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Decision support for ship flooding crisis management
Ocean Engineering 38 (2011) 1568–1581
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Decision support for ship flooding crisis management Andrzej Jasionowski The Ship Stability Research Centre, Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Strathclyde, 100 Montrose Str., Glasgow G4 0LZ, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 17 August 2010 Accepted 5 June 2011 Editor-in-Chief: A.I. Incecik Available online 24 August 2011
Decision support systems for onboard use are many and varied. Primary role of such systems is to alleviate burden of processing of ship and environment data and ultimately to help crew in making informed decisions. Effectiveness of such processing could not be more important than during crises situations. This article presents with a prototype of an ergonomic decision support function for provision of advisory to the crew for enhancing their instantaneous preparedness for response to a distressed flooding situation. It is argued that inculcation of crew preparedness is the most effective tool for avoiding and managing flooding crises, should they occur. & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Crises management Emergency response Decision support Stability Vulnerability Flooding
1. Introduction Technological advances in computing hardware over the last decades have facilitated solution of many problems in ever decreasing amount of time. However, the progress in technical calculus, involving modelling based on the fundamental physical laws, has been just as significant, and despite the availability of ever grater processing power, many cases of numerical approximations to reality remain impractical to compute. It is for this reason that advanced prognosis have only had limited success in proliferating the field of instantaneous decision support. Although highly advanced computerised safety management systems (SMS), have found accelerated support, their advisory functionality are mostly limited to detection only, with more sophisticated prognosis and advisory capabilities remaining at prototyping and development stages. Such prototype simulation approaches available for use in prognosis comprise a range of phenomena such as (a) ship response to flooding progression, modelled through various but direct solution to conservation of momentum laws, (Letizia et al., 1995; Letizia, 1997; Papanikolaou et al., 2000; Schreuder, 2008; de Kat Jan and Peters Andrew, 2002; Jasionowski, 2001; Petey, 1988), or through quasi-static iterative approximations, (Varela Jose and Soares, 2007), or (Ruponen et al., 2006), (b) structural stress evolution under flooding, (Bole, 2007), (c) mustering pro˜ eiro et al., 2005), (d) fire and smoke cess, (Vassalos et al., 2001; Pin spread, (Guarin et al., 2004), and possibly many others.
Some of the reasons inhibiting their more wide use for decision support arise due to a series of practical problems in addition to sheer computational effort, such as the following:
Each of these processes may vary at any instant of time due to changing conditions.
The input is subject to considerable uncertainty. For any set of input information the outcome is random due to
computational and modelling uncertainties as well as due to random nature of environmental or process conditions themselves. Each may be seriously influenced by decision choices.
The nature as well as inseparable combination of these engineering challenges imply that the projection functionality would need to be iterated for a range of uncertain conditions of either of the scenarios occurring as well as for a range of decision options, so that the best choice can be identified with controllable degree of confidence. This, in turn, implies that the computational task of scenario projection in real time in support of decision making will likely remain a serious challenge, as most of these analyses require substantial amount of processing time, at present accounted in hours. This is in contrast to real-life cases of casualty scenarios, which in many occasions evolve in a matter of minutes, during which decisions could prove critical. The following recent casualties can be viewed to elaborate the issue. 1.1. MV Estonia, 1994, 852 fatalities
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852 human lives were lost when the passenger Ro-Ro ferry MV Estonia sank on the night of 27/28th of September 1994 in the
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List Development
80 60 Phase 1 Initial heeling
20 0 00:45
00:50
00:55
Ship Lost from the Utö Radar
100
40
Distress Stop
Phase 2 Floating on side Häire WT-Doors, Mr. Skylight
List [deg]
120
Phase 4 Sinking by stern
Ship's Clock Stops
140
Distress Start
160
Var. Observations JAIC P4 P49 P92 C33 C36 C38 C45
ME:s Fail
180
Phase 4 Sinking by stern
Phase 3 Capsizing
01:00
01:05
01:10
01:15 01:20 01:25 Time Reference Ship Time CET+01:00
01:30
01:35
01:40
01:45
01:50
Fig. 1. MV Estonia, statements by survivors on the heel angle experienced during abandonment, (Bergholtz et al., 2008).
Fig. 2. MV Estonia, (Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2008). At some instant two survivors managed to climb down the closed ramp, using its stiffening arrangement and abandon the ship. Heel angle 931.
Baltic Sea, while on route between Tallinn, Estonia, and Stockholm, Sweden, (Bergholtz et al., 2008; Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2008). The notable observation is that most of the 137 survivors are those that reacted fast, within the first approximate 10–20 min into the casualty (Figs. 1 and 2). Perhaps if crew were aware of what ‘‘to expect’’ they could have reacted quicker to casualty or averted it in the first place.
1.2. Monarch of the Seas, 1998, no fatalities According to the accident reported by Paulsrud and Timothy (2003), ‘‘at about 01:30 h, y, the Monarch of the Seas raked the Proselyte Reef at an approximate speed of 12 knots without becoming permanently stranded’’. Subsequently, ‘‘at 01:35 h and owing to the water ingress, all watertight doors were closed from
Fig. 3. Monarch of the Seas, actual casualty in 1998 and flooding extent, (Paulsrud and Timothy, 2003).
the bridge y’’ and ‘‘at 01:47 h the general emergency signal, seven short and one long blast, was given y’’. See Fig. 3. It appears that it took the crew 5 min to decide about closure of watertight doors (WTD), and 17 min to inform the persons onboard of the casualty. Whilst this accident resulted in no fatalities, it should be clear that this time might as well not have been available, was the damage more severe. Decisions before as well as during every minute of the accident could have proven far more critical to this accident. A decision support system might
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have informed the crew if the situation is critical or not, and in this particular scenario it would have need to have been shown as moderate or perhaps not critical, after the watertight doors closure. Of note is the fact that even though importance of WTD closure is identified in the report on this accident as critical, none of the ultimately recommended 20 safety actions, nor the pointed 20 lessons to be learned, mentioned issue of ship watertight integrity explicitly, highlighting only importance of SMS (Safety Management System) procedures.
1.3. Rockness, 2004, 18 fatalities On the 19 of January 2004 the Antigua & Barbuda flagged cargo vessel MV ‘Rocknes’ capsized within a number of minutes in a strait south of Bergen, Norway, resulting in 18 fatalities, see Fig. 4. At the time, the ship was loaded with ground rock-like cargo (stones, gravel) that were to be delivered in Emden, Germany. The crew had perhaps 2–3 min into the casualty, for making their minds up on what, or if, any action was to be taken, as the
rate of ship capsize due to flooding was very high (Jasionowski and Khattab, 2005), see Fig. 5. Perhaps all these lives could have been saved if the crew was informed at all times of the vulnerability of the vessel to any flooding extent that was feasible, allowing them to react instantly at the first sign of distress. It can be seen that any projections for supporting decisions for crises management in either of these different ship flooding scenarios would need to have been made virtually within first vital minutes from the very instant of loss of watertight integrity. Indeed, it could be argued, that even more effective would have been for the crew to know beforehand the crises occurring, as to how to react to the arising situation. This is the principle, in the search of which the VLog functionality has been developed as a possible ergonomic solution for sustaining the crew’s preparedness for response to a crises situation, as described next.
2. Vulnerability Log (VLog) Vulnerability Log, or VLog for short, is hereby proposed to be the functionality to inform the crew at all times on the instantaneous vulnerability to flooding of the vessel, considering its actual loading conditions, the environmental conditions and the actual watertight integrity architecture. The vulnerability is proposed to be measured in terms of the probability that a vessel might capsize within given time when subject to any feasible flooding scenario. Since until a casualty occurs it is impossible to anticipate any specifics of a flooding case a ship might suffer and therefore let
Table 1 MV Estonia, ship particulars.
Fig. 4. MV Rocknes, actual casualty in 2004, (Jasionowski and Khattab, 2005).
Lbp B Displacement Draught mean Trim GM KG
137.4 m 24.2 m 11,930 m3 5.39 m 0.435 m aft 1.17 m 10.62 m
Fig. 5. MV Rocknes, numerical reconstruction when heeling to 421 during capsize process. The vessel capsizes in 2 min. Visible in a light blue colour are the intact ship free surface tank loads as well as compartments flooded due to damage, (Jasionowski and Khattab, 2005). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 6. GA of MV Estonia assumed for numerical modelling.
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1.1 0.9 0.7
GZ[m]
0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.1
0
5
10
15
20
-0.3
25
30
35
Intact DS/P11.1.0
-0.5
DS/P11.1.0, door "240" opened
Heel Angle [deg] Fig. 7. MV Estonia, flooding case no. 36, all doors closed, hydrostatic properties.
Fig. 8. Probability for capsize within time tc. Case no. 36 with all doors closed. Effect of significant wave height.
Fig. 9. Probability for capsize within time tc. Case no. 36 with all doors closed. Effect of assumed time to capsize.
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Table 2 MV Estonia, flooding case j¼ 36, sample calculations. Doors
All closed
#240 opened
GZmax Range (deg.) Hscrit,j (m) sr ðHscrit,j Þ Hs (m) FðnÞ FT9n ðtc ¼ 30 min9Hs,jÞ
0.107656 m 9.576027 2.148 0.133 0 0 0
0m 0 0 0.049 0 0.5 0.5
2.148 0.5 0.5
4 1.0 1.0
2.148 1.0 1.0
4 1.0 1.0
Fig. 10. Ergonomic communication interface, model of MV Estonia, screenshot of watertight doors (WTD) closure status, green indicates ‘‘closed’’, red ‘‘opened’’. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
the crew prepare for it, it seems plausible that instead the crew is made aware of the range of such flooding specifics together with projected impact these can have on the ship state. The crew would be able to infer the criticality of the situation evolving immediately, based on their own awareness, and hence decide instinctively of the best possible actions to follow. Ship vulnerability to flooding will naturally vary significantly from a flooding case to a flooding case, and subject to what condition the vessel operates at, at which environment and what is the watertight integrity status. All these must, therefore, be considered. The flooding scenario considered in this article pertains to a flooding resulting from a ship-to-ship collision event, and the vulnerability will be expressed as a probability of a capsize subject to specific events of loading W¼w, flooding extent D ¼d, environment E ¼e and capsize within time of T¼tc. The probability mass for such an event can be assigned as follows: pW&D&E&T ðw \ d \ e \ tc Þ
ð1Þ
The event w \ d \ e \ tc , can also be referred to as a ‘‘compound event’’ or a flooding ‘‘scenario’’, and is regarded as unconditional,1 although it would be more appropriate to consider pW&D&E&TjU ðw \ d \ e \ tc 9floodingÞ or in fact pW&D&E&T9U ðw \ d \ e \ tc 9collision \floodingÞ, however for convenience the conditional notation of collision \ flooding is omitted. Considering now that the events of loading and flooding extent can be considered independent, as well as applying the chain rule of probability calculus (Baye’s theorem), allows for expressing probability (1) as follows: pW&D&E&T ðw \ d \ e \ tc Þ ¼ pW ðwÞpD ðdÞpE9Dn ðeÞpT9W&D&E ðtc 9w \ d \ eÞ pW pD pE9Dn pT9W&D&E
ð2Þ
1 ‘‘unconditional’’ is implied unconditional on any of the four events of loading W, flooding, D, environment, E, or time to capsize, T, with that the only underlying condition being the occurrence of a collision with hull breach event and ensuing flooding.
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Note that pEjDn is a probability mass distribution for the environment encountered during a collision, and hence should be viewed as probability of event conditional on the collision event occurring, however, for the reasons of practical availability of data, it is not conditional on any specifics of the collision damage. The mass function of unconditional1 probability that a joint event of specific loading condition W¼w, environment E¼e as well as the capsize within time of T¼tc occurs can be obtained by marginalisation, as follows: X pW&E&T ðw \ e \ tc Þ ¼ pW&D&E&T ðw \ d \ e \ tc Þ O\ðW&E&TÞ
¼ pW pE9Dn
X
pD pT9W&D&E
ð3Þ
collision \ flooding, and the specific extent of which can be described as number j out of all feasible flooding extents for the ship at given watertight architecture arrangement. The probability for the extent of flooding, pD , can consequently be denoted as pj. Furthermore, let the probability mass pT jW&E be denoted as FT ðtc 9HsÞ, and assign cumulative probability for capsize within time tc, given specific environment condition Hs, loading W¼w, and the vessel suffered any of the many feasible flooding extents as a result of a collision and ensuing flooding. Given the above presented theoretical model and the subsequent numerical notations, the following framework, given by Eqs. (5) and (6), is hereby proposed as an instrument to provide with the vulnerability functionality, whereby VLog refers to FT logged continuously in real ship-operation time.
D
where O ¼ fW,D,E,Tg. Deriving from this, the mass function of conditional probability that an event of capsize within time T ¼ tc occurs, given specific loading W¼w and environment E¼e occurred can be assigned as follows: pT9W&E ðtc 9w \ eÞ ¼
pW&E&T ðw \ e \ tc Þ X ¼ pD pT9W&D&E pW ðwÞpE9Dn ðeÞ D
FT ðtc 9HsÞ ¼
X
pj FT9n ðtc 9Hs,jÞ
ð5Þ
j
where tc =t0 HsHcrit,j FT9n ðtc 9Hs,jÞ ¼ 1 1F
s
ð6Þ
ð4Þ
For ease of numerical notation, let the probability mass pT jW&D&E be denoted as FT9n ðtc 9Hs,jÞ, assigning probability (cumulative) distribution for capsize within time tc, given the environment attained significant wave height Hs, the loading conditions were W¼ w, and the vessel suffered a collision leading to flooding,
Hscrit,j ¼ 4
GZmax,j Rangej 0:12 16
sðHscrit,j Þ ¼ 0:039Hscrit,j þ 0:049
ð7Þ ð8Þ
And, furthermore, where
Fig. 11. Vulnerability information, screenshot of the colour-coded values of FT9n ð3 h9Hs ¼ 0m,jÞ for each of the j ¼ 1. . .1368 flooding cases, each represented by a ‘‘diamond’’, as well as FT ð3 h90mÞ ¼ 17:38% of ship overall vulnerability, all logged down at 15:40:06 h (example time marked by the yellow square at 15 h 40 min 06 s). For overlapping ‘‘diamonds’’ (e.g. multiple penetration or vertical extent for the same length of flooding case), the worst cases are shown. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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FT is, again, cumulative probability distribution for occurrence of ship capsize within time t, conditional on event of a sea state of Hs occurring and subject to any feasible flooding scenario. FT jn is cumulative probability distribution for occurrence of capsize within time t, conditional on events of a sea state of Hs and a specific flooding scenario j occurring. tc is time, minutes. t0 ¼ 30 min is benchmark physical testing time. Hs is significant wave height, metres. j is ship flooding scenario considered. pj is probability mass of flooding scenario j occurring, according to MSC 84, 2006, with theoretical details available at Paw"owski (2004, 2005). FðzÞ is cumulative standard normal probability distribution function. Hcrit,j is 50th percentile significant wave height in which a ship subjected to flooding scenario j might capsize. GZmax , Range is maximum restoring lever and range of positive restoring moment for a ship subjected to flooding scenario j, metres and degrees, respectively. Note that both probabilities FT and FT jn are assigned for events of capsize conditional on all other implicitly considered events, such as sea state, loading condition, and instantaneous watertight architecture arrangement occurrences. Considering a special case of loading conditions, say corresponding exactly to the deepest subdivision draught DS as it is
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used in calculations for SOALS CH II, the following can be observed: Z 1 sj ¼ dHsfHs9coll ðHsÞð1FT9n ðtc ¼ 30 min9Hs,jÞÞ ð9Þ 0
which is the marginal probability of ship surviving in any sea states Hs expected in a collision accidents, also known as ‘‘s’’ factor of MSC82/24, with fHs9coll ðHsÞ representing probability density distribution for such sea states. With so assigned probability sj , and accounting for other phenomena, as regulatory instruments MSC82/24 stipulates, one can relate Eq. (5) to the well known probabilistic subdivision index ADS ,which is calculated as X pj sj ð10Þ ADS ¼ j
More details on theory of models (5), (6) and (8) can be found in Jasionowski et al. (2006a, 2007), whereas on model (7) in Tagg and Tuzcu (2002). The next paragraph aims to demonstrate and then explain how the VLog functionality would work in practise, including giving practical interpretations of FT as well as FT jn .
3. Sensitivity study A case of MV Estonia is hereby used to demonstrate the VLog functionality. Loading condition at the time of the loss of the vessel in 1994 were used, see Table 1 and Fig. 6.
Fig. 12. Screenshot of the colour-coded values of FT9n ð3 h9Hs ¼ 4m,jÞ for each of the flooding cases, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 37:18% (purple window), logged down at 15:41:09 h (example time marked by the yellow square at 15 h 41 min 09 s). The green coloured ‘‘diamonds’’ indicate FT9n ¼ 0%, and red FT9n ¼ 100%. GZ curve and draught marks shown for the ship in intact condition. Sea state Hs manual input shown in the left lower corner. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Let some characteristics of the kernel function (6) be examined first. For this reason a flooding case no. 36 out of total 1368 flooding cases considered, and no. 36 with adjacent watertight door opened, are used, as shown in Figs. 7–9 and Table 2. As can be seen the probability assigned to the event of capsize varies significantly from a flooding case to flooding case, as well as due to the environment conditions. The lesser the stability, or the higher the sea state, the more likely it is that a ship will capsize within given period of time. Note also that the longer a period of time one wishes to infer on the fate of the ship, the more likely it is that capsize will occur, as one would expect. Perhaps worth of note is assigning of FT9n ðtc ¼ 30 min9Hs ¼ 0 m,j ¼ 36Þ ¼ 0:5 for a case of adjacent watertight door left opened, where the ship has no stability whatsoever. Although it is expected that capsize would be imminent, that is the probability should be 1.0, the approach is consistent with the assumptions of critical sea state underlying model (7), that is likelihood of capsize within benchtesting time of 30 min is 0.5. This small detail is subject of ongoing investigation, however, given that sea state is hardly ever 0 m, it seems to bear little practical significance. Next, the following series of figures, Figs. 10–18, are presented to allow for thorough interpretation of the VLog functionality. Before expanding discussions of the VLog functionality for decision support, the following further set of real-life sample of results gathered on an undisclosed ship is presented to demonstrate the significance of the VLog for daily use. As can be seen, the crew awareness of vulnerability at any one time can lead to its substantial and material reduction.
4. Discussions The first element worth mentioning is the interpretation of ‘‘vulnerability’’. As mentioned earlier, ship vulnerability to flooding is proposed to be measured by means of the probability that an event of ship capsizing within given period of time occurs, subject to status assumptions. For a flooding scenario resulting to final floating attitude, it is expected that ship’s residual stability will be sufficient to sustain its functional attitude for a level of environmental excitation. The relationship between residual stability and the environment has been derived in project HARDER, as reported in Tagg and Tuzcu (2002), and as given here by Eq. (7). It has subsequently been shown in the project SAFEDOR, (Jasionowski et al., 2006a, 2007; Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2006b), that this relationship can be used to describe stochastic nature of ship capsize for any given environment, and that it can be marginalised for all feasible flooding scenarios. Thus, for an example of a specific flooding case j, a vulnerability of FT9n ð3 h9Hs ¼ 2 m,jÞ ¼ 40% recorded in a given instant of time, implies probability of 40% that a ship may capsize in 3 h, when subject to specific environmental conditions of Hs¼2 m. In other words, applying ‘‘frequentist’’ interpretation of probability, should the vessel suffer 10 accidents involving exactly flooding extent j, and each time at sea state of Hs¼2 m, it would be expected to observe 4 capsizes within less than 3 h, or between 0 and 8 capsizes, when accommodating for sampling uncertainty. This vulnerability can be derived for any feasible flooding extent for given ship design, and it can be conveyed to the crew in an
Fig. 13. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 15:40:06, see Fig. 11. Ship vulnerability FT ð3 h90 mÞ ¼ 17:38%. Note that draught marks correspond to ship condition of the most recent log at 15:41:16. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 14. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 15:45:09, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h90 mÞ ¼ 27:61%. Note the three watertight doors, #216, #217 and #218, on the tank deck opened with the ensuing impact on the flooding extent. Note again Hs ¼0 m. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 15. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 16:15:28, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 44:93%. Note Hs ¼ 4 m. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 16. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 19:00:30, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 68:24%. Note Hs¼ 4 m and many WTD opened. Very likely state of the vessel on the night of the ship loss in September 1994. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
ergonomic manner by means of colour coding, see the colourful ‘‘diamonds’’ in either of Figs. 11 or 16. Furthermore, the vulnerability can be ‘‘averaged’’ for all flooding cases with ‘‘weights’’ corresponding to likelihood of any flooding extent occurring, in the marginalisation process. Thus, an example of an overall vulnerability of FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 70%, indicates probability of 70% that a ship may capsize in 3 h, when subjected to specific environmental conditions of Hs ¼4 m and for any among the many feasible flooding extents a ship might suffer. In other words, should the vessel suffer 10 accidents involving any flooding extent, and each time at sea state of Hs ¼4 m, it would be expected to observe 7 capsizes within less than 3 h, or between 3 and 10 capsizes, when accounting for sampling uncertainty. This ‘‘overall’’ vulnerability can be derived periodically for given ship conditions and conveyed to the crew in an ergonomic manner as a time-log, see Fig. 17. It can be noted in Fig. 17 the ‘‘enormity’’ of the extent to which operation can have on the ship’s instantaneous vulnerability, that is its ability to sustain stable attitude when subject to loss of watertight integrity. The vulnerability can increase from some 18% to nearly 70%, for the sample study cases used. The various conditions leading to this dramatic variation can again be found in Figs. 11–16. The impact of each of the watertight doors considered in separation, can be seen in Fig. 18, which seems to be a powerful method that can be used during design stage, to guide distribution of watertight architecture in the vessel in the first place. The variation in time reflects changes to ship loading conditions, environment conditions Hs, as well as watertight integrity through opening of watertight doors. The very process of logging in time of quantified and meaningful measure of vulnerability allows for auditing of the ‘‘goodness’’ of the
operation. Such information, easily inferable from typical onboard computer display, allows for development and sustaining of understanding on what to expect, should flooding casualty occur. The actual field-testing has demonstrated the merit of VLog functionality, as shown in the records in Figs. 19 and 20. For instance, given the vulnerability of MV Estonia on the night of the loss as shown in Fig. 16, it can easily be seen that the vessel is extremely likely to capsize due to flooding. The fact that specific type of flooding which is thought to have happened on the night of the casualty is not taken into account in cases used in Fig. 16 is immaterial. The crew would not know what was happening exactly, but given projections as shown in Fig. 16 with vulnerability of 70%, it would be instantly obvious that immediate action is required at the first sign of problems. More importantly, the crew might have taken greater vigil, were they aware of how vulnerable their ship can be, and how this can be managed through their own actions.
5. Further work It appears that the framework for vulnerability assessment given above by models (5) and (6) can serve as a very informative model for use in the context of decision making. It reflects fundamentals of physical processes governing ship stability in waves and explicitly acknowledges uncertainty of such predictions by exploiting probability theory. Therefore, further research efforts should be expanded to establish and verify practicalities of the principles of the proposed functionality, as well as to assess impact of all engineering approximations that are used in application of the proposed
A. Jasionowski / Ocean Engineering 38 (2011) 1568–1581
Fig. 17. Sample of 8 h vulnerability log (VLog).
Fig. 18. Impact of single doors opening on overall ship vulnerability.
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Percentage of time operated at [%] vulnerability or less
90%
median
median
100%
Week7 Week6 Week5 Week4 Week3 Week2 Week1
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Vulnerabiliy [%]
Median Vulnerability [%]
Fig. 19. Distribution of vulnerability logged on a demonstration ship. The actual vulnerability values are undisclosed. The impact of the awareness of the crew on the day-to-day management of watertight integrity, and hence crew and ship preparedness, can be seen in the week 7, when explanation and training on use of VLog had been given.
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Week 5
Week 6
Week 7
Fig. 20. Median of vulnerability logged on a demonstration ship. The actual vulnerability values are undisclosed. The impact of the awareness of the crew on the day-today management of watertight integrity, and hence crew and ship preparedness, can be seen in the week 7, when explanations and training on use of VLog had been given.
model. Many such aspects should be considered, with key focus on uncertainty in the widest sense, pertaining to its both aleatory as well as epistemic types. Example impact of treatment of actual tank loads in assessing stability, effects of damage character, relative importance of transient flooding stages, accuracy of physical experimentation used as basis data, or simple elements such as effect of computational speed on functionality of the whole proposition, or ergonomics of the conveying techniques used. The prime objective is to find solution acceptable for wider industrial application.
provision of ergonomic information to the crew on the instantaneous ship vulnerability to flooding. Such information allows the crew to have notion at all times on ships capacity to cope with any feasible flooding scenario, and thus allows for making informed and instant decisions on how to respond with mitigating actions at the first sign of distress. Most importantly, the crew can take precautionary actions at any time of the ship operation to knowingly reduce vulnerability to the lowest levels possible for a particular ship design. Therefore, crew preparedness for response to distressed situation can be promoted at all times.
6. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
This article outlined a concept of an active life-cycle decision support and crises management principle. The key feature is
This research has been supported directly by EC FLAGSHIP (TIP5CT-2006-031406) and EC FLOODSTAND (SCP7-GA-2009–218532).
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The financial support of the EC, as well as cooperative efforts among the consortium members are hereby gratefully acknowledged. Many colleagues that have contributed with advice, expertise, research, development or analysis efforts in these ongoing projects are, in no particular order, Anthony York, Luis Guarin, Jonathan Logan, Jerzy Prigara, and Piotr Do"ebski from Safety At Sea Ltd and Phil York, Jakub Cichowicz, Sara Locke, Qi Chen, Yasmine Hifi, Dracos Vassalos, Sandy Day, and Andrew Pennycott from the Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Strathclyde, whose varied valuable contributions are all hereby acknowledged. References Bergholtz, J., Rutgersson, O., Schreuder, M., 2008. WP2.1 Review of Evidence Report No. 2 Conceivable Course of Events. Technical Report. Department of Shipping and Marine Technology, Chalmers, March 2008. Bole, Marcus, 2007. Introducing Damage Structural Assessment to Onboard Decision Support Tools. Graphics Research Corporation Ltd., UK. de Kat Jan, O., Peters Andrew, J., 2002. Model Experiments and Simulations of a Damaged Frigate, IMAM Congress, Crete, No. 129, May 2002. Guarin, Luis, Majumder, Jayanta, Shigunov, Vladimir, Vassalos, Guro, Vassalos, Dracos, 2004. Fire and flooding risk assessment in ship design for ease of evacuation. In: Proceedings of the Conference on Design for Safety, Osaka. Jasionowski, A., 2001. An Integrated Approach to Damage Ship Survivability Assessment. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Strathclyde. Jasionowski, A., Khattab, O., 2005. Time Domain Simulation of the Dynamics of Progressive Flooding and Capsizing MV Rockness, TQRN01-RE-001-AJ, 12 September 2005. Jasionowski, A., Bulian, G., Vassalos, D., Francescutto, A., Paw"owski, M., Maccari, A., 2006a. Modelling Survivability, ECSAFEDOR, D2.1.3., November 2006. Jasionowski, Andrzej, Vassalos, Dracos, 2006b. Conceptualising risk. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, Rio de Janeiro, September 2006. Jasionowski, Andrzej, Vassalos, Dracos, Scott, Andrew, 2007. Ship vulnerability to flooding. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Maritime Conference on Design for Safety, Berkeley California, September 26th, 28th 2007. Jasionowski, A., Vassalos, D., 2008. Technical Summary of the Investigation on the Sinking Sequence of MV Estonia. Safety at Sea Report no. VIES01-RE-005-AJ, May 2008.
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Letizia, L., Vassalos, D., 1995. Formulation of a non-linear mathematical model for a damaged ship with progressive flooding. In: Proceedings of the International Symposium on Ship Safety in a Seaway, Kaliningrad, Russia, May 1995. Letizia, L., 1997. Damage Survivability of Passenger Ro-Ro Vessels Subjected to Progressive Flooding in a Random Sea. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Strathclyde. Papanikolaou, A., Zaraphonitis, G., Spanos, D., Boulougouris, V., Eliopoulou, E., 2000. Investigation into the capsizing of damaged Ro-Ro passenger ships in waves. In: Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles STAB2000, Australia, Tasmania. Paulsrud, Finn, Farley J., Timothy, 2003. Norwegian/US Coast Guard. Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Grounding of the Monarch of The Seas on Proselyte Reef in Great Bay, Philipsburg, St Maarten, Netherlands Antilles on December 15 1998, Resulting in Major Vessel Damage, No Loss of Life and Minor Pollution, 10 April 2003. Paw"owski, M., 2004. Subdivision and damage stability of ships. Euro-MTEC Book Series. Foundation for the Promotion of Maritime Industry, Gdansk, ISBN 83-919488-6-2. Paw"owski, M., 2005. Probability of flooding a compartment (the pi factor)—a critique and a proposal. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part M: Journal of Engineering for the Maritime Environment 219, 185–201. Petey, F., 1988. Ermittlung der kentersicherheit lecker schiffe im seegang. Schiffstechnik 35, 155–172. ˜ eiro, A.Lopez, Perez Arribas, F., Donoso, R., Torres, R., 2005. Simulation of Pin passengers movement on ship emergencies: tools for IMO regulations fulfillment. Journal of Maritime Research 2 (1), 105–125. Ruponen, Pekka, Sundell, Tom, Larmela, Markku, 2006. Validation of a simulation method for progressive flooding. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles. Schreuder, M., 2008. Numerical Simulations of Foundering Scenarios, Research Study of the Sinking Sequence of M/V ESTONIA. Research Report no. 134. SSPA, ¨ Goteborg, Sweden. Tagg, R., Tuzcu, C., 2002. A performance-based assessment of the survival of damaged ships—final outcome of the EU research project HARDER. In: Proceedings of the 6th International Ship Stability Workshop, Webb Institute. Varela Jose, M., Soares, G.Guedes, 2007. A Virtual Environment for Decision Support in Ship Damage control. IEEE Computer Society (August). Vassalos, Dracos, Hyunseok, Kim, Guro, Christiansen, Jayanta, Majumder, 2001. A mesoscopic model for passenger evacuation in a virtual ship-sea environment and performance-based evaluation. Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics, Duisburg, April 4–6 2001.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Ocean Engineering journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/oceaneng
Decision support for ship flooding crisis management Andrzej Jasionowski The Ship Stability Research Centre, Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Strathclyde, 100 Montrose Str., Glasgow G4 0LZ, United Kingdom
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 17 August 2010 Accepted 5 June 2011 Editor-in-Chief: A.I. Incecik Available online 24 August 2011
Decision support systems for onboard use are many and varied. Primary role of such systems is to alleviate burden of processing of ship and environment data and ultimately to help crew in making informed decisions. Effectiveness of such processing could not be more important than during crises situations. This article presents with a prototype of an ergonomic decision support function for provision of advisory to the crew for enhancing their instantaneous preparedness for response to a distressed flooding situation. It is argued that inculcation of crew preparedness is the most effective tool for avoiding and managing flooding crises, should they occur. & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Crises management Emergency response Decision support Stability Vulnerability Flooding
1. Introduction Technological advances in computing hardware over the last decades have facilitated solution of many problems in ever decreasing amount of time. However, the progress in technical calculus, involving modelling based on the fundamental physical laws, has been just as significant, and despite the availability of ever grater processing power, many cases of numerical approximations to reality remain impractical to compute. It is for this reason that advanced prognosis have only had limited success in proliferating the field of instantaneous decision support. Although highly advanced computerised safety management systems (SMS), have found accelerated support, their advisory functionality are mostly limited to detection only, with more sophisticated prognosis and advisory capabilities remaining at prototyping and development stages. Such prototype simulation approaches available for use in prognosis comprise a range of phenomena such as (a) ship response to flooding progression, modelled through various but direct solution to conservation of momentum laws, (Letizia et al., 1995; Letizia, 1997; Papanikolaou et al., 2000; Schreuder, 2008; de Kat Jan and Peters Andrew, 2002; Jasionowski, 2001; Petey, 1988), or through quasi-static iterative approximations, (Varela Jose and Soares, 2007), or (Ruponen et al., 2006), (b) structural stress evolution under flooding, (Bole, 2007), (c) mustering pro˜ eiro et al., 2005), (d) fire and smoke cess, (Vassalos et al., 2001; Pin spread, (Guarin et al., 2004), and possibly many others.
Some of the reasons inhibiting their more wide use for decision support arise due to a series of practical problems in addition to sheer computational effort, such as the following:
Each of these processes may vary at any instant of time due to changing conditions.
The input is subject to considerable uncertainty. For any set of input information the outcome is random due to
computational and modelling uncertainties as well as due to random nature of environmental or process conditions themselves. Each may be seriously influenced by decision choices.
The nature as well as inseparable combination of these engineering challenges imply that the projection functionality would need to be iterated for a range of uncertain conditions of either of the scenarios occurring as well as for a range of decision options, so that the best choice can be identified with controllable degree of confidence. This, in turn, implies that the computational task of scenario projection in real time in support of decision making will likely remain a serious challenge, as most of these analyses require substantial amount of processing time, at present accounted in hours. This is in contrast to real-life cases of casualty scenarios, which in many occasions evolve in a matter of minutes, during which decisions could prove critical. The following recent casualties can be viewed to elaborate the issue. 1.1. MV Estonia, 1994, 852 fatalities
Tel.: 0141 5485731.
E-mail address: [email protected] 0029-8018/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.oceaneng.2011.06.002
852 human lives were lost when the passenger Ro-Ro ferry MV Estonia sank on the night of 27/28th of September 1994 in the
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List Development
80 60 Phase 1 Initial heeling
20 0 00:45
00:50
00:55
Ship Lost from the Utö Radar
100
40
Distress Stop
Phase 2 Floating on side Häire WT-Doors, Mr. Skylight
List [deg]
120
Phase 4 Sinking by stern
Ship's Clock Stops
140
Distress Start
160
Var. Observations JAIC P4 P49 P92 C33 C36 C38 C45
ME:s Fail
180
Phase 4 Sinking by stern
Phase 3 Capsizing
01:00
01:05
01:10
01:15 01:20 01:25 Time Reference Ship Time CET+01:00
01:30
01:35
01:40
01:45
01:50
Fig. 1. MV Estonia, statements by survivors on the heel angle experienced during abandonment, (Bergholtz et al., 2008).
Fig. 2. MV Estonia, (Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2008). At some instant two survivors managed to climb down the closed ramp, using its stiffening arrangement and abandon the ship. Heel angle 931.
Baltic Sea, while on route between Tallinn, Estonia, and Stockholm, Sweden, (Bergholtz et al., 2008; Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2008). The notable observation is that most of the 137 survivors are those that reacted fast, within the first approximate 10–20 min into the casualty (Figs. 1 and 2). Perhaps if crew were aware of what ‘‘to expect’’ they could have reacted quicker to casualty or averted it in the first place.
1.2. Monarch of the Seas, 1998, no fatalities According to the accident reported by Paulsrud and Timothy (2003), ‘‘at about 01:30 h, y, the Monarch of the Seas raked the Proselyte Reef at an approximate speed of 12 knots without becoming permanently stranded’’. Subsequently, ‘‘at 01:35 h and owing to the water ingress, all watertight doors were closed from
Fig. 3. Monarch of the Seas, actual casualty in 1998 and flooding extent, (Paulsrud and Timothy, 2003).
the bridge y’’ and ‘‘at 01:47 h the general emergency signal, seven short and one long blast, was given y’’. See Fig. 3. It appears that it took the crew 5 min to decide about closure of watertight doors (WTD), and 17 min to inform the persons onboard of the casualty. Whilst this accident resulted in no fatalities, it should be clear that this time might as well not have been available, was the damage more severe. Decisions before as well as during every minute of the accident could have proven far more critical to this accident. A decision support system might
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have informed the crew if the situation is critical or not, and in this particular scenario it would have need to have been shown as moderate or perhaps not critical, after the watertight doors closure. Of note is the fact that even though importance of WTD closure is identified in the report on this accident as critical, none of the ultimately recommended 20 safety actions, nor the pointed 20 lessons to be learned, mentioned issue of ship watertight integrity explicitly, highlighting only importance of SMS (Safety Management System) procedures.
1.3. Rockness, 2004, 18 fatalities On the 19 of January 2004 the Antigua & Barbuda flagged cargo vessel MV ‘Rocknes’ capsized within a number of minutes in a strait south of Bergen, Norway, resulting in 18 fatalities, see Fig. 4. At the time, the ship was loaded with ground rock-like cargo (stones, gravel) that were to be delivered in Emden, Germany. The crew had perhaps 2–3 min into the casualty, for making their minds up on what, or if, any action was to be taken, as the
rate of ship capsize due to flooding was very high (Jasionowski and Khattab, 2005), see Fig. 5. Perhaps all these lives could have been saved if the crew was informed at all times of the vulnerability of the vessel to any flooding extent that was feasible, allowing them to react instantly at the first sign of distress. It can be seen that any projections for supporting decisions for crises management in either of these different ship flooding scenarios would need to have been made virtually within first vital minutes from the very instant of loss of watertight integrity. Indeed, it could be argued, that even more effective would have been for the crew to know beforehand the crises occurring, as to how to react to the arising situation. This is the principle, in the search of which the VLog functionality has been developed as a possible ergonomic solution for sustaining the crew’s preparedness for response to a crises situation, as described next.
2. Vulnerability Log (VLog) Vulnerability Log, or VLog for short, is hereby proposed to be the functionality to inform the crew at all times on the instantaneous vulnerability to flooding of the vessel, considering its actual loading conditions, the environmental conditions and the actual watertight integrity architecture. The vulnerability is proposed to be measured in terms of the probability that a vessel might capsize within given time when subject to any feasible flooding scenario. Since until a casualty occurs it is impossible to anticipate any specifics of a flooding case a ship might suffer and therefore let
Table 1 MV Estonia, ship particulars.
Fig. 4. MV Rocknes, actual casualty in 2004, (Jasionowski and Khattab, 2005).
Lbp B Displacement Draught mean Trim GM KG
137.4 m 24.2 m 11,930 m3 5.39 m 0.435 m aft 1.17 m 10.62 m
Fig. 5. MV Rocknes, numerical reconstruction when heeling to 421 during capsize process. The vessel capsizes in 2 min. Visible in a light blue colour are the intact ship free surface tank loads as well as compartments flooded due to damage, (Jasionowski and Khattab, 2005). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 6. GA of MV Estonia assumed for numerical modelling.
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1.1 0.9 0.7
GZ[m]
0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.1
0
5
10
15
20
-0.3
25
30
35
Intact DS/P11.1.0
-0.5
DS/P11.1.0, door "240" opened
Heel Angle [deg] Fig. 7. MV Estonia, flooding case no. 36, all doors closed, hydrostatic properties.
Fig. 8. Probability for capsize within time tc. Case no. 36 with all doors closed. Effect of significant wave height.
Fig. 9. Probability for capsize within time tc. Case no. 36 with all doors closed. Effect of assumed time to capsize.
40
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Table 2 MV Estonia, flooding case j¼ 36, sample calculations. Doors
All closed
#240 opened
GZmax Range (deg.) Hscrit,j (m) sr ðHscrit,j Þ Hs (m) FðnÞ FT9n ðtc ¼ 30 min9Hs,jÞ
0.107656 m 9.576027 2.148 0.133 0 0 0
0m 0 0 0.049 0 0.5 0.5
2.148 0.5 0.5
4 1.0 1.0
2.148 1.0 1.0
4 1.0 1.0
Fig. 10. Ergonomic communication interface, model of MV Estonia, screenshot of watertight doors (WTD) closure status, green indicates ‘‘closed’’, red ‘‘opened’’. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
the crew prepare for it, it seems plausible that instead the crew is made aware of the range of such flooding specifics together with projected impact these can have on the ship state. The crew would be able to infer the criticality of the situation evolving immediately, based on their own awareness, and hence decide instinctively of the best possible actions to follow. Ship vulnerability to flooding will naturally vary significantly from a flooding case to a flooding case, and subject to what condition the vessel operates at, at which environment and what is the watertight integrity status. All these must, therefore, be considered. The flooding scenario considered in this article pertains to a flooding resulting from a ship-to-ship collision event, and the vulnerability will be expressed as a probability of a capsize subject to specific events of loading W¼w, flooding extent D ¼d, environment E ¼e and capsize within time of T¼tc. The probability mass for such an event can be assigned as follows: pW&D&E&T ðw \ d \ e \ tc Þ
ð1Þ
The event w \ d \ e \ tc , can also be referred to as a ‘‘compound event’’ or a flooding ‘‘scenario’’, and is regarded as unconditional,1 although it would be more appropriate to consider pW&D&E&TjU ðw \ d \ e \ tc 9floodingÞ or in fact pW&D&E&T9U ðw \ d \ e \ tc 9collision \floodingÞ, however for convenience the conditional notation of collision \ flooding is omitted. Considering now that the events of loading and flooding extent can be considered independent, as well as applying the chain rule of probability calculus (Baye’s theorem), allows for expressing probability (1) as follows: pW&D&E&T ðw \ d \ e \ tc Þ ¼ pW ðwÞpD ðdÞpE9Dn ðeÞpT9W&D&E ðtc 9w \ d \ eÞ pW pD pE9Dn pT9W&D&E
ð2Þ
1 ‘‘unconditional’’ is implied unconditional on any of the four events of loading W, flooding, D, environment, E, or time to capsize, T, with that the only underlying condition being the occurrence of a collision with hull breach event and ensuing flooding.
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Note that pEjDn is a probability mass distribution for the environment encountered during a collision, and hence should be viewed as probability of event conditional on the collision event occurring, however, for the reasons of practical availability of data, it is not conditional on any specifics of the collision damage. The mass function of unconditional1 probability that a joint event of specific loading condition W¼w, environment E¼e as well as the capsize within time of T¼tc occurs can be obtained by marginalisation, as follows: X pW&E&T ðw \ e \ tc Þ ¼ pW&D&E&T ðw \ d \ e \ tc Þ O\ðW&E&TÞ
¼ pW pE9Dn
X
pD pT9W&D&E
ð3Þ
collision \ flooding, and the specific extent of which can be described as number j out of all feasible flooding extents for the ship at given watertight architecture arrangement. The probability for the extent of flooding, pD , can consequently be denoted as pj. Furthermore, let the probability mass pT jW&E be denoted as FT ðtc 9HsÞ, and assign cumulative probability for capsize within time tc, given specific environment condition Hs, loading W¼w, and the vessel suffered any of the many feasible flooding extents as a result of a collision and ensuing flooding. Given the above presented theoretical model and the subsequent numerical notations, the following framework, given by Eqs. (5) and (6), is hereby proposed as an instrument to provide with the vulnerability functionality, whereby VLog refers to FT logged continuously in real ship-operation time.
D
where O ¼ fW,D,E,Tg. Deriving from this, the mass function of conditional probability that an event of capsize within time T ¼ tc occurs, given specific loading W¼w and environment E¼e occurred can be assigned as follows: pT9W&E ðtc 9w \ eÞ ¼
pW&E&T ðw \ e \ tc Þ X ¼ pD pT9W&D&E pW ðwÞpE9Dn ðeÞ D
FT ðtc 9HsÞ ¼
X
pj FT9n ðtc 9Hs,jÞ
ð5Þ
j
where tc =t0 HsHcrit,j FT9n ðtc 9Hs,jÞ ¼ 1 1F
s
ð6Þ
ð4Þ
For ease of numerical notation, let the probability mass pT jW&D&E be denoted as FT9n ðtc 9Hs,jÞ, assigning probability (cumulative) distribution for capsize within time tc, given the environment attained significant wave height Hs, the loading conditions were W¼ w, and the vessel suffered a collision leading to flooding,
Hscrit,j ¼ 4
GZmax,j Rangej 0:12 16
sðHscrit,j Þ ¼ 0:039Hscrit,j þ 0:049
ð7Þ ð8Þ
And, furthermore, where
Fig. 11. Vulnerability information, screenshot of the colour-coded values of FT9n ð3 h9Hs ¼ 0m,jÞ for each of the j ¼ 1. . .1368 flooding cases, each represented by a ‘‘diamond’’, as well as FT ð3 h90mÞ ¼ 17:38% of ship overall vulnerability, all logged down at 15:40:06 h (example time marked by the yellow square at 15 h 40 min 06 s). For overlapping ‘‘diamonds’’ (e.g. multiple penetration or vertical extent for the same length of flooding case), the worst cases are shown. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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FT is, again, cumulative probability distribution for occurrence of ship capsize within time t, conditional on event of a sea state of Hs occurring and subject to any feasible flooding scenario. FT jn is cumulative probability distribution for occurrence of capsize within time t, conditional on events of a sea state of Hs and a specific flooding scenario j occurring. tc is time, minutes. t0 ¼ 30 min is benchmark physical testing time. Hs is significant wave height, metres. j is ship flooding scenario considered. pj is probability mass of flooding scenario j occurring, according to MSC 84, 2006, with theoretical details available at Paw"owski (2004, 2005). FðzÞ is cumulative standard normal probability distribution function. Hcrit,j is 50th percentile significant wave height in which a ship subjected to flooding scenario j might capsize. GZmax , Range is maximum restoring lever and range of positive restoring moment for a ship subjected to flooding scenario j, metres and degrees, respectively. Note that both probabilities FT and FT jn are assigned for events of capsize conditional on all other implicitly considered events, such as sea state, loading condition, and instantaneous watertight architecture arrangement occurrences. Considering a special case of loading conditions, say corresponding exactly to the deepest subdivision draught DS as it is
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used in calculations for SOALS CH II, the following can be observed: Z 1 sj ¼ dHsfHs9coll ðHsÞð1FT9n ðtc ¼ 30 min9Hs,jÞÞ ð9Þ 0
which is the marginal probability of ship surviving in any sea states Hs expected in a collision accidents, also known as ‘‘s’’ factor of MSC82/24, with fHs9coll ðHsÞ representing probability density distribution for such sea states. With so assigned probability sj , and accounting for other phenomena, as regulatory instruments MSC82/24 stipulates, one can relate Eq. (5) to the well known probabilistic subdivision index ADS ,which is calculated as X pj sj ð10Þ ADS ¼ j
More details on theory of models (5), (6) and (8) can be found in Jasionowski et al. (2006a, 2007), whereas on model (7) in Tagg and Tuzcu (2002). The next paragraph aims to demonstrate and then explain how the VLog functionality would work in practise, including giving practical interpretations of FT as well as FT jn .
3. Sensitivity study A case of MV Estonia is hereby used to demonstrate the VLog functionality. Loading condition at the time of the loss of the vessel in 1994 were used, see Table 1 and Fig. 6.
Fig. 12. Screenshot of the colour-coded values of FT9n ð3 h9Hs ¼ 4m,jÞ for each of the flooding cases, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 37:18% (purple window), logged down at 15:41:09 h (example time marked by the yellow square at 15 h 41 min 09 s). The green coloured ‘‘diamonds’’ indicate FT9n ¼ 0%, and red FT9n ¼ 100%. GZ curve and draught marks shown for the ship in intact condition. Sea state Hs manual input shown in the left lower corner. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Let some characteristics of the kernel function (6) be examined first. For this reason a flooding case no. 36 out of total 1368 flooding cases considered, and no. 36 with adjacent watertight door opened, are used, as shown in Figs. 7–9 and Table 2. As can be seen the probability assigned to the event of capsize varies significantly from a flooding case to flooding case, as well as due to the environment conditions. The lesser the stability, or the higher the sea state, the more likely it is that a ship will capsize within given period of time. Note also that the longer a period of time one wishes to infer on the fate of the ship, the more likely it is that capsize will occur, as one would expect. Perhaps worth of note is assigning of FT9n ðtc ¼ 30 min9Hs ¼ 0 m,j ¼ 36Þ ¼ 0:5 for a case of adjacent watertight door left opened, where the ship has no stability whatsoever. Although it is expected that capsize would be imminent, that is the probability should be 1.0, the approach is consistent with the assumptions of critical sea state underlying model (7), that is likelihood of capsize within benchtesting time of 30 min is 0.5. This small detail is subject of ongoing investigation, however, given that sea state is hardly ever 0 m, it seems to bear little practical significance. Next, the following series of figures, Figs. 10–18, are presented to allow for thorough interpretation of the VLog functionality. Before expanding discussions of the VLog functionality for decision support, the following further set of real-life sample of results gathered on an undisclosed ship is presented to demonstrate the significance of the VLog for daily use. As can be seen, the crew awareness of vulnerability at any one time can lead to its substantial and material reduction.
4. Discussions The first element worth mentioning is the interpretation of ‘‘vulnerability’’. As mentioned earlier, ship vulnerability to flooding is proposed to be measured by means of the probability that an event of ship capsizing within given period of time occurs, subject to status assumptions. For a flooding scenario resulting to final floating attitude, it is expected that ship’s residual stability will be sufficient to sustain its functional attitude for a level of environmental excitation. The relationship between residual stability and the environment has been derived in project HARDER, as reported in Tagg and Tuzcu (2002), and as given here by Eq. (7). It has subsequently been shown in the project SAFEDOR, (Jasionowski et al., 2006a, 2007; Jasionowski and Vassalos, 2006b), that this relationship can be used to describe stochastic nature of ship capsize for any given environment, and that it can be marginalised for all feasible flooding scenarios. Thus, for an example of a specific flooding case j, a vulnerability of FT9n ð3 h9Hs ¼ 2 m,jÞ ¼ 40% recorded in a given instant of time, implies probability of 40% that a ship may capsize in 3 h, when subject to specific environmental conditions of Hs¼2 m. In other words, applying ‘‘frequentist’’ interpretation of probability, should the vessel suffer 10 accidents involving exactly flooding extent j, and each time at sea state of Hs¼2 m, it would be expected to observe 4 capsizes within less than 3 h, or between 0 and 8 capsizes, when accommodating for sampling uncertainty. This vulnerability can be derived for any feasible flooding extent for given ship design, and it can be conveyed to the crew in an
Fig. 13. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 15:40:06, see Fig. 11. Ship vulnerability FT ð3 h90 mÞ ¼ 17:38%. Note that draught marks correspond to ship condition of the most recent log at 15:41:16. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 14. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 15:45:09, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h90 mÞ ¼ 27:61%. Note the three watertight doors, #216, #217 and #218, on the tank deck opened with the ensuing impact on the flooding extent. Note again Hs ¼0 m. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 15. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 16:15:28, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 44:93%. Note Hs ¼ 4 m. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 16. Flooding extent for damage case j¼ 702, DS/S6.2.0, (diamond/triangle in yellow frame), with corresponding GZ curve logged at 19:00:30, ship vulnerability FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 68:24%. Note Hs¼ 4 m and many WTD opened. Very likely state of the vessel on the night of the ship loss in September 1994. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
ergonomic manner by means of colour coding, see the colourful ‘‘diamonds’’ in either of Figs. 11 or 16. Furthermore, the vulnerability can be ‘‘averaged’’ for all flooding cases with ‘‘weights’’ corresponding to likelihood of any flooding extent occurring, in the marginalisation process. Thus, an example of an overall vulnerability of FT ð3 h94 mÞ ¼ 70%, indicates probability of 70% that a ship may capsize in 3 h, when subjected to specific environmental conditions of Hs ¼4 m and for any among the many feasible flooding extents a ship might suffer. In other words, should the vessel suffer 10 accidents involving any flooding extent, and each time at sea state of Hs ¼4 m, it would be expected to observe 7 capsizes within less than 3 h, or between 3 and 10 capsizes, when accounting for sampling uncertainty. This ‘‘overall’’ vulnerability can be derived periodically for given ship conditions and conveyed to the crew in an ergonomic manner as a time-log, see Fig. 17. It can be noted in Fig. 17 the ‘‘enormity’’ of the extent to which operation can have on the ship’s instantaneous vulnerability, that is its ability to sustain stable attitude when subject to loss of watertight integrity. The vulnerability can increase from some 18% to nearly 70%, for the sample study cases used. The various conditions leading to this dramatic variation can again be found in Figs. 11–16. The impact of each of the watertight doors considered in separation, can be seen in Fig. 18, which seems to be a powerful method that can be used during design stage, to guide distribution of watertight architecture in the vessel in the first place. The variation in time reflects changes to ship loading conditions, environment conditions Hs, as well as watertight integrity through opening of watertight doors. The very process of logging in time of quantified and meaningful measure of vulnerability allows for auditing of the ‘‘goodness’’ of the
operation. Such information, easily inferable from typical onboard computer display, allows for development and sustaining of understanding on what to expect, should flooding casualty occur. The actual field-testing has demonstrated the merit of VLog functionality, as shown in the records in Figs. 19 and 20. For instance, given the vulnerability of MV Estonia on the night of the loss as shown in Fig. 16, it can easily be seen that the vessel is extremely likely to capsize due to flooding. The fact that specific type of flooding which is thought to have happened on the night of the casualty is not taken into account in cases used in Fig. 16 is immaterial. The crew would not know what was happening exactly, but given projections as shown in Fig. 16 with vulnerability of 70%, it would be instantly obvious that immediate action is required at the first sign of problems. More importantly, the crew might have taken greater vigil, were they aware of how vulnerable their ship can be, and how this can be managed through their own actions.
5. Further work It appears that the framework for vulnerability assessment given above by models (5) and (6) can serve as a very informative model for use in the context of decision making. It reflects fundamentals of physical processes governing ship stability in waves and explicitly acknowledges uncertainty of such predictions by exploiting probability theory. Therefore, further research efforts should be expanded to establish and verify practicalities of the principles of the proposed functionality, as well as to assess impact of all engineering approximations that are used in application of the proposed
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Fig. 17. Sample of 8 h vulnerability log (VLog).
Fig. 18. Impact of single doors opening on overall ship vulnerability.
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Percentage of time operated at [%] vulnerability or less
90%
median
median
100%
Week7 Week6 Week5 Week4 Week3 Week2 Week1
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Vulnerabiliy [%]
Median Vulnerability [%]
Fig. 19. Distribution of vulnerability logged on a demonstration ship. The actual vulnerability values are undisclosed. The impact of the awareness of the crew on the day-to-day management of watertight integrity, and hence crew and ship preparedness, can be seen in the week 7, when explanation and training on use of VLog had been given.
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Week 5
Week 6
Week 7
Fig. 20. Median of vulnerability logged on a demonstration ship. The actual vulnerability values are undisclosed. The impact of the awareness of the crew on the day-today management of watertight integrity, and hence crew and ship preparedness, can be seen in the week 7, when explanations and training on use of VLog had been given.
model. Many such aspects should be considered, with key focus on uncertainty in the widest sense, pertaining to its both aleatory as well as epistemic types. Example impact of treatment of actual tank loads in assessing stability, effects of damage character, relative importance of transient flooding stages, accuracy of physical experimentation used as basis data, or simple elements such as effect of computational speed on functionality of the whole proposition, or ergonomics of the conveying techniques used. The prime objective is to find solution acceptable for wider industrial application.
provision of ergonomic information to the crew on the instantaneous ship vulnerability to flooding. Such information allows the crew to have notion at all times on ships capacity to cope with any feasible flooding scenario, and thus allows for making informed and instant decisions on how to respond with mitigating actions at the first sign of distress. Most importantly, the crew can take precautionary actions at any time of the ship operation to knowingly reduce vulnerability to the lowest levels possible for a particular ship design. Therefore, crew preparedness for response to distressed situation can be promoted at all times.
6. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
This article outlined a concept of an active life-cycle decision support and crises management principle. The key feature is
This research has been supported directly by EC FLAGSHIP (TIP5CT-2006-031406) and EC FLOODSTAND (SCP7-GA-2009–218532).
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The financial support of the EC, as well as cooperative efforts among the consortium members are hereby gratefully acknowledged. Many colleagues that have contributed with advice, expertise, research, development or analysis efforts in these ongoing projects are, in no particular order, Anthony York, Luis Guarin, Jonathan Logan, Jerzy Prigara, and Piotr Do"ebski from Safety At Sea Ltd and Phil York, Jakub Cichowicz, Sara Locke, Qi Chen, Yasmine Hifi, Dracos Vassalos, Sandy Day, and Andrew Pennycott from the Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, University of Strathclyde, whose varied valuable contributions are all hereby acknowledged. References Bergholtz, J., Rutgersson, O., Schreuder, M., 2008. WP2.1 Review of Evidence Report No. 2 Conceivable Course of Events. Technical Report. Department of Shipping and Marine Technology, Chalmers, March 2008. Bole, Marcus, 2007. Introducing Damage Structural Assessment to Onboard Decision Support Tools. Graphics Research Corporation Ltd., UK. de Kat Jan, O., Peters Andrew, J., 2002. Model Experiments and Simulations of a Damaged Frigate, IMAM Congress, Crete, No. 129, May 2002. Guarin, Luis, Majumder, Jayanta, Shigunov, Vladimir, Vassalos, Guro, Vassalos, Dracos, 2004. Fire and flooding risk assessment in ship design for ease of evacuation. In: Proceedings of the Conference on Design for Safety, Osaka. Jasionowski, A., 2001. An Integrated Approach to Damage Ship Survivability Assessment. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Strathclyde. Jasionowski, A., Khattab, O., 2005. Time Domain Simulation of the Dynamics of Progressive Flooding and Capsizing MV Rockness, TQRN01-RE-001-AJ, 12 September 2005. Jasionowski, A., Bulian, G., Vassalos, D., Francescutto, A., Paw"owski, M., Maccari, A., 2006a. Modelling Survivability, ECSAFEDOR, D2.1.3., November 2006. Jasionowski, Andrzej, Vassalos, Dracos, 2006b. Conceptualising risk. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, Rio de Janeiro, September 2006. Jasionowski, Andrzej, Vassalos, Dracos, Scott, Andrew, 2007. Ship vulnerability to flooding. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Maritime Conference on Design for Safety, Berkeley California, September 26th, 28th 2007. Jasionowski, A., Vassalos, D., 2008. Technical Summary of the Investigation on the Sinking Sequence of MV Estonia. Safety at Sea Report no. VIES01-RE-005-AJ, May 2008.
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