- Email: [email protected]
Crucial decisions: Leadership in policymaking and crisis management, 1989
BOOK REVIEWS
John M. Jermier, Editor University of South Florida
Crucial Decisions: leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, 1989, New York: The Free Press, 388 + xi pages, $27.95, cloth. by Irving 1. Janis Reviewed by Ramon J. Aldag, University
of Wisconsin-Madison
In Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, Irving Janis undertakes the daunting task of presenting the beginnings of an integrated, general theory of the conditions under which leaders are likely to use sound procedures to arrive at policy decisions. The product is much like Janis’s earlier work-laden with anecdotes, bold in scope, sweeping in claims for generalizability, and intuitively appealing in its implications for practitioners. Also as with his earlier writings, there is ample reason here to apply the sort of critical perspective which Janis has regularly espoused. Crucial Decisions is an exhaustive, and somewhat exhausting, presentation of a “constraints model of policymaking processes.” This constraints model subsumes, extends, and updates Janis’s earlier work, including the familiar groupthink model (Janis, 1972, 1982) and the conflict model (Janis & Mann, 1977). The book aims “to try to answer the following fundamental questions: When and why do leaders of large organizations make avoidable errors that result in faulty policy decisions? How can such errors be prevented or at least kept to a minimum?” (p. ix). This focus on error permeates the book.
STRUCTURE
OF THE BOOK
Crucial Decisions is comprised of ten chapters as well as very detailed endnotes. In the sole chapter in Part One, titled “Order Out of Theoretical Chaos?,” Janis attempts to make the case that effective leadership, and specifically the avoidance of errors in Leadership Quarterly, 2(2), 141-155. Copyright @ 1991 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 1048-9843
142
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
policymaking and crisis management, is critical to organizational success and survival. He argues that an appropriate integrated theory specifying the conditions under which leaders use sound procedures to arrive at policy decisions that are likely to have successful rather than damaging outcomes is not available. Finally, he introduces his attempt at the start of such a theory, termed the Constraints Model of Policymaking Processes. In Part Two, titled “Common Simplistic Strategies Evoked By Constraints,” Janis discusses how policymakers often deviate from normative models of problem solving, resorting to simplistic strategies relying on a few simple decision rules. Chapter 2 discusses cognitive decision rules which simplify tasks facing policymakers. These include a variety of familiar heuristics such as satisficing and availability as well as one additional heuristic which Janis calls the “nutshell briefing” rule. In Chapter 3, affiliative decision rules are considered. These are rules relating to the desire of policymakers “to maintain or enhance their power, compensation, and status within the organization and to continue to obtain social support from their personal network.“(p. 45) The nowfamiliar “groupthink” tendency is one such rule. Others include “avoid punishment,” and “rig meetings to suppress the “follow the party line, ” “exercise one-upmanship,” opposition.” Finally, Chapter 4 discusses self-serving and emotive rules which give priority to the leader’s personal motives or emotional needs rather than to the best interests of the organization. The self-serving rule is “what’s in it for me?” The emotive rules include “rely on gut feeling,” “retaliate!,” “can do!,” and “wow, grab it!” The conflict theory model of decisionmaking proposed by Janis and Mann (1977) is reviewed at this point. The chapter concludes with a discussion of disadvantages of simplistic approaches. Part Three is titled “Sound Policymaking Procedures.” In Chapter 5 Janis details the essential steps in an “uncommon strategy,” vigilant problem solving. This strategy, previously discussed by Janis and Mann (1977), involves attention to the steps of problem formulation, use of informational resources, analysis and reformulation, evaluation and selection, and so on-essentially, taking care not to slight stages of the problem-solving process. In this chapter, Janis also notes limitations of vigilant problem solving-even vigilant leaders may be subject to perceptual and cognitive errors, existing knowledge may be so incomplete that policymakers are unaware of faulty assumptions about an adversary’s threatening moves, and information inputs to decision makers may contain error. Chapter 6 addresses two of the basic assumptions of the preceding chapters: that the vigilant problem-solving strategy is in the repertoire of most policymakers and that the poorer the quality of the procedures used in arriving at a policy decision, the greater the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes of the decision. In regard to the first assumption, Janis simply argues that, while adequate empirical research is lacking, he does not believe in the extreme view that vigilance makes no difference. To provide support for the second assumption, Janis presents a summary of his previous research purporting to demonstrate that proper procedures yield desirable outcomes. Part Four, “A New Theoretical Framework,” presents discussions of the constraints model of policymaking processes (Chapter 7) and of values and limitations of that model (Chapter 8). Janis states regarding the constraints model that, rather just providing a few notions about policymaking, “if the theoretical framework I am attempting to
143
Book Reviews construct is as promising
as I think it is, I expect social science theory to attain a much more ambitious objective within the near future-a theoretical model that can account for most decisionmaking processes for most policymakers most of the time.” (p. 139) The constraints model begins with policymakers becoming aware of a challenge and asking if a problem is routine or unimportant. If the problem is seen as sufficiently important to warrant attention, cognitive, affiliative, and egocentric constraints may serve as hurdles. If any of these constraints is judged to require overriding priority, the search for a high-quality solution is inhibited and simple decision rules are employed, as discussed above. Only if the decision maker judges “consciously or preconsciously” that the problem is important and that the constraints don’t have to be given dominant consideration does the model’s pathway lead to the opportunity for vigilance. Here, “the policymaker is required to answer conscientiously a set of twelve additional questions” (p. 159) dealing with the problem solving process. Janis notes that intermediate “quasi-vigilant” and “quasi-simplistic” approaches may also be employed. Janis highlights “some major implications of Finally, in Part Five, “Implications,” the constraints model in order to illustrate its potential value as a preliminary theoretical framework for generating new hypotheses that appear to be worth pursuing.” (p. 203) In Chapter 9, Janis presents 17 hypotheses concerning individual differences which might play roles in determining whether particular leaders are good or poor policymakers. Finally, Chapter 10 presents an additional 20 hypotheses relating to effective leadership practices. The endnotes are extensive. Many are used to respond to criticisms of Janis’s earlier work.
SOURCES OF CONCERN As noted above, while the constraints model has roots stretching back two decades, Janis presents it here as representing the beginnings of an integrated, general model of sound leadership. Since this implies that the model will be further revised, careful attention to its assumptions, development, and application seems critical. In fact, while I see much to praise in Crucial Decisions, I feel that a number of points merit concern and consideration. Some are shared by Janis’s earlier work, including his groupthink writings. Sally Fuller and I recently conducted a comprehensive review of the groupthink literature. We discussed some of the following points in more detail in that context (Aldag & Fuller, 1990). We conclude that there is little valid empirical support for groupthink, that the groupthink model is incomplete and rests on many questionable assumptions, and that many writers and researchers on groupthink have been serving as-to use Janis’s term-mindguards. I restate these conclusions here to lay my biases on the table, and to signal that I will be serving as a devil’s advocate in the comments that follow. I hope the concerns raised will induce the sort of dissonance which Janis sees as necessary to vigilance. I will address eleven sets of issues. Importance of leadership Janis begins the book by building a case for the critical role of effective leadership. In fact, the book’s first quotation includes the statement that “Most of the organizations
144
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
my colleagues and I have studied did not survive their crises, but in every case of survival, the reorientations included wholesale replacements of the top managers, and we infer that survival requires this.” (Starbuck, 1983, p. 100) The selection of this quote in support of the importance of leadership is both ironic and telling; ironic since the quote is from William Starbuck, whose world view Janis subsequently explicitly rejects, and telling since it presages the selectivity and subjectivity which I believe characterizes reporting in the book. This early quote, like others that Janis provides in support of his arguments, ignores bodies of contradictory literature. The evidence linking executive succession to subsequent organizational outcomes is, at least, conflicting, with some studies showing no effect, or even negative effects, of succession (for instance, see Carroll, 1984). Also, while the “Great Man”view of leadership to which Janis apparently subscribes sees individual leaders as critical determinants of organizational outcomes, perspectives not cited emphasize the role of context, or even view succession as primarily a symbolic event. Further, Janis gives no clue here that Starbuck basically argues that if improved organizational performance follows executive succession, it is due more to unlearning than to the new leader’s skills; getting rid of a leader permits purging of misconceptions, outdated methods, and self-deceptions (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Starbuck, 1983). Thus, in Starbuck’s view, executive succession is often desirable simply because “Removing people is a quick, effective way of erasing memories.” (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984, p. 58). Relationship of Processto Outcomes As noted above, one of Janis’s basic assumptions is that an effective process is associated with desirable decision outcomes. Certainly, this is a widely held assumption which underlies many theories and associated prescriptions, and it is one which most readers would probably accept. Nevertheless, Janis devotes considerable attention to this issue, including all of Chapter 6, which essentially restates the Herek, Janis, & Huth (1987) Journal of Conflict Resolution study. However, what should be a comforting exercise serves instead as a reminder both of the difficulty of convincingly demonstrating a process-outcome linkage and of the problems of resorting to faith in the midst of critical analysis. In the Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987) research, quality of process was related to outcomes for 19 “major international crises.“Fifty-nine bibliographic sources were used, and coding schemes were developed for quality of the policymaking process. Outside experts who were “blind” to the research hypotheses rated the outcomes of the crises. It was concluded that there was “a strong relationship between quality of decisionmaking as manifested by number of symptoms of defective decisionmaking (rated by investigators) and unfavorable outcomes (based on average ratings of the outside experts).” (p. 127) While Janis discusses in considerable detail the strengths of this methodology-and it is certainly preferable to many alternative approaches-its flaw is that the original writers of the bibliographic sources were keenly aware of the outcomes of the decision situations they discussed. As such, they were not “blind.“There is strong evidence to suggest that when individuals have knowledge of a negative outcome, they infer a negative process (e.g., Guzzo, Wagner, Maguire, Herr, & Hawley, 1986). Starbuck and Milliken (1988) convincingly address this issue. Janis recognizes
145
Book Reviews
the possibility of such biasing, but argues that “Our principle safeguard here is our reliance on the standards of sound scholarship. We assume that highly competent historians and political scientists who meet those standards are less likely than others to distort facts to fit their expectations.” (p. 130) Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be supported; it seems inappropriate to argue that top-level policymakers are subject to many perceptual and other biases, but that “competent” scholars are not. In another discussion of the linkage of process to outcomes, Janis notes that some decision makers may perform poorly even when adopting the vigilant pattern, but that this would be due to unusual circumstances. He writes, “Of course, those decisionmakers who are extremely incompetent or suffering from psychological disorders may practically always do a poor job and make gross errors, irrespective of whether their coping pattern is vigilance or one of the nonvigilant patterns. Such persons, however, are rarely found among national policymakers or in top-level management positions. If stricken by acute depression or any other emotional disorder, an official is promptly removed from office.” (p. 78) This contention would be more convincing if it were not refuted by daily observation. A week’s front pages of the Wall Street Journal reveal cases of a CEO who mysteriously vanished, leaving questions about his credentials and motivations, at a time when the company announced a seven million dollar loss; the sentencing of an S&L executive to a five-year prison term for diverting funds to pay for a beach house and prostitutes; the development of instructional videotapes of prisoners, including former CEOs, discussing how they were able to commit repeated frauds; as well as numerous examples of more routine incompetence and malfeasance. In each case, these leaders were able to continue their behaviors undetected for years, were inflicting major harm on the firms they led, and were exposed only through chance, carelessness, or arrogance. In short, it cannot be assumed that incompetent or disturbed leaders will be “promptly removed from office,” nor does it follow that vigilance should lead to positive outcomes for all but rare leaders.
leader Ability and Flexibility Another assumption basic to the constraints model is that leaders can flexibly adopt vigilance or other styles. Janis writes, “This variability assumption is a basic postulate of my theory of policymaking.” (p. 114) Many theories of leadership, including pathgoal theory (House, 1971), situational leadership theory (Hersey & Blanchard, 1977), and the Vroom and Yetton normative model of leadership (Vroom 8z Yetton, 1973), make similar assumptions. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that leaders do not exhibit an appropriate range of behaviors (Vroom and Jago, 1974), and the issue of leader behavior flexibility has been generally ignored. Yet, in arguing for the importance of vigilance, Janis claims that virtually all leaders are capable of vigilance, can flexibly alternate between vigilance and less taxing strategies, and thus have the opportunity to improve their decision making. It is important to note that Janis does not provide evidence in support of this assumption. In my opinion, leader ability to adopt behaviors, styles, or strategies and to flexibly select from among them cannot and should not simply be assumed in this or any other model.
146
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
Generalizability As was the case in his previous works, Janis is clearly more comfortable presenting examples from foreign policy crises than from other settings. The reader will find here the now-familiar discussions of such fiascoes as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the appeasement of Hitler, the escalations of conflict in Korea and Vietnam, the failure to heed warnings regarding an attack on Pearl Harbor, and so on. In addition, there are myriad examples relating to such events as the ill-fated 1980 Iranian rescue mission, the Watergate cover-up, Ford’s pardon of Nixon, and Reagan’s waffling on issues. However, Janis’s excursions outside government policymaking settings are rare and strained. For instance, as in his previous writings, he cites the 1972 Buffalo Creek dam disaster as his example of groupthink in a business setting. In that disaster, top-level executives ignored warnings from engineers and insurance inspectors that heaping of slag to dam up Buffalo Creek could be disastrous. When, as the experts warned, the dam broke, more than 125 people were killed and the company was required to pay $26 million to survivors. Whether or not this disaster reflects groupthink, it is unfortunate that more recent and typical examples could not be presented. In only a few other cases does Janis cite business examples or quote businessmen (no businesswoman, or woman in any role, is discussed as a key decision maker in the book). This constrained focus is evidenced in the book’s references. As in his earlier works, Janis is either unaware of many relevant sources or considers them unworthy of attention. For example, of well over 300 references, none are from the Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Harvard Business Review, Sloan Management Review, California Management Review, Academy of Management Executive, Human Relations, Journal of Management, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Decision Sciences, or Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. A total of only ten references, with an average age of over a dozen years at the time of publication of Crucial Decisions, are from Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, American Sociological Review, Administration and Society, Journal of General Management, Personnel Management, Psychological Bulletin, or American Journal of Sociology. Perhaps because examples outside government policymaking settings are so rare, and because many bodies of literature are ignored, extrapolations to business and other non-governmental settings are tenuous and unconvincing. Further, while Janis consistently provides examples only of top-level policymakers, he regularly claims that his model is generalizable even to lower and middle levels of organizations. He states, for instance, that “the presence or absence of these symptoms can be used to judge the quality of decisionmaking not only of top-level policymakers but also of middle-level and lower-level administrators who are pursuing the goals of their own unit”(p. 95) and “the constraints model, as stated earlier, is directly applicable when lower- or middle-level personnel function as innovative leaders.. .” (p. 333). These assertions are simply not supported by the evidence Janis provides. Indeed, recall that Janis’s original question was “When and why do leaders of large organizations make avoidable errors that result in faulty policy decisions ?” This question indicates a focus on leaders of large organizations, not leaders in large organizations, or even leaders of small organizations. In fact, Crucial Decisions addresses critical decisions of male policymakers in top-level governmental policymaking positions.
147
Book Reviews
The Focus on Fiasco
As in his previous works, Janis focuses here on error, and in particular on dramatic fiascoes. The point of the constraints model, he states, is to prevent or reduce avoidable error. Unfortunately, this focus on error invites illusory correlation (Einhorn, 1980; Hogarth, 1980) since only the confluence of fiascoes with defects is considered. It may be the case that the “defects” found to be associated with fiascoes are also associated with high-quality decisions, or that vigilance is also associated with fiascoes. For instance, McCauley (1989) used content analysis to review Janis’s descriptions of historical cases and found surprisingly little difference between the numbers of hypothesized antecedents of groupthink evidenced in the groupthink and nongroupthink decisions. Further, as Lopes (1987) and others have argued, this focus on decision errors rather than on decision quality represents an important, and perhaps unfortunate, reframing. That is, instead of asking “how good are decisions?” and “how can decisions be improved?” questions are framed as “how bad are decisions?” and “how can errors be avoided?” The latter questions imply-incorrectly, in my view-that quality is simply the absence of error; they divert attention from decision creativity and, for better or worse, discourage risk taking. The Reliance on Anecdote
Janis relies heavily on anecdote and case studies. While he sometimes calls for use of a “full range of behavioral research methods” and alludes at points to lab or field experiments or survey research, he does so with apparent distaste. In referring to research on groupthink, for instance, Janis cites none of the survey or experimental studies of the phenomenon, referring only to case studies and anecdotal pieces. This not only constrains the literature Janis deems appropriate for consideration but also narrows his perspective and limits feasible research methodologies. For instance, Janis calls for comparison of “grand masters of policymaking” with others rated as mediocre or poor in order to learn about “plausible components that might form part of the masterful pattern.” (p. 109) Janis notes that such comparison will not be possible if grand masters cannot be found. However, with the sample sizes available in organizational settings, alternative designs, not requiring the search for grand masters and geniuses, could adequately address these issues. The Roles of Heuristics
The constraints model places heavy emphasis on the roles of heuristics, with a series of simplifying rules serving as barriers to vigilance. Janis essentially sees use of heuristics as potentially appropriate for simple, unimportant decisions but dangerous in other cases. He does not point out, though, that others see heuristic usage in a substantially more positive light. For instance, Hogarth (198 1) has argued that many heuristics may actually be beneficial in dynamic, complex, real-world environments, and that laboratory experiments cannot be confidently extrapolated to such settings. Further, while Janis recognizes that individuals may be unaware that they are using heuristics, he pays little attention to the question of whether awareness matters. As noted
148
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
above, for instance, he says that policymakers may “consciously or preconsciously” decide whether or not constraints must be given dominant attention. However, policycapturing studies suggest that decision makers may be unaware of their heuristic usage (e.g., Slavic, 1969; Valenzi & Andrews, 1973). Janis does not consider how the constraints model addresses the consequences of clashes between conscious and “preconscious” decisions. It would seem that not only degree of heuristic usage but also veridical awareness of such usage may be important in determining decision outcomes. Finally on this point, it seems to me that some of the rules which Janis treats as constraints are not heuristics. For instance, the “rig meetings to suppress the opposition” rule would be seen by Pfeffer (1981) as a conscious political tactic rather than a “simplistic approach.“(Curiously, while Pfeffer (1981) is included in the references, that source is apparently nowhere cited in the book.) In my view, Janis confounds motivation or goal with approach simplicity. Calls for Additions to Research Agendas Janis regularly presents aspects of his model development in terms of calls for additions to the research agendas of social scientists. For instance, he sees his attention to individual differences of policymakers as important because “. . . personality research in the fields of political and organizational psychology seems to be in need of fresh and stimulating ideas” (p. 229) and he refers to personality research as having “fallen into the doldrums.” (p. 229) At other points he provides what he calls “suggestive leads to be put on the research agenda of social scientists who investigate policymaking processes” (p. 148) and suggests that research such as he proposes “would also provide an empirical basis for developing basic theory on the role of personality in organizational decisionmaking.” (p. 226) Such calls become annoying since Janis completely ignores much relevant social science literature. Despite obvious relevance, for example, there is no mention here of the literature on decision confirmation (Soelberg, 1966) or choice of decision mode (Einhorn, 1971; Payne, 1976). The omission of discussion of Pfeffer’s (1981) work on politics is glaring since Pfeffer’s discussion of political strategies and tactics is directly relevant to many issues Janis raises and since he has a drastically different view of the roles of experts and committees than does Janis. Further, as is consistent with the focus on decision quality as absence of error, creativity gets only passing mention, and most recent literature on the topic is ignored. This reluctance to broadly sample from other literatures is especially evident in Chapter 9, where Janis explores the roles of individual differences. Here, he considers a range of general and largely-dated sets of individual differences but fails to explicitly consider many variables which have been directly related to decision making, such as self-monitoring, dogmatism, Machiavellianism, cognitive complexity, and problem-solving style. Indeed, for a book with a central focus on decision processes, the decision literature is given remarkably little attention. Many references to this literature are drawn from the Abelson and Levi (1985) review. This is a fine work, but it is not meant as an alternative to consideration of primary sources. There is surprisingly little attention devoted to discussions of problem formulation (e.g., Lyles & Mitroff, 1980) or perception of environmental threat and opportunity (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987).
149
Book Reviews
Further, as noted above, the creativity literature (e.g., Busse & Gustafson, 1988) is directly relevant to effective alternative generation but is slighted. This constrained focus would be less troublesome if Janis were simply suggesting variables for consideration in his constraints model. In such a case, readers might say, “These aren’t a bad start, but other variables have been more thoroughly explored and should be incorporated.” However, as noted above, Janis’s goals are more ambitious. He presents the model as cutting-edge, and in my opinion it is not. Comprehensiveness
The groupthink model could be fruitfully expanded by further consideration of literature relating to variables such as norms, task characteristics, leader power, stage of group development, social control, and organizational politics (see Aldag & Fuller (1990) for specific examples). The constraints model is much broader in its aims but essentially rests on the same literature base as the groupthink and conflict models which it incorporates. A model which hopes to account “for most decisionmaking processes for most policymakers most of the time” demands a broader theoretical foundation. Suitability for Testing
In the first chapter of Crucial Decisions, Janis notes that “good” theory must “. . . account for prior empirical findings more adequately than any rival theory, make novel, nontrivial predictions that are testable, and suggest new prescriptions that are worth investigating.” (p. 24) He subsequently repeatedly calls for further development and testing of the constraints model. I think most readers of Crucial Decisions would agree that the book makes nontrivial predictions and suggests prescriptions that are worth investigating. However, an unsettling aspect of the model is that, like the conflict and groupthink models which it subsumes, it apparently cannot be empirically refuted. That is, Janis provides so many hedges concerning characteristics and interpretation of the model and limits on its applicability that any nonconfirming evidence could probably be discounted. For instance, Janis notes that “Each of these hypotheses should be understood as referring to leadership behavior that is authentic. None of the leadership practices can be expected to be effective in promoting vigilant problem solving if accompanied by cues indicating that the leader does not genuinely believe in what he or she is saying or doing.” (p. 235) Unfortunately, this rather casual disclaimer appears incongruous when it is recognized that the model is meant to guide managers in dealing with such constraints as self-serving biases. That is, it is difficult to understand how, or why, an individual who is trying to maximize personal welfare at the expense of organizational goals would be “authentic” in adopting a vigilant mode. Indeed, it would seem that such vigilance might be used to advance self interests. Further, of course, any failure to confirm the model could be attributed to the “inauthentic” behavior on the part of the leader rather than to weaknesses of the model. As another example of the difficulty in determining what might reasonably be accepted as refutation of the model, “strong” and “weak” versions of the Janis (1972, 1982) groupthink model have emerged (Aldag & Fuller, 1990). In the strong versions, groupthink is not considered to exist unless it is fully evidenced. In reviewing past research on groupthink, Janis has rejected as inappropriate those studies which don’t meet these
150
LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
stringent criteria. He writes here that “It does not suffice merely to see if a few of the eight telltale symptoms of groupthink are detected. Rather, it is necessary to see if practically all the symptoms were manifested and also to see if the antecedent conditions and the expected immediate consequences-the symptoms of defective decisionmakingare also present.” (p. 60) In weaker versions, which researchers have generally adopted, the degree to which these conditions are present is deemed relevant; more conditions should lead to poorer decisions. Strangely and confusingly, though, Janis sometimes also seems to espouse this “weak” version, writing that “The more of those conditions that are present, the higher the probability that reliance on the “preserve group harmony” rule will impair the quality of the group’s policymaking and give rise to serious errors that could be avoided.” (p. 61) It seems that in discussing the broader constraints model, Jams accepts this weak view. The problem here is that any disconfiing studies which do not meet the “strong” interpretation can be rejected as inappropriate tests while confirming evidence meeting the “weak” interpretation may be accepted. As another example of barriers to testing of the model, Janis argues that if a policy has bad consequences and it appears that vigilance was used, “the investigator would realize that he or she needs to consider a different sort of explanation that lies beyond the scope of the constraints model” (p. 169), such as incompetence, conspiracy, hidden agendas, uncorrected ideological preconceptions, misleading intelligence sources, or problem complexity. In short, if there is a bad outcome and vigilance has been employed, the model cannot be taken as refuted; it has simply been applied in a situation beyond its scope. Finally, Janis argues that the model will make predictions which are better than chance “but not highly accurate for any single case.” (p. 171) For this and the previouslynoted reasons, failure to find support for the model could be explained away on so many grounds that attempts at testing seem futile.
Operationality A final question relating to the model is “Can it be used?” I have already indicated that I believe the many interpretations and uncertainties associated with the model essentially preclude adequate testing, thus limiting potential research applications. While practitioners are likely to find the bulk of this book ponderous and “academic,” they may find the “hypotheses” presented in the final chapter to be useful. Indeed, they may simply skip the first nine chapters and turn there for the “bottom line.” It is in the final chapter that the material from the preceding chapters apparently comes together to provide concrete guidelines for practice. Again, while these are presented as hypotheses since they await adequate testing, they clearly have the flavor of prescriptions and practitioners are likely to treat them as such. Indeed, Janis’s familiar suggestions for overcoming groupthink tendencies are subsumed in just one of these hypotheses. The hypotheses (or prescriptions) are intuitively appealing and may have substantial merit. However, it is important to recognize that, while the constraints model serves as an organizing device, these hypotheses do not necessarily follow from the earlier chapters.
CONTRIBUTIONS
OF THE BOOK
It is clear that Jams has thought long and hard about his model; the discussion and extensive endnotes (totalling 77 pages of small print) suggest that Janis has tried to antici-
151
Book Reviews
pate virtually every permutation of every question which has been, or might be, raised about the model. Certainly, those who have not read Janis’s previous works can find succinct summaries here. Also, my criticisms of failures to adequately incorporate business examples and certain literatures should not be taken as a suggestion that Crucial Decisions should be avoided by management scholars. To the contrary, Janis provides rich excursions into complementary literatures, especially books relating to historical policy decisions. Finally, as noted above, practitioners may-appropriately, in my view-find the final chapter’s hypotheses to be useful as pr~c~ptions. While it is true that the hypotheses have not been fully tested, they are likely to offer the opportunity for improvement of current practice. In sum, this is an ambitious, provocative book, full of ideas and interesting tangents, but perhaps flawed by its reach. Janis has invested the coufidence, enthusiasm, and vision necessary to develop a grand model. These are attractive characteristics, and it could be argued that bold work, however blemished, is superior to timid and incremental efforts. It could further be argued that what I have characterized as hedges and inconsistent interpretations are in fact appropriate caveats, reservations, and recognitions of current uncertainties. Nevertheless, future development and testing of the constraints model would profit, in my opinion, from a less grudging recognition of the m~a~ment and decision making literatures. It would also benefit, I think, from greater reliauce on a broad range of research methodologies, focus on decision triumphs as well as fiascoes, and conscious attempts to find concrete examples in the settings to which it attempts to generalize. Finally, and critically in my opinion, bounds on the constraints model must be clarified, including specification of what could reasonably be taken as disproof. Without such specification, hypotheses are pointfess. REFERENCES Abelson,R. P. & A. Levi. (1985). Decision-making and decision theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), 7% handbook ofsocialpsychology (3d ed., vol. I). New York: Random House. Aldag, R. J. & S. F. Fuller. (1990). Beyond Orwell: A critical reappraisal of the ~oupt~~ phenomenon and a new model of group decision processes. Working paper, University of Wisconsin. Busse, T. V. & S. B. Gustafson. (1988). Creativity syndrome: Integration, application, and innovation. Psychological Bulletin 103, 2743. Carroll, G. R. (1984). Dynamics of publisher succession in newspaper organizations. Administrutive
Science Quarterly 29, 93-113.
Dutton, J. E. & S. E. Jackson. f 1987). Categorizing strategic issues: Links to org~zation~ action. Academy of ~un~gement Review 12,76-90. Einhorn, H. J. (1971). Use of nonlinear, noncompensatory models as a function of task and amount of information. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 6, l-27. Einhorn, H. J. (1980). Overconfidence in judgment. New directions for methodology of social and behavioral science 4, 1- 16. Guzzo, R. A., D. B. Wagner, E. Maguire, B. Herr, & C. Hawley. (1986). Implicit theories and the evaluation of group process and performance. ~ga~izationa~ Behavior and Human Performance 37,279-295.
Herek, G., I. L. Janis, & P. Huth. (1987). Decisionmaking during international crises: Is quality of process related to outcome? Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 1, 203-226.
LEADERSHIP
152
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
Hersey, P. & K. H. Blanchard. (1977). Management of organizational behavior (3d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hail. Hogarth, R. M. (1980). Judgment and choice. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Hogarth, R. M. (1981). Beyond discrete biases: Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics. Psychological Bulletin 90, 197-217. House, R. J. (1971). A path-goal theory of leader effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly 16,321-338.
House, R. J. & T. R. Mitchell. (1974). Path-goal theory of leadership. Journal of Contemporary Business 3, 81-98.
Jams, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Jams, I. L. & L. Mann. (1977). Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment. New York: Free Press. Lopes, L. L. (1987). The rhetoric of irrationality. Paper presented at a colloquium on mass comm~cation. Madison, WI, November. Lyles, M. A. & I. I. Mitroff. (1980). Organizational problem formulation: An empirical study. Administrative
Science Quarterly 25, 102-I 19.
McCauley, C. (1989). The nature of social influence in groupthink: Compliance and internalization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57,250-260. Nystrom, P. C. & W. H. Starbuck. (1984). To avoid organizational crises, unlearn. Organizational Dynamics
12(4), 5365.
Payne, J. W, (1976). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: An Behavior and Human information search and protocol analysis. Organizational Performance 16, 366-387.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing. Slavic, P. (1969). Analyzing the expert judge: A descriptive study of stockbrokers’ decision processes. Journal of Apphed PsychoZogy 53,255-263. Soelberg, P. ( 1966). Unpro~~med decision making. Papers and Proceedings of the 26th Annual Academy of Management
26,3-16.
Starbuck, W. H. (1983). Organizations as action generators. American Sociological Review 48, 91-102. Starbuck, W. H. & F. J. Milliken. (1988). Executives’ perceptual filters: What they notice and how they make sense. In D. Hambrick (Ed.), The executive effect: Concepts and methods for studying top munagers (pp. 35-65). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Valenzi, E.‘& I. R. Andrews. (1973). Individual differences in the decision process of employment interviewers. Journal of Applied Psychology 58,49-53. Vroom, V. H. & A. G. Jago. (1974). Decision making as a social process: Normative and descriptive models of leader behavior. Decision Sciences 5, 160-186. Vroom, V. H. & P. W. Yetton. (1973). Leadership and decision making. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Group Problem Solving: An Improved Managerial Approach, 1988, Atlanta: Georgia State University BusinessPress. 231 + xi pp., $29.95, cloth. by Harvey J. Brightman Reviewed by Sally Riggs Fullet. Uff;versi~y of ~~sco~s;~-~~~;~o~
Harvey J. Brightman’s Group Problem Solving does not challenge prevailing theoretical assumptions or present new empirical data, but rather attempts to synthesize the group
John M. Jermier, Editor University of South Florida
Crucial Decisions: leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, 1989, New York: The Free Press, 388 + xi pages, $27.95, cloth. by Irving 1. Janis Reviewed by Ramon J. Aldag, University
of Wisconsin-Madison
In Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, Irving Janis undertakes the daunting task of presenting the beginnings of an integrated, general theory of the conditions under which leaders are likely to use sound procedures to arrive at policy decisions. The product is much like Janis’s earlier work-laden with anecdotes, bold in scope, sweeping in claims for generalizability, and intuitively appealing in its implications for practitioners. Also as with his earlier writings, there is ample reason here to apply the sort of critical perspective which Janis has regularly espoused. Crucial Decisions is an exhaustive, and somewhat exhausting, presentation of a “constraints model of policymaking processes.” This constraints model subsumes, extends, and updates Janis’s earlier work, including the familiar groupthink model (Janis, 1972, 1982) and the conflict model (Janis & Mann, 1977). The book aims “to try to answer the following fundamental questions: When and why do leaders of large organizations make avoidable errors that result in faulty policy decisions? How can such errors be prevented or at least kept to a minimum?” (p. ix). This focus on error permeates the book.
STRUCTURE
OF THE BOOK
Crucial Decisions is comprised of ten chapters as well as very detailed endnotes. In the sole chapter in Part One, titled “Order Out of Theoretical Chaos?,” Janis attempts to make the case that effective leadership, and specifically the avoidance of errors in Leadership Quarterly, 2(2), 141-155. Copyright @ 1991 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 1048-9843
142
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
policymaking and crisis management, is critical to organizational success and survival. He argues that an appropriate integrated theory specifying the conditions under which leaders use sound procedures to arrive at policy decisions that are likely to have successful rather than damaging outcomes is not available. Finally, he introduces his attempt at the start of such a theory, termed the Constraints Model of Policymaking Processes. In Part Two, titled “Common Simplistic Strategies Evoked By Constraints,” Janis discusses how policymakers often deviate from normative models of problem solving, resorting to simplistic strategies relying on a few simple decision rules. Chapter 2 discusses cognitive decision rules which simplify tasks facing policymakers. These include a variety of familiar heuristics such as satisficing and availability as well as one additional heuristic which Janis calls the “nutshell briefing” rule. In Chapter 3, affiliative decision rules are considered. These are rules relating to the desire of policymakers “to maintain or enhance their power, compensation, and status within the organization and to continue to obtain social support from their personal network.“(p. 45) The nowfamiliar “groupthink” tendency is one such rule. Others include “avoid punishment,” and “rig meetings to suppress the “follow the party line, ” “exercise one-upmanship,” opposition.” Finally, Chapter 4 discusses self-serving and emotive rules which give priority to the leader’s personal motives or emotional needs rather than to the best interests of the organization. The self-serving rule is “what’s in it for me?” The emotive rules include “rely on gut feeling,” “retaliate!,” “can do!,” and “wow, grab it!” The conflict theory model of decisionmaking proposed by Janis and Mann (1977) is reviewed at this point. The chapter concludes with a discussion of disadvantages of simplistic approaches. Part Three is titled “Sound Policymaking Procedures.” In Chapter 5 Janis details the essential steps in an “uncommon strategy,” vigilant problem solving. This strategy, previously discussed by Janis and Mann (1977), involves attention to the steps of problem formulation, use of informational resources, analysis and reformulation, evaluation and selection, and so on-essentially, taking care not to slight stages of the problem-solving process. In this chapter, Janis also notes limitations of vigilant problem solving-even vigilant leaders may be subject to perceptual and cognitive errors, existing knowledge may be so incomplete that policymakers are unaware of faulty assumptions about an adversary’s threatening moves, and information inputs to decision makers may contain error. Chapter 6 addresses two of the basic assumptions of the preceding chapters: that the vigilant problem-solving strategy is in the repertoire of most policymakers and that the poorer the quality of the procedures used in arriving at a policy decision, the greater the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes of the decision. In regard to the first assumption, Janis simply argues that, while adequate empirical research is lacking, he does not believe in the extreme view that vigilance makes no difference. To provide support for the second assumption, Janis presents a summary of his previous research purporting to demonstrate that proper procedures yield desirable outcomes. Part Four, “A New Theoretical Framework,” presents discussions of the constraints model of policymaking processes (Chapter 7) and of values and limitations of that model (Chapter 8). Janis states regarding the constraints model that, rather just providing a few notions about policymaking, “if the theoretical framework I am attempting to
143
Book Reviews construct is as promising
as I think it is, I expect social science theory to attain a much more ambitious objective within the near future-a theoretical model that can account for most decisionmaking processes for most policymakers most of the time.” (p. 139) The constraints model begins with policymakers becoming aware of a challenge and asking if a problem is routine or unimportant. If the problem is seen as sufficiently important to warrant attention, cognitive, affiliative, and egocentric constraints may serve as hurdles. If any of these constraints is judged to require overriding priority, the search for a high-quality solution is inhibited and simple decision rules are employed, as discussed above. Only if the decision maker judges “consciously or preconsciously” that the problem is important and that the constraints don’t have to be given dominant consideration does the model’s pathway lead to the opportunity for vigilance. Here, “the policymaker is required to answer conscientiously a set of twelve additional questions” (p. 159) dealing with the problem solving process. Janis notes that intermediate “quasi-vigilant” and “quasi-simplistic” approaches may also be employed. Janis highlights “some major implications of Finally, in Part Five, “Implications,” the constraints model in order to illustrate its potential value as a preliminary theoretical framework for generating new hypotheses that appear to be worth pursuing.” (p. 203) In Chapter 9, Janis presents 17 hypotheses concerning individual differences which might play roles in determining whether particular leaders are good or poor policymakers. Finally, Chapter 10 presents an additional 20 hypotheses relating to effective leadership practices. The endnotes are extensive. Many are used to respond to criticisms of Janis’s earlier work.
SOURCES OF CONCERN As noted above, while the constraints model has roots stretching back two decades, Janis presents it here as representing the beginnings of an integrated, general model of sound leadership. Since this implies that the model will be further revised, careful attention to its assumptions, development, and application seems critical. In fact, while I see much to praise in Crucial Decisions, I feel that a number of points merit concern and consideration. Some are shared by Janis’s earlier work, including his groupthink writings. Sally Fuller and I recently conducted a comprehensive review of the groupthink literature. We discussed some of the following points in more detail in that context (Aldag & Fuller, 1990). We conclude that there is little valid empirical support for groupthink, that the groupthink model is incomplete and rests on many questionable assumptions, and that many writers and researchers on groupthink have been serving as-to use Janis’s term-mindguards. I restate these conclusions here to lay my biases on the table, and to signal that I will be serving as a devil’s advocate in the comments that follow. I hope the concerns raised will induce the sort of dissonance which Janis sees as necessary to vigilance. I will address eleven sets of issues. Importance of leadership Janis begins the book by building a case for the critical role of effective leadership. In fact, the book’s first quotation includes the statement that “Most of the organizations
144
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
my colleagues and I have studied did not survive their crises, but in every case of survival, the reorientations included wholesale replacements of the top managers, and we infer that survival requires this.” (Starbuck, 1983, p. 100) The selection of this quote in support of the importance of leadership is both ironic and telling; ironic since the quote is from William Starbuck, whose world view Janis subsequently explicitly rejects, and telling since it presages the selectivity and subjectivity which I believe characterizes reporting in the book. This early quote, like others that Janis provides in support of his arguments, ignores bodies of contradictory literature. The evidence linking executive succession to subsequent organizational outcomes is, at least, conflicting, with some studies showing no effect, or even negative effects, of succession (for instance, see Carroll, 1984). Also, while the “Great Man”view of leadership to which Janis apparently subscribes sees individual leaders as critical determinants of organizational outcomes, perspectives not cited emphasize the role of context, or even view succession as primarily a symbolic event. Further, Janis gives no clue here that Starbuck basically argues that if improved organizational performance follows executive succession, it is due more to unlearning than to the new leader’s skills; getting rid of a leader permits purging of misconceptions, outdated methods, and self-deceptions (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Starbuck, 1983). Thus, in Starbuck’s view, executive succession is often desirable simply because “Removing people is a quick, effective way of erasing memories.” (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984, p. 58). Relationship of Processto Outcomes As noted above, one of Janis’s basic assumptions is that an effective process is associated with desirable decision outcomes. Certainly, this is a widely held assumption which underlies many theories and associated prescriptions, and it is one which most readers would probably accept. Nevertheless, Janis devotes considerable attention to this issue, including all of Chapter 6, which essentially restates the Herek, Janis, & Huth (1987) Journal of Conflict Resolution study. However, what should be a comforting exercise serves instead as a reminder both of the difficulty of convincingly demonstrating a process-outcome linkage and of the problems of resorting to faith in the midst of critical analysis. In the Herek, Janis, and Huth (1987) research, quality of process was related to outcomes for 19 “major international crises.“Fifty-nine bibliographic sources were used, and coding schemes were developed for quality of the policymaking process. Outside experts who were “blind” to the research hypotheses rated the outcomes of the crises. It was concluded that there was “a strong relationship between quality of decisionmaking as manifested by number of symptoms of defective decisionmaking (rated by investigators) and unfavorable outcomes (based on average ratings of the outside experts).” (p. 127) While Janis discusses in considerable detail the strengths of this methodology-and it is certainly preferable to many alternative approaches-its flaw is that the original writers of the bibliographic sources were keenly aware of the outcomes of the decision situations they discussed. As such, they were not “blind.“There is strong evidence to suggest that when individuals have knowledge of a negative outcome, they infer a negative process (e.g., Guzzo, Wagner, Maguire, Herr, & Hawley, 1986). Starbuck and Milliken (1988) convincingly address this issue. Janis recognizes
145
Book Reviews
the possibility of such biasing, but argues that “Our principle safeguard here is our reliance on the standards of sound scholarship. We assume that highly competent historians and political scientists who meet those standards are less likely than others to distort facts to fit their expectations.” (p. 130) Unfortunately, this assumption cannot be supported; it seems inappropriate to argue that top-level policymakers are subject to many perceptual and other biases, but that “competent” scholars are not. In another discussion of the linkage of process to outcomes, Janis notes that some decision makers may perform poorly even when adopting the vigilant pattern, but that this would be due to unusual circumstances. He writes, “Of course, those decisionmakers who are extremely incompetent or suffering from psychological disorders may practically always do a poor job and make gross errors, irrespective of whether their coping pattern is vigilance or one of the nonvigilant patterns. Such persons, however, are rarely found among national policymakers or in top-level management positions. If stricken by acute depression or any other emotional disorder, an official is promptly removed from office.” (p. 78) This contention would be more convincing if it were not refuted by daily observation. A week’s front pages of the Wall Street Journal reveal cases of a CEO who mysteriously vanished, leaving questions about his credentials and motivations, at a time when the company announced a seven million dollar loss; the sentencing of an S&L executive to a five-year prison term for diverting funds to pay for a beach house and prostitutes; the development of instructional videotapes of prisoners, including former CEOs, discussing how they were able to commit repeated frauds; as well as numerous examples of more routine incompetence and malfeasance. In each case, these leaders were able to continue their behaviors undetected for years, were inflicting major harm on the firms they led, and were exposed only through chance, carelessness, or arrogance. In short, it cannot be assumed that incompetent or disturbed leaders will be “promptly removed from office,” nor does it follow that vigilance should lead to positive outcomes for all but rare leaders.
leader Ability and Flexibility Another assumption basic to the constraints model is that leaders can flexibly adopt vigilance or other styles. Janis writes, “This variability assumption is a basic postulate of my theory of policymaking.” (p. 114) Many theories of leadership, including pathgoal theory (House, 1971), situational leadership theory (Hersey & Blanchard, 1977), and the Vroom and Yetton normative model of leadership (Vroom 8z Yetton, 1973), make similar assumptions. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that leaders do not exhibit an appropriate range of behaviors (Vroom and Jago, 1974), and the issue of leader behavior flexibility has been generally ignored. Yet, in arguing for the importance of vigilance, Janis claims that virtually all leaders are capable of vigilance, can flexibly alternate between vigilance and less taxing strategies, and thus have the opportunity to improve their decision making. It is important to note that Janis does not provide evidence in support of this assumption. In my opinion, leader ability to adopt behaviors, styles, or strategies and to flexibly select from among them cannot and should not simply be assumed in this or any other model.
146
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
Generalizability As was the case in his previous works, Janis is clearly more comfortable presenting examples from foreign policy crises than from other settings. The reader will find here the now-familiar discussions of such fiascoes as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the appeasement of Hitler, the escalations of conflict in Korea and Vietnam, the failure to heed warnings regarding an attack on Pearl Harbor, and so on. In addition, there are myriad examples relating to such events as the ill-fated 1980 Iranian rescue mission, the Watergate cover-up, Ford’s pardon of Nixon, and Reagan’s waffling on issues. However, Janis’s excursions outside government policymaking settings are rare and strained. For instance, as in his previous writings, he cites the 1972 Buffalo Creek dam disaster as his example of groupthink in a business setting. In that disaster, top-level executives ignored warnings from engineers and insurance inspectors that heaping of slag to dam up Buffalo Creek could be disastrous. When, as the experts warned, the dam broke, more than 125 people were killed and the company was required to pay $26 million to survivors. Whether or not this disaster reflects groupthink, it is unfortunate that more recent and typical examples could not be presented. In only a few other cases does Janis cite business examples or quote businessmen (no businesswoman, or woman in any role, is discussed as a key decision maker in the book). This constrained focus is evidenced in the book’s references. As in his earlier works, Janis is either unaware of many relevant sources or considers them unworthy of attention. For example, of well over 300 references, none are from the Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Harvard Business Review, Sloan Management Review, California Management Review, Academy of Management Executive, Human Relations, Journal of Management, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Decision Sciences, or Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. A total of only ten references, with an average age of over a dozen years at the time of publication of Crucial Decisions, are from Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, American Sociological Review, Administration and Society, Journal of General Management, Personnel Management, Psychological Bulletin, or American Journal of Sociology. Perhaps because examples outside government policymaking settings are so rare, and because many bodies of literature are ignored, extrapolations to business and other non-governmental settings are tenuous and unconvincing. Further, while Janis consistently provides examples only of top-level policymakers, he regularly claims that his model is generalizable even to lower and middle levels of organizations. He states, for instance, that “the presence or absence of these symptoms can be used to judge the quality of decisionmaking not only of top-level policymakers but also of middle-level and lower-level administrators who are pursuing the goals of their own unit”(p. 95) and “the constraints model, as stated earlier, is directly applicable when lower- or middle-level personnel function as innovative leaders.. .” (p. 333). These assertions are simply not supported by the evidence Janis provides. Indeed, recall that Janis’s original question was “When and why do leaders of large organizations make avoidable errors that result in faulty policy decisions ?” This question indicates a focus on leaders of large organizations, not leaders in large organizations, or even leaders of small organizations. In fact, Crucial Decisions addresses critical decisions of male policymakers in top-level governmental policymaking positions.
147
Book Reviews
The Focus on Fiasco
As in his previous works, Janis focuses here on error, and in particular on dramatic fiascoes. The point of the constraints model, he states, is to prevent or reduce avoidable error. Unfortunately, this focus on error invites illusory correlation (Einhorn, 1980; Hogarth, 1980) since only the confluence of fiascoes with defects is considered. It may be the case that the “defects” found to be associated with fiascoes are also associated with high-quality decisions, or that vigilance is also associated with fiascoes. For instance, McCauley (1989) used content analysis to review Janis’s descriptions of historical cases and found surprisingly little difference between the numbers of hypothesized antecedents of groupthink evidenced in the groupthink and nongroupthink decisions. Further, as Lopes (1987) and others have argued, this focus on decision errors rather than on decision quality represents an important, and perhaps unfortunate, reframing. That is, instead of asking “how good are decisions?” and “how can decisions be improved?” questions are framed as “how bad are decisions?” and “how can errors be avoided?” The latter questions imply-incorrectly, in my view-that quality is simply the absence of error; they divert attention from decision creativity and, for better or worse, discourage risk taking. The Reliance on Anecdote
Janis relies heavily on anecdote and case studies. While he sometimes calls for use of a “full range of behavioral research methods” and alludes at points to lab or field experiments or survey research, he does so with apparent distaste. In referring to research on groupthink, for instance, Janis cites none of the survey or experimental studies of the phenomenon, referring only to case studies and anecdotal pieces. This not only constrains the literature Janis deems appropriate for consideration but also narrows his perspective and limits feasible research methodologies. For instance, Janis calls for comparison of “grand masters of policymaking” with others rated as mediocre or poor in order to learn about “plausible components that might form part of the masterful pattern.” (p. 109) Janis notes that such comparison will not be possible if grand masters cannot be found. However, with the sample sizes available in organizational settings, alternative designs, not requiring the search for grand masters and geniuses, could adequately address these issues. The Roles of Heuristics
The constraints model places heavy emphasis on the roles of heuristics, with a series of simplifying rules serving as barriers to vigilance. Janis essentially sees use of heuristics as potentially appropriate for simple, unimportant decisions but dangerous in other cases. He does not point out, though, that others see heuristic usage in a substantially more positive light. For instance, Hogarth (198 1) has argued that many heuristics may actually be beneficial in dynamic, complex, real-world environments, and that laboratory experiments cannot be confidently extrapolated to such settings. Further, while Janis recognizes that individuals may be unaware that they are using heuristics, he pays little attention to the question of whether awareness matters. As noted
148
LEADERSHIP
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
above, for instance, he says that policymakers may “consciously or preconsciously” decide whether or not constraints must be given dominant attention. However, policycapturing studies suggest that decision makers may be unaware of their heuristic usage (e.g., Slavic, 1969; Valenzi & Andrews, 1973). Janis does not consider how the constraints model addresses the consequences of clashes between conscious and “preconscious” decisions. It would seem that not only degree of heuristic usage but also veridical awareness of such usage may be important in determining decision outcomes. Finally on this point, it seems to me that some of the rules which Janis treats as constraints are not heuristics. For instance, the “rig meetings to suppress the opposition” rule would be seen by Pfeffer (1981) as a conscious political tactic rather than a “simplistic approach.“(Curiously, while Pfeffer (1981) is included in the references, that source is apparently nowhere cited in the book.) In my view, Janis confounds motivation or goal with approach simplicity. Calls for Additions to Research Agendas Janis regularly presents aspects of his model development in terms of calls for additions to the research agendas of social scientists. For instance, he sees his attention to individual differences of policymakers as important because “. . . personality research in the fields of political and organizational psychology seems to be in need of fresh and stimulating ideas” (p. 229) and he refers to personality research as having “fallen into the doldrums.” (p. 229) At other points he provides what he calls “suggestive leads to be put on the research agenda of social scientists who investigate policymaking processes” (p. 148) and suggests that research such as he proposes “would also provide an empirical basis for developing basic theory on the role of personality in organizational decisionmaking.” (p. 226) Such calls become annoying since Janis completely ignores much relevant social science literature. Despite obvious relevance, for example, there is no mention here of the literature on decision confirmation (Soelberg, 1966) or choice of decision mode (Einhorn, 1971; Payne, 1976). The omission of discussion of Pfeffer’s (1981) work on politics is glaring since Pfeffer’s discussion of political strategies and tactics is directly relevant to many issues Janis raises and since he has a drastically different view of the roles of experts and committees than does Janis. Further, as is consistent with the focus on decision quality as absence of error, creativity gets only passing mention, and most recent literature on the topic is ignored. This reluctance to broadly sample from other literatures is especially evident in Chapter 9, where Janis explores the roles of individual differences. Here, he considers a range of general and largely-dated sets of individual differences but fails to explicitly consider many variables which have been directly related to decision making, such as self-monitoring, dogmatism, Machiavellianism, cognitive complexity, and problem-solving style. Indeed, for a book with a central focus on decision processes, the decision literature is given remarkably little attention. Many references to this literature are drawn from the Abelson and Levi (1985) review. This is a fine work, but it is not meant as an alternative to consideration of primary sources. There is surprisingly little attention devoted to discussions of problem formulation (e.g., Lyles & Mitroff, 1980) or perception of environmental threat and opportunity (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987).
149
Book Reviews
Further, as noted above, the creativity literature (e.g., Busse & Gustafson, 1988) is directly relevant to effective alternative generation but is slighted. This constrained focus would be less troublesome if Janis were simply suggesting variables for consideration in his constraints model. In such a case, readers might say, “These aren’t a bad start, but other variables have been more thoroughly explored and should be incorporated.” However, as noted above, Janis’s goals are more ambitious. He presents the model as cutting-edge, and in my opinion it is not. Comprehensiveness
The groupthink model could be fruitfully expanded by further consideration of literature relating to variables such as norms, task characteristics, leader power, stage of group development, social control, and organizational politics (see Aldag & Fuller (1990) for specific examples). The constraints model is much broader in its aims but essentially rests on the same literature base as the groupthink and conflict models which it incorporates. A model which hopes to account “for most decisionmaking processes for most policymakers most of the time” demands a broader theoretical foundation. Suitability for Testing
In the first chapter of Crucial Decisions, Janis notes that “good” theory must “. . . account for prior empirical findings more adequately than any rival theory, make novel, nontrivial predictions that are testable, and suggest new prescriptions that are worth investigating.” (p. 24) He subsequently repeatedly calls for further development and testing of the constraints model. I think most readers of Crucial Decisions would agree that the book makes nontrivial predictions and suggests prescriptions that are worth investigating. However, an unsettling aspect of the model is that, like the conflict and groupthink models which it subsumes, it apparently cannot be empirically refuted. That is, Janis provides so many hedges concerning characteristics and interpretation of the model and limits on its applicability that any nonconfirming evidence could probably be discounted. For instance, Janis notes that “Each of these hypotheses should be understood as referring to leadership behavior that is authentic. None of the leadership practices can be expected to be effective in promoting vigilant problem solving if accompanied by cues indicating that the leader does not genuinely believe in what he or she is saying or doing.” (p. 235) Unfortunately, this rather casual disclaimer appears incongruous when it is recognized that the model is meant to guide managers in dealing with such constraints as self-serving biases. That is, it is difficult to understand how, or why, an individual who is trying to maximize personal welfare at the expense of organizational goals would be “authentic” in adopting a vigilant mode. Indeed, it would seem that such vigilance might be used to advance self interests. Further, of course, any failure to confirm the model could be attributed to the “inauthentic” behavior on the part of the leader rather than to weaknesses of the model. As another example of the difficulty in determining what might reasonably be accepted as refutation of the model, “strong” and “weak” versions of the Janis (1972, 1982) groupthink model have emerged (Aldag & Fuller, 1990). In the strong versions, groupthink is not considered to exist unless it is fully evidenced. In reviewing past research on groupthink, Janis has rejected as inappropriate those studies which don’t meet these
150
LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
stringent criteria. He writes here that “It does not suffice merely to see if a few of the eight telltale symptoms of groupthink are detected. Rather, it is necessary to see if practically all the symptoms were manifested and also to see if the antecedent conditions and the expected immediate consequences-the symptoms of defective decisionmakingare also present.” (p. 60) In weaker versions, which researchers have generally adopted, the degree to which these conditions are present is deemed relevant; more conditions should lead to poorer decisions. Strangely and confusingly, though, Janis sometimes also seems to espouse this “weak” version, writing that “The more of those conditions that are present, the higher the probability that reliance on the “preserve group harmony” rule will impair the quality of the group’s policymaking and give rise to serious errors that could be avoided.” (p. 61) It seems that in discussing the broader constraints model, Jams accepts this weak view. The problem here is that any disconfiing studies which do not meet the “strong” interpretation can be rejected as inappropriate tests while confirming evidence meeting the “weak” interpretation may be accepted. As another example of barriers to testing of the model, Janis argues that if a policy has bad consequences and it appears that vigilance was used, “the investigator would realize that he or she needs to consider a different sort of explanation that lies beyond the scope of the constraints model” (p. 169), such as incompetence, conspiracy, hidden agendas, uncorrected ideological preconceptions, misleading intelligence sources, or problem complexity. In short, if there is a bad outcome and vigilance has been employed, the model cannot be taken as refuted; it has simply been applied in a situation beyond its scope. Finally, Janis argues that the model will make predictions which are better than chance “but not highly accurate for any single case.” (p. 171) For this and the previouslynoted reasons, failure to find support for the model could be explained away on so many grounds that attempts at testing seem futile.
Operationality A final question relating to the model is “Can it be used?” I have already indicated that I believe the many interpretations and uncertainties associated with the model essentially preclude adequate testing, thus limiting potential research applications. While practitioners are likely to find the bulk of this book ponderous and “academic,” they may find the “hypotheses” presented in the final chapter to be useful. Indeed, they may simply skip the first nine chapters and turn there for the “bottom line.” It is in the final chapter that the material from the preceding chapters apparently comes together to provide concrete guidelines for practice. Again, while these are presented as hypotheses since they await adequate testing, they clearly have the flavor of prescriptions and practitioners are likely to treat them as such. Indeed, Janis’s familiar suggestions for overcoming groupthink tendencies are subsumed in just one of these hypotheses. The hypotheses (or prescriptions) are intuitively appealing and may have substantial merit. However, it is important to recognize that, while the constraints model serves as an organizing device, these hypotheses do not necessarily follow from the earlier chapters.
CONTRIBUTIONS
OF THE BOOK
It is clear that Jams has thought long and hard about his model; the discussion and extensive endnotes (totalling 77 pages of small print) suggest that Janis has tried to antici-
151
Book Reviews
pate virtually every permutation of every question which has been, or might be, raised about the model. Certainly, those who have not read Janis’s previous works can find succinct summaries here. Also, my criticisms of failures to adequately incorporate business examples and certain literatures should not be taken as a suggestion that Crucial Decisions should be avoided by management scholars. To the contrary, Janis provides rich excursions into complementary literatures, especially books relating to historical policy decisions. Finally, as noted above, practitioners may-appropriately, in my view-find the final chapter’s hypotheses to be useful as pr~c~ptions. While it is true that the hypotheses have not been fully tested, they are likely to offer the opportunity for improvement of current practice. In sum, this is an ambitious, provocative book, full of ideas and interesting tangents, but perhaps flawed by its reach. Janis has invested the coufidence, enthusiasm, and vision necessary to develop a grand model. These are attractive characteristics, and it could be argued that bold work, however blemished, is superior to timid and incremental efforts. It could further be argued that what I have characterized as hedges and inconsistent interpretations are in fact appropriate caveats, reservations, and recognitions of current uncertainties. Nevertheless, future development and testing of the constraints model would profit, in my opinion, from a less grudging recognition of the m~a~ment and decision making literatures. It would also benefit, I think, from greater reliauce on a broad range of research methodologies, focus on decision triumphs as well as fiascoes, and conscious attempts to find concrete examples in the settings to which it attempts to generalize. Finally, and critically in my opinion, bounds on the constraints model must be clarified, including specification of what could reasonably be taken as disproof. Without such specification, hypotheses are pointfess. REFERENCES Abelson,R. P. & A. Levi. (1985). Decision-making and decision theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), 7% handbook ofsocialpsychology (3d ed., vol. I). New York: Random House. Aldag, R. J. & S. F. Fuller. (1990). Beyond Orwell: A critical reappraisal of the ~oupt~~ phenomenon and a new model of group decision processes. Working paper, University of Wisconsin. Busse, T. V. & S. B. Gustafson. (1988). Creativity syndrome: Integration, application, and innovation. Psychological Bulletin 103, 2743. Carroll, G. R. (1984). Dynamics of publisher succession in newspaper organizations. Administrutive
Science Quarterly 29, 93-113.
Dutton, J. E. & S. E. Jackson. f 1987). Categorizing strategic issues: Links to org~zation~ action. Academy of ~un~gement Review 12,76-90. Einhorn, H. J. (1971). Use of nonlinear, noncompensatory models as a function of task and amount of information. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 6, l-27. Einhorn, H. J. (1980). Overconfidence in judgment. New directions for methodology of social and behavioral science 4, 1- 16. Guzzo, R. A., D. B. Wagner, E. Maguire, B. Herr, & C. Hawley. (1986). Implicit theories and the evaluation of group process and performance. ~ga~izationa~ Behavior and Human Performance 37,279-295.
Herek, G., I. L. Janis, & P. Huth. (1987). Decisionmaking during international crises: Is quality of process related to outcome? Journal of Conflict Resolution 3 1, 203-226.
LEADERSHIP
152
QUARTERLY
Vol. 2 No. 2 1991
Hersey, P. & K. H. Blanchard. (1977). Management of organizational behavior (3d ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hail. Hogarth, R. M. (1980). Judgment and choice. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Hogarth, R. M. (1981). Beyond discrete biases: Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics. Psychological Bulletin 90, 197-217. House, R. J. (1971). A path-goal theory of leader effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly 16,321-338.
House, R. J. & T. R. Mitchell. (1974). Path-goal theory of leadership. Journal of Contemporary Business 3, 81-98.
Jams, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Jams, I. L. & L. Mann. (1977). Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment. New York: Free Press. Lopes, L. L. (1987). The rhetoric of irrationality. Paper presented at a colloquium on mass comm~cation. Madison, WI, November. Lyles, M. A. & I. I. Mitroff. (1980). Organizational problem formulation: An empirical study. Administrative
Science Quarterly 25, 102-I 19.
McCauley, C. (1989). The nature of social influence in groupthink: Compliance and internalization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57,250-260. Nystrom, P. C. & W. H. Starbuck. (1984). To avoid organizational crises, unlearn. Organizational Dynamics
12(4), 5365.
Payne, J. W, (1976). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: An Behavior and Human information search and protocol analysis. Organizational Performance 16, 366-387.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman Publishing. Slavic, P. (1969). Analyzing the expert judge: A descriptive study of stockbrokers’ decision processes. Journal of Apphed PsychoZogy 53,255-263. Soelberg, P. ( 1966). Unpro~~med decision making. Papers and Proceedings of the 26th Annual Academy of Management
26,3-16.
Starbuck, W. H. (1983). Organizations as action generators. American Sociological Review 48, 91-102. Starbuck, W. H. & F. J. Milliken. (1988). Executives’ perceptual filters: What they notice and how they make sense. In D. Hambrick (Ed.), The executive effect: Concepts and methods for studying top munagers (pp. 35-65). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Valenzi, E.‘& I. R. Andrews. (1973). Individual differences in the decision process of employment interviewers. Journal of Applied Psychology 58,49-53. Vroom, V. H. & A. G. Jago. (1974). Decision making as a social process: Normative and descriptive models of leader behavior. Decision Sciences 5, 160-186. Vroom, V. H. & P. W. Yetton. (1973). Leadership and decision making. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Group Problem Solving: An Improved Managerial Approach, 1988, Atlanta: Georgia State University BusinessPress. 231 + xi pp., $29.95, cloth. by Harvey J. Brightman Reviewed by Sally Riggs Fullet. Uff;versi~y of ~~sco~s;~-~~~;~o~
Harvey J. Brightman’s Group Problem Solving does not challenge prevailing theoretical assumptions or present new empirical data, but rather attempts to synthesize the group