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Effects of differential request procedures and self-consciousness on trait attributions
JOURNAL
OF RESEARCH
IN PERSONALITY
12, 431-438 (1978)
Effects of Differential Self-Consciousness ROBERT Pepperdine
Request Procedures on Trait Attributions
and
G. TURNER University
Using 20 bipolar traits with a “depends on the situation” response alternative, Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek (1973) reported that subjects attributed more traits to others than to themselves. However, Bern and Allen (1974) have pointed out that in situations outside the laboratory we do not use a fixed list of traits in describing ourselves or others but select only those traits that are pertinent to the person. The first purpose of the present study was to determine if subjects would attribute more traits to themselves than to another person if for each they were allowed to generate their own list of applicable descriptors. The second purpose was to investigate the moderating effect of habitual self-reflection on the number of self-descriptors employed by subjects to characterize themselves. As predicted, subjects listed significantly @ < .OOl) more traits for themselves than for a friend when allowed to generate their own lists. Results replicating Nisbett et al. were found on the list of 20 traits. In addition, high private self-consciousness subjects used significantly (p < .02) more traits to describe themselves than did the low private self-consciousness group.
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek (1973) reported that subjects attributed more global traits to others than to themselves. Their procedure directed subjects to check which of three descriptions best fit the person they were rating: a trait term, its polar opposite, or the phrase “depends on the situation.” The self-report inventory they employed consisted of 20 of these three-choice items. Their result was that subjects checked the “depends on the situation” significantly more times when rating themselves than when rating friends or acquaintances. Bern and Allen (1974) have recently restated the challenge to assumptions of the existence of trait dimensions universally applicable to all persons. They point out that when we describe ourselves or some friend, we do not employ some total set of dimensions but rather “permit ourThe assistance of John Nicks, Michael Shermer. Steven Biehn, Jeffrey Baarstad, Gretchen Liebig, and LuNell Gilliland in gathering and analyzing the data is gratefully acknowledged. Requests for reprints should be addressed to: Robert G. Turner, Social Science Division, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA 90265. 431 0092-6566/78/0124-0431$02.00/0 Copyright @ 1978 by Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
432
ROBERT
G. TURNER
selves to select a small subset of traits which strike us as pertinent . . .” (Bern & Allen, 1974, p. 510). The inventory employed by Nisbett et al. (1973) did not allow for an idiographic selection of traits since all subjects replied to the same dimensions. If a trait was irrelevant or did not universally apply to the subject or the person he was rating, the response “depends on the situation” was available. Thus a response to this alternative could mean that the trait did not apply to the ratee or that the trait dimension did apply but the person inconsistently expressed the trait relevant behavior (i.e., was situationally variable). The first purpose of the present study was to investigate whether or not the effect reported by Nisbett et al. (1973) would also occur if subjects were asked to describe themselves and a friend via an open-ended format rather than responding to a rating scale containing a fixed number of traits. Since both Nisbett et al. (1973) and Bern and Allen (1974) seem to assume that the subject is more aware of “actual” consistencies and inconsistencies in his own behavior than that of a friend, a prediction of more self-attributed traits than friend-attributed traits would seem to follow when an open-ended trait ascription format is employed. Therefore, when employing the inventory of Nisbett et al. (1973) subjects were expected to use fewer traits to describe themselves than to describe a friend; but when allowed to choose their own descriptions, subjects were expected to use more traits to characterize themselves than to characterize a friend. The second purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which habitual self-consciousness moderated the length of subjects’ selfdescriptions. According to the Duval and Wicklund (1973) theory of objective self-awareness, human consciousness can be focused either on the self or on objects and events in the external environment. As a manipulated variable, self-focused attention has been shown to increase selfattributions (Duval and Wicklund, 1973), to mediate consistency between self-reports and behavior (Carver, 1975; Pryor, Gibbons, & Wicklund, cited in Wicklund, 1975) and to increase the use of first person pronouns when guessing at the meaning of foreign language pronouns (Davis & Brock, 1975). In developing the Self-Consciousness Scale, Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) have recently called attention to individual differences in the extent to which persons habitually reflect upon themselves. Two subscales of this instrument measure different components of selfconsciousness: private and public. Private self-consciousness is concerned with the extent to which one reflects on his thoughts, feelings, and motives. A representative item from this subscale is: “I reflect about myself a lot.” Public self-consciousness involves an awareness of oneself as a social object and is measured by items such as: “I’m concerned about what other people think of me.”
SOURCES FOR TRAIT
ATTRIBUTIONS
433
According to Fenigstein et al. (1975) habitual private or public selfconsciousness should mediate behavior in much the same way as does the transient state of self-awareness created by camera or mirror manipulations. In an aggression study employing separate high and low private self-consciousness groups. Scheier (Note I) reported significant effects for both a self-awareness manipulation and the self-consciousness independent variable. Angered subjects subsequently aggressed more against their antagonist if a mirror was present than if it were absent. In addition, the high private self-consciousness group also aggressed significantly more than the low self-consciousness group. In this experiment both variables led to a greater focus on internal feelings of anger which presumably resulted in higher levels of aggression. Individual differences in self-consciousness have also been shown to mediate the consistency between self-reports and behavior in much the same way as objective self-awareness manipulations (Turner & Peterson. 1977; Turner, 1978). Higher self-report-criterion correlations were found for persons who habitually reflected upon themselves (high compared to low private self-consciousness persons) or who were not highly concerned about their appearance to others (low compared to high public self-consciousness persons). Since high private self-consciousness persons repeatedly attend to their inner thoughts and motives, they should provide not only valid selfreports, as shown by Turner (1978), but also more detailed selfreports. Habitual self-reflection should result in an ability to give a more complete or extended self-description. The nonreflective person (low private self-consciousness), when asked to describe himself, should have fewer descriptive phrases at his command than should the habitually reflective person. Thus the prediction was that high private selfconsciousness persons would employ more descriptive adjectives or phrases in characterizing themselves than would low private selfconsciousness persons. Theoretically, differential concern about one’s appearance (public self-consciousness) should not be related to the extent to which one generates descriptive statements about himself. METHOD Subjects were 144 students (61 males, 83 females) taking the introductory social science course at Pepperdine University. During the first week of the trimester. subjects completed the Self-Consciousness Scale for themselves in addition to a “Person Description Form” and the Nisbett et al. (1973) list of traits for both themselves and one of their best friends. The Self-Consciousness Scale was titled the “California Inventory” and had an item response format of one (extremely uncharacteristic) to five (extremely characteristic). The Person Description Form was one sheet of paper asking subjects at the top of the page to “list the adjectives or traits that best describe yourself’ and at the middle of the page to “list the adjectives or traits that best describe one of your best friends.” The order or placement of these instructions was reversed for approximately half the subjects. The Nisbett et al. (1973) inventory was labeled the Trait Ascription Inventory-Self when the directions instructed the subject to describe himself and the Trait Ascription Inventory-Other when the
434
ROBERT G. TURNER
directions instructed the subject to rate one of his best friends. On this 20 item inventory, subjects checked which of three descriptions best fit the person they were rating: the trait term, its polar opposite, or the phrase “depends on the situation.” All subjects completed the Person Description Form first, the Self-Consciousness Scale second, and the Nisbett et al. inventory third, after the first two had been collected. ‘The two scores derived from the Personal Description Form were the number of trait-like descriptors subjects used to characterize themselves and their friend. The number of traits in each characterization were obtained from two independent scores. Interscorer reliabilities were ,996 for the number of self-descriptions and ,955 for the number of descriptions used to characterize the friend. If the two scorers disagreed in their counts of the number of descriptors, the mean of their scores was used in all further analyses. Since the instructions told subjects to list the traits characterizing themselves and their friend, the use of single adjectives was the most common means of response. When phrases such as “likes to be around people” were used. they were counted as one descriptor. Compound phrases such as “likes to be around people and is very intelligent” were counted as two descriptors. In addition, synonyms were counted separately and repetitions were counted only once. (There were only two instances of repetition.) The Trait Ascription Inventories and Self-Consciousness Inventory were scored independently by two additional research assistants. Since Carver and Glass (1976) reported a low positive correlation (r = .l6) between private self-consciousness and IQ, subjects’ SAT-Verbal scores were used as a covariate in analyses related to the moderating effect of self-consciousness on the length of subjects’ self-descriptions. In these analyses N = 112 (41 males, 71 females), since SAT data were not available on the remaining students. High and low groups on the private self-consciousness subscale were formed by eliminating those subjects scoring within one unit of the mean. Thus the high private selfconsciousness group had scores greater than one point above the mean on this subscale while the low group had scores lower than one point below the mean. This procedure was also followed in creating high and low public self-consciousness groups.
RESULTS
Results replicating those of Nisbett et al. (1973) were expected when subjects responded to the list of 20 traits. As presented in Table 1, this was the case. Subjects attributed significantly more global traits to their friend than to themselves. Results consistent with expectations were also obtained on the Person TABLE MEANS AND AND FRIEND
STANDARD ON THE
I
DEVIATIONS OF TRAIT ASCRIPTIONS NISBETT ET AL. INVENTORY AND THE DESCRIPTION
FORM
Inventory
Nisbett et al. inventory Person description form
TO SELF PERSON
Stimulus person Self
Friend
12.17 (4.14) 9.56 (4.33)
13.72 (4.25)* 8.58 (4. I I)**
* f = 5.90, df = 143,~ < .OOl; t-test for correlated means. ** t = 3.84, df = 143,~ < .OOl; t-test for correlated means.
SOURCES FOR TRAIT
435
ATTRIBUTIONS
Description Form. As presented in Table 1, subjects ascribed significantly more traits to themselves than to their friend when they were allowed to individually generate the descriptive terms. The intercorrelation matrix of the four measures is presented in Table 2. The scores derived from the same instrument were highly correlated; however, correlations across inst~ments were generally insignificant. Thus the number of traits generated by subjects to describe themselves was relatively independent of the number of global traits they ascribed to themselves on the Nisbett et al. inventory. The mean scores of subjects on the private and public selfconsciousness subscales were 34.49 (SD = 5.28) and 25.62 (SD = 5.34), respectively. Since the mean scores of males and females on the two subscales did not significantly differ, no additional analyses by sex were performed. The high private self-consciousness group consisted of subjects scoring 36 or greater (I%= 39.41, SD = 3.29, iV = 54) while the low private selfconsciousness group scored 33 or below @ = 29.96, SD = 2.62, N = 46). As predicted, the total number of descriptors used by the high private self-consciousness group to characterize themselves (Y = 10.33, SD = 3.96) was significantly larger (p < .02) than the mean 8.48 (SD = 3.60) employed by the low private self-consciousness group (see Table 1). The effect of the SAT-Verbal covariate was insignificant. Subjects divided into high and low public self-consciousness groups were not expected to differ in the number of trait-like descriptors used to characterize themselves. Results were consistent with this prediction. The high public self-consciousness subjects, defined as those scoring 27 or greater, averaged 9.43 descriptors (SD = 4.94, N = 42), while those scoring 24 or below, the low public self-consciousness group, averaged 9.56 descriptors (SD = 3.45, N = 52). This difference was not statistically significant (F < 1, df = 1192). TABLE INTERCORRELATION
MATRIX
Nisbett et al. inventory (I) Self (2) Friend Person description form (3) Self (4) Friend
**
* P < .05. P< ,001.
OFTHEFOUR
2 TRAIT ASCRPTION
MEASURES
(2)
(31
(4)
.72**
-.10 -.I0
-.16 -.if?* .75**
436
ROBERT
ANALYSIS
Source Covariate (SAT-V) Between groups groups Within Total
G.
TURNER
TABLE 3 OF VARIANCE FOR PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SAT-VERBAL EMPLOYED AS A COVARIATE
GROUPS
SS
df
MS
.69 87.56 1408.72 14%.97
1 1 97 99
.69 87.56 14.52
WITH
F
* p < .02.
DISCUSSION
Subjects did view themselves as possessing fewer broad, nomothetic traits than did their friend. However, when provided an opportunity to generate their own descriptions, they reported more traits for themselves than their friend. The simplest explanation for both effects would seem to be that subjects simply knew more about themselves than they knew about their friend. When required to generate their own descriptions, subjects had more self-related than other-related information available to them, based upon self-reflection and feedback from others. Therefore, they generated lengthier descriptions of themselves than of their friend, although these sets of descriptors probably would not entirely duplicate any inventoried list of traits (Allport, 1937; Kelly, 1955; Bern 8z Allen, 1974). The list of global traits probably brought to the subject’s attention areas of behavior that they would not normally generate or “construct” (Kelly, 1955) either for themselves or for the other they were rating. In responding to these traits subjects were more willing to assume consistency for others than for themselves. However, since subjects attributed more traits to themselves on the Nisbett et al. inventory than they generated on the Person Description Form (see Table l), it would seem that subjects did not always use the “depends on the situation” response when confronted with a trait that they did not generate in their original self-description. An area for future research would be to determine the predictive validity of self-generated trait ascriptions versus those ascriptions occurring only in response to an inventory such as that currently employed. Thus it would seem that whether or not subjects ascribe more traits to themselves or others depends in part upon the method employed to obtain the descriptions. The results relating private self-consciousness to length of selfdescription are somewhat analogous to those of Davis and Brock (1975) who reported an increased use of first person pronouns as guesses of the meaning of foreign language pronouns when the subjects were made objectively self-aware. However, in the present study individual differ-
SOURCES
FOR
TRAIT
ATTRIBUTIONS
437
ences in reported habitual self-reflection, rather than an objective selfawareness manipulation, resulted in more self-directed or self-descriptive statements when subjects were asked to characterize themselves. The self-reports of high private self-consciousness persons now have been shown to be both more detailed and more predictively valid than are the self-reports of low private self-consciousness persons (Turner, 1978). Theoretically, these effects result from differences in the amount of self-reflection in which the high and low private self-consciousness groups engage (Fenigstein et al., 1975). These results would seem to have implications for both the researcher and the clinician. Whether self-reports are employed as independent or dependent variables, those of the high private self-consciousness person should be more valid and more detailed. It may be that a significant part of the variance in scores on manipulation check questionnaires results from low private self-consciousness persons who are not sensitive to changes in their states or attitudes resulting from the manipulation. In clinical situations, the high private self-consciousness person should be able to validly describe at length his characteristic behavioral patterns and be very comfortable with insight therapy. However, beyond a certain point such therapy may merely encourage continued reflection as a substitute for ameliorative action. Conversely, for the low private selfconsciousness person, insight therapy should be a difficult process since his output to self-reflective demands is shorter and less predictively valid. Thus one’s level of private self-consciousness would seem to be relevant to both the choice and goal of therapy (Fenigstein et al., 1975). REFERENCES Allport, G. W., Personality: A psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, 1937. Bern, D. J., & Allen, A. On predicting some of the people some of the time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior. Psychological Review, 1974, 81, 506-520. Carver, C. S. Physical aggression as a function of objective self-awareness and attitudes toward punishment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 510-519. Carver, C. S., & Glass, D. C. The Self-Consciousness Scale: A discriminant validity study. Journal of Personality Assessment, 1976, 48, 169-172. Davis, D., & Brock, T. C. Use of first person pronouns as a function of increased objective self-awareness and performance feedback. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 1975, 11, 381-388. Duval, S.. Jr Wicklund, R. A. A theory of objective self-awareness on attribution of causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 17-31. Fen&stein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1975, 43, 522-527. Kelly, G. A. The psychology of persona/ constructs. New York: Norton, 1955. Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Maracek, J. Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1973,27, 154-164. Turner, R. G. Consistency, self-consciousness, and the predictive validity of typical and maximal personality measures. Journal of Research in Personality. 1978, 12, 117- 132.
438
ROBERT G. TURNER
Turner, R. G., & Peterson, M. Public and private self-consciousness and emotional expressivity. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 1977, 45, 490-491. Wicklund, R. A. Objective self-awareness. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),Advances in experimental social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1975.
REFERENCE NOTE I. Scheier, M. F. Self-awareness, se&consciousness, and angry aggression. doctoral dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1975.
Unpublished
OF RESEARCH
IN PERSONALITY
12, 431-438 (1978)
Effects of Differential Self-Consciousness ROBERT Pepperdine
Request Procedures on Trait Attributions
and
G. TURNER University
Using 20 bipolar traits with a “depends on the situation” response alternative, Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek (1973) reported that subjects attributed more traits to others than to themselves. However, Bern and Allen (1974) have pointed out that in situations outside the laboratory we do not use a fixed list of traits in describing ourselves or others but select only those traits that are pertinent to the person. The first purpose of the present study was to determine if subjects would attribute more traits to themselves than to another person if for each they were allowed to generate their own list of applicable descriptors. The second purpose was to investigate the moderating effect of habitual self-reflection on the number of self-descriptors employed by subjects to characterize themselves. As predicted, subjects listed significantly @ < .OOl) more traits for themselves than for a friend when allowed to generate their own lists. Results replicating Nisbett et al. were found on the list of 20 traits. In addition, high private self-consciousness subjects used significantly (p < .02) more traits to describe themselves than did the low private self-consciousness group.
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Maracek (1973) reported that subjects attributed more global traits to others than to themselves. Their procedure directed subjects to check which of three descriptions best fit the person they were rating: a trait term, its polar opposite, or the phrase “depends on the situation.” The self-report inventory they employed consisted of 20 of these three-choice items. Their result was that subjects checked the “depends on the situation” significantly more times when rating themselves than when rating friends or acquaintances. Bern and Allen (1974) have recently restated the challenge to assumptions of the existence of trait dimensions universally applicable to all persons. They point out that when we describe ourselves or some friend, we do not employ some total set of dimensions but rather “permit ourThe assistance of John Nicks, Michael Shermer. Steven Biehn, Jeffrey Baarstad, Gretchen Liebig, and LuNell Gilliland in gathering and analyzing the data is gratefully acknowledged. Requests for reprints should be addressed to: Robert G. Turner, Social Science Division, Pepperdine University, Malibu, CA 90265. 431 0092-6566/78/0124-0431$02.00/0 Copyright @ 1978 by Academic Press. Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
432
ROBERT
G. TURNER
selves to select a small subset of traits which strike us as pertinent . . .” (Bern & Allen, 1974, p. 510). The inventory employed by Nisbett et al. (1973) did not allow for an idiographic selection of traits since all subjects replied to the same dimensions. If a trait was irrelevant or did not universally apply to the subject or the person he was rating, the response “depends on the situation” was available. Thus a response to this alternative could mean that the trait did not apply to the ratee or that the trait dimension did apply but the person inconsistently expressed the trait relevant behavior (i.e., was situationally variable). The first purpose of the present study was to investigate whether or not the effect reported by Nisbett et al. (1973) would also occur if subjects were asked to describe themselves and a friend via an open-ended format rather than responding to a rating scale containing a fixed number of traits. Since both Nisbett et al. (1973) and Bern and Allen (1974) seem to assume that the subject is more aware of “actual” consistencies and inconsistencies in his own behavior than that of a friend, a prediction of more self-attributed traits than friend-attributed traits would seem to follow when an open-ended trait ascription format is employed. Therefore, when employing the inventory of Nisbett et al. (1973) subjects were expected to use fewer traits to describe themselves than to describe a friend; but when allowed to choose their own descriptions, subjects were expected to use more traits to characterize themselves than to characterize a friend. The second purpose of this study was to investigate the extent to which habitual self-consciousness moderated the length of subjects’ selfdescriptions. According to the Duval and Wicklund (1973) theory of objective self-awareness, human consciousness can be focused either on the self or on objects and events in the external environment. As a manipulated variable, self-focused attention has been shown to increase selfattributions (Duval and Wicklund, 1973), to mediate consistency between self-reports and behavior (Carver, 1975; Pryor, Gibbons, & Wicklund, cited in Wicklund, 1975) and to increase the use of first person pronouns when guessing at the meaning of foreign language pronouns (Davis & Brock, 1975). In developing the Self-Consciousness Scale, Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) have recently called attention to individual differences in the extent to which persons habitually reflect upon themselves. Two subscales of this instrument measure different components of selfconsciousness: private and public. Private self-consciousness is concerned with the extent to which one reflects on his thoughts, feelings, and motives. A representative item from this subscale is: “I reflect about myself a lot.” Public self-consciousness involves an awareness of oneself as a social object and is measured by items such as: “I’m concerned about what other people think of me.”
SOURCES FOR TRAIT
ATTRIBUTIONS
433
According to Fenigstein et al. (1975) habitual private or public selfconsciousness should mediate behavior in much the same way as does the transient state of self-awareness created by camera or mirror manipulations. In an aggression study employing separate high and low private self-consciousness groups. Scheier (Note I) reported significant effects for both a self-awareness manipulation and the self-consciousness independent variable. Angered subjects subsequently aggressed more against their antagonist if a mirror was present than if it were absent. In addition, the high private self-consciousness group also aggressed significantly more than the low self-consciousness group. In this experiment both variables led to a greater focus on internal feelings of anger which presumably resulted in higher levels of aggression. Individual differences in self-consciousness have also been shown to mediate the consistency between self-reports and behavior in much the same way as objective self-awareness manipulations (Turner & Peterson. 1977; Turner, 1978). Higher self-report-criterion correlations were found for persons who habitually reflected upon themselves (high compared to low private self-consciousness persons) or who were not highly concerned about their appearance to others (low compared to high public self-consciousness persons). Since high private self-consciousness persons repeatedly attend to their inner thoughts and motives, they should provide not only valid selfreports, as shown by Turner (1978), but also more detailed selfreports. Habitual self-reflection should result in an ability to give a more complete or extended self-description. The nonreflective person (low private self-consciousness), when asked to describe himself, should have fewer descriptive phrases at his command than should the habitually reflective person. Thus the prediction was that high private selfconsciousness persons would employ more descriptive adjectives or phrases in characterizing themselves than would low private selfconsciousness persons. Theoretically, differential concern about one’s appearance (public self-consciousness) should not be related to the extent to which one generates descriptive statements about himself. METHOD Subjects were 144 students (61 males, 83 females) taking the introductory social science course at Pepperdine University. During the first week of the trimester. subjects completed the Self-Consciousness Scale for themselves in addition to a “Person Description Form” and the Nisbett et al. (1973) list of traits for both themselves and one of their best friends. The Self-Consciousness Scale was titled the “California Inventory” and had an item response format of one (extremely uncharacteristic) to five (extremely characteristic). The Person Description Form was one sheet of paper asking subjects at the top of the page to “list the adjectives or traits that best describe yourself’ and at the middle of the page to “list the adjectives or traits that best describe one of your best friends.” The order or placement of these instructions was reversed for approximately half the subjects. The Nisbett et al. (1973) inventory was labeled the Trait Ascription Inventory-Self when the directions instructed the subject to describe himself and the Trait Ascription Inventory-Other when the
434
ROBERT G. TURNER
directions instructed the subject to rate one of his best friends. On this 20 item inventory, subjects checked which of three descriptions best fit the person they were rating: the trait term, its polar opposite, or the phrase “depends on the situation.” All subjects completed the Person Description Form first, the Self-Consciousness Scale second, and the Nisbett et al. inventory third, after the first two had been collected. ‘The two scores derived from the Personal Description Form were the number of trait-like descriptors subjects used to characterize themselves and their friend. The number of traits in each characterization were obtained from two independent scores. Interscorer reliabilities were ,996 for the number of self-descriptions and ,955 for the number of descriptions used to characterize the friend. If the two scorers disagreed in their counts of the number of descriptors, the mean of their scores was used in all further analyses. Since the instructions told subjects to list the traits characterizing themselves and their friend, the use of single adjectives was the most common means of response. When phrases such as “likes to be around people” were used. they were counted as one descriptor. Compound phrases such as “likes to be around people and is very intelligent” were counted as two descriptors. In addition, synonyms were counted separately and repetitions were counted only once. (There were only two instances of repetition.) The Trait Ascription Inventories and Self-Consciousness Inventory were scored independently by two additional research assistants. Since Carver and Glass (1976) reported a low positive correlation (r = .l6) between private self-consciousness and IQ, subjects’ SAT-Verbal scores were used as a covariate in analyses related to the moderating effect of self-consciousness on the length of subjects’ self-descriptions. In these analyses N = 112 (41 males, 71 females), since SAT data were not available on the remaining students. High and low groups on the private self-consciousness subscale were formed by eliminating those subjects scoring within one unit of the mean. Thus the high private selfconsciousness group had scores greater than one point above the mean on this subscale while the low group had scores lower than one point below the mean. This procedure was also followed in creating high and low public self-consciousness groups.
RESULTS
Results replicating those of Nisbett et al. (1973) were expected when subjects responded to the list of 20 traits. As presented in Table 1, this was the case. Subjects attributed significantly more global traits to their friend than to themselves. Results consistent with expectations were also obtained on the Person TABLE MEANS AND AND FRIEND
STANDARD ON THE
I
DEVIATIONS OF TRAIT ASCRIPTIONS NISBETT ET AL. INVENTORY AND THE DESCRIPTION
FORM
Inventory
Nisbett et al. inventory Person description form
TO SELF PERSON
Stimulus person Self
Friend
12.17 (4.14) 9.56 (4.33)
13.72 (4.25)* 8.58 (4. I I)**
* f = 5.90, df = 143,~ < .OOl; t-test for correlated means. ** t = 3.84, df = 143,~ < .OOl; t-test for correlated means.
SOURCES FOR TRAIT
435
ATTRIBUTIONS
Description Form. As presented in Table 1, subjects ascribed significantly more traits to themselves than to their friend when they were allowed to individually generate the descriptive terms. The intercorrelation matrix of the four measures is presented in Table 2. The scores derived from the same instrument were highly correlated; however, correlations across inst~ments were generally insignificant. Thus the number of traits generated by subjects to describe themselves was relatively independent of the number of global traits they ascribed to themselves on the Nisbett et al. inventory. The mean scores of subjects on the private and public selfconsciousness subscales were 34.49 (SD = 5.28) and 25.62 (SD = 5.34), respectively. Since the mean scores of males and females on the two subscales did not significantly differ, no additional analyses by sex were performed. The high private self-consciousness group consisted of subjects scoring 36 or greater (I%= 39.41, SD = 3.29, iV = 54) while the low private selfconsciousness group scored 33 or below @ = 29.96, SD = 2.62, N = 46). As predicted, the total number of descriptors used by the high private self-consciousness group to characterize themselves (Y = 10.33, SD = 3.96) was significantly larger (p < .02) than the mean 8.48 (SD = 3.60) employed by the low private self-consciousness group (see Table 1). The effect of the SAT-Verbal covariate was insignificant. Subjects divided into high and low public self-consciousness groups were not expected to differ in the number of trait-like descriptors used to characterize themselves. Results were consistent with this prediction. The high public self-consciousness subjects, defined as those scoring 27 or greater, averaged 9.43 descriptors (SD = 4.94, N = 42), while those scoring 24 or below, the low public self-consciousness group, averaged 9.56 descriptors (SD = 3.45, N = 52). This difference was not statistically significant (F < 1, df = 1192). TABLE INTERCORRELATION
MATRIX
Nisbett et al. inventory (I) Self (2) Friend Person description form (3) Self (4) Friend
**
* P < .05. P< ,001.
OFTHEFOUR
2 TRAIT ASCRPTION
MEASURES
(2)
(31
(4)
.72**
-.10 -.I0
-.16 -.if?* .75**
436
ROBERT
ANALYSIS
Source Covariate (SAT-V) Between groups groups Within Total
G.
TURNER
TABLE 3 OF VARIANCE FOR PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SAT-VERBAL EMPLOYED AS A COVARIATE
GROUPS
SS
df
MS
.69 87.56 1408.72 14%.97
1 1 97 99
.69 87.56 14.52
WITH
F
* p < .02.
DISCUSSION
Subjects did view themselves as possessing fewer broad, nomothetic traits than did their friend. However, when provided an opportunity to generate their own descriptions, they reported more traits for themselves than their friend. The simplest explanation for both effects would seem to be that subjects simply knew more about themselves than they knew about their friend. When required to generate their own descriptions, subjects had more self-related than other-related information available to them, based upon self-reflection and feedback from others. Therefore, they generated lengthier descriptions of themselves than of their friend, although these sets of descriptors probably would not entirely duplicate any inventoried list of traits (Allport, 1937; Kelly, 1955; Bern 8z Allen, 1974). The list of global traits probably brought to the subject’s attention areas of behavior that they would not normally generate or “construct” (Kelly, 1955) either for themselves or for the other they were rating. In responding to these traits subjects were more willing to assume consistency for others than for themselves. However, since subjects attributed more traits to themselves on the Nisbett et al. inventory than they generated on the Person Description Form (see Table l), it would seem that subjects did not always use the “depends on the situation” response when confronted with a trait that they did not generate in their original self-description. An area for future research would be to determine the predictive validity of self-generated trait ascriptions versus those ascriptions occurring only in response to an inventory such as that currently employed. Thus it would seem that whether or not subjects ascribe more traits to themselves or others depends in part upon the method employed to obtain the descriptions. The results relating private self-consciousness to length of selfdescription are somewhat analogous to those of Davis and Brock (1975) who reported an increased use of first person pronouns as guesses of the meaning of foreign language pronouns when the subjects were made objectively self-aware. However, in the present study individual differ-
SOURCES
FOR
TRAIT
ATTRIBUTIONS
437
ences in reported habitual self-reflection, rather than an objective selfawareness manipulation, resulted in more self-directed or self-descriptive statements when subjects were asked to characterize themselves. The self-reports of high private self-consciousness persons now have been shown to be both more detailed and more predictively valid than are the self-reports of low private self-consciousness persons (Turner, 1978). Theoretically, these effects result from differences in the amount of self-reflection in which the high and low private self-consciousness groups engage (Fenigstein et al., 1975). These results would seem to have implications for both the researcher and the clinician. Whether self-reports are employed as independent or dependent variables, those of the high private self-consciousness person should be more valid and more detailed. It may be that a significant part of the variance in scores on manipulation check questionnaires results from low private self-consciousness persons who are not sensitive to changes in their states or attitudes resulting from the manipulation. In clinical situations, the high private self-consciousness person should be able to validly describe at length his characteristic behavioral patterns and be very comfortable with insight therapy. However, beyond a certain point such therapy may merely encourage continued reflection as a substitute for ameliorative action. Conversely, for the low private selfconsciousness person, insight therapy should be a difficult process since his output to self-reflective demands is shorter and less predictively valid. Thus one’s level of private self-consciousness would seem to be relevant to both the choice and goal of therapy (Fenigstein et al., 1975). REFERENCES Allport, G. W., Personality: A psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, 1937. Bern, D. J., & Allen, A. On predicting some of the people some of the time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior. Psychological Review, 1974, 81, 506-520. Carver, C. S. Physical aggression as a function of objective self-awareness and attitudes toward punishment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 510-519. Carver, C. S., & Glass, D. C. The Self-Consciousness Scale: A discriminant validity study. Journal of Personality Assessment, 1976, 48, 169-172. Davis, D., & Brock, T. C. Use of first person pronouns as a function of increased objective self-awareness and performance feedback. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 1975, 11, 381-388. Duval, S.. Jr Wicklund, R. A. A theory of objective self-awareness on attribution of causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 17-31. Fen&stein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1975, 43, 522-527. Kelly, G. A. The psychology of persona/ constructs. New York: Norton, 1955. Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Maracek, J. Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1973,27, 154-164. Turner, R. G. Consistency, self-consciousness, and the predictive validity of typical and maximal personality measures. Journal of Research in Personality. 1978, 12, 117- 132.
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Turner, R. G., & Peterson, M. Public and private self-consciousness and emotional expressivity. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology. 1977, 45, 490-491. Wicklund, R. A. Objective self-awareness. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),Advances in experimental social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 1975.
REFERENCE NOTE I. Scheier, M. F. Self-awareness, se&consciousness, and angry aggression. doctoral dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1975.
Unpublished