Foresight methods for multilateral collaboration in space situational awareness (SSA) policy & operations

Foresight methods for multilateral collaboration in space situational awareness (SSA) policy & operations

The Journal of Space Safety Engineering 5 (2018) 115–120 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect The Journal of Space Safety Engineering journal h...

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The Journal of Space Safety Engineering 5 (2018) 115–120

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

The Journal of Space Safety Engineering journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jsse

Foresight methods for multilateral collaboration in space situational awareness (SSA) policy & operations

T

Regina Peldszus Department of Space Situational Awareness (SSA), DLR Space Administration, Königswintererstr. 522-524, Bonn 53227, Germany

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Space situational awareness Space surveillance & tracking Foresight Space operations Space security resilience International relations

Our orbital environment is undergoing profound changes characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and complexity. At the same time, the governance of the global domain of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is undergoing a transformation itself, as it evolves from the paradigm of traditional single state-actor efforts to multilateral collaborations. This paper offers a theoretical perspective to adapting to external and internal changes through foresight. Drawing on contemporary safety approaches to resilience and reliability, it highlights three qualitative methods at various levels of depth: horizon scanning, scenario building, and live simulation. In considering the merits of foresight activities as vehicle for transparency and confidence building, as forum for reflection across multiple actors, and for the reconciliation of divergent stakeholder interests, it makes the case for concerted foresight efforts as indispensable measure to explore, understand and respond to incremental and disruptive change.

1. Introduction 1.1. Changing context of SSA in the orbital environment Across various orbital regimes, the space environment faces unprecedented changes. Greater access to launch technology for a larger number of actors, the miniaturization of space assets, and incidents that significantly increased the population of objects represent only some of the incremental developments and disruptive events that have resulted in an increasingly complex and dynamic setting [1–3,24]. New propulsion systems, the advent of large constellations, and novel operational concepts such as satellite servicing or removal technologies will compound the inherent complexities of our utilization of the space environment further. Meanwhile, next generation sensor systems and advances in processing enable larger-scale detection and diagnostics (Fig. 1). In order to mitigate the risks they are routinely exposed to, spacefaring actors with primary interests in safeguarding their maneuverable assets and sustaining access to orbit engage in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) activities. SSA constitutes the operational monitoring and understanding of the orbital environment and the behavior of its constituent actors. Dedicated surveillance and tracking sensors (e.g., radar, optical, laser ranging) acquire data on objects (e.g., active and non-active satellites, debris, fragmentations, re-entries), which are processed as part of a catalogue. Together with information on natural

phenomena (e.g., space weather, near earth objects), the resulting insights are synthesized in a recognized space picture (RSP). This is the base for generating products, for instance to alert operators of possible conjunctions and enable them to perform collision avoidance measures. Today, SSA represents a crucial operational domain. Given the pace of current developments in orbit, their foreseen acceleration, and the increasing importance of space as critical infrastructure [18], the field is likely to grow in significance and scope in the coming decades. 1.2. Changing nature of SSA from single- to multi-stakeholder operations & governance Yet, in parallel to the changes in the environment that SSA as a domain will have to adapt to in the near future, its global community of practice itself is fundamentally changing. Particularly, the traditional paradigms of operations and governance hailing from Cold War missile defense legacies have been challenged, relaxed, or transformed. Today, SSA activities are not performed exclusively by state-actors anymore. The SSA community prepares itself for future activities to be planned and undertaken by aggregations of multiple heterogeneous organizations, rather than individual actors. The increasingly collaborative – or at least interdependent – activities of individual stakeholder of sovereign states (e.g., 18th Space Control Squadron/ JSPOC) have been diversifying in the past decade. In the context of burden-sharing of investment and

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2018.07.001 Received 1 December 2017; Received in revised form 26 June 2018; Accepted 12 July 2018 Available online 24 July 2018 2468-8967/ © 2018 International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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themselves particularly to a multilateral institutional or intergovernmental context. After a brief discussion of their merits and challenges, the paper concludes with an outlook on further research needs. 2. Selecting foresight methods for multilateral settings in SSA Fig. 1. Excerpt of key trends contributing to the proliferation of objects across orbital regimes.

Corporate entities in the automotive, semi-conductor, or consumer electronics sectors routinely perform foresight activities, and have long been integrating them into their organisational design under the name of strategic or business intelligence [36,37]. Others, such as research institutes, think tanks or consultancies have dedicated their core mission to foresight, systems analysis, or trend research. Much can be gleaned from how such organisations focus, organise, implement, and use foresight. Yet, their overall goals, constraints and values are not necessarily comparable to the domain of SSA, and their requirements and methods may not be applicable or transferrable directly. As a safety-critical domain, SSA is subject to much greater degrees of causality (i.e., it is constraint by the laws of physics), but also features an inherently dual-use dimension and comparably bespoke systems.

operations, and to enable more resilient systems through the integration of complementary elements, collaborations are being implemented. These range from partnerships between state-actors, to efforts across government agencies or civil-military stakeholders (e.g., jointly operated SSA centers). Consolidated programs are emerging between groups of sovereign states under the aegis of supranational organizations (e.g., European SST Support Framework at the European Commission). Access to sensor and processing technologies enable commercial actors to enter the market and cater to customers across the spectrum of government and private entities. The pursuit of near fulltime availability and reliability of space-based services has enticed commercial and institutional owner-operators to actively align their operational interests (e.g., Space Data Association). Other SSA activities, such as research and development, are embedded in programs run by intergovernmental organizations (e.g., R&D at ESA). All these constituents are bound – but also fragmented – through a complex ecology of cooperation agreements, data sharing arrangements, technology transfer instruments, capacity sharing initiatives, operational contracts, oversight mechanisms, and shared policy fora.

2.1. Approaches from domains comparable to SSA It may hence be useful to approach the selection and application of foresight methods through the lens of organisations and sectors with similar domain characteristics as SSA. These include organisations in safety-critical or high-risk sectors as taxonomized in approaches such as Normal Accident Theory (NAT), Resilience Engineering (RE), or High Reliability Organising (HRO) [4,13,14,17,33]. They include other large-scale sociotechnical systems (LSSTS) for instance Air Traffic Management (ATM), operation of energy grids or particle-research installations, epidemic response, transport, chemical processing, nuclear power and others (see Fig. 2). These sectors are comparable to space operations in that their operations are highly complex, tightly coupled, interdependent, with nonlinear interactions; they rely on collaborative practices of distributed actors; feature an asymmetry between causality and intentionality during operations; and in several cases the related infrastructure possesses a degree of international significance and sophistication (cf. [32]). In these sectors, the collective ‘anticipation of the potential’ is a key feature of resilient organizations for devising adaptation strategies [20]. In order to explore uncertainties, map different futures, and craft actionable insight, they systematically engage in strategic foresight [5,6]. This allows them to adapt and grow in response to novelty, change, and disruption within and outside the boundaries of their organizations [15,16].

1.3. Adapting to exchanging internal and external settings through foresight How can an entity or aggregation of entities adapt to external changes while being in flux itself? While SSA per se already constitutes an effort of foresight – of inherently looking forward and outward in pursuit of safeguarding space assets – the long-term strategic development and operation of an SSA capability is contingent upon making sense of and responding to change. A key prerequisite to responding to opportunities and threats in a dynamically changing environment is foresight, the comprehensive activity aimed at identifying, observing and understanding future developments [29]. In and beyond the aerospace sector, foresight is increasingly understood from the security, resilience, crisis management, risk management, and business continuity perspective [12]. Foresight is employed – or its dedicated employment advocated – for identifying, exploring, and understanding different futures. This may be used in light of debating emerging and potential security challenges, to inform complex organizational decision-making, reconcile divergent interests, underpin assumptions for systems requirements, and guide public policy formulation in view of great uncertainty [7,8]. Particularly in the context of space security and space sustainability, the term foresight is often used synonymously with concepts such as due diligence or care [9], vision or prediction [10], or strategic awareness [11]. These notions allude to the practical definition of foresight or strategic intelligence in an organizational strategy context as the systematic participatory monitoring and sense-making of potential issues and long-term developments [28].

2.2. Contemporary foresight approaches In the past 15 years, the latest generations of foresight approaches have increasingly emphasized perspectives that integrate high-level systems and cross-actor perspectives. Rather than extrapolating separate specific aspects of a given future for individual stakeholders – such as the use of a particular technology by a specific group – they explore through interdisciplinary lenses how changes simultaneously affect a variety of groups in different ways. Contrary to past approaches that

1.4. Outline In the following, this paper addresses the question on how to implement and integrate thinking about the future in multilateral SSA collaborations. Drawing on theory from contemporary approaches to safety in domains comparable to SSA, it lays out an approach on how to select methods. From the repertoire available to the foresight analyst, specific qualitative methods are then outlined and appraised that lend

Fig. 2. Safety-critical domains sharing characteristics with the operational, organizational, or systems environment of SSA. 116

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emphasized forecasting of likely futures or the affirmative extrapolation of desired states, contemporary methods acknowledge the conceptual challenges of understanding the unprecedented. They embrace ambiguity as an opportunity for critical probing [19], which may reflect an increasing interest in the underlying values of complex sociotechnical systems today [38]. The ability to absorb and address divergent aspects – including futures that are unlikely or undesirable but possible – render these approaches particularly attractive for settings that comprise of different interest groups, and touch upon policy and governance as much as technology and the physical environment. In terms of application, current generation foresight approaches have evolved to specifically afford the parallel integration of combining collective anticipation processes with adaptive planning, i.e., channeling the outputs of foresight to concrete strategy crafting.

Fig. 3. Three foresight methods afford various levels of scanning and sensemaking on a spectrum of policy and operations.

developments, and a so-called ‘big picture’ of opportunities and risks. On a high-level, horizon scanning involves both monitoring of evidence of future trends, as well as the identification, review, synthesis, assessment, and prioritization of these issues [22]. The analysis activity usually follows a broad sequence [22]:

2.3. Selecting methods for the context of multilateral collaboration When foresight is performed by a group of entities rather than an individual entity, it becomes more complex in terms of implementation, but potentially also richer in insights. The selection of methods that lend themselves better than others to the multilateral collaborative context must take into account a number of factors. In scope, granularity, and products, the outputs of foresight must to be tailored to the specific needs of its end-users. The primary audience of SSA foresight may be senior-level governance stakeholders in strategy and R&D, who may, however, also participate directly in a foresight activity themselves. Accordingly, the type and depth of questions multilateral entities need to answer varies. They may require an understanding of general trends, but then understand concrete situations and events and devise practical strategies. In addressing these questions, their activities will both be shaped by multiple and possibly divergent interests, and will involve distributed, sometimes sequential discussions. Finally, their time horizon varies. A reflection of long term, foreseeable, fundamental developments will be crucial in order to devise preparedness strategies (i.e., advent of larger constellations). This is particularly relevant as regulations may take years to be negotiated, and legacy systems are operated across decades. Yet, it is equally important to understand developments surfacing in shorter timeframes (i.e., commercial market entrants for ground-based sensor systems), or preparing for disruptive events that may occur without notice (i.e., ASAT incidents). A practical fluidity between high levels of abstraction and fine granularity will therefore be desirable, as much as tools that can be combined and adjusted in scale in view of resource availability. Products will need to allow various degrees of depth in order to fit the briefing process inherent in many operational and policy contexts.

- Signal collection, including definition and limitation of scan field (e.g., geographic, issue based, sector-based), characterization of scan field (e.g., assumptions, context); - Sense-making, including description of system relationships, description of change drivers; - Weighting of issues as part of reporting. Techniques are manifold, and data collection approaches may be combined in parallel or sequentially. They include desk research, expert solicitation, interviews, workshops, and automated content mining of a wide range of sources (including conference scanning, automated bibliometric search, etc.). Horizon scanning can be conducted either as stand-alone activity or as the initial phase of a larger foresight exercise, on demand or continuously [21]. It can be implemented continuously or to resolve ad-hoc questions. Particularly when not outsourced, an important part of this process is sharing and complementing of information between various actors [22]. Advantages of this approach are its malleability in terms of topics and data collection. It can be conducted through desk research of open source material, with adjustable intensity of personnel. While as an overall activity it may be outsourced, analyst teams will likely need to include generalists and subject-matter experts skilled in processing and effectively communicating to various stakeholders. Due to its focus on the external environment, for instance regulatory or technology developments, this approach is suited to inform overall strategy processes, such as pre-phase-A studies in the development a capability. In any case, it provides the comprehensive baseline that can be explored further with the following two methods.

3. From explorative to responsive: three foresight methods for SSA The variety of questions and constraints for tailoring foresight approaches to the area of SSA, and to cater to the requirements of multistakeholder activities can be addressed by a set of approaches that accommodate cross-integration, flexibility and scalability, and that yield insight relevant in practical contexts. In the following, three methods are outlined that cater to these requirements in that they are sufficiently fluid on the spectrum of resource intensity, complexity, depth, and application (Fig. 3).

3.2. Method: scenario building for in-depth exploration of overall trends and low-probability-high-impact events Departing from the macro-overviews of horizon scanning, scenarios can delve deeper into specific issues. Fundamentally narrative in nature, scenarios act as a predictive, explorative, or normative tool to structure thought [23]. They can reveal context, relationships, and impact of future settings, including those that may appear tangential and unlikely at the outset but nevertheless entail serious consequences. Scenarios allow us to address fuzzy problems characterized by trade-off and interdependency, and to expose structure and dynamics of problem domains, and affords different perspectives (e.g., use cases, various actors) [25]. As part of foresight activities, scenario building has become increasingly valued in providing a platform to recognize, consider, and

3.1. Method: horizon scanning for comprehensive understanding of weak signals, wild cards & emerging developments A fundamental approach to parse for both incremental and disruptive change is horizon scanning. Horizon scanning represents a systematic and rigorous outlook for early or weak signals, future 117

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reflect deep uncertainties in complex technology settings. Scenarios ideally highlight not just the most likely, but plausible and important futures [7]. Contrary to more simplified, specification-driven design or policy-making, scenarios emphasize contextual richness and precision rather than likelihood [26]. They thrive on exploring critical, even dystopian or counterfactual futures to tease out potential narratives that are either undesirable or ‘unimaginable’. For developing the various elements of a scenario – goals, agents, and settings [27] – the activity relies on both subject-matter expertise and a preparedness to engage in non-solution-oriented thinking. Accordingly, the formats of scenario-building products vary. While some manifestations of a possible future scenario involve a written vignette or case study, others are conveyed in actual prototypes that evoke a scene, or use storytelling in various forms (literary; moving image). In its most sophisticated instances, immersive virtual or live environments are created. Advantages of this method include that key issues of interest identified in the horizon-scanning phase of a project can be probed in greater depth, and with more illustrative means. This supports communication to various stakeholders. In terms of resources, scenario building involves dedicated personnel; analysts and facilitators will require advanced skills such as storytelling [22]. Scenarios can be produced by or with external consultants. However, it is critical the products are discussed by the actual stakeholders involved in or affected by future scenarios. Borne out of the ecology of issues identified in horizon scanning, scenarios frame certain developments that set the stage for unravelling concrete future narratives in actual exercises.

Fig. 4. Illustration of a possible setting of a table top exercise in space operations. (Image: DLR).

large-scale exercises this is supported most effectively by employing observers and observation technologies, instructors, or other types of facilitators. 4. Foresight for transparency building & collective reflection 4.1. Foresight as opportunity for collective reflection

3.3. Method: simulation & table-top exercises for anticipative problemsolving

Foresight is an intrinsically participatory process. In thinking about the future, multilateral teams benefit from shared discussion bases. Ideally, foresight will be performed as a continuous activity to reap the benefits of sharing knowledge and hence evolving jointly. Yet, it is feasible and in some cases wise to outsource facilitation to external experts, or to perform ad-hoc exercises. Rather than doing the fundamental research key participants may join the process at the synthesis and discussion stage. They do not necessarily need to engage in specific modeling exercises to produce data about potential futures, which can be delegated or commissioned from think tanks, research institutes, academia, or cross-agency working groups. Rather, they may focus on ingest and process the findings unearthed by those external parties, to identify important change drivers and explore situations directly. Crucially, foresight offers a window for explorative, thinking in an otherwise highly regimented domain. Engaging in foresight activities may, in many operations-related settings, be the only opportunity and forum for distributed teams to engage in structured but open-ended reflection and evaluation that is neither time-critical (as in operations) or necessarily and interest-driven (as in policy). Topics may be actively selected that otherwise do not surface on a regular agenda; they may not be immediately urgent, but must nevertheless be addressed in the long-term and hence merit debate. To facilitate eventual action upon insights, the connection between analysis and decision-making must be forged, underpinned by a clear remit of discovery and analysis versus priority setting.

In using scenarios as underlying base, simulations and table-top exercises finally really require the active participation of the stakeholders involved or affected by a certain future. Such exercises involve a foreseeable and plausible setting, i.e., the unfolding of a realistic discrete situation or event against a backdrop of certain developments, which is then enacted in detail. Especially civil-military communities in SSA make regular use of large-scale table-top (TTX) or real-world exercises (e.g., Schriever war games; Global Sentinel) [39]. Live simulation and tabletop exercises enable the link between a future setting and the active response to it. They are frequently employed in a training and readiness context for collaborative decision-making, rehearsal of formal processes or protocols, and resolution of anomaly situations (e.g., for contingency simulation of Launch and Early Orbit Operations, cf. [30]). Live exercises afford structured, realistic co-discovery across diverse actors, and serve to identify – in cases even tentatively resolve – foreseeable issues, bottlenecks, or problems [31] (Fig. 4). Depending on fidelity and scale, preparing and conducting simulations and table top exercise can be complex, time-consuming, and extremely resource-intensive. This is the case particularly when convening various groups of participants (e.g., both operational and policy staff), or cross-agency participation. This may then necessitate the use of large, dedicated or customized simulation sites or analogous field settings, computation of results, and a sequence of ‘moves’ that require participants to dedicate considerable time for preparation. However, also low-fidelity exercises can be highly evocative and instructive. Even convening a half-day session with the most basic instructional media (e.g., written scenario outline, conference room, writing material) can yield important first insights into otherwise unforeseen problem cases. Increasingly, simulation exercises are also conducted remotely, particularly when involving distributed operational teams. Regardless of complexity of implementation, simulation efforts must be accompanied by careful debriefing and subsequent discussion. In

4.2. Foresight as transparency & confidence building measure (TCBM) If implemented in a meaningful and relevant manner that modifies scope, issues, and products to its specific audiences, foresight may play a critical role in consolidating, synchronizing, and expanding a shared knowledge base between stakeholders of a highly heterogeneous entity. It can thus act as a vehicle for transparency and confidence building both within the organization and towards its partners (cf. [34,35]). Many participants in activities based on the methods outlined above 118

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– such as practitioners from ‘sharp end’ of operations or those in highlevel policy discourse and negotiation – will already be deeply aware of emerging developments in their respective subject matter niches. When intra- and cross-organizational experts channel and contextualize their subject matter insights and merge their thinking and sources on potential futures, the resulting collective synthesis can be an important forum for mutual exchange.

5.3. Outlook and further R&D needs While the body of theory and practice on foresight in general is ample, a range of SSA-domain-specific aspects remain to be further understood from a methodological and applied perspective. Among those that merit particularly attention is the relationship of foresight methods to other critical thinking or probing efforts for specific problem scenarios. These include tools such as red teaming that bear direct links to real-world exercises and are routinely employed by individual organizations in a variety of security domains (i.e., cyber) [40]. A related strand of enquiry may address the practical integration of quantitative techniques. Those outlined in this paper can form a fundamental heuristic base to complement, frame, or provide impulse to numerical modeling, i.e., those that address orbital populations or explore low-probability-high-impact events. Given the resource-intensity of some scenario-building or quantitative exercises, it will be worth experimenting in as to when best to apply each for most insightful output (i.e., generating quantitative data to be discussed and contextualized through qualitative narratives, or representing outcomes of qualitative scenarios such as a wildcard as a point of departure for quantitative simulation). Furthermore, a dedicated mapping of the boundaries and fruitful tangents of foresight to various other forms of intelligence gathering will be of practical use. De facto any given topic in SSA and space security at large will eventually intersect with, derive impetus from, and in some cases trigger intelligence activities. Regardless of the choice of sources, this constitutes a gray area that requires careful management especially in a multi-stakeholder environment, but also offers opportunity for tighter dovetailing and richer insights. Finally, in view of other high-risk domains with wide-reaching relevance, practitioners and theorists of foresight in the SSA domain can learn from, and in turn contribute to, current discourses outside space sector. These include for instance wicked policy problems, global commons, complex systems, or existential risk [41].

5. Conclusion 5.1. Foresight as key contribution to resilience Engaging in foresight constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for ensuring resilience in SSA while the domain itself evolves in response to a dynamically changing environment. Studying the future is part and parcel of the SSA domain whose raison-d’être involves the anticipation of immediate or near-term developments in the orbital environment. Equally, however, broader and longer-term views are paramount for SSA, as regulatory measures are usually in the making for years, and investment in bespoke sensor infrastructure entails operation across decades. In view of the risks and opportunities presented by current paradigm shifts in operation and governance, the tools offered by foresight enable entities engaged in multilateral collaborations for SSA to navigate an unprecedented environment and make informed choices. Selected for a multilateral, intergovernmental, or institutional context, three top-down approaches were outlined above. They are malleable, can be scaled to the needs and constraints of various stakeholders, and yield different types of insight that can be blended in parallel or sequentially.

5.2. From future challenges to jointly owned concerns Today foresight activities in the space operations and SSA domain are still fragmented and piecemeal, more often driven by – or charting – policy changes and specific events. A sustained, concerted, and rigorous approach can yield interesting insights per se. Yet, not only do SSA actors require foresight to evolve, the particular process and culture of foresight can present a way to support them in becoming better-integrated multilateral aggregations. It can serve to consolidate and enhance collaboration across a field with highly heterogeneous actors – particularly as ever more of them position themselves as part of a potential future space traffic management (STM) regime. Frequently, foresight will be the primary or only opportunity for non-agenda driven exchange between partners collaborating or intending to collaborate. Employed as part of strategy crafting, capability development, or operational planning processes, foresight constitutes an evocative vehicle for challenging assumptions and for explorative thinking in an otherwise highly proceduralized domain. In order to be effective and relevant, foresight methods and outcomes must be actively matched to the remit and requirements of their respective audiences. When tailored in scope, method, and product to their audiences, foresight promotes a shared knowledge base among diverse and distributed stakeholders and supports robust strategy formulation. Contrary to other sectors, SSA is a comparably specialized and internally interdependent domain. The higher-level constituents of its main actors are often de facto in a position to exert real influence on the issues they identify as part of engaging with futures. When employed across diverse interagency ‘team-of-teams’, this aspect can expedite a participatory process where future challenges become jointly owned concerns that eventually find their way into guiding the conception and design of actual policy instruments.

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Glossary ASAT: Anti-Satellite ATM: Air Traffic Management ESA: European Space Agency GSSAC: German SSA Centre HIE: High Interest Event HRO: High Reliability Organization JSPOC: Joint Space Operations Center LEO: Lower Earth Orbit LEOP: Launch & Early Orbit Operations LSSTS: Large-Scale Sociotechnical Systems NAT: Normal Accident Theory NEO: Near Earth Objects RE: Resilience Engineering R&D: Research & Development RSP: Recognized Space Picture SDA: Space Data Association SSA: Space Situational Awareness SST: Space Surveillance & Tracking STM: Space Traffic Management SWX: Space Weather TCBM: Transparency & Confidence Building Measures TTX: Table-Top Exercise

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