Economie development and land policies in the highlands and islands of Scotland

Economic development and land policies in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland M.G. Lloyd and D.M. Shu~ks~ith

This paper explores the complex relationship between economic development and land use in a remote part of the UK - the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. It is suggested that the essential link between land reform and economic development is obscured in the Highlands and Islands. The historic reasons for this are given in detail and attached to the argument that the problems of the area have never been fully addressed. The authors state that many government policies in the area have been on an ad hoc basis and the background and achievements of the Highlands and Islands Development Board are given. The authors conclude with a plea for further legislative changes. Keywords: land reform; Highlands Islands; economic development

and

Mr Shucksmith and Mr Lloyd are lecturers in the Department of Land Economy, Universi~ of Aberdeen, Edward Wright Building, Old Aberdeen, AB9 2TY, UK. ‘M. Gray, ‘The abolition of runrig in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland’, Economic History Review, Vol 5, No 1, pp 46-57. *J. Hunter, ‘The politics of Highland land reform 1983-l 995’, Scottish Historical Review, Vol 53, pp 45-68. 3The 1707 Act of Union ioined Scotland to England for the first time. 4T. Dickson, Scottish Cauifalism: Class. Stafe and Nation from befbre fhe Union to the Present, Lawrence and Wishart, London, UK, 1980. ‘E.K. Hunt and H.J. Sherman, Economics: an /n~roducf;on to Tradj~jonaf and Radical News, Harper and Row, New York, NY, USA, 1981. ‘G. Dalton, Economic Systems and Sociefy, Penguin, Harmondsworth, UK, 1974. ‘J. Ratcliffe. Land Policy: An Exploration of continued on p 115

114

Until the early 18th century the Highlands and Islands area was primarily a peasant agrarian society, consisting of a small aristocracy and numerous perceived

smallholders.

by those

keen

The prevailing

system of land tenure was

to commercialize

Highland

agriculture

to

consist of ‘individual small holdings, dispersed strips, ill defined peasant rights. collective practices’. ’ This essentially feudal system was known as runrig, and was the basis of communal

stability and of the Highland

economy.’ Following the 1707 Act of Union.’ however. the Scottish economy was tr~~Ilsf(~rnle~ from feu~~lli~rn to in~ustri~~l ~~ipit~llisrn.~ hastened in the Highl~ln~s by the ~ism~Intling of the clans. particularly after the Jacobite rebellions.

Hunt and Sherman trace the changing rote

of land during such a fundamental implications

for society.’

transformation.

In a feudal

society.

and demonstrate custom,

tradition

its and

social relationships hinge an the degree of accessibility to land itself. The communal use of land is often a fundamental characteristic of such a society. The rise of industrial capitalism and the penetration of agrarian land use practices by commercial principles, however, cmphosize the private derivation

of

ownership property

of the land resource

income

from

land.”

and specifically The

transition

the from

~~rnrnun~~l use to the private ~~~vn~rship of Iand thus derived from the emergence of :t private commercial ideology. with signi~i~~~nt effects on social and economic relnti<>nships. Further. ‘an age when scant regard was paid to land

as as

Ratcliffe ii scarce

argues, this was national rcsourcc

to be deployed in iI manner amenable to the interests of the community as a whole’.’ The brutal means by which such communally held land was expropriated

in the Highlands

in order to accommodate

the profitable

Cheviot sheep. and the voluntary and cnforccd emigration of the populiition through the infamous Clenrances has been documented in detail elsewhere.’ The consequence of these complex changes and cvcnts was that ‘a labour intensive, communal economy gave W:I~ to ;I land intensive, in~ivi~i~I~llisti~ framework’.“ This w;\s based primarily on crafting. The crofters were allocated small in~iivi~u~~l holdings of poor enclosed land, with shares in common grazings: the crofters were thus forced to undertake ancillary work such as kelping, fishing and Inbouring in order to p;ly rent to the landlord. The declinin g fertility of the plots. the collapse of kelping, and the increasing poverty of the crofters came to

0264-8377/85/02114-12

$03.00 0 1985 Butterworth

& Co (Publishers)

Ltd

Economic

Greg Lloyd

Mark Shucksmith

continued from p 114 the Nature of Land in Society, Hutchinson, London, UK, 1976, p 25. ‘M. Gray, The Highland Economy, 775s 1850, 1957; J. Hunter, The Making of the Croffing Community, John Donald, Edinburgh, UK, 1976; ES. Richards, A History of Highland Clearances, Croom Helm, Beckenham, UK, 1982; J.M. Bumstead, The People’s Clearance 1760-1815, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, UK, 1982. ‘ES. Richards, ‘Structural change in a regional economy: Sutherland and the Industrial Revolution, 1930-1830’, Economic History Review, Vol 26, pp 63-76. “D.W. Crowley, ‘The “Crofters Party”, 1885-l 892’, Scottish Historical Review, Vol 35, pp 110-126. “Hunter, op tit, Ref 8. “J.G. Kellas, ‘The Crofter’s war 18821888’, History Today, Vol 12, pp 281-288. ‘?bid. 140p tit, Ref 10. 150p tit, Ref 2, p 49. continued on p 7 16

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light explicitly following the 1846 Potato Famine. The apalling circumstances of the crafting community gradually created the conditions in which the crofters’ grievances came to be articulated. Crowley notes that ‘although the day of the notorious clearances was over, they had no security of tenure, the rents of many had been raised several times during the preceding decade, not a few were living in extreme poverty, and evictions seem to have been frequent. Many had recently moved to less fertile holdings to make way for sheep grazing or sporting preserves; some were still in the process of losing common grazings to their landlords’.“’ Hunter chronicles the actions taken by many crofters, and Kellas suggests that such agitation and often ending in violence,” agrarian unrest led directly. if slowly, to a revolution in land tenure in the Highlands.” The demands of the crofters were ‘largely legal and economic, having reference to security of tenure, the fixing of fair rents, and the extension of holdings’.” The demand for more land was particularly crucial, reinforced by a strong sense of grievance arising from the landowners’ abuse of land which the crofters believed was the traditional and communal property of the clans.” As a result, however, of ‘mounting political pressure, coupled with the impact of renewed violence in established a Royal Commission in 1883 to Skye’,‘5 the government enquire into crafting conditions. The Report of the Napier Commission (1884) may be seen as a turning point in the history of the Highlands and Islands, both because of its proposals for land reform,‘” and as the first recognition by government of the problems of the area. MacPhail analyses the context for the Napier Commission and its work in detail.” Its Report was primarily a critique of the historical circumstances of the Highlanders and the crafting communities. Its proposals for change were aimed at overcoming the worst abuses of the crafting system, but it rejected the basic crofters’ demands of fixity of tenure, free sale of holdings, and a downward revision of rents. In place of these, the Napier Commission set out to stabilize the crafting townships, although associated but limited powers for enlarging the area of cultivated land were envisaged. The emphasis therefore was on the traditional basis of crafting through the communal use of land, particularly with respect to cattle grazing. Given the prevailing and dominant private ideology of this periodix such a proposal must be viewed as an imaginative attempt to solve the highland land question with a specifically highland solution. Nonetheless ‘The Commission anticipated objection to the township proposals on the ground that they would give legal sanction to a system of common occupation which was not conducive to agricultural progress’. I” The Napier Report remains of considerable significance today, both as a formidable indictment of the landowning class in the Highlands,“’ and as a first attempt at reform. As anticipated, however, the dominant ideology and the political influence of vested landowning interests ensured that on the one hand the proposals were not radical in nature,” and on the other that even these would be rejected by Parliament. MacCuish argues that ‘the Commission missed the opportunity to propose a sound basis for legislation that would make amends for past wrongs. Axiomatic acceptance of the existing order and of the sanctity of proprietary rights made it impossible for the Commission to produce the radical recommendation that might have matched the need’.‘2 As a

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Economic development and land policies

consequence its proposals proved unacceptable to government and to the crofters. In the resulting vacuum, fresh violence developed and crofters resorted ‘to terrorist tactics of destruction and intimidation . . Time and again fences were pulled down, ricks fired, sheep driven from the grazings’.” The government responded with military force, as at Skye, and this together with the emergence of a Crofters Party at Westn~inster~2~ eventually forced the government to instigate Highland reforms in 1886. These were quite different from the proposals of the Napier Commission which ultimately ‘fell to laissez-faire scepticism’.” The Crofters’ Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886 is significant as the first legislative measure concerned with land in the Highlands and Islands. It initiated reforms which stressed the rights of individual crofters as opposed to the interests of the wider crafting community, and further, it laid the foundation for subsequent ‘attempts to solve the crafting problem by means of officially sponsored economic development’.‘” As a consequence, since 1886 the Highland problem has been perceived partly as a problem of crafting land tenure and partly as a problem of economic underdevelopment.

Crofting land reforms and initiatives

conihued from p I 15 16D.J. MacCuish, ‘Ninety years

of crafting legislation and administration’, Transactions, Gaelic Society of fnwerness, Vol 50, pp 296-336. ‘%M.M. MacPhail, ‘The Napier Commission’, Transactions, Gaelic Sociefy of fnverness, Vol 48, pp 435-472. ‘*J. Scott, The Upper Classes: Property and Privilege in Britain, Macmillan, London, 1982. 19D.J. MacCuish, ‘The origin and development of crafting law’, Transactions, Gaelic Society of Inverness, Vol 43, pp asi 13. 2oOp tit, Ref 12. “0. Massey and A. Catalano, Capital and Land: Land Ownership by Capital in Greaf Britain, Edward Arnold, London, 1976 “Op tit, Ref 16, p 297. 23K Stewart. Crofts and Crowing, ~iiliam Blackwood, Edinburgh, UK, 1980, p 12. 240p cit. Ref 10. ?. Dewey, ‘Celtic agrarian legislation and the Celtic Revival: Histories and implications of Glaston’s Irish and Scottish Land Acts 167&l 886’, Past and Present, Vol64, pp 30-70. 260p tit, Ref 2. 270p tit, Ref 19. z8G.C.H. Paton and J.G.S. Cameron, The Law of Landlord and Tenant in Scotland, The Scottish Universities Law Institute, Edinburgh, UK, 1967. “Op tit, Ref 12. -Ibid.

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The Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886 established the basic principles and characteristics of legislation as it relates to land use and tenure in the crafting counties of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. As MacCuish points out,” prior to this legislation there was no separate body of law specific to crafting, and crofts were subject to the ordinary agricultural law of Scotland. The details of this and subsequent crafting measures arc usefully outlined in Paton and Cameron.‘X This section of the paper identifies the main thrust in crafting land reforms to the present. The 1886 Act was based not on the findings and recommend~ltions of the Napier Commission brit drew heavily on the model of land reform which had been introduced to deal with the land question in Ireland. In broad terms, the legislation provided for the statutory protection of tenure of individual crofters, subject to certain conditions: fair rents; the compensation for improvements made to the property by the crofter during the tenancy; and finally, the right of bequest within the crofter’s family. An aspect of the legislation specific to crafting was its administration, as it ‘established the Crofters Commission to fix fair rents and gave security of tenure to all crofters whose rents were under f15 per year’.“‘The 1egisIation applied to the crafting counties - Argyll. Inverness. Caithness, SLItherl~ln~i, and Ross and Cromarty. The immediate impact of the reformist legislation was powerful. and stability, the Kellas argues, ‘It brought an era of improvement replacement of thatched “black houses” by neat stone buildings. and a better landlord-tenant relationship, since evictions for non payment of rent became a rarity’.3” Despite this advance in crafting conditions,there remained a fundamental weakness in the legislation. This was the failure to return to the crafting population the lands from which they had been dispossessed. This was remedied in part with the Congested Districts (Scotland) Act 1897, which established a Congested Districts Board “to provide, equip and adapt land for occupation by crofters and fishermen, to whom grants and loans could be given, to assist crofters in rni~r~~ting

LAND USE POLICY

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Economic

3’0~ tit, Ref 28. 320p cif, Ref 19, p 195. 330p tit, Ref 28. 34D Turnock, Patterns of Highland Devel&menf, Macmillan, London, UK, 1970, p 70. 350p tit, Ref 16. 360p &it, Ref 19. 370p tit, Ref 16.

LAND USE POLICY April 1985

developmenr

and land policies

from these districts, to develop and improve the agriculture and fishing industries and to develop spinning, weaving and other rural This legislation thus provided wider powers for land industries’.3’ settlement, and represents an early attempt at the fusion of land reform with economic development policies. Attention was deflected from the crafting case, however, with the Small Landowners (Scotland) Act 1911. This provided a new system of tenure for existing holdings throughout Scotland. The legislation dissolved the Crofters Commission and the Congested Districts Board, replacing these bodies with the Board of Agriculture and the Land Court of Scotland. Although the powers for land resettlement were again strengthened, in terms of the crafting interest ‘the Act of 1919 did not introduce any major changes in the existing law’.” The concern with resettlement issues continued in Scotland, as opposed to the crafting areas alone, with the Land Settlement (Scotland) Act 1919. This ‘extended the powers and duties of the Board of Agriculture, authorising it to purchase land anywhere in Scotland by agreement or conlpulsorily for land settlement without restriction and to assist the provision of equipment and the adaptation of land acquired for settlement’.3” This heralded a period of active land reform, concerned in the main with small holders, throlI~hout Scotland, although as Hunter (1976) documents, progress was slow in the crafting areas due to the landowners’ opposition to the scheme. Nonetheless ‘a number of farms were acquired and divided into small holdings throughout Scotland. In the crafting counties, however, where the new holdings qualified for croft status along with the original letted holdings created in the early nineteenth century, no fewer than 44 000 acres of arable and SO7 000 acres of grazing went to form 1 999 new small holdings and enlarge 1 922 others between 1922 and 1933. It was a record far superior to that even of the Congested Districts Board, which only dealt with 3 000 acres of arable and 130 000 acres of hill in their resettlement schemes’.3J A turning point in the interests of the crafting p~~pulation was the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955, which ‘restored to the crofters in the seven crafting counties their own special code of law, consisting in the main of a consolidation with some amendment of the existing statutory provisions from 18X6 onwards’.3s This legislation was partially based on the findings of the Taylor Commission of Enquiry into Crafting Conditions which reported in 1954. Its practical effects may be considered marginal, however, as MacCuish further argues ‘so far as the law of the croft is concerned the Act introduced little change. The rights of assignation and bequest were widened, subject to Commission approval, and there was provision to secure that when a crofter died his successor was traced and the tenancy put into his name without undue delay.“‘The Act created a new Crofters Commission which was charged with the reorganization, development and regulation of crafting. It was given the responsibility of controlling the reletting of crofts and administering land improvement grants. The Commission can also dispossess absentee crofters whose crofts can then be relet in the general crafting interest. This may be seen as a significant reassertion of the rights of the community over the rights of the individual crofter. As MacCuish documents in detail, the Commission was at first concerned with the traditional approach of reorganizing the crafting townships.“’ A re~~rientation in approach soon followed, however, and further reforms of crafting tenure were sought.

117

381b;d. 390p tit, Ref 19, p 196. 4oOp tit, Ref 16, p 312. 4’/bid; op cif, Ref 19. 42James Grassie, High/and Experiment, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, UK, 1983, p 70. 430p tit, Ref 16. 44D.J. MacCuish, ‘The case for converting crafting tenure to ownership’, Transactions, Gaelic Society of Inverness, Vol 48, pp 89-l 13. 450p tit, Ref 43, p 66. 46D.J. MacCuish, ‘Reform of crafting tenure’, Transactions, Gaelic Society of lnvemess, Vol48, pp 557-583. 470p tit, Ref 16.

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Amending legislation was introduced in the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1961, which, although it did not provide the full range of changes argued for by the Crofters Commission. still represents a watershed in crafting history.3x Indeed as MacCuish further suggests, up to this point the forms ‘were more concerned with land settlement and with changes in administration than with changes in the body of the law itself’.“” From this point on, the issues of agricultural efficiency, and the need for ec~~n~)~~ic dev~iopmcnt in the Highi~~lids were fused with issues of land reform. As MacCuish notes,~‘Reorg~lIiis~tion of crafting townships, on which the Taylor Commission had laid great store. was not a pnnacca. The popular idea of wholesale enlargement of crofts providing :I solution was not realistic. The Highlands required capital investment like any other underdeveloped area’.“’ This change in emphasis is important in terms of land policies in the Highlands and Islands, and in terms of the subsequent economic policies introduced by government agencies. MacCuish iiiustratcs how at first the Crofters Commission attempted to rationalize crofting agriculture into an efficient economic activity.” In terms of land tenure however, ‘the crofters’ security of tenure had to be pr~)gressiveiy loosened SO that the ordinary economic trends could operate to bring croft land into the hand of those who wzere prepnrecl to work it‘. Such measures were reyuestcd in the 1961 legislation but were not granted to the Crofters Commission. The arguments for economic development of the Highlands and Islands eventually found expression in the creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB). This was not entirely a new initiative, as Grassic notes ‘attempts had been made since the immediate aftermath of Cuiioden to encourage development’,‘” and as early as 1897 the Congested Districts Board had been set up to devciop fishing and farming, and to provide infr~structur~i improvements. The forln~tion of the HIDB enc~~ur~l~ed the Crofters C~~rnrnissi~~n to press for the reform of crafting land tenure. The Crofters C(~mrnissi(~n argued that reform was necessary in order to facilitate the broader development sought by the government and the HIDB.‘j The arguments for such reform were powerful. In the first place the prevailing tenure system would be an obstacle to economic advance and secondly, as MacCuish outlines, the crofters’ security of tenure had in fact been seriously eroded since the original legislation in 1886 and there was a case for its strengthening.44 This is supported by Turnock who argues that up to this time ‘the effect of the legislation was to fossilize the crafting landscape as it happened to appear in 18%. Change is now frustr~~ted by the high degree of security which crofters enjoy as well as by the cssentiaiiy communal nature of the system’.” Clearly a balance had to be found between the interests of individual crofters and those of the crafting the community as a whole. Further, a balance was needed between prevailing crafting tenure and the conditions necessary for economic development. MacCuish analyses in detail the emergence of the Crofters Commission’s strategy for the modernization of crafting in line with changing social, economic and developmental circumstances.4” The passage of reform, along these lines was slow, and as MacCuish illustrates.” there were major differences between the rec~~mmend~~tion of the Crofters ~o~irnis~i~~n and the eventual legislation. This was the Crofters Reform

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Economic development and lnnd policies

(Scotland)

Act 1976, which created a major political controversy in The legislation’s primary effect was to give crofters the option to purchase their crofts. MacCuish argued that this legislation ‘cleared the ground of obstacles to development deriving from previous legislation. At the same time the Act provides necessary protection to carry the crafting communities over a difficult transitional period until they are restored to full strength and no longer stand in need of special statutory protection’.~~ It is ciear, therefore, that the basis of crafting land policies had shifted markedly during the period since 1886. This was in line with the perceived need for economic development, to be provided now by the Highlands and Islands Development Board. Britain.48

Economic development initiatives

48J. Hunter, ‘The crofter, the laird, and the agrarian socialist: the Highland land question in the 197Os’, in, H.M. Drucker and N.L. Drucker, eds, The Scottish Government Yearbook, Paul Harris, Edinburgh, UK, 1978. %3p tit, Ref 16. ‘“G. MacCrone, ‘The Highland Deveiopment Board’, New Society, Vol 6, 2 December 1965. “I. Carter, ‘The Highlands of Scotland as an underdeveloped-region’, in E. de Kadt and G. Williams, eds. Socioloov and Development, Tavistock; London:UK, 1974, pp 279-311. 520p tit, Ref 42, p 77. ?bid, p 69. 54J. Bryden and G. Houston, Agrarian Change in the Scottish t-lighiands, Glasgow Social and Economic Research Stuyge7s6.4. Martin Robertson, Oxford, UK,

LAND USE POLICY April 1985

The HIDB was established with the aims of assisting the people of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland in improving their economic and social conditions, and in enabling the region to play a more effective part in the economic and social development of the nation (see Figure 1). McCrone argued that the Board ‘has been given a formidable task. It is charged with what must be the most difficult regional development problem in Britain, for it is expected to find a means of restoring to economic health an area which has suffered a process of decay for well over a hundred years’.“’ In order to tackle this problem, the HIDB was given a unique range of powers, and indeed ‘no other agency engaged in regional development in Britain has been presented with such an armoury’.” It was given ‘a blanket remit which enabled it to influence every aspect of life within the Highlands and Islands. Nothing was excluded from its gaze, hardly an activity beyond its financial help’.s2 Thus, the Board was given the power to acquire land, by compulsion if necessary, and to hold and manage land. Further powers, such as the powers to carry on businesses, to give financial assistance, and to provide advice and technical assistance, were also relevant to the use of land in the Highlands. ‘To many, how the Board tackled the problem of misuse of land would be its key test. There was an air of anticipation; at long last an alternative centre to the power of the landlords had been established. Backed by a sympathetic government and with access to finance, the Board, it seemed, could not fail to redress the abuses suffered by Highlanders and Islanders for two centuries’.” According to Bryden and Houston, the power of private landowners in the Highl~~nds was still considerable: private Iand[?wners directly controlled 44 percent of the total area of agricultural and afforested land, and ‘some 35 families or companies with holdings over 36 000 acres . . account for about one third of all privately owned land’.‘” In its report on land use in 1964, the Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands had raised many expectations by arguing that ‘clearly there is a good deal of under-used, and in some cases grossly misused land in the Highlands. Much of this land could be better used. Highlands and national interest requires that it should be’. This passage was quoted by Lord Hughes, under secretary of state for Scotland, in 1965 in the House of Lords, and he continued by stressing that ‘the better use of a basic resource must be one of the Board’s main concerns’. Thus it is clear that where land was not being

119

Economic development and land policies

I.‘;ii

E3 _ ___

Predominantly

Mixed

with

crafting

farmlng

HIDB area

Figure 1. Crofting lands and the HIDE area.

550p tit, Ref 42. “B. MacGregor, ‘Regional planning in remote areas; the Highlands and Islands Development Board’, Town and Country Planning, Summer School, Report of Proceedings, Royal Town Planning Institute, London, UK, 1979, pp l&-24. 57The views of Sir Andrew Gilchrist were contained in written correspondence with James Grassie, see op tit, Ref 42, p 100.

120

managed in the best interests of the community the HIDB was expected, and was intended, to wrest the control of land from the private landowner, and thus to reassert the communal interest in land use in the Highlands and Islands. Despite these expectations, the HIDB proceeded cautiously. Grassic has suggested that there were ‘formidable reasons for a cautious approach’,55 which included the power of the farming and landowning lobby, and the fear of abolition upon a changec of government. MacGregor has also drawn attention to the planning background of the Board’s first chairman and his belief in the notion of the impartial, apolitical planner.5” The Board’s second chairman. Sir Andrew GilChrist, was equally unenthusiastic about any attempt at tackling the issue of landownership and land use which heiegarded as ‘an unfortunate and ‘The land to be acquired had to bc Ixlid impracticable commitment’.” for at its full value, so that the percentage of Highland land which the Board, with its existing annual income, could acquire would be completely negligible; thus, in the doubtful hope of creating or altering

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Economic dev~t~prne~lf and land pnticie,s

581. Carter, ‘A socialist strategy for the Highlands’, in G. Brown, ed. The Red Paper on Scotland, EUSPB, pp 247-253. 50H1DB. Occasional Bulletin No 2. HIDB. Inverne& UK, 1968. ‘OHIDB, Strath of Kildonan, Proposak for ~evetopment, Special Report No 10, HIDB, Inverness, UK, 1970. “HIDB Proposals for Changes in fhe High/aids and Islands Development (Scotland) Act 65 to allow more Effective Powers over Rural land Use, HIDB, Inverness, UK, 1978. 6”HIDB Island of Mull, Surveyand Proposa/s for 'Deve/opm~nt,Special Report No 10, HIDB, Inverness, UK, 1973, p 18. 630p cit. Ref 42, p 87. ““/bid, pp 89-93. 650p tit, Ref 56.

LAND USE POLICY April 1985

a few jobs in the Highlands, the Board would find itself at the storm centre of not merely a legal but a political struggle which ought to have been fought out in Parliament and not left to a few non-political appointees like myself.’ (Gilchrist was a retired diplomat.) Such an attitude was heavily criticized by Carter who argued that the HIDB had shown ‘a constant pusillanimity to the land question over the years’ and that ‘by thus accepting the extraordinarily inequitable land-holding structure of the Highlands, the HIDB has reinforced the political and economic power of the great capitalist landlords’.5” During this period, even though it avoided directly addressing the land ownership issue, the HIDB attempted to pursue a number of pioneering land use initiatives: many illustrate the pervasive influence of the private landowner. The Board’s bulletin on agriculture committed it to initiate agricultural development projects and to promote the comprehensive development of selected areas.” In particular, two areas had been recommended by the Advisory Panel and the Scottish Office, the Strath of Kildonan and Mull. ‘Because of the history of the Clearances, absentee landownership and apparent underuse of land resources, the Strath has been frequently cited as a typical example of misuse of land in the Highlands.‘“” However, little was achieved by the HIDB in Kildonan. and a later report expressed the Board’s frustration at the failure to implement its proposals for a programme of afforestation: ‘the paucity of it . . . cannot be disguised and the Board sees only a small proportion of the recommended land being afforested, either by the Forestry Commission or privately’.“’ In Mull the obstacle to development was clear. ‘Despite the survey, its recommendations, the discussions which have surrounded it and all the incentives which the Board can offer to development projects, the island still provides many examples of communities and land suffering at the hands of owners whose goals and policies are in conflict with the needs and desires of the community.‘62 Apart from demonstrating the fundamental importance of subordinating private property rights to the interests of the community, these experiences also denied the HIDB the opp~~rtunity to demonstrate the benefits of progressive land use. Grassie cites the case of Lord Strathcona’s treatment of Colonsay in 1966 to illustrate ‘that landowners were able frequently to act as if the twentieth century had not dawned’.‘” However, it was Dr Green’s ownership of part of Raasay which made it ‘the island that was to epitomize the issue of obstructive ownership’.~~ The years between 1967 and 1979 ‘were spent in dealing with a recalcitrant landlord who seemed determined to obstruct development’ by refusing to sell land for a ferry terminal. Although he owned less than 200 acres of Raasay, Dr No (as he became known) ‘seemed to cover the whole island with his dead hand’. The HIDB was also constrained by central government in its attempts to promote the proper use of land. Thus an attempt to bid for the Kiliiechron~~n estate on Mull was vetoed by the Treasury, despite the support of the Scottish Office, because of public expenditure cutbacks; the estate was subsequently bought for sporting use and the number of jobs on the estate was reduced from 22 to two. MacGregor has noted that in the failure of the HIDB’s land policies, ‘landi~~rd obstruction and intr~~nsigence were major factors, but central government caution and a somewhat laissez-faire doctrine were contributory’.“’ The HIDB has summarized these experiences as illustrating ‘the clash

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““Op crt, Ref 61. 670p tit, Ref 42, 680p tit, Ref 61,

122

p 93. p 3.

which can, and does, occur between the interests of owner and community in the Highlands and Islands, and emphasizes the measure of power, for good or ill, which can be wrought by one private individual over the lives of whole communities . . . Sometimes the reasons attach to conflicting interests (usually sporting or speculative) which do not often bring either financial or employment returns of significance to the local community: at other times it is hard to discern any reason at all . .‘66 Towards the end of Sir Andrew Gilchrist’s term as chairman, he became convinced of the need to make use of the Board’s compulsory purchase powers in one particularly extreme case. ‘I was well aware of the legal resistance which might be made, but I relied on the conspicuous contrast between our own development plans and dereliction under the existing ownership; surely we could defeat a bad landlord . It gradually emerged, after legal consultation, that the position had been misunderstood and that for the purpose of taking over a generalised or multifarious activity like an estate, the alleged powers were for all practical purposes worthless.’ Indeed, the Board’s legal advisors (the Scottish Office) made it clear that, whatever the intentions of parliament, its powers of compulsory purchase were limited to those exercised by any local authority under the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation Procedure) (Scotland) Act 1947. ‘But while a council found these provisions sufficient to allow it to acquire ground for a particular building or for a road improvcmcnt, the Board was to find them of no help at all in trying to reach its objectives. The Board wanted to obtain land on which it could demonstrate a comprehensive approach to better land use. To do that it required estates measured in thousands of acres, not small pockets of ground. When eventually it sought legal advice on this point it was told bluntly that it would not win its case. It did not have the power to do so.“” Gilchrist ‘entertained no hope for change. No political party he thought would ever provide the Board with powers appropriate to the involve discrimination bctwccn Highland task’, since this would landlords and all other landlords in the UK. However. his successor as Chairman. Sir Kenneth Alexander, was more optimistic. In a paper in 1968 he had argued ‘that either the Board has to grasp the thistlc more boldly or it must recognise that no development strategy is possible’. In the Board’s 1976 Annual Report he attached ‘particular importance to the strategy for land use A sound approach to land use can contribute more to the economic health of the Highlands and Islands than any other single policy’. Consequently, ‘meetings with the Scottish Office were held in September 1976 and January 1977. These meetings established that ‘practical proof of the inadequacy of the Board’s compulsory purchase powers was not an essential preliminary to the consideration of legislation amending the Board’s powers’.“” A test case was therefore unnecessary. In 1978 the HIDB published and submitted its proposals for changes to the 1965 Act to allow more effective powers over rural land USCin the Highlands and Islands. Both the nature of these proposals and their fate are of interest. The proposals were intended as a ‘means of making effective the powers of land acquisition and use which Parliament voted to the Board in 1965’, being ‘designed exclusively to deal with cxtrcme cases of

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Ecmomic

6glbid, 7olbid, “ibid, 721bid, 73ibid,

p 4. p 8.

p 19. p 21. p 27.

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underuse or misuse of land . . .‘h9 The proposals involved the ‘designation of areas in which such problems are of reaI significance for the development or indeed survival of communities, and the Board being given control over land sales and powers of nominated leasing and compulsory purchase in such designated areas. Steps could then be taken quickly to ensure the development of the land”” for the benefit of the community. These powers sought by the HIDB closely resembled the powers already available, or potentially available, to the Crofters Commission. Indeed the HIDB noted the parallels: ‘On land under crafting tenure there are normally statutory solutions for problems similar to those faced in the Strath of Kildonan, Mull and elsewhere. Problems do remain, but the legislation appears to be more appropriate than for land with similar problems and not held under crafting tenure’.” In attempting to ensure that land in the Highlands and Islands is used for the benefit of the community it was inevitable that the HIDB should find itself requesting similar powers to those given to the Crofters Commission to ensure crafting land use is ‘proper and efficient’ and ‘to the general benefit of the township’ as specified under Section 8 of the 1961 Act. The HIDB’s proposals envisaged the designation of areas in which these more effective powers could usefully be employed to ensure that land was used for the benefit of the community. Designation would involve the preparation of a development plan for the area after adequate consultation and subject to the approval of the secretary of state. The aims of such plans would include maintaining population, increasing incomes and maximizing production. The HIDB itself draws an analogy with the power to prepare a scheme for the reallocation of land in crafting townships available to the Crofters Commission under the 1961 Act. ‘If one likens the crafting reorganisation scheme to the development plan and area designation in the Board’s current case there is a close parallel in the subsequent powers of implementation which are contained in the Crofters Act and which the Board is now seeking’.” The Board intended to use its existing powers of financial inducement to encourage ‘those owning and/or working land to develop it along approved lines’.‘” Analogous powers are given to the Crofters Commission by the amended 1955 Act. In addition the HIDB sought three additional powers with which to secure the implementation of the development plan. The first is the power of nominated leasing. If a landowner is not prepared to develop his land in accordance with the plan, despite financial inducements, then the Board sought ‘the power to arrange for the land to be leased out,’ with appropriate compensation payable. Again, there are precedents in the Crofters Acts. Section 16 of the 1955 Act empowers the Crofters Commission to let a vacant croft at its own hand on behalf of the landlord if it does not approve his proposals for reletting it. The 1961 Act, although not currently brought into operation, gives the Commission the power to insist that an inadequately used croft be sublet to another tenant, or to sublet it itself on the crofter’s behalf. A further precedent is provided by Section 7 (as amended) of the 1911 Act which allows the secretary of state to prepare compulsory schemes to create leasehold holdings where there is a demand for small holdings and suitable land is available. A second power sought was control over the sale of land, as given to

f23

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“‘Ibid, p 20. 751bid, p 21. 760p tit, Ref 56.

77HighlandRegional Development Coun-

cil, Minutes, p 1 715, 3 March 1981. “Op

124

cit. Ref 42.

Rural Development Boards under the 1967 Act and exercised briefly by the North Pennines Rural Development Board. The HIDB argued that ‘the necessity of obtaining Board consent before any sale went through would serve to bring to the designated area owners whose ideas on using the land were in line with the development plan, which by its nature would reflect the ideas of other members of the community . . .‘7J Thirdly, the Board required as a last resort the power of compulsory purchase. The Board ‘would prefer not to have to use this power at all,’ but ‘its importance lies in the public knowing that the Board possesses the power effectively, rather than in the use of it’.75 There was again a precedent in the provisions of the Crofters (Scotland) Act 1961 for the reorganization of land around crafting townships: the scheme may involve not only the rationalization of existing crafting land but can also include nearby land which is not under crafting tenure, and this land may be acquired by compulsion if necessary for the benefit of the community. All these proposed measures sought to resolve the fundamental conflict between private property rights and the use of land in the interest of the community, which has been at the root of the Hi~hl~Ind problem since the early 18th century. The two perceptions of the Highland problem that of crafting land tenure and that of ccttnomic underdevelopment, were at last converging as the HIDB, the agency charged with promoting economic and social development realized the central importance of the control of land use and landownership in the interest of the community. Although &the powers would offer no overnight solution,“” the Board’s Consultative Council supported the proposals unanimously, and its chairman concluded that ‘the proposals were the most important step that the Board had made . . If they succeeded, a turning point in the development of the Highland agricultural economy could be provided. . .’ The HIDB’s proposals remained in abeyance for the last six months of the Labour government, and for a full year of the Conservative administration’s term of office. Then, in response to questions in the House of Commons on 7 May 1980, the secretary of state indicated that he was not persuaded of the need for the HIDB to be given more effective powers. Despite the advice of the Scottish Office in 1976 and 1977 that practical ‘proof of the inadequacy of the Board’s compulsory purchase powers was not an essential preliminary to the consideration of legislation,’ the secretary of state told the House that ‘The Board has never attempted to use those (existing) powers and until it does attempt to use them it should not seek additional powers.’ As the HIDB’s chairman commented: ‘The Board had found this answer particularly surprising when they know that the Government’s own advice was that the Board’s existing powers were inadequate to deal with the types of land use problems which the Board had highlighted. It therefore seemed strange for the Board to be given advice to try to use these powers’.” The obvious explanation was that the government did not wish those types of land use problems to be remedied. The government was defending private property rights, however much abused, against the wider interests of the community. Grassie comments ruefully that ‘After fifteen years (the HIDB) had made no progress on the issue which its friends and foes alike saw as central to its work . . . Gilchrist had proved right. It had been a waste of time to pursue the question’.‘” And yet ‘it was not a battle it had lost,

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but the war. The injustices inflicted by some landowners on the communities depending on them - and which had been identified by the Board itself - would be allowed to continue.’

Conclusion Current land policies in the Highlands suffer from a confused interpretation of the Highland problem. It is clear that the government agencies most concerned with the problems of the Highlands and Islands have each come independently to recognize the need for a close relationship between land reform and economic development. The development of this relationship has, however, changed over time. The Crofters Commission has argued that the reform of crafting land tenure is a necessary precondition to economic development in the crafting counties, since change is frustrated by the security of tenure provisions which crofters presently enjoy. This argument is unquestionably sound. However the loosening of crofters’ security of tenure by encouraging owner-occupation is not the answer, since this will merely strengthen private property rights at the expense of the community interest: the history of private landownership in the Highlands has consistently demonstrated the dangers to the community inherent in such an approach. Instead the answer lies in strengthening the powers and the resolve of the Crofters Commission to intervene in land use decisions in the interest of the community. As the HIDB has noted, current crafting legislation allows some intervention in order to rationalize land use for the benefit of the crafting community since crafting legislation embraces the concept of a social obligation of property. The need is to extend such powers in order to prevent the obstruction of economic development by private property rights, whether in the form of large sporting estates or a fossilized system of smallholdings. The HIDB has also realized the fundamental importance of ensuring that land in the Highlands and Islands is used for the benefit of the community, if it is to achieve its objective of furthering the economic and social development of the area. Its proposals for changes to the 1965 Act to allow more effective powers over rural land use resulted from the HIDB’s frustrating experiences with private landowners whose power could be wrought, for good or ill, over the lives of whole communities; and the importance attached by the HIDB to these proposals reflected the belief that overcoming such obstacles was crucial to the economic health of the Highlands. The development plans envisaged by the HIDB offer a constructive approach in the Highland and Islands. The conclusion of both these agencies is confirmed by an analysis of the Highland problem itself. Many of the problems of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland derive from the failure of owners or occupiers of property to acknowledge their social obligation and to use their land in the best interests of the community. The current structure of land holding acts to hinder social and economic development and thus perpetuates the Highland problem. Until the problem of land tenure and land use and the problem of economic underdevelopment can be tackled in concert, through a land reform which subordinates private property rights to the use of land for the community, it is inevitable that the Highland problem will persist, in the way in which it has persisted for over 200 years since the communal use of land in the Highlands was first overcome by private interests.

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