Institution strengthening in rural development: The case of Djibouti

Agric. Admin. & Extension

28 (1988) 181-189

Institution Strengthening in Rural Development: The Case of Djibouti J. Mullen Institute for Development Policy and Management, Precinct Centre, Oxford Road, Manchester Ml3 9QS, Great Britain (Received 21 July 1986; revised version received 30 March 1987; accepted 2 July 1987)

SUMMARY Grievances articulated by small farmers in Djibouti highlight some major problems of institutional performance of the Ministry of Agriculture. Macroeconomic policies and divisions between competing departments within the Ministry mitigate against agricultural growth. Administrative reforms are proposed intended to unify policy-making, financial, personnel and monitoringfunctions throughout the Ministry. A post of Secretary General is to be created, supported by two technical units, to whom all Heads of Departments will report. Improvedmanagement performance will, it is hoped, provide solutions to the bottlenecks plaguing agricultural development and encourage greater government commitment to the sector.

INTRODUCTION On the road to Arta, 13kilometres from Djibouti City, stood a mound of 12 tons of rotting tomatoes dumped by disillusioned small farmers of the AsEyla Co-operative as a protest against government mismanagement of marketing. Somewhat ironically on the same day, about 30 trucks queuing up at Djibouti railway station awaited the arrival of the weekly goods train from famine-stricken Ethiopia with its consignment of citrus fruits, vegetables and, of course.. . tomatoes.5 These quickly appeared on the consumer’s table at three times the price of the local produce. In the face of thesehighly controversial eventsit is legitimate to ask why Djibouti should apparently wasteits foreign exchangeon importing produce that is locally in 181 Agric. Admin. & Extension 0269-7475/88/$03.50 @)Elsevier Applied SciencePublishers Ltd,

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surplus, particularly as it is procured from a neighbouring drought-stricken country and, secondly, why it should damage the morale of its smallholder agricultural sector that it has endeavoured to nurture and sustain? No simple answersto thesequestionscan be forthcoming without relating small farmers’ agricultural development to the political economy within which it operates.The object of this paper is to explore the co-relations which exist between macro policy considerations, institutional structures and agricultural productivity at the farm level in Djibouti.

GEOPOLITICAL

FACTORS IN THE RURAL ECONOMY

Djibouti became independent only in 1977, having been since 1967 the French territory of the Afars and the Issas and, prior to then, French Somaliland.’ During the colonial years little effort was made to develop the rural hinterland socially or economically. Its principal function in the colonial economy was for the port to serve as a supply post for French military and merchant shipping interests en route from the Suez Canal to Indo-China and Indian Ocean ports.2 A close relationship continues with the former colonial power and it currently extends basefacilities to a 4000 garrison of French military personnel (including the Legion) with their dependants. Although the total area of the country covers only 23 000km2, its geopolitical location is particularly significant. It is wedged between socialist Ethiopia and Somalia and faces South Yemen across the Red Sea, where there is a considerableSoviet naval presence.It representsboth an important Western enclave and a neutral ground for countries of differing political viewpoints. Its choice as a location for the meeting of Ethiopian and Somali leaders and as a site for the headquarters of the major inter-governmental agency for the Horn of Africa-the Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)--emphasises its role as the Switzerland of the Horn. Its strategic trading location on the Gulf of Aden, with excellent dock and freeport facilities and a direct railway link to Addis Ababa, in sharp contrast to its apparent weak natural resource base,may partially explain the pronounced urban character of the economy where 60 per cent of its total population of 400 000 live in and around the capital. An estimated 100000 refugees,mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia, present a serious socio-economic problem for Djibouti.‘j The structure of the economy is untypical of Africa; 70 per cent of the national product is derived from a combination of commerce (31 per cent), services(24 per cent) and telecommunications (15 per cent). Public works

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contribute a further 10 per cent. The agriculture sector,including livestock, fisheries and crop production, contribute a mere 7 per cent. A policy of currency convertibility basedon the US dollar is maintained. When changed at black market rates in neighbouring countries with non-convertible currencies,the Djibouti franc enhancesconsiderably its purchasing power, thus facilitating the importation of consumer goods at very favourable terms of exchange. The economy of Djibouti is extremely sensitive to events in the Horn of Africa such as the temporary closure of the SuezCanal, the disruption of the railway line between Addis Ababa and Djibouti and particularly drought and desertification. Since 70 per cent of the recurrent national budget comes from taxes, excise, import duties and subsidies, the growing competition from other ports in the region, particularly Assab in Ethiopia and Djeddah, constitute major threats to its commerce-basedeconomy. The dependence on its port and foreign (predominantly French) related investments, such as military installations, administration, commerce houses and associated activities, which make up about 40 per cent of the gross domestic product, contribute to making foreign policy and commerce among the most influential institutions of state4 and agriculture the Cinderella of the economy. AGRICULTURAL

PRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

Agriculture in Djibouti is operating under severe socio-technical constraints. A combination of high temperatures, regularly reaching 45°C infrequent and erratic rainfalls of 100to 150mm per annum and arid, sandy soils contribute to making rainfed agriculture virtually impossible. Apart from some isolated occurrencesof palm oasis, and a small area of forest on the plateau of Day, the pastoral areasare virtually denudedof all vegetation and a state of extreme environmental degradation prevails. Cultivable areas are limited to those where accessiblewater resourcescan provide irrigation facilities; as yet, a water resource inventory at local level has not been established.It is unlikely that the total irrigated areaexceeds300hectares,70 per cent of which is dependent upon shallow well sources. Although agriculture contributes only minimally in visible earningsto the country’s GDP, the Government of Djibouti has, since independence, encouraged the primary sectors in order to reduce its external dependence and go some way towards providing a measure of food security. Horticultural production, consisting mainly of irrigated vegetables, rose from 50tonnes in 1978/9to 1090tonnes in 1982/4which met, however, only 11 per cent of national consumption requirements.3aThe number of small

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farms (OS2ha) producing vegetables and fruit increased from 180 in 1980to 930 in 1985.Efforts to extend the total area under cultivation are accelerating but have met with severe marketing constraints due to the narrow production base-85 per cent of total production consists of tomatoes-and seasonal gluts are endemic. The traditional economic activity of the rural areasis livestock raising, upon which the virtual totality of the rural population depends.Ninety per cent of the estimated one million animal population are sheepand goats. These are raised along traditional nomadic lines with seasonal migrations to over-exploited grazing areas following the irregular distribution of the sparseannual rainfall (on average 100 to 150mm per annum spread over 20 to 30days). With the traditional emphasis on the numerical size of herds rather than quality and consequently low take-off rates, by improving local genetic strains, rangeland management and husbandry practices, the marketing of local livestock could be further increased to meet local demand. But it is the potential for fish that appears particularly promising. It is estimated that annual catches of up to 3000 tonnes are possible without affecting reproduction rates.(Actual fish landings have risen from 62 tonnes in 1979 to 265tonnes in 1985.) Despite the limiting factors of land and water availability and capital scarcity, it is widely considered that major obstaclesfacing the expansion of agriculture in Djibouti are that of institutional management capacity and effective administration.5 While the farming population have responded enthusiastically to the proclaimed policy goals of self-reliance in food, by a marked increasein production, state-sponsoredinfrastructure to servicethis production has not evolved in parallel, commensurate with the expansion. The total production cycle presupposesan effective and timely delivery of inputs including water, seeds, fertilisers and credit; good husbandry, including land and water management and an efficient system. The provision of infrastructural support from government is required for eachof the interdependent components of the total production cycle, particularly since sedentaryagriculture in Djibouti is a comparatively recent innovation and the private sector is extremely fragile. The efficient servicing of agricultural activities requires an integrated management approach between the government departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development responsible for these functions vis-Avis the smallholders. Herein lies the crucial problem of co-ordination and collaboration between departments of the same ministry; ensuring that the different phases of agricultural production be supported in an integrated manner as final output is dependent upon successful completion of tasks performed sequentially within a tight time-frame and marketing incentives are attractive.

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The Ministry comprises four departments: Livestock and Fisheries, Agriculture and Forests, Land and Water Resources, and latterly, Laboratory Services.The head of each department reports directly to the Minister on policy and operational issues. The Minister, however, is a political appointee and, apart from an adviser provided under French development aid, does not have accessto a professional capacity to analyse budgets or monitor projects, let alone develop interdepartmental coordination or implement a unified development policy. The situation is also compounded by the need to maintain a visible balance between the two major ethnic groups within the country, the Afars and the 1ssas.rAs there tends to be a preponderanceof one or other group within departments, the environment is not ideal for improved horizontal co-ordination. The process of project selection,resourceallocation, relationship with aid donors, all of which decisions are critical to ministerial policy-making, have become fragmented, resulting in there being no mechanism of technical coordination functioning betweenthe four departments of the Ministry. At the operational level, the promotion of irrigated agriculture presupposesclose collaborative links between the land and water resourcesdepartment and the agriculture department, similarly in respect of overall land use policy affecting the agriculture and livestock departments. The issue is a much broader one than overproduction of tomatoes but goesdirectly to the heart of the organisational structure of the Ministry. The strengthening of the Central Ministry appears an essential prerequisite to any meaningful agricultural expansion, particularly in the much needed areas of food production, anti-desertification and droughtresistancemeasures.It is highly unlikely that any additional projects could be managed by the Ministry without first undertaking initiatives to strengthen absorptive capacity and the Ministry’s capability to plan, monitor and manage projects. Although the actual human resourcebaseof the Ministry as a whole is already weak, with only a handful of professional staff available for direct day-to-day operations, structural obstacles compound the difficulties in achieving an effective use of existing human, physical and financial resources. ADMINISTRATION, REORGANISATION AND INSTITUTIONSTRENGTHENING MEASURES The reorganisation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is of the highest priority if it is to be the principal institutional instrument by which agricultural, pastoral, fisheries and forestry development will be guided and managed for the foreseeablefuture. It is widely acknowledged

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that, within the present context, the Ministry does not possess the management or administrative capacity to elaborate and execute in a coordinated manner development programmes which reflect national development policy objectives, a view which was also shared by the aid donors conference of 1984.5Aware of this predicament, the Government introduced in June 1985administrative legislation3bdesignedto strengthen the technical and co-ordinating capacity of the Minister’s Office. Central to this proposal is the setting up of a Ministerial Secretariat headed by a Secretary General who would act as Head of the Civil Service within the Ministry and assume major advisory functions to the Minister. The Secretariat will be endowed with a strong technical capability consisting of a Programming and Monitoring Unit and an Administrative and Financial Unit. These two units would have responsibility at central level for planning and monitoring all new and on-going activities in the four departments and in controlling the financial and personnel management functions of these departments. A number of development objectives would, it is hoped, be achieved as a result of the administrative reform. In particular, it is anticipated to be able to apply a national policy of rural development throughout the whole Ministry; a specific consequenceof which would be the selection of projects which reflect national policy considerations rather than individual departmental priorities. Organisational decision-making would be rationalised by the creation of an Administrative and Financial Unit for financial planning, budgeting, and personnel management and a Programming, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit with a brief to service all ministerial activities. Better co-ordination would lead to increased organisational effectivenesscontributing in turn to increasing the productive capacity of small farmers and fishermen by better services at the local level and the reduction of local poverty. Further, extension delivery systems to small producers would improve in terms of the timely delivery of inputs, increased yields, better credit facilities, and more efficient marketing. The institutional characteristics and specific tasks of the Programming and Monitoring Unit will be to design and plan projects and programmes for the entire agricultural sector, and to monitor current operational programmes in collaboration with the department in question. Monitoring activities will require a data system on the sub-sectorsof priority concern to the Ministry i.e. Agriculture, Forests, Fisheries, Livestock, Land and Water Resources,Rural Population and Services.At the project level, base line data will be collected on every on-going and planned project in the Ministry, in collaboration with the department concerned. Project implementation schedules and indicators of objective achievement relating to individual projects of the Ministry will be verified and remedial action will be proposed

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for shortfalls, cost or time overruns. On-going and ex-post evaluations of projects will also be undertaken in co-operation with external funding agencies.Training will be a key preoccupation of the unit and a master plan of training for all ministerial personnel from executive level to village-level worker will be elaborated. The setting up of administrative mechanisms to strengthencollaboration and co-operation betweendepartments on specific inter-departmental activities, specifically including a programme of integrated extension between the Departments of Agriculture, Livestock and Land and Water Resources,will be inaugurated. The Administrative and Financial Unit will be primarily responsible for the introduction of a central management information system to include personnel, finance and budgeting which would provide up-to-date information on the status of projects and on-going commitments. This would lead to the introduction of a uniform system of financial management by harmonising the systems of accounting and budgeting in each department. Administration of the personnel function would involve setting up a central inventory of personnel, stock and materials of each department and to monitor transfers and flows of material relating to ongoing and new projects. The elaboration of uniform ministerial policy on the recruitment and promotion of personnel would be monitored by the Unit. But, above all, the Unit will establish a central budgeting capacity for the Ministry as a whole so as to consolidate the budgetary proposals of the various departments according to national policy priorities. Three new senior level posts would be created as a result of the reorganisation: the post of Secretary General (which resemblesmore the post of Chqf de Cabinet than Permanent Secretary)and two Unit Heads, one for Programming and Monitoring and the other for Administration and Finance. The post of Secretary General will be the most senior administrative appointment within the Ministry and, being the right-hand man of the Minister, is naturally a most sensitive one.As it is highly unlikely that the required expertise to head the two units will be available in Djibouti, it is proposed to recruit two international consultants through multilateral or bilateral aid agenciesin order to supply four man-years of expertise in programme planning and monitoring and in financial systems. Logistical support in terms of administrative servicesand equipment would also be requested through donor channels. CONCLUDING

REMARKS

Although small farmers are generally adept at finding alternative resources when government servicesfail to deliver, the farming community in Djibouti

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is singularly vulnerable to mismanagement due to the relatively recent introduction of agriculture (they were previously pastoralists) and the generouspromises of support made by the Government. The concentration on the production of a single crop--tomatoes-the neglectof the marketing function and the total lack of crop diversification illustrated the inability of the Agriculture Department to tackle production issuesand to enrol the help of other departments in solving critical production bottlenecks. In all fairnessto the Agriculture Department, it ought to be acknowledged that their budget or personnel establishment has hardly increased in real terms since independence,while production has expandedten-fold over the period. The stated policy of self-reliance in food production has not been accompanied by a commensurate allocation of resourcesto the agriculture sector as a whole and institutional mechanisms for solving production problems through inter-departmental collaboration have been virtually absent. The compartmentalisation of departmental responsibilities, which looks at land, water, inputs and extension advice and marketing as discrete government functions endowed with bureaucratic power and influence, is totally alien to the holistic approach of the small farmer to whom these resourcesare interlinked in an inseparablefashion. Worse still, rivalries and divisions between departments hinder the generation of solutions to practical problems, such as crop diversification and agro-industrial processingin the caseof tomatoes, becauseof the institutional implications of multi-sectoral involvement in such a solution. It is debatable whether the problem can be adequately addressed by introducing organisational reforms aimed at a centralising control in the hands of a Secretariat. There may also be a need to review the criteria of resource distribution between departments and the manner in which bilateral aid donors contribute to expanding the power base of certain departments by attracting counterpart funding to projects which may not be of the highest national priority. It is unlikely that structural reforms in isolation from other measureswill transform the narrow departmentalism which has grown over the years. Human and technical factors such as advanced training opportunities, increased budgets, and expanded recruitment allied to a new organisational structure could well offer the stimuli to increase inter-departmental communication and strengthen servicesto farmers. Training in the principles of organisational behaviour, in which officers would have an opportunity to appreciate how institutions actually work, could make a substantial contribution to enhancing interdepartmental collaboration. In the final analysis institutions have their raison d’etre in terms of the clients they serve. Unless the farmers of As-Eyla can reach a satisfactory solution to the over-production of tomatoes-through perhapsa temporary

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halt on imports-while extension agents and subject matter specialists prepare plans of crop diversification and improved delivery of services involving other departments and ministries (e.g. Foreign Affairs and Trade), food production in the Sahelian state is likely to stagnate and external dependency to grow. And, as in many instances, the blame for food production decline lies less with the small farmer or actual physical constraints, but rather with the inability of government institutions to shed their territorial imperative mentality to meet the production and marketing requirements of their small farmer clients.

REFERENCES 1. Africa Confidential, Djibouti:

2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

Only one winner, Vol. 27, No. 19, I7 September 1986, 3-1. Doresse, J., Histoire sommaire de la Corne Orientale de I’Afrique Paris, P. Geuthmer, 1971. Djibouti, Gouvernment de: (a) Direction Nationale de la Statistique (DINAS) 1985; (b) Loi No. 154/AN/85 l&e L. du 11 juin 1985. Glaser, T., Inter-governmental Authority on Drought & Development (IGADD), Inaugural summit in an oasis of peace, The Courier, No. 96, March-April 1986. La Nation (Djibouti’s weekly journal), 20 March 1986. Refugees, Voluntary repatriation resumes, No. 34, October 1986, 9-10. Thompson, V. & Adloff, R., Djibouti and the Horn of Africa, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967.