Making competent land use policy using a co-management framework

Land Use Policy 72 (2018) 171–180

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Land Use Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol

Making competent land use policy using a co-management framework a

a,⁎

Maryam Adhami , Seyed Hamidreza Sadeghi , Majid Sheikhmohammady a b

T

b

Departmentof Watershed Management Engineering, Faculty of Natural Resources, Tarbiat Modares University, Noor 46417-76489, Mazandaran, Iran Faculty of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Environmental issues Multisector collaboration Nonpoint source pollution Optimal solution Policy making

A new cooperative watershed management methodology has been designed for developing equitable and efficient Best Management Practices (BMPs) with participation of all main stakeholders. The approach intended to control total sediment yield, stormwater and to improve socio-economic status of the watershed, considering villagers, legislation and executive stakeholders with conflicting interests. Toward this goal, the game theory was used as an alternative tool for analyzing strategic managerial practices and measures among various demands in order to achieve cooperative decision-making in sub-watershed and Best Co-Management Practices prioritization (BCMPs). Hence, the Borda scoring algorithm applied to count the priority of 13 sub-watersheds in the Galazchai Watershed (103 km2) in West–Azarbaijan Province, Iran. Accordingly, the aforesaid algorithm rated suggested BCMPs by three groups of stakeholders and a factor scoring method was then used to classify 94 proposed practices in three categories. Based on the Borda scoring results, seven sub-watersheds placed in first priority of which five sub-watersheds occupied main rangelands of the study watershed. In addition, the first category of practice included 12 BCMPs of which four measures were related to secondary livelihood source creation, seven practices proposed proper land use management and rehabilitation, monitoring, timely grazing of rangelands, and financial support for rangelands improvement. Finally just one practice emphasized on biological operations in order to control streambed erosion.

1. Introduction Many environmental issues have been solved in the last three decades through collaborative management (Parrachino et al., 2006a; Koontz and Jens, 2014). Based on environmental and land management incentives, in order to sustainable development, interdependence among involved stakeholders and obtaining local needs are necessary (van Berkel and Verburg, 2011). Besides, it is assumed that environmental public problems are not amenable to control satisfactory except with development of collaborative solutions (Koontz and Jens, 2014; Adhami and Sadeghi, 2016). The collaborative management is a cooperation process to participate in information collecting, decision-making and accomplishment of projects (Bryson et al., 2013) leading to resolve complex society-environment dilemmas (Leys and Vanclay, 2011). Collaborative approach has been applied in various areas such as policy making (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004), economic development (Agranoff and McGuire, 1998), medical care (Johnston and Romzek, 1999), food security (Carfì et al., 2018), natural disaster management (Seaberg et al., 2017), soil and water conservation (Bewket and Sterk, 2002), landscape management (Leys and Vanclay, 2011), and watershed management (Bryson

⁎

et al., 2013; Koontz and Jens, 2014; Adhami and Sadeghi, 2016). Collaborative management has occupied main house in thought and practice of natural resource management since the 1990s (Cundill et al., 2013). Collaborative Watershed management is also crucial to guarantee the ecosystem sustainability. A collaborative watershed management is a process, which includes relevant stakeholders to watershed resources. They interfere in decision-making to achieve ecosystem-oriented goals, such as water quality improvement, soil conservation and pollution control (Üçler et al., 2015; Thomas, 2017). Aforementioned stakeholders involve government participants, policy making institutions and the residents as well (Koontz and Jens, 2014; Shisanya, 2018). All watershed partnerships usually focus on planning tasks. Although collaborative planning may take considerable time, effort, information, and funding but proponents argue leading to advantages over traditional policymaking. One potential benefit is the creation of plans that are more readily implemented (Inam et al., 2015; Pandey and Singh, 2016). Nowadays controlling stormwater and managing nonpoint source (NPS) pollution are two objectives of water and soil resources conservation in watersheds (Davudirad et al., 2016) for which various best management practices (BMPs) have been implemented (Qiu, 2013).

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M. Adhami), [email protected] (S.H. Sadeghi), [email protected] (M. Sheikhmohammady).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.12.035 Received 2 May 2017; Received in revised form 3 December 2017; Accepted 12 December 2017 0264-8377/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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2016). While, the different attitudes of various groups of beneficiaries have been mostly ignored. The voting procedure is simple and transparent for voters without need to severe computational difficulties. Thereby, this algorithm of game theory is an appropriate tool for groupdecision-making. However, one of the disadvantages of current method is inability to determine the alternative that would provide the most satisfaction of stakeholders. In the other words, it is not possible to bargain and reach a maximum deal. As it is seen from the reviewing of literatures, the concepts of game theory such as non-cooperative (considering the strategies interaction among the players and to decide based on the maximization of their payoffs) and cooperative (focusing on agreement among the players and to equitably and fairly allocate cooperative payoffs) have been applied to water resources field. However, no study has used game theory to prioritize different sub-watersheds based on BCMPs with the agreement of political, executive and villager (watershed inhabitants and utilizers) stakeholders. This study therefore planned to apply the game theory to provide clear choices for different decision-makers to select appropriate alternatives that balance socio-economic, political and even technical development in the Galazchai Watershed, Iran. The results of this study may not only be directly used for the study watershed but can be supposed as an initiative to expand the application of game theory in integrated watershed management, revision in legislation and even implementation of appropriate soil and water conservation measures.

The BMPs could conserve soil and water on-site resulted from improvement in watershed resources utilization (Lee et al., 2010; Nobles et al., 2017). The specification of BMPs requires constant involvement of all relevant stakeholders whose attitudes and behavior toward land use and management practices have long-term impact on watershed resources sustainability and also are influenced by the implemented alternatives (Lee, 2012). The effectiveness of BMPs on watershed management will be greatly improved if they come up from stakeholder’s consultation upon the same issues. On the other hand, various environmental and socio-economic conditions may lead to conflicts among stakeholders, strategies and policies that cause barriers to proper management (Sadeghi et al., 2009). This approach derived from integrated model hereafter will be named as Best Co-Management Practices (BCMPs). At present, a watershed is supposed as the basic unit of all research, development and policy-making activities to achieve integrated management of water and land resources. However, watershed is a dynamic unit, its reaction for naturally and man-made driving forces varies both spatially and temporally (Sadeghi, 2005). Recognition of important sites with high priority in term of issue is therefore necessary to develop appropriate strategies in order to abate the issues. To solve such problems, one approach is to identify critical areas of a watershed responsible for occurrence of obstacle in the critical sub-watersheds (Besalatpour et al., 2012; Adhami and Sadeghi, 2016; Naubi et al., 2017). The BCMPs facilitate collaboration of involved stakeholders to compromise upon conflicts among various attitudes in social, economic and natural resources management (Alves-Pinto et al., 2017; Roth and de Loë, 2017; Thomas, 2017). Issues and conflicts in the context of watershed management often derive from economic benefits resulting from land use development. Sometimes there are parallel benefits on economic and social objectives and in some cases environmental goals (reduction of water pollution) have been apparent as one side of a velitation (Lee, 2012; Skardi et al., 2013; Shiau and Chou, 2016; Gluesing et al., 2017). Hence, Pareto-optimal (non-dominated) and multi-objective approaches may help managers mediate among all stakeholders’ demands identifying one or few solutions (Madani, 2010; Lee, 2012; Cohon, 2013; Kim and Chung, 2014; Berthomé and Thomas, 2017). The game theory, which originated with the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is a mathematical tool for analyzing and resolving problems related to conflicting interests (Madani, 2010; Adhami and Sadeghi, 2016; Li, 2018). The conflict includes players (stakeholders) who pursue distinct goals and accordingly select various alternatives from an available set (Madani et al., 2014). From application viewpoint, the game theory is a mathematical interactive decisionmaking process that attempts to identify optimal strategies between several players whose choices affect the interests of other players (Parrachino et al., 2006b). The game theory has been applied in various velitating fields of science including economics (e.g., Ichiishi, 2014) and sociology (e.g., Lee, 2008; Colman et al., 2008). It has also been used in water resources management (Parrachino et al., 2006a, 2006b; Madani, 2010; Kucukmehmetoglu, 2012), water resources and rights allocation (Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos, 2008; Jalili Kamjoo and Khosh Akhlagh, 2016), water reservoir operation problems (Shirangi et al., 2008), and management of water-quality issues (Shi et al., 2016). Reviewing of the literature showed that the application of game theory as a voting support system to reduce conflicts of decision-makers in watershed management (e.g., Adhami and Sadeghi, 2016) has been rarely reported. However, Watershed management encircles conflicts arising from opposing interests or needs of stakeholders. Hence, because of multitude watershed management objectives with increasing competition for watershed resources, single task decision-making process is replaced with conflict analyzing approaches specifically game theory (Apipalakul et al., 2015; Adhami and Sadeghi, 2016). Most of literatures cite analysis of environmental and economic conflicts applying game theory (Lee, 2012; Üçler et al., 2015; Zarezadeh et al.,

2. Materials and methods 2.1. Study area The Galazchai mountainous watershed (≈103 km2; between 44° 56′ and 45° 35′E longitudes, and 37° 01′ and 37° 09′N latitudes) in WestAzarbaijan Province, Iran, was selected for the present study due to availability of background research (Mostafazadeh et al., 2015; Sadeghi et al., 2015a, 2015b; Mostafazadeh et al., 2016; Saeidi et al., 2016), data availability, and possibility of frequent field surveying. The length of the main stream is some 19.3 km, and the average watershed slope is approximately 32%. It also extended between 1480 and 3300 m above mean sea level. The area is steep and prone to soil erosion and flooding. The average annual precipitation (1981–2010) at Oshnavieh meteorological station in the vicinity of the main outlet is 482 mm (Ab BananAzardasht Engineering Consulting Inc., 2010). The governing climate of the study watershed is dry semi-arid with annual average temperature of 11.8 °C (Ab Banan-Azardasht Engineering Consulting Inc., 2010). Different land uses viz. rangelands (85%), forest (7%), rainfed farming (5%) and irrigated farming (3%) exist in the watershed (Sadeghi and Singh, 2005). The study area has been divided into 13 sub-watersheds based on drainage network using Arc Hydro extension in GIS environment. The general view and locality of the Galazchai watershed has been shown in Fig. 1. 2.2. Data sources and analysis The whole data for the study were collected for three main stakeholders containing watershed inhabitants, governmental organizations or technical sector and also local politicians or government representatives. The major source of data was a formal household survey conducted between August and September 2016. To conduct the research, two villages in the study watershed viz. Galaz (with 282 households) and Zemmeh (with 100 households) respectively located in upstream and downstream of the watershed (Fig. 1) were considered. The lists of households in each village were then obtained from the respective Village Council. A total number of 243 samples (i.e., 163 and 80 samples from Galaz and Zemmeh, respectively) were selected from the entire households using Cochran’s criterion (Cochran, 2007). A random sampling procedure (Jia and Barabási, 2013) was also selected 172

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Fig. 1. Geographical location of the Galazchai Watershed, West-Azarbaijan Province, Iran.

bi = Σk(N − rik)

for the study to avoid any probable bias in data collection. In cases where selected household happened to be away from the home for a long time or was unwilling to be interviewed, another randomly selected household was substituted. Given the relative homogeneity of the subsistence rural in both villages in terms of physical environmental factors and resource endowments, the sample size of each village was reasonably representative of the population it stood for. The interviews were then conducted face to face and through going to each interviewee’s homestead or farm. The interviewees were simply asked to prioritize all 13 sub-watersheds and the most suitable measure in order to improve the socio-economic and natural resources balance in the study area. The time taken by an interview ranged between 15 and 60 min. Early mornings and late afternoons were convenient times to get access to the interviewees. Governmental organizations (i.e., Department of Natural Resources, Department of Tribal and Rural Development, Department of Environment, Department of Soil and Water Conservation and Department of Land Affairs) were supposed as second group of stakeholders. All of local organizations playing a role in decision-making were elected as effective component in planning process. The third group was also related to local politicians (village or district governor) who affect legislation and long term schematization of the area.

(1)

The alternatives ultimately then ordered according to these counts (Lansdowne and Woodward, 1996). The players (3 groups of stakeholders) arranged sub-watersheds in a new arrangement, which was the result of the member’s opinion and finally three rating lists entered in the game theory-based algorithm. The Borda scoring algorithm as a consensus-based voting system analyzed the preference of sub-watersheds and specified the total scores. 2.3.2. Prioritization of best co-management practices Three groups of stakeholders (villagers, executive organizations and political officials) suggested their comments for improving the socioeconomic situation and soil and water conservation betterment. Some 94 BCMPs (Appendix A, Table A1) were wholly suggested by all aforesaid stakeholders some of which were common. The preference of offers and scores were then defined by applying the Borda scoring algorithm (Eq. (1)). 3. Results The present study stood up on application of the Borda scoring algorithm of the game theory approach to prioritize 13 sub-watersheds of Galazchai Watershed as a resultant of co-management of three main stakeholders of villagers, executive sectors and local politicians. The general preference of the study sub-watersheds by three groups were found out using interview whose detailed results have been summarized in Table 1. The weighted scores of the entire sub-watersheds were then calculated by applying the Borda scoring algorithm whose results have been summarized in Table 2. The Borda scores were arranged in a sorted table and the total scores of sub-watersheds were then calculated based on the rules of algorithm and hierarchy weights of candidates. As it is seen in Table 2, Milan 1 (M1) and Gonbad (G) sub-watersheds were the winner candidates (the most important sub-watersheds in viewpoint of stakeholders) and Zemmeh sub-watershed was the looser (the lowest priority in viewpoint of stakeholders) with respective scores of 31 and 5.

2.3. Application of the game theory 2.3.1. Prioritization of sub-watersheds In order to prioritize the sub-watersheds in study area, three groups of aforesaid stakeholders (named as voters) provided a linear ordering of the candidates (sub-watersheds). The entire 243 list of households from two study villages, five orders for executive organizations and nine orders for political officials were completed. Each candidate was described with a Borda score (Balinski and Laraki, 2007). Given N candidates and multiple voters, points of N-l, N-2… candidate in each voter's preference order. The points for each candidate were then summed up across all voters to find out the winner candidate with the greatest total number of points. If rik was the rank of alternative i under voter k, the Borda score for alternative i was: 173

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Table 1 Linear preference of sub-watersheds of Galazchai Watershed by different stakeholders.

SB: Shinke Bi, G: Gonbad, M 1 and 2: Milan 1and 2, Q 1, 2 and 3: Qazan 1, 2 and 3, CH: Chehel Asiyab, H: Havarkhatoun, GL: Galaz, SK: Shive Khezal, Z: Zemmeh, M: Merga Mir all shown in Fig. 1. Isochromic and italic cells have equal preferences.

In order to achieve an integrated and practical management, all study sub-watersheds were classified into three categories using factor scoring method. The range of each class and existing sub-watersheds in categories were summarized in Table 3. Each voter (individual members of three groups of stakeholders) in addition to sub-watershed prioritization, proposed measures to improve the socio-economic and natural resources management status of the region. All 94 proposed measures were also classified into 6 categories as presented in Table 4. Besides, briefly illumination of suggested practices and measures have been summarized in Appendix A, Table A1. The results of Table 4 only showed the abundance of offered BCMPs in each category. Application of the Borda scoring algorithm revealed the linear preference of practices using stakeholders rating. All 94 proposed practices got the Borda scores and were then classified into three classes of priority (i.e., 1st, 2nd and 3rd) according to the scores. The first priority gained the most attention of three groups of voters and contained 12 practices. The number of practices in categories along with the range of the Borda scores have also been presented in Table 5. In order to reduce the number of proposed practices (94; Appendix A, Table A1) to facilitate decision-making process, managers have to focus on the most considerable suggestions placed as the first priority in Table 5. The list of first priority category has been detailed in Table 6.

Table 3 Results of prioritization of 13 study sub-watersheds based on the Borda scoring algorithm in Galazchai Watershed, Iran. Priority

Range of the Borda scores

Sub-watersheds

First priority

22.33–31

Second priority Third priority

13.66–22.33 < 13.66

Gonbad, Chehel Asiyab, Milan1, Milan 2, Qazan 1, Qazan 2 and Shinke Bi Havarkhatoun and Shive Khezal Galaz, Merga Mir and Zemmeh

among complex driving forces (Sadeghi, 2005; Gashaw et al., 2018). In fact, prioritizing different areas of a watershed based on different interests provides numerous benefits to managers and it is a useful tool for the government when preparing regional development strategies (Rahman et al., 2015). The preferred sub-watershed has a different meaning for each person who is in association with one aspect of complicated system of the watershed. Therefore, considering various stakeholders to determine the vulnerable sub-watershed based on their own point of views is a vital task. The game theory as a powerful model to find a balanced space among different purposes (Sheikhmohammady et al., 2008) was applied in the present study to detect sub-watersheds with high priority in the Galazchai Watershed in western Iran as a representative watershed across semi-arid region of Iran. Fig. 2 presents the priority of sub-watersheds using the Borda scoring algorithm as per procedure explained before. According to Fig. 2, seven sub-watersheds had high priority of that, six sub-watersheds consisted the main rangelands of the study area and another one covered by agricultural land. Shinke Bi Sub-watershed; notwithstanding, as the only source of agricultural products had no proper condition. Lack of enough water supply and appropriate soil caused physical and socio-economic issues and made it the most important sub-watershed for residents. In addition, since the main source of livelihood in the study villages was animal husbandry, the main pastures were supposed as notable regions. With regard to the relation between the villagers and the policy-makers, some interests of villagers were reflected in final scoring. Unlike the political section, the executive branch was independent from the wishes of the villagers, therefore, individual targets of governmental organizations were expressed as their opinions. As Madani (2010) discussed, the results of game theory

4. Discussion The BMPs are practical control measures including technological, economic, and institutional considerations that have been demonstrated to effectively minimize water quality and soil erosion issues (Lee et al., 2010). Although implementing BMPs is necessary to reduce nonpoint source pollutants, besides, site selection of associating areas is inevitable (Adhami and Sadeghi, 2016; Naubi et al., 2017; Ameri et al., 2018). In this regard, prioritization of sub-watersheds based on common agreement among various users and administrators of watershed nominated as the best co-management practices (BCMPs) is further necessary. It highly guarantees the success of watershed management plans. Watershed managers believe the watershed prioritization is thus considered as the ranking of different areas of a watershed which requires detailed information on watershed sediment yield and a tradeoff

Table 2 Weighted scores of sub-watersheds based on the Borda scoring algorithm in Galazchai Watershed, Iran.

SB: Shinke Bi, G: Gonbad, M 1 and 2: Milan 1and 2, Q 1, 2 and 3: Qazan 1, 2 and 3, CH: Chehel Asiyab, H: Havarkhatoun, GL: Galaz, SK: Shive Khezal, Z: Zemmeh, M: Merga Mir.

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Table 4 Stakeholders suggested Management Practices in Galazchai Watershed, Iran. Main categories of suggested practices

Sub-category 1 of suggested practices

Sub-category 2 of suggested practices

Sub-category3 of suggested practices

No. of Practices in category

Rangelands management Practices

Revising or improving management structure Inter-basin water transfer Biologic measures Engineering measures Development of ecotourism

Reinforcement of vegetation cover

Providing financial facilities

26

Soil and water management Reinforcement of vegetation cover Construction of floodgates Creation of new production units

22 6 10 24

Control of fertilizers pollution

Digging deep wells Afforestation in rangelands Construction of check dams Exploitation of watershed potentials Protection of plant species

3

Revising village guide plan

Providing financial facilities

Maintaining environmental water right Flood zoning

Agricultural management Practices Soil and water conservation Practices Secondary source of livelihood Practices Environmental protection Practices Disaster management Practices

conflicting goals were involved through cooperation to recognize hot spots in management planning. A similar approach has been proposed by Oleson et al. (2017) in identification of how and where to use limited resources. The survey study of the Galazchai Watershed showed that the final decision was more influenced by legislation and executive section (as two groups of stakeholders) because of weak relation among three groups of stakeholders. The rural livelihood was directly dependent on rangeland and agricultural land, which effectively affected conservation operations. As Parrachino et al. (2006b) expressed, the impact of players on joint decisions is controlled by strength of each participant’s position for or against each of issues and power of a player to influence an issue as well. In other words, aforementioned study confirmed the results of current study in power of governmental stakeholders in decision-making. Much of the guidance on watershed management stated that people as the most impressive group by management decisions should be “involved throughout” and should “shape key decisions” (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 2015; Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). Hence, adapted management practices would be nominated as the Best Co-Management Practices. Although, it might not be technically fully accepted. Out of 94 proposed practices, 83 were offered by villagers, which were common with the suggestions of legislation and executive stakeholders. According to the interviews with the residents, the most important practice for villagers was about surrounding rangelands of two study villages with 14975.5 scores. Rangelands of Milan 1 and 2, Qazan 1 and 2, Gonbad and Merga Mir legally were considered as commonwealth rangelands of Galaz and Zemmeh Villages. However, they have been exploited temporarily by nomads since 2 years ago. Villagers believed revision in law enforcement could improve socio-economic condition and reduce overgrazing of rangelands as well. Unfortunately, as Blomqvist (2004) stated, any change in institutional system involve inherent inertia and create serious obstacles in accepting the results of participation. The second important willing of villagers was inter-basin water transfer from Gonbad to Shinke Bi sub-watershed with 10372 scores. The two above-mentioned practices were not considerable necessity for legislation and executive groups. Disparity among three groups of stakeholders showed the basic reason for rejection of watershed conservation plans by rural people. Attitude of governmental organizations was remarkably far from real issues in the watershed. While, Shiau and Chou (2016) expressed that the key to achieve the goals of sustainable development and water and soil conservation depends on people who directly are contacted with these sources. Sumbalan and Buenavista (2016) also described this difference as a gap between research and policy making section of management body. Results of the game theory in expressing differences of stakeholder’s attitudes were similar to network analysis approach applied by Ghorbani et al. (2012) in comanagement of natural resources field. Eventually, 12 managerial practices with the highest Borda scores were chosen from conflicting purposes and management alternatives

Table 5 Classification of management practices in Galazchai Watershed, Iran. Category of priority

No. of practices in category

Range of the Borda score

1st priority 2nd priority 3rd priority

12 24 58

180.33–265 95.66–180.33 11–95.66

Table 6 The most important management practices in Galazchai Watershed, Iran. Proposed management practices

Borda scores

Tourism development in Gonbad sub-watershed Tourism development in Zemmeh sub-watershed Development of exploitation and processing of herbal medicine in rangeland Preventing of rangeland conversion to farmland Tourism development in Chehel Asiyab sub-watershed Grain providing at the start of spring to prevent of livestock entry in rangeland Vegetation increasing in stream bed as roughness amplification to reduce water velocity and erosion Government control on number of livestock in rangeland Monitoring of rangeland rehabilitation Improvement of financial facilities to protect rangeland (delay in livestock entry) Management of rangeland scheduling Rangeland rehabilitation

185 189.5 191.5

3

204.5 229.5 239.5 240.5 253 258 259 260 265

could better reflect the behavior of the involved stakeholders in order to solve multisector decision-making issues as this case study. The executive branch focused on rangelands, because the largest percentage of the watershed was allocated to rangeland and played a significant role in controlling soil erosion and sediment transport, and besides, was directly influenced by the livelihoods and population of two study villages. On the other hand, from the perspective of environmental protection, rangelands as genetic resources, biodiversity and secondary source of livelihood were momentous. Pandey and Singh (2016) also introduced hillsides as attractive sites for farmers, animal husbandry and conservational areas as well. The Borda scoring algorithm, using weighted coefficients, revealed the comparative priority of sub-watersheds. As Garrity et al. (2016) believed, the global consensus had shifted towards the view that environmental conservation was not in conflict with development. As it was implied from the present results, environmental goals were favorable with development in study watershed. Eventually, Milan 1 and Gonbad with the scores of 31 were detected as the most significant sub-watersheds. Gonbad because of an 11 m-dam as an important water supply for Galaz Village, a desirable rangeland for executive stakeholders, and Milan1 as the nearest rangeland to Galaz Village were important for watershed resources user and managers. Hence, various possible trade-offs of stakeholders with 175

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Fig. 2. The results of the Borda scoring algorithm of game theory approach for prioritization of sub-watersheds in Galazchai Watershed, Iran.

management manner, which eliminates both top-down and bottom-up patterns. This approach have some advantages in comparison with multi-objective decision-making methods. The Borda scoring algorithm unlike AHP, ANP and other multi-objective methods did not consider any weight to stakeholders and variables (affecting decision-making). Besides that, the proposed measures were not categorized (Azarnivand and Banihabib, 2015; Gross and Hagy, 2017) to overlap among stakeholders or measures in classification, to avoid assigning a preference to any stakeholder led to various errors in results. Additionally, grouping of stakeholders according their affiliation or similarity in goals needed more time and caused more complexity (Arnette et al., 2010; Moorman et al., 2013). Current socio-ecological system combined local knowledge with scientific viewpoints to choose conservation measures, which guarantees success in implementation level according to Duvall et al. (2017). Assessing possible alternatives by stakeholders cause realistic results, which is obvious in some studies (e.g., De Pina Tavares et al., 2014). The way that current study was conducted, created a condition for members of decision-making process to show their concerns to final election of management alternatives. This method could realize new ideas.

(Table 6). Four suggestions represented a new source of livelihood creation in the study area. Tourism development was proposed in three sub-watersheds with natural attraction, mountainous status, holly shrines, ancient cemetery and verdurous grasslands. Accordingly, Gonbad, Chehel Asiyab and Zemmeh sub-watersheds could be a new profit source for economic betterment of the area. Another new occasion engrossed the attention of all stakeholders was development of exploitation and processing of herbal medicine in rangeland. Out of all 12 final suggestions, seven cases were regarding management of rangelands (i.e., rehabilitation of rangelands, fertilization, seeding and cultivation and timely grazing). Most of the rangeland issues in all study sub-watersheds were due to disproportionate of livestock number with rangeland area or capacity. Therefore, providing financial facilities in order to prevent entering livestock to rangeland at early spring was introduced as an urgent solution for the management of the study watershed. Grassing waterway was also proposed as a practice to control streams bed erosion through increasing roughness. Scrutinizing Table 6 verified that all measures were classified as managerial or/and planning operations. In contrary to administrators’ opinion (policy making and executive group), most villagers offered mechanical measures to combat soil erosion, sedimentation, water pollution and flood issues. Although both biological and mechanical BCMPs are important tools in controlling water pollution in watersheds, villagers generally favor mechanical BCMPs over biological ones because of their visibility and immediate effect in controlling storm runoff and NPS pollutions. A similar finding was also reported by Qiu (2013) in the Neshanic River watershed, a typical mixed land use watershed in central New Jersey, USA. As it is seen from the results of game theory approach, three main stakeholders were considered equally in order to achieve optimal

5. Conclusion The increasing reliance on collaborative stakeholder partnerships to address watershed and other environmental issues has led to growing interest in understanding how such collaborative efforts operate. Of particular interest in this new form of governance is stakeholders’ collaboration called as best co-management practices. This study set out to describe and explain conflicting opinion and purposes in watershed 176

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economic (human wellbeing) improvement. All results confirmed that sustainable development and successful management of the study watershed would not be achieved unless demands of rural communities are addressed.

management planning. The proposed framework balanced the human benefits (e.g., water supply, agricultural products, employment and increasing income) with environmental indices (e.g., soil and water conservation, reduction of NPS pollution, sustainable development and land use management). According to the results of the Borda scoring algorithm in all sub-watersheds and BCMPs prioritization, remarkable differences were detected among three groups of voters who have main role in planning, implementation and conservation operations. Executive organizations and legislations tried to control soil erosion and reduce NPS pollution and to protect environmental resources without paying attention to demands and livelihood security of villagers. On the other hand the people who lived in the study area considered both natural resources conservation (resources wellbeing) and socio-

Acknowledgements The authors would like to extend their sincere gratitude to Dr. Raouf Mostafazadeh from the University of Mohaghegh Ardebili and Dr. Pari Saeidi from Tarbiat Modares University who provided necessary information and services for this study. They also owe gratitude to Eng. Saeid Zare for his valuable assistance in the field surveys.

Appendix A

Table A1 Stakeholders suggested Management Practices in Galazchai Watershed, Iran. Number

Practices and measures

1 2 3 4 5

Modification of rangeland audits Inter-basin water transfer (Gonbad to Shinke Bi) Construction of floodgate in upstream of Gonbad Sub-watershed Reinforcement of vegetation cover by seeding and fertilizing Construction of check dams in the Qazan rangelands to reduce water velocity Monitoring and management of rangeland reinforcement Reinforcement of vegetation cover by seeding and fertilizing in Milan and Qazan Construction of check dams in the Milan rangelands to reduce water velocity Modification of Milan rangeland audits Dredging dam in Gonbad Scheduling and management of grazing Partial enclosure of rangelands Fountain water channeling for livestock Digging deep wells in Shinke Bi Supplying cereals at the onset of the spring to prevent livestock from entering the rangelands Construction of small dams (radier) along the waterways Providing financial facilities Modification of Shive Khezal rangeland audits Inter-basin water transfer (Chehel Asiyab to Shinke Bi, Milan and Gonbad) Dredging of water pools made in the rangelands of Qazan and Milan Inter-basin water transfer (Shive Khezal to Zemmeh) Modification of Havarkhatoun rangeland audits Management of water distribution for irrigation Construction of a check dam in the village of Zemmeh Monitoring livestock capacity Inter-basin water transfer (Gonbad to Milan) Management of water distribution in the Chehel Asiyab Development of ecotourism in Chehel Asiyab Extraction of mineral water in Shive Khezal and Merga Mir Use of stored water behind check dams for farming Reinforcement vegetation cover of stream bed to reduce water velocity Construction a larger dam in the Gonbad Capacity building through establishing industrial livestock and poultry Fertilizers allocation among villagers to reinforce rangelands Modification of Merge Mir rangeland audits Fish Farming Development Inter-basin water transfer (Chehel Asiyab to Qazan) Digging deep wells in Qazan Development of ecotourism in Gonbad Inter-basin water transfer (Galaz to Gonbad and Shinke Bi) Improvement of soil quality in agricultural lands Reinforcement of vegetation cover in Gonbad Silvi-pastoral development Rangelands allocation to animal husbandries Digging deep wells in Milan Modification of Qazan rangeland audits Modernization of traditional irrigation systems (continued on next page)

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

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Table A1 (continued) Number

Practices and measures

48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

Preventing conversion of rangelands to agricultural lands Enrichment of agricultural land Road construction in Milan to facilitate tourist attraction Revising village guide plan Improvement of agricultural water distribution canals Dispelling water leakage of the Gonbad dam Construction of a dam in the Chehel Asiyab Silvi-pastoral development in Qazan rangelands Silvi-pastoral development in Milan rangelands Flood zoning Digging deep wells in Gonbad Proper management of dam gates in Gonbad Management of beekeeping rangeland ownership Mineral water exploitation of springs Modification of Galaz rangeland audits Modification of Gonbad rangeland audits Beekeeping development Use of stored water in check dams for rangeland cover reinforcement Silvi-pastoral development in Chehel Asiyab rangelands Development of ecotourism in Zemmeh Sub-watershed Development of ecotourism in Shinke Bi Sub-watershed Converting agricultural lands to rangelands in Milan and Qazan Selection of proper product type for cultivation Converting rangelands to agricultural lands Implementation of the justification plan Preventing firing harvest residues Access road construction Development of medical plants utilization Water transfer (downstream to upstream in Galaz) Extraction of mineral water in Shinke Bi Water turbine installation in Chehel Asiyab Wind turbine installation Management of slope lands Horse breeding Managing rivers water rights Ski track construction Cultivation of greenhouse and organic plants Farming local chicken Development of handicrafts industry Quail farming Construction of textile production Construction of dairy factory Conducting tourism studies Controlling pollution resulted from fertilizers application Considering the region into environmental protection zones Comprehensive study on land use planning Construction of hostels and temporary dormitories

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