two sets of time pressures seemed to affect people’s receptivity to use the CIP program at Systems. The first of these was that upper management was heavily involved in the procedures needed to take the company public for several months just before this study was conducted and therefore had little time to devote to public support for CIP. Systems Company was being spun off by its parent and its top management had decided they would take the company public and continue to manage it. They were therefore traveling a lot and busy with documentation and negotiations needed to raise capital and sell stock. Second, the study took place during a time when the company’s resources were under pressure from a dramatic increase in orders. Several employees reported that during the recent production crunch, middle managers’ interest shifted from quality to getting the product out the door. Employees felt that they couldn’t always do both. Use at Systems. Employees and managers at Systems Company reported rather uneven use of CIP Most saw the manufacturing function as having changed more than other parts of the company. The R&D group, however, made extensive use of TQ tools. Some use of teams and TQ tools had been also made in personnel, financial, and other sectors of the company. The engineering function was reported to be least changed by CIP, perhaps because of the individualistic professional norms of that group and the unstructured nature of their work, as mentioned earlier. Cross-functional teams had been set up to address three organizational-level issues: (1) make-market; (2) engineering and R&D; and (3) repair, maintenance, and return. These and other cross-functional team efforts were seen as improving communication within the firm. One informant said that before TQ, people were trying to find faults in other departments, and that the TQ program had done away with “pointing fingers.” Various policies and practices supported the use of TQ at Systems. Any employee was allowed to devote one hour per week to TQ team meetings. In addition, top management regularly devoted one meeting per week to quality issues, and invited various team leaders, on a rotating basis, to these meetings to discuss their progress and any problems they wanted to bring to management. Consistent with his patient and subtle style of implementation, Systems’s TQ champion used many different permissive devices to stimulate voluntary use of CIP. He instituted morning meetings where anyone who wanted to could bring in a problem or issue that needed resolution. He put up wipe-off boards in the production area. When supervisors said they had no need for them, he told them that was okay, don’t use them then. Employees subsequently began to write some of their problems on the boards, and sometimes employees from other units who saw the items listed could make suggestions on how to solve them. In addition, lower level employees were trained to classify problems they detected as Types 1,2, or 3. Type 1 problems were those they could deal with on their own; Type 2 problems required them to go to a manager; and Type 3 problems involved the whole organization. Employees managed to tackle Type 1 problems first, but they didn’t stop there. They were empowered to turn Type 2 problems into Type 1 problems. For example, they changed the layout of the whole production floor one rack at a time. In manufacturing, more than elsewhere, lower level employees now felt “safe” to JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, No. I, 1997

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bring up problems and solutions and get help in solving them. They did not yet use CIP automatically-they had to think about it and work at it. To communicate the successes in Systems’ programs, meetings and other signs of team activity were posted on the walls where employees could see them. Also, a newsletter was started to report on what was going on within the CIP program, especially what various teams had accomplished. Although most respondents saw some progress in work processes around them as a result of CIP efforts, these outcomes were not known throughout the company. Despite the newsletter, knowledge of progress from TQ tended to be localized. For example, a production supervisor reported that worker skills, accuracy, and general awareness of quality were substantially improved among his subordinates as a result of CIP Another production supervisor reported that he delegated more decisions and that teams were now interviewing new job applicants. Managers knew how their employees and their work processes had improved, but were unaware of what had happened in sectors of the company that did not affect them directly. Institutionalization Institutionalizing change involves the persistent incorporation of the change into the culture and daily routines of an organization (Beyer & Trite, 1978). The process of institutionalization is complete when something becomes both an accepted and taken-for-granted part of the way people feel and think, and the way they usually do things. Institutionalizing a planned change like TQM requires establishing new structures and routines, and changing the culture. Our findings regarding institutionalization will be presented using these categories. The data collected from the second trip to Bradley and Systems revealed substantial differences in the ways their TQ programs had been institutionalized. Differences had, if anything, widened between the two firms during the interval between the two visits. Structures at Bradley. As already mentioned, the implementation of TCT at Bradley triggered several structural changes, including an extensive hierarchical structure of various teams, each with clear specifications of what to do, and a restructured engineering function. The persistence of these structural changes helped to institutionalize TCT at this company. Another significant structural change, already mentioned, was symbolic: it was the quick promotion of Bradley’s TQ champion from Vice-President and Director of Quality, the position at which he had been hired, to Chief Operating Officer (COO). In his new post, the champion continued to personally supervise the implementation of the TCT program, which was thus very closely tied to his personal and official power. By the time of our second visit to Bradley, only 18 months later, the TCT champion had “retired.” Although they were not sure, several respondents believed that he had been forced out by the President’s parents, the founders of the company, because he had fired or otherwise induced too many of the old managers they knew and liked to leave the company. While the President did not directly JOURNAL

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confirm this as the reason, he did not deny, when asked, that the TCT champion had indeed been forced out. Enthusiasm for TCT seemed to be waning, except among the very top managers. The former CEO, a manager from the parent company, had become COO and had taken over direction of the TCT program. He and the President planned to continue the TCT program with the TCT champion acting as a consultant for the company and training employees in their foreign operations. But continued acceptance of TCT was open to question, since several informants had expressed the idea during both of our visits that, without the champion’s presence and oversight, TCT would lose its momentum. The champion’s “retirement” also provoked considerable retrospective sensemaking. Although he had been feared by many, some respondents now commented on how he had also been appreciated and even admired. Everyone we talked to felt that he had been the most powerful force in bringing about changes that were generally credited for turning around the company. Several managers commented on the clear direction that the champion had created for the company, one saying “we were marching to the same tune.” Another remarked, Before TCT, the company was a rudderless ship. We didn’t have anything pulling the entire business together. The beauty of this program is that it pulls everything together.

But one and that

the champion was still also described as hard-nosed, dictatorial, and as some“you took on with trepidation.” In discussing his guidance of the TCT program the difficulties inherent in achieving change quickly, the President remarked “dictators have their places.” Whether the former CEO, now acting as COO, had sufficient command of TCT techniques and was sufficiently committed to all of them to champion the TCT program as assiduously as the original champion remained to be seen. He was considered a less threatening figure and was probably better liked. We observed a meeting he held with a cross-section of managers in which they reported on their progress in various areas that had been defined using TCT techniques. The progress reported by the attending managers varied considerably and TCT jargon was at a minimum. Overall, while this meeting confirmed that the general business-like efficiency and accountability inherent in TCT ideology was being continued, it provided little evidence that other TCT principles had been intemalized by managers at Bradley. The biggest structural change at Bradley that had implications for the TQM program was its acquisition in 1992 by a much larger company shortly after the TCT program was adopted. However, as it turned out, the new parent company did not interfere in daily operations at Bradley, including the TCT program, nor interject any new managerial personnel beyond the manager mentioned above who acted first as CEO and later as COO. So any impact the acquisition had on the TCT program was indirect. Specifically, its new owners increased pressures for favorable financial returns; TCT was seen by the President and COO as helping them to achieve and document such results. The primary way in which the routines at Bradley had Routines at Bradley. changed was the inclusion and prominence given to measurements and statistics. JOURNAL

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TCT introduced a methodology, heavily on measurement:

procedures,

tools, and techniques

that relied

President: C’s hit squad [a team of internal TCT auditors] went through the organization; there was no escape. The documentations and discipline are in place; the cycle time methodology is clearly understood. We are measuring almost everything that affects quality as well as cycle times....we are actually managing the business according to cycle time concepts.

Various employees confirmed that the TCT procedures and tools were in place and were part of the day-to-day routine for many in the company. As a senior engineer put it, “I use pieces of TCT on a daily basis. The AIP governs what I work on.” The tools most commonly described were the cycle time methodology, documentation, protocols, AIP’s (action in progress), metrics for judging first-pass yields, and the use of teams. There was little question that these tools and techniques had brought needed discipline and increased efficiency and quality to Bradley’s design and manufacturing processes. There was also some sophistication among upper managers in using the metrics: Operations Manager: You have to understand what the numbers mean. You can’t just look at the numbers and know where we are. You have to know what’s behind those numbers.

A senior engineer and other informants, however, pointed out that neither the use of metrics nor an understanding of them had “trickled down to the majority” of lower level employees. Another way in which routines had changed at Bradley to reflect the importance of TCT was the beginning of an effort to incorporate TCT into performance standards and evaluation, especially at the managerial levels, and into strategic planning. Most employees commented that, although TCT was now being included in performance appraisal, the reward system had not yet formally acknowledged TCT achievements. Any such rewards were informal in nature. Cultural Change at Bradley. Although TCT emphasized techniques and tools, employees and managers also understood that it embodied a new way of thinking: Director of MIS and Manufacturing: going to go about my daily activities.

TCT is just a thought process about how I am

Director of Quality: TCT is a whole new mindset. It tells me to map the process out whenever I encounter the problem, and then get rid of things that don’t have any value, find out why delays occur. Sometimes it’s something really simple.

The overriding theme in the TCT ideology expressed by employees at Bradley was that their program produced measurable results. A subtheme, articulated more by upper managers than other employees, was that TCT provided a total business orientation that included economic or “bottom-line” issues. These themes were used to contrast TCT with the earlier Deming-type program and to demonJOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, NO. 1, 1997

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strate that TCT was the superior program. For example, Bradley’s president argued that TCT addressed the three drivers in firm performance-time-to-market, reducing costs, and quality-and, in addition, TCT had the potential for producing results. Another top manager liked that profit and loss were primary drivers under TCT. A third said that TCT was nothing more than “common business sense-a nice, concise, structured way of approaching it.” Another thought TCT brought “discipline and old-fashioned efficiency.” For example, people learned if they were “working around the problem, then you need to get back to the root cause and find out why you have the problem in the first place . . . .They realize that removing barriers is part of the daily job now.” Most of the managers and employees interviewed at Bradley Company mentioned some of these practical benefits as part of what TCT meant in their firm. Additionally, TCT was perceived as a vehicle for increasing accountability. The TCT program at Bradley was accepted as a very comprehensive program-one that not only changed behaviors, but also how people thought. Some of the statements illustrating this point were quoted earlier. There were, however, managers who saw some conceptual flaws in the TCT program. They pointed out that it lacked a good model of human systems and change, and tended to portray its procedures as “the one best way.” Others felt it had been a mistake to introduce TCT as a counterthrust to all previous efforts at Total Quality-that this framing tended to create feelings of discontinuity and cynicism. The CIP program at Systems had been incorporated Structures at Systems. to some extent into the structure of the company, but not nearly as intensively as had been done at Bradley. Systems also established cross-functional teams, but some were no longer active at the time of our second visit. From the beginning Systems had not tried to establish teams in nearly as comprehensive a manner as Bradley had done. Rather, at Systems teams seemed to evolve as they were needed, operate for as long as they were needed, and then disband or fade away. Some teams were cross-functional; others involved people in the same function. Membership depended on who was seen as having a stake in and contributions to make in solving a given problem. All seemed to operate rather informally. An important exception was a regularly scheduled meeting of lo-15 mid-level managers now held three mornings a week with the top management team, including the Director of Quality. This meeting, which had been held only once a week at the time of our first visit, addressed company-wide issues of all kinds. The meetings were apparently effective, and their very existence signaled to the whole company the strong support of top management for TQ. The initial program champion at Systems was still on the job and continued to enjoy the support of top management. He was not, however, nearly so prominent a figure within the company as the TQ champion at Bradley had been. Nor was he as controversial. He had not sought to restructure the company in the way his counterpart at Bradley Company had, but the company had grown in the interim, which had necessitated various changes in structure not seen as driven by TQ. While one or two old-time managers had left unhappy with the CIP program, none were seen as driven out by the champion. JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2. No. I, 1997

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21

In his low-key way, Systems’ TQ champion continued to rely heavily on the self-generative capacity of people to change their own and others’ ways of thinking and behaving gradually as they got involved in working together to improve work processes. Unlike his counterpart at Bradley, he played a behind-the-scenes role in institutionalizing CIP. Rather than operating as the dominant visible force that the champion at Bradley was, Systems’ champion focused more on getting people on board and active in the CIP effort, and then letting them manage themselves. He told us that he did not worry about keeping them on board. He believed that once they were in, they would stay. Also, he continued to concentrate on working with those employees who were receptive to conversion to CIP and expected that once a critical mass of people had been won over, CIP would continue to spread on its own. The major structural change at Systems-using sales of its stock and other public financing to become independent of its parent company-seemed to have had very positive effects on company-wide and individual performance. In two years it had grown from 300 to 550 employees, its sales had almost tripled, and the value of a share of its stock had increased from $10 to $80.2 The company currently had more orders for its products than it could fill and was planning expansion of its product lines. Employees were encouraged to own stock and many followed the price of the stock avidly and were naturally gratified by the large increase in its value. These favorable circumstances probably helped to solidify acceptance of the CIP program. Routines at Systems. By the time of our second visit, almost two years later, acceptance and use of CIP principles seemed universal at Systems. What was interesting was that people reported using all of the techniques of TQ and said they no longer called them by the TQ labels. As one put it, we don’t use the term “quality” anymore-but the concept was still there. Another commented that we do teamwork quite well, although people would laugh and say “we don’t do that.” The firm was still experiencing production pressures, and some employees reported that TQ principles were sometimes neglected in the push for production. Despite continuous hiring, most of the employees interviewed during the second visit reported they and their subordinates were working grueling hours and getting “burned out.” But TQ seemed to be universally internalized as desirable to use whenever possible. Thus, it was harder to observe regularized formal procedures that had changed as a result of CIP at Systems. Rather, people talked of it as “allowing us to learn and grow.” Systems’ champion and other employees talked of CIP as a philosophy that was changing the way problems get solved. Employees were encouraged to use those CIP principles and procedures that helped them and to envision it as a program that “we constantly adapt to our needs.” For example, the champion and top management had been exposed to TCT, but did not adopt nor implement it in its entirety, but rather incorporated it into their TQM program selectively: TQ Champion: We’re not too big on the buzzwords associated with TCT. We use the philosophy and picked up some of the procedures such as flowcharts, calculating cycle time (our people didn’t like that and it didn’t stick). Our teams simplified a lot of it, JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, No. 1, I997

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using more simple, direct, intuitive kinds of stuff. Then they went out with a few tools they hung onto-flow charting, and a simple way of calculating cycle time.

The President of Systems explained that although they did not have formal measurement systems in place throughout the company, they were focused on teaching employees about collecting data. Some units therefore were relatively informal about the way they collected data; others were relatively formal, using computers that had been acquired since our first visit to document various aspects of their workflow. Manager of Receiving Customer Returns: We don’t have a lot of time to measure if customers are being taken care of. My measurement is simply if we receive an order and place it in the same day. Shipping, Receiving and Storage Manager: One of the advantages of CIP is proceduralizing stuff. Now I can train people indirectly. I used to be the main person documenting procedures. Now I delegate this; now we have computers, and we have people with the experience. TQ Champion: We can resolve problems with processes a lot faster than we used to be able to.. .Some parts were shipped to Company X one day late. Upper management tried to look for someone to blame. Then JG got involved and took us through the flow chart of the activities. Everyone agreed on what happened. They decided what was to be done to stop the problem in the future, and that was the end of it. That’s one of the benefits of documentation-you can ask questions about the process.

Although team meetings were not held uniformly throughout the company, they were used by various groups in important ways. Their selective and sporadic use made them more of a technique than a formal part of the structure. For example, the relatively new Engineering Vice-President was holding meetings at 5 p.m. each day to learn whether the tests engineers were using conformed to actual customer needs and uses of their equipment. As these matters were clarified, it seemed likely that these meetings would not be held as often. However, the use of teams was well institutionalized: Sales and Service Manager: People don’t form teams formally much anymore when they see a problem. If necessary they’ll form a team and fix it before management hears about it. Manufacturing Manager: We have lots of teams; we have lots of meetings. We don’t necessarily call everything a team. Materials Manager: I don’t see teams forming to talk about things in general anymore; there are probably fewer active teams because they are now short-lived, one or two months and they’re done.

Training on CIP techniques was ongoing and all but two temporary employees had been trained in the basics, according to the TQ training manager. TQ training was, however, not always given immediately after hire because the company was continually adding temporary employees to keep up with their work JOURNAL

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demands. Some of the temporary employees eventually became permanent employees, but the company was quite selective in choosing among them. Cultural Change at Systems. At Systems Company the overriding ideological theme in the CIP program was employee empowerment to learn by doing. One manager observed that the CIP program had helped to change the overall corporate culture and helped people “learn along the way.” The TQ Champion explained: For me the cornerstone of all of this is learning.. ..If you don’t give people the opportunity to learn, then they don’t have the new knowledge to change anything. Learning for me is largely learning by doing.. ..When we started [certain changes] no one anticipated how it was going to end up. People gained knowledge, so it created better ideas as to how to go about doing things.

The ideology underlying Systems’ program saw cross-functional and other problem-solving teams not only as a way to generate solutions to problems but also as a vehicle for learning. Employees got a message that Total Quality was a new way of looking at everything they did-that it was reflected in everything they did. They also understood that improving quality was a continuous process. The main concern in the mind of the TQ champion was to create an environment that encouraged and permitted learning. Clearly, this idea that learning was an emergent process was different from the TCT philosophy at Bradley, which emphasized a structured and preplanned way to discover and solve quality problems. Managers and others at Systems reported that they had learned from the CIP program: Shipping Manager: CIP has made it possible to learn and change and grow more than before.. .People feel good about the changes we have made. We don’t seem to be so set in our ways as we used to be. Manufacturing Manager: It’s amazing how these little successes spread. This is, of course, the TQ champion’s ideology. Manufacturing Manager: This is all really about learning.. .CIP has been a springboard to other things we have gone on to. The same principles apply when we go on to things like cycle time reduction. It’s not just part of how we do business around here. One is a stepping stone into the other. You start with basic skill improvements; then you get involved with cycle time reduction, building a foundation of quality into all that you do.

At the time of our first visit, the empowerment theme was more popular with lower level employees than with middle level managers at Systems. Some managers told stories of how changes made by one group undid improvements made by others because the two groups were not in sufficient communication with each to know what the other was doing. The CIP ideology at Systems Company was not nearly as explicit nor as structured by top levels of management in terms of how to coordinate activities across the whole company as was the TCT ideology at Bradley Company. Like much else in the Systems Company program, learning about coordination across groups was expected to emerge, rather than be designed into JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT,

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the program. By the time of our second visit, middle managers who earlier had been skeptics or critics had been won over. All had witnessed some positive effects of CIP efforts around them and, as the TQ champion hoped, had started using some elements of CIP, too. The ways in which CIP was applied continued to vary across the company and became less consistent in times when pressures were especially intense, but no part of Systems was untouched by CIP. DISCUSSION This study examined how Total Quality Management was enacted in two organizational settings. These two firms, both supplier firms to the semiconductor industry, shared some common strengths that they brought to their total quality efforts: each have good reputations and market positions, both firms’ cultures had strong traditions of customer service, both firms had strong support for TQ from upper management and in each case the TQ champion did much of the training for the TQ programs. In spite of these similarly favorable circumstances, the enactment of TQ in these two organizations differed in fundamental ways: many of these differences are summarized in a straightforward fashion in Table 1. A more theoretical and cross-cutting analysis of the significance of these differences and their consequences emerges from comparing these cases on the following five issues: (1) the dominance of a single ideology; (2) the focus on means; (3) the style of leadership used by the TQ champion; (4) how predetermined procedures were; and (5) the kinds of learning that resulted. One Dominant

Ideology vs. Agnosticism

The TQM champion and top management at Bradley preached a single ideology-that expressed through TCT. By their insistence on one dominant ideology and their denial of the previous TQ ideology’s value, they created a culture favoring conformity. Employees reported that they had no choice; they were expected to embrace TCT. In pushing TCT, the champion and top management apparently felt they had to destroy all signs of the previous TQ ideology. In their framing of the TCT program, top management invariably enumerated the deficiencies of the prior Deming-type program as a way to highlight the benefits of TCT. Furthermore, the TCT ideology was treated as dogma-as complete, unassailable, and inflexible. It was not considered acceptable by employees we talked to that they criticize or improve on the given techniques of TCT, that they adopt only those portions of TCT that best fitted their unit or individual needs, or that they add quality concepts not incorporated in the TCT methodology. For example, employees were reluctant to admit they were still using techniques from the prior TQ program. Others reported that activities were being force-tit into TCT frameworks. The dogmatic way that TCT was pushed by the champion and top management discouraged employees at Bradley from adapting the TCT program to their specific situations. They could only identify problems that TCT was set up to detect and solve. Furthermore, the paths to solutions were prescribed. JOURNAL

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Table 1.

Summary

of Contrasts in Implementation

and Institutionalization Systems (Organic)

Bradley (Mechanistic) I.

Philosophy:

1. Quantitative

measurement

1. Qualitative measurement

is essential

3. Implementation is uniform; requires adherence 3. Implementation adaptation to formal method 4. The application is pre-determined; script

can vary; involves local

follow the 4. Application is emergent; see how it fits, apply as appropriate

5. Numbers are target of action

5. Numbers are instructive

6. Single prescribed

6. Agnostic

2.

is sufficient

2. Ideology - CIP

2. Ideology - TCT

ideology

Styles:

1. Explicit to implicit learning

1. Implicit to explicit learning

2. Top-down, highly directed

2. Emergent, with top management

3. Champion - feared

3. Champion - well-liked

4. Champion - dominant, visible force

4. Champion stays behind the scenes

5. Champion did all the training

5. Champion handed over training to someone else

6. Never diffused to low levels

6. Diffused to low levels

7. Lack of trust; employees ment not totally truthful

7. Much trust in top management

sensed top manage-

8. Teams formally structured by management

8. Teams evolve as necessary

9. Champion has large ego, dictatorial

9. Champion is retiring, empowering

IO. Apply the one method

lO.Experiment

11. Constrained,

11.Universal empowerment

3.

scattered empowerment

commitment

with what works

Results

1. Sometimes CIP is neglected, but the principles 1. If Champion left TCT would die. Champion does leave (retires under fire); future uncertain. are so embedded in work processes that it could never be dropped 2. Much turnover in management

ranks

2. Little turnover; much hiring and promotion

3. Parent company is concerned about bottom line3. Internal stockholders

watch stock value

At Systems there was no single prescribed ideology. Although he was a strong proponent of TQ, the champion had synthesized his own beliefs about TQ from a variety of approaches and his practical experience implementing TQ at other firms. He taught all employees the basics of what he called CIP, and then encouraged intact work groups to select and apply those that seemed to help them solve immediate problems. In the process, groups were encouraged to make adaptations of CIP methods to their own situations as they saw fit. The champion also formed teams, but again left them fairly free to adopt and adapt from a broad menu of techniques and procedures associated with TQM. This more agnostic approach to ideology made CIP adaptable, believable, and workable for specific problems in JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, No.

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each work setting. It also facilitated system-wide use and institutionalization of TQ throughout Systems. The singularity of the Bradley ideology and the extensive set of new concepts and unique language used to present it required had another disadvantage: it required organizational members to overturn existing schemas and frames and replace them with new ones, and thus may have challenged esteemed aspects of their sense of the core organizational identity (Reger et al., 1994). To the degree that the new language did not fit their understandings of their work situations, it made communication more difficult and created discontinuities or inconsistencies with their existing organizational and self-schemas. In addition, TCT was framed as opposed to TQM ideas that had been previously valued and undoubtedly internalized by many at Bradley. The cognitive oppositions thus set up also made it likely that TCT would trigger considerable negative affect (Reger et al., 1994). Cognitive oppositions were much less likely at Systems, both because the CIP ideology was not pushed as “the one best way” and because it was flexible enough, as implemented, to allow employees leeway in both their beliefs and actions. A Focus on Means vs. Ends Bradley’s use of TCT focused on the means to desired ends-fast cycle time with expected bottom-line benefits. Top management and the champion talked as if TCT techniques were a panacea-an effective means to all desired ends they considered relevant. They preached that reducing cycle time would increase quality and customer satisfaction, reduce the time to market for new products, reduce costs, generally increase efficiency, and ultimately increase profitability. All of this organization’s energy during implementation was therefore bent on learning and mastering the prescribed means associated with TCT, including a plethora of new concepts and language. It was a matter of faith that, if correctly followed, TCT would ensure the desired ends. Some employees, even when trained in the TCT ideology and methods, found it difficult to link the new approach to their daily activities. Some employees reported they had observed an almost “ritualistic kind of adoption” with the application of TCT ideas and procedures to parts of the company “where it just didn’t fit.” Learning the language and being able to use it became an outward sign that an employee was on board and part of the TCT effort. Being able to talk the talk, however, did not necessarily ensure that they would know how to walk the talk. A couple of managers expressed to us their concern that employees were making up things because of the pressures they felt to use TCT, for example, they might invent another barrier to overcome or offer an unrealistic completion date. At Systems the implementation of TQ was much more ends-oriented than means-oriented. Top management and the TQ champion envisioned the desired end as continuous improvement through an empowered workforce. There was little effort made to insist on specific methods for achieving that end. The TQ champion wanted to create an environment in which people could learn and in a sense create their own versions of TQ.3 Just as there was no prescribed ideology, there was no single set of techniques that he advanced as a panacea for all probJOURNAL

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lems. Managers and employees were therefore allowed and even encouraged to adapt existing techniques or invent new means to solving their problems. In his classic analysis of conformity and deviance, Merton (1938) argued that an overreliance or emphasis on societally prescribed means to desired ends produces ritualistic behavior while the pursuit of societally desirable ends by other than prescribed means produces innovative behavior. The implementation of TCT at Bradley clearly had elements of ritualism, while the implementation of CIP at Systems seemed to produce genuine innovation. The innovations at Systems were incremental, not radical, but they seemed to cascade and ramify in ways that produced system-wide change. Dictatorial

vs. Facilitative

Leadership

There is no doubt that the highly directive and coercive leadership style of the TCT champion at Bradley affected its implementation. His severe philosophy is captured in the following comment he made to us about his tolerance of failure, “Failure is OK in a stretch situation. What is not OK is stupid mistakes like not checking with a supervisor when faced with a novel event.” He did not seem to place as much faith in the general good judgment or positive motivations of people as in a strict adherence to procedure and rules. Perhaps this is why he prescribed such a doctrinaire, rigid version of TCT. Clearly, the TCT champion was a threatening figure and intended to be so. The major structural changes he initiated, the departure of key players, and the general turmoil he created within the company produced a culture of fear at Bradley around the implementation of TCT. People worried that they couldn’t find enough ways to reduce the time it took to do their jobs, they worried that if they found too many ways to reduce the time it took to do their jobs it would make them dispensable, and they worried about the long-term effects of all of the changes they were witnessing. These fears were undoubtedly reinforced by the firings or other forced departures that employees had witnessed. One person remarked, “You can’t operate all the time in the fear zone or the anxious zone . . .You have to have times to re-coup.” In sharp contrast to his counterpart at Bradley, Systems’s champion functioned as a teacher and facilitator. He seemed to see his role as Vice-President and Director of Quality more in terms of conversion and facilitation than in terms of power and authority. Although it could be argued that System’s TQ champion did not have as much formal legitimate authority as Bradley’s champion, who had been promoted to COO, the champion at Systems enjoyed strong support from top management. He worked to create a culture of trust rather than fear in the organization. There were no apparent personal costs for not participating in CIP Those not converted were left alone by the champion and top management, who waited for the converted to spread the word and convince the unconverted of the merits of CIP. Their patience and faith in this conversion process is remarkable. Systems’s TQM champion described the change process at Systems in the following terms: Management has to change if you really want some of these things to happen. Participation occurs as management backs off. Then management gains confidence so they JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT. Vol. 2, No. I, 1997

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back off a little more. So the freedom that’s given grows. One thing about management here is that when people stub their toes it doesn’t put an end to the process. Management is pretty calm and they tend to look at it as what can we learn here?

Their permissiveness was not unlimited, however. They replaced their VP of Engineering when he could not find ways to apply CIP to the activities he supervised. They then took great care to be sure that his replacement’s beliefs and style of supervision were compatible with their approach to TQ. Along with these differences in leadership styles went different types of employee empowerment. Empowerment at Bradley seemed to occur almost exclusively through membership on a team of some sort. Team members’ decisions and inputs were heavily constrained by the prescriptions of TCT methodology as to what that type of team should be d0ing-e.g. whether it was supposed to identify and prioritize actions in progress or was supposed to identify and remove barriers. This empowerment never reached the lowest levels of the organization. Top management relinquished little control and the traditional hierarchy was as powerful as ever. By contrast, the teams at Systems were much less constrained and employees were therefore much freer to behave and decide as they saw fit. Also, work groups were allowed to identify and formulate solutions to problems involving their own work. In this way, even the lowest level employees were empowered to devise changes in work practices and processes. At Systems, as some TQ theory advocates (Manley, 1996), the traditional hierarchy was reversed in the sense that initiatives for change could begin at the bottom of the organization. Furthermore, there was no implication that management always knew best. Clearly, the more democratic ethos and genuine trust in employees the champion and top management at Systems displayed permitted greater empowerment there than occurred at Bradley. Predetermined

vs. Emergent Change

The TCT program implemented at Bradley was an “off-the-shelf’ program that, it was claimed, had been used successfully in other firms, in particular by the consultants and its champion; it therefore was not modified in any significant way when implemented at Bradley. The program specified, a priori, an explicit methodology, including the kinds of teams, techniques, procedures, and metrics to be used to reduce cycle time at every point in any work process-all expressed in an extensive new vocabulary. Because it was so heavily preplanned and allowed for little deviation, the TCT program promised to increase the control of management. The champion, top management, and the persons applying TCT did not have to do much innovating. What they were to do was already prescribed for them-it was a given. The challenge for management in the implementation of TCT was training managers and employees in the specifics and then persuading them to conform to the desired new specifics. The challenge for those using the procedures was to figure out what the language actually meant in terms of their specific circumstances. The Bradley TCT program, in many ways, resembled the model of the control-oriented TQ program (TQC) described by Sitkin et al. (1994). JOURNAL

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The weakness of such predetermination is the rigidity it can introduce. Units like R & D, which performed less structured tasks with less measurable outcomes, had difficulty applying TCT tools and techniques to their work processes. In such units, application of TCT tended to be ritualistic. In addition, the TCT methodology prescribed that the company prioritize its list of objectives from the very inception of ideas for new products through the entire production cycle. The danger in this approach was that if these priorities were mistaken, perhaps because of incomplete information about the future course of technology, the firm could pursue the wrong products with adverse results on market share and profits. It could, in effect, be very efficient at producing the wrong outcomes. Finally, the rigidity of the way TCT was presented was bound to create cognitive conflict with preexisting ideas. The TQ program implemented at Systems was a local adaptation, eclectic in nature, drawing upon TQ ideas and principles from a number of well-established programs. It was not a predetermined customization (Westphal et al., 1996). CIP consisted at the outset of principles that the TQ champion believed in, but the nature of CIP continued to change and grow throughout its use, depending on which elements of TQ worked best at Systems. For example, some parts of TCT, such as flow charting, were incorporated in departments at Systems, but many other TCT ideas were not used. Another related idea that had been selectively tried out and implemented was manufacturing cells. But above all, employees were encouraged to invent their own ways to apply CR? At Systems a localized version of TQ continued to emerge even up through our second visit, where we observed that the use of teams was still in existence but with more fluidity than observed on the first visit. As the TQ champion remarked, “Things sort of ebb and flow.” The Systems’ CIP program had many of the qualities of the learning-oriented TQ program (TQL) described by Sitkin et al. (1994). It also resembled Mintzberg’s (1987) conceptualization of emergent strategies, which form rather than are formulated. Because the targeted outcomes were less well specified at Systems than at Bradley, employees and managers were encouraged to be creative in how they used CIP ideas and to be innovative in improving quality. One of the most vivid examples was the purchase of personal computers for field inspectors so as to make their jobs easier and help them be more productive. They were sent to a class to learn how to use the computer, but they then, on their own, figured out how to collect data and analyze it to reduce defects. As the TQ champion said, “We did not force a particular program on them...1 would never have thought inspectors would have so benefited from a PC [personal computer]. Now I’m wondering, shouldn’t everyone have one?” Systems’s champion chose to expose people to the concepts of CIP, give them resources that might be helpful, and then let them find innovative ways to use the concepts and resources. People were encouraged to experiment to find out what worked for them rather than being told what others thought would work. Modes of Learning Although learning was not a word we heard often at Bradley and it was a word we heard frequently at Systems, learning clearly occurred in both TQ efforts. The JOURNAL

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type of learning fostered at Bradley, however, was much different than that fostered at Systems. The primary ways learning differed concerned: (1) the creation and conversion of knowledge; and (2) the reliance on negative vs. positive feedback. The way in which knowledge was created at these two organizations varied significantly. In their theory of organizational knowledge creation, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that organizations create knowledge through social interactions involving tacit and explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is personal, contextspecific, and hard to formalize and communicate. Explicit knowledge is “codified’ knowledge-that which is transmittable in formal, systematic terms. Nonaka and Takeuchi called a process of learning that proceeds from the conversion of explicit to tacit knowledge internalization. There is a good fit between this concept and what happened at Bradley. As the TCT champion put it, “I am trying to change ideas; then behavior will follow.” The primary way knowledge was created at Bradley was to expose individual workers to the ideology and methodologies of TCT, the explicit knowledge, with the expectation that they would convert what they learned to tacit knowledge that would form the basis for new behaviors. As they followed TCT procedures and documented what they did and the outcomes of what they did, individuals were likely to internalize some lessons from what they had experienced. The documents so created could also facilitate the learning of other people, by providing them with indirect experiences from which they might internalize lessons. In addition, the extensive documentation used in TCT created a growing base of explicit knowledge. Systems, on the other hand, created knowledge largely by converting tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. In this type of conversion, referred to by Nonaka and Takeuchi as externalization, new concepts are created from tacit knowledge, usually triggered through dialogue and collective reflection. The TQ champion, for example, initially encouraged the use of teams within existing work settings to focus on their own problems. Thus, workers brought to these dialogues tacit knowledge from their own personal experiences with the processes involved in their jobs and eventually, through discussions, converted that knowledge to explicit knowledge, creating new concepts and ideas about what it meant to pursue quality that could then be shared with others throughout the company. These companies also differed in the degree to which they relied on negative vs. positive feedback for learning. Feedback is negative when, as strategy analysts put it, the organization has a prior intention and then compares the outcomes of actual behavior against the intended behavior, feeding the information about deviations back into the process in order to remove the deviation (Stacey, 1996). Single-loop learning occurs with the application of negative feedback. If the response taken is favorable, the behavior is repeated; if the response is unfavorable the behavior is modified to reduce the deviation between desired and actual outcomes. On the other hand, positive feedback and double-loop learning occur when organizations feed back information to individuals in a way that encourages them to question existing connections between discovery, choice, and action, thus destabilizing current streams of action, and “spreading revolutionary ideas to change activities in beneficial ways” (Stacey, 1996, p. 35). Positive feedback tends to proJOURNAL

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duce alterations in the schemas driving behavior in light of the responses provoked by the behavior. When double-loop learning occurs, the behavior and the rules governing the behavior are altered at the same time. Bradley seemed to rely most heavily on the use of negative feedback and single-loop learning. The intended outcome of the TCT process was reducing cycle time. When behaviors applied to the process did not result in a reduction in cycle time, the behavior was altered until the desired reduction occurred. There was little questioning of the rules and assumptions behind the behaviors intended to reduce cycle time. At Systems, on the other hand, it seemed that positive feedback as well as negative feedback played a role and that the company fostered more complexdouble-loop learning in its implementation of TQM. Throughout its implementation, the use of CIP was expected to alter existing schemas in order to achieve new streams of future actions and thus improvements in quality. The operational rules embedded in CIP were evolving continually because they were enacted, rather than given. The champion’s encouragement to discover, choose, and act on only the methods and principles that were found to work for a particular problem or setting was encouragement for double-loop learning. CONCLUSIONS As originally described by Bums and Stalker (1961), among the characteristics exhibited by mechanistic systems are a functional differentiation of tasks; precisely defined obligations, rights, and responsibilities; top-down control; instructions governing how work is done; and an emphasis on obedience.4 All of these characterize Bradley’s second TQ implementation effort. The various teams prescribed by TCT had different tasks to perform that were specified in advance and heavily structured by TCT procedures. Each had certain duties and responsibilities, and the specific tasks they undertook were quite closely supervised by the TCT champion, who had substantial hierarchical authority. Repeatedly employees at Bradley told us that no one would dare to resist TCT, they felt constrained to obey the dictates of the champion and the TCT dogma. This approach to TQM was not all bad. Insistence on a single ideology has value in that it is a way of helping people reduce uncertainty and create some degree of order in the midst of the ambiguity (Trite & Beyer, 1993). The reduction of uncertainty is especially desirable in crisis situations5 where people’s understandings of the way the world works are thrown into question. Providing a certain path to follow in such situations is very reassuring, and people made anxious by a sense of crisis will be open to accepting new ideas that promise a way out of the crisis. At the same time this singular focus makes it difficult for innovations that result from a different set of beliefs and values to be developed and find expression. The narrow focus that Bradley had on a specific set of means and predetermined procedures may have reduced anxieties engendered by increasing competition and whatever slippage in quality had occurred, but in the process, the emphasis on pre-set procedures reinforced conformity and allowed for only constrained innovation. Other factors reinforcing tendencies toward conformity were JOURNAL

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the dictatorial style of leadership employed by the champion and the reliance on primarily negative feedback and the resultant single-loop learning that seems to be inherent in the TCT method. On the other hand, Bums and Stalker described organic systems as valuing special knowledge and experience; continually redefining tasks through interaction; emphasizing information and advice in communications; eschewing topdown control; and generating commitment. Organic systems aim for innovation rather than conformity. And thus it was with the implementation of TQ at Systems. There were no set procedures that were imposed on everybody at Systems. Everyone was assumed to be capable of contributions, and empowerment was thus spread throughout the organization. By the time of our second visit, groups formed as needed and disbanded when they had completed the envisioned task. The low-key style of the TQ champion made the very idea of obedience irrelevant; groups and individuals exercised considerable control over how they performed their work, including whatever activities were in pursuit of continuous improvement of quality. The boundaries between CIP and regular work procedures had dissolved. The organic approach to implementing TQ at Systems produced incremental innovation. The ideological agnosticism practiced there fostered innovation because people were allowed and encouraged to consider multiple ideas and beliefs before identifying and solving problems. The focus on ends vs. means at Systems meant that multiple approaches to problem solving were always available-a condition conducive to innovation. The presence of a leader who saw himself as a facilitator also promoted innovation because facilitators allow people to invent new solutions, rather than constrain their responses within prescribed paths. The unstructured, emergent implementation of TQ at Systems emphasized adaptation, a defining characteristic of organic systems. Finally, at Systems we observed double-loop learning, yet more evidence of an adaptive, innovative culture. Our results call into question some early theory about implementation. Duncan (1976) argued that organizations have to be ambidextrous to both generate and implement change. His idea was that organic structures are necessary to encourage and produce innovation, but that more mechanistic structures are needed to assure that envisioned changes are implemented. He was thus suggesting that centralized control and some formalization are needed to assure conformity to desired change. The theory behind TCT, at least as enacted at Bradley, seems to resemble Duncan’s theory. The enactment of this theory through TCT at Bradley did produce some implementation, but it was limited, and may disappear if centralized control over the process is softened. The enactment of CIP at Systems throws doubt on Duncan’s theory, for with an extremely organic approach, Systems achieved widespread implementation and institutionalization of its CIP program. In their earlier study of the implementation of personnel policies, Beyer and Trite (1978) also obtained results questioning Duncan’s theory. They found that decentralization of decision making, in particular, facilitated implementation of Equal Employment Opportunity policies in local offices of federal agencies. Giving people discretion JOURNAL

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apparently makes them more willing or able to implement TQ or other change programs. The question remains if fast implementation of TQ or another change is needed, mechanistic control of the process is more likely to produce it. Our data strongly suggest that, if the change desired must be practiced at the lower reaches of the organization, the answer is no. Mechanistic approaches can gain just so much compliance and control. The TCT program at Bradley did not change how lower level people did their work as much as the more organic approach used at Systems. What management gains from mechanistic implementation, we suspect, is a degree of compliance that is heavily dependent on the mechanisms used. When the mechanisms are removed or top management gets distracted by something else, compliance fades. It is hard to get explicit knowledge internalized. Change that is championed with an organic approach, on the other hand, builds from people’s own skills and learning. The knowledge is already internalized, and only has to be made explicit to spread. Such change is much more likely, therefore, to be institutionalized. Of course, implementation of planned change need not be as mechanistic as it was at Bradley nor as organic as it was at Systems. Whether something in the middle can produce fast change that becomes institutionalized remains for other studies to determine. Perceptions of crisis make people receptive to change, whether prescribed or emergent. The persistence of the changeits incorporation into the very fabric of an organizationhowever, may depend mainly on how that change is implemented. In the current parlance, people must genuinely “buy into” a change if it is to be lasting. Forcing conformity is unlikely to produce this buy-in unless people experience positive results. The weakness of top-down implementation is that top management cannot know the details of each work situation likely to constrain how it is possible to produce desired results. Implementation that is emergent and organic, by contrast, leaves room for needed local adaptations. We hope that future research will continue to examine these questions in a way that reveals how the specifics of TQ implementation affect both the extent and the persistence of change. Not long ago Fortune magazine raised the question-is TQ a dying fad? Our initial response is: In many organizations TQ may appear to be dying because the principles and ideologies have been so internalized that they no longer bear the “quality” labels. Instead, the cultural toolkit provided by TQ has become part of daily routines and given new life to the organization. This is what we observed at Systems in its organic implementation of TQ. Our second response is: In some organizations TQ was a fad, because the organization took a toolkit provided by someone else, failed to customize it to the organization’s specific needs, and insisted on a highly mechanized control-oriented approach to its implementation. The result was that people picked up the cultural toolkit for a while, but failed to internalize the beliefs and principles behind the tools. Positive benefits of TQ were therefore short-lived. When TQ is implemented in as mechanistic a way as we observed at Bradley, we fear that the results of TQ will always be short-lived. JOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, NO. 1, 1997

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Acknowledgment: We wish to thank Joseph F. Roberts and Todd Salter for their assistance in coding the data reported in this paper; Ashok Kanagol, Frank Squires, and many others at SEMATECH for their assistance in pursuing this study; SEMATECH for its financial support of this research; the management and employees of both of these companies for their exceptional cooperation; and Jim Westphal for his helpful comments. APPENDIX

A

Interview Questions The following sets of questions were used during the two visits we made to the two companies studied. Visit 1 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

What is your current title and what are your major job responsibilities? Total Quality means a lot of different things across different firms. What does TQ mean in this firm? How did TQ get adopted in this firm? What was your role in the implementation of TQ? What were the major challenges involved in implementing TQ here? Was TQ needed by this firm (how or why)? Overall what has TQ accomplished for this firm? Has TQ spread throughout the organization? How has TQ changed your job? (ask for examples) When management wants to make a real change in this firm, how does management go about it? How strongly has top management supported the TQ effort? How strongly has middle management support TQ? How does the way top management sees the TQ program define how you and your subordinates should carry out your work? How has the way in which work is evaluated changed? What questions should we be asking about TQ and partnering that we have not asked?

VISIT 2-Managerial/Employee

Interview

Questions varied slightly for the second round of interviews because we wanted to follow up on specific issues we learned about in the first round of interviews. Words and phrases in parentheses were used at Systems Company. Questions in brackets were asked only at Bradley Company. 1. 2.

What is your current job title and duties? How long have you been in that position?

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3. 4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15.

What was your prior position and duties? [Total Quality is an issue throughout the semiconductor industry. How is your company managing its quality?] How closely have you been involved in the TCT (CIP) process here at your company? Were you familiar with this process before joining your company, [and if not, how much training did you receive here on the TCT process and how soon after you arrived did that occur]? [Regarding specific segments of the TCT process,] have you been a member of a cross-functional team; [one of the core teams; a barrier removal team; or an AIP team], and if so, how has that team(s) worked and what results has it achieved? Are there any other specific TCT (CIP) activities about which I should know? Because TCT (CIP) is such an encompassing process, have you found you use it as part of your daily routine, and if so, could you describe an example of how that happens? What proportion of the employees here do you think are using TCT (CIP) and are they rewarded for using it? Who’s leading the TCT (CIP) effort now? Concerning what you have observed about how the TCT (CIP) process works here, could you describe a recent instance of something that happened to further the acceptance and use of TCT (CIP)? Do you know of any incidents that worked against the acceptance or use of TCT (CIP)? Could you describe a specific instance of improvements made either in your unit or company-wide through using TCT (CIP)? Is it harder for old-timers to accept TCT (CIP)? Has anyone left the company because of TCT (CIP)?

VISIT ~-TOP Management 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

35

Team Interview

How do you feel now about the results of using TCT (CIP) for your company? What criteria do you use to judge its results? Did profits, returns on net assets, sales, and first pass yields all continue to improve and do they all give the same picture? Are there any other improvements it has achieved? Did TCT (CIP) implementation proceed as planned-[did you proceed into phase 2 in the fall of 1993]? [Were you able eventually to train the non-managerial levels in TCT techniques and, if so, did you do it through the BIT prime program]? What proportion of the employees have received TCT (CIP) training and what proportion would you estimate use TCT (CIP) on a daily basis (and have made it part of their regular routines)? Were any other additional steps taken to spread its implementation throughout the company? (e.g., incorporated into the reward and evaluaJOURNAL OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Vol. 2, No. I, 1997

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10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

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tion systems; for managers only, or for other employees, also?) [Regarding the changes you envisioned when we were last here to facilitate the TCT process, did you adopt activity-based accounting? implement the so-called paperless report system?] Have you made any major structural changes in the last 18 months? Has Company X become one of your customers, as you hoped it would and, if so, how is the relationship working out? Do you have any other new large customers or any surprises? You seem to have had a fair amount of turnover in managerial ranks. Is this a cause for concern? Is the overall workforce here growing or shrinking? Are you under more or less pressure from your competitors than you were 18 months (two years) ago? APPENDIX

B

Coding Frameworks The following framework, based on the Beyer and Trite (1978) model of change processes, was used to code data used in this paper from the first set of interviews: l

Adoption

l

Ideology

l

Diffusion

l

Receptivity

l

Use/Results

l

Institutionalization

We developed the following framework to code the second round of interviews. We used data from a selected group of these categories for this paper. Institutionalization l

l

l

Roles and structures Persistence of techniques and procedures Persistence of ideology

Other behavioral/cognitive l

changes

Resistance

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l

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Political fall-out Other new initiatives

Outcomes Customer needs and satisfactions* Internal communication and problem solving Employee commitment and motivation Stronger relations with suppliers* Fewer errors, waste, etc. TQM Indicators Financial Indicators Top management’s role/style *Our respondents

reported little data that fit these categories. NOTES

of the U.S. semiconductor 1. As part of its efforts to improve the global competitiveness industry, SEMATECH diffused the TQ ideology and practices to suppliers in this industry (Browning & Beyer, 1996), who founded their own consortium, called SEMKSEMATECH. Managers and staff of the TQ initiative helped the first author to identify firms within that group that their knowledge suggested had made the most progress in TQM. They then assisted us in gaining access to these firms and funded the collection and much of the analysis of the data. 2. The stock recently lost value with those of other semiconductor firms, but at the time of this writing, was still worth four times its initial value. 3. If he had been working for another firm, the version of TQ that would have emerged would have been different. 4. Of the 11 characteristics listed by Bums and Stalker, these five seemed to especially describe the differences between how Bradley and Systems implemented TQM. The two firms differed less on others. Spencer (1994) also used the mechanistic/organic comparison in her analysis of TQM and added a third type she called cultural. Her framework did not fit our findings as well as our interpretation of the original Bums and Stalker dichotomy. In terms of her framework, the implementation of CIP at Systems was more cultural than organic. 5. Crisis situations can sometimes be created through rhetoric or selective attention. It was not clear to us how serious the “crisis” was at Bradley Company that precipitated the rejection of the earlier Deming-type program.

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