JPL Mobile Satellite Program

Acta Astronautica Vol. 29, No. 9, pp. 667~575, 1993

0094-5765/93 $6.00 + 0.00 Pergamon Press Ltd

Printed in Great Britain

A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY: THE NASA/JPL MOBILE SATELLITE P R O G R A M t WILLIAMJ. WEBER III, VALERIEW. GRAY, BYRON JACKSONand LAURAC. STEELE California Institute of Technology, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA 91109-8099, U.S.A. (Received 3 June 1992; received for publication 3 March 1992)

Abstract--This paper discusses the systems approach taken by NASA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in the commercialization of land-mobile satellite services (LMSS) in the United States. As the lead center for NASA's Mobile Satellite Program, JPL was involved in identifying and addressing many of the key barriers to commercialization of mobile satellite communications, including technical, economic, regulatory and institutional risks, or uncertainties. The systems engineering approach described here was used to mitigate these risks. The result was the development and implementation of the JPL Mobile Satellite Experiment Project. This Project included not only technology development, but also studies to support NASA in the definition of the regulatory, market, and investment environments within which LMSS would evolve and eventually operate, as well as initiatives to mitigate their associated commercialization risks. The end result of these government-led endeavors was the acceleration of the introduction of commercial mobile satellite services, both nationally and internationally.

l. INTRODUCTION

Nearly three decades of NASA satellite communications development and demonstrations have contributed to the emergence of a multi-billion dollar industry for land, aeronautical, and maritime mobile communications via satellite. Since the early 1980s, NASA's Satellite Communications Program has emphasized two development areas: the wide-bandwidth Ka-band technology, with primarily fixed satellite service applications, which has focused on the development of the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (ACTS), and the mobile satellite service (MSS) and its associated applications, through the Mobile Satellite (MSAT) Program. NASA's approach to accelerating MSS commercialization in the U.S. has revolved around a basic requirement: the need to reduce the financial risks to commercializing the MSS industry. The risks were associated with the economic viability of the technology, as well as the regulatory process. These risks posed a barrier to direct industry investment in the technology, which precipitated NASA research and development (R&D) risk-reduction strategy that incorporated technical, regulatory, financial, and institutional elements. In seeking broader participation in the commercialization process than mere technology development, NASA has gone beyond the traditional role of a U.S. government agency and has influenced nearly tPaper IAF-91-482 presented at the 42nd Congress of the International Astronautical Federation Montreal, Canada, 7-I1 October 1991.

all facets of this new communications industry. To accomplish this, NASA has contributed to MSS technology developments and demonstrations and has also helped define the MSS regulatory framework, both nationally and internationally. It has worked with other countries, particularly Canada, in seeking institutional and regulatory agreements to promote MSS; it has aided in market development through the MSS user agreements with other government agencies; it has sought to reduce the financial risks to the first commercial MSS provider through its launch offer (in exchange for government use of the system); and it has served as a focal point for the dissemination of studies and the exchange of information and ideas relevant to the emerging MSS community of service providers, equipment manufacturers, and potential users. By so doing, NASA has accelerated the introduction of MSS both in the U.S. and throughout the world. 1. I. M S A T program history

NASA's involvement in satellite communications R&D dates back to a robust program that began at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in the 1960s with the development and subsequent deployment of a number of experimental satellites on which more than 100 experiments were conducted. The Advanced Technology Satellite Series (ATS 1, 3, and 6) and the Communications Technology Satellite (CTS), a cooperative effort between NASA and Canada's Department of Communications (DOC), were the focal points of NASA's early satellite communications program. The ATS and CTS satellites were predeces-

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sors of today's mobile and direct-broadcast satellite services and contributed to the evolution of presentday small, ground terminals[l]. In the early 1970s, NASA withdrew from satellite communications R&D, deferring this role to private industry. Both government and industry thought that it was time for U.S. private enterprise to lead the continued development of satellite communication technologies. However, the experience of the ensuing years showed that NASA's withdrawal was premature, as U.S. private industry failed to invest in new satellite communications technology. In response to a Presidential directive, NASA reentered the satellite communications field in the late 1970s to ensure that the U.S. maintained its position as a leader in that field. Seeking appropriate direction for satellite communications R&D, NASA interviewed industry executives to determine the key drivers of a robust U.S. satellite communications industry. The result was the formation of two programs: one to study the possibility of wideband (20-30 GHz) communications and the other to study narrowband communications in the 1-2 GHz region, U H F and L-band. The narrowband program eventually became the Mobile Satellite Program. In 1982, JPL became the lead center for the Mobile Satellite Program. The goals of the Program were to stimulate the commercial deployment of a low-cost, spectrally efficient, mobile communications service in geographical areas and applications where terrestrial mobile alternatives were not commercially viable. Early system studies of possible commercial mobile satellite systems led to more detailed activities, which included institutional, financial, and regulatory studies; traffic modeling; international coordination; propagation studies; conceptual systems design; and technology development. In response to these studies, JPL's Mobile Satellite Experiment (MSAT-X) was initiated in 1983 and focused on: (1) development of advanced ground-segment technology and techniques for use in future systems; (2) technical verification of these technologies through experimentation on the first-generation mobile satellite; and (3) verification of the operational utility of the service through a set of government agency experiments[2]. 1.2. Systems engineering applied to M S A T A systems engineering approach begins with the definition of a "system" as a "set of interrelated components which interact with one another in an organized fashion toward a common purpose"[3]. Systems enginering is a structured approach that can be described by the following steps[3]: (1) Identification and quantification of system goals. (2) Creation of alternative system design concepts. (3) Prediction of how well each alternative would do in terms of the goals. (4) Controlled modification and development of the

design concepts until the predicted performance in terms of the goals is satisfactory. (5) Selection and implementation of the best design. (6) Postimplementation assessment of how well the system meets the need. The systems engineering process also considers the environment within which the system is to function (environment being defined as the outside factors that affect or are affected by the system). In this sense, the environment is an integral part of the system, and the systems engineering process is responsive to factors other than technology development, including financial, political, and institutional considerations as they affect the goals and performance of the system. A close examination of a system's "critical path" to implementation can reveal the interaction of all elements of the system. This process can involve several iterations to include additional risk factors as more is learned about the system. In MSAT, the "system" includes the space segment (satellite or satellites), the ground segment (fixed base stations, network control center, and user mobile terminals), and the communications network architecture. Unlike most engineering systems, this "system" description also includes the regulatory and institutional frameworks within which the physical system operates, both nationally and internationally. Thus, in modeling the MSS system, it was necessary to include the legislative and regulatory factors governing MSS, the mobile satellite systems of other countries, sharing and sparing scenarios, competitive terrestrial systems (such as cellular telephone), and how these elements might change over time. From a commercialization standpoint, the goal of MSS development was to demonstrate a sufficiently profitable enterprise to attract industry investment. The goal, then, of the NASA Mobile Satellite Program was to develop a MASS system scenario, understand its weak points, and then take active steps towards reducing the risks to the eventual investors. The early years of JPL involvement in mobile satellite communications focused on establishing the economic feasibility of the technology and setting the goals for a systems engineering effort. Studies were made in several areas to better assess the economic prospects for the technology[4]. Market studies were conducted, and several highly promising applications were identified, including government services, telephony in rural areas, emergency communications in natural disasters, and thin route communications. A financial study was conducted by Citibank to determined if private capital would find adequate returns from the proposed MSS industry to offset the risks associated with the market introduction of a new technology [4]. Technical studies were undertaken to determine the feasibility of the overall concept, including the design of the spacecraft antenna, communications network, and base station[5]. Based on these studies and previous NASA

Mobile Satellite Program experience in the satellite communications field, NASA/JPL determined that development of a mobile satellite communications system relied on a complex interaction of various factors, including technology development, market considerations, institutional relationships, and regulatory constraints. Each of these elements had to interact with the other elements in an organized manner for mobile satellite communications to compete effectively for market share. The key to the systems approach applied to MSAT was the development and continual refinement of the "strawman" system design. The strawman system was basically a model of a conceptual MSS system that included definitions and descriptions of the space and ground segments, the communications architecture and network, financing profiles, the regulatory environment, and prospective users. Associated with the system description were the costs of the various system elements, the regulatory constraints within which the system operates, the predicted number of users, system performance estimates, and a myriad of other factors and parameters from which a "model" of the system behavior and performance could be developed. An entire system scanario could be tested, or typically a change to a single element was made to assess the incremental change in performance. Within this system, all changes had a "ripple effect" that was traced and analyzed. For example, the question of whether to use a relatively expensive directional antenna or a simple omnidirectional vehicle antenna was analyzed in a full systems context. The latter case involved many low-cost vehicle terminals, but with the resulting need for a high-power satellite, while the former implied a low-power satellite (and possible orbit reuse with a second satellite), but with a heavy terminal cost burden on each user. Trade-offs of this nature became an integral part of the MSAT program to help direct both the technology development and the technology transfer frameworks. 2. CHALLENGES FACING MSS DEVELOPMENT

The studies completed in the 1970s and early 1980s by NASA and JPL indicated that a mobile satellite communications system was feasible from both a technical and a market perspective. However, substantial uncertainty concerning the economic viability of such a system remained. The source of the uncertainty was a combination of technical, economic, regulatory, and institutional factors that were sufficient to discourage private investment. Moreover, a significant reduction in the level of uncertainty in one area, such as technology development, did not necessarily guarantee that private industry would commercialize MSS because of the other sources of risk to investors.

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2.1. Technical issues

Uncertainty in the technical development of MSS is based on whether the system provides adequate capability in terms of capacity, voice quality, lack of interference and transmission delays[4]. Constraints on the technology's ability to meet these requirements were limited spectrum, cost, and the availability of orbital slots for additional satellites at some future date. Several early studies concentrated on the conceptual development of a future mobile satellite communication system. These studies investigated a range of potential system configurations from single-beam satellites with very limited capacity but readily available technology to large, multibeam-antenna, highcapacity satellites that required significant technology development. The choice of the space-segment technology has important implications for ground technology requirements. Gain requirements for the mobile ground-unit antenna, i.e. the need for a directional antenna, rather than a less costly omnidirectional antenna, depended on the satellite's power and antenna efficiency. But increased satellite antenna efficiency required a significant R&D investment for new technology development for larger deployable antennas. The goal of early system commercialization made the reduction of total system costs important and a strong factor in the choice of technical goals. 2.2. Economic issues Market issues. Significant uncertainty surrounded estimates of the potential market for MSS services. That uncertainty stemmed from the system's relatively high cost, as compared with comparable communication services currently available in metropolitan areas. During the years following the introduction of a new system, low production volume for equipment and incomplete capacity utilization could place MSS at a cost disadvantage relative to cellular phones, mobile radio, paging, and radiodeterruination satellite services even in some rural areas. A number of studies have attempted to develop estimates for the size of the MSS market but they have been handicapped by two problems. First, the cost of MSS will remain fairly uncertain until production of ground units begins. Cellular phones are a good example of what is possible, but costs are going to be high during the introductory years of relatively low production volume, as they were originally for cellular phones[6]. The other problem in estimating the market is the absence of a directly comparable item. The mobility of MSS, combined with its ability to interface with other communication systems, notably the public telephone network, makes it relatively unique. From the earliest days of the MSAT Program, government was identified as an important market segment for the MSS technology. Consideration was

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even given to the possibility of a dedicated government MSS system. It became a goal of MSAT-X to develop a government user base to help reduce some of the market uncertainty and encourage investment in the technology. Financial issues. An additional source of risk for potential private investors is the long lead time from the point at which a financial commitment is first made to build a MSS to the point when the investment begins earning a satisfactory return. A number of years are required for technology development, satellite construction, and launch, as well as for the regulatory process to allocate spectrum and grant a license to build and operate a satellite communications system. Following the successful launch of the satellite, additional time is needed to develop the market. Users are likely to delay their commitment to MSS until they are certain that the system will be operational. Z3. Regulatory issues

Uncertainty in the regulatory environment relates to the allocation of sufficient spectrum for, and assignment of, the license(s) to the provider/ operator(s) of MSS. Spectrum allocation has important implications for system capacity and performance, which are major concerns of prospective private investors[4]. The regulatory pathway to the current allocation of spectrum in L-band for MSS was expected to be long and circuitous, mirroring the experience of cellular telephony[4, Exhibit 10, p. 1]. Although the regulatory process for MSS was initiated by NASA in 197417] the FCC's position on spectrum remained uncertain, despite an 800-MHz (UHF) allocation that was made at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC). NASA's subsequent efforts to obtain domestic frequencies for U H F met with significant opposition from other prospective spectrum users. One of the key issues in the U.S. regulatory environment is that regulatory decisions for the introduction of a new commercial service are made in a highly competitive environment in which proceedings can be protracted and costly. NASA's experience with the regulatory environment is inherently different from that of Canada's DOC, since Canada's regulatory authority for frequencies and licensing resides within the same agency conducting R&D for MSS. NASA must work through the FCC and is subject to the same uncertainty as other contenders for frequencies. Licensing is another competitive area in which NASA's involvement would be inherently limited, because, with a commercial system as the goal, NASA is not the applicant for the license. In addition, authority and control over the license application and selection process appropriately resides with the FCC, not NASA. Although this process can be somewhat uncertain, NASA can provide technical justification to influence the process; however, this

does not negate the possibility of legal challenges to the regulatory procedures or their outcome. The development of working relationships among the institutions with a key role in the development of MSS is essential for the successful transfer of this technology to industry. Government-sponsored R&D had to be transferred to industry, despite the uncertain milieu. To ensure that R&D would continue to be available for future growth of the system, universities, as well as industry, had to be involved early in the process. The key domestic and international regulatory bodies also played a critical role in the technology's eventual commercialization. The needs of industry, including satellite manufacturers, launch providers, and ground equipment manufacturers, were factored into the MSAT Program from the beginning to minimize the financial, market, and regulatory risks that blocked investment in the technology. The U.S. and Canada, seeking to enable and provide mobile communications in their respective countries, determined that a joint effort might be helpful in mitigating some of the risks [4]. Eventually, intersatellite system coordination will be needed among the U.S. MSS operators and other satellite operators, both domestically and internationally. 3. JPL SYSTEMS APPROACHTO THE MSAT PROGRAM As the lead center for MSAT ground systems development, JPL concentrated on reducing the uncertainty in each of the areas discussed above. In the MSAT Program, all system risk factors were analyzed and addressed, and the objective became the reduction of the total uncertainty confronting prospective private investors. This approach can be traced to recommendtions of a Citibank study commissioned during the early phase of the program, which called for "a conceptual broadening of the government's role in 'experimenting', to include market, cost and other studies as part of the technological experiments"[4, Exhibit 6, p. 4]. The following five major program thrusts were developed to address the risks confronting the prospective industry: (1) High-risk, enabling technology R&D that would foster future development of the system. (2) Financial incentives to attract industry involvement. (3) Government experiments for system validation and user-base development. (4) Regulatory actions focused on spectrum allocation and licensing. (5) Institutional interfaces needed to involve key institutional participants that will implement MSS. In each of the above thrusts, JPL either played a key role or provided direct support to NASA in implementing the necessary activities. Figure I out-

Mobile Satellite Program lines the system engineering process in detail, illustrating how these factors were integrated into the strawman MSS system model to direct the process of technology development and transfer to industry. Each of the areas of uncertainty addressed through this systems approach is discussed in detail below.

3. I. Technology R&D and transfer to industry The three principal elements of MSS are: (l) The fixed ground segment, which includes the network management center, gateways to other communication systems, and base stations for independent communication networks. (2) The space segment or satellite. (3) The mobile terminals located in vehicles. It was determined early in the program that the technology for the fixed ground segment of the systems already existed as elements of other communication systems. The technology for the first-generation space segment, a large 10-m spacecraft antenna and other vital technologies, had been developed and demonstrated by NASA in the ATS and CTS programs. However, the technology for the mobile terminals and a viable system architecture presented an area of considerable uncertainty for investors. The MSAT-X task specifically addressed these problems. Figure 2 illustrates the various phases and activities of MSAT-X technology development and transfer. The major factors governing the MSAT-X ground technology R&D work were limited satellite power, constrained frequency spectrum and orbital slots, and the need for low-cost consumer units that are acceptable in appearance. The mobile terminal, which includes the radio, antenna, and a user interface, would have to be reduced in both size and cost for user acceptance. In keeping with these considerations, the MSAT-X Task focused on six aspects of ground-segment mobile terminal technology [8]: (1) Steerable, medium-gain vehicle antennas that would conserve satellite power.

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(2) A speech coder capable of near-toll-quality voice at 4800 bps to conserve bandwidth or frequency spectrum. (3) A modulation/coding scheme that is bandwidth and power efficient and robust with regard to fading, shadowing (trees, etc.) and frequency uncertainties (vehicle motion). (4) Network architecture and multiple access techniques for integrated voice and data services. (5) Propagation studies for the validation of technology and system concepts. (6) Overall system architecture and design to provide the framework for individual technology areas.

The JPL technology effort resulted in the completion of first- and second-generation designs and the development of a prototype terminal that has been extensively demonstrated. A pre-prototype, mechanically steered, tilted linear array antenna, a Yagi microstrip array antenna, and an 8-DPSK-TCM modem were developed in-house. Through industry contracts with Teledyne-Ryan Electronics and Ball Aerospace, two phased-array, electronically steered antennas were developed. Speech coders were developed through contracts with University of California at Santa Barbara and Georgia Institute of Technology. A fully instrumented van was designed and built to serve as a mobile testing facility for equipment performance validation and channel (propagation) modeling. By using tower-mounted, as well as actual satellite transponders, pilot field experiments were conducted to demonstrate the ability of the system to test t h e end-to-end link of all subsystems and to demonstrate the ability of the terminal in a moving vehicle to acquire and track a signal. The JPL terminal has been tested in a flight environment aboard a Boeing 727 in an experiment conducted jointly with the Federal Aviation Administration's Technical Center, over INMARSAT's MARECS-B2 Satellite. Another experiment was performed in cooperation with AUSSAT and Japan's Communications Research

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Mobile Satellite Program Laboratory (CRL) by using the Japanese ETS V satellite. Ensuring that the technology being developed in the MSAT-X Task would be transferred to industry was vital in reducing private investor uncertainty concerning MSS economic prospects. This "push" aspect of technology transfer was accomplished in two ways. One approach was to involve the private sector in the technology development effort through contracts let to Ball Aerospace and Teledyne-Ryan. Other strategies were to provide for widespread dissemination of results through conferences and workshops with industry and prospective users, to involve academia through contracts with universities for speech coder development, and to extensively publish results through in-house publications and the open literature. Active information dissemination to industry is another incentive provided by JPL and has been a hallmark of the MSAT-X task. All research is thoroughly documented and disseminated through the S A T C O M Quarterly and its predecessor, the M S A T - X Quarterly, and through wide U.S. distribution of over 80 technical reports published by MSAT-X at JPL. More than 1000 requests a year are made for MSAT-X technical reports, and over 1600 individuals are on the mailing list for the Quarterly. In addition, MSAT-X personnel have been available for technical consultation at the request of several large companies interested in MSS. This has been a primary goal of technology transfer, which brings information directly to industry. This in turn helps define future NASA technology efforts. Finally, JPL has conducted two international conferences for NASA (1988, 1990) on mobile satellite communications, the latter being jointly sponsored with Canada's DOC, as well as numerous technical workshops and appropriate press and media coverage. 3.2. Economic considerations Market acceptance. The ultimate objective of the MSAT Program is market acceptance of the technology. Therefore, development of a product that meets consumers' needs at a competitive price is fundamental. The near-term goal is consumer familiarity with the product because the large front-end investment requires that the product be quickly adopted by prospective users. By introducing prospective government users to the product and encouraging early adoption, the MSAT Program has increased the probability of financial success for private investors. The crucial role that cost plays in the early years of market development was given full recognition in the MSAT task. Cost estimates for future commercial equipment production considered production volumes of 1000, 5000, and 10,000 units per year to demonstrate that units could be produced at reasonable cost at relatively low production levels typical of the early years of market development. Contracts let with Teledyne-Ryan and Ball AA 2 9 / ~

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Aerospace for electronically steered phased-array antenna work required that these contractors provide detailed estimates of commercial production cost. The contractor selected for voice-coder development was similarly required to develop cost estimates. These early estimates were integrated into a JPL in-house study of the cost of producing the complete mobile ground unit at these initial production volumes [9]. The cost estimates considered the transmitter/receiver and the operator communication device, as well as several alternative antenna designs under development and the voice coder. The engineering cost estimates provided specific details that would support private industry's incorporation of the findings into their own work. A JPL government and industry interface subtask has been included as an integral part of the MSAT-X Task. This subtask was designed to plan for and implement government experiments with the technology, which would hasten exposure to the technology and therefore the probability of adoption. The experiments are expected to occur during the first 2 years following launch of a commercial MSS. Recognizing that government is a significant user base for the technology, NASA entered into agreements with 10 government agencies to experiment with MSS technology. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) were signed with these agencies between 1983 and 1989 for this purpose, with the utilizing capacity to be arranged by NASA. Since that time, a survey has been conducted and 14 more government agencies (federal and state) have expressed interest in being experimenters. The need to reduce market uncertainty is perhaps best addressed by the government experiments and associated building of a government user base. Technology adoption should be encouraged by the opportunity agencies have to try and evaluate the technology before they commit large sums of money to procure these systems. Experiments allow agencies a structured approach to assess MSS capabilities in meeting their operational requirements. In addition, the results of the experiments are an excellent feedback mechanism to NASA and JPL, one which will provide validation of the developed technology and will enable planning for advanced technology needs. JPL plans to implement these experiments for NASA through designing the experimental process and relationships among a broad range of federal and state agencies that will take advantage of JPL's expertise in SATCOM systems development and technology transfer. To facilitate this process, JPL has established and has begun coordinating several meetings of an Experimenters' Working Group for NASA. This working group has encouraged initial discussions with prospective experimenters and has been effective in generating and maintaining support for this new communications technology. Financial incentives. JPL functioned in direct support of the NASA Communications Program Office

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(now within the Office of Commercial Programs) for the development of a NASA offer to industry, known as the "launch offer" or "Opportunity Notice for a Mobile Satellite Agreement", published in 1985. Analysis and support for this agreement has been provided by JPL as an integral part of the process to plan for and implement government experimentation with the satellite. The Opportunity Notice describes the incentive strategy developed by NASA, which offered a launch to the licensed provider of MSS in exchange for capacity during the first two years of operation for government experiments. This strategy has served as a financial incentive and has encouraged private industry to provide both the technology and demand for its services (government agency and other users). The ability to fully implement the offer is contingent, however, on Congressional funding, which is currently under review. 3.3. Regulatory activities

JPL's involvement in the regulatory aspects of MSS is indirect. Included in JPL's regulatory support to NASA have been spectrum studies for use by NASA in the process required to obtain frequency allocations for satellite communications technologies under development. In addition, general regulatory analysis is conducted to monitor the status of the regulatory proceedings. In 1985, the principal spectrum allocation issue for MSS was resolved with an allocation in the L-band. This was followed by an allocation of L-band for MSS in the Western Hemisphere at the 1987 Mobile WARC. In the U.S., according to FCC-stated intentions, there was to be a single license granted for MSS. Since such regulatory aspects as licensing and tariffs are not subject to NASA's direction or control, NASA's impact on the licensing process is indirect. For example, NASA made it clear that it was prepared to enter into an agreement with the licensed provider of MSS in the U.S. to exchange a launch for satellite capacity for experiments. This action constituted a significant impetus to industry applicants for the MSS license and helped to encourage 12 applications for the license. JPL supported NASA Headquarters with the development of this launch offer. Ultimately, the FCC directed that the applicants form a consortium and put $5 million apiece into an escrow account while preparing a business plan. Only 8 of the original 12 companies joined the consortium, known as the American Mobile Satellite Corporation, which was eventually licensed by the FCC in 1989. However, negotiations regarding NASA's launch offer have since been delayed due to a ruling by the Federal District Court in March 1991, which challenged the FCC's MSS licensing procedures. The case is now "remanded to the Commission for reconsideration of the $5 million and consortium rules and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion" [10].

This situation illustrates the uncertainty inherent in the U.S. regulatory environment and the need for continuing effort to mitigate such risk, when possible. 3.4. Institutional dimension

The principal purpose of the MSAT Program has been to accelerate the commercial development of MSS. A systems engineering approach was taken to optimize the use of Program resources. In this work, the system was defined broadly to include those principal sources of uncertainty that served to discourage private investment in MSS. This has involved NASA/JPL in a number of institutional interfaces, as illustrated in Fig. 3. These relationships serve as arteries for the transfer of information, technology, and resources, as the MSAT program has progressed from initial into final phases. The institutional relations dimension of the Program has proven vital to its success. NASA/JPL's close ties with industry and other institutions through this network have made it feasible to combine and leverage resources, when necessary, to address problems. Activities include those needed to (1) Coordinate the MSS effort with Canada and U.S. industry. (2) Involve researchers in private industry and universities in the R&D effort. (3) To influence, to the extent possible, the regulatory process. The institutional network shown has contributed to the effectiveness of the systems engineering effort to develop and commercialize MSAT technology. 4. CONCLUSIONS

The systems engineering approach used by NASA and JPL in the MSAT Program incorporates activities that have gone considerably beyond technology development. This evolved as the system "boundary" was defined to include all the interrelated risk factors that affect the outcome, or purpose, of the system under development. It was determined that the essential program elements to foster MSS commercialization were market, financial, regulatory, and institutional activities, as well as technology development. How all these components interact to affect the outcome constitutes the institutional dimension described above. The NASA/JPL systems approach fostered early identification of these risks and contributed greatly to the success of the MSAT Program. By regarding MSS technology and its environment as a total system, NASA/JPL was able to address potential problems in a proactive, rather than reactive, manner. This permitted more careful consideration of all the factors involved in the development of a mobile communications infrastructure. Given the wide diversity of activities necessary to bring MSS to the marketplace, one may conclude

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that it will be necessary for the federal government to play an active role in maintaining U.S. preeminence in satellite communications by sponsoring advanced communications R&D. With risk to the private investor coming from the market, institutional, and regulatory arenas, it is unlikely that one firm, or even a consortium, will be able to handle the entire process from concept development through commercialization of significant advances in space communications. In the present environment, more than hardware engineering is required, particularly when policy aspects can affect a technology's critical path to commercialization. A better approach seems to be a partnership of all interested parties, coordinated by N A S A for the U.S. Government, with a c o m m o n goal of transferring the technology to the marketplace. Acknowledgements--The authors wish to thank the following individuals for their support in writing this paper: Ray J. Arnold, Elisabeth Dutzi Carpenter, Richard Emerson, Jerry Friebaum, George Knouse, Robert Lovell, Firouz M. Naderi and William Rafferty. The research described in this paper was performed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, under a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

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