- Email: [email protected]
In defense of a distinction: A reply to Jef Verschueren
Journal of Pragmatics 2 (I 978) 153-154 © North-Holland Publishing Company
~ DEFENSE OF A D|ST~CTION: A REPLY TO ]EF VERSCHUEREN B~ter HARDER and Christian KOCK
In summing up about our ~heory of Pre:~upposgtion Failure (in ":his issue of the Jg:oT/gl of Prag~lic$, pp. ~07-151), Jef VerschuLeren says that our "stubborn clinging to file phenomenon of presupposition (and presupposition taflure) [ . . . ] prevented them [i.e., us] from reaching the point where the full relevance of their theory could emerge" (p. 38). This is of course a gratifying rebuke. Nevertheless we would maintain the distir~ction that m~tkes Verschueren think v,e are reductionists. It is certainly legitimate to roll to~ether those pragmatic phenomena that we tried to keep apart - if the purpose is to set up a global theory of pragmatics that is based, as Ver.;chueren says it is, o~ Lhe notio,~l ~.~f~'appropfiateness conditions". But then Verschueren seems r.o have overlooked what was our central purpose - one which we believe is equally legitimate and which necessitates that the difference,.; between presuppositions a~a,~ other types of appropriateness conditions are insisted upon. That such differences do exist, Verschueren himself half-way rec~gnizes (cf. p. 34); and what one wants to make of them is .,;imply a function of what poir~t one is trying to get acro:~s. Our point is the following. We thi~,k that there are two fundamentally different ways in which linguistic utterances can be made to introduce a given assumption in communication. It may 0e introduce¢~ either as a point of interest or as a point of departure. Our concern has been to discuss what really ~oes on when a~l assumption is introduced as a point of departure, i.e. is 'presup?osed'. In particular we ask: what happens when this assumption does not fulfil the specific condition that such assumptions are subject to - namely that they should be recognized not only by the speaker (who introduced it) but by the hearer as well. To this we add our diagram with the pluses and minuses. Simplistic as it may be (and on this point we agree with mo:~t of Verschueren's suggestions), it is meant to exhib.;t in an illuminatire manner the many devious aspects that speech events may take on as a function of the speaker's and the heater's assumptions about each others' assumptions. Verschueren has given very little at,cation to this special evncern of ours - and if he had given ~ore, he would have had less cause, ~c, label us as reductionists. It would then have appeared more clearly why we chos~.~ to leave out :~,'Jchthings as sincerity conditions and conditions an those illocutiouary forces that are not indicated in the utterance. The point is that a speaker in m;tking an ,,~tterar~ce is subjecting only himself to such conditions, ~mt hhuaself and the hearer in solid~arity. Let us t~¢e an vt~erance like I'll ~top phoning you, ~ntended by the speaker as a 153
154
P. Harder, C. Koek / In defense of a distinction
promige and thus uttered on the assumption that the speaker's ceasing to phone file hearer is desirable to, the latter. Now most people would agree that in making this utterance the speaker introduces ttie circumstance that he has been phoning the hearer as an assumption which should be taken for granted. This assumption, we would say, is in fact introduced on behalf of speaker and hearer; R is therefore necessary thai: the hearer should recognize it, if straightforward communication is not to break down and a 'presupposition: failure' situation to arise instead. Now on file other hand the desir,,bility of the speaker's ceasing to phone is an assumption that is not foi~ted on the hearer in this way. The hearer may share the assumption or he may not - in either case I'1~ stop phoning you will be a perfectly felicitous utter~ce. If however the speaker l a d said, lpromise I'll stop phoning you, then the assmnption of the desirability of this circumstance would have been made on behalf of the speaker and the healer, and if the hearer did not happen to share it, he would have to react accordingly. As for sincerity conditions, one :ould not class them with presuppositions without ha~dng to say that in uttering l~i stop phoning you, the speaker is taking for granted that he, the speaker, is s~ncere. But this seems rather a nonsensical thing to say. Of course well-formed conmmn/cation proceeds on the conditions that speakers are sincere and speak the truth; ~ut these assumptions are not introduced and palraed off on the hearer in the way characteristic of those assumptions we wish t~ c, ,! presuppositions. It is ~tere~ting that Verschueren, the pragmaticist, thinks us restrictive with regard ~o the range of phenomena we group together, whereas compared to other linguistic theories of presupposition ours is very inclusive indeed. We would defend ourselves to both sides by emphasizing that our subject was presupposition failure -- i.e., situations where an utterance indicates that speaker and hearer are meant to have some assumption in common, but where something goes ~vrong in connection wi~h that. We think such situations interesting and in need of investigation. That is why we tried to fence in just those, and all those, appropriateness conditions on utterances which require such a common assumption to be pres~mt.
~ DEFENSE OF A D|ST~CTION: A REPLY TO ]EF VERSCHUEREN B~ter HARDER and Christian KOCK
In summing up about our ~heory of Pre:~upposgtion Failure (in ":his issue of the Jg:oT/gl of Prag~lic$, pp. ~07-151), Jef VerschuLeren says that our "stubborn clinging to file phenomenon of presupposition (and presupposition taflure) [ . . . ] prevented them [i.e., us] from reaching the point where the full relevance of their theory could emerge" (p. 38). This is of course a gratifying rebuke. Nevertheless we would maintain the distir~ction that m~tkes Verschueren think v,e are reductionists. It is certainly legitimate to roll to~ether those pragmatic phenomena that we tried to keep apart - if the purpose is to set up a global theory of pragmatics that is based, as Ver.;chueren says it is, o~ Lhe notio,~l ~.~f~'appropfiateness conditions". But then Verschueren seems r.o have overlooked what was our central purpose - one which we believe is equally legitimate and which necessitates that the difference,.; between presuppositions a~a,~ other types of appropriateness conditions are insisted upon. That such differences do exist, Verschueren himself half-way rec~gnizes (cf. p. 34); and what one wants to make of them is .,;imply a function of what poir~t one is trying to get acro:~s. Our point is the following. We thi~,k that there are two fundamentally different ways in which linguistic utterances can be made to introduce a given assumption in communication. It may 0e introduce¢~ either as a point of interest or as a point of departure. Our concern has been to discuss what really ~oes on when a~l assumption is introduced as a point of departure, i.e. is 'presup?osed'. In particular we ask: what happens when this assumption does not fulfil the specific condition that such assumptions are subject to - namely that they should be recognized not only by the speaker (who introduced it) but by the hearer as well. To this we add our diagram with the pluses and minuses. Simplistic as it may be (and on this point we agree with mo:~t of Verschueren's suggestions), it is meant to exhib.;t in an illuminatire manner the many devious aspects that speech events may take on as a function of the speaker's and the heater's assumptions about each others' assumptions. Verschueren has given very little at,cation to this special evncern of ours - and if he had given ~ore, he would have had less cause, ~c, label us as reductionists. It would then have appeared more clearly why we chos~.~ to leave out :~,'Jchthings as sincerity conditions and conditions an those illocutiouary forces that are not indicated in the utterance. The point is that a speaker in m;tking an ,,~tterar~ce is subjecting only himself to such conditions, ~mt hhuaself and the hearer in solid~arity. Let us t~¢e an vt~erance like I'll ~top phoning you, ~ntended by the speaker as a 153
154
P. Harder, C. Koek / In defense of a distinction
promige and thus uttered on the assumption that the speaker's ceasing to phone file hearer is desirable to, the latter. Now most people would agree that in making this utterance the speaker introduces ttie circumstance that he has been phoning the hearer as an assumption which should be taken for granted. This assumption, we would say, is in fact introduced on behalf of speaker and hearer; R is therefore necessary thai: the hearer should recognize it, if straightforward communication is not to break down and a 'presupposition: failure' situation to arise instead. Now on file other hand the desir,,bility of the speaker's ceasing to phone is an assumption that is not foi~ted on the hearer in this way. The hearer may share the assumption or he may not - in either case I'1~ stop phoning you will be a perfectly felicitous utter~ce. If however the speaker l a d said, lpromise I'll stop phoning you, then the assmnption of the desirability of this circumstance would have been made on behalf of the speaker and the healer, and if the hearer did not happen to share it, he would have to react accordingly. As for sincerity conditions, one :ould not class them with presuppositions without ha~dng to say that in uttering l~i stop phoning you, the speaker is taking for granted that he, the speaker, is s~ncere. But this seems rather a nonsensical thing to say. Of course well-formed conmmn/cation proceeds on the conditions that speakers are sincere and speak the truth; ~ut these assumptions are not introduced and palraed off on the hearer in the way characteristic of those assumptions we wish t~ c, ,! presuppositions. It is ~tere~ting that Verschueren, the pragmaticist, thinks us restrictive with regard ~o the range of phenomena we group together, whereas compared to other linguistic theories of presupposition ours is very inclusive indeed. We would defend ourselves to both sides by emphasizing that our subject was presupposition failure -- i.e., situations where an utterance indicates that speaker and hearer are meant to have some assumption in common, but where something goes ~vrong in connection wi~h that. We think such situations interesting and in need of investigation. That is why we tried to fence in just those, and all those, appropriateness conditions on utterances which require such a common assumption to be pres~mt.