Technovation, 15(3) (1995) 165-175
Kirton adaption-innovation theory: organizational implications Samuel Mudd Department of Psychology, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA 17325-1486, USA Abstract
M.J. Kirton's cognitive style theory (adaption-innovation) is considered from two points of view. First. the adaptor-innovator profiles typically used to describe the adaption-innovation (AI) variable are developed to specify the A1 continuum in terms of structural inclusion. A content analysis of Kirton's theoretical statements is then presented as a collation of 47 theory elements organized into eight descriptor categories. An analysis of those categories suggests that Kirton's A-1 theory is essentially a theory of organizational behavior, rather than an intraindividual theory of psychological process.
Introduction Adaption-Innovation (A-I) theory, as formulated over the years since 1976 by M.J. Kirton [e.g., 1-6], has to do with the intra-individual psychological processes constituting creative style as well as the application of that style construct to an understanding of various phenomena of a social-organizational nature - - for example, selection and tenure in the job situation, team building, and performance in a research and development setting. The KAI is now widely used by industrial and management consultants, certified in courses conducted by Kirton himself, for a variety of purposes including personnel selection, leadership training, team-building and organizational development in general. The existing research literature reflects this orientation toward applications, the concern with how the measurement tool, the KAI, can be used, rather than with the psychological processes undergirding the device. Nevertheless,
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there is a body of A-I theory, but it is scattered throughout the literature. It is the intention of this paper to identify Kirton's published statements of A-I theory and organize them into a set of summary descriptors. The plan of this review is first to establish a working understanding of what Kirton means by his AI continuum in terms of psychological processes, and then to collate the discernible elements of Kirton's theory as set out by Kirton himself. Readers should note in the following text that the unhyphenated AI is used throughout to distinguish the inferred psychological process (AI) from adaption-innovation (A-I) theory in general.
1. The AI continuum as structural inclusion 1.1
AI continuum as inferred from vignettes
A-I theory is typically set out in terms of vignettes characterizing the two extremes, the
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'Innovator' and the 'Adaptor', on the hypothesized AI continuum measured operationally by the KAI (see Table 1). Four of these sets of adaptor and innovator characteristics shown in Table 1 are especially relevant to the implied nature of the psychological process underlying the AI continuum - - implications for: problem-solving, solutions, policies, and potential creativity. These characteristics have particular relevance because they are one of the means Kirton offers to infer the nature of the basic AI continuum. Further clarification of the AI continuum, in the indirect terms of associated personality characteristics, is given by Kirton in several places: "What may distinguish adaptors and innovators • . . is the size of the cognitive domain deemed appropriate to the search. Both may initially view an anomaly for which a (creative) solution is required as a residual puzzle to a selected paradigm and so be limited by its perceived boundaries. Adaptors find these boundaries less elastic and permeable than innovators" [7 (p. 697)]. " . . . (the AI) continuum which posits that there are differences in a person's general readiness to initiate and accept change, not just in terms of crude level or capacity but depending on whether the stimulus for it emerged from predictable or unexpected lines of thought" [4 (p. 9)]. These latter two characterizations, together with the standard adaptor/innovator vignettes (Table 1), evoke an extremely complex picture of the cognitive style variable, one difficult to capture in a simple statement. Nevertheless, one can induce from these extended descriptions several basic attributes of individuals who differ with respect to that inferred psychological construct: 1.
2.
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Innovators vis-a-vis adaptors tend to view problems and novel stimuli in unconventional frameworks and thereby see those problems in a new way. Innovators vis-a-vis adaptors tend to search a broader cognitive space in problem-solving,
3.
decision-making, and other creative activities, and to prefer generating multiple possibilities in those activities. Innovators vis-a-vis adaptors tend to be more ready to accept and to initiate change, especially if the change arises from unexpected sources•
These characteristics, abstracted from the various profiles described by Kirton over the years, are helpful in establishing a two-category typology of creative style, but they do not provide much insight into the psychological process suggested by an AI continuum• A unidimensional continuum implies the variability of some meaningful psychological 'stuff' that underlies the demonstrable variability of KAI scores• To put the question crudely, "'What is the nature of that 'stuff'?" Whatever its nature, it must be capable of generating the continuous scale differences that its operational measure, the KAI, reflects so reliably in a variety of situations. One aspect of Kirton's theorizing suggests such a possibility. 1.2 AI continuum as inferred from concepts of structure
From the very beginning, Kirton has emphasized the central place that cognitive structure holds in his theory. He considers his view in this matter to be consistent with Drucker's thesis " . . . that the more structure surrounding a problem is incorporated within and treated as part of the problem, the more any solution is likely to be radical and innovative (i.e., 'doing things differently' per Kirton). The less the structure is challenged, the more any solution is likely to be adaptive" (i.e., 'doing things better' per Kirton) [1 (p. 622)]. On the other hand, Kirton also wrote: "Adaptors tend to cope with novelties (new unexpected stimuli) by assuming at the outset that a relevant paradigm has the power to resolve the problem posed by the perception of such novelties. The integration of a novelty
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"--I 21 O <
B" -! < O TABLE I Z O
CharaclcrlstlCS ol a d a p t o r s dnd innovators*
lmphcatlons For problem solving
Adaptors Tend to take the problem as defined and generate nmel. creative ~deas aimed at 'doing things better' Immediate high efficmncy is the keynote of high adaptors
lnno~ alors Tend It) redefine genera]l~ agreed problems, breaking pre~lousl_,, perceived restraints, generating soluhons tamed at 'doing things differently'
For solutions
Adaptors generally generate a few well-chosen and relevant solutmns, that they generally find sufficmnl but w'h~ch sometimes fall to contain ideas needed to break the existing pattern completely
Innovators produce numerous ideas many ot which may not be either obwous or acceptable to others Such a pool olten contains ideas, if they can be identified, that ma?, crack hitherto retractable problems
For policies
Prefer wcll-estabhshed, structured situations Best at incorporating new data ,.ir event', into existing Mlucltlres or pohcms
Prefer unstructured MlUdtlons, Use new data as opportunities h~ set new structures or policies accepting the gr,'alcr attendant risk
¢.,O
la I
~°
For orgamzatum,iI "ill'
Essential to the ongoing functions, but in times of unexpected changes ma~, have some difficult?, mo~mg out ot their established role
For polenlht] crcatlvlt~
Fhe KIrton inventor) is a measure ol style but not le,,el of capaclt.s of creatp,'e problem solving Adaptors and mno',ators are both capable of geneiatmg original, creative sohmotl~ but v,hlch reflect their dfflerent o~erall approaches to problem solving
For collaboratmn
Adaptors and innovators do not readily get on. especlall,, if they' arc extreme scorers Middle scorers have the de, advantage that the,,' do not easd} reach the heights ot adaptkm or mno~atmn as do extreme scorers This. conversely, Is a positive advantage in a team where the~ can more easily act as "brldgerC, |ormmg the consensus group and getting the best Of skillful) out o1 clashing extreme scorers
Essential in tlme~ of change or crisis, but may have some trouble applying themselves to ongoing organizational demands ~°
For perceived beha~our
"From M J Knton
Seen by innovators as sound, conforlmng, sale. predictable, relevant, lnflc~,lble, v,edded to the s3,stem, intolerant of amblgmty
hA1 Manual, 2rid ed (p 1~1. ()ccupatu)nal Research Lcntrc. tlathcld
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Seen by adaptors as unsound. Impractical. risky, abrasive, often shocking lhelr opposites and creating dissonance
1985 c%2)1987 b~ M J KIrton Reprinted b} permnsslon
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S. Mudd
into the paradigm structure may give rise to a solution at once highly creative and supportive - - in general terms - - of the paradigm. Such a solution not only therefore resolves an initial anomaly, but turns a possible threat to the paradigm into support for i t . . . Innovators are characteristically less concerned with the maintenance of paradigms and so their creativity or problem solving is more likely to lead - - for them - - to a new paradigm or in Kuhn's terms a paradigm switch" [7 (p. 695)]. These two formulations seem inconsistent. In the first characterization, incorporation of structure into the problem is said to lead to an innovative solution. In the second case, integration of novelty into the paradigm structure leads to an adaptive solution. The confusion arises from two sources: whether 'problem structure' and 'paradigm structure' mean the same thing; and what is being incorporated into what, the structure into the problem or the problem into the structure? It appears that a sort of cognitive figure-ground reversal is going on from one formulation to the other. In the first case, the Drucker formulation, the so-called 'problem' is the figure into which the problem framework (structure) is drawn. If one assumes that this 'drawing in' of structure changes that structure in some way, then the problem may be perceived in a new way, i.e., innovatively. If this interpretation is valid, such a process is what Piaget called 'accomodation', the process by which cognitive structure evolves developmentally. On the other hand, the opposite Piagetian equivalent, 'assimilation', may occur when novelty (the problem figure) is drawn into a familiar structure (framework or paradigm). In other words, the innovator tends to accommodate to novel stimuli by modifying the structure while his extreme AI counterpart, the adaptor, tends to assimilate novel stimuli by modifying those stimuli to fit an existing structural framework. Kirton, in enlisting Kuhn's work to explicate paradigm change dynamics in the context of field dependence, throws a certain light on the question
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of what structure means in his (Kirton's) thinking. Kuhn's paradigm in this case is equated to a compelling field: " . . . the overall organization of the surrounding field is in this case the prevailing theory, and the parts of the field are the supporting data; the latter are experienced as 'fused'. For the scientist the paradigm is continually tested by discovering novelty, i.e., fresh data, which can either become part of the field and fuse into the existing paradigm (author's note - assimilation per Piaget) or it can fail to do so. New evidence that does not fit and yet is still accepted provides the stimulus for a reappraisal of the theory, causing a decomposition of the field and a re-evaluation of relevance of the elements to the whole. Such re-appraisal of the elements may create such damage to the paradigm (author's note - accommodation per Piaget) as to cause its radical re-structuring -- a paradigm switch [8 (p. 1240)]. Taken together, the structural dynamics described here in conjunction with the attendant characteristics described in the preceding section lead the present writer to a conceptualization of the AI trait continuum in terms of a 'structure inclusion' tendency. In this formulation adaptors have a weak tendency to incorporate a broader framework into their approach to a problem, decision, or other creative challenge. The new is assimilated into the old. Innovators, on the other hand, have a strong tendency to include a broad framework in their approach to comparable situations. The old is accommodated to the new. The tendency toward structural inclusion is considered here to be the process equivalent of creative style. The value of this view is that it moves the AI continuum from a relatively more descriptive personality variable, as personified in the typical descriptive portraits of innovators and adaptors (Table 1), toward a functional process variable to be understood in terms of basic psychological constructs. This interpretation leaves the typical Kirton characterizations of the
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adaptor-innovator types undisturbed while offering a venue on basic cognitive processes that make A-I theory potentially more accessible to conventional information-processing models. With this conceptualization of the AI dimension as a structural inclusion factor variable in mind, it is now appropriate to survey A-I theory as formulated over the years by M.J. Kirton himself.
2.
Inventory of elements of A-I theory
In the first 16 years since Kirton [1] published his validation work on the KAI (Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory) [1, 2] he has been the sole author (20 papers), senior author (7 papers), or co-author (1) of 28 formal publications concerned with adaption-innovation theory and/ or the KAI. These formal publications constitute the body of work examined by the present author in a content analysis designed to identify the numerous theoretical elements in Kirton's 'A-I theory', as it has come to be called. The results of that content analysis are shown in Tables 2 and 3. It is likely that this analysis suffers both Type I (attributing elements to Kirton's theory which he would not claim) and Type II errors (missing elements which Kirton would include). Type II errors of omission are probably less likely than commission errors since most of the elements identified were cited in more than one source. To avoid clutter in Tables 2 and 3 only that item judged to be the earliest citation is shown for each element. This practice has the advantage of showing interested readers the sequential emergence of theoretical elements over the first 16 years of Kirton's work.
2.1
Quantitative summary of the elements
The 47 theory elements identified in the content analysis were classified along two dimensions, the first of which has two categories. The first category (Table 2) has to do with 27 structural properties of the AI construct. These properties are the intrinsic characteristics attributed to it by Kirton
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along with the relation of the AI continuum to other demographic and personality variables. Table 3 lists 20 dynamic characteristics attributed to the construct, the capacity of the AI continuum itself to change and the capacity of that dimension to change behavior in other domains. Both sets of theoretical elements, the structural and the dynamic, are also classified with respect to the human scope addressed by those elements: from the level of the individual, through group, organizational, and cultural aggregations [18 (p. 103)]. Summing over both structural and dynamic categories, there are 30 elements associated with the individual level, nine with the group level, three at the level of the organization, and five at the level of the overall culture. From an inspection of Tables 2 and 3 it can be seen that A-I theory is weighted somewhat more (57% of the elements) toward structural vs dynamic (43%) properties of the AI construct. It is also weighted relatively more (64%) toward the individual. The remaining 36% of the elements involve group, organizational and cultural levels. An interesting relation is the 19:11 ratio of structural to dynamic elements at the individual level. Meanwhile, on the basis of the content analysis, it is possible to profile the theory more meaningfully in qualitative terms. 2.2
Qualitative summary of the e l e m e n t s
The 47 theoretical elements abstracted from the Kirton publications can be classified as follows. The notation in parentheses indicates the relevant supporting table entry (Tables 2 and 3) for the particular assertion; e.g., (2B3) refers to Element B3 in Table 2. 2.2. 1 Basic nature of the AI continuum The central construct of the Kirton theory is that of a cognitive style continuum (2A5), all levels of which express creativity (2A2) but vary qualitatively in terms of how that creativity expresses itself, i.e., adaptively or innovatively (2A3). Adaptors show relatively greater within paradigm consistency, while innovators show
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TABLE 2
Structural elements of A-I theory by level of apphcabd]ty
A lndtvldual ]
2 3 4. 5. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18.
Cognitive style relates to behavior change strategies as manifested m creativity, problem-solving, and decision-making [1 (p. 62311 All levels of At are creative [2 (p 26)] Cognittve styles (adaptor vs innovator) differ quahtatlvely ]1 (p. 622)] Cognitive style Is established early and remains stable throughout life 16 (p. 2011 AI ranges on a continuum [1 (p 622)] Measured AI (KAI) scores are normally distributed 11 (pp. 624-625)] Creative (cognitive) stylc is independent of creative level (capacity) [7 (p 697) I Style is independent of technique 16 (p. 5)] Style is independent of competence 16 (p. 5)1 Style is independent of social desirability [2 (pp. 19-2(I)] Style IS related to management style 16 (p 311] Style IS unrelated to intelligence, socioeconomic status and educational level I1 (p 62511 Measured style (l e., KAI score) has a low but slgmficant correlation with sex (women more adaptive) and age (mnovatlvcness decreases with age I1 (p. 625)] KAI scores factor mto three components (suffioency of ongmahty, cffioency, rule-group conformltyl [1 (p 6251] KAI factors differ quahtatwely [1 (p 625)] KAI factors have the theoretical status of a trait ]2 (p 32)] The KAI factor traits are independent [5 (p 52)] Extreme KAI scores (renovators vs adaptors) relate meaningfully to two definable clusters of related personahty varmbles [9
(p 221)] 19. B Group 1
2
3 4.
Adaptors and renovators tend to have reoprocal negatwe stereotypes of each other 11 (pp 625-626)] Composite individual AI styles in a g~ven group constitute the cognitive chmatc of that group ]1(1 (p 141)] KAI score range is lnvarlant over differences in means for various groups that differ with respect to the cognitive demands required by the typical activities of those groups [10 (p 140)] Certain umquely qualified KAI variants (individuals) in a gwcn group can serve as group 'cfiangc agents' 11(1 (p 142)] Certain uniquely quahficd intermediate, i c , not too discrepant, KAI variants (mdw]duals) m a given group can serve as 'bridges" between individuals and sub-groups with differing cognitive styles Ill (p 58) I
(" Organtzatton 1
2 D. Culture 1
2
Group cogn,twc climate vanes with type of firm, orgamzatlon, and department, depending on the cognitive demands of the umt
112 (pp 216-22011 Cognitive ehmatc is part of the broader organizational chmatc [111 (p 14I) I Cognitive style norms vary from culture to culturc till (p 140)] Entrcncficd theories tend to bc vigorously supported by adaptor-oriented establishments [13 (p 612)]
range that does not vary with differences in group mean scores (2B2).
relatively greater consistency across paradigms (3A8). This AI dimension is independent of creative level (2A7) and the 'technique' aspect of creativity (2A8) as well as social desirability (2A10) and general competence (2A9). Cognitive style relates to behavior change strategies as manifested in creativity, problem-solving, and decision-making (2All, and so is related to management style (2All). It is established early and remains stable through life (2A4).
2.2.3 Underlying AI factor~trait structure The basic AI dimension factors reliably into three (2A14) independent (2A17), qualitatively different (2A15) factors (sufficiency of originality (SO), efficiency (E), and rule/group conformity (R)) which have the theoretical status of psychological traits.
2.2.2 Psychometric characteristics of the AI measure (KAI) The operational measure of AI, the KAI, yields scores that distribute normally (2A6) within a
2.2.4 Style maintenance energy requirements The effort required in presenting oneself in ways other than one's natural cognitive style requires
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TABLE 3
Dynamic elements of A-I theory by level of apphcabfl~ty
,I Individual 1
t~ III 11 t~ ¢;roup 1 2 3 4
(
Or,~antzatton I
I) Culture 1 2
Cognmve style is 'orthogonal' to coping behawor [14 (p 91)] The self-presentation effort revolved w~th a given cognmvc style ~s reversely related to the discrepancy between that style and one's natural style [6 (p 33)] VarlaUon of one's style reqmres the expenditure ol energ~ [5 (p 851] Individuals under pressure revert to thmr less effortful natural style [13 (p 612)] The stress expemenced m a conflicting cogmtlve st~le situation vanes directly with the 'qze ot thc cogmtwe gap underlwng the conflict [14 (p 90)} Adaptors are more hkely to suffer gap stress than are renovators [15 (p 17q) I Women are more likely than men to reqmre coping behavior m their work situation [5 (p IlS)] Adaptors show relatively greater consistency wtthm paradigms than do renovators, while renovators shov, relatwcl~ greater consistency across paradigms [16 (p 491))] Innovators are more likely to adopt a greater number o! new types of renovation than adaptors {4 (p 79)] Adaptors are more hkely to adopt new products of a famdtar type than are renovators 14 (p 7t~)] Reciprocal understanding by renovators and adaptors ot their cogmtlve style difference', promotes greater tolerance (i e reduces stereotypes) for those differences [2 (p 8)] Groups tend to select and retain individuals whose cognmve stoic agrccs with the group's [12 (p 223)] Adaptors experience easier acceptancc of their Ideas by the group than do renovators [3 (p 290)] Work groups/teams need both adaptor and renovator cognmve styles for ctfectlve funct~omng [2 (p 12) I The difficulty of mediating differences between groups ~arles directly with the distance of thc group means from the general KAI mean [11 (p. 58)] The group change prec~pltatJon threshold vames directly with the discrepancy of the group mean lrom the general population mean [l()(p 142)] Orgamzatlons. to be effectwe, need both adaptors and renovators ]13 (p 611 )] Innovators arc more hkely Innovators are more likely Culture clash l~ heightened conservatism ot entrenched
to cross more cultural boundaries to cross a rigid cultural boundary by the stress regression tendency theory (element A4 and clcmcnt
additional psychological energy (3A3) inversely related to the similarity of that assumed style to one's natural style (3A2). Coping behavior, that is, functioning outside one's natural cognitive style, is "orthogonai to' (not dependent upon) cognitive style (3A1). Functioning in a situation where there is a discrepancy between one's own cognitive style and the dominant style in a group is stressful (3A5). Felt pressure tends to push the individual to revert to his or her natural cognitive style (3A4). Women in work situations are more likely to be required to cope than are men (3A7), and adaptors are more likely than innovators to experience "cognitive gap stress' (3A6).
2.2.5 Relation of AI to other personality variables Scores on the KAI have no correlation with IQ or educational level (2A12), a low correlation with
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than arc adaptors [10 (p 1411)] than arc adaptors I I0 (p 141))] (to revert to onc's natural cogmtJ~c slvlc under stress) and 1he D2 respectively Table 1)
sex (women more adaptive (2A13)) and age (KAI scores decrease with age (2A13)), and are substantially and meaningfully correlated with two definable clusters (adaptor vs innovator) of personality variables (2A18). Adaptors and innovators tend to hold reciprocal, negative stereotypes of each other (2A19), but these stereotypes may be softened by training in A-I theory (3A 11).
2.2.6 Organizational implications of A-I theory Composite individual styles in a stable social organization (e.g., work group, athletic team, etc.) constitute a group cognitive climate (2B1). Organizations (2C 1) and work groups (2B 1) differ in terms of their cognitive climate (mean KAI score), depending on the type of group and/or organization. Cognitive climate in small work units
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is a part of the wider, organizational climate (2C2). Smaller work groups (3B3) as well as larger organizations (3C1) need both innovators and adaptors in order to be effective. Certain uniquely qualified individuals whose individual cognitive style is different from that of the group can serve that group as so-called change agents (2B3) where the threshold for the precipitation of change in a group increases as the cognitive style of that particular group differs from the KAI mean in the general population (3B5). Other uniquely qualified persons in a group can serve as 'mediators' of conflict within the group (2B4) where the difficulty of the mediation varies directly with the degree of discrepancy in the cognitive styles between those involved in the conflict (3B4). Adaptors' ideas are more readily accepted in the organization than are the ideas of innovators, which are often resisted (3B2). Work groups, and organizations generally, tend to select and retain individuals whose cognitive style is consonant with that of the group and/or organization (3B1).
2.2. 7 Cultural manifestations of cognitive style differences Cognitive style tends to vary from one culture to another (2D1). Innovators are more likely to cross more cultural boundaries (3D1) and more rigid cultural boundaries (3D2) than are adaptors. Entrenched theories tend to be vigorously supported in adaptor-oriented establishments (2D2). Culture clash is heightened by the tendency of the conflicting parties to regress to their natural cognitive style under the stress of such conflict and by the conservatism of entrenched theory (3D3).
2.2.8 Differentia/innovation-adoption behavior in innovators vs adaptors Innovators tend to adopt a greater number of new types of innovation (3A9) while adaptors tend to adopt a greater number of new products, i.e., brands of a particular product type (3A10).
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3. Focus of A-I theory: psychological vs organizational processes? Taken together, the eight sets of qualitative summary statements constitute a rich set of descriptors of Kirton's A-I theory. The first three categories, accounting for 23 theoretical elements, are concerned with the nature of the AI continuum, the psychometric properties of its operational measure (the KAI), and the factor structure of KAI scores. The characteristics described by these three categories of Kirton's theoretical elements have been corroborated empirically by other investigators in several other nations and languages, including Goldsmith [19] in the US, Previde [20] in Italy, and Kube~ [21] in Slovakia. Although these three categories are psychological in nature, they are essentially descriptive, except for the factor structure to which psychological trait status has been ascribed. Kirton's fourth category of elements has a psychological focus of an inferential nature, having to do with the energy demands of maintaining cognitive style equilibrium in varying situations. To my knowledge there has been no direct test of this energy mobilization hypothesis beyond the seminal work of McCarthy [22], whose cognitive gap group of women reported significantly more work pressures than a comparable group of women who experienced no cognitive gap on the job (p. 94). Overall, however, the four categories (1-4) together do not address process, namely how such a cognitive dimension works in the functional economy of the individual. On the other hand, the last four categories of theoretical element do tend to focus on function, but not at the level of psychological process. Categories 5-8 of the AI element collation consist of 24 assertions having implications for the functioning of organizations. The personality clusters characterizing the (extreme) adaptor and the (extreme) innovator (category 5) help account for organizational dysfunction growing out of reciprocal, negative stereotypes that these two extremes tend to hold for each other. The early case study by Lindsay,
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Kirton adaption-innovation theory: organizational implications
published in this journal [23], established the reality of such organizational disturbance at the management level due to cognitive style differences. Management consultants, such as Prather [24] and Rosenbach [25], report that the dysfunctional effects of such differences within work teams can be dispelled, or at least ameliorated, by a set of appropriate experiential exercises designed to give participants an understanding of, and respect for, cognitive style differences. The relation of cognitive style to organizational climate (category 6) has been investigated with respect to tenure and job satisfaction at an individual level by Keller and Holland [26] and Zarambe [27] along with effectiveness at the level of organizational function (e.g., staff vs line; sales vs manufacturing, etc.). See Mudd [28 (pp. 73-76 and Tables 14 and 15)] for a review of such work by more than a dozen investigators. Cultural manifestations of cognitive style differences (category 7) can account in part for certain genderand minority-based career processes within an organization, as shown by McCarthy [22] and Foxall [29-31], as well as differential job selection and retention strategies between organizations, factors such as public vs private sector preferences found by Hayward and Everett [32] and Thomson [33], market vs controlled economies, etc. And finally there is growing evidence (category 8) for a relationship between AI style and adoption preferences for new products, ideas, etc. by Gordon Foxall and his associates [34, 35] and Mudd [36, 37]. The main point in the present context is to recognize that A-I theory has to do in large measure, perhaps even primarily, with organizational processes. Kirton, in fact, began his work on A-I theory in response to his important observations concerning the behavior of organizations in adopting major innovations that had been shown in retrospect to have been critical to the continuing effectiveness of a set of British firms. Kirton's Management Initiatives study [17] presented instances where the conventional wisdom concerning organizational behavior was inconsistent with Kirton's extended observation of four
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successful firms over a two-year period. Kirton found that ideas for initiatives were often strongly resisted. Acceptance of change came only with long time lags. Individuals who argued for the changes which (eventually) were adopted tended to be ostracized by their colleagues. Kirton was able to reoncile those observations in terms of his A-I theory which, in its simplest statement, holds that individuals differ in their preference to do things in different ways (innovators) as opposed to doing things better, but in the old way (adaptors). Developing the implications of that statement to include the reciprocal stereotypes of the adaptor and the innovator, Kirton held, in retrospect, that the resistance to the change advocated by innovators was led by adaptors. Adaptors tend to dominate mature organizations at any given time and they tend to be threatened by such change. The Kirton work subsequently has focused on the use of the KAI to help organizations acknowledge, understand, and respect individual differences in cognitive style as they apply to organizational climate, team functioning, and staff selection and tenure. This work has been extremely influential over the past ten years as an increasing number of practitioners and consultants become certified in the use of the KAI to bring insight and tolerance into the important dimension of cognitive diversity in the workplace.
Acknowledgements This work was supported by a sabbatical leave and a Research and Professional Development Grant from Gettysburg College in addition to the logistical support of the Institute of Creativity, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia. The author is grateful to Mari~in Kubeg of the Institute of Creativity, Bratislava, Slovakia, and to Michael Kirton of the Occupational Research Centre, Berkhamsted, England, for comments on the manuscript. Mary Stasiak from Buchanan Valley in Pennsylvania typed Tables 2 and 3, for which the author is thankful.
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A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 12th Triennial Congress of the International Ergonomics Association in Toronto, Canada, 15-19 August 1994.
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