Fault tolerant computers and multiprocessing. January 1985–June 1987

Fault tolerant computers and multiprocessing. January 1985–June 1987

Computers and Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 hardware, software, network and user-related risks. Each of these is discussed in the article as well as securi...

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Computers and Security, Vol. 7, No. 1

hardware, software, network and user-related risks. Each of these is discussed in the article as well as security measures available for protection. Among these are risk analysis, security policy and guidelines, environmental controls, physical security, access security, data security and backup and contingency planning. Edpacs, September

1987, pp. 5-I1.

Fault Tolerant Computers and Multiprocessing. January 1985-June 1987 This bibliography contains citations concerning computational concurrency and fault tolerant features o f computer hardware, including their design, architecture and applications. Greedy's diagnostic theory, multiple node and link failures, transient fault detection, error correction and faulty recovery are among the topics discussed. Reliability studies on various systems by real time testing and statistical analysis are presented. (This updated bibliography contains 178 citations, 32 of which are new entries to the previous edition.)

National Technical Information Service, PB87-862959/WCC.

Development of Confidence Limits by Pivotal Functions for Estimating Software

Reliability The utility o f pivotal functions is established for assessing software reliability. Based on the Moranda geometric de-eutrophication model of reliability growth, confidence limits for attained reliability and prediction limits for the time to the next failure are derived using a

pivotal function approach. Asymptotic approximations to the confidence and prediction limits are considered and are shown to be inadequate in cases where only a few bugs are found in the software. Departures from the assumed exponentially distributed interfailure times in the model are also investigated. The effect of these departures is discussed relative to restricting the use of the Moranda model. National Technical Information

Service, N87-23244/3/WCC.

After the Street's Unforgettable Week all Info Systems are (Mostly) go, Barton Crockett and Cassimir J. Medford On Monday, October 19, when the stock markets plummeted in New York, London and Tokyo, the computers and communications links strained to the breaking point--coping with the deluge, but barely. The next day, the disk drives that record daily transactions at the American Stock Exchange ran out of space in the last five minutes o f trading. On Wednesday, the automated transaction system of the Pacific Stock Exchange, running at 130% of capacity for three consecutive days, crashed. Throughout much of the week, the ticker tape at the New York Stock Exchange was as much as two hours behind time.

Information WEEK, October 26, 1987, pp. 12, I3.

In Japan, MIS Weathers the Storm Easily, Dorothy Ko During the stock market drop and recovery, the Tokyo Stock Exchange found that its regular systems

were sufficient to handle emergencies. There is no program trading in Tokyo. Informatio, WEEK, October

26, 1987, p. 12.

In London, Stocks Up and Computers Down, Philip Hunter Having coped with falls on Monday and Tuesday, one o f the computer systems broke down under the weight of Wednesday's rebound, failing to display the Financial Times 100 share index for two hours. Nevertheless, the basic Stock Exchange Automated Quotation system coped admirably with the record trading, handling a volume beyond the maximum it was designed to carry.

Information WEEK, October 26, 1987, p. I3.

Today's Computer Crime: The Threat from Within, Diana ben-Aaron with Lee Green According to Donn Parker, the trusted insider is still the biggest danger to the corporation. What's prevalent is data diddling, changing data before or as it goes into the system rather than in the computer. The primary management techniques for minimizing this problem are separation of functions and strict auditing. Within the MIS department, only a handful of people should be authorized to bring the system up, create users and manage the audit trail. The array o f security products can be grouped into physical security, access security, transmission security and encryption/decryption techniques. Each of these is discussed in the article, lnformationWEEK, October 26, 1987, p. 34ff.

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