- Email: [email protected]
Do liberal teachers produce violent and xenophobic students? An empirical study of German ninth graders and their teachers
Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
Do liberal teachers produce violent and xenophobic students? An empirical study of German ninth graders and their teachers夽 Elke Bovier, Klaus Boehnke* Department of Sociology, Chemnitz University of Technology, D-09107 Chemnitz, Germany Received 23 February 1998; received in revised form 2 October 1998; accepted 3 January 1999
Abstract A study of 96 teachers and 598 of their students from East and West Berlin is reported, testing a hypothesis that emerged in media coverage of right-wing youth violence in Germany, namely that liberal teachers are 'producing' right-wing youth, primarily due to their permissive teaching style. LISREL models show that neither do left teachers, in general, have violent and/or right-wing students, nor do permissive teachers have such students. It was, however, found that teachers who emphasize a universalistic and humanistic political value conviction, but at the same time favor an authoritarian teaching style, do indeed have more violent, right-wing extremist students. 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
The question posed in the title of the current paper may at "rst glance come as a surprise to many readers. The question can only be understood in reference to German history. The paper, thus, has to start with a brief look at the speci"cities 夽
The paper presents central results of the dissertation of the "rst author prepared under the mentorship of the second author. The dissertation is published as an Internet document in German (http://archiv.tu-chemnitz.de/pub/1998/0001). The paper was in part presented by the "rst author at the Fifth European Congress of Psychology in Dublin, Ireland, July 1997, and by the second author at the Second Project Leaders Meeting of the Carnegie Corporation Program of Research to Improve Intergroup Relations Among Youth, New York, NY, October, 1997. The research was originally funded by the Berlin-Forschung program of the Free University of Berlin. * Corresponding author. Tel.: #49-371-531-3925; fax: #49371-531-4450. E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Boehnke)
of German history pertinent to the topic of the paper. The starting point of this short overview is the end of World War II. The historic truth about Naziism and the holocaust is well-engraved in the historic knowledge of humanity. What is less known is how Germany dealt with the Nazi era in its own educational system after the war. Ways of dealing with national socialism and its crimes were in many ways diametrically opposed in the two Germanies after the war. In East Germany most teachers from the Nazi era were "red by the new regime, had voluntarily left for the West, or were dead. Many new teachers, usually with minimal training, entered schools. They emphasized the anti-fascist traditions of the new rulers. A &decreed anti-fascism' persisted all through the history of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In a certain sense, a new authoritarian regime had positioned itself on the &good'
0742-051X/99/$ - see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 7 4 2 - 0 5 1 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 1 7 - 7
816
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
side of German history without ever putting the continuity of the hierarchic command structure of the East German society (from the Nazi to the communist era) at any deliberation (see Benner et al., 1996). In West Germany the development was quite di!erent. In spite of the fact that the Allied powers, especially Americans, made major investments into a democratic reeducation of West Germany in the early post-war years, the Nazi era remained largely a blind spot in West German education for a long time. Teachers frequently were the same who had already taught during the Nazi era, there was a new enemy * communism * and Germany literally had to be rebuilt. Until the late 1960s this often meant that the years 1933}1945 did not take place at all in West German schools. Then a major shift occurred: What is now called the &Student Revolt' took place. Anti-authoritarian university students eventually brought about a major change in the cultural climate of West German society. In the schools anti-authoritarian, permissive educational principles started to become in#uential and later prevailed. By the end of the 1980s, the average political convictions of a German teacher were those of a moderate left. In this situation German uni"cation took place. In both German states the political left*the Old Left in the East, the New Left in the West*had decisive in#uence on education in the schools. Then*all of a sudden, for many neutral onlookers*the ghosts of the German past reappeared: Right-wing extremists committed arson attacks on dormitories of asylum seekers, later even on synagogues. The place names Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen in the former GDR, as well as MoK lln, Solingen, and LuK beck in West Germany went around the world. The perpetrators usually were youth, those youth that had gone or were still going through a school that was and largely is in#uenced by anti-fascist (East) and anti-authoritarian (West) traditions. Pushed by German and world media, a picture of a right-wing German youth, alienated from the main stream of society emerged. This view overlooks that*especially in the earlier incidents in the East*there were numerous applauding adult spectators on the sidewalks. On the other hand, it also
overlooks that major proportions of youth participated in powerful demonstrations against the xenophobic crimes committed by age-mates. Youth were important activists in the organization of socalled &light-chains', demonstrations that carried thousands of candles to commemorate the deaths of refugees and immigrants. Also, at about the same time, there were large paci"st children's demonstrations under the motto &No blood for oil' against the second Gulf War. Farin and Seidel-Pielen (1993) point out that there is no evidence whatsoever for a monochrome, 'brown' picture of German youth. What has to be conceded, however, is that for the "rst time in decades there were political crimes committed by rightist youth, and politically motivated juvenile delinquency accompanied by a rightist rhetoric. Social scienctists have engaged in extensive research in recent years as to the reasons for this reemergence of right-wing ideology among youth. Meredith Watts (1997), a North American political scientist, recently published a monograph on Xenophobia in the ;nited Germany. Results of the relevant research can only brie#y be summarized here. The so-called individualization approach has somewhat dominated the research "eld in Germany. Heitmeyer (e.g., Heitmeyer & MuK ller, 1995) is the most prominent advocate of that approach. In a society, says Heitmeyer, that puts an ever increasing emphasis on individual accomplishments and is at the same time ridden by economic crises, youth will resort to autocratic ideologies to cope with the uncertainties of everyday lives. Other work in the "eld draws on the classic theory of authoritarianism associated with the name Theodor W. Adorno (Lederer & Schmidt, 1995). In a nutshell, that kind of work assumes that undemocratic, repressive parenting*presumed to prevail in East Germany as a consequence of the undemocratic structure of East German society*is the source of an authoritarian right-wing orientation among youth (more so in the East than in the West). Yet other work amalgamates social capital theory (Coleman) and social control theory (Hirschi). Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke (1995), for example, see right-wing extremism as a form of juvenile delinquency that originates in reduced social control and decreasing opportunities to gain social capital in the years immediately following
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
German uni"cation. All three approaches have been able to provide empirical evidence to support their basic views. The current study, however, draws more on a "erce public debate than on earlier social scienti"c research. Fueled by the political Moderate Right, but echoed by parts of the New Left, the question was raised, how right-wing outbursts could happen given that schools had been held sway by liberals (in the West) and the Old Left (in the East). The debate culminated in a pamphlet written by Renate Sche%er, a representative of the Green Party in the parliament of the West German state of NorthRhine-Westphalia. The German news weekly DER SPIEGEL (1993) published the paper under the title &Left Teachers}Right Students?'. In the paper the question is raised whether the*alledged*permissive climate of normlessness in German schools is responsible for producing right-wing students. The implied answer is yes. Renate Sche%er and SPIEGEL journalists insist that there is considerable truth to the title under which Sche%er's pamphlet was published. To test Sche%er's postulate is the aim of the present study. To understand the central mechanisms assumed by Sche%er, a closer look at speci"cs and peculiarities of the German school system and its current status is necessary. The traditional German school system knows systematic hierarchical tracking, di!ering to some extent between the 16 German states. This means that after a comprehensive elementary school (up to Grade 4 or 6, depending on the state), student cohorts are sent to di!erent school tracks. To which track a student is sent, nominally depends on his or her academic achievement and on parental decisions. In practice, the track selection traditionally replicates social class. The weakest students usually come from lower working-class backgrounds or from immigrant groups. They are selected to go to Hauptschule and get their leaving certi"cate after Grade 9 or 10. Students from established workingclass and lower middle-class backgrounds*average achievers*are usually selected to go to Realschule. They receive their leaving certi"cate after Grade 10. Only upper middle class and upper class students were traditionally selected to go to Gymnasium (up to Grade 13). Only the Abitur, the leav-
817
ing certi"cate o!ered by the Gymnasium, allows a student to study at a university. In East Germany the traditional system was abolished by the Socialist Unity Party and supplanted by a system that can best be described as a mixture of the American and the Russian system. All students had to go to a ten-grade comprehensive school, the Polytechnische Oberschule. Afterwards about 15% of a cohort were selected*on the grounds of achievement and degree of political activism*to continue until the end of Grade 12 to obtain the traditional German high school leaving certi"cate, the Abitur (KoK hler, 1996) at the Erweiterte Oberschule. In the West the case was quite di!erent. In the 1960s the situation in West Germany*with only 10% of a cohort at most eligible for a university education (and even less "nishing it)*was described as an &education catastrophe' (Picht, 1964). The reform climate brought about by the student revolt led to many changes. There were plans to introduce a comprehensive school instead of the tripartite traditional school system. Also, it was suggested to abolish the grading of academic achievement or at least postpone it to post-puberty age (Deutscher Bildungsrat, 1970). Neither of these reforms really took place. Most German states founded ten-grade comprehensive schools in addition to the traditional three school types, but Germany-wide the new Gesamtschule draws less than 10% of a birth cohort. Grading of academic achievement was abolished in Grades 1, sometimes 2, 3, and also 4. Grade reports were substituted by anecdotal reports there, but from Grade 5 onward no substantial changes occurred. All reforms remained faint-hearted, many critics remark (Ellwein, 1978; Friedeburg, 1992). In principle, they took place within the framework of the traditional tracked German school system. What did, however, happen in the 1970s was an in#ux of teachers who were strongly sympathetic with the reform ideas. A situation emerged where reform-oriented teachers were placed in an in#exible, conservative institution not apt to serve as a frame for the implementation of educational
Today the proportion lies at about 30% (Landesschulamt Berlin, 1997).
818
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
reform ideas. Mostly in the 1970s, large numbers of new teachers were hired. In summary, one can say that the West German school is "lled with teachers who were on average very inclined to follow educational reform ideas, and were now &stuck' in a structurally conservative institution. There are numerous schools in the West where the average age of teachers is around 50. In East Germany the situation of teachers after uni"cation was unlike that in the West, but also prone to cause frustration. In GDR times teachers had to be the transmission belts of the Party. More or less overnight they then found themselves in the situation that much of what they had taught was no longer valid. Additionally, the traditional tripartite German school system was re-introduced in East Germany with only minor modi"cations. In this situation disorientation of teachers was high. Many of them were not accepted by their students, because they stood for the old regime, even if they had not held formal positions in the administrative hierarchy; they had to teach new content; they had to teach in a new school system that made it necessary to assemble new faculties; and, they had been trained for a teacher-centered, more or less authoritarian teaching style that was clearly denounced by their colleagues from the West. With this background information, Sche%er's allegation that German teachers are prone to produce &right students' may appear more lucid than it presumably did at "rst glance. In more detail, Sche%er assumed that the general permissive, anti-authoritarian class climate that*she claims*is persisting in (West) German schools, creates a normlessness in which students experience no clear dos and don'ts. This makes them prone to engage in delinquent activities which they do not really know are acceptable to the general public or not. A second, more implicitly formulated assumption can also be found in Sche%er's pamphlet. It bears more validity for the East and could be labeled the generation gap assumption. Students see adults (i.e., teachers) whom they*on average*do not like (which student really likes teachers?). They want to be di!erent from these adults, and*knowing that the adults are usually liberals*they engage in violent, xenophobic behavior which they know that adults abhor. To
formulate hypotheses on the grounds of Sche%er's argumentation we end with the following two assumptions: (1) The more a teacher has a political stance on the left of the spectrum, the more inclined his/her students will be to engage in violent every-day behavior and to express rightist political attitudes (generation gap hypothesis). (2) The more permissive, anti-authoritarian the social climate of a class, the more inclined students will be to engage in violent every-day behavior and to express rightist political attitudes (permissiveness hypothesis). In contrast to these very straightforward hypotheses, we see a third hypothesis that is still partially in line with the convictions of Sche%er but seems more plausible to us. We have described the situation of the (West) German school system above. We have tried to argue that teachers who set out as reformers found themselves &stuck' in a structurally conservative system. This situation calls for adjustments. Teachers may change their political attitudes. That obviously, however, does not happen too often. In Berlin, for example, where our study was conducted, the distinctly left teachers' union GEW regularly draws up to two thirds of the votes in board elections. A second type of adjustment could be to retain political convictions but adjust one's educational style to the demands of the structurally conservative institution teachers "nd themselves in. This second type of adjustment does, however, create a noticeable incongruity. Political orientation and teaching style no longer &"t'. In extreme cases an authoritarian teaching style is executed by a declared liberal. This combination may be seen as more prone to induce acceptance of violently xenophobic, right-wing attitudes among students. There could be a danger that liberal lipservice is*with some right*evaluated as being `phonya. This experience of phoniness may then generate oppositional &re#exes'. Our third hypothesis, thus, reads: (3) The more pronounced the incongruity between political convictions of a teacher and his/her style of teaching, the more inclined his/her
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
students will be to engage in violent every-day behavior and to express rightist political attitudes (incongruity hypothesis). We set out to test these three hypotheses in a study of ninth graders and their teachers from East and West Berlin. Given the di!erent socialization experiences of East and West Berlin teachers and students, we think it makes sense to assume that living in East or West Berlin may have an impact on violence and xenophobia that is not explainable on the grounds of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles. Also, &leftness' of teachers, social climates of classrooms and degrees of incongruities may di!er between East and West a priori. In summary, the model we test, thus, appears as documented in Fig. 1. Before we come to the test of our model we should state the we expect &our' hypotheses C1 and C2 to be rejected. Contrary to Sche%er we assume that &left' teachers are prone to have non-right, non-violent students. We also expect that teachers who are able to create a positive social climate in a class in reliance on non-authoritarian teaching styles are also prone to have non-right, non-violent students. The theoretical basis of our assumption is*in a nutshell*that of social learning and model learning theory as proposed, among others, by Bandura (1976). Thus, we do not assume that
819
Sche%er's postulates of left teachers producing right students can empirically be validated, but that, on the contrary, &leftness' and &permissiveness' are actually safeguards against violent xenophobia. Incongruity between political orientation and teaching style, however, we do see as a decisive risk factor.
1. Methods 1.1. Samples In order to test the model depicted in Fig. 1, we drew a sample of eight schools from violence-prone school districts, one from each of the four school types (mentioned above), from East and West Berlin, respectively. The rationale for selecting what we call violence-prone districts was that in spite of extensive media coverage of violent and right-wing incidents in schools, such events are by no means an overly frequent phenomenon (Dettenborn, 1993). Therefore, in order to reduce the danger of gathering a sample with extremely few violent and/or right-wing students, we resorted to what may be called clinical sampling. Our operationalization of a &violence-prone school district' was based on a pilot study. There had to be at least one report of a violent or right-wing incident for the district in 10 pilot interviews with randomly
Fig. 1. Theoretical model of in#uences of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles on violence and right-wing extremism among Adolescents.
820
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
selected teachers known to the researchers from earlier research on other topics. The "rst four districts that appeared in the interview transcripts, and were not the districts in which the interviewed teachers taught, were selected as our sampling districts. From these districts schools were selected at random (with the exclusion of schools where teachers from the pilot interviews taught). In the sampled schools we surveyed all ninth graders and their teachers. In general, response rates among students were very high. The overall average was above 80%. There was, however, one full class*30 students*at a Gymnasium that refused to participate. For teachers, response rates were considerably lower. Rates also varied to some extent between the school types. Especially in the East teachers sometimes voiced the concern that their political orientation was spied upon, something they had known all through their GDR teaching career. Overall teacher participation rates averaged some 50%. From brief encounters with the teachers who refused to participate, we gained the impression that usually those teachers refused participation who were leaning more toward the right of the political spectrum than other teachers. This bias in the teacher sample is, however, a deviation from representativeness that is acceptable for the purposes of the present study: Our hypotheses focus on teachers who politically lean toward the left. We presumably oversampled that group to some degree. The modal age of the surveyed students was 15. All in all, 598 students (290 from East Berlin, 308 from West Berlin) and 96 teachers (41 from East Berlin and 55 from West Berlin) participated. For teachers a noticeable East}West di!erence emerged with regard to age. Frequencies are documented in Table 1. The table shows that teachers in East Berlin are considerably younger than teachers in the West. This is not a sampling peculiarity but re#ects the di!erent age distributions of teachers in East and West Berlin.
Table 1 Age of teachers in East and West Berlin
The decision not to consider mentionings of the school district in which the interviewed teachers taught was taken as a safeguard against e!ects of selective attention.
Presumably to the surprise of readers in many parts of the world this item is a psychometrically sound nationalism item in surveys conducted in Germany.
Age
East Berlin (abs. freq./percent in EB)
West Berlin (abs. freq./percent in WB)
Under 30 30}39 40}49 50}59 60 and above (Missing)
6 24 4 5 1 1
2 (3.6%) 7 (12.7%) 30 (54.6%) 15 (27.3%) * 1 (1.8%)
(14.6%) (58.5%) (9.7%) (12.2%) (2.5%) (2.5%)
1.2. Instruments To measure right-wing attitudes of students we used a scale proposed by StoK ss (1993). The scale has 15 items and covers "ve dimensions of right-wing attitudes, namely nationalism (sample item: `I am proud to be a Germana), &welfare'-chauvinism (`Only us Germans have a right to the fruits of our prosperitya), authoritarianism (`Whoever wants to educate his/her children to become good citizens must primarily demand discipline and order from thema), ethnocentrism (`It is going too far that foreigners even try to get involved with German girls and womena), and alienation (`In former times people were in better shape because everyone knew what he/she had to doa). Items had to be answered on a 4-point rating scale ranging from 0"¬ at all true' to 3"&completely true'. The scale attained a consistency of a"0.78. It also was used with teachers (a"0.86). For them reversed scores went into the index formed to measure &leftness' of the teacher (see below). To measure violent behavior of students a scale introduced by Dettenborn (1993) was used that asked both for proximity to violence as well as personal involvement in violent acts. The "rst aspect was covered by items like `In my opinion acts of hostility between students have increased in the last two to three years.a The second aspect was covered by items like `Have you yourself engaged in violent acts against other students or threatened
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
to do so?a. The 18-item scale had an a"0.81. Most items had an yes}no format. Leftness of teachers was &measured' through an index. Teachers were asked for their party preferences (`With which political party do you sympathize most?a). They were, secondly, asked for their value priorities using the Schwartz Value Survey (1992). Thirdly, as mentioned above, they were asked for right-wing attitudes. With regard to party preferences all teachers were scored as &left' who indicated a preference for the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party, or the Democratic Socialists (PDS), the successors of the old Socialist Unity Party in the GDR. All other preferences were scored as non-left. Using 58 single items the Schwartz Value Survey discriminates 10 value types, namely universalism (UN), benevolence (BE), tradition (TR), conformity (CO), security (SE), power (PO), achievement (AC), hedonism (HE), stimulation (ST), and self-direction (SD). According to Schwartz's theory, these value types form four basic dimensions of value orientations, namely self-transcendence (UN, BE), conservation of the status quo (TR, CO, SE), self-enhancement (PO, AC), and openness to change (ST, SD, HE). Teachers' scores of self-transcendence values and of openness values were used as the second part of the &leftness' index: Teachers who were above the mean on both types of value orientations were scored as &left', all other teachers were scored as non-left. As the third part of our index we used reversed scores of the right-wing attitudes scale. All teachers below the mean on the right-wing attitudes scale were scored as left, teachers above the mean were scored as non-left. Scores for the three aspects of &leftness' were added up, so that values ranging from 0 to 3 are possible. Students were also asked to judge the political orientations of their teachers. They were asked to indicate what party they assume their class-teacher (home-form tutor) to sympathize with. They also were asked for an estimate of the value preferences of their teacher using an abbreviated version of the
Among teachers HE is usually a part of openness values, whereas among (university) students it is more often a part of self-enhancement values (see Schwartz, 1992).
821
Schwartz Value Survey, namely the "rst 30 socalled terminal values. For student judgment of the &leftness' of teachers an index was formed on the basis of presumed party preference of the teacher (scoring as with teachers) and presumed teacher preferences of self-transcendence and openness values (scoring as with teachers). For students the index of 'leftness' of teachers could, thus, take the scores 0}2. The degree to which the social climate in the classroom can be described as permissively positive was measured by a selection of 39 items from the Landauer Skalen zum Sozialklima (LASSO, Saldern & Littig, 1987). Sample items read `As far as possible, our teacher tries to ful"ll requests of studentsa, `Our teacher tries hard to explain everything well to all studentsa, or `Our teacher helps us like a friend.a Analogous scales were used with students and with teachers. Items had to be answered on a 4-point rating scale ranging from 0"¬ at all true' to 3"&completely true'. After the appropriate item reversals, consistencies were a"0.88 for students and a"0.78 for teachers. Incongruity of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles was measured by multiplying the scores on Schwartz's self-transcendence value dimension and the degree of emphasis on discipline and order (a sub-selection of two items from the LASSO scale; example: `With our teacher we always have to do everything as he/she commands,a a"0.70/St, a"0.60/T). Multiplying the two scores implies that those teachers get high scores who advocate universalist and benevolence values and at the same time practice an authoritarian teaching style (or are experienced as doing so by their students).
2. Results Data analyses were conducted in two steps. First, means and standard deviations of all scales were determined and t-tests for East-West di!erences were conducted. In a second step a series of LISREL analyses were conducted to test the theoretical model depicted in Fig. 1. Results of the exploratory part of our analyses are documented in Table 2.
822
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
Table 2 Means of all scales and indicators for teachers and students in East and West Berlin Scale/indicator
&Leftness' of teacher Permissively positive social climate in the classroom Incongruity of teachers' political orientation and teaching style Violent behavior Right-wing attitudes
Students
Teachers
East Berlin
West Berlin
East Berlin
West Berlin
M
M
t
M
M
t
1.70 1.54
1.70 1.56
!0.01 !0.66
1.88 1.78
2.34 1.72
!1.73 !1.05
4.75
5.37
!2.19
8.14
8.66
!0.62
0.30 3.26
0.36 2.45
!3.43 9.74
O O
O O
Not obtained or irrelevant for the present study. p40.05. p40.01.
The table shows that there are no East}West di!erences with regard to &leftness' of teachers. Both for student estimates and for teacher self-report data, sample means are above the expected mean on the indicator (1 for the student indicator that ranges from 0 to 2), 1.5 for the teacher indicator that ranges from 0 to 3). This implies that teachers are on average moderately &left' through the eyes of students and in self-reports. Regarding the social climate in the classroom again no signi"cant East}West di!erences were found. Average scores are slightly above the expected scale mean of 1.5. Incongruity of political orientations and teaching style is judged to be signi"cantly higher in the West by students. For teacher self-reports the results are similar, but due to the smaller size of the teacher sample, the di!erence is not signi"cant. For the two dependent variables we found that violent behavior is signi"cantly more prevalent in the West, whereas agreement with right-wing attitudes is substantially higher in the East. Before we report the results of our structural analyses, a few methodological matters have to be discussed. In studies that incorporate data from two or more sources, the problem "rst has to be solved on which body of data to base analyses. At "rst glance, the most appropriate approach seems to be that of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). An attempt to analyze the data within that frame-
work was undertaken, but the data set proved to be too small (only eight schools were studied, see above) for stable "ndings. One of the remaining options is to use teacher data as the basic unit of analysis. In that case school means from our student data are merged with the data of the 96 teachers. Ideally, mean scores of those students who are taught by a speci"c teacher would be merged with the data of that teacher, but for privacy reasons we were not allowed to collect data on whether an individual student is taught by a speci"c teacher. We only know that students and teachers are at the same school. This means that for violence and right-wing extremism every teacher at a speci"c school gets the mean student score of his school as a variable. To put it technically, this means that for the 96 teachers in our study there are only eight di!erent scores for each of the two dependent variables. This certainly is a sub-optimal measurement solution and may lead to problems when running the statistical analyses. Also, it has to be stressed that using school averages of students as
Here lies the primary reason for the inappropriateness of HLM. Had we been able to match the individual students to their 96 teachers, HLM would have been possible. So, however, student data could only be merged to teacher data within the eight schools.
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
dependent variables in analyses based on the teacher data implies that individual teacher's &leftness', evaluations of the social climate in the classroom and incongruity predict the average violence and right-wing extremism at a school, not individual students' engagement in violent behavior and/or individual acceptance of right-wing attitudes. Secondly, we can also use the student data as the basic unit of analysis. In that case, however, an additional conceptual question has to be dealt with: This time the dependent variables are the individual students' involvement in violence and his or her right-wing attitudes. There are two options, though, for the inclusion of the predictor variables. Option 1 is to merge mean scores of the teachers of one school to the individual data of students from that school. In that case the average &leftness' of the faculty, the average class climate as evaluated by the teachers, and the teachers' average incongruity are the predictors of individual students' behavior and attitudes. Again, statistical problems may arise when 598 individuals have only eight di!erent scores on three decisive predictor variables. Option 2 is to use the students' judgments of the teachers' &leftness', of the social climate in class, and of the degree of incongruity of a teacher's political orientation and his/her teaching style. To choose this option would minimize statistical problems, but it would also constitute a conceptual shift. One
823
would give up two advantages of the two-datasource design of our study and would implicitly postulate that whether a student is violent or a right-winger depends on his/her subjective impressions of how a teacher &behaves'. Also, evaluations of &leftness' and of incongruity would rely on the evaluation of one teacher, the student's class teacher (home-form tutor), to whom the students' ratings solely pertain. As we see, there are advantages and disadvantages to all three approaches to data analysis. We, thus, decided to run all three types of analyses, and contrast results afterwards. We started our analyses with the teacher data set. Fig. 2 documents the signi"cant path coe$cients (p40.05) from a path analysis conducted by LISREL 8 (JoK reskog & SoK rbom, 1993). As our theoretical model is in a way a saturated model, goodness-of-"t indices for the path analysis documented in Fig. 2 are not truly informative. Even though six possible paths (covariations) are not signi"cant, indices are, however, still*as in all further analyses*more than su$cient (s/df(2, GFI'0.95). The "gure shows that, as we [not(!) Sche%er] expected, &leftness' of the teacher and a permissively positive social climate in the classroom covary negatively with student violence and right-wing extremism. Path coe$cients vary between }"!0.15 and }"!0.28. Incongruity of the teacher's political orientation and his/her
Fig. 2. Model for teacher data.
824
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
teaching style, however, covaries positively with violence and right-wing extremism (}"0.25/}"0.16). The "gure further shows that violence is higher in West Berlin (c"0.34), whereas preference of right-wing attitudes is higher in East Berlin (c"!0.69). The second test of our model is based on the student data set. As mentioned above, we have two options to test the model in the student data. Option 1 is to use mean scores of teachers for the three predictor variables, the second option is to use student estimates of the predictors as variables. Fig. 3 documents signi"cant path coe$cients from analyses entertaining Option 1 (mean teacher scores as predictors). This time, p40.01 was chosen as the signi"cance threshold in accordance with the larger sample size of the student data set. The "gure shows that in this mode of analysis three of the six model-speci"c paths can be con"rmed. The average &leftness' of teachers covaries negatively with student violence (}"!0.51). Average teacher ratings of the social climate in the classroom covary negatively with student rightwing extremism (}"!0.25). Thirdly, average incongruity covaries positively with student rightwing extremism. East}West di!erences in violence and right-wing extremism remain the same in their sign, c"0.52 for violence and c"!0.46 for right-wing extremism. Di!erences in size between
the "rst and the second analysis have their reason in the di!erent aggregation modalities of the two analyses. In the analysis documented in Fig. 2, East}West di!erences pertain to the eight school means from the student data, in the analysis documented in Fig. 3 di!erences pertain to the individual student data. A similar e!ect is found for the predictor variables. In the prior analysis, East}West di!erences pertained to individual teachers, now they pertain to the eight school means from the teacher data. Findings now are that the average &leftness' of teachers is much higher in West Berlin (c"0.75), that the social climate is on average worse in West Berlin (c"!0.21) and that incongruity is higher there, too (c"0.17). If the average social climate is more positive at a school, there tend to be more &left' teachers (}"0.33), and the less incongruity is found among the teachers of a school, the more teachers will hold &left' convictions. (}"!0.38) Our third model test was based on an analysis of student data, where not only the dependent variables, but also the predictor variables were taken from that data set. This means that, now teacher ratings of their own &leftness', teacher ratings of the classroom climate, and of their own incongruity are no longer the predictors, but student estimates thereof. Results of this analysis are documented in Fig. 4. Again all signi"cant path coe$cients (p40.01) are shown.
Fig. 3. Model for student data (with teacher means as predictors).
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
825
Fig. 4. Model for student data (student estimates only).
The analysis documented in Fig. 4 shows that &leftness' of a teacher (as judged by students) does not serve as a predictor of violence and rightwing attitudes. The social climate of a class (as experienced by students) does, however, covary negatively with violence (}"!0.33) and with right-wing extremism (}"!0.16). Even more importantly, the incongruity of political orientation and teaching style (as experienced by students) covaries positively with violence (}"0.11) and with right-wing extremism (}"0.15). East}West di!erences are again replicated in their sign, violence is higher in the West, right-wing extremism in the East. The experience of incongruity of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles is related to experiencing a bad social climate in the classroom (}"!0.38), while a bad social climate in the classroom additionally covaries with the judgment of teachers being non-&left' (}"0.24).
3. Discussion All in all, one can say that all our assumptions [not(!) Sche%er's] were con"rmed. Strongest evidence was found for Hypothesis 3, the incongruity hypothesis. Incongruity of the value orientation of an individual teacher and his/her teaching style predicted the average degree of violence and of agreement with right-wing statements among the students of the school at which the teacher taught.
The same picture emerged when student estimates of incongruity were related to violence and to right-wing extremism. Again high incongruity was related to more violence and stronger right-wing extremism. When average incongruity at a school was used as a predictor, only the relationship with right-wing attitudes could be con"rmed on the 1% signi"cance level, but the relationship with individual students' involvement with violence was signi"cant on the 5% level (not shown in Fig. 3) as well. A permissively positive social climate in the classroom (as evaluated by teachers) predicts low average levels of engagement in violence and low average levels of right-wing extremism at a school. Individual students' experience of such a climate also lowers the probability of involvement in violence and agreement with right-wing attitudes. If one uses school averages of teacher ratings as predictors of individual students' violence and rightwing extremism, the relationship also holds (though, once again, only on the 5% signi"cance level for the relationship of average social climate and involvement in violence). &Leftness' of teachers, the core predictor in Sche%er's pamphlet never serves as a predictor in Sche%er's sense. In no mode of analysis is there a "nding that would con"rm the assumption that left teachers have right (violent, xenophobic) students. On the contrary, self-reported &leftness' of individual teachers goes along with below-average
826
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
right-wing extremism at a school. Additionally, above-average mean &leftness' of the teachers of a school predicts less involvement in violence among individual students. Only student ratings of the &leftness' of their teachers shows no relationship to student violence and right-wing extremism. Before we come to conclusions that can be drawn from our "ndings, we have to caution readers that our data are correlational. When we report that, for example, incongruity predicts right-wing extremism and violence, no causal relationship is implied. It could very well be the case that a teacher's experience of violence and right-wing extremism among his/her students lead him/her to an incongruity of values and teaching style. The experience may make him/her more authoritarian in order to better cope with the given situation. Social climate could certainly also be a!ected by student violence and right-wing extremism. Only for &leftness' of the teacher it seems less plausible that student violence and right-wing extremism have a strong e!ect on it. What does hold, however, disregarding causal direction, is that a permissively positive classroom climate and &leftness' of teachers do not play the role of a risk factor for right-wing attitudes and violent behavior among youth. The risk postulated by Sche%er*if it exists at all*stems from a possible experience of phoniness of teachers among students. Teachers who possibly preach universalism and benevolence, but at the same time apply teaching methods that are in essence authoritarian may be risk factors for the &producing of violent, xenophobic students'. Reasons why teachers may be prone to become incongruent in the described manner have been discussed in the introduction. Adherents of educational reform ideas have been swept into a non#exible, possibly even unreformable institution. They may see no other way to struggle successfully in this institution than employing &the old' teaching strategies. This danger becomes even stronger when one takes into consideration that incongruity is higher in the West and that teachers are older in the West. Our empirical "nding may speak for the existence of a burnout syndrome. The older West Berlin teachers are likely to be more worn out than their younger East Berlin colleagues. They have
originally also been more &infected' with educational reform ideas. This situation may now indeed result into higher frustration and burnout among West Berlin teachers, because their educational goals were &higher' from the beginning and they have &dwelt' in a frustration-prone environment for a longer time. To voice some advice to school authorities, one could summarize as follows: (1) It may be time to hire young teachers in order to prevent incongruity through burnout among the older teachers in the West. (2) When focusing on xenophobia and violence among students, there is little need to abandon the ideas of a permissive, non-authoritarian teaching style as the basic approach to teaching. Once again, however, this fairly outspoken advice has to be watered down in a "nal cautioning remark. Our data included school- and teachingrelated variables only. In spite of the fact that substantial amounts of variance (in all modes of analyses R exceeds 15%) of violence and rightwing extremism are &explained' by teacher leftness, a permissively positive classroom climate, and incongruity of value orientations and teaching style, we have no information whatsoever whether family variables, student personality variables, or measures of the general political climate in the German society would not have been better predictors. What we can say, however, is that the school is a socialization agent that is worth studying when one is interested in the genesis of violence and right-wing extremism among youth.
References Bandura, A. (1976). Lernen am Modell [Model learning]. Stuttgart: Klett. Benner, D., Fischer, R., Gatzemann, T., GoK stemeyer, P., & Sladek, H. (1996). A$rmative und re#ektierende Lernzielorientierungen in Bildungs - und LehrplaK nen der SBZ/DDR und BRD [A$rmative and re#ective educational goal orientation in curricula of the Soviet Occupation Zone, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany]. In H. Merkens, D. Benner, and F. Schmidt, (Eds.), Bildung und Schule im Transformationsproze} von SBZ, DDR und neuen La( ndern - Untersuchungen zu Kontinuita( t und Wandel (pp. 59}81). Berlin: Institut fuK r Allgemeine PaK dagogik, Arbeitsbereich Empirische Erziehungswissenschaft.
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827 DER SPIEGEL (1993). `Linke Lehrer, rechte SchuK lera [Left teachers, right students]. DER SPIEGEL, 47(4), 41}43. Dettenborn, H. (1993). Entwicklung und Ursachen von Aggression in der Schule } wie SchuK ler daruK ber denken [Development and causes of aggression in school-how students think about it]. Pa( dagogik und Schulalltag, 48, 60}67. Deutscher Bildungsrat (1970). Empfehlungen der Bildungskommission, Bd. 7, Strukturplan fu( r das Bildungswesen [Recommendations of the Commission for Education, Vol. 7, A structural plan for the education system]. Stuttgart: Klett. Ellwein, T. (1978). Die verwaltete Schule [The administrated school]. In C. Lohmann (Ed.), Schule als soziale Organisationsform, (pp 29}41). Bad Heilbronn: Klinkhardt. Farin, K., & Seidel-Pielen, E. (1993). Ohne Gewalt la( uft nichts [Without violence nothing works]. KoK ln: Bund}Verlag. Friedeburg, L. V. (1992). Bildungsreform in Deutschland [Education reform in Germany]. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Hagan, J., Merkens, H., & Boehnke, K. (1995). Delinquency and disdain: Social capital and the control of right wing extremism among East and West Berlin youth. American Journal of Sociology, 100, 1028}1052. Heitmeyer, W., & MuK ller, J. (1995). Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt junger Menschen: biographische HintergruK nde, soziale Situationskontexte und die Bedeutung strafrechtlicher Sanktionen. [Xenophobic violence among youth: Biographic background, situational social context and the role of correctional sanctions]. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Forum. JoK reskog, K., & SoK rbom, D. (1993). LISREL 8: Structural equation modeling with the SIMPLIS command language. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. KoK hler, H. (1996). Konzept fuK r ein Datenhandbuch zur Schulgeschichte der SBZ/DDR und Perspektiven fuK r die Analyse
827
der Daten [Conceptualization of a data handbook of school history in the Soviet Occupation Zone and the German Democratic Republic, and perspectives for data analyses]. In D. Benner, H. Merkens, & T. Gatzemann, (Eds.), Pa( dagogische Eigenlogiken im Transformationsproze} von SBZ, DDR und neuen La( ndern, (pp 211}224). Berlin: Institut fuK r Allgemeine PaK dagogik, Arbeitsbereich Empirische Erziehungswissenschaft. Landesschulamt Berlin (1997). Das Schuljahr 1996/97 in Zahlen [The school year 1996/97 in numbers]. Berlin: Landesschulamt. Lederer, G., & Schmidt, P. (1995). Autoritarismus und Gesellschaft: Trendanalysen und vergleichende Jugenduntersuchungen von 1945}1993 [Authoritarianism and society: Trend analyses and comparative youth studies between 1945 and 1993]. Opladen: leske#Budrich. Picht, G. (1964). Deutsche Bildungskatastrophe. Analyse und Dokumentation [German education catastrophe. Analysis and documentation]. Freiburg: Walter. Saldern, M. V., & Littig, K. E. (1987). Landauer Skalen zum Sozialklima [Laudau scales on social climate]. Weinheim: Beltz. Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 1}65. StoK ss, R. (1993). Rechtsextremismus in Berlin 1990 [Right-wing extremism in Berlin 1990]. Berliner Arbeitshefte und Berichte zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, No. 80. Berlin: Zentralinstitut fuK r Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung. Watts, M. (1997). Xenophobia in the United Germany. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Do liberal teachers produce violent and xenophobic students? An empirical study of German ninth graders and their teachers夽 Elke Bovier, Klaus Boehnke* Department of Sociology, Chemnitz University of Technology, D-09107 Chemnitz, Germany Received 23 February 1998; received in revised form 2 October 1998; accepted 3 January 1999
Abstract A study of 96 teachers and 598 of their students from East and West Berlin is reported, testing a hypothesis that emerged in media coverage of right-wing youth violence in Germany, namely that liberal teachers are 'producing' right-wing youth, primarily due to their permissive teaching style. LISREL models show that neither do left teachers, in general, have violent and/or right-wing students, nor do permissive teachers have such students. It was, however, found that teachers who emphasize a universalistic and humanistic political value conviction, but at the same time favor an authoritarian teaching style, do indeed have more violent, right-wing extremist students. 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
The question posed in the title of the current paper may at "rst glance come as a surprise to many readers. The question can only be understood in reference to German history. The paper, thus, has to start with a brief look at the speci"cities 夽
The paper presents central results of the dissertation of the "rst author prepared under the mentorship of the second author. The dissertation is published as an Internet document in German (http://archiv.tu-chemnitz.de/pub/1998/0001). The paper was in part presented by the "rst author at the Fifth European Congress of Psychology in Dublin, Ireland, July 1997, and by the second author at the Second Project Leaders Meeting of the Carnegie Corporation Program of Research to Improve Intergroup Relations Among Youth, New York, NY, October, 1997. The research was originally funded by the Berlin-Forschung program of the Free University of Berlin. * Corresponding author. Tel.: #49-371-531-3925; fax: #49371-531-4450. E-mail address: [email protected] (K. Boehnke)
of German history pertinent to the topic of the paper. The starting point of this short overview is the end of World War II. The historic truth about Naziism and the holocaust is well-engraved in the historic knowledge of humanity. What is less known is how Germany dealt with the Nazi era in its own educational system after the war. Ways of dealing with national socialism and its crimes were in many ways diametrically opposed in the two Germanies after the war. In East Germany most teachers from the Nazi era were "red by the new regime, had voluntarily left for the West, or were dead. Many new teachers, usually with minimal training, entered schools. They emphasized the anti-fascist traditions of the new rulers. A &decreed anti-fascism' persisted all through the history of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In a certain sense, a new authoritarian regime had positioned itself on the &good'
0742-051X/99/$ - see front matter 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 7 4 2 - 0 5 1 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 1 7 - 7
816
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
side of German history without ever putting the continuity of the hierarchic command structure of the East German society (from the Nazi to the communist era) at any deliberation (see Benner et al., 1996). In West Germany the development was quite di!erent. In spite of the fact that the Allied powers, especially Americans, made major investments into a democratic reeducation of West Germany in the early post-war years, the Nazi era remained largely a blind spot in West German education for a long time. Teachers frequently were the same who had already taught during the Nazi era, there was a new enemy * communism * and Germany literally had to be rebuilt. Until the late 1960s this often meant that the years 1933}1945 did not take place at all in West German schools. Then a major shift occurred: What is now called the &Student Revolt' took place. Anti-authoritarian university students eventually brought about a major change in the cultural climate of West German society. In the schools anti-authoritarian, permissive educational principles started to become in#uential and later prevailed. By the end of the 1980s, the average political convictions of a German teacher were those of a moderate left. In this situation German uni"cation took place. In both German states the political left*the Old Left in the East, the New Left in the West*had decisive in#uence on education in the schools. Then*all of a sudden, for many neutral onlookers*the ghosts of the German past reappeared: Right-wing extremists committed arson attacks on dormitories of asylum seekers, later even on synagogues. The place names Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen in the former GDR, as well as MoK lln, Solingen, and LuK beck in West Germany went around the world. The perpetrators usually were youth, those youth that had gone or were still going through a school that was and largely is in#uenced by anti-fascist (East) and anti-authoritarian (West) traditions. Pushed by German and world media, a picture of a right-wing German youth, alienated from the main stream of society emerged. This view overlooks that*especially in the earlier incidents in the East*there were numerous applauding adult spectators on the sidewalks. On the other hand, it also
overlooks that major proportions of youth participated in powerful demonstrations against the xenophobic crimes committed by age-mates. Youth were important activists in the organization of socalled &light-chains', demonstrations that carried thousands of candles to commemorate the deaths of refugees and immigrants. Also, at about the same time, there were large paci"st children's demonstrations under the motto &No blood for oil' against the second Gulf War. Farin and Seidel-Pielen (1993) point out that there is no evidence whatsoever for a monochrome, 'brown' picture of German youth. What has to be conceded, however, is that for the "rst time in decades there were political crimes committed by rightist youth, and politically motivated juvenile delinquency accompanied by a rightist rhetoric. Social scienctists have engaged in extensive research in recent years as to the reasons for this reemergence of right-wing ideology among youth. Meredith Watts (1997), a North American political scientist, recently published a monograph on Xenophobia in the ;nited Germany. Results of the relevant research can only brie#y be summarized here. The so-called individualization approach has somewhat dominated the research "eld in Germany. Heitmeyer (e.g., Heitmeyer & MuK ller, 1995) is the most prominent advocate of that approach. In a society, says Heitmeyer, that puts an ever increasing emphasis on individual accomplishments and is at the same time ridden by economic crises, youth will resort to autocratic ideologies to cope with the uncertainties of everyday lives. Other work in the "eld draws on the classic theory of authoritarianism associated with the name Theodor W. Adorno (Lederer & Schmidt, 1995). In a nutshell, that kind of work assumes that undemocratic, repressive parenting*presumed to prevail in East Germany as a consequence of the undemocratic structure of East German society*is the source of an authoritarian right-wing orientation among youth (more so in the East than in the West). Yet other work amalgamates social capital theory (Coleman) and social control theory (Hirschi). Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke (1995), for example, see right-wing extremism as a form of juvenile delinquency that originates in reduced social control and decreasing opportunities to gain social capital in the years immediately following
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
German uni"cation. All three approaches have been able to provide empirical evidence to support their basic views. The current study, however, draws more on a "erce public debate than on earlier social scienti"c research. Fueled by the political Moderate Right, but echoed by parts of the New Left, the question was raised, how right-wing outbursts could happen given that schools had been held sway by liberals (in the West) and the Old Left (in the East). The debate culminated in a pamphlet written by Renate Sche%er, a representative of the Green Party in the parliament of the West German state of NorthRhine-Westphalia. The German news weekly DER SPIEGEL (1993) published the paper under the title &Left Teachers}Right Students?'. In the paper the question is raised whether the*alledged*permissive climate of normlessness in German schools is responsible for producing right-wing students. The implied answer is yes. Renate Sche%er and SPIEGEL journalists insist that there is considerable truth to the title under which Sche%er's pamphlet was published. To test Sche%er's postulate is the aim of the present study. To understand the central mechanisms assumed by Sche%er, a closer look at speci"cs and peculiarities of the German school system and its current status is necessary. The traditional German school system knows systematic hierarchical tracking, di!ering to some extent between the 16 German states. This means that after a comprehensive elementary school (up to Grade 4 or 6, depending on the state), student cohorts are sent to di!erent school tracks. To which track a student is sent, nominally depends on his or her academic achievement and on parental decisions. In practice, the track selection traditionally replicates social class. The weakest students usually come from lower working-class backgrounds or from immigrant groups. They are selected to go to Hauptschule and get their leaving certi"cate after Grade 9 or 10. Students from established workingclass and lower middle-class backgrounds*average achievers*are usually selected to go to Realschule. They receive their leaving certi"cate after Grade 10. Only upper middle class and upper class students were traditionally selected to go to Gymnasium (up to Grade 13). Only the Abitur, the leav-
817
ing certi"cate o!ered by the Gymnasium, allows a student to study at a university. In East Germany the traditional system was abolished by the Socialist Unity Party and supplanted by a system that can best be described as a mixture of the American and the Russian system. All students had to go to a ten-grade comprehensive school, the Polytechnische Oberschule. Afterwards about 15% of a cohort were selected*on the grounds of achievement and degree of political activism*to continue until the end of Grade 12 to obtain the traditional German high school leaving certi"cate, the Abitur (KoK hler, 1996) at the Erweiterte Oberschule. In the West the case was quite di!erent. In the 1960s the situation in West Germany*with only 10% of a cohort at most eligible for a university education (and even less "nishing it)*was described as an &education catastrophe' (Picht, 1964). The reform climate brought about by the student revolt led to many changes. There were plans to introduce a comprehensive school instead of the tripartite traditional school system. Also, it was suggested to abolish the grading of academic achievement or at least postpone it to post-puberty age (Deutscher Bildungsrat, 1970). Neither of these reforms really took place. Most German states founded ten-grade comprehensive schools in addition to the traditional three school types, but Germany-wide the new Gesamtschule draws less than 10% of a birth cohort. Grading of academic achievement was abolished in Grades 1, sometimes 2, 3, and also 4. Grade reports were substituted by anecdotal reports there, but from Grade 5 onward no substantial changes occurred. All reforms remained faint-hearted, many critics remark (Ellwein, 1978; Friedeburg, 1992). In principle, they took place within the framework of the traditional tracked German school system. What did, however, happen in the 1970s was an in#ux of teachers who were strongly sympathetic with the reform ideas. A situation emerged where reform-oriented teachers were placed in an in#exible, conservative institution not apt to serve as a frame for the implementation of educational
Today the proportion lies at about 30% (Landesschulamt Berlin, 1997).
818
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
reform ideas. Mostly in the 1970s, large numbers of new teachers were hired. In summary, one can say that the West German school is "lled with teachers who were on average very inclined to follow educational reform ideas, and were now &stuck' in a structurally conservative institution. There are numerous schools in the West where the average age of teachers is around 50. In East Germany the situation of teachers after uni"cation was unlike that in the West, but also prone to cause frustration. In GDR times teachers had to be the transmission belts of the Party. More or less overnight they then found themselves in the situation that much of what they had taught was no longer valid. Additionally, the traditional tripartite German school system was re-introduced in East Germany with only minor modi"cations. In this situation disorientation of teachers was high. Many of them were not accepted by their students, because they stood for the old regime, even if they had not held formal positions in the administrative hierarchy; they had to teach new content; they had to teach in a new school system that made it necessary to assemble new faculties; and, they had been trained for a teacher-centered, more or less authoritarian teaching style that was clearly denounced by their colleagues from the West. With this background information, Sche%er's allegation that German teachers are prone to produce &right students' may appear more lucid than it presumably did at "rst glance. In more detail, Sche%er assumed that the general permissive, anti-authoritarian class climate that*she claims*is persisting in (West) German schools, creates a normlessness in which students experience no clear dos and don'ts. This makes them prone to engage in delinquent activities which they do not really know are acceptable to the general public or not. A second, more implicitly formulated assumption can also be found in Sche%er's pamphlet. It bears more validity for the East and could be labeled the generation gap assumption. Students see adults (i.e., teachers) whom they*on average*do not like (which student really likes teachers?). They want to be di!erent from these adults, and*knowing that the adults are usually liberals*they engage in violent, xenophobic behavior which they know that adults abhor. To
formulate hypotheses on the grounds of Sche%er's argumentation we end with the following two assumptions: (1) The more a teacher has a political stance on the left of the spectrum, the more inclined his/her students will be to engage in violent every-day behavior and to express rightist political attitudes (generation gap hypothesis). (2) The more permissive, anti-authoritarian the social climate of a class, the more inclined students will be to engage in violent every-day behavior and to express rightist political attitudes (permissiveness hypothesis). In contrast to these very straightforward hypotheses, we see a third hypothesis that is still partially in line with the convictions of Sche%er but seems more plausible to us. We have described the situation of the (West) German school system above. We have tried to argue that teachers who set out as reformers found themselves &stuck' in a structurally conservative system. This situation calls for adjustments. Teachers may change their political attitudes. That obviously, however, does not happen too often. In Berlin, for example, where our study was conducted, the distinctly left teachers' union GEW regularly draws up to two thirds of the votes in board elections. A second type of adjustment could be to retain political convictions but adjust one's educational style to the demands of the structurally conservative institution teachers "nd themselves in. This second type of adjustment does, however, create a noticeable incongruity. Political orientation and teaching style no longer &"t'. In extreme cases an authoritarian teaching style is executed by a declared liberal. This combination may be seen as more prone to induce acceptance of violently xenophobic, right-wing attitudes among students. There could be a danger that liberal lipservice is*with some right*evaluated as being `phonya. This experience of phoniness may then generate oppositional &re#exes'. Our third hypothesis, thus, reads: (3) The more pronounced the incongruity between political convictions of a teacher and his/her style of teaching, the more inclined his/her
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
students will be to engage in violent every-day behavior and to express rightist political attitudes (incongruity hypothesis). We set out to test these three hypotheses in a study of ninth graders and their teachers from East and West Berlin. Given the di!erent socialization experiences of East and West Berlin teachers and students, we think it makes sense to assume that living in East or West Berlin may have an impact on violence and xenophobia that is not explainable on the grounds of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles. Also, &leftness' of teachers, social climates of classrooms and degrees of incongruities may di!er between East and West a priori. In summary, the model we test, thus, appears as documented in Fig. 1. Before we come to the test of our model we should state the we expect &our' hypotheses C1 and C2 to be rejected. Contrary to Sche%er we assume that &left' teachers are prone to have non-right, non-violent students. We also expect that teachers who are able to create a positive social climate in a class in reliance on non-authoritarian teaching styles are also prone to have non-right, non-violent students. The theoretical basis of our assumption is*in a nutshell*that of social learning and model learning theory as proposed, among others, by Bandura (1976). Thus, we do not assume that
819
Sche%er's postulates of left teachers producing right students can empirically be validated, but that, on the contrary, &leftness' and &permissiveness' are actually safeguards against violent xenophobia. Incongruity between political orientation and teaching style, however, we do see as a decisive risk factor.
1. Methods 1.1. Samples In order to test the model depicted in Fig. 1, we drew a sample of eight schools from violence-prone school districts, one from each of the four school types (mentioned above), from East and West Berlin, respectively. The rationale for selecting what we call violence-prone districts was that in spite of extensive media coverage of violent and right-wing incidents in schools, such events are by no means an overly frequent phenomenon (Dettenborn, 1993). Therefore, in order to reduce the danger of gathering a sample with extremely few violent and/or right-wing students, we resorted to what may be called clinical sampling. Our operationalization of a &violence-prone school district' was based on a pilot study. There had to be at least one report of a violent or right-wing incident for the district in 10 pilot interviews with randomly
Fig. 1. Theoretical model of in#uences of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles on violence and right-wing extremism among Adolescents.
820
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
selected teachers known to the researchers from earlier research on other topics. The "rst four districts that appeared in the interview transcripts, and were not the districts in which the interviewed teachers taught, were selected as our sampling districts. From these districts schools were selected at random (with the exclusion of schools where teachers from the pilot interviews taught). In the sampled schools we surveyed all ninth graders and their teachers. In general, response rates among students were very high. The overall average was above 80%. There was, however, one full class*30 students*at a Gymnasium that refused to participate. For teachers, response rates were considerably lower. Rates also varied to some extent between the school types. Especially in the East teachers sometimes voiced the concern that their political orientation was spied upon, something they had known all through their GDR teaching career. Overall teacher participation rates averaged some 50%. From brief encounters with the teachers who refused to participate, we gained the impression that usually those teachers refused participation who were leaning more toward the right of the political spectrum than other teachers. This bias in the teacher sample is, however, a deviation from representativeness that is acceptable for the purposes of the present study: Our hypotheses focus on teachers who politically lean toward the left. We presumably oversampled that group to some degree. The modal age of the surveyed students was 15. All in all, 598 students (290 from East Berlin, 308 from West Berlin) and 96 teachers (41 from East Berlin and 55 from West Berlin) participated. For teachers a noticeable East}West di!erence emerged with regard to age. Frequencies are documented in Table 1. The table shows that teachers in East Berlin are considerably younger than teachers in the West. This is not a sampling peculiarity but re#ects the di!erent age distributions of teachers in East and West Berlin.
Table 1 Age of teachers in East and West Berlin
The decision not to consider mentionings of the school district in which the interviewed teachers taught was taken as a safeguard against e!ects of selective attention.
Presumably to the surprise of readers in many parts of the world this item is a psychometrically sound nationalism item in surveys conducted in Germany.
Age
East Berlin (abs. freq./percent in EB)
West Berlin (abs. freq./percent in WB)
Under 30 30}39 40}49 50}59 60 and above (Missing)
6 24 4 5 1 1
2 (3.6%) 7 (12.7%) 30 (54.6%) 15 (27.3%) * 1 (1.8%)
(14.6%) (58.5%) (9.7%) (12.2%) (2.5%) (2.5%)
1.2. Instruments To measure right-wing attitudes of students we used a scale proposed by StoK ss (1993). The scale has 15 items and covers "ve dimensions of right-wing attitudes, namely nationalism (sample item: `I am proud to be a Germana), &welfare'-chauvinism (`Only us Germans have a right to the fruits of our prosperitya), authoritarianism (`Whoever wants to educate his/her children to become good citizens must primarily demand discipline and order from thema), ethnocentrism (`It is going too far that foreigners even try to get involved with German girls and womena), and alienation (`In former times people were in better shape because everyone knew what he/she had to doa). Items had to be answered on a 4-point rating scale ranging from 0"¬ at all true' to 3"&completely true'. The scale attained a consistency of a"0.78. It also was used with teachers (a"0.86). For them reversed scores went into the index formed to measure &leftness' of the teacher (see below). To measure violent behavior of students a scale introduced by Dettenborn (1993) was used that asked both for proximity to violence as well as personal involvement in violent acts. The "rst aspect was covered by items like `In my opinion acts of hostility between students have increased in the last two to three years.a The second aspect was covered by items like `Have you yourself engaged in violent acts against other students or threatened
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
to do so?a. The 18-item scale had an a"0.81. Most items had an yes}no format. Leftness of teachers was &measured' through an index. Teachers were asked for their party preferences (`With which political party do you sympathize most?a). They were, secondly, asked for their value priorities using the Schwartz Value Survey (1992). Thirdly, as mentioned above, they were asked for right-wing attitudes. With regard to party preferences all teachers were scored as &left' who indicated a preference for the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party, or the Democratic Socialists (PDS), the successors of the old Socialist Unity Party in the GDR. All other preferences were scored as non-left. Using 58 single items the Schwartz Value Survey discriminates 10 value types, namely universalism (UN), benevolence (BE), tradition (TR), conformity (CO), security (SE), power (PO), achievement (AC), hedonism (HE), stimulation (ST), and self-direction (SD). According to Schwartz's theory, these value types form four basic dimensions of value orientations, namely self-transcendence (UN, BE), conservation of the status quo (TR, CO, SE), self-enhancement (PO, AC), and openness to change (ST, SD, HE). Teachers' scores of self-transcendence values and of openness values were used as the second part of the &leftness' index: Teachers who were above the mean on both types of value orientations were scored as &left', all other teachers were scored as non-left. As the third part of our index we used reversed scores of the right-wing attitudes scale. All teachers below the mean on the right-wing attitudes scale were scored as left, teachers above the mean were scored as non-left. Scores for the three aspects of &leftness' were added up, so that values ranging from 0 to 3 are possible. Students were also asked to judge the political orientations of their teachers. They were asked to indicate what party they assume their class-teacher (home-form tutor) to sympathize with. They also were asked for an estimate of the value preferences of their teacher using an abbreviated version of the
Among teachers HE is usually a part of openness values, whereas among (university) students it is more often a part of self-enhancement values (see Schwartz, 1992).
821
Schwartz Value Survey, namely the "rst 30 socalled terminal values. For student judgment of the &leftness' of teachers an index was formed on the basis of presumed party preference of the teacher (scoring as with teachers) and presumed teacher preferences of self-transcendence and openness values (scoring as with teachers). For students the index of 'leftness' of teachers could, thus, take the scores 0}2. The degree to which the social climate in the classroom can be described as permissively positive was measured by a selection of 39 items from the Landauer Skalen zum Sozialklima (LASSO, Saldern & Littig, 1987). Sample items read `As far as possible, our teacher tries to ful"ll requests of studentsa, `Our teacher tries hard to explain everything well to all studentsa, or `Our teacher helps us like a friend.a Analogous scales were used with students and with teachers. Items had to be answered on a 4-point rating scale ranging from 0"¬ at all true' to 3"&completely true'. After the appropriate item reversals, consistencies were a"0.88 for students and a"0.78 for teachers. Incongruity of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles was measured by multiplying the scores on Schwartz's self-transcendence value dimension and the degree of emphasis on discipline and order (a sub-selection of two items from the LASSO scale; example: `With our teacher we always have to do everything as he/she commands,a a"0.70/St, a"0.60/T). Multiplying the two scores implies that those teachers get high scores who advocate universalist and benevolence values and at the same time practice an authoritarian teaching style (or are experienced as doing so by their students).
2. Results Data analyses were conducted in two steps. First, means and standard deviations of all scales were determined and t-tests for East-West di!erences were conducted. In a second step a series of LISREL analyses were conducted to test the theoretical model depicted in Fig. 1. Results of the exploratory part of our analyses are documented in Table 2.
822
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
Table 2 Means of all scales and indicators for teachers and students in East and West Berlin Scale/indicator
&Leftness' of teacher Permissively positive social climate in the classroom Incongruity of teachers' political orientation and teaching style Violent behavior Right-wing attitudes
Students
Teachers
East Berlin
West Berlin
East Berlin
West Berlin
M
M
t
M
M
t
1.70 1.54
1.70 1.56
!0.01 !0.66
1.88 1.78
2.34 1.72
!1.73 !1.05
4.75
5.37
!2.19
8.14
8.66
!0.62
0.30 3.26
0.36 2.45
!3.43 9.74
O O
O O
Not obtained or irrelevant for the present study. p40.05. p40.01.
The table shows that there are no East}West di!erences with regard to &leftness' of teachers. Both for student estimates and for teacher self-report data, sample means are above the expected mean on the indicator (1 for the student indicator that ranges from 0 to 2), 1.5 for the teacher indicator that ranges from 0 to 3). This implies that teachers are on average moderately &left' through the eyes of students and in self-reports. Regarding the social climate in the classroom again no signi"cant East}West di!erences were found. Average scores are slightly above the expected scale mean of 1.5. Incongruity of political orientations and teaching style is judged to be signi"cantly higher in the West by students. For teacher self-reports the results are similar, but due to the smaller size of the teacher sample, the di!erence is not signi"cant. For the two dependent variables we found that violent behavior is signi"cantly more prevalent in the West, whereas agreement with right-wing attitudes is substantially higher in the East. Before we report the results of our structural analyses, a few methodological matters have to be discussed. In studies that incorporate data from two or more sources, the problem "rst has to be solved on which body of data to base analyses. At "rst glance, the most appropriate approach seems to be that of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). An attempt to analyze the data within that frame-
work was undertaken, but the data set proved to be too small (only eight schools were studied, see above) for stable "ndings. One of the remaining options is to use teacher data as the basic unit of analysis. In that case school means from our student data are merged with the data of the 96 teachers. Ideally, mean scores of those students who are taught by a speci"c teacher would be merged with the data of that teacher, but for privacy reasons we were not allowed to collect data on whether an individual student is taught by a speci"c teacher. We only know that students and teachers are at the same school. This means that for violence and right-wing extremism every teacher at a speci"c school gets the mean student score of his school as a variable. To put it technically, this means that for the 96 teachers in our study there are only eight di!erent scores for each of the two dependent variables. This certainly is a sub-optimal measurement solution and may lead to problems when running the statistical analyses. Also, it has to be stressed that using school averages of students as
Here lies the primary reason for the inappropriateness of HLM. Had we been able to match the individual students to their 96 teachers, HLM would have been possible. So, however, student data could only be merged to teacher data within the eight schools.
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
dependent variables in analyses based on the teacher data implies that individual teacher's &leftness', evaluations of the social climate in the classroom and incongruity predict the average violence and right-wing extremism at a school, not individual students' engagement in violent behavior and/or individual acceptance of right-wing attitudes. Secondly, we can also use the student data as the basic unit of analysis. In that case, however, an additional conceptual question has to be dealt with: This time the dependent variables are the individual students' involvement in violence and his or her right-wing attitudes. There are two options, though, for the inclusion of the predictor variables. Option 1 is to merge mean scores of the teachers of one school to the individual data of students from that school. In that case the average &leftness' of the faculty, the average class climate as evaluated by the teachers, and the teachers' average incongruity are the predictors of individual students' behavior and attitudes. Again, statistical problems may arise when 598 individuals have only eight di!erent scores on three decisive predictor variables. Option 2 is to use the students' judgments of the teachers' &leftness', of the social climate in class, and of the degree of incongruity of a teacher's political orientation and his/her teaching style. To choose this option would minimize statistical problems, but it would also constitute a conceptual shift. One
823
would give up two advantages of the two-datasource design of our study and would implicitly postulate that whether a student is violent or a right-winger depends on his/her subjective impressions of how a teacher &behaves'. Also, evaluations of &leftness' and of incongruity would rely on the evaluation of one teacher, the student's class teacher (home-form tutor), to whom the students' ratings solely pertain. As we see, there are advantages and disadvantages to all three approaches to data analysis. We, thus, decided to run all three types of analyses, and contrast results afterwards. We started our analyses with the teacher data set. Fig. 2 documents the signi"cant path coe$cients (p40.05) from a path analysis conducted by LISREL 8 (JoK reskog & SoK rbom, 1993). As our theoretical model is in a way a saturated model, goodness-of-"t indices for the path analysis documented in Fig. 2 are not truly informative. Even though six possible paths (covariations) are not signi"cant, indices are, however, still*as in all further analyses*more than su$cient (s/df(2, GFI'0.95). The "gure shows that, as we [not(!) Sche%er] expected, &leftness' of the teacher and a permissively positive social climate in the classroom covary negatively with student violence and right-wing extremism. Path coe$cients vary between }"!0.15 and }"!0.28. Incongruity of the teacher's political orientation and his/her
Fig. 2. Model for teacher data.
824
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
teaching style, however, covaries positively with violence and right-wing extremism (}"0.25/}"0.16). The "gure further shows that violence is higher in West Berlin (c"0.34), whereas preference of right-wing attitudes is higher in East Berlin (c"!0.69). The second test of our model is based on the student data set. As mentioned above, we have two options to test the model in the student data. Option 1 is to use mean scores of teachers for the three predictor variables, the second option is to use student estimates of the predictors as variables. Fig. 3 documents signi"cant path coe$cients from analyses entertaining Option 1 (mean teacher scores as predictors). This time, p40.01 was chosen as the signi"cance threshold in accordance with the larger sample size of the student data set. The "gure shows that in this mode of analysis three of the six model-speci"c paths can be con"rmed. The average &leftness' of teachers covaries negatively with student violence (}"!0.51). Average teacher ratings of the social climate in the classroom covary negatively with student rightwing extremism (}"!0.25). Thirdly, average incongruity covaries positively with student rightwing extremism. East}West di!erences in violence and right-wing extremism remain the same in their sign, c"0.52 for violence and c"!0.46 for right-wing extremism. Di!erences in size between
the "rst and the second analysis have their reason in the di!erent aggregation modalities of the two analyses. In the analysis documented in Fig. 2, East}West di!erences pertain to the eight school means from the student data, in the analysis documented in Fig. 3 di!erences pertain to the individual student data. A similar e!ect is found for the predictor variables. In the prior analysis, East}West di!erences pertained to individual teachers, now they pertain to the eight school means from the teacher data. Findings now are that the average &leftness' of teachers is much higher in West Berlin (c"0.75), that the social climate is on average worse in West Berlin (c"!0.21) and that incongruity is higher there, too (c"0.17). If the average social climate is more positive at a school, there tend to be more &left' teachers (}"0.33), and the less incongruity is found among the teachers of a school, the more teachers will hold &left' convictions. (}"!0.38) Our third model test was based on an analysis of student data, where not only the dependent variables, but also the predictor variables were taken from that data set. This means that, now teacher ratings of their own &leftness', teacher ratings of the classroom climate, and of their own incongruity are no longer the predictors, but student estimates thereof. Results of this analysis are documented in Fig. 4. Again all signi"cant path coe$cients (p40.01) are shown.
Fig. 3. Model for student data (with teacher means as predictors).
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
825
Fig. 4. Model for student data (student estimates only).
The analysis documented in Fig. 4 shows that &leftness' of a teacher (as judged by students) does not serve as a predictor of violence and rightwing attitudes. The social climate of a class (as experienced by students) does, however, covary negatively with violence (}"!0.33) and with right-wing extremism (}"!0.16). Even more importantly, the incongruity of political orientation and teaching style (as experienced by students) covaries positively with violence (}"0.11) and with right-wing extremism (}"0.15). East}West di!erences are again replicated in their sign, violence is higher in the West, right-wing extremism in the East. The experience of incongruity of teachers' political orientations and teaching styles is related to experiencing a bad social climate in the classroom (}"!0.38), while a bad social climate in the classroom additionally covaries with the judgment of teachers being non-&left' (}"0.24).
3. Discussion All in all, one can say that all our assumptions [not(!) Sche%er's] were con"rmed. Strongest evidence was found for Hypothesis 3, the incongruity hypothesis. Incongruity of the value orientation of an individual teacher and his/her teaching style predicted the average degree of violence and of agreement with right-wing statements among the students of the school at which the teacher taught.
The same picture emerged when student estimates of incongruity were related to violence and to right-wing extremism. Again high incongruity was related to more violence and stronger right-wing extremism. When average incongruity at a school was used as a predictor, only the relationship with right-wing attitudes could be con"rmed on the 1% signi"cance level, but the relationship with individual students' involvement with violence was signi"cant on the 5% level (not shown in Fig. 3) as well. A permissively positive social climate in the classroom (as evaluated by teachers) predicts low average levels of engagement in violence and low average levels of right-wing extremism at a school. Individual students' experience of such a climate also lowers the probability of involvement in violence and agreement with right-wing attitudes. If one uses school averages of teacher ratings as predictors of individual students' violence and rightwing extremism, the relationship also holds (though, once again, only on the 5% signi"cance level for the relationship of average social climate and involvement in violence). &Leftness' of teachers, the core predictor in Sche%er's pamphlet never serves as a predictor in Sche%er's sense. In no mode of analysis is there a "nding that would con"rm the assumption that left teachers have right (violent, xenophobic) students. On the contrary, self-reported &leftness' of individual teachers goes along with below-average
826
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827
right-wing extremism at a school. Additionally, above-average mean &leftness' of the teachers of a school predicts less involvement in violence among individual students. Only student ratings of the &leftness' of their teachers shows no relationship to student violence and right-wing extremism. Before we come to conclusions that can be drawn from our "ndings, we have to caution readers that our data are correlational. When we report that, for example, incongruity predicts right-wing extremism and violence, no causal relationship is implied. It could very well be the case that a teacher's experience of violence and right-wing extremism among his/her students lead him/her to an incongruity of values and teaching style. The experience may make him/her more authoritarian in order to better cope with the given situation. Social climate could certainly also be a!ected by student violence and right-wing extremism. Only for &leftness' of the teacher it seems less plausible that student violence and right-wing extremism have a strong e!ect on it. What does hold, however, disregarding causal direction, is that a permissively positive classroom climate and &leftness' of teachers do not play the role of a risk factor for right-wing attitudes and violent behavior among youth. The risk postulated by Sche%er*if it exists at all*stems from a possible experience of phoniness of teachers among students. Teachers who possibly preach universalism and benevolence, but at the same time apply teaching methods that are in essence authoritarian may be risk factors for the &producing of violent, xenophobic students'. Reasons why teachers may be prone to become incongruent in the described manner have been discussed in the introduction. Adherents of educational reform ideas have been swept into a non#exible, possibly even unreformable institution. They may see no other way to struggle successfully in this institution than employing &the old' teaching strategies. This danger becomes even stronger when one takes into consideration that incongruity is higher in the West and that teachers are older in the West. Our empirical "nding may speak for the existence of a burnout syndrome. The older West Berlin teachers are likely to be more worn out than their younger East Berlin colleagues. They have
originally also been more &infected' with educational reform ideas. This situation may now indeed result into higher frustration and burnout among West Berlin teachers, because their educational goals were &higher' from the beginning and they have &dwelt' in a frustration-prone environment for a longer time. To voice some advice to school authorities, one could summarize as follows: (1) It may be time to hire young teachers in order to prevent incongruity through burnout among the older teachers in the West. (2) When focusing on xenophobia and violence among students, there is little need to abandon the ideas of a permissive, non-authoritarian teaching style as the basic approach to teaching. Once again, however, this fairly outspoken advice has to be watered down in a "nal cautioning remark. Our data included school- and teachingrelated variables only. In spite of the fact that substantial amounts of variance (in all modes of analyses R exceeds 15%) of violence and rightwing extremism are &explained' by teacher leftness, a permissively positive classroom climate, and incongruity of value orientations and teaching style, we have no information whatsoever whether family variables, student personality variables, or measures of the general political climate in the German society would not have been better predictors. What we can say, however, is that the school is a socialization agent that is worth studying when one is interested in the genesis of violence and right-wing extremism among youth.
References Bandura, A. (1976). Lernen am Modell [Model learning]. Stuttgart: Klett. Benner, D., Fischer, R., Gatzemann, T., GoK stemeyer, P., & Sladek, H. (1996). A$rmative und re#ektierende Lernzielorientierungen in Bildungs - und LehrplaK nen der SBZ/DDR und BRD [A$rmative and re#ective educational goal orientation in curricula of the Soviet Occupation Zone, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany]. In H. Merkens, D. Benner, and F. Schmidt, (Eds.), Bildung und Schule im Transformationsproze} von SBZ, DDR und neuen La( ndern - Untersuchungen zu Kontinuita( t und Wandel (pp. 59}81). Berlin: Institut fuK r Allgemeine PaK dagogik, Arbeitsbereich Empirische Erziehungswissenschaft.
E. Bovier, K. Boehnke / Teaching and Teacher Education 15 (1999) 815}827 DER SPIEGEL (1993). `Linke Lehrer, rechte SchuK lera [Left teachers, right students]. DER SPIEGEL, 47(4), 41}43. Dettenborn, H. (1993). Entwicklung und Ursachen von Aggression in der Schule } wie SchuK ler daruK ber denken [Development and causes of aggression in school-how students think about it]. Pa( dagogik und Schulalltag, 48, 60}67. Deutscher Bildungsrat (1970). Empfehlungen der Bildungskommission, Bd. 7, Strukturplan fu( r das Bildungswesen [Recommendations of the Commission for Education, Vol. 7, A structural plan for the education system]. Stuttgart: Klett. Ellwein, T. (1978). Die verwaltete Schule [The administrated school]. In C. Lohmann (Ed.), Schule als soziale Organisationsform, (pp 29}41). Bad Heilbronn: Klinkhardt. Farin, K., & Seidel-Pielen, E. (1993). Ohne Gewalt la( uft nichts [Without violence nothing works]. KoK ln: Bund}Verlag. Friedeburg, L. V. (1992). Bildungsreform in Deutschland [Education reform in Germany]. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Hagan, J., Merkens, H., & Boehnke, K. (1995). Delinquency and disdain: Social capital and the control of right wing extremism among East and West Berlin youth. American Journal of Sociology, 100, 1028}1052. Heitmeyer, W., & MuK ller, J. (1995). Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt junger Menschen: biographische HintergruK nde, soziale Situationskontexte und die Bedeutung strafrechtlicher Sanktionen. [Xenophobic violence among youth: Biographic background, situational social context and the role of correctional sanctions]. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Forum. JoK reskog, K., & SoK rbom, D. (1993). LISREL 8: Structural equation modeling with the SIMPLIS command language. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. KoK hler, H. (1996). Konzept fuK r ein Datenhandbuch zur Schulgeschichte der SBZ/DDR und Perspektiven fuK r die Analyse
827
der Daten [Conceptualization of a data handbook of school history in the Soviet Occupation Zone and the German Democratic Republic, and perspectives for data analyses]. In D. Benner, H. Merkens, & T. Gatzemann, (Eds.), Pa( dagogische Eigenlogiken im Transformationsproze} von SBZ, DDR und neuen La( ndern, (pp 211}224). Berlin: Institut fuK r Allgemeine PaK dagogik, Arbeitsbereich Empirische Erziehungswissenschaft. Landesschulamt Berlin (1997). Das Schuljahr 1996/97 in Zahlen [The school year 1996/97 in numbers]. Berlin: Landesschulamt. Lederer, G., & Schmidt, P. (1995). Autoritarismus und Gesellschaft: Trendanalysen und vergleichende Jugenduntersuchungen von 1945}1993 [Authoritarianism and society: Trend analyses and comparative youth studies between 1945 and 1993]. Opladen: leske#Budrich. Picht, G. (1964). Deutsche Bildungskatastrophe. Analyse und Dokumentation [German education catastrophe. Analysis and documentation]. Freiburg: Walter. Saldern, M. V., & Littig, K. E. (1987). Landauer Skalen zum Sozialklima [Laudau scales on social climate]. Weinheim: Beltz. Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 1}65. StoK ss, R. (1993). Rechtsextremismus in Berlin 1990 [Right-wing extremism in Berlin 1990]. Berliner Arbeitshefte und Berichte zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, No. 80. Berlin: Zentralinstitut fuK r Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung. Watts, M. (1997). Xenophobia in the United Germany. New York: St. Martin's Press.