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Intuition and gist
INTUITION
AND GIST
CURTACREDOLO UNlVERSllYOFCALIFORNIA, DAVIS
Cognitive developmental&s have always been centrally concerned with identifying at what age specific skills and knowledge become functional within the average child. Progress in this area, however, advances in fits and starts as researchers eagerly jump on the proverbial bandwagon and exploit new paradigms for their potential. Only when this prescription runs dry do they finally begin exploiting challenges to those paradigms for new potential. In the process of repeatedly first becoming committed to one research design and then later discovering its apparent gross inaccuracies and ambiguities, cognitive developmentalists have slowly come around to recognizing a basic fact: our findings and their implications for understanding cognitive development are constrained by our methods. Understanding how the questions we ask influence the results we obtain is vital, and solving this methodological riddle is antecedent to addressing the central questions of cognitive developmental psychology. Different methods of assessing the same skills or knowledge frequently produce very different results and implications. Why children should evidence skill or knowledge in one task and then fail to use that same skill or knowledge in another is clearly a mystery begging to be solved. But the more immediate concern has continued to focus on the issue of which performance represents nominal skill or knowledge. If the same children perform well in one task but perform poorly a second, does performance in the former reveal hidden competence and performance in the latter document distracters? Or should we require evidence of masterful use of same skill or knowledge in all tasks before crediting the child with maturity? This debate is not really solvable, however, in the absence of an explanation for why individuals display skill and knowledge so inconsistently. We need to explain the paradox. We need to understand why children (and adults) frequently display what appears to be different levels of competence in different tasks. Reyna and Brainerd have provided a very appealing and promising answer to the paradox: tasks that on the surface seem to assess the same knowledge (or skill) may not in fact do so at all. One task may cue the child to evaluate precise memories and process explicit information, while another task may signify that only memory for gist is required and that a gist-wise interpretation is sufficient and perhaps even Dimcl all correspondsnw b: Cult Acredoio. AppliedBehavioralSciences, Universtlyof California.Davis. CA 95616. LeaminrJ and Individual Diffsmnces, Volume 7. Number Z1995, pages 83-66. All riuMs of recmduclion in anv form reserved.
Copyrk~hfQ 1995 by JAI Press Inc. ISSN: 1041-6060
LEAf?NlNG AND/NfWDlML DIFFERENCES
VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2.1995
desired. Thus, when subjects respond as if Iess mature than expected, it is usually because we have assumed that they would evaluate precise memories and processes explicit information, but we have failed to recognize that we were not ourselves explicit in calling upon the subject to do this. Of course, as Reyna and Brainerd detail, it is not quite that simple. Regardless of our conscious intent to cue the subject to the verbatim side of the verbatim/gist con6mmm, subjects may be “pushed” toward gist processing by subtle aspects of the task procedure or by memory or information processing load, and too, there is a natural preference for gist memory and gist processing. As Reyna and Brainerd demonstrate, this theory can explain many of the inconsistencies in results among studies across a broad range of domains. They have provided an impressive, convincing and extremely promising body of work. Nevertheless, given the huge scope of their theory, it is natural that certain aspects will be open to criticism, and I regard it as my duty to identify what I perceive as errors or weaknesses. One problem I have with their model and in particular with the interim review of their evolving theory contained in the previous issue is that gist processing is denigrated. It is repeatedly attributed as the cause of errors and inconsistencies. Reyna and Brainerd note the particular advantages of gist processing, but their research focuses principally on identifying gist processing as the source of error. While they do note the severe limitations on accurate verbatim processing, the advantages of gist are portrayed as almost entirely economical-gist is a source of error (when precision is needed) but nevertheless gist is frequently adequate and always easier. Thus, one is left feeling that gist-processing represents the independent operation of a parallel penurious processor where all problems are shuttled by default unless the executive function is somehow cued to invest the energies of the much more expensive verbatim system and the verbatim system is up to the task. Reyna and Brainerd seem to imply that optimum skill is revealed only in assessments that tap verbatim memory and processing. Day-to-day functioning only occasionally reflects optimum skill because individuals prefer gist and because sometimes this is the only alternative available, as when verbatim memories are lost or inaccessible, or verbatim processing would overwhelm the individual’s information processing capacity. I feel that Reyna and Brainerd are not fully appreciating (or else not communicating their appreciation of) the tremendous importance of gist extraction and gist processing for knowledge and skill development. There is certainly a time and place for verbatim processing, but verbatim processing is extremely bitt-rne~~cal and ~ag~ative. Comparing verbatim and gist is like comparing the occupations of an accountant and a physicist. Accountants would never have gotten us to the moon. Gist acquisition represents that process by which we all acquire new ideas. Gist acquisition is the quintessence of perceptual learning and intuitive induction. This leads to my next concern with Reyna and Brainerd’s presentation: what is gist? I am earnestly confused. Most frequently, Reyna and Brainerd equate gist with qualitative information where quantitative information is available. Although they emphasize this qualitative-quantitative distinction, the verbatim/gist continuum appears to represent a more general (and opportunistic) distinction between “pre-
85
lion-at-~~level-prouder versus less precision. It is an issue of exactitude. Thus, if a child is told that there are five cows and four horses, then gist is captured in the recognition that there are more cows than horses. The statement, “more cows than horses,” is gist, in this case, because more precise information was available. Personally, I dislike equating gist with imprecision. To me, gist represents understanding at a more general level, free of the limits imposed by explicit instances. I prefer to think of gist as intuitive ~duction. tuition is an extremely rich form of information pickup. It is the subjective detection of pattern and affordance that goes far beyond the explicit objects and events that are directly perceived and objectively certain. The detection of pattern and affordance is what we mean by induction. Whereas verbatim information is relatively simple and sterile, free of subjective interpretation, intuition yields a wealth of additional information, interpretations albeit uncertain. From my perspective, gist is clearly intuitive. Now at other times, Reyna and Brainerd do equate gist with intuition, which I very much applaud, having great interest in promoting research into the role intuition plays in cognition and learning. The problem for me, however, is that intuition/gist has nothing to do with precision or levels of measurement, and implying that intuition/gist is qualitative (and verbatim is quantitative) is not only unnecessary and inaccurate but dangerous as well. While ~~tion/g~t may be largely qualitative and imprecise in as much as it is expressed as generalizations rather than specifics, there is no particular reason for limiting intuition/gist exclusively to qualitative or imprecise knowledge. There is simply no need to equate either intuition or gist with qualitative thinking. Intuitive inductions can have logical or mathematical or even numerical forms. Rather than being invariably qualitative, their principal characteristic is that they organize, explain and predict specifics. They represent a broader, more encompassing, representation of the witnessed events. Verbatim information, on the other hand, is not invariably quantitative. Inits ideal form, verbatim thinking is depicted in the copy theory of perception, and ideally derno~~at~ in eidetic imagery. Thus, from my perspective, the qua~tative/qu~titative distinction is convenient when analyzing specific research designs, but misleading and inexact. Moreover, I am not altogether convinced that Reyna and Brainerd are being consistent in what they regard as verbatim or gist. For example, if a child is told that there are five cows and four horses, and they subsequently ignore the numbers and remember only that there am more cows than horses, this seems to represent a less precise form of verbatim notation rather than represent an intuitive induction. If we equate gist with intuition, then the label gist seems undeserved. What Reyna and Brainerd meanby gist (intuition?) in this instance may refer to the inductive assumption on the part of the child that a problem is solvable (with a sufficient degree of success likelihood) by recalling and manipulating less precise representations of the categorizations and relations that were or are presented in the problem. It is simply unclear to me, however, what Reyna and Brainerd consider gist and where intuition fits in. As Reyna and Brainerd note, the truth is that all thinking extends along a continuum with verbatim memory and information processing at one end and
LEARNINGAND /NDlVlDLlALDIFFERENCES
VOLWE7,NUMeER2.1995
memory for gist and gist processing at the other. What they call gist extraction I would call intuitive induction, and I suggest that we axe making intuitive inductions all the time and that these inductions are extremely important for cognitive development. As the source of new ideas (imagination, alternative possibilities) these inductions are more important than our capacity for precise recall and verbatim information processing. That is why we have computers: to free us from the drudgery of verbatim memory and processing and free our time and energy for imagination and discovery.
AND GIST
CURTACREDOLO UNlVERSllYOFCALIFORNIA, DAVIS
Cognitive developmental&s have always been centrally concerned with identifying at what age specific skills and knowledge become functional within the average child. Progress in this area, however, advances in fits and starts as researchers eagerly jump on the proverbial bandwagon and exploit new paradigms for their potential. Only when this prescription runs dry do they finally begin exploiting challenges to those paradigms for new potential. In the process of repeatedly first becoming committed to one research design and then later discovering its apparent gross inaccuracies and ambiguities, cognitive developmentalists have slowly come around to recognizing a basic fact: our findings and their implications for understanding cognitive development are constrained by our methods. Understanding how the questions we ask influence the results we obtain is vital, and solving this methodological riddle is antecedent to addressing the central questions of cognitive developmental psychology. Different methods of assessing the same skills or knowledge frequently produce very different results and implications. Why children should evidence skill or knowledge in one task and then fail to use that same skill or knowledge in another is clearly a mystery begging to be solved. But the more immediate concern has continued to focus on the issue of which performance represents nominal skill or knowledge. If the same children perform well in one task but perform poorly a second, does performance in the former reveal hidden competence and performance in the latter document distracters? Or should we require evidence of masterful use of same skill or knowledge in all tasks before crediting the child with maturity? This debate is not really solvable, however, in the absence of an explanation for why individuals display skill and knowledge so inconsistently. We need to explain the paradox. We need to understand why children (and adults) frequently display what appears to be different levels of competence in different tasks. Reyna and Brainerd have provided a very appealing and promising answer to the paradox: tasks that on the surface seem to assess the same knowledge (or skill) may not in fact do so at all. One task may cue the child to evaluate precise memories and process explicit information, while another task may signify that only memory for gist is required and that a gist-wise interpretation is sufficient and perhaps even Dimcl all correspondsnw b: Cult Acredoio. AppliedBehavioralSciences, Universtlyof California.Davis. CA 95616. LeaminrJ and Individual Diffsmnces, Volume 7. Number Z1995, pages 83-66. All riuMs of recmduclion in anv form reserved.
Copyrk~hfQ 1995 by JAI Press Inc. ISSN: 1041-6060
LEAf?NlNG AND/NfWDlML DIFFERENCES
VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2.1995
desired. Thus, when subjects respond as if Iess mature than expected, it is usually because we have assumed that they would evaluate precise memories and processes explicit information, but we have failed to recognize that we were not ourselves explicit in calling upon the subject to do this. Of course, as Reyna and Brainerd detail, it is not quite that simple. Regardless of our conscious intent to cue the subject to the verbatim side of the verbatim/gist con6mmm, subjects may be “pushed” toward gist processing by subtle aspects of the task procedure or by memory or information processing load, and too, there is a natural preference for gist memory and gist processing. As Reyna and Brainerd demonstrate, this theory can explain many of the inconsistencies in results among studies across a broad range of domains. They have provided an impressive, convincing and extremely promising body of work. Nevertheless, given the huge scope of their theory, it is natural that certain aspects will be open to criticism, and I regard it as my duty to identify what I perceive as errors or weaknesses. One problem I have with their model and in particular with the interim review of their evolving theory contained in the previous issue is that gist processing is denigrated. It is repeatedly attributed as the cause of errors and inconsistencies. Reyna and Brainerd note the particular advantages of gist processing, but their research focuses principally on identifying gist processing as the source of error. While they do note the severe limitations on accurate verbatim processing, the advantages of gist are portrayed as almost entirely economical-gist is a source of error (when precision is needed) but nevertheless gist is frequently adequate and always easier. Thus, one is left feeling that gist-processing represents the independent operation of a parallel penurious processor where all problems are shuttled by default unless the executive function is somehow cued to invest the energies of the much more expensive verbatim system and the verbatim system is up to the task. Reyna and Brainerd seem to imply that optimum skill is revealed only in assessments that tap verbatim memory and processing. Day-to-day functioning only occasionally reflects optimum skill because individuals prefer gist and because sometimes this is the only alternative available, as when verbatim memories are lost or inaccessible, or verbatim processing would overwhelm the individual’s information processing capacity. I feel that Reyna and Brainerd are not fully appreciating (or else not communicating their appreciation of) the tremendous importance of gist extraction and gist processing for knowledge and skill development. There is certainly a time and place for verbatim processing, but verbatim processing is extremely bitt-rne~~cal and ~ag~ative. Comparing verbatim and gist is like comparing the occupations of an accountant and a physicist. Accountants would never have gotten us to the moon. Gist acquisition represents that process by which we all acquire new ideas. Gist acquisition is the quintessence of perceptual learning and intuitive induction. This leads to my next concern with Reyna and Brainerd’s presentation: what is gist? I am earnestly confused. Most frequently, Reyna and Brainerd equate gist with qualitative information where quantitative information is available. Although they emphasize this qualitative-quantitative distinction, the verbatim/gist continuum appears to represent a more general (and opportunistic) distinction between “pre-
85
lion-at-~~level-prouder versus less precision. It is an issue of exactitude. Thus, if a child is told that there are five cows and four horses, then gist is captured in the recognition that there are more cows than horses. The statement, “more cows than horses,” is gist, in this case, because more precise information was available. Personally, I dislike equating gist with imprecision. To me, gist represents understanding at a more general level, free of the limits imposed by explicit instances. I prefer to think of gist as intuitive ~duction. tuition is an extremely rich form of information pickup. It is the subjective detection of pattern and affordance that goes far beyond the explicit objects and events that are directly perceived and objectively certain. The detection of pattern and affordance is what we mean by induction. Whereas verbatim information is relatively simple and sterile, free of subjective interpretation, intuition yields a wealth of additional information, interpretations albeit uncertain. From my perspective, gist is clearly intuitive. Now at other times, Reyna and Brainerd do equate gist with intuition, which I very much applaud, having great interest in promoting research into the role intuition plays in cognition and learning. The problem for me, however, is that intuition/gist has nothing to do with precision or levels of measurement, and implying that intuition/gist is qualitative (and verbatim is quantitative) is not only unnecessary and inaccurate but dangerous as well. While ~~tion/g~t may be largely qualitative and imprecise in as much as it is expressed as generalizations rather than specifics, there is no particular reason for limiting intuition/gist exclusively to qualitative or imprecise knowledge. There is simply no need to equate either intuition or gist with qualitative thinking. Intuitive inductions can have logical or mathematical or even numerical forms. Rather than being invariably qualitative, their principal characteristic is that they organize, explain and predict specifics. They represent a broader, more encompassing, representation of the witnessed events. Verbatim information, on the other hand, is not invariably quantitative. Inits ideal form, verbatim thinking is depicted in the copy theory of perception, and ideally derno~~at~ in eidetic imagery. Thus, from my perspective, the qua~tative/qu~titative distinction is convenient when analyzing specific research designs, but misleading and inexact. Moreover, I am not altogether convinced that Reyna and Brainerd are being consistent in what they regard as verbatim or gist. For example, if a child is told that there are five cows and four horses, and they subsequently ignore the numbers and remember only that there am more cows than horses, this seems to represent a less precise form of verbatim notation rather than represent an intuitive induction. If we equate gist with intuition, then the label gist seems undeserved. What Reyna and Brainerd meanby gist (intuition?) in this instance may refer to the inductive assumption on the part of the child that a problem is solvable (with a sufficient degree of success likelihood) by recalling and manipulating less precise representations of the categorizations and relations that were or are presented in the problem. It is simply unclear to me, however, what Reyna and Brainerd consider gist and where intuition fits in. As Reyna and Brainerd note, the truth is that all thinking extends along a continuum with verbatim memory and information processing at one end and
LEARNINGAND /NDlVlDLlALDIFFERENCES
VOLWE7,NUMeER2.1995
memory for gist and gist processing at the other. What they call gist extraction I would call intuitive induction, and I suggest that we axe making intuitive inductions all the time and that these inductions are extremely important for cognitive development. As the source of new ideas (imagination, alternative possibilities) these inductions are more important than our capacity for precise recall and verbatim information processing. That is why we have computers: to free us from the drudgery of verbatim memory and processing and free our time and energy for imagination and discovery.