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Internationalism in the age of nationalism
Hurory Prmted
o/Euro#ean Ideas. I” Great Bntam
Vol. 15. No. l-3,
pp. 21 I-216.
INTERNATIONALISM
1992
0191-6599/92 $5.00+0.00 ‘9 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd
IN THE AGE OF NATIONALISM JANET L. POLASKY*
The Socialists of the Second International, inspired by the doctrine of Karl Marx and guided by the praxis of national working class movements, shared a common revolutionary vision. Between 1889 and 1914, these English, German, French, Polish, Italian, Austrian, Russian, Dutch, and Belgian Socialists assembled every two to three years at international congresses to debate resolutions ranging from temperance to armaments. The ever present danger of factionalism along national as well as ideological lines called the President of the International, the Belgian Socialist Emile Vandervelde, to a pivotal position as conciliator and moderator. Vandervelde ‘harmonized’ the conflicts that threatened to splinter the International.’ He defined the compromises and maintained the comradeship that sustained the vision of the international Socialist federation. When three hundred and sixty-two delegates assembled together at the Second Congress of the International in 1891, the young Vandervelde observed euphorically: ‘For the first time, revolutionary socialists and trade unionists agreed that they must all join in the class struggle. That consensus was something new and without precedent. All the world’s Socialists had joined together, in accordance with the dictate of Karl Marx: “Workers of the world unite.“‘2 Two years later, when Friedrich Engels closed the Zurich Congress, Vandervelde reported: ‘It was as if Marx had been reborn in the figure of his brother in arms. It was at once a democratic and a revolutionary Socialism that appeared before our eyes, embodied in the last glorious survivor of the heroic era!‘3 The leaders of the Second International recognised their common heroes and aspired to the ideals handed down from the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the Socialists at the turn of the century debated broad resolutions that reaffirmed their Marxist heritage, they could not specify a strategy for the achievement of their goals. As the correspondence and the records of the debates at the International Congresses reveal, each national party and each faction within each party followed its own set of tactics. Theoretical issues were resolved at the Congresses by general pronouncements that left the definition of praxis to the national parties. The executive body, the Bureau Socialiste International, coordinated, but did not direct the implementation ofCongressional resolutions. Chosen by their national Socialist parties, delegates to the Congresses and to the Bureau struggled to define a radical new internationalism. Especially after 1905, the critical problems for the Socialists ofthe Second International were the intensifying nationalist rivalries, colonial entanglements, and the escalating arms race. In theory, the Second International dealt with the threats posed by nationalism *History Department,
University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824, U.S.A. 211
212
Jnmt
L. Polusky
and militarism by referring to Marx’s 1848 pronouncement that the proletariat had no fatherland. Capitalists and their generals fomented wars. Socialism would therefore prevent wars as workers united across national frontiers. Vandervelde’s acknowledgement that workers in France, Germany, England, and Belgium did identify with their ‘patrie’ at the beginning of the twentieth century seemed easily reconciled with Marx’s optimism. ‘Defensive patriotism is not incompatible with the internationalist principles of socialism’, Vandervelde simply explained.4 The contradictions inherent in this defensive patriotism surfaced in every subsequent debate on nationalism and militarism of the Second International. In principle, the Socialists could easily agree to condemn foreign aggression. They could also unanimously attack standing armies and support the formation of national militias. But if each nation was somehow special-the French with their unique revolutionary tradition and the Germans with their organisational culture-then its people deserved the right to self-defense against foreign aggression. Vandervelde’s definition of patriotism in fact implied the willingness to defend a nation’s democratic institutions from attack by less advanced nations.5 ‘A people with something to defend has the right to exercise its right to legitimate defense, Vandervelde maintained. 6 What could Socialists do when these ‘legitimate national interests’ clashed? Rosa Luxemburg and a number of other socialists on the Left echoed Friedrich Engels’ belief that such a war would lead to the ‘general exhaustion and the establishment of conditions for the final victory of the working class’.’ But in 1907, the International Socialist Bureau countered: ‘To the contrary, the working class is the natural enemy of wars. . , because wars contradict the goal of socialism which is the creation of a new order of things that is based on the solidarity of producers, on the fraternity of nations, on the liberty of peoples.‘E Rejecting the historical inevitability of war and its revolutionary implications, the majority of European Socialists reasserted Marx’s optimistic prophecy. Their goal, however, was reform. Henceforth Vandervelde and the majority of the Second International would struggle to prevent war. Single actions by isolated national Socialist parties had failed in the campaign against the Boer War. Between the 1904 Congress at Amsterdam and the 1907 Congress at Stuttgart, the threat of war dramatically intensified. The Russo-Japanese war, the Russian Revolution of 1905, and the Moroccan crisis all aggravated international tensions. For Socialist action to be effective, it had to be international, all members agreed. But that consensus was no less problematic than Marx’s 1848 pronouncement. A grave sense of purpose motivated the delegates to the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 as they debated the definition of a strategy of internationalism. In his presidential address, Vandervelde celebrated the dedication and unity of the International. Rosa Luxemburg served as his translator. The debates on ‘ie militarisme et ies conflits internationaux’ at Stuttgart clearly focused the significant contradictions in an internationalism based on defensive patriotism.” Discussion centered on four resolutions. In the first of three resolutions proposed by French Socialists, Gustave Herve condemned all forms of patriotism and called for a Mass Strike in the event of war. Jules Guesdes
rn?ernationa~~~min the Age of Nationalism
2f.3
maintained that the issue of militarism diverted the proletariat from crucial economic issues. He urged all Socialists to vote in their parliaments against war credits. Edouard Vaillant and Jean Jaures’s resolution opened with the broad theoretical statement that militarism and imperialism oppressed the working class but concluded with an assertion of the right to national self-defense. Finally, August Bebel, explaining that wars between capitalist states were the consequence of rivalries in world markets and would only end when capitalism was overturned, resolved that the proletariat had a duty to prevent armed conflict. While more explicit than earlier resolutions in its definition of the causes of war, like the others it did not advocate specific international Socialist tactics to prevent war. After days of bitter debate, Vandervelde reported a compromise resolution to the assembled congress for a vote. The resolution began with a restatement of Bebel’s definition of the economic causes of war, linking militarism to the capitalist system. In adopting the resolution, the International pledged to coordinate the struggle against escalating armaments and urged Socialists to work in their respective parliaments to achieve a reduction in military service and to replace standing armies with militias. The resolution concluded with Luxemburg’s statement that: ‘Should war break out in spite of all this, it is their duty to intercede for its speedy end, or to strive with all their power to make use of the violent economic and political crisis brought about by the war to rouse the people and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule.“O Georges Haupt suggested in his introduction to the Compte-rendu of the Congress that the forces of the Left had successfully exploited the breach separating the moderates, Jaures and Bebel, and had tactically outmaneuvered the revisionists.” However, even though Luxemburg’s resolution prevailed, it was Vandervelde who had the final word. In his closing remarks, Vandervelde reaffirmed the international solidarity of the proletariat, at the same time that he recognised each nation’s right to selfdefense. The President appealed to each faction, validating Bebel’s fears about the consequences of launching a general strike against the repressive German government, and placating Jaures. He attempted to minimise, but did not reconcile the ideological and national differences separating the revisionists from the orthodox delegates, the French from the Germans. Vandervelde later acknowledged: ‘I was frequently chosen as the reporter for the more difficult questions’ because of his ability to define ‘resolutions that were moderate, centrist, and equally removed from the extremes of the right and the left.“* This ability to forge a consensus held the International together, allowing each national group to follow its own strategy of domestic politics. But by 1910 the escalation of international tensions may well have demanded another solution, a stronger hand, a more centralised set of Socialist institutions, and a resolution of the contradictions in the international theory. The International perservered for twenty-five years as a loose federation of national parties without sanctions. The Copenhagen Congress of 1910 itself affirmed: ‘The Congress, recognising that it would be difficult to formulate a model instruction for the carrying out of the resolutions of International Congresses, declares that it is necessary to leave to the national parties the
214
.Junet i.. Polasky
power to choose the form of action and the opportune moment.‘13 The Second International debated issues, but passed no resolutions that would bind member parties to concrete anti-military strategies. the responsibility for coordinating a After the Copenhagen Congress, response to international crises passed to the International Socialist Bureau, but it is not obvious that the Socialist executive had any effective recourse to action. Although the French delegates sensed the growing threat, the Germans resolutely opposed the calling of special meetings of the Bureau to consider the conflicts. Finally, in 1912 the Bureau agreed to convene an extraordinary International Congress in Basle in December. In their last formal resolution, the Socialists assembled at Basle again came down on both sides of the international question simultaneously without specifying their strategy: ‘In the event that war does break out despite their efforts, it is their duty to intervene to stop it quickly, and to take advantage of the economic and political crises caused by the war to shake up the lowest popular classes and to bring about the fall of capitalist domination.‘14 Longuet’s description of the final vote of the Basle Congress sums up the enthusiasm and optimism of this last regular meeting of the International. ‘In a massive, unanimous all of the Congress-twenty races and twenty nations standing action, together-affirmed its will to struggle against war.‘15 Deprived of the gift of prophesy, Vandervelde heralded this display of Socialist unity as: ‘the greatest peaceful force in the world’.16 The declaration of war forced the Bureau to meet in Brussels in July 1914 to decide what to do about the next Congress scheduled to assemble in Vienna in August. After bitter wrangling, they agreed to convene the Congress on 9 August in Paris instead of Vienna and to place the question ‘leprolktariat et was only able to silence the la guerre’ at the head of the agenda. I7 Vandervelde debates over the actual urgency of the international threat by declaring in his typical manner: ‘We should vote because this discussion is taking too long. If the national powers were as deliberate in mobilizing for war as we are in organizing our war against war, we could sleep peacefully.“* Unfortunately, they were not so deliberate. The Second International collapsed in the face of the threat of World War. They had never coalesced to form an effective international organisation, nor had they convinced the workers of their respective countries that they had only their chains to lose. Defensive patriotism could not be reconciled with internationalism. But what historians have subsequently forgotten is that the Socialists had joined together over a twenty-five year period as comrades sharing a common goal. The war obliterated the friendship and the shared vision. After the German Socialists voted war credits and Vandervelde joined his king’s wartime cabinet, they could neither exchange letters nor meet. It is significant that when Vandervelde recalled these ‘heroic years’, he reminisced about the international friendships, but forgot the logistics of the debates of the nine Congresses or the more numerous Bureau meetings. Between the Congresses, the Socialist leaders had hiked together through the mountains of Europe. During the Congresses, they had conversed and dined together late
into the night. When Victor Adkr tvrote to excuse himseff from the upco~ng meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in 1906, for example, he did not worry about absenting himself from the decision making. He professed instead that he would miss ‘those few delicious hours’ that he was accustomed to spending with the Vanderveldes at their home in La Hulpe.” In his memoirs, Vandervelde chronicled “my somewhat nomadic existence as a “Socialist Wanderer.“20 Journeying through Europe by bicycle, foot, and train, Vandervelde met other Socialists and addressed assemblies of workers. He recalled, for example, his frequent visits chez Mme M&-ode-Dorian near the Bois de Boulogne where: ‘The English Labor Party deputies rubbed shoulders with exiled ~~~~~F~~~ agrarians, Irish Fen&s, and members of the Ligue i~~e~atio~ale des Droits de f’f-fomme. They were joined by some passing Americas who had come to Europe “to investigate”. Alongside Frenchmen from the extreme left were men such as the warmonger Venizelos or the pacifist von Gerlach’,2i For Vandervelde, that comradeship and exchange of ideas was the true Socialist internationalism. Historians of Socialism have emphasised the interweaving in Socialist life of ‘politics and the private world.‘22 Even to suggest that there were two separate entities to be interwoven in Vandervelde’s life is false. All was politics-but a politics more broadly defined. Politics to Vandervetde was not simply the attainment of governmental power, it meant the human relationships forged during the struggie. Vandervelde’s compromises only papered over the fissures in the Second Iute~at~ona~s strnggl~ against war. The unity rhat he preserved, that of c~~~a~~s~~~~ did not withstand the strains ofwar the the Second International could not prevent. Janet t, Polasky
NOTES
1, Lewis Lorwin’s description of Vandervelde’s role at the 1907 Stuttgart Congress, Lewis Lorwin, Labor 6i Internationalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 93, 2. Emile VanderveIde cited by Jean Longuet, Le ~~~ve~~~~ sucia&e i~te~~utja~u~ (Paris: A. Quitlet, 19X3), p. 24. 3. E&e van~erve~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~Bwn ~~~~~~~~ ~~C~~~~~~~ (Paris: E&&3ns Denoel), p_ 145. 4_ Emile Vandervelde, Le Pet@% (31 May 1905). 5. Emile Vandervelde, ‘Socialisme et Patriotisme’ Le Pa&? (3% -May 1805). 6. Emile Vandervelde, 1913 Cong&s Anntr~i, Parti ouvrier beige, p. 92. 7. FF. Engels, Introduction to Sigismund Borkheim’s pamphlet Zur Erimerungf@ die deutschen Mordspatrioten 1806-12 (18871, cited by J. Jell, The Second Internatfanal, 1889-lP14, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p_ 107. 8. Bureau Socialiste International, ‘Aux travailleurs de tous les Pays’ (June 1907), I, 76, Camille Huysmans Archief, Antwerp. 9. See: Cong& Social&e bternationa/ 1907, ccl. Georges Haupt, (Geneva: Minkoff, 1905).
216
.Janer L. Polaskr,
13. Cited in G.D.H. Cole. A ffi,tor:\, ($ Socialic~ Thorl,yht: T/1(, .Sc~c~otrt/Intemaiiontrl (London: MacMillan & Co.. 1956-58). 3.1. p. 86. 14. Manifestc Baste (24-25 November 1912). I. 174. Camille Hu~smans Archicf. Antwerp. 15. Jean Longuet, Le Mouvement Socialiste International, (Paris: A. Quillet, 1913), p. 74. 16. Emile Vandervelde, ‘L’Internationale et la Guerre’ in Le Peuple (I2 November 1912). 17. For a full discussion of the meetings see: Georges Haupt, Le CongrPs manque d’lnternational b la veille de la premi+?re guerre mondiaie (Paris: Maspero, 1965), pp. 109-115; and the minutes in I 1043, Camille Huysmans Archief, Antwerp. 18. Emile Vandervelde. Compte rendu, Skance du Mercredi Matin 29 juillet 19 14, Bureau Socialiste International in Haupt, Le Congrk ManqutG, p.258. 19. Victor Adler to Emile Vandervelde (I March 1906), I 19/32, Camille Huysmans Archief, Antwerp. 20. Vandervelde, Souvenir.r. p. 121. 21, Vandervelde, Souvenirs, p. 126. 22. See for example: Tony Judt. Marxism and the French Left, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 23.
o/Euro#ean Ideas. I” Great Bntam
Vol. 15. No. l-3,
pp. 21 I-216.
INTERNATIONALISM
1992
0191-6599/92 $5.00+0.00 ‘9 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd
IN THE AGE OF NATIONALISM JANET L. POLASKY*
The Socialists of the Second International, inspired by the doctrine of Karl Marx and guided by the praxis of national working class movements, shared a common revolutionary vision. Between 1889 and 1914, these English, German, French, Polish, Italian, Austrian, Russian, Dutch, and Belgian Socialists assembled every two to three years at international congresses to debate resolutions ranging from temperance to armaments. The ever present danger of factionalism along national as well as ideological lines called the President of the International, the Belgian Socialist Emile Vandervelde, to a pivotal position as conciliator and moderator. Vandervelde ‘harmonized’ the conflicts that threatened to splinter the International.’ He defined the compromises and maintained the comradeship that sustained the vision of the international Socialist federation. When three hundred and sixty-two delegates assembled together at the Second Congress of the International in 1891, the young Vandervelde observed euphorically: ‘For the first time, revolutionary socialists and trade unionists agreed that they must all join in the class struggle. That consensus was something new and without precedent. All the world’s Socialists had joined together, in accordance with the dictate of Karl Marx: “Workers of the world unite.“‘2 Two years later, when Friedrich Engels closed the Zurich Congress, Vandervelde reported: ‘It was as if Marx had been reborn in the figure of his brother in arms. It was at once a democratic and a revolutionary Socialism that appeared before our eyes, embodied in the last glorious survivor of the heroic era!‘3 The leaders of the Second International recognised their common heroes and aspired to the ideals handed down from the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the Socialists at the turn of the century debated broad resolutions that reaffirmed their Marxist heritage, they could not specify a strategy for the achievement of their goals. As the correspondence and the records of the debates at the International Congresses reveal, each national party and each faction within each party followed its own set of tactics. Theoretical issues were resolved at the Congresses by general pronouncements that left the definition of praxis to the national parties. The executive body, the Bureau Socialiste International, coordinated, but did not direct the implementation ofCongressional resolutions. Chosen by their national Socialist parties, delegates to the Congresses and to the Bureau struggled to define a radical new internationalism. Especially after 1905, the critical problems for the Socialists ofthe Second International were the intensifying nationalist rivalries, colonial entanglements, and the escalating arms race. In theory, the Second International dealt with the threats posed by nationalism *History Department,
University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824, U.S.A. 211
212
Jnmt
L. Polusky
and militarism by referring to Marx’s 1848 pronouncement that the proletariat had no fatherland. Capitalists and their generals fomented wars. Socialism would therefore prevent wars as workers united across national frontiers. Vandervelde’s acknowledgement that workers in France, Germany, England, and Belgium did identify with their ‘patrie’ at the beginning of the twentieth century seemed easily reconciled with Marx’s optimism. ‘Defensive patriotism is not incompatible with the internationalist principles of socialism’, Vandervelde simply explained.4 The contradictions inherent in this defensive patriotism surfaced in every subsequent debate on nationalism and militarism of the Second International. In principle, the Socialists could easily agree to condemn foreign aggression. They could also unanimously attack standing armies and support the formation of national militias. But if each nation was somehow special-the French with their unique revolutionary tradition and the Germans with their organisational culture-then its people deserved the right to self-defense against foreign aggression. Vandervelde’s definition of patriotism in fact implied the willingness to defend a nation’s democratic institutions from attack by less advanced nations.5 ‘A people with something to defend has the right to exercise its right to legitimate defense, Vandervelde maintained. 6 What could Socialists do when these ‘legitimate national interests’ clashed? Rosa Luxemburg and a number of other socialists on the Left echoed Friedrich Engels’ belief that such a war would lead to the ‘general exhaustion and the establishment of conditions for the final victory of the working class’.’ But in 1907, the International Socialist Bureau countered: ‘To the contrary, the working class is the natural enemy of wars. . , because wars contradict the goal of socialism which is the creation of a new order of things that is based on the solidarity of producers, on the fraternity of nations, on the liberty of peoples.‘E Rejecting the historical inevitability of war and its revolutionary implications, the majority of European Socialists reasserted Marx’s optimistic prophecy. Their goal, however, was reform. Henceforth Vandervelde and the majority of the Second International would struggle to prevent war. Single actions by isolated national Socialist parties had failed in the campaign against the Boer War. Between the 1904 Congress at Amsterdam and the 1907 Congress at Stuttgart, the threat of war dramatically intensified. The Russo-Japanese war, the Russian Revolution of 1905, and the Moroccan crisis all aggravated international tensions. For Socialist action to be effective, it had to be international, all members agreed. But that consensus was no less problematic than Marx’s 1848 pronouncement. A grave sense of purpose motivated the delegates to the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 as they debated the definition of a strategy of internationalism. In his presidential address, Vandervelde celebrated the dedication and unity of the International. Rosa Luxemburg served as his translator. The debates on ‘ie militarisme et ies conflits internationaux’ at Stuttgart clearly focused the significant contradictions in an internationalism based on defensive patriotism.” Discussion centered on four resolutions. In the first of three resolutions proposed by French Socialists, Gustave Herve condemned all forms of patriotism and called for a Mass Strike in the event of war. Jules Guesdes
rn?ernationa~~~min the Age of Nationalism
2f.3
maintained that the issue of militarism diverted the proletariat from crucial economic issues. He urged all Socialists to vote in their parliaments against war credits. Edouard Vaillant and Jean Jaures’s resolution opened with the broad theoretical statement that militarism and imperialism oppressed the working class but concluded with an assertion of the right to national self-defense. Finally, August Bebel, explaining that wars between capitalist states were the consequence of rivalries in world markets and would only end when capitalism was overturned, resolved that the proletariat had a duty to prevent armed conflict. While more explicit than earlier resolutions in its definition of the causes of war, like the others it did not advocate specific international Socialist tactics to prevent war. After days of bitter debate, Vandervelde reported a compromise resolution to the assembled congress for a vote. The resolution began with a restatement of Bebel’s definition of the economic causes of war, linking militarism to the capitalist system. In adopting the resolution, the International pledged to coordinate the struggle against escalating armaments and urged Socialists to work in their respective parliaments to achieve a reduction in military service and to replace standing armies with militias. The resolution concluded with Luxemburg’s statement that: ‘Should war break out in spite of all this, it is their duty to intercede for its speedy end, or to strive with all their power to make use of the violent economic and political crisis brought about by the war to rouse the people and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule.“O Georges Haupt suggested in his introduction to the Compte-rendu of the Congress that the forces of the Left had successfully exploited the breach separating the moderates, Jaures and Bebel, and had tactically outmaneuvered the revisionists.” However, even though Luxemburg’s resolution prevailed, it was Vandervelde who had the final word. In his closing remarks, Vandervelde reaffirmed the international solidarity of the proletariat, at the same time that he recognised each nation’s right to selfdefense. The President appealed to each faction, validating Bebel’s fears about the consequences of launching a general strike against the repressive German government, and placating Jaures. He attempted to minimise, but did not reconcile the ideological and national differences separating the revisionists from the orthodox delegates, the French from the Germans. Vandervelde later acknowledged: ‘I was frequently chosen as the reporter for the more difficult questions’ because of his ability to define ‘resolutions that were moderate, centrist, and equally removed from the extremes of the right and the left.“* This ability to forge a consensus held the International together, allowing each national group to follow its own strategy of domestic politics. But by 1910 the escalation of international tensions may well have demanded another solution, a stronger hand, a more centralised set of Socialist institutions, and a resolution of the contradictions in the international theory. The International perservered for twenty-five years as a loose federation of national parties without sanctions. The Copenhagen Congress of 1910 itself affirmed: ‘The Congress, recognising that it would be difficult to formulate a model instruction for the carrying out of the resolutions of International Congresses, declares that it is necessary to leave to the national parties the
214
.Junet i.. Polasky
power to choose the form of action and the opportune moment.‘13 The Second International debated issues, but passed no resolutions that would bind member parties to concrete anti-military strategies. the responsibility for coordinating a After the Copenhagen Congress, response to international crises passed to the International Socialist Bureau, but it is not obvious that the Socialist executive had any effective recourse to action. Although the French delegates sensed the growing threat, the Germans resolutely opposed the calling of special meetings of the Bureau to consider the conflicts. Finally, in 1912 the Bureau agreed to convene an extraordinary International Congress in Basle in December. In their last formal resolution, the Socialists assembled at Basle again came down on both sides of the international question simultaneously without specifying their strategy: ‘In the event that war does break out despite their efforts, it is their duty to intervene to stop it quickly, and to take advantage of the economic and political crises caused by the war to shake up the lowest popular classes and to bring about the fall of capitalist domination.‘14 Longuet’s description of the final vote of the Basle Congress sums up the enthusiasm and optimism of this last regular meeting of the International. ‘In a massive, unanimous all of the Congress-twenty races and twenty nations standing action, together-affirmed its will to struggle against war.‘15 Deprived of the gift of prophesy, Vandervelde heralded this display of Socialist unity as: ‘the greatest peaceful force in the world’.16 The declaration of war forced the Bureau to meet in Brussels in July 1914 to decide what to do about the next Congress scheduled to assemble in Vienna in August. After bitter wrangling, they agreed to convene the Congress on 9 August in Paris instead of Vienna and to place the question ‘leprolktariat et was only able to silence the la guerre’ at the head of the agenda. I7 Vandervelde debates over the actual urgency of the international threat by declaring in his typical manner: ‘We should vote because this discussion is taking too long. If the national powers were as deliberate in mobilizing for war as we are in organizing our war against war, we could sleep peacefully.“* Unfortunately, they were not so deliberate. The Second International collapsed in the face of the threat of World War. They had never coalesced to form an effective international organisation, nor had they convinced the workers of their respective countries that they had only their chains to lose. Defensive patriotism could not be reconciled with internationalism. But what historians have subsequently forgotten is that the Socialists had joined together over a twenty-five year period as comrades sharing a common goal. The war obliterated the friendship and the shared vision. After the German Socialists voted war credits and Vandervelde joined his king’s wartime cabinet, they could neither exchange letters nor meet. It is significant that when Vandervelde recalled these ‘heroic years’, he reminisced about the international friendships, but forgot the logistics of the debates of the nine Congresses or the more numerous Bureau meetings. Between the Congresses, the Socialist leaders had hiked together through the mountains of Europe. During the Congresses, they had conversed and dined together late
into the night. When Victor Adkr tvrote to excuse himseff from the upco~ng meeting of the International Socialist Bureau in 1906, for example, he did not worry about absenting himself from the decision making. He professed instead that he would miss ‘those few delicious hours’ that he was accustomed to spending with the Vanderveldes at their home in La Hulpe.” In his memoirs, Vandervelde chronicled “my somewhat nomadic existence as a “Socialist Wanderer.“20 Journeying through Europe by bicycle, foot, and train, Vandervelde met other Socialists and addressed assemblies of workers. He recalled, for example, his frequent visits chez Mme M&-ode-Dorian near the Bois de Boulogne where: ‘The English Labor Party deputies rubbed shoulders with exiled ~~~~~F~~~ agrarians, Irish Fen&s, and members of the Ligue i~~e~atio~ale des Droits de f’f-fomme. They were joined by some passing Americas who had come to Europe “to investigate”. Alongside Frenchmen from the extreme left were men such as the warmonger Venizelos or the pacifist von Gerlach’,2i For Vandervelde, that comradeship and exchange of ideas was the true Socialist internationalism. Historians of Socialism have emphasised the interweaving in Socialist life of ‘politics and the private world.‘22 Even to suggest that there were two separate entities to be interwoven in Vandervelde’s life is false. All was politics-but a politics more broadly defined. Politics to Vandervetde was not simply the attainment of governmental power, it meant the human relationships forged during the struggie. Vandervelde’s compromises only papered over the fissures in the Second Iute~at~ona~s strnggl~ against war. The unity rhat he preserved, that of c~~~a~~s~~~~ did not withstand the strains ofwar the the Second International could not prevent. Janet t, Polasky
NOTES
1, Lewis Lorwin’s description of Vandervelde’s role at the 1907 Stuttgart Congress, Lewis Lorwin, Labor 6i Internationalism (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 93, 2. Emile VanderveIde cited by Jean Longuet, Le ~~~ve~~~~ sucia&e i~te~~utja~u~ (Paris: A. Quitlet, 19X3), p. 24. 3. E&e van~erve~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~Bwn ~~~~~~~~ ~~C~~~~~~~ (Paris: E&&3ns Denoel), p_ 145. 4_ Emile Vandervelde, Le Pet@% (31 May 1905). 5. Emile Vandervelde, ‘Socialisme et Patriotisme’ Le Pa&? (3% -May 1805). 6. Emile Vandervelde, 1913 Cong&s Anntr~i, Parti ouvrier beige, p. 92. 7. FF. Engels, Introduction to Sigismund Borkheim’s pamphlet Zur Erimerungf@ die deutschen Mordspatrioten 1806-12 (18871, cited by J. Jell, The Second Internatfanal, 1889-lP14, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p_ 107. 8. Bureau Socialiste International, ‘Aux travailleurs de tous les Pays’ (June 1907), I, 76, Camille Huysmans Archief, Antwerp. 9. See: Cong& Social&e bternationa/ 1907, ccl. Georges Haupt, (Geneva: Minkoff, 1905).
216
.Janer L. Polaskr,
13. Cited in G.D.H. Cole. A ffi,tor:\, ($ Socialic~ Thorl,yht: T/1(, .Sc~c~otrt/Intemaiiontrl (London: MacMillan & Co.. 1956-58). 3.1. p. 86. 14. Manifestc Baste (24-25 November 1912). I. 174. Camille Hu~smans Archicf. Antwerp. 15. Jean Longuet, Le Mouvement Socialiste International, (Paris: A. Quillet, 1913), p. 74. 16. Emile Vandervelde, ‘L’Internationale et la Guerre’ in Le Peuple (I2 November 1912). 17. For a full discussion of the meetings see: Georges Haupt, Le CongrPs manque d’lnternational b la veille de la premi+?re guerre mondiaie (Paris: Maspero, 1965), pp. 109-115; and the minutes in I 1043, Camille Huysmans Archief, Antwerp. 18. Emile Vandervelde. Compte rendu, Skance du Mercredi Matin 29 juillet 19 14, Bureau Socialiste International in Haupt, Le Congrk ManqutG, p.258. 19. Victor Adler to Emile Vandervelde (I March 1906), I 19/32, Camille Huysmans Archief, Antwerp. 20. Vandervelde, Souvenir.r. p. 121. 21, Vandervelde, Souvenirs, p. 126. 22. See for example: Tony Judt. Marxism and the French Left, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 23.