Futures studies as a catalyst for change

Futures studies as a catalyst for change

Futures 36 (2004) 611–616 www.elsevier.com/locate/futures Discussion Futures studies as a catalyst for change Peter Hayward AFI, Swinburne Universit...

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Futures 36 (2004) 611–616 www.elsevier.com/locate/futures

Discussion

Futures studies as a catalyst for change Peter Hayward AFI, Swinburne University, PO Box 218, Hawthorn, Vic. 3122, Australia

Does it make sense to think of future studies as a catalyst for change? This question was discussed during a 2-day seminar in July 2003 during a visit by Ziauddin Sardar to the Australian Institute of Foresight, Swinburne University. Other participants included Professor Richard Slaughter, Director of AFI, Doctor Joseph Voros, Senior Lecturer, and students Peter Hayward, Alex Burns, Rowena Morrow and Serafino de Simone. This is a summary of the discussion with my own reflections. Rather than being a single proposition, the question comprises two concepts that require separate consideration. Let us consider first the nature of change itself and its relevance, or not, to future studies. To some, change is an a posteriori fact; either something can be seen to have changed or it cannot. Change can also be an ontological position held, a belief that things have changed before and they will continue to change in the future; ‘the only constant is change itself’. Many American futurists have built successful careers from writing books from this ontological stance, a stance that gives change the property of an extrinsic phenomenon. Change happens ‘to’ us, seemingly with its own agency, or perhaps no agency at all. Yet if we examine change carefully, then these properties become problematic. This, then, is the first relevant point for futures studies. Change is commonly unexamined, its agency and interests are not normally uncovered. A starting point for future studies is dig deeper into the concept of change and to discover if it is a sensible or useful concept. First is the idea that change is ‘created’, that it is a product of agency and intention. To some, there is more change now than there used to be (as if change is quantifiable) and to others what has ‘changed’ is the pace of change rather than its extent. These viewpoints tend to portray change as an artefact of modernity. Yet if the natural world is examined, recurrent cycles of birth, growth, decline and death are seen in organic lifeforms while accumulation followed by dispersion are commonly observed in many of the natural forces that operate in the environment. As E-mail address: [email protected] (P. Hayward). 0016-3287/$ - see front matter # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2003.10.015

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those cycle recur, it can be argued that nothing is really ‘changing’. While the cycles can exhibit the surface appearance of variability, once the nature of the cycle is identified then the possibility of agency is lost. Purpose and intent would have little purchase in trying to effect change when a cycle is in ‘control’ of the dynamics. Similarly, if a polar or symmetrical relationship is observed, can change be said to have occurred if another value compensates for any change in particular value? The property of equilibrium, also, would seem to defeat the idea of change at all. Further, the idea of change is somewhat nonsensical if it is not considered within the appropriate context. Take, for example, the three realms of the physiosphere (the material that makes the planet Earth), the biosphere (the lifeworld that exists on Earth) and the noosphere (the mindspace that arises on Earth through some of the forms of the lifeworld developing consciousness). The physiosphere does not so much change as its compositional materials are redistributed through extremely slow equilibrium systems. The biosphere comprises organic life that cycles through birth, growth, decline and death, however, there is another ‘change’ process that is operating as well. Taking a longer timeframe than just the lifespan of individual organisms uncovers an evolutionary change process that seems to be ‘purposefully’ evolving towards greater complexity. This process does appear to be a true change process, driven by the agency of environmental adaptation. Still, taking an even longer timeframe uncovers thermodynamic entropy and the conclusion that, evolution notwithstanding, all lifeforms will return to low energy forms. The idea of change in the physiosphere and biosphere does seem problematic. The noosphere, however, is the only realm that seems free of limits of equilibrium and lifecycle. This would seem to be a realm where change is the product of the agency of consciousness. Still, while the noosphere is seemingly the realm of agenetic change, the existence of the noosphere is totally dependent upon minimal movement in the physiosphere equilibrium systems and the biosphere organic lifecycles. Those three realms can be arranged in terms of holarchy whereby the physiosphere is transcended by the biosphere, which in turn is transcended by the noosphere. The noosphere is free to change through cultural evolution and language provided that the biosphere upon which it is founded maintains a largely or slowchange state. The biosphere, likewise, changes through evolution provided that the physiosphere maintains a largely no-change state as well. A significant asteroid impact on Earth would cause a ‘fast’ transformation of the parts of the physiosphere. The biosphere would see accelerated lifecycles operating where those lifeforms that cannot successfully adapt to the altered physiospheric conditions become extinct. How the noosphere would be changed would depend on the fate of the conscious lifeforms in the biosphere. If they all become extinct the noosphere would disappear as well. Ideas of change are ultimately dependent on the timeframe, the quality of observation and the realm in focus. Adopting very short time frames would see change as ubiquitous. Applying longer-time frames would see cycles and equilibrium emerge and change would then be seen as only possible in the realm of consciousness and only if other realms do not find equilibrium points that remove conscious-

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ness altogether. That last statement is a raison d’etre for future studies, if we do not think about the future then we would not be thinking at all. The domain of future studies can be approached through examining the relationship between methodologies and the ontological stance towards change. The ontological stance that change is ever present and accelerating describes a future studies that is about forecasting change in all realms in order to plan for or to manage it. The ontological stance that humans shape their future through the decisions they make in the present brings forth a future studies studying probable, possible and preferred futures and is predominantly the examination of noosphere change. The ontological stance seeking development of the noosphere leads to critical and civilisational futures. While future studies has always had a strong relationship with change its relationship with no-change is a fairly recent phenomenon. The ecological movement and the role played in it by future studies can be seen as the study of change in the physiosphere and biosphere and its likely impacts on both the biosphere and noosphere. Its ontological stance is towards studying those no-change processes that are essential for the ongoing existence of the part of the biosphere occupied by Homo sapiens. Its interest is with the use of renewable resources rather than resource depletion, maintaining biodiversity through species protection and regeneration as well as creating changes in the noosphere (living lightly on the earth, thinking green). Futures studies is well endowed with frameworks of understanding that assist in the consideration of change. There is a plethora of strategy development frameworks that assist pragmatic futures studies. There are foresight ideas of preparation and prevention for change. There are the ecological frameworks based around sustainability and resilience. There are the post-normal science frameworks of complexity and emergence and there are the macrohistorical frameworks used to examine the many different forms and shapes of long-term change. Frameworks that similarly assist in the consideration of no-change would also be useful. Humberto Maturana introduced the idea of conservation. What is conserved is of far more significance as it is through conservation that identity is maintained. Conservation describes a co-existence between change and no-change. Once it is known what must be conserved for identity or existence to continue then everything else can freely change. What is conserved is a pattern or structure; the actual components of which the pattern is comprised are free to change. A river is the pattern that is conserved even though the water that flows through the river is constantly changing. If the water in the river stops flowing then the pattern is changed and the river can now be recognised as a lake. If the water dries up then the river is changed into a canyon. Conservation also occurs in a context; remove something from its context in order to conserve it and what occurs is not conservation but preservation. Preservation might be useful in some realms, for example, to ensure digital continuity or as an exhibit in a museum for research purposes but it will be at the expense of conservation. Here we encounter Ziauddin Sardar’s idea of permissible structures. Sardar has been working on this idea for several years and has applied it to the study of

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Islamic societies. Permissible structures embody the idea that the surface form of something may be altered significantly but if its underlying structural integrity remains then overall the item is conserved. In the noosphere the surface appearance of a culture can look different in a particular epoch but if the underlying truths and values endure then it can continue to be recognised by its community; it has been conserved. If the underlying integrity does change then the overall structure will no longer be recognised by the community; instead of being seen as conserved it will be interpreted as something foreign, out-of-place, ‘neither fish nor fowl’. There is a pathological form of permissible structures. When a community feels that it has lost the structural integrity of its culture it can try to regain that lost integrity by replicating the surface appearance of an earlier epoch. Yet surface appearance cannot restore the underlying structures. No matter how much some in the community would wish it to be, such regression does not restore the conservation of the permissible structure. What is contemporary in an epoch is its surface form; what endures or is conserved is the underlying integrity. This integrity, or its lacking, is what is recognised by its community. Contemporisation will not necessarily stop conservation. Communities socially legitimise the form of the permissible structure. The actual mechanism for social legitimisation or conservation can vary from culture to culture. In some it is language, other use belief, some use song and others memory. Cognitive memory can be a mechanism for the transmission of conservation but Gestalt memory is unreliable as to what is recalled. Perhaps the role of aesthetic conservation is that it can more readily tap into emotional and imaginary memory. What is conserved can be added to via novelty and evolution. Maori culture retained certain surface and deep forms of a permissible structure and then utilised it to earn income from tourism. Buddhism evolved through a series of changes to different ‘schools’ and yet a core structure has been conserved and can still be recognised by all Buddhists. Evolution is morphogenetic where the conserved permissible structure is brought forward, the potential for novelty is added, and this is what continues as the new starting point, a new point of conservation. Conservation can occur ‘unreflectively’ although the risk is always there that what is currently legitimated could be lost. A culture could focus on the surface appearances only, or it could ‘forget’ what has been conserved in prior generations. Technology too has the potential to change the nature of what is conserved. Someone originally conserved fire in the tribe, carrying it with them, but with the advent of the technology to create fire the earlier form of conservation became unnecessary. What was conserved evolved through the impact of technology. Different communities can legitimate different permissible structures and eventually varying structures will come into conflict with one another. Competing legitimacy claims arise and therefore a way to determine relative legitimacy is needed. Each permissible structure contains notions of justness and of functional fit. One role that futures studies could serve is to create a virtual space to contain differing permissible structures. Each structure has a right to exist yet some structures may contain more encompassing notions of justness or functional fit. Does the permiss-

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ible structure consist of elements that other permissible structures can accept are just and functional? If it does then the two can easily co-exist. Another criterion is whether the permissible structure has contemporary relevance. If two permissible structures have contemporary relevance then co-existence is straightforward. Disputes will arise when there are conflicting notions of justness or contemporary relevance is lacking. Within the idea of conservation is the implicit idea of change through contemporisation and evolution. Without change ossification would occur. The cybernetic term for this is pathological autopoiesis, the continuing reproduction of structures that lack functional fit, contemporary relevance or notions of justness. Futures studies is partly about maintaining the conditions for conservation and contemporisation. While it is necessary to maintain spaces within which differing permissible structures can co-exist, futures studies would also wish that structures evolve to more encompassing levels of justness and functional fit. To do so is to both reduce the likelihood of future conflict and to enhance the variety available for future evolution. Still conflicts will arise and the highest criteria for resolving any conflict must favour a structure that is life enhancing rather than life denying. It is possible that the legitimacy of permissible structures may be unresolvable in the present. These conflicts can only be resolved in the future. From this discussion, we can discern an emerging shape for a role for futures studies. On the whole, the following tasks would need to be managed: . The creation and maintenance of future cooperative spaces. . The conservation of diversity through multiple permissible structures which will offer the noosphere resilience. . The conservation of the many mechanisms by which permissible structures are themselves conserved. . The reflexive understanding of the surface and deep elements of the permissible structures. Is then, futures studies a catalyst? In the physiosphere, a catalyst creates change in other bodies but not in itself. Do the same rules apply in the noosphere? Do we need a discipline that is unchanging or one that co-changes or co-conserves? In the ontology of managing change, a catalyst is seen as outside the change being managed. This is the ontology of positivism, futures studies and the futurist as independent and value-free experts. This is a futures studies that is catalytic in nature. In the ontology of constructivism, futures studies is complicit in whatever it does and interprets. It is non-catalytic in nature, it cannot be unchanging. Perhaps the term we are looking for is transformational, or co-transformational. Transformation, by its nature, cannot be predicted; what emerges is unknowable until the transformation occurs—it is highly risky and not to be attempted lightly. The initial proposition can now be restated: futures studies is a co-transformational agent in conservation and change. If that is an acceptable proposition then what is a framework that would embody it? Is it a meta-discipline? Is it a

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post-conventional discipline? Is it an Integrative discipline? Is it a discipline at all? Can we say that futures studies is an open, multilayered field of disciplined enquiry (and not a discipline as such)? Can we, at the very least, make the following statements about futures studies with some confidence? . It is open, it seeks to integrate, it adopts a post-conventional stance, it takes a meta perspective, it is still disciplined in the way it does things. . It represents hope. . It seeks co-transformational change with the full awareness that this is a big/ long and uncertain process. . It is participatory. . It is self-reflexive. . It is not ethnocentric.