Mobilization against “agricultural terrorism” and the political-economy of agriculture in Israel

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Mobilization against “agricultural terrorism” and the political-economy of agriculture in Israel Tomer Dekel Department of Geography and Environmental Development, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er-Sheva, Israel

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Agricultural crime Agricultural policy Political-economy Mobilization Framing

This article addresses political mobilization of farmers and the political-economy of Jewish agriculture in Israel, which is caught in the tension between nationalism and post-nationalism, and between socialism and neoliberalism. In contrast with early Jewish farmers, who enjoyed the ideological backing of a robust national movement, and later intervention by a protectionist state, farmers now find themselves in a more fragile position. They gradually lost their prestige in the eyes of the mainstream (Zionist) public, and the neo-liberalizing state is withdrawing many types of its traditional support. The article focuses on the mobilization of Jewish farmers against such trends, and particularly, against the wave of crime they are experiencing, which they frame as “agricultural terrorism.” Two case-studies – The New Guardian movement and The Dromi Law – are surveyed in more depth. In both cases, the mobilization uses symbolic events to amass political influence, recruit supportive activists, allocate resources and reshape the law to enable civil society to act in “self-defense” against criminals. To analyze how the discourse of terrorism is used and the context that underlies it, I draw on theoretical frameworks developed by Foucault, Bourdieu, and Lefebvre. Topics discussed include how framings of terrorism and pioneering produce Israel's agricultural spaces and policies in the 21st century; how neoliberal logic is internalized by farmers who turn to civil society and self-help; and how they invoke national images in an attempt to regain the social prestige they have lost during the post-nationalist era.

1. Introduction While policy debates about economic reform of agriculture commonly use dry jargon about efficiency, profits, yields, and so forth, these debates in Israel commonly utilize concepts that might sound strange to Western ears, such as land redemption, sacrifice, or terrorism. This article explores how (Jewish) farmers' mobilization and framing of political discourse in Israel shape and are shaped by the political-economy of agriculture, which is caught in the ideological tension between nationalism and post-nationalism, and between socialism and neoliberalism. The study focuses on the struggle to find support for combatting agricultural crime (theft, sabotage, extortion payments), which farmers consider fundamental threats to their economic and social survival. Two related cases are highlighted – the rise of The New Guardian movement and the passage of the Dromi Law. In both cases ideological images and identities, with deep roots in Zionist discourse, are utilized to (re-)frame agricultural crime as “agricultural terrorism,” agricultural space as a frontier, and farmers as pioneers who “guard the nation's lands.” These cases are analyzed using data and illustrations gathered from professional reports, media coverage, and several semi-structured interviews with farmers and activists.

In contrast with the common dichotomic views on the subject, myth and material reality are blended in the struggle of individuals and associations over security, aid, economic capital, and recognition, within a context of the increased vulnerability and deteriorating social prestige of farmers. While these dynamics receive much public and political attention in Israel, they have received very little scholarly treatment. Policy debates on the future of agriculture, which are ignorant of these factors, can be expected to be futile or even destructive for farmers. 2. Theoretical framework For the purpose of analyzing these issues, I make use of three prominent writers, namely, Lefebvre's production of space, Bourdieu's understanding of capital, and Foucault's discourse analysis, and the ways in which they are used in mobilization studies. I explain how the discourse of agricultural terrorism is framed by farmers, how this frames certain agricultural spaces, and the motivations underlying this project. Foucault's (1972) discourse analysis is utilized in social constructivist and social movement theory. In particular, I refer to Sandberg (2006) who combined Foucault with framing theory, which

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2019.10.018 Received 8 January 2019; Received in revised form 17 September 2019; Accepted 6 October 2019 0743-0167/ © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Please cite this article as: Tomer Dekel, Journal of Rural Studies, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2019.10.018

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defines “frames” as “schemata of interpretation” used by individuals to attach meaning to events and occurrences. Frames encompass a diagnosis of a problem, a prognosis, and a call to action for its resolution. However, agents cannot apply any frame to any situation. Foucault highlights structural social constructions, like discourse, that impose boundaries on how participants in a social movement frame their own movement, its political opportunities and politics in general. Compared to frames, discourses are broader structures of language that determine the speech acts possible for actors in a field. For Foucault, systems of meaning are relatively stable. Sandberg overcomes the contradiction between the views emphasizing agency and those emphasizing structure by proposing that framing is part repetition and part creation. Creativity must take place within a discursive order and be based on existing discourses in society. As shown by Bryant and Garnham (2013), for example, farmers are trapped within discursive structures of neoliberal hegemony, and have very little room for resistance (see also Guthman, 2008). However, along with Halpin (2017), I wish to show how, despite neoliberal hegemony, agricultural interest groups still have agency within that structure, and can shape it for their benefit. I further connect this framing to Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith (1991) theory of space production, which has been used in mobilization studies (Dekel et al., 2019) to show how social movements and networks are not confined to dealing with abstract policy issues. Because “space is at once perceived, conceived, and lived” (Schmid, 2008: 43), movements can and must produce the alternative spaces they desire, via multiple paths: contesting legal constructions, shaping material spaces, and invoking alternative emotions and ideologies of space. When studying rural mobilization, agricultural space should thus be seen as constituted by multiple, overlapping frames. An agricultural movement that seeks to contest political-economic policies must (re-)frame itself and its space ideologically and (re-)produce this space materially to enable and promote change; while obviously considering the limits of existing discursive, material, and legal structures. Lastly, to understand the context of mobilization, I turn to Bourdieu's (1986) theory concerning the various forms of capital. Elaborating on his ideas, Atkinson (2015) explains that the political-economic study of class-struggle should treat capital as a fluid category, shaped not only by the differential accumulation of economic capital, but also by the parallel accumulation of social capital (networks, organizations), and cultural capital (style, knowledge). These forms of capital are interchangeable, and measured according to the social recognition of them as valuable, as possessing symbolic capital (prestige, recognition, etc.). The process unfolds continuously: each form of capital is used to gain other forms, ultimately manifested as symbolic capital, which is, in turn, used to gain even more economic, social, or cultural capital, and so on. In this light, the political-economic and class conflicts which unfold within it, are understood here as stretching far beyond the purely economic realm. As Greenspan (2014) shows, social movements can use different forms of capital forms instrumentally and convert between them to reach their goals.

previous levels of services and experience a decline in social and human capital (Sullivan et al., 2015). Under the hegemonic economist discourse, agrarian ethics (e.g., Jeffersonian ideals) are marginalized and agricultural policies are expected to be framed solely in respect to rationalist utilitarian foundations. The farmers' way of life or connection to the land and nation, which guided past policies, are rendered irrelevant (Mariola, 2005). Farmers' changing status has led them to mobilize in various arenas, and mount a struggle against these trends and advance their politicaleconomic position, especially for confronting global competition and threats of decreasing revenues. Agricultural interest groups collaborate in movements and associations to lobby, campaign, protest and produce knowledge in hopes of influencing public opinion and policymakers (Halpin, 2017). Some have pointed that these movements reproduce neoliberal practices while allegedly opposing neoliberalism writ large (Guthman, 2008). Conversely, although the movements find it harder to justify protectionism, regulation, and subsidies when confronted with contrasting dominant neoliberal agendas (with their supportive national and global institutions), the liberalization of agriculture is still a process open to political negotiation (Busch, 2010; Carroll, 2015; Dibden et al., 2009). The Israeli case provides an intriguing example for the unfolding mobilization of farmers through state politics and civil society, in face of such challenges. 4. Political-economy and discourse of Jewish agriculture Jewish agriculture in Israel has gone through significant changes with many similarities to other Western contexts, but also a few unique characteristics, especially in its relationship to socialism and nationalism. Agriculture in Israel was once synonymous with Zionism, the Jewish national movement. Pioneering Jewish farmers who settled the frontiers of what-would-be Israel, established “facts on the ground,” spatially asserting the Zionist demand for national territory. Moreover, through cultivation – with various degrees of socialist organization – it was believed that Jews could shed their stereotypical bourgeoisie, rootless character and produce a “new man,” nationalist, healthy in body and spirit, and rooted in the land he cultivates and guards. Farmer-settlers, organized in movements that expanded the number and dispersal of settlements, were very important in the early struggles for statehood. After 1948, more settlements were established as part of the new state's attempts to Judaize compromised landscapes: hostile borders and other internal frontiers, where settlement and cultivation was meant to protect the so-called “friction-line” from infiltration, and most of all, against encroachment by Arabs who attempted to reclaim the lands they fled or were expelled from during the 1948 war (Feitelson, 1999; Temper, 2009). The (practical) ideology guiding this endeavor was summarized in the saying “where the Jewish plow tills the last furrow, there our border lies.” As pioneer-warriors of the Zionist movement, farmers enjoyed tremendous social prestige and were supported accordingly with state subsidies, protectionism, and other kinds of aid (Feitelson, 1999). Recent decades have seen significant shifts that undermined the political, social, and economic status of Jewish agriculture. The economic crisis of the 1980s and subsequent liberalization of the economy caused many farmers to experience economic hardships. The hardest to be hit were the socialist settlements (kibbutzim). The state rescued many of them financially but in return, they had to forfeit lands and had to undergo structural adjustment (privatization). The parallel rise of the conservative right to political power shifted governmental attention and budgets to the needs of other sectors and populations, and an embrace of suburban, non-farmer, Zionist settlers (Applebaum and Sofer, 2012; Feitelson, 1999; Kislev, 1993; Sofer and Applebaum, 2006). During the late 1990s, governmental support of agriculture dropped to half its previous level (Tal, 2007). As a response to these changes, many farmers have gradually diversified their livelihood by introducing new land-uses including tourism, retail, residential or

3. Background: political-economy and discourse of agriculture Agriculture is experiencing significant changes in neoliberal, postmodern times. It was once widely considered an exceptional sector, deserving special policy treatment, and the foundation of the social order; farmers were seen as the custodians of the countryside. As such, agriculture enjoyed high levels of government protectionism and subsidies, enduring to some degree even into the age of economic liberalization. Agricultural associations facilitated close working relationships with policymakers. With that, when neo-liberalization grabs hold of national policies, farmers lose their previous subsidies and protections. This is happening as the sector globalizes, agriculture's contribution to the GDP is shrinking, it employs fewer people, and small farms disappear in favor of large corporations (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2012; Halpin, 2017). Rural settlements are denied of their 2

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Agriculture is often depicted in media and public discourse as a profession that has neither prestige nor an economic future, in contrast with its past glory (e.g., Shpigel, 2015). The average age of farm owners is over 60, and they are often portrayed as the last in their line. The young leave to work in other, more profitable sectors; they move from their parents' villages and move to metropolitan centers, especially when the village is in the periphery (see Applebaum and Sofer, 2012). One farmer was quoted in a typical description: “The message for our future generations is: stay away [from agriculture and the rural settlements], nothing to do here” (in Shpigel, 2015). While agriculture is growing and some (Jewish) farmers enjoy the new “liberalized” situation, many others, especially in remote locales, are facing a crisis: not only of extended economic risk but also diminishing social prestige and legitimacy, as well as degeneration of their communities.

commercial rentals, partially shedding their relation to agriculture in the process. Some practice off-farm employment by one or two members of the household, whether full or part time, within or outside the rural settlement. Others have moved to cities, and were replaced by new, non-agricultural suburban residents. Rural institutions have embraced the latter and put great effort into attracting them to suburban expansions of the villages, hoping they will counter the strong trends of outmigration, aging, and financial decline in these settlements. This has put some on the road for new flourishing, but many other rural settlements, especially those far from metropolitan cores, remain stagnant or continue declining demographically and economically (Applebaum and Sofer, 2012; Kimhi, 1994; Sofer, 2001; Sofer and Applebaum, 2006). Retamim, a Jewish settlement in southern Israel, is an extreme but not sole example of a village nearly abandoned and resettled only in 2009; most of the new residents are non-farmers. A decline in the relative economic significance of agriculture (today, around 3% of the GDP), coupled with widespread economic and demographic decline of rural settlements, was accompanied by ideological marginalization of agriculture and farmers in Zionism. Not only they were no longer seen by many as pioneers; some even blamed them for grabbing public lands, and misusing state subsidies and resources. Their socialist history weakened their status in the eyes of the new conservative ruling party. Neoliberals and environmentalists blamed the “rent-seeking well-organized, highly-informed agricultural interests” (Feitelson, 2005: 421) for disrupting the market, harming ecological systems, and increasing food prices through the promotion of tariffs and water subsidies, using their lobby and political parties (Heruti-Sober, 2014). Many farmers find themselves in a vulnerable economic position with little political support behind them. This does not mean that, as a whole, they are damaged by the shift. Liberalization has opened the technologically sophisticated, productive Israeli agricultural sector to global markets for its goods, and also to cheap labor markets. Since Jewish agriculture was privatized, it has consistently relied on labor that is 50% foreign or Palestinian (Fanos, 2017; Temper, 2009; Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016) – both groups have limited rights, and little ability to mobilize politically. In public discourse the word “farmer” is now (mostly) synonymous with owner-employer. Other Jews employed in agriculture are mainly in managerial and professional positions (Kimhi, 2015). Though it operates in and enjoys free global markets, Israeli agriculture is still regulated and protected by the state with quotas, tariffs, and subsidies, which occasionally draws criticism from economists (Heruti-Sober, 2014; Sorochkin, 2017) and even threats of sanctions from global institutions (Arlozorov, 2016). The productivity of agriculture is constantly rising, as well as revenues from capital and work. This progress and reorganization pushed many to sell, because it is harder to make a livelihood from small-scale plots. Thus, while some corporations expand, small farmers struggle to hold on (Fanos, 2017; Ministry of Agriculture, 2009; Temper, 2009). Agricultural non-profit organizations operate an assertive lobby, and they have representatives in both right- and left-wing parties to counter the threatening trends of liberalization. They often launch campaigns on relevant issues, like increases in water prices, subsidy cuts, and so forth (Feitelson, 2005; e.g., Davar Rishon, 2016; Knesset, 1992). One farmer-protester summarized his discontent with both liberalization and the corporate power of retailers: “They have increased the price of water, opened the gates to foreign imports … The farmers are supposed to control the market, not the supermarkets. We work year-round, do all the hard work, we sweat, drown in the mud, and get wet in the rain just to make some profit, and it is not fair that they hurt us” (in Eisenbud, 2016). The speaker turns to narratives of Socialist Zionism, that valued labor, hard work, and equity, hoping to raise sympathy for his distress – a recurrent but arguably less than useful effort, because Israeli-Jewish society has mostly left socialism behind, and tends to value entrepreneurship, competition, and individual success.

5. Agricultural crime in Israel Farmers in Israel have always faced theft, sabotage, and extortion payments that burden them financially with the loss of crops and machinery, costly protective measures (fences, patrols, etc.), higher insurance payments (or the refusal of insurance companies to issue policies to farmers), and mental stress. In comparison to parallel kinds of crime in urban settings, agricultural crime is harder to prevent due to the high costs of monitoring the relatively large, uninhabited areas it targets (Gal, 1998; Tal, 2007; Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016; State comptroller, 2016); but inefficient policing also has a political cause. The State comptroller (2016) recently determined that agricultural crime is expanding because it is a low priority item for the police and government, lacks budgets, and policy decisions are poorly implemented. A prominent feature of agricultural crime in Israel is the overwhelming representation of Arabs (either Israeli citizens or Palestinians) among the perpetrators while a vast majority of the victims are Jewish farmers. According to published police data, between 2011 and 2015, 80% of reported agricultural crime was committed by Arabs1 (Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016). This fact is at the heart of the public-political discussion on the issue, although academic research has nearly ignored it (Hassanein (2016)). While the question of why Arabs commit (agricultural) crime is not the subject of this article, the issue must be addressed in order to understand the discourse surrounding it. The generally high rate of crime in Arab society in Israel is explained by common socio-economic theories: low economic status, deep socioeconomic gaps between Arabs and Jews, social ruptures caused by modernization, and the breakdown of traditional socio-cultural structures (Ali, 2014; Ronen, 2010; Zussman et al., 2016). Agricultural crime, in particular, may be related to the fact that many Arabs are farmers, so they have the necessary knowledge and social-economic networks to sell or use the stolen goods efficiently. Arab herders can find rational advantages for pushing other herders off their lands – through sabotage, theft, and threats – so they can subsequently take over and use the area. Nevertheless, these are partial explanations that cannot sufficiently explain such a strong tendency of Arabs to commit (agricultural) crime against Jewish (farmers). Hassanein (2016), Hasisi and Weitzer (2007), and Korn (2000) claim that the national, political conflict is the crucial catalyst. The Arabs feel alienated from the state, specifically from the police and law-enforcement apparatus. For decades, not only was no effort made to provide them with proper police service for their benefit, the law and police criminalized many of their norms, discriminated against them, expropriated their land, and persecuted political activists who challenged the Zionist hegemony. This post-colonialist approach may seem radical to some but, to a high degree, it has been reflected in official state declarations, such as 1 Given that most crime goes unreported this figure does not represent the accurate scale of the phenomenon.

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Jewish sovereign off the land “disguised as criminal activity” (Amitai, head of The Farmers Association, in: Knesset, 2018). With the eruption of terrorism and the indifference of the police, a few farmers indeed forfeited their land, and Arab herders began to use it instead. The underlying Zionist rationale is that the Jewish farmer, in his routine economic use of the land (which he leases or rents from a state agency), is a manifestation of the sovereign. More than an ideology, this is enshrined in law. The vast majority of agricultural land in Israel is owned by the state and leased to farmers. Under this contract, leasers are usually forbidden to allow any use by others, and are required to safeguard the land from “mal use” (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009). The campaign against agricultural terrorism has gained a significant foothold in public, media, and political discourse. Repeated protests against agricultural terrorism have demanded the state to solve the crisis by prioritizing it in police activity and subsidizing insurance for farmers (The Agricultural Union, 2018). The framing of criminal offenses against farmers as “terrorism” was recently reinforced by its overlap with kite terrorism, in which thousands of kites and balloons carrying incendiary devices have been launched from the Gaza Strip over the border fence, with the explicit aim of torching Jewish fields, harming and terrorizing the Israeli public. Despite this, the concept of agricultural terrorism has also been contested by prominent figures in Zionist politics and the national establishment. Among them are the Minister of Agriculture and the Chief of Police, who agreed there is no terrorist-nationalist intention behind most crimes (except for kite terrorism) but rather, an economic one (Cohen, 2018). Based on several indicators, the police concluded that only 1% of agricultural crime is motivated by Arab nationalist aspirations (Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016). This announcement led to critique and ridicule of farmers for their racism against Arabs, and manipulation of public fears to milk governmental budgets (Foier, 2018). These claims ignited outrage among farmers who responded to the accusation by pointing to the foul assumptions behind the police's conclusions: farmers have deep distrust of authorities and only 20% of them report to the police when victimized; nationalist intention is hard to determine and anyway, most alleged perpetrators are uncaught, so the data is extremely partial (Committee of Economy, 2018; also: State comptroller, 2016; Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016). Further, farmers who allow others to use their leased lands – even when being threatened – are breaking their contract with the state and thus avoid reporting crimes (New Guardian, interview).2 The critiques from both post-nationalist (post-Zionist) (Foier, 2018) and neoliberal (Moav, 2018) publicists on their campaign against agricultural terror reveal the new social reality that Jewish farmers in Israel face, in which their plight is ignored. Taking an alternative view of how agricultural terrorism is framed strategically, I analyze it as a pragmatic, political framing. As Hassanein argued regarding crime in the Arab society: “Only when political aspects are manifestly involved – coded in Israel as ‘security,’ ‘terrorism’ or ‘nationalism’ – do matters of crime and justice become public issues and open to ideological dispute” (2016: 379). Farmers have identified the Arab-nationalist aspect behind the crime (even if relatively small in significance) and use it to frame the issue, in hopes that it will help them receive direly needed publicpolitical attention. Notably, they are not only vulnerable to crime and receive no satisfactory solution from enforcement agencies, but also the market denies them an alternative solution by refusing insurance coverage. The distress is tangible and must be addressed politically, yet they fail to draw attention without turning to the code words that interest the public agenda of today's Israeli mainstream. This notion is described well in statements made by a few members of parliament at a parliamentary committee meeting. For example, “[only] when it will be

the conclusions of the special governmental Orr Committee (Orr, 2003) that was appointed after nationalist riots of Israeli-Arab citizens in 2000 and clashes with the police. The committee found that the state neglected to provide the Arab public with essential services and budgets, which caused a drift towards criminal and nationalist (anti-Israeli) activities. Professional and academic writers, both pro- and post/antiZionist, agree that the high Arab criminality is a negative outcome (symptom) of the Jewish-Arab conflict, but this does not mean they believe it serves a function within this conflict. Conversely, a widening public-political discourse reverses the post-colonial narrative, arguing that criminal activity – particularly in agriculture – is an Arab-nationalist strategy against Zionism and Israel. As such, it is widely referred to as “agricultural terrorism.” 6. Crime or terrorism? During the 1990s, agricultural crime erupted in mass scale, particularly across the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank, which was then relatively open, enabling Palestinians to infiltrate into Israel. The regions' farmers experienced the crime wave as “unbearable,” and mobilized to form civic associations to protest and demand higher budgets for enforcement and patrols. Gal (1998) was the only researcher to document the discontent and anxiety, the disappointment from the government's impotent counter-measures, and the fear that terror attacks would follow the routine, daily infiltrations into the fields. He found that rural settlements near the Green Line experienced much more crime than distant ones, that the crime led farmers to abandon their lands, and even their communities. Agricultural crime has escalated over the years, although police data show some periods of relative reduction, at least in reported crime (for example, 18% between 2006 and 2007 [Tal, 2007], and 54% between 2016 and 2017 [Knesset, 2018]). Rough police estimates evaluate the overall yearly economic damage from agricultural crime at NIS 1.2 billion (Knesset, 2018), concentrated mostly in the north and to a lesser degree in the south of Israel (these are peripheral areas where most agricultural activity is concentrated, but also most of the Arab population). When police files are opened, 85–95% of them are closed without suspects being prosecuted. Out of the prosecutions, most end without convictions, meaning that approximately 1% of reported crimes are solved. These numbers are even more negligible when considering the estimation that some 80% of agricultural crimes remain unreported by farmers (Tal, 2007; Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016). Consider the example of Retamim, mentioned above, which neighbors the informal and impoverished Arab-Bedouin village Bir-Hadaj (whose residents are Israeli citizens), which is not near the Green Line. Retamim regularly faced sabotage of crops and equipment, not merely for economic reasons, but as a symbolic acts by outraged Bedouin youngsters who wished to protest the authorities' demolition of illegally built houses in their settlement. They identified the Zionist-Jewish farmers with the state apparatus, and hoped that terrorizing them would transmit a message of resistance. Retamim erected a perimeter fence and dug a moat around its fields, but the Bedouin cracked the barrier, and the police failed to respond, causing discontent among Retamim's inhabitants at their inability to protect them (Cohen, 2015; Retamim resident, interview). Such disappointment with the police's work is widespread among farmers (State comptroller, 2016). Use of “agricultural terrorism” as a concept expanded during the last decade. The term is embraced by farmers, their associations, and political representatives – from both left- and right-wing Zionist parties, and by the mainstream media (e.g., Baruch, 2008). Officially, unlike agricultural crime that is motivated by economic incentives, agricultural terrorism, also known as “nationalist agricultural crime” is motivated by a political agenda (Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016). In practice, the term is used narratively. This narrative moves between reference to the fear imposed on farmers by bold theft and sabotage, and a more precise reference to other types of terrorism that are meant to drive the

2 The police face many difficulties in obtaining reliable data – most victims don't report; nationalist intention is hard to identify; there is no data for unreported and unsolved cases; deficient coordination between agencies in charge of gathering the data, etc. (State comptroller, 2016; Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016).

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as parliament member Ahmed Tibi who illustrated Dromi as a “Southern John Wayne” and explained: “The judge's decision is a direct outcome of the public campaign and the media enrolment, making Dromi a cultural hero and legitimizing his act […] The [Arab] Bedouin suffer of exclusion, marginalization, lack of allocation of resources, and expropriation of lands – some become vast farmsteads [for Jews]” (in: Tibi, 2007). In his accusation, the Jewish farmers are constructed as the offenders, encroaching on the Arabs' lands by use of lethal force. The criminal aspect of the Arab offenders and the farmers' distress are ignored as irrelevant. This portrays the mirror-like framing processes on both sides. Like the Jewish farmers, the Arabs see themselves as victims in need of protection from nationally inspired colonial farmers and cry against their neglect by the state. The Dromi law rearranged the legal space to enable better deterrence but notably, this deterrence is by the farmers themselves and not by state agencies. Farmers feel disappointed (and even betrayed) by the state, but nonetheless have begun to internalize the new, neoliberal logic of state withdrawal and individual self-help. This logic commands the privatization and transfer of ever more services, including security, to the private market, making them the responsibility of individuals, and –when necessary – civil society (see Busch, 2010; Evans et al., 2005; Goldstein, 2005). Indeed, classical Socialist (and semi-Socialist) Zionism once pushed pioneers to the frontier to act as civic agents, acting on a voluntary basis, but the overarching intention was to lay the foundation for a sovereign centralized state. The current post-Socialist movement leads the state and legal structure to create a post-sovereign frontier with farmers acting as civil society – as an aim, not a means. The logic of privatization is best reflected in the rise of the civic organization The New Guardian (Hashomer Hahadash). It started as a grassroots initiative of Yoel Zilberman, the son of a cattle farmer who suffered severe and continuous criminal offenses, from the theft of cattle and machinery to sabotage of fences. The assumed intention behind these offenses was to drive him off the land (New Guardian employees, interview). Zilberman placed a small trailer on a hill in the pasture, started guarding and patrolling the area together with his friends, routinely chasing criminals away. The rumor spread and numerous volunteers signed up to help. The popular initiative was quickly institutionalized as a formal NGO (Amuta) and began assigning volunteer guardians to aid different Jewish farmers (mainly cattle farmers) who suffered from crime and nearly forfeited their lands. It was named after the mythical Guardian (Hashomer) movement that had a key role in pre-state agricultural settlements of classical Zionism. Within a short period, the New Guardian provided volunteers to farmers across Israel and became the leader of the campaign against agricultural terrorism. Under the flag of combatting terrorism, Zionist-inspired donors, from Israel and abroad, channeled large donations, and the state added “matching” budgets. It created a program for hundreds of students who, in return for a generous scholarship, patrol on a monthly basis and participate in work camps, where they help farmers build fences and do other kinds of essential farm work. The organization today operates thousands of volunteers and youth groups at multiple agricultural sites throughout Israel, creating significant change in patterns of theft and vandalism that have previously sustained for decades at those locations (New Guardian, 2018; New Guardian employees, interview). The state started supporting the organization with an allocation of NIS 5 million in 2011, which increased to NIS 27 million by 2016 (Government of Israel, 2011; Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016). Retamim (see above) is an example of a site aided by The New Guardian, which “adopted” the village and a nearby farmstead, building outposts to prevent infiltration and sabotage. The outposts are manned a few days a week, by sympathetic volunteers and students from the nearby “student village” Ayalim, founded by another Zionist association that aims to aid peripheral communities (New Guardian, interview). The New Guardian also became the prime referent for journalists covering the issue of agricultural terrorism. It collects data, initiates studies, arranges tours for politicians and publicists, and

termed terrorism […] it will be treated accordingly” (Mualem, in Committee of Economy, 2018). In the following analysis, the answer to the question “crime-or-terrorism?” is considered irrelevant. It is probably the case (as both sides would agree) that a certain portion of crimes, even if a small one, is motivated by nationalist aspirations. It can also be argued that some level of nationalist resentment and hope to banish Jews from the land is behind many of the crimes, even if the economic aspect is dominant. This makes sense if we compare the terrorism frame with the (wellestablished) postcolonial claim that Arab farmers in Israel and the West Bank face attempts to colonize their lands by Zionist agents. These attempts take the form of both state expropriation and agricultural takeover, for example, by Jewish farmsteads that encroach on the traditional herding territories of Bedouin pastoralists (see Yiftachel, 2009). While most of the Jewish farmers act on the basis of economic motivations, some of them are sympathetic to the Zionist ideology that postcolonialists criticize. The argument (frame) of “colonization” can thus be used to describe fairly similar patterns of nationally-motivated (agricultural) struggle over lands by both Jews and Arabs. Either way, it is almost impossible to strictly define this vague and fluid phenomenon in strictly separate terms – economic/nationalist (criminal/terrorist). Any strict use of the term, without acknowledging its vague nature is either ignorant of its complexity or politically motivated. Thus, it would be better to consider the use/non-use of agricultural terrorism concept as a political framing, rising out of specific needs, within a specific political-economic context. 7. Internalizing privatization The ongoing agricultural terrorism campaign not only leverages the farmers' political negotiation for state budgets (e.g., for new policing units and technologies) and subsidies (e.g., to extend insurance) (Committee on the Economy, 2018; Knesset, 2018) but has several additional, less visible, aims. In multiple arenas, this campaign strives to reshape the law and the law-enforcement system to allow improved protection against crime/terrorism in the context of state withdrawal. During the last two decades, the agricultural lobby has managed to pass significant legislative amendments to the criminal law, which frame the theft of agricultural goods or equipment as a felony that should be treated more severely than other kinds of theft. The lobby has managed to increase the punishment and widen the scope of the law (Yehimovich-Cohen, 2016; e.g., Knesset, 2016). The most publicized legislation is referred to as “The Dromi Law,” after the farmer Shay Dromi, who was given formal approval to maintain a “lone farmstead” near the Green Line. In the 1980s, this was considered a solution that would mitigate crime and smuggling across the line. Like many other livestock farmers, especially in this area, Dromi experienced routine offenses on his ranch, causing him distress and nearly ruining him financially. He often found the police indifferent to his plight. Other state agencies also did little, if anything, to help him. One night in 2007, he spotted four Arab thieves in the ranch yard and shot at them, killing one and injuring another (District Court of Be'er-Sheva, 2009). When he was arrested and tried for misuse of lethal violence (District Court of Be'er-Sheva, 2009), the incident raised widespread outrage among Jewish farmers. In the following months, various civic associations mobilized to protest the arrest, and repeatedly compared agricultural crime to terrorism. Buoyed by the wave of popular support, with the aid of parliament members, new legislation was passed which broadened the definition of legally-justified self-defense to include trespassing on agricultural property. In light of this, Dromi was acquitted (Baruch, 2007; Izenberg, 2008; YehomovichCohen, 2016; Dromi, interview). Noteworthy, though not the article's focus, is that the Arab public had no meaningful representation in the public debate around the incident, although the national dimension of the issue seemed to be clear to all. Some Arab political leaders protested against the outcome, such 5

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and reasserting the importance of the agricultural vanguard to the nation. The framing of agricultural terrorism receives here its ultimate and most important meaning: to portray the offense committed against individual farmers as an offense committed against the Jewish nation as a whole. A parliament member, prominent in the agricultural lobby, stated, “Terrorism should not be measured according to intentions [the nationalist motivation of the Arab offenders], but according to results …. It is nationalist terrorism because it hurts national goals” (Committee of the Interior, 2018). While conflating agriculture with national goals, he denies that the subjectivity of the Arab alleged criminal/terrorist has any relevance. What matters to the national interest is that the farmer – the bodily manifestation of the nation on the land – might not use the land any longer, meaning, it will be relinquished to the enemy. The farmers are thus again the bold, Zionist avant-garde, pioneers who confidently (re-)take the mission to guard the nation's land with their life, tears, and sweat – not an easy mission to accept, but one holding the promise of material aid and much more, including regaining the social prestige that has been lost to post-nationalist trends.

lobbies at government committees to pass legislation and allocate budgets (Committee of Economy, 2018). Lastly, it promotes partnerships between volunteers and the police and Border Patrol in patrolling and ambushing criminals, on foot, or using jeeps, motorbikes, and drones (New Guardian, 2018). The New Guardian reflects the fundamental change of (frustrated) farmers, who internalized the fact that they would have to provide for themselves a growing list of services that were once the exclusive role of the state. This self-help can manifest in completely privatized manner, in cooperation between the state and civil society, or in the form of civic organizations (partly sponsored by the state). In any case, the new, neoliberal logic is evident. 8. Guarding the nation's lands Classical Zionist ideology correctly considered the ownership and use of land by Jews as a method to create “facts on the ground,” claim national sovereign rights over vast regions. Today, after formal sovereignty has been fully achieved, farmers lost their vanguard position and the social prestige tied to it. The framing of crime as terror has the effect of (re-) framing farmers as warriors and pioneers and agricultural space as a frontier. It is a reassertion of “classical” Zionist categories that framed them as the bold guardians of the nation's lands. In the literature, Gal (1998) is the first (and only) scholar to reflect the opinion of state officials about farmers abandoning lands near the Green Line under the crime's pressure. The farmers warned that the Green Line would creep inwards at the expanse of national lands, through ArabPalestinian encroachment with herding and later with cultivation. Although not stating it explicitly, he overlaid agricultural crime with terrorism and Palestinian nationalism. This “primordial” fear of the potential Arabization of already “redeemed” lands remains dominant and constant in the ever-changing Zionist worldviews and myths. Agricultural terrorism is thus conceived of as a national threat, and farmers are the ones resisting it, as a parliament member stated: “Our roots in the ground, our firm hold guarantee true Zionism, spreading across Israel – its agriculture” (Yalin, in Committee of Economy, 2018; see also Knesset, 1992). The way this ignites the Zionist imagination and harnesses political support is evident in the responses to the Dromi incident. Protestors gathered spontaneously or through civil society organizations, declared, “We are all Shai Dromi,” and hundreds went to his farm to help with the farm work, plant trees (a symbolic ritual of Zionism), and guard. The fact that Dromi did not see the incident as a positive one (Dromi, interview), mattered very little to the campaign leaders. It soon became a mythical moment, and Dromi the man became Dromi the symbol. He was framed as a heroic figure, dedicated to protecting the nation's lands (e.g., Bershakovski, 2007; Ma'ariv, 2007; Shoval, 2007). The evolution of The New Guardian also reveals the (re-)framing of Zionist-agricultural values. The organization has gradually expanded its role, from the organization of guards to leading a youth movement. The students, besides guarding, participate in annual camps and workshops, where they are educated in Zionist-agricultural values. In addition, it operates special programs for high school graduates (mekhinot) to prepare them for military service while aiding farmers and learning agricultural professions. Recently, a special high school was opened as well (New Guardian, 2018; New Guardian, interview). The organization depicts its goals as a triangle with three key points: “Land-Aid-Legacy,” meaning, connecting the people to its land through solidarity and help, and strengthening (classical) Zionist values (New Guardian, 2018). The website states: “Our mission: guarding the state's land by action and learning … guard it ourselves with agriculture and afforestation, strengthening Israeli society's connection to its land, through studies and educational initiatives” (New Guardian, 2018). The two cases presented above are only anecdotes, though important ones, for the continuous efforts of the Jewish agricultural sector to promote an ideological educational campaign. At its heart it is reestablishing the ‘broken’ connections between Zionism and agriculture,

9. Discussion and conclusions Jewish farmers in neo-liberalizing Israel – like other farmers in developed countries -are exposed to increased risk, the pressure of competition, state withdrawal from service delivery, the cessation of subsidies and other benefits, and the deterioration of their traditional social prestige (e.g., Sofer and Applebaum, 2006). While agriculture as a whole is growing, many farmers are experiencing economic and social distress. They mobilize to counter these trends but are caught in the tension between the socialist-nationalist past and the post-socialist, post-nationalist present. The spread of agricultural crime is one severe manifestation of the current challenges that they must confront in the political realm, now that neither the market nor the neoliberal-izing state provide them with satisfactory solutions. The article focused on how agricultural crime is politically framed as agricultural terrorism. This frame has some grounding in reality, but the basis is limited and does not adequately explain the entire phenomenon (economic factors are significantly more dominant than nationalist factors in motivating the offenses). It is just one trajectory among many in the political economy of (Jewish) agriculture in Israel. With that, it portrays a clear picture of the material, social, and cultural forces at hand. Though crime/terrorism poses a significant material threat to farmers, it is also their path to a solution. As they lost legitimacy and the ability to attract state support and social prestige, the political (re-) framing of them as warriors against nationalist terrorism is reconstructing their position. The image of their age-old nemesis meaning, the Arab encroacher on the nation's land, which they hold in trust, was resurrected to threaten them again - has potent social power in the Jewish-Zionist discourse. The farmers construct themselves as fighting this Arab nemesis, while actually embracing his presenceince this nemesis has become their raison d'être. As long as they struggle against him, their persistence is charged with symbolic meaning of guarding the nation's lands. Using Sandberg's (2005) convergence of discourse analysis with framing theory, this case portrays how existing discursive structures both impose limits and provide opportunities for mobilization: contesting the neoliberal hegemony through socialist discourse is futile, but utilizing nationalist emotions and ideologies to (re-)frame state intervention in agriculture is a far more effective way. Framing and discourse analysis are insufficient, however, for grasping the scope of this mobilization. As Dekel et al. (2019) show, based on Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith (1991), to shape state policies a movement must also act in all dimensions of space: legal, symbolic, and material. During early Zionism, Jewish farmers created “facts on the ground” in the frontier, a material presence that was charged with symbolic meanings, which later won them national sovereignty over these spaces. Today, after sovereignty has been achieved, farmers, have 6

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supports and safety nets. While liberalization widens socio-economic gaps, discontent, and alienation between the groups, comprehensive and inclusive state intervention can begin to narrow the gaps.

reversed the dynamic, and are (re-)framing their symbolic and legal space as a frontier, a place of pioneering and heroism, where the state has no enduring “‘monopoly over violence’” (see Baretta and Markoff, 1978). Frontierizing agricultural spaces gives a new-old symbolic meaning to their material presence in space; they are again facts on the ground. However, it is notable that this is no longer a pro-sovereignty act but rather one of post-sovereignty, where policing and guarding are privatized, and conducted by civil society. Neoliberal logic penetrates the reality of agriculture, and farmers (although reluctantly, and with great disappointment) internalize it and accordingly make arrangements for it to serve their needs. They are doing this by restructuring the law to allow practical self-protection by lethal means (Dromi law), organizing civic associations, and recruiting volunteers for guarding missions (The New Guardian). Shaping the materiality of agricultural spaces proves their determinacy and heroism, convincing the state to provide more support, albeit in a neoliberal manner using state-civil society partnerships. This shows that policy debates are never detached from the concrete material reality that agricultural movements address. With this, we can scrutinize the underlying motivations behind the mobilization, beyond its “purely” economic aspects, using Bourdieu (1986) and Atkinson (2015). For them, “class” is a fluid category, shaped not only by the accumulation of economic capital, but also by the parallel accumulation of social and cultural capital. These forms of capital are interchangeable and are always measured according to the social recognition of them as valuable, as possessing symbolic capital. Liberalization exposes farmers to growing risks to their economic capital, and the deterioration the values that were tied to their profession, values, and way of life (cultural capital). As a response, they turn to the two assets they still possess and continue to rebuild: social capital, manifested in established networks and associations (the agricultural lobby) and newly established civic organizations (The New Guardian); and cultural capital, the ethos (and myth) of agriculture within the Zionist discourse which they embody in their way of life and their spaces. Both of these allow them to recruit public recognition of farmers' importance and grant them prestige as ideological pioneers (symbolic capital). This gain is both the end and the means. Using accumulated symbolic capital, they can further master political influence when struggling for state protection, subsidies, and new legislation, and so forth. The agricultural terrorism frame is simultaneously a genuine cry of distress, an instrument to win practical, material support against it, and an attempt to regain recognition from the society in which the farmers live. As presented above, the struggle to accumulate these various forms of capital, entrench the above frames in public-political discourse, and produce the needed spaces is ongoing. Farmers have gained significant achievements in their mobilization, from new legislation and recruiting volunteers, to improved enforcement and state support (for example, budgeting The New Guardian). But they still find the political-economic context far from satisfying, having that neoliberal discourse and policy are still entrenched and agricultural crime/terrorism is still on the rise. Presumably, this double movement (see Carroll, 2015) will continue for the foreseeable future, without a clear-cut result. Embracing an empathic view of their plight, I conclude that it is crucial to grasp the broad political-economic context of economic risk, violence, and identity crisis that is generative of the mobilization against agricultural terrorism. Whether it is genuinely terrorism or just a politically-driven exaggeration (the facts differ in each particular case), policymakers should consider the underlying distress and discontent, and act to mitigate it. An opposite demand – for example, saying that farmers must suffer the full potential damage of liberalized markets without addressing nationalism as a potential cure – can be expected to breed a more radical counter-response, economic crisis, and political strife. State intervention is direly needed to ensure better enforcement, economic support and safety nets for farmers. It is also needed to support the Arab society that turns to agricultural crime/ terrorism, to a high degree, because it sorely lacks these state economic

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