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Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory
JCHAS-1015; No of Pages 6
RESOURCE ARTICLE
Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory Laboratory safety must always be a top priority in today’s research laboratories. Laboratory hazards need to be identified and hazard controls need to be developed and implemented to ensure a safe work environment. The purpose of this article is to provide a general overview of safety in research laboratories. This article describes approaches to identify, understand, and assess hazards in experiment laboratories, including safety in experiment operations. Approaches and controls to mitigate some types of hazards are discussed. In addition, some lab safety experiences are described.
By Lee C. Cadwallader, Robert J. Pawelko
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
Each year, laboratory researchers are injured, sometimes fatally, while working in their labs. These accidents underscore the importance of assessing laboratory hazards and maintaining a workplace safety culture. This article is written from the perspective of a laboratory manager whose primary role is to ensure that research is conducted efficiently and safely in accordance with approved work control documents. It is intended to be a general overview of safety in research laboratories and to convey some practical information relating to the process of identifying hazards, assessing hazards, and developing and implementing appropriate work controls that mitigate the hazards. These steps are discussed below, highlighted by some safety incidents. Lee C. Cadwallader is affiliated with the Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 834153860, United States. Tel.: (208) 5261232, Fax: (208) 526-0528, (e-mail: [email protected]). Robert J. Pawelko is affiliated with the Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-7113, United States. Tel.: (208) 533-4792, Fax: (208) 533-4207, (e-mail: Robert. [email protected]).
1871-5532 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
Identifying hazards is an essential first step in ensuring safe lab operations. Lab managers and principal researchers should evaluate the proposed work scope for things such as sources of hazardous energy, hazardous materials or equipment, error-likely situations, and interactions between hazards. Potential sources of hazardous energy include electrical power, mechanical energy, hydraulic energy, pneumatic energy, chemical energy, thermal energy, and stored energy sources. Some oft-used methods of hazard identification are discussed below. Inspection
Some principal researchers and lab managers identify lab hazards simply by walking through the lab and observing the processes, energies, and hazardous materials to be used in the lab. This can be a very effective approach to hazard identification and the more diverse experience the person has the better the outcome. For those not experienced with the experiments to be performed in the lab, the safety checklist tends to be used as the first approach to identifying laboratory safety hazards. An example is found in Prudent Practices in the Laboratory.1 The checklist offers the benefits of thoroughness and reproducibility. Checklists suffer from an inherent issue, however, in that they typically only address a single effect, hazardous energy, or material at a time. Synergistic effects of multiple hazards in a given experiment need to be addressed to better ensure
researcher safety. Identifying combinations of energies and hazardous materials must be performed, at least on the basis of proximity between multiple sources and the personnel. For example, the checklist can assist in evaluating what chemicals are in a lab but the lab manager may have to take intuitive leaps to address potential chemical incompatibility hazards. An event at the University of Kentucky in 1997 had students working on different experiments inadvertently mixed their chemical wastes in a single waste jug in a fume hood. It is believed that nitric acid and organic solvents were mixed, leading to the capped jug exploding and a fire spreading outside the fume hood.2 A hazard checklist would have shown there were acids and solvents in the lab but the lab manager would have been left to identify how these chemicals could contact each other and address the potential hazards. Job Hazard Analysis
Another approach to hazard identification is job hazard analysis [JHA]3 (also known as job safety analysis). The JHA is a list of the tasks to be performed and a list of the hazards associated with each task. This can be a tedious analysis and can become voluminous because each experiment will likely have its own unique set of tasks. If there are routine tasks in the lab, such as sample preparation, it is possible to modularize the JHAs to address routine tasks. In this scheme, all routine tasks have one JHA and then another JHA is written to address the unique tasks or aspects of a given experiment.
ã 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society.
Please cite this article in press as: Cadwallader, L. C., and Pawelko, R. J., Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory. J. Chem. Health Safety (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
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Idaho National Laboratory [INL] has successfully used Laboratory Instructions (LI) to conduct experiment operations for more than 10 years. A LI contains a very thorough JSA. The principal researcher creates a LI document with the main tasks of the experiment listed in a table format along with their overall hazards and mitigations. A LI also contains sections relating to emergency preparedness, waste generation, training requirements, lessons learned, required facility conditions, and instructions based on the risks associated with the performance of the work. The LI is reviewed by the lab manager and then by a team of subject matter experts. These reviews often include walkthroughs of the lab(s). Additional reviews occur when planned work falls outside of the original work scope. Information and guidance on conducting a safety assessment is available at the American Chemical Society web site.4 Operating Experience and Lessons Learned Review
A review of operating experience (OE) and lessons learned (LL) provides a method for lab managers and primary researchers to learn from the mistakes and successes of others. Some hazards may be rare events but it remains prudent to understand all the possible hazards in the lab. Equipment faults are one type of rare event that can pose large hazards to personnel. One of the best things the lab manager can do to provide for safety during rare equipment failures is to learn about the operations experience of the equipment used in the laboratory. Information extracted from an OE and LL review may be used to identify and to mitigate the types of failures that have occurred with such equipment, or used in developing emergency preparedness scenarios. Often the equipment failures are also covered by other mitigating features in the lab (e.g., fire sprinkler systems). Discussion of scientific equipment operating experience is not often included in the technical literature—a quick literature search or internet search might reveal some useful information or it may not yield anything. There are, however, some databases
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that record off-normal events in labs. These are available for searching, such as the Food and Drug Administration’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience [MAUDE] database5 and the publicly accessible reports in the U. S. Department of Energy’s [DOE’s] Occurrence Reporting and Processing System [ORPS].6 Each database has limitations but both can provide some pertinent information on what types of equipment failures might occur in a laboratory. For example, a search on mass spectrometers shows that failures are not always manifest as failing to operate. Some events were reported as short circuits that produced shocks when the instrument cover was touched; other events were caused by vacuum pumps that issued smoke or caught fire. Lessons learned from other labs is another important source of operating experience. Personnel can discuss equipment and process faults with other lab managers or researchers who have similar equipment and experience. DOE also maintains a web site called OPEXShare7 that allows users to search for lessons learned, best practices, and recalls submitted by U.S. national laboratories, state and federal agencies, professional organizations, and industry. Searching for “mass spectrometer” in OPEXShare reveals information such as recalled SCIEX mass spectrometers and project management lessons from building the highest resolution mass spectrometer in the world. An often overlooked source of operating experience is the service engineers who periodically visit to maintain major equipment items. McMaster8 describes that the service engineer sees a wide set of both commercial and university laboratories (including different types of labs such as environmental, clinical, analytical, forensic, etc.) and machines that operate in various states of good to poor maintenance. The service engineer can describe what has occurred in other labs using similar equipment and perhaps give suggestions on avoidance or mitigation of off-normal events. Scenarios to discuss may include human errors (what would happen if a vacuum chamber were inadvertently over
pressurized with an inert gas?), ancillary equipment failures (what if the cooling water pump trips off-line or the compressed air supply is lost?), or equipment faults (what if the equipment is not grounded correctly or the equipment is not well maintained?). These issues are all valuable to evaluate for researcher safety. Regulations Governing Hazards
Laboratory Instructions are the safety basis for experimental operations at the INL. In many laboratories, there are the “Big 3” hazards in experiments: use of pressurized components (requiring a pressure safety program), use of electricity (electrical safety program), and use of various chemicals (chemical safety program). Prior to LI approval, the identified hazards and mitigating controls are reviewed by the lab manager and then by a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) for completeness, and appropriateness of the mitigating controls. The SMEs also review the document to ensure experiment activities are within federal, state, local, and institutional laws and rules. This review process helps researchers to achieve regulatory compliance and allows them to focus on their safety and the safety of those working around them. At INL, pressure safety has to meet the requirements given in 10CFR851.9 The pressure systems must be designed, fabricated, tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, and operated by trained and qualified personnel. The piping or tubing systems must conform to applicable design codes such as ASME B31.310 and any state and local codes. Design drawings and calculations must be peer reviewed and approved by a qualified, independent design professional. The design information must be maintained in the experiment documentation. At INL, the worker safety regulation also directs having an electrical safety program that follows NFPA 7011 and NFPA 70E.12 Within the regulations, INL laboratories have adopted a graded approach. Low voltages under 50 V with low current are not particularly hazardous. Instrumentation at low voltage and current can be worked on without special safety provisions.
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013
Please cite this article in press as: Cadwallader, L. C., and Pawelko, R. J., Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory. J. Chem. Health Safety (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
JCHAS-1015; No of Pages 6
Very high voltages with almost no current are also not a significant hazard. Researchers also use “cord and plug control” where the researcher working on his or her experiment is the only person working and has exclusive control of the plug so that the equipment cannot be accidentally energized. INL’s chemical safety program also meets 10CFR851.9 An industrial hygienist periodically surveys the laboratory for workplace exposure to chemicals, carcinogens, nonionizing radiation, and other hazards in the lab including hazardous waste products generated in experiments. Handling and disposing of hazardous wastes can be very time consuming and expensive. At the INL, hazardous wastes are turned over to a subcontracted waste generation service whose function is to dispose of them in compliance with current hazardous waste regulations.
used for multiple or varying research initiatives in the future. This can mean longer usage time for the experiment and the need for more robust, reliable equipment to meet that longevity challenge. For example, many polymers used to seal surfaces in gas handling components and valves degrade when exposed to ionizing radiation such as tritium gas. By selecting components and valves that contain polymers which are less susceptible to ionizing radiation will increase the service life of tritium gas handling systems. Reliability in the experiment apparatus is always desired but is not always pursued. Taking the time to read about the experiment apparatus under consideration often leads to a more highly functional experiment. Resources such as Moore13 and Walker14 are very valuable for the experiment designer. Substitution of Lesser Hazards
HAZARD MITIGATION
In some research fields, the design of an experiment is a considerable challenge in and of itself. To properly isolate the phenomenon to be studied can pose great difficulty and the researcher may have to include atypical design provisions to accomplish the goal of the experiment. In cases such as these, it is especially important to ensure the safety goals do not become subordinate to the primary goal of the experiment. The challenge is to ensure that all of the hazards have been recognized and assessed, and that the best methods (Substitution/Elimination, Engineered controls, Administrative controls, PPE) to minimize risks have been selected. Three significant considerations are discussed below. Reliability in Design
Taking time to think about reliability in design is time well applied and often pays rich dividends. Experimentalists always desire an experiment that operates well; gives solid, repeatable results; and lends transparency to the study. Reliable equipment supports that desire. Depending on the size and scale of the experiment, the researcher/designer may want to incorporate aspects of versatility into the design so that the experiment can be
Personnel should consider replacing especially hazardous materials with other less hazardous materials and seek methods to reduce exposure. Having the experiment designer think through the choices made for items and processes may reduce hazards even if a substitution is not carried out. If substitution is not an option, limiting the quantities of hazardous materials used to that needed for task completion will reduce the hazards. Thinking through the inventories and determining they cannot be substituted or reduced is not a wasted effort. Besides showing diligence in design, it can also serve as the basis for inclusion of safety barriers in the experiment.
In the operations phase, the experiment may need to be shut down for calibration, cleaning, adjustment, sample changeout, or decontamination so it can continue to produce accurate results. Designs to minimize personnel exposure and to allow easy re-assembly are very good safety design provisions that also help the experiment to return to operation in the fastest possible time. When an experiment has been completed, it may be left idle in the hope of future use or it may be dismantled. If left idle, it should be made safe and it must adequately confine any remaining hazardous materials. Too often, researchers complete a test series and then cease the experiment to write up the results. If left idle until more funding is available to deal with the apparatus (and paucity of funding for safe storage seems to occur more often that experimentalists care to admit), the experiment needs to be left in a safe state—purged, cleaned, depressurized, and de-energized. Lab managers need to be vigilant about proper shutdown of experiments. It is very easy for the lab to become a graveyard of old experiments. In some cases, new projects must carry the burden of making space in the lab for new experiments by dismantling an abandoned experiment. If the experiment is dismantled, the provisions included above also aid in orderly decommissioning so that the laboratory space can be reclaimed and used for other purposes.
CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION Consider All Experiment Phases
The experiment designer is well served by considering all of the phases of the experiment when looking for and mitigating hazards: construction, operation, storage, and decommissioning. During construction, the experiment may require leak checking or pressure testing so the design has to allow for trapping pressure and leak checking. If the experiment is being built in sections and is pressure tested in sections, the designer has to be sure that parts do not detach under mild pressurization (i.e., 110% of operating pressure may be used for testing).
People are fallible and even the best researchers can make a mistake. A lab manager cannot count on human performance to always keep a lab safe. Once hazards have been identified, controls need to be developed based on factors such as the nature of the risks; the frequency of the activity; and the knowledge, experience, and skill of the researchers. There are three levels of controls (listed from most to least reliable and effective): engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment [PPE].
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013
Please cite this article in press as: Cadwallader, L. C., and Pawelko, R. J., Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory. J. Chem. Health Safety (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
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Engineering Controls
Engineering controls are physical changes made to a work environment to minimize contact with hazards. A partial list of common engineering controls includes gloveboxes, hoods, facility and/or localized ventilation, pressure relief devices, flow restricting devices, normally closed or normally open valves, HEPA filters, high voltage protection barriers, insulation to prevent inadvertent heat/cold burns, uninterruptible power supplies, automatic shutdown devices, chemical and fire cabinets, and fire suppression systems. Sometimes an experiment will require an engineered physical barrier to keep the researchers safe during experiment operation. If a known apparatus must be operated under new, more aggressive conditions or use some type of hazardous materials not previously under study and without accumulated data on behavior, toxicity, etc., an additional safety enclosure may be needed to protect personnel. One example is a dust combustion experiment that required an inert atmosphere glovebox so that hazardous dusts could be tested for their explosion indices. Some of the attributes and design parameters studied were: & Work environment: A walk-in enclosure was considered (e.g., a Perma-Con enclosure) but the inert atmosphere in a walk-in enclosure was believed to be a risk to personnel so an inert atmosphere glovebox was used. The inert atmosphere glovebox prevented dust release to the lab room and dust inhalation as well as suppression of dust combustion. & Items housed in the glovebox: One consideration in using a glovebox as a confinement barrier was the mass of the combustion chamber (37 kg) and its apparatus (13 kg). The glovebox manufacturers verified that this mass was acceptable in the stainless steel glovebox. A second consideration was spatial dimensions. The apparatus required use of an extra chamber built on the glovebox roof for an additional 0.4 m of vertical movement when removing and installing the chamber lid.
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& Ease of movement: Operations in the glovebox were restricted in freedom of motion. Additional gloveports and gloves were installed in windows to help with these ergonomic issues. Several specialized reach tools were designed and built for use via glovebox gloves to support disassembly of the combustion chamber internals for cleaning between tests. A special wrench was designed and fabricated to remove internal components, and long-handle reach tools with sponges and wipes were fabricated to clean the chamber between campaigns. A rolling ladder with a handrail was purchased to access the chamber on the glovebox roof. & Air monitoring: The glovebox had an oxygen monitor that required periodic recalibration. Replacement of this monitor with a new unit was the chosen approach because this was easier and safer than decontamination of the existing sensor for its annual recalibration. & Fire safety: Low static gloves and static electricity suppression was also added to prevent stray ignition of dust and of chemical igniters used in the experiments. & Other operating experience: Other experiment work in gloveboxes has had some good ideas published for experiment design and construction.15,16 While these two references are aimed at tritium gas experiments, the ideas are very useful for in-box experiments using any gas species. Another engineering control to consider is with associated software. Many researchers use LabVIEW17 or other software to control experiments and capture data. Often the control software will allow addition of emergency stops and the only effort required is to program the stop into the control software architecture. This can be a wise safety precaution and may also help to save data in an experiment that departs from planned parameters. Care needs to be taken, however, to ensure that aborting doesn’t leave the application in an unwanted state or create an impression that physical equipment
(such as motors) have also been stopped. Administrative Controls
Administrative controls typically change the behavior of personnel to minimize hazard exposure. These controls include procedures, policies, checklists, training, and process changes. Some lab managers and researchers frown on administrative controls, implying that pieces of paper are not effective tools for safety in the lab. Researchers may have a poor opinion of administrative controls when safety is perceived as an impediment to progress or may think poorly of the safety officers who strive to enforce these controls.18 As a generality, researchers who have witnessed or been impacted by an event that caused an injury or significantly set back research tend to see the value of well-defined administrative controls more readily than those who have not had any adverse events occur. Also, some disciplines have more successful use of administrative controls than others. For example, work with radioactive and biological substances are areas where administrative controls work in concert with engineered controls to provide for personnel safety. Lab managers and principal researchers should communicate the importance and role of administrative controls. Ordinarily, the more experience and training a researcher has, the better the reaction to an off-normal event. Kuespert describes an undergraduate lab assistant who had a fire occur during chemical manipulations in a fume hood.19 Rather than back away and call for help, sound the fire alarm, close the sash and evacuate, or perhaps try to fight the fire, the student took the burning beaker out of the hood, then marched over and showed it to the professor, stating that it was on fire. As this incident shows, sometimes people do not react well in off-normal events or emergencies. Stress is inevitable and training on responses to stressful events will increase the likelihood that personnel will achieve automaticity or durability of skills to have better performance in stress situations.20 The “training reversion” idea
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013
Please cite this article in press as: Cadwallader, L. C., and Pawelko, R. J., Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory. J. Chem. Health Safety (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
JCHAS-1015; No of Pages 6
is that in high stress situations, people revert to their training and select what to do from the alternatives their training offers to them rather than trying to think through and select the best possible response while under high stress of an emergency situation. The lab manager has to ensure the researchers are trained well and that training is periodically reinforced.21 Some researchers tend to not see the value in periodic training and can regard it as a reluctant chore, or worse, as a detraction from their productive time working in the lab. An experience was witnessed while visiting a facility and being involved in an unannounced, annual evacuation drill. When the loud sirens sounded, pulse quickened and stress increased. The office workers and other employees did not remember the directions for the two siren sounds (steady siren meant shelter in place, alternating siren meant evacuate the building). These personnel had annual training but it was not reinforced enough to be an automatic response. A manager bellowed over the siren noise for the people to think and reminded them that this drill happens every year. His statements had no effect on the group of people who had forgotten what to do. He quickly yelled to go to the shelter area; the group then started for the stairwell. After that, local management enhanced the computer-based training and posted signs reminding workers that steady = stay and alternate = evacuate. These measures helped employees to remember their training and perform better during drills and actual events. Personal Protective Equipment
In the hierarchy of personal safety controls, PPE is considered to be the least effective because it is the last barrier protecting the lab worker.22 Nevertheless, PPE should be used in case other controls fail and is particularly important when an experiment does not lend itself to barriers and other controls. Personnel may not wear PPE correctly, however, or might not wear it at all. The lab manager must verify that (a) appropriate PPE was selected for the hazards of the experiment and (b) personnel are trained and correctly using the PPE.
There are often complaints about loss of dexterity when using gloves and loss of visual acuity when using goggles or safety glasses. A tactic that has been used successfully at INL is to include the users in the process of selecting the PPE to be provided in the lab. Samples of leading brands of PPE are purchased for employees to try out before final PPE decisions are made for the lab. Trial use has shown a large contrast between various PPE samples for a given application. Engaging employees in PPE selection has generated more positive feedback about PPE and employee usage is generally no longer an issue. One recurring concern with safety glasses is that lenses become scratched. Anyone ever using safety glasses with scratched lenses knows the frustration of poor visual acuity. Periodic checks leading to replacement of glasses removes this complaint. Buying several sets of new goggles or glasses every year costs much less than an eye injury that could occur when employees do not wear damaged safety glasses. Safety Culture
Safety is a collective responsibility of each person in a lab (no one is exempt). Safety culture, the beliefs and actions of a lab group to prioritize safety over meeting goals, is a leadership responsibility.23 Lab managers and principal researchers encourage a healthy safety culture by modeling safety in their decisions and actions, responding to questions in an open, nondefensive manner, and watching for changes that may create new or different hazards. A safety-positive lab atmosphere sets a tone that carries through both low-hazard and highhazard work. Lab supervision can never truly relax. The lab may function well under the inertia of past good leadership but it will slowly (or quickly) lose the safety culture. A questioning attitude is an essential part of a strong safety culture. It prevents complacency and allows researchers to identify assumptions, anomalies, error-likely situations, and changing conditions. An episode in a lab shows this. A typically very safe researcher wanted to reduce the length of some ceramic screws so they could
be used in an experiment. He wanted to use a grinding wheel to sand them down to a shorter length. The lab manager asked what the material was because sanding the ceramic down would put milligrams of the material into the breathing zone around the grinder. The grinder did not have special ventilation controls and the lab did not have respirators readily available. The researcher had not considered the chemical safety aspect of breathing small particulate produced by the grinder; the screws were not part of the lab’s chemical inventory. The researcher decided to run nuts down the screws and break the threads off at the desired length to avoid the grinding hazard altogether.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has described some approaches for hazard identification, including inspection, job hazard analysis, and review of equipment operating experience. Hazard mitigation approaches and controls were also discussed, illustrated by some safety experiences in labs. This information should support lab managers in providing safety in various types of laboratories. While each researcher is responsible for safety, laboratory leadership is responsible for establishing and maintaining a vibrant safety culture. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fusion Energy Sciences; under DOE Idaho Operations Office contract number DE-AC07-051D14517.
REFERENCES 1. National Research Council of the National Academies. Prudent Practices in the Laboratory: Handling and Management of Chemical Hazards; National Academies Press: Dulles, VA, 2011, Supplemental materials CD, laboratory hazard assessment checklist. 2. Interactive Learning Paradigms, Incorporated. What Can Happen When You Don’t Follow Safety Rules. 2019. From the web site: http://www.ilpi.com/
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Please cite this article in press as: Cadwallader, L. C., and Pawelko, R. J., Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory. J. Chem. Health Safety (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
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safety/explosion.html, accessed 9/6/ 2018. 3. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Job Hazard Analysis; OSHA 3071, U.S. Department of Labor: Washington, DC, 2002. 4. American Chemical Society. Safety. 2019. http://www.acs.org/content/ acs/en/chemical-safety/ramp.html, accessed 1/9/2019. 5. U.S. Food & Drug Administration. MAUDE—Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience. 2019. https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/search. cfm, accessed 9/21/2018. 6. DOE. Occurrence Reporting and Processing System. 2019. https://data.doe. gov/asp/Main.aspx?, accessed 9/21/ 2018. 7. DOE. OPEXShare Operating Experience Lessons Learned, Best Practices. https://opexshare.doe.gov/, 2019. accessed 9/21/2018. 8. McMaster, C.; McMaster, M. C. GC/ MS, A Practical User’s Guide; John Wiley & Sons: New York, NY, 1998.
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9. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Worker Safety and Health Program. Title 10, Part 851; U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2018. 10. American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Process Piping, ASME Code for Pressure Piping, B31. ASME B31. 32016; ASME: New York, NY, 2017. 11. National Fire Protection Association. National Electrical Code. NFPA 70, 2017 ed. NFPA: Quincy, MA, 2016. 12. National Fire Protection Association. Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. NFPA 70E, 2018 ed. NFPA: Quincy, MA, 2017. 13. Moore, J. H.; Davis, C. C.; Coplan, M. A.; Greer, S. C. Building Scientific Apparatus, 4th ed. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2009. 14. Walker, I. R. Reliability in Scientific Research: Improving the Dependability of Measurements, Calculations, Equipment, and Software; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2011. 15. Anderson, J. L.; Coffin, D. O.; Nasise, J. E.; Sherman, R. H.; Jalbert, R. A. Fusion Technol. 1985, 8(2P2), 2413–2419.
16. Binning, K. E.; Jenkins, E. M. Fusion Technol. 1988, 14(2P2B), 958–961. 17. National Instruments. LabVIEW; National Instruments: Austin, TX, 2018. 18. Mullis, K. Dancing Naked in the Mind Field; Vintage Publishers: New York, NY, 2000, pp. 40–43. 19. Kuespert, D. R. Research Laboratory Safety; Walter De Gruyter, Inc.: Boston, MA, 2016. 20. Driskell, J. E.; Salas, E. (Eds.).Stress and Human Performance. Taylor & Francis Publishers: New York, NY, 2016 p. 105. 21. Rieve, S. Occup. Health Saf. 2015, 84 (6), 96–97. 22. Goetsch, D. L. Occupational Safety and Health, for Technologists, Engineers, and Managers, 6th ed. Prentice Hall Publishers: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2008, pp. 442–444. 23. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture. INPO 12-012, rev. 1. 2013. http:// nuclearsafety.info/wp-content/ uploads/2010/07/Traits-of-a-HealthyNuclear-Safety-Culture-INPO-12-012rev.1-Apr2013.pdf, accessed 9/21/2018.
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013
Please cite this article in press as: Cadwallader, L. C., and Pawelko, R. J., Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory. J. Chem. Health Safety (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
RESOURCE ARTICLE
Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory Laboratory safety must always be a top priority in today’s research laboratories. Laboratory hazards need to be identified and hazard controls need to be developed and implemented to ensure a safe work environment. The purpose of this article is to provide a general overview of safety in research laboratories. This article describes approaches to identify, understand, and assess hazards in experiment laboratories, including safety in experiment operations. Approaches and controls to mitigate some types of hazards are discussed. In addition, some lab safety experiences are described.
By Lee C. Cadwallader, Robert J. Pawelko
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
Each year, laboratory researchers are injured, sometimes fatally, while working in their labs. These accidents underscore the importance of assessing laboratory hazards and maintaining a workplace safety culture. This article is written from the perspective of a laboratory manager whose primary role is to ensure that research is conducted efficiently and safely in accordance with approved work control documents. It is intended to be a general overview of safety in research laboratories and to convey some practical information relating to the process of identifying hazards, assessing hazards, and developing and implementing appropriate work controls that mitigate the hazards. These steps are discussed below, highlighted by some safety incidents. Lee C. Cadwallader is affiliated with the Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 834153860, United States. Tel.: (208) 5261232, Fax: (208) 526-0528, (e-mail: [email protected]). Robert J. Pawelko is affiliated with the Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-7113, United States. Tel.: (208) 533-4792, Fax: (208) 533-4207, (e-mail: Robert. [email protected]).
1871-5532 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
Identifying hazards is an essential first step in ensuring safe lab operations. Lab managers and principal researchers should evaluate the proposed work scope for things such as sources of hazardous energy, hazardous materials or equipment, error-likely situations, and interactions between hazards. Potential sources of hazardous energy include electrical power, mechanical energy, hydraulic energy, pneumatic energy, chemical energy, thermal energy, and stored energy sources. Some oft-used methods of hazard identification are discussed below. Inspection
Some principal researchers and lab managers identify lab hazards simply by walking through the lab and observing the processes, energies, and hazardous materials to be used in the lab. This can be a very effective approach to hazard identification and the more diverse experience the person has the better the outcome. For those not experienced with the experiments to be performed in the lab, the safety checklist tends to be used as the first approach to identifying laboratory safety hazards. An example is found in Prudent Practices in the Laboratory.1 The checklist offers the benefits of thoroughness and reproducibility. Checklists suffer from an inherent issue, however, in that they typically only address a single effect, hazardous energy, or material at a time. Synergistic effects of multiple hazards in a given experiment need to be addressed to better ensure
researcher safety. Identifying combinations of energies and hazardous materials must be performed, at least on the basis of proximity between multiple sources and the personnel. For example, the checklist can assist in evaluating what chemicals are in a lab but the lab manager may have to take intuitive leaps to address potential chemical incompatibility hazards. An event at the University of Kentucky in 1997 had students working on different experiments inadvertently mixed their chemical wastes in a single waste jug in a fume hood. It is believed that nitric acid and organic solvents were mixed, leading to the capped jug exploding and a fire spreading outside the fume hood.2 A hazard checklist would have shown there were acids and solvents in the lab but the lab manager would have been left to identify how these chemicals could contact each other and address the potential hazards. Job Hazard Analysis
Another approach to hazard identification is job hazard analysis [JHA]3 (also known as job safety analysis). The JHA is a list of the tasks to be performed and a list of the hazards associated with each task. This can be a tedious analysis and can become voluminous because each experiment will likely have its own unique set of tasks. If there are routine tasks in the lab, such as sample preparation, it is possible to modularize the JHAs to address routine tasks. In this scheme, all routine tasks have one JHA and then another JHA is written to address the unique tasks or aspects of a given experiment.
ã 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society.
Please cite this article in press as: Cadwallader, L. C., and Pawelko, R. J., Elements of experiment safety in the laboratory. J. Chem. Health Safety (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2019.01.002
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Idaho National Laboratory [INL] has successfully used Laboratory Instructions (LI) to conduct experiment operations for more than 10 years. A LI contains a very thorough JSA. The principal researcher creates a LI document with the main tasks of the experiment listed in a table format along with their overall hazards and mitigations. A LI also contains sections relating to emergency preparedness, waste generation, training requirements, lessons learned, required facility conditions, and instructions based on the risks associated with the performance of the work. The LI is reviewed by the lab manager and then by a team of subject matter experts. These reviews often include walkthroughs of the lab(s). Additional reviews occur when planned work falls outside of the original work scope. Information and guidance on conducting a safety assessment is available at the American Chemical Society web site.4 Operating Experience and Lessons Learned Review
A review of operating experience (OE) and lessons learned (LL) provides a method for lab managers and primary researchers to learn from the mistakes and successes of others. Some hazards may be rare events but it remains prudent to understand all the possible hazards in the lab. Equipment faults are one type of rare event that can pose large hazards to personnel. One of the best things the lab manager can do to provide for safety during rare equipment failures is to learn about the operations experience of the equipment used in the laboratory. Information extracted from an OE and LL review may be used to identify and to mitigate the types of failures that have occurred with such equipment, or used in developing emergency preparedness scenarios. Often the equipment failures are also covered by other mitigating features in the lab (e.g., fire sprinkler systems). Discussion of scientific equipment operating experience is not often included in the technical literature—a quick literature search or internet search might reveal some useful information or it may not yield anything. There are, however, some databases
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that record off-normal events in labs. These are available for searching, such as the Food and Drug Administration’s Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience [MAUDE] database5 and the publicly accessible reports in the U. S. Department of Energy’s [DOE’s] Occurrence Reporting and Processing System [ORPS].6 Each database has limitations but both can provide some pertinent information on what types of equipment failures might occur in a laboratory. For example, a search on mass spectrometers shows that failures are not always manifest as failing to operate. Some events were reported as short circuits that produced shocks when the instrument cover was touched; other events were caused by vacuum pumps that issued smoke or caught fire. Lessons learned from other labs is another important source of operating experience. Personnel can discuss equipment and process faults with other lab managers or researchers who have similar equipment and experience. DOE also maintains a web site called OPEXShare7 that allows users to search for lessons learned, best practices, and recalls submitted by U.S. national laboratories, state and federal agencies, professional organizations, and industry. Searching for “mass spectrometer” in OPEXShare reveals information such as recalled SCIEX mass spectrometers and project management lessons from building the highest resolution mass spectrometer in the world. An often overlooked source of operating experience is the service engineers who periodically visit to maintain major equipment items. McMaster8 describes that the service engineer sees a wide set of both commercial and university laboratories (including different types of labs such as environmental, clinical, analytical, forensic, etc.) and machines that operate in various states of good to poor maintenance. The service engineer can describe what has occurred in other labs using similar equipment and perhaps give suggestions on avoidance or mitigation of off-normal events. Scenarios to discuss may include human errors (what would happen if a vacuum chamber were inadvertently over
pressurized with an inert gas?), ancillary equipment failures (what if the cooling water pump trips off-line or the compressed air supply is lost?), or equipment faults (what if the equipment is not grounded correctly or the equipment is not well maintained?). These issues are all valuable to evaluate for researcher safety. Regulations Governing Hazards
Laboratory Instructions are the safety basis for experimental operations at the INL. In many laboratories, there are the “Big 3” hazards in experiments: use of pressurized components (requiring a pressure safety program), use of electricity (electrical safety program), and use of various chemicals (chemical safety program). Prior to LI approval, the identified hazards and mitigating controls are reviewed by the lab manager and then by a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) for completeness, and appropriateness of the mitigating controls. The SMEs also review the document to ensure experiment activities are within federal, state, local, and institutional laws and rules. This review process helps researchers to achieve regulatory compliance and allows them to focus on their safety and the safety of those working around them. At INL, pressure safety has to meet the requirements given in 10CFR851.9 The pressure systems must be designed, fabricated, tested, inspected, maintained, repaired, and operated by trained and qualified personnel. The piping or tubing systems must conform to applicable design codes such as ASME B31.310 and any state and local codes. Design drawings and calculations must be peer reviewed and approved by a qualified, independent design professional. The design information must be maintained in the experiment documentation. At INL, the worker safety regulation also directs having an electrical safety program that follows NFPA 7011 and NFPA 70E.12 Within the regulations, INL laboratories have adopted a graded approach. Low voltages under 50 V with low current are not particularly hazardous. Instrumentation at low voltage and current can be worked on without special safety provisions.
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Very high voltages with almost no current are also not a significant hazard. Researchers also use “cord and plug control” where the researcher working on his or her experiment is the only person working and has exclusive control of the plug so that the equipment cannot be accidentally energized. INL’s chemical safety program also meets 10CFR851.9 An industrial hygienist periodically surveys the laboratory for workplace exposure to chemicals, carcinogens, nonionizing radiation, and other hazards in the lab including hazardous waste products generated in experiments. Handling and disposing of hazardous wastes can be very time consuming and expensive. At the INL, hazardous wastes are turned over to a subcontracted waste generation service whose function is to dispose of them in compliance with current hazardous waste regulations.
used for multiple or varying research initiatives in the future. This can mean longer usage time for the experiment and the need for more robust, reliable equipment to meet that longevity challenge. For example, many polymers used to seal surfaces in gas handling components and valves degrade when exposed to ionizing radiation such as tritium gas. By selecting components and valves that contain polymers which are less susceptible to ionizing radiation will increase the service life of tritium gas handling systems. Reliability in the experiment apparatus is always desired but is not always pursued. Taking the time to read about the experiment apparatus under consideration often leads to a more highly functional experiment. Resources such as Moore13 and Walker14 are very valuable for the experiment designer. Substitution of Lesser Hazards
HAZARD MITIGATION
In some research fields, the design of an experiment is a considerable challenge in and of itself. To properly isolate the phenomenon to be studied can pose great difficulty and the researcher may have to include atypical design provisions to accomplish the goal of the experiment. In cases such as these, it is especially important to ensure the safety goals do not become subordinate to the primary goal of the experiment. The challenge is to ensure that all of the hazards have been recognized and assessed, and that the best methods (Substitution/Elimination, Engineered controls, Administrative controls, PPE) to minimize risks have been selected. Three significant considerations are discussed below. Reliability in Design
Taking time to think about reliability in design is time well applied and often pays rich dividends. Experimentalists always desire an experiment that operates well; gives solid, repeatable results; and lends transparency to the study. Reliable equipment supports that desire. Depending on the size and scale of the experiment, the researcher/designer may want to incorporate aspects of versatility into the design so that the experiment can be
Personnel should consider replacing especially hazardous materials with other less hazardous materials and seek methods to reduce exposure. Having the experiment designer think through the choices made for items and processes may reduce hazards even if a substitution is not carried out. If substitution is not an option, limiting the quantities of hazardous materials used to that needed for task completion will reduce the hazards. Thinking through the inventories and determining they cannot be substituted or reduced is not a wasted effort. Besides showing diligence in design, it can also serve as the basis for inclusion of safety barriers in the experiment.
In the operations phase, the experiment may need to be shut down for calibration, cleaning, adjustment, sample changeout, or decontamination so it can continue to produce accurate results. Designs to minimize personnel exposure and to allow easy re-assembly are very good safety design provisions that also help the experiment to return to operation in the fastest possible time. When an experiment has been completed, it may be left idle in the hope of future use or it may be dismantled. If left idle, it should be made safe and it must adequately confine any remaining hazardous materials. Too often, researchers complete a test series and then cease the experiment to write up the results. If left idle until more funding is available to deal with the apparatus (and paucity of funding for safe storage seems to occur more often that experimentalists care to admit), the experiment needs to be left in a safe state—purged, cleaned, depressurized, and de-energized. Lab managers need to be vigilant about proper shutdown of experiments. It is very easy for the lab to become a graveyard of old experiments. In some cases, new projects must carry the burden of making space in the lab for new experiments by dismantling an abandoned experiment. If the experiment is dismantled, the provisions included above also aid in orderly decommissioning so that the laboratory space can be reclaimed and used for other purposes.
CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION Consider All Experiment Phases
The experiment designer is well served by considering all of the phases of the experiment when looking for and mitigating hazards: construction, operation, storage, and decommissioning. During construction, the experiment may require leak checking or pressure testing so the design has to allow for trapping pressure and leak checking. If the experiment is being built in sections and is pressure tested in sections, the designer has to be sure that parts do not detach under mild pressurization (i.e., 110% of operating pressure may be used for testing).
People are fallible and even the best researchers can make a mistake. A lab manager cannot count on human performance to always keep a lab safe. Once hazards have been identified, controls need to be developed based on factors such as the nature of the risks; the frequency of the activity; and the knowledge, experience, and skill of the researchers. There are three levels of controls (listed from most to least reliable and effective): engineering, administrative, and personal protective equipment [PPE].
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Engineering Controls
Engineering controls are physical changes made to a work environment to minimize contact with hazards. A partial list of common engineering controls includes gloveboxes, hoods, facility and/or localized ventilation, pressure relief devices, flow restricting devices, normally closed or normally open valves, HEPA filters, high voltage protection barriers, insulation to prevent inadvertent heat/cold burns, uninterruptible power supplies, automatic shutdown devices, chemical and fire cabinets, and fire suppression systems. Sometimes an experiment will require an engineered physical barrier to keep the researchers safe during experiment operation. If a known apparatus must be operated under new, more aggressive conditions or use some type of hazardous materials not previously under study and without accumulated data on behavior, toxicity, etc., an additional safety enclosure may be needed to protect personnel. One example is a dust combustion experiment that required an inert atmosphere glovebox so that hazardous dusts could be tested for their explosion indices. Some of the attributes and design parameters studied were: & Work environment: A walk-in enclosure was considered (e.g., a Perma-Con enclosure) but the inert atmosphere in a walk-in enclosure was believed to be a risk to personnel so an inert atmosphere glovebox was used. The inert atmosphere glovebox prevented dust release to the lab room and dust inhalation as well as suppression of dust combustion. & Items housed in the glovebox: One consideration in using a glovebox as a confinement barrier was the mass of the combustion chamber (37 kg) and its apparatus (13 kg). The glovebox manufacturers verified that this mass was acceptable in the stainless steel glovebox. A second consideration was spatial dimensions. The apparatus required use of an extra chamber built on the glovebox roof for an additional 0.4 m of vertical movement when removing and installing the chamber lid.
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& Ease of movement: Operations in the glovebox were restricted in freedom of motion. Additional gloveports and gloves were installed in windows to help with these ergonomic issues. Several specialized reach tools were designed and built for use via glovebox gloves to support disassembly of the combustion chamber internals for cleaning between tests. A special wrench was designed and fabricated to remove internal components, and long-handle reach tools with sponges and wipes were fabricated to clean the chamber between campaigns. A rolling ladder with a handrail was purchased to access the chamber on the glovebox roof. & Air monitoring: The glovebox had an oxygen monitor that required periodic recalibration. Replacement of this monitor with a new unit was the chosen approach because this was easier and safer than decontamination of the existing sensor for its annual recalibration. & Fire safety: Low static gloves and static electricity suppression was also added to prevent stray ignition of dust and of chemical igniters used in the experiments. & Other operating experience: Other experiment work in gloveboxes has had some good ideas published for experiment design and construction.15,16 While these two references are aimed at tritium gas experiments, the ideas are very useful for in-box experiments using any gas species. Another engineering control to consider is with associated software. Many researchers use LabVIEW17 or other software to control experiments and capture data. Often the control software will allow addition of emergency stops and the only effort required is to program the stop into the control software architecture. This can be a wise safety precaution and may also help to save data in an experiment that departs from planned parameters. Care needs to be taken, however, to ensure that aborting doesn’t leave the application in an unwanted state or create an impression that physical equipment
(such as motors) have also been stopped. Administrative Controls
Administrative controls typically change the behavior of personnel to minimize hazard exposure. These controls include procedures, policies, checklists, training, and process changes. Some lab managers and researchers frown on administrative controls, implying that pieces of paper are not effective tools for safety in the lab. Researchers may have a poor opinion of administrative controls when safety is perceived as an impediment to progress or may think poorly of the safety officers who strive to enforce these controls.18 As a generality, researchers who have witnessed or been impacted by an event that caused an injury or significantly set back research tend to see the value of well-defined administrative controls more readily than those who have not had any adverse events occur. Also, some disciplines have more successful use of administrative controls than others. For example, work with radioactive and biological substances are areas where administrative controls work in concert with engineered controls to provide for personnel safety. Lab managers and principal researchers should communicate the importance and role of administrative controls. Ordinarily, the more experience and training a researcher has, the better the reaction to an off-normal event. Kuespert describes an undergraduate lab assistant who had a fire occur during chemical manipulations in a fume hood.19 Rather than back away and call for help, sound the fire alarm, close the sash and evacuate, or perhaps try to fight the fire, the student took the burning beaker out of the hood, then marched over and showed it to the professor, stating that it was on fire. As this incident shows, sometimes people do not react well in off-normal events or emergencies. Stress is inevitable and training on responses to stressful events will increase the likelihood that personnel will achieve automaticity or durability of skills to have better performance in stress situations.20 The “training reversion” idea
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is that in high stress situations, people revert to their training and select what to do from the alternatives their training offers to them rather than trying to think through and select the best possible response while under high stress of an emergency situation. The lab manager has to ensure the researchers are trained well and that training is periodically reinforced.21 Some researchers tend to not see the value in periodic training and can regard it as a reluctant chore, or worse, as a detraction from their productive time working in the lab. An experience was witnessed while visiting a facility and being involved in an unannounced, annual evacuation drill. When the loud sirens sounded, pulse quickened and stress increased. The office workers and other employees did not remember the directions for the two siren sounds (steady siren meant shelter in place, alternating siren meant evacuate the building). These personnel had annual training but it was not reinforced enough to be an automatic response. A manager bellowed over the siren noise for the people to think and reminded them that this drill happens every year. His statements had no effect on the group of people who had forgotten what to do. He quickly yelled to go to the shelter area; the group then started for the stairwell. After that, local management enhanced the computer-based training and posted signs reminding workers that steady = stay and alternate = evacuate. These measures helped employees to remember their training and perform better during drills and actual events. Personal Protective Equipment
In the hierarchy of personal safety controls, PPE is considered to be the least effective because it is the last barrier protecting the lab worker.22 Nevertheless, PPE should be used in case other controls fail and is particularly important when an experiment does not lend itself to barriers and other controls. Personnel may not wear PPE correctly, however, or might not wear it at all. The lab manager must verify that (a) appropriate PPE was selected for the hazards of the experiment and (b) personnel are trained and correctly using the PPE.
There are often complaints about loss of dexterity when using gloves and loss of visual acuity when using goggles or safety glasses. A tactic that has been used successfully at INL is to include the users in the process of selecting the PPE to be provided in the lab. Samples of leading brands of PPE are purchased for employees to try out before final PPE decisions are made for the lab. Trial use has shown a large contrast between various PPE samples for a given application. Engaging employees in PPE selection has generated more positive feedback about PPE and employee usage is generally no longer an issue. One recurring concern with safety glasses is that lenses become scratched. Anyone ever using safety glasses with scratched lenses knows the frustration of poor visual acuity. Periodic checks leading to replacement of glasses removes this complaint. Buying several sets of new goggles or glasses every year costs much less than an eye injury that could occur when employees do not wear damaged safety glasses. Safety Culture
Safety is a collective responsibility of each person in a lab (no one is exempt). Safety culture, the beliefs and actions of a lab group to prioritize safety over meeting goals, is a leadership responsibility.23 Lab managers and principal researchers encourage a healthy safety culture by modeling safety in their decisions and actions, responding to questions in an open, nondefensive manner, and watching for changes that may create new or different hazards. A safety-positive lab atmosphere sets a tone that carries through both low-hazard and highhazard work. Lab supervision can never truly relax. The lab may function well under the inertia of past good leadership but it will slowly (or quickly) lose the safety culture. A questioning attitude is an essential part of a strong safety culture. It prevents complacency and allows researchers to identify assumptions, anomalies, error-likely situations, and changing conditions. An episode in a lab shows this. A typically very safe researcher wanted to reduce the length of some ceramic screws so they could
be used in an experiment. He wanted to use a grinding wheel to sand them down to a shorter length. The lab manager asked what the material was because sanding the ceramic down would put milligrams of the material into the breathing zone around the grinder. The grinder did not have special ventilation controls and the lab did not have respirators readily available. The researcher had not considered the chemical safety aspect of breathing small particulate produced by the grinder; the screws were not part of the lab’s chemical inventory. The researcher decided to run nuts down the screws and break the threads off at the desired length to avoid the grinding hazard altogether.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has described some approaches for hazard identification, including inspection, job hazard analysis, and review of equipment operating experience. Hazard mitigation approaches and controls were also discussed, illustrated by some safety experiences in labs. This information should support lab managers in providing safety in various types of laboratories. While each researcher is responsible for safety, laboratory leadership is responsible for establishing and maintaining a vibrant safety culture. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fusion Energy Sciences; under DOE Idaho Operations Office contract number DE-AC07-051D14517.
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safety/explosion.html, accessed 9/6/ 2018. 3. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Job Hazard Analysis; OSHA 3071, U.S. Department of Labor: Washington, DC, 2002. 4. American Chemical Society. Safety. 2019. http://www.acs.org/content/ acs/en/chemical-safety/ramp.html, accessed 1/9/2019. 5. U.S. Food & Drug Administration. MAUDE—Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience. 2019. https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/search. cfm, accessed 9/21/2018. 6. DOE. Occurrence Reporting and Processing System. 2019. https://data.doe. gov/asp/Main.aspx?, accessed 9/21/ 2018. 7. DOE. OPEXShare Operating Experience Lessons Learned, Best Practices. https://opexshare.doe.gov/, 2019. accessed 9/21/2018. 8. McMaster, C.; McMaster, M. C. GC/ MS, A Practical User’s Guide; John Wiley & Sons: New York, NY, 1998.
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9. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Worker Safety and Health Program. Title 10, Part 851; U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2018. 10. American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Process Piping, ASME Code for Pressure Piping, B31. ASME B31. 32016; ASME: New York, NY, 2017. 11. National Fire Protection Association. National Electrical Code. NFPA 70, 2017 ed. NFPA: Quincy, MA, 2016. 12. National Fire Protection Association. Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. NFPA 70E, 2018 ed. NFPA: Quincy, MA, 2017. 13. Moore, J. H.; Davis, C. C.; Coplan, M. A.; Greer, S. C. Building Scientific Apparatus, 4th ed. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2009. 14. Walker, I. R. Reliability in Scientific Research: Improving the Dependability of Measurements, Calculations, Equipment, and Software; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2011. 15. Anderson, J. L.; Coffin, D. O.; Nasise, J. E.; Sherman, R. H.; Jalbert, R. A. Fusion Technol. 1985, 8(2P2), 2413–2419.
16. Binning, K. E.; Jenkins, E. M. Fusion Technol. 1988, 14(2P2B), 958–961. 17. National Instruments. LabVIEW; National Instruments: Austin, TX, 2018. 18. Mullis, K. Dancing Naked in the Mind Field; Vintage Publishers: New York, NY, 2000, pp. 40–43. 19. Kuespert, D. R. Research Laboratory Safety; Walter De Gruyter, Inc.: Boston, MA, 2016. 20. Driskell, J. E.; Salas, E. (Eds.).Stress and Human Performance. Taylor & Francis Publishers: New York, NY, 2016 p. 105. 21. Rieve, S. Occup. Health Saf. 2015, 84 (6), 96–97. 22. Goetsch, D. L. Occupational Safety and Health, for Technologists, Engineers, and Managers, 6th ed. Prentice Hall Publishers: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2008, pp. 442–444. 23. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture. INPO 12-012, rev. 1. 2013. http:// nuclearsafety.info/wp-content/ uploads/2010/07/Traits-of-a-HealthyNuclear-Safety-Culture-INPO-12-012rev.1-Apr2013.pdf, accessed 9/21/2018.
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