Method and theory in linguistics

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inally deiivvred at a threeute. Each paper is followquen t discussion ~ Frankly, one of this kind art: worth publiaries of work that is published dience”s immediate reactjons t this particular volume ‘Ias ns represent a wide variety of schools and interests: one is sorry to say so, but in a subject with ay well in itself be useful. And such widespread part chiality this Ily quite enlightening. WWXR~ of the session,; were ir divi : At the same timt:, the book as a whole can hardly be said to hang together. The declarer I aim of :Ihe conference was to”dii;cuss the place of method in linguist its’ : in part ocular, ‘the relation of met hod to theory’, ’ the develop men t of me 1.hodological principles’, and ‘the application of method to particul lir prlS3ble near to Garvin’s heart, and indee it is not contribution (‘Behavioral tests ir linguistics’ Madeleine Mat hiat (I l’heory-build ing in t h 48) c~rne closest 60 fulfilling rois intentions. The skeletal introductory paper by V. Et. Chao ~j’Sorneaspects of the rttlation between theory and method’, 1!?i-2Q) is lj kewix appropriate ; so also, for linguis.tics example, W. WinterC ‘Sshort disc,tission of comparative (‘Principles of the comparative method’, 14743). But as Garvin points out in his intrsc!uction (S-12), the culrference as a wh& kvbk a number of different ciiirections. The t\lr o iongtst cant ributions 1at h refer to method in their title: ‘Linguisti: methced in ethnography’ by D. Hymes (249-31 I), #nnd ‘Method, theory an(P phenomenology’ b3 67

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J, W, M. V2rhaar (42-82). But the former is more historical than methodological in its orientation: it is in fact a valuable survey of linguistic influences on anthropology in the Unitxl States - a rich and well-peopled tapestry in Hymes’s familiar manner. Verhaar’s paper is also useful and at times illuminating - in part a gallant attempt to dish up phenomenology for English-speaking readers, andB in part a comparison with Chomsky’s concept of linguistic theory. But this is simply ‘Theory and phenomcnology’ ; how does ‘Method’ in Garvin’s sense come into it? It is no disparagement of such papers to say that there is little gain in publishing them together. Nor can one discuss linguistic method simply by presenting a specific example of linguistic research. The third longest contribution has a promising title : ‘Experimental methods in psycholinguistics’, by J. Dubois and L. Iragaray (212-45). In fact it is simply a write-up of a single experiment - an interesting and pioneering experiment, concerned with the interactions of syntax and lexical collocation, but if there are any methodological cone I usions the reader must draw them by himself. Likewise F. DaneS offers little more than a summary of Czechoslovak researches into Functional Sentence Perspective (‘One instance of Prague School methodology: functional analysis of utterance and text’, 132-4(O). He adds some brief remarks at the beginmng, saying broadly speaking that the Prague School linguists have always been sound chaps who adopted a “balanced’ approach to their subject; but nothing is said in detail a’oout the methods which are illustrated. Surely the mere illustration is not sufficient for a collection on ‘Method and theory’ in general? But perhaps because of the heterogeneity of the volume, it is only the issues of theory and method which call for extended comment. In a linguistic investiga@tion, Garvin’s own approach is to restrict his a lpyio~i. theory to the minimum: a handful of ‘relatively simple assumptions about the nature of language’ (110). From these as-

sumptions we may derive a set of ‘methodological principles’ (95) which specify the type of procedure which is appropriate to a given type of analysis: in the paper before us, for exampIe, he illustrates the detailed format of a type of test which is commonly undertaken with informants - the motives and criteria for each particular tes arising, of course, from specific material at a specific stage of investigation. Now this approach is not ‘anti-theoreticat” (see the remark cited in his first footnote [95]). Nor can it be accused of con-

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founding theory Gth methodolq y, in the \j’av that Chomsky has ratisnalised under the rubric of Uiscovery pro4&lures’. Ci hat then would be a responsible critic’s ob ection to ia ? The book does not provide an aker, but it does provide 2.t least ary. According td R. E. , ‘what we really want in the way of li~g~j~tic di 5 perhaps, quite simply, a linguistic model: a set of ‘guide fnes which mnsist of sa notions’ wnccv-ning our subject-m; ttcr. It is ‘to the extent notions are devela;P:d and detail4 that WVcari ‘approach a new problem in any Jar age, whet he1 previau41b1 tudied or not’ (173). The debt to Choms and his scho 31is clear in indeed acknowledged. Longacre aceor :ling! y prescn t 5 is own eMoration of the familiar ‘size-lcvcl’ morlc4 of grammatical s:ructure, atld adds at the end what might be taken as a first sketch oft -R relevant ‘evaluation procedure’. For example, an analysis is bettc r to the elitent that it minimises ‘back40oping (IEl?)- tk I~SSi~~~~et~tfy, that is, that a structural, unit at one level it-, the hierarchy is assigned as part of a unit at the levei lower, the second level lowel, and so 01;:.There would, unfortunatcly. be pmblcms in attemptin, 3 to make this principle and those which follow (187-90) precise. To take the most general point alone, it is not clear quitI: what an eval lation procedure would takt? as its input. Would it consider the strut tures assigned to specific sentences in the data ? Presumably not, silice Longacre’s ‘methodological observations a\, i suggestions’ are a ready cast in terms of the generalto the other extreme and evaluate ised ‘syntagmemes’. a formal statemonl oi a size-level ‘grammar’ “iOne ftbels this is not his intention ; but is t IPer@a feasible alternative It would have helped if the discussion ( 19 14) could have criticize. Longacre’s paper from generative concept of iing&tics. As so often the standpoint 0% a cr throughout this beak, it concentrates instead on the specific substantive proposals and not on thl? SORT OF THING which these proposals were intended to da. But at least we may note how well this papt:r lends itself to intcrpretatian in Chomskyan terms. In particular, what room wo Aid be left for the investigation of method as Marvin conceives it ? Obviously, Longacre would say, there are some ot her things which must in practice be considered. Like any investigzl.tor of anything, we need ‘methods’ for obtaining and evaluating ditta: examples are the well-known techniques of

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eliciting forms within a paradigm, of assessing the adequacy of a corpus, and the iike. It may also help if we learn to keep o”tr notebooks tidily, to recall and cross-reference our material, and so on; a good deal of Longacre’s arguably mistitled Grammar discovery ~6rocedwesis concerned with just such matters. I3ut should we admit any vital role for organised ‘linguistic analysis’? Many linguists would follow Chomsky and say no. The crucial point is that given “observational adequacy’, with respect to sufficient ‘primary linadequacy’ can allegedly be guistic data’, relative ‘descriptive measured, within an ‘explanatorily adequate’ theory, by means of a. formal evaluation. Qua theoreticians and methodologists we are not then ‘interested’, for example, in th; structure of a ‘behavioural test’ . $B?f,\, ,* taking for morph-segmentation (Garvm’s **PO+ rhlJL ;l~ll+=atio~, lll\lO1. .‘-m____ tfrp ___-1 grammar as a whole, ‘rules’ which assign a set of ‘structural descriptions’ with the right segmentation should be ‘simpler’ (SC. in terms of an er,+&icaily correct evaluation measure) than those which get it wrong. NOWLongacre does not speak in such language, at least. Rut we might put it to him: in principle, is there anything in this aspect of Chomsky’s philosophy which he would not be willing or else driven (by the logic of his remarks before us) to accept? By 1964 American attitudes on this point had already so far hardened that the conference yielded not a breath of a discussion. The stock argument for an evaluation procedure is that it is, in fact, the w ?akest requirement that can be placed on a linguistic theory: one recalls the relevant chapter in Chomsky’s SJV&JG~Z'G strzcctures. Garvin’s 0 wn proposals can only be interpreted, through these eyes, as an attempt to meet the considerably stronger requirement of a discovery procedure. But a grammar is nothing less than a theory of the particular language; surely in other sciences it is unheard of to demand, etc., etc. Unfortunately, such recitals have been dinned so persistently in our ears that we are apt to forget that they are sometimes irrelevant . Marly iinguists are not concerned with a formal procedure of any kind. Quite simply, they would dispute that either the development or the evaluation of hypotheses can be the province of a ‘linguistic theory’ in Chomsky’s sense. Thus Garvin’s concept of a general theory is, as we have seen, significantlv restricted. He RIV rejects the concept of a grammar as itxlf d ‘theory’ ; it is simply ‘a description based on a theory’ (95). A ‘generative grammar’, if I may interpret this position in terms which I have learnt from W. Haas in

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particular, TMXXI kw sed?lnas no more than an account or summary, at uEts af a linguistic analysis that in, would all linguists n between ‘descriptive’ and ‘~b~rvat~~n~’ adequacy. It is only in this wider context that a profitable ct One important q is whether evaluation procedures in turn are feasiblf: t us accept the case against dist a formal metatheory tthe the most adequate theory iven data. But is it not indeed extraordinary to expecl that a metatheory should provide assessments of empirical correctness (in Ghomsky’s ‘descriptive’ sense) at all! Adequacy, it would be said, can only be the fruit of a sound and imaginative application of ii uistic method : techniques of observation, analysis, ex rimc,nt, d so on, We have again no right to demand that a theory of ‘correctness’ - even of reiative ‘correctness’ - of theories sI!ould plaovide a ‘rigorous’ solution. Now the transformationalist answer 1.0 all this presumably lies in the theory of universals. An explanatorily adequate theory is, above all, a restriction of the type of gramnlar for which correctness is even admissible: this involves a specificiktion of ‘formal’ universals (as is in part attempted, whether successfuI.ly or unsuccessfully, in Longacre’s paper) and also of ‘substantive’ universals which restrict, to put it loosely, the very categories in terms of which the data may be analysed. It is not on the mere evaluation measure, therefore, tha ake burden is intended to fall. The basic error of Marvin and many others, one would reply, is to work from a general model which is s;3 arbitrarily impoverished. It is in this comlection that we may turn to P. M. Postal’s contribution : ‘The method of universal grammar’ (I 13-27). Postal’s roncerns the retlexive construction : after particular illustrattion ._-,~anrrnng the facts of English in particular and then Mohawk in particular (11644) he abstracts a pair of rules, for ‘ordinary anawhich are tentatively ‘assumed’ phora’ and ’ reflezcive anaphora’, (124) to be obligal ory for all languages. The fact that such rules can be formulated, ‘in such diverse and superficially different languages as Mohawk and English’, is ‘some evidence that a rich universal grammar does exist and is discoverable’ (127). The discussion which followed was agai,n devoted, in the main, to the specific substantive

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proposals; in fact, some of Postal’s points were verye tentative. One questioner also wondere (I (whether ‘universal statements’ can be made on the evidence of just two languages (130). Postal’s reply is, of course, in principle correct : such statements are intended as hypetheses, and indeed it is ‘perfectly reasonable’ for a hypothesis to be advanced on nc: contrastive evidence whatsoever (~oc. cit. ; see also a comment by Victoria Fromkin at an earlier session [36]). On the ot.her hand, we must also abide by the standards of responsible scholarship. I might suggest, let us say, that all languages use similar particles in locative and temporal expressions (e.g., English i~zLondon or in A@& at WembZr!y or at teatime, and so on). This is verifiable anuA m;ah+ 1111~U &be interesting if true. However, it can already be checked extensively with the aid of published grammars. It would therefore be a cause for scandal -though not, we will still adrnit, for methodological scandal - if I were to publish a paper without first doing ‘so. ‘Izut surely Postal’s approach is open to more serious objections. How precisely, we must ask, does one frame and verify hypotheses of this kind? How do we determine, for example, if the reflexive constructions of Ianguagqs X, y and z do in fact display significant resemblances? Now many linguists would .begin by asking for a definition of the term ‘reflexive construction’. We may then have to inquire, as a first step, whether all our languages ‘have got’ constructions to which this term is applicable. If so, the answers will themselves be interesting. Alternatively, the definition may be such that a language could hardly be expected not to satisfy it: thus it might simply be based on co-reference within one-verb sentences Ne hit himself being ‘refle:;ive’ just because the /ze and h&self refer to the same person. In eii her case, we will then find that the construction in any particl+r !22,-~a+m display:; three sorts of properties. The first are simply the defining properties themselves. The second are those which may be shown to follow from the defining properties, either directly or in conjunction again with r;‘eatures that can hardly be expected to be absent. For example, if ‘reflexives’ are indeed established simply by co-reference it 1s inot surprising that, in addition, reflexive sentences such as We hit hiwad/ or I hit m~~~st$/ can be seen to fil; out paradigms composed of sentences without coreference, such as He hit me and I hit him (cf. Postal’s properties E3 for English, M3 for Mohawk). Thirdly, however, there will be many properties that seem entirely independent. For example, it does net

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follow that co-referenze should be marked bv a constant grammatical Seh?s. Nor does it follow that a first have a different form from the lish I id mvsel~ versus tee hit n~e which is &presented by I like *Il%c 1properties E4 and M4]). If eithe of these was universal - which, of course, t lhey are not ,- we eou claim to have made a ~+~.~ine discovery. A+n, we could pro rly advance the hypothesis {compare Postal on the basis of E and M6) that an element which marks the reflexive i t9 simple sent rices will net cr appear when the relation of co-reference extends into an emt:~&?eJ structure. This too is prilna facia wrong (e.g., Latin se in the Accuxat ive and Infinitive construction), but a’: least we know what VIe are doing. We can pro~xse genuine hyl:otheses, which can be verified or falsified for any language on which we have the information. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be Postal’s way of procerc?a ing. He does not begin with an Q:@+ori definition of ‘reflexiveness’ ; we &are merely referred to ‘c&ses of sentences . . . which have traditionally been ca.Iled’ by this name (I 16). Nor does he examine his listed properties of English arld Mohawk to see how far they may be interdependent; ht if they do not initiall>, ‘seem’ independent then the fact that cc?rtain ‘similarities’ are ‘predicted’ by his rules (126) is of scant explanatory interest ! Now tht? lack of a definition would be comprehcrm~ible in an inductive study. We would begin, let us say, by writing ;L generative grammar for English ‘in its own terms’. This might contain a ‘syntactic feature x which is realised in str& eta. $$rite separately we would then write a grammar of Mohawk, alsc ‘in its own terms’. This might contain a feature y which is realised by a special object agreemf?nt marker atat (120). \\Tt would then find a partial ‘1somorphism’ between the rules for x 011the one hand and those for I on the other. ventually, we would have a univerqar ~P:UIUII;~~to the extent that ail languages, when Charact erised initia I !y ‘ il f fhocir own terms’, turn out to display this sort of corresponderce. This is comprehensible, as kdfesaid, and may indeed be attractive Isr examy le, to older members of the school of to some linguists American descriptive linguist .cs which is represented by H. Pitkin in the present volume (‘MetLod and theory in the perspective of anthropolq$cal litig uistics’, 27-33). But it is certainly not the ap-

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preach which Postal intended! To describe each language in its own terms is for him ‘as misguided as it is impossible’ (127). And, of course, we would be back with all th91:problems of inductive linguistic analysis which the transformationalists have been trying to escape from. But how does he, in fact, propose to guarantee a scientific basis? His particular ‘hypothesis’ consists, as we have said, of two rules: the first assigns a feature ‘ + Anaphoric’ to any Noun-phrase that is identical with a preceding Noun-phrase in the same deep structure, and the second an additional feature ‘-+ Reflexive’ if, at ‘some point K in transformational derivations’, there is no undcrlying ‘sentence’ of which one but not: the other is part. Both fcaturcs are assigned to the head Noun; Postal ad& a subsidiary rule by which all modifiers of ‘ + Anaphoric’ Nouns are deleted (125). The consequence:3 for surface structure then ‘depend on the rules and lexical conditions of the relevant language’. Thlls English has a special rule for se& Mohawk for ntat, and so on. Bl~i how in principle could such a ‘hypothesis’ be falsified? Obxziously, Postal would retort, if WCfind a language whose grammar could not contain them! But is such a language conceivable - one ‘Lhat can be generated, that is to say, by a transformational gramma but net, for example, if it assigns the feature ‘-+ Keflcxivc’ in this sort of way? Presumably there are two possibilities. The first is that the deep structures might not meet the conditions uuder which these rules apply. But that means, in effect, thlzt the language would exclude co-reference : that its ‘semantic representations’ could not include the equivalent of English sentences such as He kit kintsetf, John said he (i.e., John) co&d not co1;12e, and so on. This hardly seems likely. The second 3s that its ‘surface structurrts’ could not be derivccl f; om the intermediate structures, ‘at level K’, which result from their application. But how can this be imagined ? Let us suppose, for example, that ‘EC’is such that in Latin grammar a structure such as Caesar dixit $hesarem ueGsse]s will indeed exist without CQc:scgYerN,b being marked as ‘+ Reflexive’. Nevertheless would we ha.ve any difficulty in writing a transformation - SOME transformation, at least - to derive tile Pronoun se correctly ? Let us imagine, again J ;:L quasi-English in which He lzit Jzijn is ambiguous in precisely the sarm: sense as He said be cotildut’t. Would we have any difficulty in form-_+ lating ‘lexical co:rlditions’ by which the realisations of [3rd singular, + Reflexive] andI [3rd singular, - Reflexive] fell together?

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hypot hcsis i X7mIcr wha *. ci rcums ancc j do M t: :sa_vthat one grc Imar, with or without these 7&s, ie i xM33- of’ t-wx than another? The problem of criteria .- cri * 1~: ria for c’ c+scri;?:ive .tdecpacy, if that is what the reader likes to call ir _ is extrrrneiy diffkllf-. 13nt we cannot evade it simply 1>5’the post ul~tk~ of a ‘rich ~lni~cr4 grammar’ ; unless the :cjfied, this it self c; .nn01 ‘exist ’ as a vcrifiak’e proposal. ri?; review i’: is per! ap:; ;LS~cll tl) stress that linguistics is a very d3fficult discipline. Ont reaacon, I nqclf Micve, is that its rnetho~~s att~i ohjectivcas a:*fj ext rean~t’ly he!CW+pwtJUs; there is no single framework. into wtic h every in,vestigatltrn neatly falls. At the beginning ()f J. i’. Rorra’ 4 (:ontrib*i;ron (‘A structural view of sociolinguist its' 199-208) W: f lrld him 4;zclaring that ‘it i:; impossibk to do aceuratrb work in a:?y scknce wit bout first having delimited the scope, the theory, an fhe method< logy of that w ence (199). But have we such i thing as ‘WE theory’ or ‘THE mefh~fology', even for the particukr branch I hat XZonais c%~~~ing? Certainly we have no such unity f>r linguistics ac ~1.wholi:. W at is there in common, for example, between the nlc!thotis of expr onetics and comparative plGlalogy ? Thr: fornler is indeed ;sn experimental science, whose particular prolrlt rns resemble those of other scientists conl:erned with liuing sub el.:ts. But tht latter is observational and taxonomic ; the clost~~ paralY4s must bta sought in anothel? direction, e.g. in t hc study of o3mplex. manuscr pt traditions. In neither of these cases is therlc any sericu!i doubt as to what the methoc!s are (It would have been difficult, for exa.mple, ft,r Winter’s contribution to have added func,famencally to the work of Me&t and others). But they are simply very differt>nt* How the11 can a scholar understand ‘linguistic method’ without a grasp and an experience of both?

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Now at this point a pigeon-holcr may be tempted to redefine i;ur discipline. Experimental phonetics, he might say, is not a branch of linguistics at all. Instead it belongs to psychology - cross-classified no doubt, but nevertheless with under ‘linguistic psychology’, methods that only find their coherence in the psychological field. Contrast, comparative philology must be reassigned as a branch of history - subclassified, perhaps, under prehistory and likewise crossclassified as linguistic rather than political, economic, and so forth. Again, within the rump of linguistics proper, we could l lttcmpt a reclassification of its own remaining subdisciplines ; thul; Rona, in the paper which we have cited, proposes a scheme of ‘ cd (diachronic V~YSZLT synchronic; ‘diatopic’, for a gcographit:al study, V~YS~ZIS ‘syntopic’ ; ‘diastratic’, referring to sociocultural str Ita., versus ‘synstratic’, 200-20 1) within which sociolinguistics has its own lit tic area and methods of investigation. Now one appreciates that for many people this is intellectually attractive. And it may be that the variety of method and theory in linguistics COULD be rationalised in this sort of way. But it offers little help with the realities of out situation. A linguist syecialising in a particular language must often act both as a comparative linguist and as a phonetican, as a ‘sociolinguist’ and as a dialectologist, as a dictionary-maker and a.s a syn. chronic grammarian, simply as part of the total ;nvcs%.@ion of his data. One cannot in practice tear these various activitit?s apart : it is notoricus, for example, that a man untrained in compaiativCb linguistics may not then be able to keep his mind from the subject, but will frequently end by doing it badly. In this sense the discipline ‘linguistics’ has an ineluctable unity, and any linguist has to tnaster the large variety of ‘melhods’ that it offers. Another difficulty, let us admit, is that these methods arc often obscure. Sometimes we seem in practice to be clear enough as to what we are doing; it is surely too much to say that ‘accurate work’ is possible only when everything has been neatly codified. But occasionally we are in real confusion. At the moment, this seems particularly true of the many investigations into language universals -. which excuses, I hope, the space that I have devoted to Postal’s relatively early and exploratory paper. If people must organise conferences, then ‘The methodology of universal grammar’ is one of the less unprofitable topics that might now be chosen. In the end, however, the hard core of our difficulties springs simply

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from thf: natr;rra r)i ow- wbject-matter. In thy discussion of Pitkin’s basically saltstar\+ contribution, b’ictoria Fromkin refers to ‘the hiotsry af xi ::ncr:’in other fiel in particular ‘in the most advanced scien xs wzh a+ physics ’ (35-6~ ; her specific point is that thesrie!~ need not IX limited to ‘immediately obscrvab~e data’. But is there a true MI& qy, a2sPitkin in turn inquires, between a ‘science’ LIKE linguistics ar d a ‘~ciencc’ LIH phyks? Thth problem is not that linguist cs i9 z\t thi4 stagt~ ‘Ii524aclv:mciC wi1 the descri yt ive linguist cmx be able to pr qwtse an ordinary mat he atical theory for a language, Gil hc c’t’cr be ddc to falsify a ‘t hwrg’ by ant* observation, will he t wf 1~ ;h f* to wnstrwt m dbsoht4.~ test of its predictions? Surely WCd&rtl~~ ~n-~lves if we imagine that linguistics will be ‘like physics’ somet irnc: in 9:hc future. Kor is it simply t at the data are ‘infinitely mJrt! compkx’ (hc. cit.) ; all i%StrOnOmer, for example, might properly greet this with a hollow laugh. Nor, yet again, is it merely ! hat cur l;inguagcs arc ull of arbitrary exceptions - though now, al.*eady, WE have left the astronomer behind. 1t is rather tla?+ the extfnt of o\‘rq-data is in ~~rinciple nlot precise. Languages change, and language ,intcracts continuously with other forms of wcial behaviwr ; f0r I hcsc reasons a synchrcnic grammar is notoriously the product of ;abstraction. We cannot c:onduct a closed experiment with our informwts. We cannot eves tw expected to account for ‘all of the 4ata’, simply I>ecause we do not know what ‘all of the data’ means’ Thence ctre p;rrallels in other sziences, of course ; but tendentiolrs am4ogiec Gth astronomy, phvsics, and the like will onlyc lead tct worse rL.isunderstanding. I have str cssed this point becausl> tllesre is a tendency to pay too much obeisa.ncfy to the fashionab e philosophies of science. As C. I. J M, S~uarrr remarks, there is c n a ‘timidity’ in some linguists’ use of tcrm~ : ’ 1.1.is almost as if we are afraid that some authoritarian legisla tive ;~sse~~~biyis going to chastise us because we have been using word; w,rongly’ (25). Thus Stuart emphasizes, contra more l>e($antic m~tmhcrs of the conference (e.g., 24), that there is no single ay we add that there is also no usage for ;P Terry su:h as ‘model’. single conr:t!pt c 1fa ‘science ’ ? Sciences t.tirne in various sorts and we, for example, m)Yst simply learn to cope with ocr subject as it is.