Global drug policy at an impasse: Examining the politics of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session

International Journal of Drug Policy 60 (2018) 74–81

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International Journal of Drug Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/drugpo

Research Paper

Global drug policy at an impasse: Examining the politics of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session Jessica Sischy, Jarrett Blaustein

T

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Monash University, Australia

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: UNGASS 2016 Global civil society Global drug prohibition regime United Nations Fractured consensus Global governance

Background: The 2016 United Nations General Assembly’s Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) was a ‘critical moment’ in recent global drug policy history. Methods: This study examines the dynamics and consequences of UNGASS 2016 using documentary analysis and interviews with ten leading international drug reform experts. Results: International consensus relating to the global drug problem remains heavily fractured. This is evident from: the increasingly diverse positions adopted by Member States during the negotiation period leading up to UNGASS; conflicting agendas within and between different United Nations agencies; and the content of the UNGASS Outcome Document. Our interviews further revealed key obstacles facing the international drug policy reform community following this event. Conclusion: Global governance in the sphere of drug policy has reached an impasse but this should have limited impact on the ongoing efforts of reformers to shift the debate so long as civil society actors have access to funding and opportunities to participate in key future global drug policy events.

Introduction In April 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly held a special session to reflect upon and re-evaluate the ‘world drug problem’ (henceforth UNGASS 2016; see United Nations General Assembly, 2016). As the third such summit of this kind, it called upon the international community to once again debate current drug control priorities. At previous UNGASS events in 1990 and 1998, Member States merely ‘reaffirmed’ their commitment to a ‘global drug prohibition regime’ (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006: 38) – declaring “drugs destroy lives and communities, undermine sustainable human development and generate crime” (United Nations General Assembly, 1998: para 1). Similarly, the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action further reaffirmed this stance by calling on ‘states to eliminate or reduce significantly and measurably’ supply and demand for illicit drugs by 2019 (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 2009: 13). The moral entrepreneurship which gave rise to prohibition has also contributed to the establishment of an enduring institutional machinery through which global drug prohibition has been maintained and enforced (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). This machinery, described as an ‘iron triangle’ (David Bewley-Taylor, interviewed for this project), consists of the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the International Narcotics ⁎

Control Board (INCB). Officially, these UN entities remain committed to maintaining the status quo but the international consensus surrounding drug prohibition has otherwise become increasingly ‘fractured’ or ‘fragmented’ (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). This has been partly attributed to growing recognition by some governments of the significant costs and consequences associated with continuing an unwinnable ‘war on drugs’. Another important contributory factor has been the efforts of global civil society actors to promote human rights and alternative drug control policies, advocate on behalf of those communities most affected by prohibition (for example, people who use drugs and subsistence farmers of illicit crops) and ultimately, bring an end to the ‘war on drugs’ (see for example, Civil Society Statement, 2016). This community was highly active in the lead-up to UNGASS 2016 where its admittedly ‘modest’ aim was ‘to shift the framing and shift the dynamic of global drug policy to try and get certain types of verbiage and certain types of ideas that had become well-established within drug policy reform and harm reduction inserted into the text of the UNGASS’ (Ethan Nadelmann, interviewed for this project). This article sets out to analyse UNGASS 2016 as a ‘critical moment’ (International Drug Policy Consortium, 2016: 1) in global drug policy transformation using a combination of documentary analysis and interviews with ten leading international drug reform experts. The primary aim of this research was to assess where official global drug policy

Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Blaustein).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.07.018 Received 20 March 2018; Received in revised form 20 June 2018; Accepted 12 July 2018 0955-3959/ © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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states, their capacity to influence regime formation, and why weaker states conform to these norms when it is not in their interest to do so. From this perspective, the institutional machinery of global prohibition provides a mechanism for enforcing and maintaining a regime that was established by a global hegemon, the United States (US). Compliance by weaker states is explained not by widespread normative commitment to prohibition but rather, the perceived threat of formal or informal sanctions for non-compliance. Finally, Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) turn to constructivist approaches to international relations to account for the institutional and normative context within which global prohibition exists. They argue that the substance of drug prohibition norms was constructed over time by other opportunistic actors including international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that participate in international institutions for reasons that extend beyond what liberalist or realist international relations scholars might characterise as rational security interests. Rather, their involvement may be driven by strategic organisational interests, cultural attachment to the regime in question, or simply by bureaucratic inertia. The institutional machinery established to govern prohibition consists of three UN bodies based in Vienna. The CND, established in 1946, consists of 53 Member States and a Secretariat responsible for ‘supervising the application’ of the international drug conventions, part of which involves voting on which substances should be scheduled and removed (United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime, 2017a: para 2). In addition to its annual meeting, the CND holds intersessional meetings and roundtable discussions on specific thematic issues. The CND also acts as a governing body of UNODC. UNODC in-turn provides technical assistance to Member States, undertakes and disseminates research, and is involved with ‘normative work’ that includes helping Member States develop and ratify domestic legislation that is consistent with UN drug conventions (United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime, 2017b: para 6). UNODC is an administrative body, meaning it is not permitted to make drug policy and it has historically maintained an outwardly neutral and non-committal stance towards potentially contentious issues and debates. The final component of this iron triangle is the INCB which is responsible for submitting recommendations to the CND regarding which substances and precursors should be scheduled and monitoring compliance with international drug conventions (International Narcotics Control Board, 2017: para 1). Beyond the iron triangle, other UN agencies also have a vested interest in global drug policy including (but not limited to) the World Health Organization (WHO), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/ AIDS (UNAIDS) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Given their distinct mandates, these non-Vienna-based-bodies have generally been more receptive to progressive agendas in the global drug policy debate including harm reduction, human rights, criminal justice reform, social justice and most recently, sustainable development. Harm reduction has historically provided the most effective vehicle for contesting prohibition because its utilitarian ethos and aspirations are, at least in many liberal democracies, politically palatable (Nadelmann, 1993). Nevertheless, powerful proponents of prohibition have attempted to present the mediums and methodologies of harm reduction as sinister, a ‘Trojan horse’ for drug legalisation (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001: 387). Criticism is levelled on the basis that harm reduction practices empower, encourage and promote drug use. The effect is that governments have not universally embraced harm reduction, the term has never been used by the CND, and leading proponents of the harm reduction movement have failed to generate sufficient support to establish an alternative global harm reduction regime. Similarly, powerful states have also historically opposed calls by reformers to re-frame drugs, or more accurately drug control, as a human rights issue (Lines, 2017). In the lead-up to UNGASS 2016, prohibition remained the dominant paradigm but as Bewley-Taylor (2012) and others have observed, the

stood in the aftermath of UNGASS 2016 and whether the notion of a ‘fractured’ consensus remained an accurate description of the current state of affairs. Additionally, the project set out to identify future obstacles and opportunities for civil society participation in the lead-up to the 2019 High-Level Ministerial Segment of the CND when the international community will once again come together to ‘take stock of the implementation of the commitments made [in the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action] to jointly address and counter the world drug problem’ (Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 2017: para 10). Our analysis suggests that events leading up to UNGASS 2016 brought about some important, albeit limited, signs of progress with respect to the aspiration of challenging the global drug prohibition regime. This in-turn contributed to greater fragmentation, thereby rendering global drug policy contradictory and incoherent at various levels. For reformers, this is promising because there is greater scope for civil society actors, allied Member States, and progressive voices within the UN to contest or ignore the global prohibition norm. Conversely, key sovereign proponents of prohibition remain staunchly opposed to progressive agendas including attempts by civil society actors to reframe the ‘world drug problem’ as a public health or a human rights issue. As such, there appears to be no immediate prospect of wholly unravelling the global prohibition regime or completely re-aligning the work of its governing institutions with progressive approaches. From global prohibition to a fractured consensus The international drug policy reform community agrees that the global war on drugs has been an ‘abject failure’ (Wodak, 2014: 191). Prices of illicit substances have historically decreased, substances have become purer and more readily available, and extensive global drug trafficking networks have emerged, expanded and prospered (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011). The only clear winners have been criminal enterprises, opportunistic politicians and law enforcement agencies whose budgets and inventory have swelled due to asset forfeiture laws (Bewley-Taylor, 2004; Pryce, 2012). The rise and persistence of the global drug prohibition regime must therefore be understood as a global political phenomenon rather than a product of rational, evidence-driven policy making processes. The seminal study of global drug policy formation is Andreas and Nadelmann’s (2006: 7) Policing the Globe which used an ‘analytically eclectic approach’ to theorise the origins and politics of the global drug prohibition regime. From a liberal internationalist perspective, they consider how the interests of otherwise interdependent states converge together and cooperate through international institutions to advance their mutual interests (typically economic) through regimes. This suggests that where there are cross-border activities that states view as undesirable (in this case, drug trafficking), states cooperate in order to develop institutions that help to control or regulate them. By implication, states accept constraints on their sovereign authority to establish and maintain international organs, frameworks or a global order to regulate these domestic activities. In this case, the relevant frameworks consist of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), later amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). In principle then, having identified an issue of mutual concern, states respond with homogeneity and conformity – adopting similar criminal justice structures, laws and methods across borders. This reproduction breeds a routine response – here, of suppression, and this ensures a compliant approach from all states. This consensus also affords them the opportunity to ‘regularize and facilitate international police and prosecutorial’ actions (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006: 9). In practice, the idealism of liberal internationalism ‘masks the enduring importance of power and conflict’ in international relations so Andreas and Nadelmann (2006: 9) stress that a ‘dose of realism’ is required. Realist perspectives supply useful insight into the behaviour of 75

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normative consensus that once underpinned this regime has ‘been ripped apart at the seams’ (Fordham, 2016: para 1). The exact origins of this ‘broken Vienna consensus’ (Jelsma, 2015: 10) are unclear but it is generally agreed that the 2009 CND proceedings invoked to debate and review the resolution agreed to by UNGASS 1998 marked a critical turning point in this debate (Bewley-Taylor, 2012). Increasingly so, and percolating with greater zeal since this date, countries have since engaged in what Bewley-Taylor (2012: 20) describes as ‘soft-defecting behaviours’; remaining staunch to the ‘letter of the law’ of the conventions yet ‘actively exploiting the wiggle room’ by pursuing policies that ‘deviate … from the [punitive] spirit of the conventions’ (BewleyTaylor, 2012: 8). Beginning in 2013, Jelsma (2015: 15) has argued that this soft defecting behaviour escalated to ‘systemic breaches’ whereby a handful of governments openly adopted and embraced alternative drug policies in direct contravention of their treaty obligations. It is against this backdrop of fragmentation and open dissent that three Latin American countries, disillusioned with the global ‘war on drugs’, called for an ‘in-depth review’ of the global drug prohibition regime by the UN General Assembly ‘in order to establish a new paradigm that would impede the flow of resources to organized crime groups’ (Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico, 2012, quoted in BewleyTaylor & Jelsma, 2016: 2). UNGASS 2016 was therefore intended to function as a ‘wide-ranging and open debate that considers all options’ (Ki-moon, 2013: para 25) with strong participation from civil society actors who approached it as an important opportunity to advance recognition of alternative ways of addressing and framing the ‘world drug problem’.

to this event. Their responses represent their personal views and should not be read as official statements on behalf of any organisations or governing bodies they currently, or have previously, worked for, served on, or have otherwise been affiliated with. Interview questions were adapted for each participant but the general themes included: the politics of UNGASS; the nature of the deliberations and discussions leading up to the event; the contributions and agendas of different stakeholders and participants including civil society actors; the advances and shortfalls of its Outcome Document; and future obstacles to global drug policy reform. Participants were given two weeks to review and approve the final transcripts which were then thematically coded and analysed. The authors then revisited the primary source material and grey literature to triangulate, illustrate, and expand upon key themes identified from the interviews. ‘Broken consensus’ and UNGASS 2016 Our research indicates that UNGASS 2016 contributed to three important dimensions of the ‘fragmented’ or ‘broken’ consensus previously described by global drug policy scholars. First, this was evident from the fact that multiple countries used their position statements to openly challenge prohibition in the lead-up to UNGASS 2016. Many of these countries had also engaged in soft-defecting behaviours or systemic breaches of the drug conventions, thus illustrating the continued erosion of the global prohibition norm and the inability of its institutional guardians to effectively enforce it. Second, fragmentation was evident in relation to internal disagreement between and within different UN bodies and agencies. The lack of coherence that characterises UN drug policy can be attributed to the presence of competing institutional agendas and the need for the UN as an international governing body to appease influential Member States. Finally, this fracturing is apparent from the content of the Outcome Document itself.

Methodology This study adopted a two-stage methodological approach to analysing the significance of UNGASS 2016 and the politics surrounding this event. First, primary source documents including official position statements were thematically coded and systematically analysed in relation to a grey literature that consisted of blog posts, civil society reports, and opinion pieces by international drug reform experts. The second stage of research involved twelve semi-structured elite interviews with high profile international drug reform experts conducted between April and August of 2017. The interviews were conducted by Skype or telephone and all except for one were audio recorded. All the participants agreed to be identified by name. This purposive sample was recruited via publically available email addresses or social media accounts and half of those approached agreed to participate. Two interviews were ultimately omitted from our final analysis because the participants, both prominent figures in the drug policy reform community, did not possess first-hand knowledge of the UNGASS 2016 proceedings. The final list of participants and details of their relevant experience is provided in Table 1. Most of these individuals attended UNGASS 2016 and were directly involved with campaigning activities and behind-the-scenes advocacy in the lead-up

Divergent positions amongst member states Multiple countries used their position statements submitted as part of the preparatory process for UNGASS 2016 to openly question or challenge the ‘war on drugs’. In doing so, they cited the significant costs and consequences they had incurred as a result of their past efforts to enforce this regime. Colombia, described by participants as ‘progressive and reform oriented’ (CY) was praised for ‘the fact that, for the first time really ever, we had sitting heads of state taking a leading call for drug policy reform’ (RL). It’s position statement called upon the international community to rethink the ‘war on drugs’ (Colombia, 2016). Other Latin American countries that were singled out by participants included Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay. Beyond Latin America, participants identified many other countries whose statements either questioned the logic of continuing the ‘war on drugs’ or endorsed alternative models. Canada, a G7 country, was praised for using its position statement to emphasise its commitment to a ‘comprehensive

Table 1 List of Interview Participants with Direct Knowledge of UNGASS 2016. Name of Participant

Relevant Experience

David Bewley-Taylor (DBT)

Director of Global Drug Policy Observatory; Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University; International Drug Policy Consortium Associate. Attended UNGASS 2016. Policy Advisor of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. Attended UNGASS 2016. Senior International Policy Manager at the Drug Policy Alliance. Attended UNGASS 2016. Member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy. Attended UNGASS 2016. Senior Policy Officer of the International Drug Policy Consortium. Attended UNGASS 2016. Executive Director of Harm Reduction International (at the time of the interview); Chair of the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. Attended UNGASS 2016. Founder and Former Executive Director (2000-2017) of the Drug Policy Alliance. Attended UNGASS 2016. Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. President of the Australian Drug Law Reform Foundation; Director of Australia21. Attended UNGASS 2016. Drug policy expert. Attended UNGASS 2016.

Barbara Goedde (BG) Hannah Hetzer (HH) Michel Kazatchkine (MK) Gloria Lai (GL) Rick Lines (RL) Ethan Nadelmann (EN) Sanho Tree (ST) Alex Wodak (AW) Coletta Youngers (CY)

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public health approach’ that centred on the use of ‘evidence-based harm reduction measures’ including supervised injection sites and improving access to naloxone (Canada, 2016: 3; cited by BG and EN). Most controversially, Canada’s statement referenced ‘the Government’s commitment to legalize, tax and regulate marijuana’ (Canada, 2016: 7). Portugal and Switzerland were also praised by participants for supporting harm reduction policies and investing ‘money into social initiatives to reduce the damage from drugs’ (AW). Tanzania’s statement revealed that the country’s embrace of harm reduction was motivated by a desire to protect ‘vulnerable people, including persons who already suffer from multiple forms of poverty’ from the public health consequences of the ‘war on drugs’ including, specifically ‘exposure to HIV and hepatitis’ (Tanzania, 2016: 2). The United States’ lethargic approach to enforcing the international drug conventions under the Obama Administration was identified as an enabling factor when it came to creating an international climate permissive to dissent and reform. To this effect, one participant stated, ‘the US Government was not seen as a significant ally, but less of an impediment than before’ (EN). At the same time, another participant acknowledged that the United States’ flexible interpretation of the conventions also posed problems:

Institutional politics of the UN system UNGASS 2016 further highlighted fracturing within the UN system that effectively administers the global drug prohibition regime. To this effect, one participant observed that the UN has ‘no singular drug policy logic’ (HH) while another questioned whether such a ‘diverging set of approaches can be realistically and honestly contained within the existing UN umbrella’ (DBT). Various UN entities participated in preliminary meetings and their diverse agendas and framings of the ‘world drug problem’ can be seen from the position statements that they submitted in the lead-up to the event. ‘For the first time’, observed one participant, 'you had most significantly, UNDP, the OHCHR [Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights], and various other [entities] speaking out on drug policy from their point of view’ (CY). A number of these entities openly challenged the Vienna consensus and ‘brought the UN drug bodies out of their silo and forced engagement or resulted in engagement with other parts of the UN’ (CY). In 2014, the WHO recommended ‘decriminalizing sexual behaviours and drug use’ to ‘essential health services’ (World Health Organization, 2014: 86). That same year, the High Commissioner for Human Rights acknowledged that ‘human rights violations continue to occur in the implementation of drug control policies by States’ and asserted, ‘the Human Rights Committee has determined … that the death penalty cannot be applied solely for drug offences’ (Pillay, 2014: 2). The following year, the OHCHR published a ‘study of the impact of the world drug problem on the enjoyment of human rights’ which explicitly endorsed ‘a harm reduction approach’ as being ‘essential for persons who use drugs’ while acknowledging the wider public health benefits of decriminalisation (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015: 4). Similarly, UNAIDS attempted to reframe the ‘world drug problem’ as a public health issue and called upon the international community to ‘recognize that the overarching purpose of drug control is first and foremost to ensure the health, well-being and security of individuals, while respecting their agency and human rights at all times’ (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 2015: 6). Like the WHO and the OHCHR, UNAIDS asserted that ‘implementing alternatives to criminalization, such as decriminalization and stopping incarceration of people for consumption and possession of drugs for personal use’ was necessary for reorienting global drug policy towards this end (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 2015: 6). UNDP’s official position statement on drug control policy was also progressive in that it cited the importance of ‘addressing the development dimensions of drug control policies’ and called for a shift away from the ‘traditional preoccupation’ with ‘reducing supply and demand’ in favour of an agenda that centres on the UN’s ‘core objectives as embodied in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: peace, development and human rights (United Nations Development Programme, 2015: 3). It further presented a critique of prohibition and the ‘war on drugs’ by acknowledging ‘the collateral harms of current drug policies’ and suggesting ‘that new approaches are both urgent and necessary’ (United Nations Development Programme, 2015: 2). These progressive statements represent a stark contrast to that which was submitted by the President of the INCB Werner Sipp who stressed:

‘… I welcome the United States stepping back on taking hard lines on the conventions and accepting some forms of flexibility but in general, flexibility in international law and norms is not what we really hope for … What if flexibility includes human rights violating approaches or the additional use of capital punishment? In general, if you believe in international law and international conventions, you do not want to erode those’ (HH) This suggests that the flexibility afforded by a breakdown of consensus presents both opportunities and challenges for reformers. Ultimately, one participant explained that ‘it was a minority of governments that spoke in favour of reform’ (GL). This suggests that most countries were not heavily invested in either the process or outcome of UNGASS 2016 and did little to shape the agenda beyond submitting a country position statement and formally participating in the New York event. Nevertheless, the strong position statements issued by a growing minority of countries can be viewed as an extension of the dissenting behaviours previously described by Bewley-Taylor (2012) and Jelsma (2015). At the other end of the spectrum, powerful countries utilised their position statements to defend the status quo. These countries generally justified their commitment to prohibition by emphasising their sovereignty and invoking the norm of non-intervention. To this effect, one participant described how countries ‘at this end of the spectrum’ are putting forth arguments to suggest that they are ‘dealing with this in [their] own territories and have the matter under control’ (BG). For example, China called upon the international community to ‘honor the principle of sovereign equality as enshrined in the UN Charter’ and to ‘avoid injecting political factors into anti-narcotic efforts’ or ‘using drug control as a pretext to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs’ (People’s Republic of China, 2016: 2). It later became clear that the reason for this was that for the first time at UNGASS 2016, ‘human rights took a central place in the drug debate’ (RL). In other words, the framing of global drug control policy as a human rights issue was seen as a significant threat to countries committed to retaining draconian penalties for non-violent drug offences, including the death penalty (GL). Interestingly, the norm of sovereignty was not explicitly invoked by Russia in its statement which instead stressed the significance of the global drug problem and the importance of sustaining international cooperation as a means of combatting the illicit drug trade and other forms of transnational organised crime associated with it (Russian Federation, 2016). This conservative position reflected ‘increasing Russian Government interest in global drug policy over the last seven to eight years’ along with its rising influence within the UN system (RL).

‘… there are voices pretending that the current drug control system as a whole represents a “war on drugs which has failed” and which therefore has to be changed. I think this is not an objective assessment. It is too simplistic and the conclusion is simply wrong.’ (Sipp, 2015: 1) Sipp’s defence of prohibition was not however echoed by UNODC’s Executive Director Yury Fedotov who instead adopted a more diplomatic position. Fedotov’s statement, presented at UNGASS 2016, emphasised the broader criminal, economic and social dimensions of the ‘world drug problem’ while acknowledging the importance of 77

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Assessing the Outcome Document

addressing the issue of drug use primarily through a public health lens (Fedotov, 2016). Entire sections of the statement were also devoted to progressive issues including human rights and sustainable development but the statement did not explicitly endorse ‘harm reduction’, call for decriminalisation, or acknowledge the failure of the ‘war on drugs’. Participants were therefore underwhelmed by Fedotov’s position. It is certainly possible that future executive directors may adopt more progressive personal stances but UNODC as an organisation is unlikely to emerge as a transformative voice in the global drug policy debate. This is not to suggest that UNODC’s staff are opposed to harm reduction or alternative drug policy models. Rather, the organisation is mandated to implement and advance a policy agenda set out by the CND where powerful Member States such as Russia, China and Pakistan have used their influence to uphold the status quo. As a result, the CND’s position remains conservative and this in-turn limits UNODC’s capacity to openly endorse progressive policies. The irony then, observed one participant, is that UNODC ‘is the biggest harm reduction organisation in the world [referring to the work of its HIV/AIDS division] at the same time it is trying to shoot down harm reduction’ (AW). Furthermore, the iron triangle has a vested, bureaucratic interest in preserving the illusion of consensus as without it, there can be no regime and without the regime, the future need for these entities becomes questionable. In this regard, multiple participants observed that the CND’s oversight of the pre-UNGASS 2016 Intersessional Meetings and the actual drafting which was done in ‘informals’ or state to state negotiations occurred behind closed doors (see BG; see also Jelsma, 2016). This constituted a major obstacle to enacting change as ‘the system was blocked, controlled – particularly in Vienna’ (MK). Similarly, other participants reflected:

The UNGASS 2016 Outcome Document features significant contradictions that reflect the divisions and competing agendas described in the previous two sections. For example, it begins by explicitly reaffirming the international community’s ‘commitment to the goals and objectives of the three international drug control conventions’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 1) but subsequently goes on to acknowledge the importance of aligning international efforts to combat the ‘world drug problem’ with the Sustainable Development Goals and the UN’s ongoing effort to promote system-wide coherence (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 3). At no point does it question whether these progressive agendas are actually compatible with the international drug control regime. All of our participants acknowledged such contradictions and were mostly ambivalent about whether the Outcome Document itself represented a favourable development or a missed opportunity. Participants observed that the most significant advances were evident in the sphere of human rights because this marked the ‘first time that an international drug control document refers to human rights’ (GL). Another participant reflected that the Outcome Document contained the ‘strongest paragraph on human rights ever in a UN drug control resolution’ (RL). The paragraph in question states: ‘4. We reiterate our commitment to respecting, protecting and promoting all human rights, fundamental freedoms and the inherent dignity of all individuals and the rule of law in the development and implementation of drug policies…’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: para 4) Page two of the Outcome Document further establishes an ‘unwavering commitment to ensuring that all aspects of demand reduction and related measures, supply reduction and related measures, and international cooperation are addressed in full conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the Universal Declaration of Human rights’. However, it immediately qualifies this by adding, ‘with full respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 2). More examples of progress in the sphere of human rights was evident in relation to the issue of criminal justice reform. Specifically, the Outcome Document called for the ‘prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention and of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 17), ‘alternative or additional measures with regards to conviction and punishment’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 16), and ‘proportionate … sentencing policies, practices and guidelines for drugrelated offences’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 16). The call for proportionality was singled out as an achievement by one participant working to promote harm reduction in South East Asia where a number of countries maintain the death penalty for non-violent drug offences. To this effect, she celebrated the Outcome Document for ‘keeping the space open for abolishing the death penalty’ (GL). In this same vein, another participant argued that the Outcome Document’s failure to explicitly condemn this practice prompted a number of countries to publicly denounce the death penalty in their oral or written statements that were presented at the actual UNGASS event and suggested, ‘I do not think that would have happened had we had some weak consensus language on the death penalty’ (RL). The same participant also acknowledged that the Outcome Document included the most comprehensive account of ‘language around harm reduction’ services in a UN drug control instrument to date (RL). Examples of such references included the ‘use of opioid receptor antagonists, such as naloxone’, ‘medication assisted therapy programmes’, ‘injecting equipment’ and the provision of harm reduction in prisons and other custodial settings (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 7). Accordingly, participants observed that the ‘language is progressive and probably more advanced than any other

‘You could say that if anything, [the Outcome Document] reflected the agenda of the CND because that is where the bulk of it was negotiated or where countries driving the drafting were also countries that generally sit on the CND … one of the debates early on, certainly from civil society’s perspective, and friendly Member States, was whether we could wrestle control of the process outside of Vienna and into New York because it was generally felt amongst us that if it stayed in Vienna, it was very much going to reflect the existing kind of dynamics of the CND and be driven by those kinds of relationships and those kind of politics’ (RL) ‘So, you know, this all should have been negotiated in open sessions, where observers could be present. Instead [the CND] decided to do it in closed door sessions – there is no UN precedent for that and they couldn’t agree, so they were doing what they called informals where they would negotiate text. But then they couldn’t agree, so they had informal informals which were a smaller group of people and they ended up in informal, informal informals where you really had a handful of countries; the reform-minded countries on the one side, the status quo countries on the other hashing it out and taking it back to people.’ (CY)

The result was an eclectic Outcome Document that was drafted to avoid hotly contested political ‘elephants in the room’ (Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, 2016: 5) and placate Member States at both ends of the spectrum. It therefore presented a more sanitised view of the proceedings and debates that took place during the CND Intersessional Meetings staged in late 2015 and the Informal Interactive Stakeholder Consultation held in New York in February 2016. The omission of taboo topics such as the death penalty, decriminalisation, and especially cannabis legalisation was described by one participant as ‘calculated political denial’ (DBT) and was attributed to the UN’s desire to preserve the illusion of consensus. Multiple participants suggested that had the Outcome Document been negotiated and drafted in New York, there would have been greater transparency and opportunities for other UN entities, civil society actors, and poorer Member States which lacked permanent delegations in Vienna to influence its final content (GL; CY). 78

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implications. For example, one participant suggested that ‘some of these draconian approaches to drug policy are going to begin to manifest on the global front as well’ (EN). The same participant went on to describe the prospect of a ‘Trump-Putin axis on punitive prohibitionist policies’ as ‘intimidating’ (EN). Similarly, another participant noted:

documentation at this point’ (DBT) and that ‘the need to have public health lenses in approaching these issues is acknowledged and recognised’ (MK). The Outcome Document’s reference to the Sustainable Development Goals was praised by some participants as providing reformers with an important avenue for reframing the global drug debate as a public health issue (RL; AW). Others remained unsure about how this would translate into practice because the link between harm reduction and sustainable development was not made ‘explicit’ in the Outcome Document and there was no clear mechanism for requiring Member States to implement Sustainable Development Goal 3 (HH; CY). Participants therefore considered the actualisation of this agenda as dependent upon how far the ‘engine of civil society or NGOs’ (RL) was able and willing to push it at the local level, a prospect that remained problematic in countries where there is limited space for civil society actors to challenge and question national drug policies (GL). Despite these signs of progress, most participants ultimately characterised the Outcome Document as ‘business as usual’ (HH) or interpreted it as evidence that ‘the advocates of the status quo, basically were able to maintain most of the status quo’ (EN). Criticisms were primarily levelled at two aspects of the Outcome Document: its enduring commitment to prohibition together with the fact that it did not explicitly acknowledge harm reduction and the aforementioned lack of transparency surrounding the actual drafting of the Outcome Document. Participants noted with dismay that the Outcome Document maintained its support for the structures of prohibition. This was evident from the Outcome Document’s failure to explicitly acknowledge the term ‘harm reduction’ despite its apparent support for specific harm reduction measures. This omission was consistent with previous UN documents concerning global drug policy which one participant accounted for by suggesting that the term ‘harm reduction’ represented ‘diplomatic kryptonite’ for the UN (DBT). The omission might therefore be understood as strategic because it enables the CND to maintain a space for UNODC to operate specific programmes, policies, and practices that align with the goals of harm reduction while avoiding unnecessary conflict or disagreement about the overarching aims of global drug policy between Member States. For this reason, another participant acknowledged that he ‘never expected [that harm reduction] would get in’ to the Outcome Document (RL). Further evidence of the Outcome Document’s continued support for prohibition can be seen in its stated commitment to promoting a ‘society free of drug abuse’ and its aforementioned commitment to the ‘goals and objectives of the three global drug conventions’ (UN General Assembly, 2016: 1). Perhaps most contentiously, the Outcome Document asserts that ‘tangible progress has been achieved in some fields’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2016: 1), a statement which one participant interpreted as validation of their concern about the fact that there ‘has not been a true review of the progress and failure since 2009’ (MK). In the end, another participant reflected that ‘[these] were not landmark changes in regards to an overall approach to drugs’ (GL) while another, more pessimistically, concluded that the Outcome Document reflected the interests of ‘an entrenched minority’ that was able to ‘work the system to their advantage’ (AW).

‘The United States has always played a heavy-handed role in drug law enforcement internationally. That started to change under the Obama Administration – things started loosening in some ways, they took a very different approach to previous Administrations … to play a much more passive role internally and also moving back from being an enforcer on the global scale. I am very concerned that the policy will not be maintained and it will go back to American drug war policies of the 80s and 90s, both internally and internationally’ (HH) At the time of publication, Trump’s desire or capacity to actively shape global governance around this issue area either within or beyond the UN system appears to be limited however. As such, the continued absence of a hegemonic backer has left the global drug prohibition regime vulnerable to further challenges, including those from within the UN system. Most notably, Secretary General Antonio Guterres openly discussed the benefits of decriminalisation in Portugal and stressed the importance of drug policies that uphold human rights at the 61st meeting of the CND in March 2018 (see Guterres & [Secretariat to the Governing Bodies UNODC], 2018). Participants acknowledged that right-wing populism and political volatility in other countries represented potential threats to progressive gains made during the years leading up to UNGASS 2016. For example, one participant described how, although there appeared to be growing support for drug law reforms in Thailand, the new Minister of Justice ‘does not seem as supportive of reform as the previous one was’ (GL). Similarly, throughout Latin America, another participant described a ‘shift to more right-wing governments in the area’ and went on to suggest that future election results could have implications for international efforts to dismantle the global prohibition regime and described the ‘coalition of reform minded or like-minded Latin American governments’ as ‘potentially fragile as we move into 2019’ (CY). Finally, participants identified an uncertain funding situation as a major obstacle to future reform efforts. One participant specifically cited the anticipated end of the Global Drug Policy Program (GDPP) at the Open Society Foundation as cause for concern (ST). In the years leading up to UNGASS 2016, a different participant emphasised that the Open Society Foundation’s funding had ‘really played an important role in enabling a lot of the activists around the world to come together … to sort of think through what would be an overall strategy’ (EN). The Open Society Foundation has since renewed its financial support for the GDPP but participants also discussed concerns about the availability of funding for specific harm reduction programs due to declining public health budgets within and beyond the UN system. It was suggested by one participant that this has ‘really scary potentials for reigniting HIV epidemics’ (RL) while another illustrated the potential impact by reflecting on the experience of Hungary where the ‘lack of availability of harm reduction services [is] now resulting in a clearly and rapidly increasing hepatitis C epidemic’ (MK). Describing the reason for these cuts, participants noted that drug policy reform is not a high priority for most countries that are more concerned about issues linked with immigration and security (EN; GL).

Other obstacles for reform At the conclusion of each interview, participants were asked to discuss key obstacles facing the drug reform movement in the lead-up to 2019 High-Level Ministerial Segment of the CND. In addition to the enduring influence of retentionist states like China and Russia and the intractability of the iron triangle, nearly all participants cited concerns about the Trump Administration and the signal it was sending to countries at both ends of the global drug policy spectrum. Although the Trump Administration’s focus in 2017 was primarily limited to domestic drug policy issues or the specific policies of other countries such as the Philippines, it was acknowledged that this could have global

Discussion: global drug policy at an impasse The analysis presented in this article contributes to a growing body of research that suggests that international consensus no longer exists around the issue of global drug policy. We evidenced this by describing how, in the lead-up to UNGASS, a number of countries openly challenged and criticised the global prohibition norm yet influential retentionist countries were able to limit their progressive gains by influencing the work of the CND. Our analysis also illustrated disagreement 79

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between and within different UN entities about how the world drug problem should be addressed. The implication is that the UN now simultaneously exists as both a leading driver of change but also a guardian of the status quo. The content of the Outcome Document exemplifies this duality and calls into question the feasibility of achieving system-wide coherence within this institutional context (see also Jelsma, 2015). We therefore conclude that global drug policy is at an impasse or ‘a stalemate in terms of the ability to agree on language around more reform-oriented ideas or reforms that should be implemented’ (CY). What does this mean for this future of global drug policy reform efforts? For better and worse, this impasse will likely foster greater opportunities for state and non-state actors to openly contest or simply ignore the international drug conventions (see also Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, 2016). However, a number of obstacles discussed in this article seemingly preclude the possibility of reformers ultimately abolishing or transforming the regime at a global level. This in itself is of little consequence as reformers acknowledged that the prospect of ever achieving wholesale reform of the UN drug control system has always been limited. To this effect, the founder of the Drug Policy Alliance reflected that ‘what is happening at the global level is mostly a significant but not overwhelmingly consequential obstacle to reform’ (EN). What then is the value of future global civil society’s engagement with an intractable regime? For starters, civil society actors act as an important counter-vailing force to powerful countries that are intent on maintaining the status quo in accordance with their geopolitical and domestic political interests and ideologies. From a realist standpoint, non-state actors lobbying for progressive agendas are at a power disadvantage but their participation around high-profile international events such as UNGASS 2016 is important for stimulating critical debate and discussion. This engagement also serves to generate awareness of drug policy alternatives amongst governments that are ready to change. To this effect, the same participant stated that ‘what is important is for individual governments to move forward in reforming their own drug policies … a lot can be done, even if the conventions remain in place’ (EN).

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Funding This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. Declarations of interest None. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the participants who agreed to be interviewed for this project. In particular, we would like to thank David Bewley-Taylor and the reviewers for their feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. References Andreas, P., & Nadelmann, E. (2006). Policing the globe: Criminalization and crime control in international relations. New York: Oxford University Press. Bewley-Taylor, D. (2004). Harm reduction and the global drug control regime: Contemporary problems and future prospects. Drug and Alcohol Review, 23(4), 483–489. Bewley-Taylor, D. (2012). International drug control: Consensus fractured. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bewley-Taylor, D., & Jelsma, M. (2016). UNGASS 2016: A broken or b-r-o-a-d consensus? viewed 15 April 2017,Transnational Institutehttps://www.tni.org/files/publicationdownloads/dpb_45_04072016_web.pdf. Canada (2016). Country position statement submitted for UNGASS 2016. viewed 1 April 2017,http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/7657386/canada-eng-.pdf. Civil Society Statement The UNGASS outcome document: Diplomacy or denialism? 14 March, viewed 4 June 2018 https://idpc.net/alerts/2016/03/civil-society-statement-

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